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MJD 4/19/2013

File Folder US - SOVIET SUMMIT: NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1987 (8)

FOIA

F02-073/5

Box Number RAC BOX 1

COLLINS

88

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
157632	MEMO	FRITZ ERMARTH TO GENRAL POWELL RE TALKERS	1	11/27/1987	B1
157633	TALKING POINTS	FOR CABINET MEETING	3	ND	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 27, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: JAMES A. KELLY *JK*
SUBJECT: Responses for Written Presidential Interview

At Tab A are responses drafted by the Department of State to written questions from five Asian and Pacific journals. Relevant NSC staffers have reviewed the responses for policy and accuracy, and they are now ready for submission to the Chief-of-Staff through the press office. The press office will incorporate pen-and-ink changes into the correct format.

DP for Dan Howard, *DP for* Marybel Batjer, *DP for* Peter Rodman, *DP for* Fritz Ermarth, *DP for* Steven Steiner, Douglas Paal *DP for* and Richard Childress concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Paul Stevens to send a memorandum (Tab I) to Dan Howard, submitting the written responses at Tab A to Rhett Dawson for White House staff approval.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memo Stevens/Howard
Tab A	Responses for Asian and Pacific journals
Tab B	Background material

Prepared by:
Douglas H. Paal

2

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B
I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR DAN HOWARD
White House Press Office

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: Responses for Written Presidential Interview

At Tab A are Presidential draft responses to questions from five Asian journals. Prepared by the Department of State, the responses were edited and cleared by the NSC staff. They are now ready for submission to the Chief-of-Staff's office after reformatting in your office.

Attachment

Tab A Responses for Written Presidential Interview

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A

Q 1: Do you envisage an expansion of the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how will the U.S. help ensure stability, security and prosperity in the region?

A: The nations of East Asia are becoming increasingly prosperous and politically stable. This is in our interest as well as theirs, and our aim is to work with the region's nations as partners in promoting prosperity and stability.

All partnerships require a balancing of benefits and burdens. For example, U.S. diplomatic efforts and military presence contribute directly to the region's peace and stability, which in turn foster economic prosperity. We look to our East Asian allies to share with us this mutually beneficial burden according to their means. Of course, we will maintain our commitments to defend their security.

Likewise, East Asia's prosperity depends significantly on continuing the liberal world trading system we and our trading partners have enjoyed for the last twenty years. But there are threats appearing to this system. Some of our major trading partners still maintain restrictive trade policies, and there is rising protectionist sentiment in the U.S. My efforts to resist this protectionist pressure will succeed only so long as our major trading partners take some steps themselves toward structural adjustment of their economies. These steps include strengthening domestic demand, dismantling trade barriers that discourage U.S. exports, and adopting exchange rate policies that reflect their economies' underlying strength.

I am confident your readers recognize that working together to keep the peace and promote everyone's prosperity benefits all of us. The United States has been active on the East Asian scene for more than 100 years, and we look forward to continuing our productive cooperation with friends and allies in the region.

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2. The newly appointed Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Noboru Takeshita, plans to come to Washington in January 1988 to have his first summit meeting with you. In view of the ongoing serious bilateral problems confronting our two nations, what would you expect out of that January meeting? And what kind of feeling do you have toward a new Japanese Prime Minister who has been almost unknown to the Western World?

A: First, I am very pleased that Prime Minister Takeshita has accepted my invitation to visit Washington. I look forward to seeing him again, this time in his new capacity. I recall that ~~the last time I saw him was~~ ^{we met} in January 1986, when he was visiting the United States to receive an honorary doctorate from Columbia University, and ~~at~~ ^{we met again at the} Tokyo Economic Summit, when Mr. Takeshita was Finance Minister.

To answer your second question first, I would like to point out that people who are "almost unknown to the Western World" do not normally meet with Western heads of state and receive honorary degrees from leading Western universities. I have known the Prime Minister for some time now, and I look forward to getting to know him ~~even~~ better in his new position.

I think that what we can all expect to come out of the January meeting is a reaffirmation of the importance of US-Japan relations, not only to our two countries but to the world, and a renewed commitment to pursue our many common interests and tackle our bilateral problems in the spirit of cooperation.

changes in pen above
J. Kelly 11-27-87

Answer to Question from Yomiuri Shimbun

Q: You have said that this INF agreement and the progress made towards a strategic arms reduction treaty would not have been possible without the strategic defense initiative. Do you also think it would have been possible without the change in the Soviet leadership? Realistically, what are the chances of reaching an agreement on strategic nuclear forces, reducing them by 50 per cent by next spring?

