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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** ERMATH, FRITZ: FILES

**Withdrawer**

MJD 4/19/2013

**File Folder** US - SOVIET SUMMIT: NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1987 (12)

**FOIA**

F02-073/5

**Box Number** RAC BOX 1

COLLINS

89

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
157658	MEMO	FRITZ ERMARTH TO COLIN POWELL RE PRESS GUIDANCE <b>R 11/14/2013 NLRRS628</b>	1	12/3/1987	B1
157659	PAPER	RE PRESS GUIDANCE <b>R 11/14/2013 NLRRS628</b>	2	ND	B1
157661	COVERSHEET	RE ATTACHED	1	12/4/1987	B1
157663	DRAFT PAPER	RE SUMMIT	6	12/3/1987	B1
157665	MEMO	COLIN POWELL TO THE PRESIDENT RE SUMMIT <b>R 8/14/2013 NLRRS628</b>	1	12/4/1987	B1
157667	MEMO	WILLIAM WEBSTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE SUMMIT	1	11/24/1987	B1
157669	MEMO	FROM ROBERT GATES RE SUMMIT	4	11/24/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
157672	MEMO	FRITZ ERMARTH TO COLIN POWELL RE DEFECTOR	1	12/5/1987	B1
157674	MEMO	MELVYN LEVITSKY TO COLIN POWELL RE DEFECTOR	2	12/4/1987	B1
157671	MEMO	FRITZ ERMARTH TO COLIN POWELL RE MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT	1	12/3/1987	B1
157675	MEMCON	RE DINNER MEETING	12	12/7/1987	B1
157676	NOTE	FRITZ ERMARTH TO ROBERT GATES RE MEMCON	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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## WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 12/03/87

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ----

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING AND BUDGET

(12/03 6:00 p.m. draft)

ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI		
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GRISCOM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HOBBS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HOOLEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAUER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RANGE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
 POWELL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RISQUE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CRIBB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CRIPPEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CULVAHOUSE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DAWSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DOLAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DONATELLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

## REMARKS:

The attached has been forwarded to the President.

## RESPONSE:

FYI: CLP, JDN, PSS, WHC, MB, JDH, PWR, RB,  
SID, FWC, REL, RDT, WWD.



(Robinson/ARD)  
December 3, 1987  
6:00 p.m.

Received

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: UPCOMING SUMMIT MEETING AND BUDGET  
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1987

My fellow Americans: In a moment I'd like to discuss the coming summit meeting between myself and General Secretary Gorbachev. But first, let me tell you about a pressing domestic matter, the recent budget agreement between our Administration and congressional leaders that will soon go before the full Congress for a vote.

As I've said since I announced it 2 weeks ago, this budget agreement is not perfect. But it happens to be both adequate -- and the best we were able to get. The agreement will cut the Federal deficit by some \$76 billion over the next 2 years and will put a cap on spending for fiscal year 1989. That's a considerable achievement -- and one that reassures the financial markets about the determination and willingness of your leaders here in Washington to get the budget process back under control.

It's important to keep in mind that this agreement preserves our national security and protects vital domestic programs, such as air safety. But perhaps the best aspect of the entire budget agreement is what it doesn't do. You see, it doesn't impose any new across-the-board taxes, and that means it doesn't touch marginal income tax rates, the very heart and soul of economic incentives. So, our tax reforms of 1981 and 1986 will remain in effect, and your income tax rates will stay low -- and in some cases, drop even lower with the beginning of the new year.

What does this mean for the economy as a whole? The answer lies in one word: Growth. After all, it was in 1982, after our Administration's first tax rate cuts had gone into effect, that today's economic expansion began. The current budget agreement will protect your low tax rates -- and keep our economy growing strong. So I urge you to join me in asking Congress to vote "yes" on this budget agreement with all due speed.

Let me turn now to the summit meeting.

The agenda for talks between myself and Mr. Gorbachev will be determined by the four-part agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations that our Administration has always insisted on: Human rights; bilateral relations, in particular, people-to-people contacts; regional conflicts; and arms reductions. I have spoken of this four-part agenda before. But it seems to me that -- especially now -- it needs to be restated.

On human rights, yes, we have seen the Soviet Union release some political prisoners. But thousands more remain in prison and political, religious, and economic oppression remains a solemn concern of the United States. So I will raise human rights forcefully during our meetings -- and it is one of my deepest hopes that during this, his first visit to America, Mr. Gorbachev will have an opportunity to sense something of the dignity and power of human liberty.

People-to-people contacts between our two countries have already been expanded. But I will ask Mr. Gorbachev: Why not more? Why should the people of America and the Soviet Union not

travel as freely to each others' countries as do, for example, the people of America and Western Europe?

On regional conflicts, the peoples of Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia are entitled to free, independent, and democratically-chosen governments. And I will make it unmistakably clear that we view the freedom and independence of Nicaragua -- a country on our very continent -- as vital to our own national security. Regarding Afghanistan, the Soviets assure us of their intention to get out. Well, we will ask them to set a date certain for their withdrawal and talk to the freedom fighters. And I will assure Mr. Gorbachev that the United States will do all it can to help speed a Soviet withdrawal.

On arms reductions, Mr. Gorbachev and I will be able to celebrate a joint achievement, the signing of a treaty completely eliminating an entire class of American and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. You'll be hearing much about the details of this treaty in coming days. For now, permit me to say only that it represents a good bargain, one that completely meets the longstanding goals of the U.S. and our Allies, and advances the interests of peace.

And this brings me to the final thought I'd like to share. Yes, deep, fundamental differences separate us from the Soviets -- differences that center upon our own belief in God and human freedom, differences that we cannot compromise. Yet as we Americans strive to spread freedom through the world, we must also recognize our obligation to ensure the peace; in particular,

to search for areas where America and the Soviet Union can act together to reduce the risk of war. This summit meeting and treaty represent just that -- steps taken together to ensure the peace.

Until next week, thanks for listening and God bless you.



5

1726

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 3, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRITZ ERMARTH  
PETER RODMAN  
JOHN HERBST  
STEVE STEINER  
LISA JAMESON  
JUDYT MANDEL

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *h*

SUBJECT: Possible Summit Material

Attached are materials from Al Weeks I mentioned. Quote looks real good, but not sure there is time to get it into the packages.

Steve, you should be able to make hay on this.

Attachment: 2 Dec Ltr fr Weeks

*[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]*

6

ALBERT L. WEEKS  
37 WASHINGTON SQUARE WEST  
NEW YORK, NY 10011

2 December 1987

LTC Tyrus W. Cobb  
The White House  
Washington

Dear Ty:

Something very important - something that could be used during the summit.

Had you ever heard of Lenin's conversation with Krupskaya around 1918 or so about Soviet development - actually "invention" - of various military means to ensure air-tight defense of the Soviet homeland (presumably, defense from air, ground or sea attack)?

This was before thermonuclear weapons and rocket launchers, to be sure. But it seems possible - or at least it's worth asking members of the Gorbachev Team, if not Mikhail Sergeyevich himself - that successors to Lenin ever since have been trying to develop such an all-sided defense. In any case, we know the Soviets have been working overtime on their own Star Wars (see Special Collection about need to have corresponding defense for each offensive weapon that is developed, and many other quotes about matching offense/defense in Soviet military literature itself).

Attached is the Russian version of Lenin's remarks to Krupskaya (never quoted, to my knowledge, in Soviet military literature, although one or two other Krupskaya-sources Lenin remarks have been); the xerox was made directly from the Soviet volume, N. K. Krupskaya, O Lenine Sbornik Stat'ei, Gosizdat, Moskva, 1960 (pages are indicated on xerox). Arrows indicate relevant passages.

Ty, Your Girl Friday explained why, understandably, you had to cancel your much-expected talk to my large Spotlight on World Crisis NYU group Dec. 1. But she said, after talking to you, that we could surely work something out for Spring Term. The class is always held TUESDAY NOONS, and the Term begins early February. In January, I'll be in touch with your office to work out your appearance - which, as I said, is much anticipated!

Hope the enclosed material is helpful; you might let me know how it is exploited - as I hope it will be.