A: The prospective INF Treaty -- the first agreement in history actually to reduce, not simply limit, offensive nuclear weapons -- is a direct result of U.S. and Allied unity and steadfastness in the face of unilateral Soviet SS-20 deployments. It is inconceivable that ^{the}~~that~~ Soviets would have considered eliminating their SS-20s had the U.S. not followed through with its deployments of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. In addition, it is probably no coincidence that Soviet willingness to reenter the Geneva ^{nuclear arms} ~~on strategic offensive reductions~~ negotiations occurred subsequent to my declaration of our intent to pursue the SDI ~~research~~ program.

I cannot speculate on whether the change in Soviet leadership has affected the course of our negotiations, ~~though~~ ^{though} ~~Soviet foreign policy seems generally to have been more active since Mr. Gorbachev became General Secretary.~~

We have made considerable progress ^{toward agreement on} ~~in bringing the Soviets~~ to ~~accept~~ our proposals to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals by 50%. We believe such an agreement can be concluded next year if the Soviets ~~are now willing to~~ apply themselves with the same seriousness as the U.S., and if they abandon their effort to hold it hostage to crippling restrictions on our Strategic Defense Initiative.

PHILIPPINES QUESTION FOR INTERVIEW WITH YOMIURI SHIMBUN

Q: The Congress mandates cutting off aid if there is a coup in Manila. Would you accept that such a cut-off include compensation for the bases in the Philippines?

A: We fully support President Aquino and the Government she heads. We are unalterably opposed to any attempts to destabilize her government. The U.S. must cut off foreign assistance to any country whose duly elected leader is overthrown by a military coup. This is a matter of law. This provision of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1987 came into effect in the case of Fiji this year. Foreign Assistance money rendered as part of our "best efforts" pledge for the Philippines is covered under this act. ✓

Q: At the forthcoming review of the Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines, Manila is certain to ask for a much larger compensation than currently allowed. In view of the shrinking foreign aid budget, how would you accommodate such a request?

A: The forthcoming review of the Military Bases Agreement will offer us the chance to go over security as well as economic aspects of the agreement. Both sides are well aware of the severe pressures on the U.S. foreign assistance budget. Nevertheless I am confident that in the review, as well as in the renegotiation which will follow the review and address the post-1991 period, we can work out arrangements which will be in our two countries' mutual interests.

Q. Some in Congress and elsewhere are calling for the United States to scale down its armed forces strength in Japan and South Korea, as retaliation for their refusal to open their markets more to exports from the U.S. and elsewhere. Do you believe this would be an appropriate response to East Asian protectionism if other means of persuasion fail?

A. Successive administrations have maintained our military presence in Japan and Korea because our mutual security interests are served by keeping a credible deterrent against aggression in Northeast Asia. *It is important to keep security interests in mind, and separate from deterrence* Thus, it would not be in our national interest to ^{reduce} ~~phase out~~ our military strength in Japan ^{for any reason, including as} ~~and~~ South Korea ^{or} in retaliation for difficulties in opening markets in those countries. We will, of course, continue to seek further opening of markets in Japan and South Korea. After all, open markets are also in our mutual interest -- they are necessary to preserve the world's free trade system -- and are a pillar of our strength.

Q 6: What kind of steps would you take to counterbalance Soviet initiatives in the Pacific region? Do you think there is scope to renegotiate mutual reductions of armed force strengths in East Asia with the Soviet Union, as proposed in Europe?

A: The Soviet Union's interest in the Pacific region has waxed and waned through history. Following a period of neglect under General Secretary Brezhnev and his immediate successors, the Soviets apparently have decided again to pay attention to this important area, one in which the United States has been actively engaged for more than 100 years. Unlike the United States, however, which has extensive trade, investment, cultural, political, and military links with almost all the countries of the Pacific, the Soviets need to create reasons to become involved. In the absence of solid relationships in most of the region, it is perhaps understandable that the Soviets have to fall back on high-sounding rhetoric and vague generalities; but that kind of thing does not meet the concrete and pressing needs of the region.