Sincerely,



Albert L. Weeks

212-425-1443

P.S. Incidentally, I had my publisher, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers hand-deliver a copy of my compendium of Soviet quotes to The White House Library. Hope you know about it and have examined it. Ty, my "military section" is extra long and extra researched, and, too, might prove useful to you at this time.

alw

Н. К. Крусида  
 О Ленине Борте  
 Сидячий

Землем, миссия  
 1960

#### БЕСЕДА С ИЛЬИЧЕМ

Недавно ко мне зашел один старый рабочий — Рудаков, приехавший по делам из Кузбасса, из Прокопьевска. В 90-е годы он работал в Питере за Невской заставой, был близким товарищем Бабушкина, одним из сознательных, активнейших рабочих того времени. Он был моим учеником по вечерней воскресной школе. Мы с ним не видались 40 лет. Приехав в Москву, он зашел ко мне. Мы оба очень взволновались. Спеша, рассказывал он свою жизнь, как сидел в тюрьме, как был в ссылке, как остался в Сибири после пятого года. «Сын — инженер, дочь вуз кончает, — говорил он, — все мы коммунисты». А потом, волнуясь, сказал: «Все, о чем мы тогда говорили, исполняется теперь». Оба мы так волновались, что он забыл сказать мне свой адрес.

Да, мы, старики, по-особому переживаем наши достижения. Это особое чувство — видеть осуществление в живой, конкретной форме того, о чем думал, за что боролся долгие годы. У нашего поколения, у тех, кто близко знал Ленина, работал с ним, к чувству радости примешивается чувство острого сожаления, что не видит этого Ильича, что рано сгорел он.

Не мог не сгореть. Напряженно все время работала его мысль. Помню, когда стала надвигаться последняя, погубившая его болезнь, врачи настаивали на строгом режиме, велели лежать два часа после обеда. Ильич режиму подчинялся, но относился к требованию врачей скептически: «Не могут они сделать так, чтобы я не думал», — сказал он как-то. И действительно, лежа в постели, на прогулке, во время разговоров на простые житейские темы он неустанно думал о том



11 We would be  
my poor revolutionaries;  
during a first lab. with the  
mind for creation we did not know  
how to exploit (resources...)  
Each + every separate  
moment a faint + separate  
(contingency) circle (addition)  
impulses in the network of objects -  
which is the principle of the circle."

Вот это, Ленин, 12.6.342  
about the future before 1960  
Dec. 1915 - Jan. 1916

деле, которому отдал всю свою жизнь, все свои силы, каждую минуту своей жизни.


Ильич любил на прогулках говорить о том, что его занимало, волновало в данную минуту. У нас в быту сложилось как-то так, что в дни его рождения мы уходили с ним куда-нибудь подальше в лес и на прогулке он говорил о том, что его особенно занимало в данный момент. Весенний воздух, начинающийся пушиться лес, разбухшие почки — все это создавало особое настроение, устремляло мысль вперед, в будущее хотелось заглянуть. Остался в памяти один такой разговор в последние годы его жизни.

Все знают, какое громадное значение придавал Ленин науке. Все помнят речь Владимира Ильича на III Всероссийском съезде Советов, где он говорил: «Раньше весь человеческий ум, весь его гений творил только для того, чтобы дать одни все блага техники и культуры, а других лишить самого необходимого — просвещения и развития. Теперь же все чудеса техники, все завоевания культуры станут общенародным достоянием, и отныне никогда человеческий ум и гений не будут обращены в средства насилия, в средства эксплуатации»<sup>1</sup>. Это относилось к нашей Стране Советов. Буржуазия капиталистических стран чем дальше, тем больше ставит достижения науки и техники на службу своим империалистическим целям. Каждое новое изобретение она старается использовать для того, чтобы ту новую грабительскую войну, о которой она страшно мечтала, сделать еще более истребительной, чем была последняя мировая империалистическая война, превратить эту войну в истребительный ураган.

Чтобы защитить нашу Родину, нашу Страну Советов от нападения, нам приходилось усиленно готовиться к обороне. На службу обороне надо было ставить все достижения науки и техники. Так и делала наша страна еще при Ленине. Так делает она сейчас под руководством партии. Страна наша готова к обороне. Только победа социализма во всем мире положит конец мечтаньям о новой войне.

И вот мне вспоминается разговор с Ильичем на эту тему во время прогулки в один из дней его рождения. Сначала он говорил о разных текущих делах, но когда мы глубже зашли в лес, он замолчал, а потом стал говорить — в связи с одним изобретением — о том, как новые изобретения в области науки и техники сделают оборону нашей страны такой мощной, что

<sup>1</sup> В. И. Ленин, Соч., т. 26, стр. 436.



всякое нападение на нее станет невозможным. Потом разговор перешел на тему о том, что, когда власть в руках буржуазии, она направляет ее на угнетение трудящихся, что, когда власть в руках сознательного организованного пролетариата, он направит ее на уничтожение всякой эксплуатации, положит конец всяким войнам. Ильич говорил все тише и тише, почти шепотом, как у него бывало, когда он говорил о своих мечтах, о самом заветном. Весь этот разговор созвучен с общими высказываниями Ильича. Но обидно ужасно, что не стенографическая у меня память.

За годы, прошедшие со времени этого разговора, благодаря политике нашей партии мы стали страной технически мощной.

Мы знаем, как выковывалась за эти годы сплоченность трудящихся нашей страны, выковывалась их сознательность, их боеспособность.

Мы знаем роль Ильича во всей той современной работе, которая идет сейчас в нашей стране. Дал он крепкую зарядку на многие и многие годы.

1935 г.

«Правда» № 111, 22 апреля 1935 г.



~~SECRET~~

8889

**DECLASSIFIED**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NLRR 1028 \*157658

BY CS NARA DATE 8/14/13

**ERMARTH**

157658

ACTION

December 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM:

FRITZ W. ERMARTH *F*

SUBJECT:

Press Guidance on Kryuchkov

The presence of Kryuchkov on the Soviet advance team and in the official summit delegation has not yet appeared in the media to my knowledge. We need to preposition some press guidance for when it does. I would recommend actually preempting the story with a low-key reference to his presence, in the context of routine comment on the progress of advance work. Barry Kelly would recommend waiting until press interest appears. John Lewis recommends giving the Soviets prior notice of any public statement, which I think we should. ✓

The troublesome questions will be: What's he doing here? Why and how did we approve his entry? What are we doing to prevent his conducting high-powered intelligence operations while here?

RECOMMENDATION

1. That the attached (Tab I) guidance is used in response to possible press inquiries.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

2. That we use this guidance at our own initiative by Friday COB to let the story die over the weekend.

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☒

BK  
Barry Kelly and Dan Howard concur.

*John Lewis concurs.*

Attachment

Tab I Press Guidance

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

*Let's respond to queries.*  
*JUST*  
*CW*

12

15 76 59

SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE

In the context of continuing preparations for the summit, on December 2 the President's National Security Advisor was visited by Ambassador Dubinin and Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. They were joined by V.A. Kryuchkov, a member of the Soviet advance team and of the official summit delegation. He is a deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee on State Security, the KGB, and head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate responsible for foreign intelligence. He is clearly the senior official in the Soviet advance party responsible for leadership security during the summit. Kryuchkov came in to express appreciation for the support and cooperation of the US Secret Service on matters concerning the security of General Secretary Gorbachev and his delegation.

Q: As foreign intelligence chief, essentially the Soviet equivalent to the head of CIA, why should Kryuchkov be on the Soviet advance team, and why should it be assumed that his responsibilities concern leadership security, which is not a function of his part of the KGB?

A: Mr. Kryuchkov is not merely the head of one component, the foreign intelligence part of the KGB, but a deputy head of the KGB. Soviet concern about leadership security is sufficiently acute, apparently, to justify this high-level oversight of the matter and the involvement of an official with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities. It is apparent from his conversation with General Powell that leadership security is, indeed, his principal concern while here in Washington.

Q: What did Kryuchkov and the General discuss.

A: As I said, Kryuchkov came in to express appreciation for the support of the Secret Service and received assurances that such support would continue throughout the summit. It would be inappropriate to comment further on matters pertaining to the physical security of the two leaders.



Q: When did you learn about Kryuchkov's coming and who approved it in Washington?

A: We learned the Soviets wanted to include him in the advance team when they submitted their request for visas on or about November 25. All the Soviet visa requests were processed in the normal manner by the Departments of Justice and State.

Q: Is it true that the FBI registered an objection to granting a visa to this high-level KGB official?

A: I shall not comment on deliberations within the Executive Branch on matters of security and intelligence.

Q: What measures are being taken to prevent this KGB leader from exploiting his presence here to conduct espionage against the US?

A: As I said, I will not comment on security and intelligence matters.

Q: Do you find the level of Soviet concern about Gorbachev's security remarkable, and, if so, why is it so high?

A: We do not find Soviet concern about leadership security out of line with what we have observed on other foreign trips by Gorbachev. As I said earlier, we shall help the Soviet delegation provide Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev the best possible physical security, just like we do for the President and the First Lady.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 3, 1987

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Mrs. Gorbachev's Schedule

The Soviets have provided us with Mrs. Gorbachev's schedule. A copy is attached.