The United States and most Asian nations are firmly in agreement about what needs to be done on a large number of real issues like getting Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, stopping Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, stopping the Soviet buildup of military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, encouraging North Korea to talk sensibly to the South Koreans to reduce tensions on the Peninsula, ~~and~~ resolving the Northern Territories dispute with Japan. The Soviets already know that they can do a great deal for peace and stability in Asia by resolving these important, tangible problems; and we take almost every opportunity to remind them of that. Moreover, the United States is working hand-in-glove with almost every country in Asia and the Pacific on real-world issues like economic development, collective security, the almost universal longing for greater democracy, and growth of trade in free market conditions. We think that real ^{the} contributions to human welfare beat lofty phrases every time.

and humanitarian issues.

and reducing the military threat to China

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Q 7: Why did you not sign the protocols to the SPNFZ Treaty? Will you reconsider your decision, as the House of Representatives requested last month?

safely

A: A world free of nuclear weapons would be a much less frightened world, and I think that nothing is more important than working to make that goal a reality. But achieving that goal demands a massive amount of work which cannot be short-circuited. Nuclear free zone treaties are at their best when they provide a bulwark against nuclear proliferation, as might be the case in South Asia or Latin America, for example. Where that is not the case, however, and I think that the South Pacific is not such a case, we have to be a little careful about encouraging growth of the notion that writing a treaty that would wall off a portion of the world from nuclear weapons somehow makes a contribution to world peace. It might do exactly the opposite.

nuclear age

Since the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1949, the world has been saved from nuclear warfare ^{-- and indeed from major conventional aggression} ~~(only)~~ by the credible threat of the western nuclear powers to use ~~(their own)~~ ^{all means necessary to defend themselves against aggression.} ~~nuclear weapons if necessary against the Soviet Union~~. This is how deterrence works. Any thing that may ~~threaten nuclear~~ ^{weaken} deterrence does a disservice to the cause of world peace because it is on deterrence that world peace since the start of the ~~Cold War~~ ^{the spread} has been based. ~~If the idea of nuclear free zones starts to spread around the world, the job of maintaining deterrence becomes much harder. For countries like the United States because our open system of government makes us comply with our treaty commitments.]~~ Can make

In regard to the resolution that has passed the House of Representatives, if it becomes a "sense of the Congress" resolution, of course we will give it careful consideration when it arrives here. From what I have said about nuclear free zones in general, however, it should be apparent that our reconsideration of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone issue is unlikely, in current circumstances, to produce a change of our policy.

Q 8: What do you think is the prospect for the democratization of South Korea? How will this affect the success of the Seoul Olympics in 1988?

A: Korea is about to hold its first direct presidential elections in well over a decade. The campaign is being contested vigorously. This is a sign, I think, of a new, more open political system. Koreans have shown they are a "can-do" people -- look at their economic achievement. I believe they will be equally successful in their efforts ~~to "democratize" their politics.~~ *at democratic political development.*

As for the Olympics, the Koreans are working hard to make the games a success. I am sure they will be. We hope that all the nations of the world will attend and make the games the international celebration they should be.

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
November 24, 1987

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Responses for Written Presidential Interview

Attached are the proposed responses to written questions submitted to the President by five Asian and Pacific publications.


Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab A: Proposed answers
Tab B: Green-Levitsky memorandum of November 20, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 20, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State


SUBJECT: Request for a Draft Response for a Written
Presidential Interview

The White House has agreed to provide Presidential responses to written questions from five Asian and Pacific journals in advance of the US-USSR summit. The eight questions are at Tab A. The NSC requests that the Department of State provide written answers to the questions by noon, Tuesday, November 24.


Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Questions from Asian and Pacific journals



Received in
871120-2310
A Daniel

The Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo)

Call Doug Paal

16

WASHINGTON BUREAU
NATIONAL PRESS BLDG.
SUITE 802
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20045

Telephone: (202) 783-0363
783-0186

QUESTIONS FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM The Yomiuri Shimbun
The Far Eastern Economic Review
The Hankook Ilbo
The Melbourne Age
The Singapore Straits Times

1. There has been a lot of talk about the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region to the United States. Yet, the U.S. is in dispute with friendly countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Honk Kong and Singapore over trade matters. The U.S. also wants Japan to contribute more for the defense of the region. Despite these problems, do you envisage an expansion of the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how will the United States go about helping to ensure the political stability, strategic security and economic well-being of the region?
2. The newly appointed Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Noboru Takeshita, plans to come to Washington in January, 1988 to have his first summit meeting with you. In view of the ongoing serious bilateral problems confronting our two nations, what would you expect out of that January meeting? And what kind of feeling do you have toward a new Japanese Prime Minister who has been almost unknown to the Western world?
3. You have said that this INF agreement and the progress made towards a strategic arms reduction treaty would not have been without the strategic defense initiative. Do you also think it would have been possible without the change in the Soviet leadership? Realistically, what are the chances of reaching an agreement on strategic nuclear forces, reducing them by 50 per cent by next spring?
4. The Congress mandates cutting off aid if there is a coup in Manila. Would you accept that such a cut-off include compensation for the bases in the Philippines? At the forthcoming review of the military base agreement with the Philippines, Manila is certain to ask for a much larger compensation than currently allowed. In view of the shrinking foreign aid budget, how would you accomodate such a request?
5. Some in Congress and elsewhere are calling for the United States to scale down its armed forces strength in Japan and South Korea, as retaliation for their refusal to open their markets more to exports from the U.S. and elsewhere. Do you believe this would be an appropriate response to East Asian protectionism if other means of persuasion fail?

THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN

6. There is a growing suspicion in Asia that after reaching an arms control agreement with the United States, the Soviet Union's next move, particularly in 1988, will be to increase her influence in the Asia-Pacific region by using such attractive public relations schemes as "The Asian Comprehensive Security Concept." As President of the United States, which has a great stake in the Pacific region, what kind of steps would you take to counter-balance this Soviet initiative? And do you think there is scope to negotiate mutual reductions on armed force strengths in East Asia with the Soviet Union, as proposed in Europe?

7. You have spoken eloquently of your desire to see a nuclear-free world. Why then have you refused to help this become reality by signing the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, which covers the most peaceful part of the world, and was carefully drafted to accommodate American interests and uphold the freedom of the seas? Will you reconsider your decision, as the House of Representatives requested last month by a bipartisan vote?

8. You are becoming more confident that the world is becoming increasingly democratized. In South Korea, the campaign to elect the next President is ongoing with increasing vigor. What do you think is the prospect for the democratization of South Korea, and how do you believe this process will affect the success of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988?

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157632 MEMO

1 11/27/1987 B1

FRITZ ERMARTH TO GENRAL POWELL RE
TALKERS

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1. A.Bessmertnykh	-	1207/09
2. V.Kryuchkov	-	1402/04
3. M.Dokuchaev	-	1215/17
4. V.Aleynikov	-	1410
5. E.Suvorov	-	1401
6. K.Bulanov	-	1421
7. V.Velichko	-	1408
8. Y.Boboshko	-	1406
9. G.Repetilo	-	1219
10. V.Pestov	-	1223
11. N.Balykovsky	-	1206
12. Y.Lanin	-	1202
13. O.Golov	-	1221
14. N.Bukhanisty	-	1221
15. A.Rybkin	-	1525
16. S.Kolbasov	-	1526
17. V.Goryachev	-	1515
18. V.Kirillov	-	1208
19. V.Mamakin	-	1210
20. A.Udod	-	1216
21. Y.Bushuev	-	1423
22. V.Feduleev	-	1218
23. O.Klimov	-	1218
24. M.Gusakov	-	1502
25. V. ^I Netylev	-	1502
26. M.Titkov	-	1416
27. V.Sobkin	-	1423
28. V.Zaitzev	-	1211~

29.	V.Kuznetsov	-	1211
30.	O.Matyuchev	-	1201
31.	A.Tyatechkin	-	802
32.	V.Filippov	-	801
33.	V.Sinyutkin	-	1204
34.	G.Zarubin	-	1203
35.	V.Tulinov	-	1121
36.	D.Lisovolik	-	1111
37.	I.Scherbakov	-	1003
38.	A.Sviridov	-	1002
39.	I.Pakhomov	-	1119
40.	A.Rozanov	-	1029
41.	A.Tarasov	-	1025
42.	V.Novikov	-	1027
43.	A.Davidenko	-	1037
44.	V.Komissarov	-	1037
45.	B.Davydov	-	1022
46.	A.Dedkov	-	1022
47.	Y.Shlyakhtenko	-	1020
48.	S.Barancheev	-	1020
49.	A. ⁶ B roshev	-	1018
50.	V.Sredin	-	1008
51.	A.Kadakin	-	1006

L I S T
of Communications Group
arriving November 27, 1987

1. V.Sazonov	- 816
2. V.Shlykov	- 827
3. S.Lukash	- 827
4. V.Labaznikov	- 825
5. Y.Ratnikov	- 825
6. V.Gorshkov	- 823
7. G.Gorbyshev	- 823
8. A.Kosylin	- 821
9. A.Korotkov	- 821
10. B.Scheglakov	- 819
11. V.Nefedov	- 819
12. Y.Kuzmenko	- 817
13. Y.Odinets	- 817
14. B.Saigin	- 813
15. A.Sergeev	- 813
16. V.Filimonov	- 801
17. A.Barsukov	- 811
18. A.Bezlepkin	- 811