*Melvyn Levitsky*

Melvyn Levitsky  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As stated

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

mn  
4/19/13

SUMMARY SCHEDULE FOR THE VISIT OF MRS. GORBACHEV

Monday, December 7, 1987

4:40 p.m. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev arrive at Andrews Air Force Base.  
5:20 p.m. Arrival at Soviet Embassy.

Tuesday, December 8, 1987

10:00 a.m. Arrival Ceremony at White House.  
10:30 a.m. Coffee with Mrs. Reagan at White House.  
11:00 a.m. Depart for sightseeing tour of Washington, D.C.  
12:00 Noon Arrival at Soviet Embassy.  
12:10 p.m. Private lunch at Soviet Embassy.  
1:00 p.m. Lunch concludes.  
1:30 p.m. Arrival at White House for INF signing ceremony.  
2:45 p.m. Departure from White House for Soviet Embassy.  
4:30 p.m. Meeting with representatives of U.S. public at Soviet Embassy.  
6:00 p.m. Meeting at Soviet Embassy concludes.  
7:00 p.m. White House State Dinner.  
10:00 p.m. Dinner concludes.

Wednesday, December 9, 1987

9:30 a.m. Tour of National Gallery.  
10:30 a.m. National Gallery tour concludes.  
11:30 a.m. Tour of White House and coffee with Mrs. Reagan.  
12:30 p.m. White House tour and coffee concludes.  
1:00 p.m. Lunch at Department of State.  
4:00 p.m. Meeting with leading publishers and editors at Soviet Embassy.  
5:00 p.m. Meeting with publishers and editors concludes.  
7:00 p.m. Soviet return dinner at Soviet Embassy.  
9:00 p.m. Soviet return dinner concludes.

Thursday, December 10, 1987

9:00 a.m. Breakfast meeting with the Vice President at Soviet Embassy.  
10:30 a.m. Meeting with representatives of the Armenian General Benevolent Union.  
11:30 a.m. Coffee hosted by Mrs. Pamela Harriman at her home.  
1:00 p.m. Private lunch at Soviet Embassy.  
2:00 p.m. Departure ceremony at White House.  
5:30 p.m. Press conference in Club Room of Soviet residential complex.  
8:00 p.m. Departure from Andrews Air Force Base.





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157661	COVERSHEET  RE ATTACHED	1	12/4/1987	B1

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157663	DRAFT PAPER  RE SUMMIT	6	12/3/1987	B1

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157665 MEMO

1 12/4/1987 B1

COLIN POWELL TO THE PRESIDENT RE SUMMIT

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157667 MEMO

1 11/24/1987 B1

WILLIAM WEBSTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE  
SUMMIT

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157669 MEMO

4 11/24/1987 B1

FROM ROBERT GATES RE SUMMIT

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157672	MEMO  FRITZ ERMARTH TO COLIN POWELL RE DEFECTOR	1	12/5/1987	B1

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157674	MEMO  MELVYN LEVITSKY TO COLIN POWELL RE DEFECTOR	2	12/4/1987	B1

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157671	MEMO  FRITZ ERMARTH TO COLIN POWELL RE MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT	1	12/3/1987	B1

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NLRR 5628 #157675

BY CW NARA DATE 2/14/13

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draft/7Dec87

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: LTG Colin Powell, Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central  
Intelligence  
Fritz Ermarth, National Security Council Staff  
Vladimir Kryuchkov, First Chief Directorate, KGB  
Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador  
Interpreter

PLACE: Maison Blanche Restaurant, 4 December 1987,  
7:30PM

Ambassador Dubinin had called Powell to invite him to dinner to go over some additional details for the summit meeting. Powell called back to inform them Gates was coming only about 20-30 minutes before the dinner. When we met at the restaurant there was some awkwardness at the outset but as soon as we sat down at the table (Kryuchkov and Gates sitting side-by-side), Kryuchkov observed that this was an occasion of historic importance -- that two such senior officials of the two intelligence services had never met. He noted that others of our services had met "under tables" in other places but that this was a first. Gates noted that it was the first time that two officials of the services had dined face to face in Moscow or in Washington, although each side certainly was intimately familiar with the daily lives of the other in the two capitals.

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Kryuchkov then said to Gates, "You speak Russian". When Gates responded it had been many years ago, Kryuchkov said "we hear that you understand it". Gates said that he would not trust his imperfect Russian for a conversation as important as this. The two spoke a little German and then relied on the interpreter the rest of the evening. Kryuchkov indicated that he spoke Hungarian as well as German.

The conversation was generally one of banter and debating points, punctuated by several serious discussions. Kryuchkov for example commented on the fact that General Powell was drinking vodka while he, Kryuchkov, was drinking scotch. When the waiter came around and Kryuchkov told the interpreter he wanted scotch, the interpreter started to order Johnny Walker Red and Kryuchkov quickly corrected him to order Chevis Regal. A few minutes later, when Kryuchkov made a comment that CIA knows about everything, Gates observed to him that he had known Kryuchkov would order Chevis before he ever opened his mouth. He initially took Gates seriously and then laughed.

Kryuchkov said a few things that indicated he was well aware of Gates' background. Gates responded that while Ambassador Dubinin could occasionally watch him on television, Kryuchkov and his associates remained a considerable mystery in their personal lives. Kryuchkov responded that he found that

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hard to believe. He said that perhaps the dinner could be the opening of a different kind of glasnost. He then went on to comment that glasnost had reached such a level in the Soviet Union that it was beginning to rival the availability of information in the United States. Gates told him that was hardly the case and that we would begin to believe in glasnost when a Soviet version of Aviation Week began to be published with the kind of information the US magazine has. He indicated familiarity with the magazine, and Gates told him we knew they had many subscriptions. He laughed.

Gates told Kryuchkov that he must be able to run his service on a considerably smaller budget than CIA thanks to the assistance of the Western press and the US penchant for leaks. He said that was hardly the case. Gates said that, in the spirit of glasnost Kryuchkov had referred to, and that inasmuch as they had the opportunity to review many CIA assessments of their economy and military strength, perhaps they should begin to share such assessments in return. He responded that many CIA assessments are quite good but that some of them are not "entirely objective".

There then followed a discussion between Powell, Ermarth and Kryuchkov on perestroika, with Powell noting the difficulties of keeping such a process under control and Ermarth indicating the difficulties of economic reform in the



absence of a money economy and particularly in light of the fact that military costs cannot really be calculated. Kryuchkov conceded most of these points, though noting that "one should not be too hard on the military". In this connection he told Gates that he would share a "secret" -- that perestroika was proceeding much more slowly than they had anticipated it would two years ago.

During the course of the conversation Dubinin raised several matters relating to the summit with Powell and Kryuchkov freely jumped in to offer his own views. In fact when Powell indicated that one of the stumbling blocks was that the Soviets had not provided pictures of the SS-25s and SS-20s as promised, Kryuchkov said there must have been some misunderstanding and that providing such pictures was "impossible". He spoke strongly not only on issues involving the arrangements for the visit but as in this case on substantive issues involving the treaty. He asked if the US always used the tactic of throwing up last minute obstacles. Gates said he had helped prepare six or so US-Soviet Summits, that both sides usually had last minute problems, and that somehow they always worked out.

Kryuchkov said that he had carefully read the Newsweek article on Director Webster. He said that he had been much impressed by Mr. Webster's comments that CIA was not going to

take a position on policy issues. He strongly endorsed that, saying that the special services had no business involving themselves on policy. He added that he had seen in the Newsweek story a quote from Mr. Webster to the effect that CIA still had good sources in the Soviet Union. He indicated that perhaps, in the spirit of glasnost, Gates would share a list of those people with him. Gates asked whether he would be willing to make an exchange of lists. He laughed. Kryuchkov asked that Gates pass his greetings on to Director Webster and that perhaps the latter should consider visiting the Soviet Union with the President for the 1988 summit, which he felt was most likely to occur.

At one point, Kryuchkov commented on the security arrangements for the visit and their desire for a successful, safe visit. Gates told him that Americans and our media were quite taken with the General Secretary and that he would be very warmly received -- apart from demonstrators. He said they still worried about security. Gates said we always should worry about security for our leaders, that we knew only too well what a crazy person could do. In this context, Kryuchkov noted how warmly Nixon had been welcomed in Moscow in 1972, and observed that the applause for him would have been even warmer had he not been bombing Hanoi and Haiphong.

In the discussion of intelligence role in policy, Gates said that the policy decisions were made by people like General Powell. At that point Kryuchkov recalled a joke about the Czech General who operated under two rules. Rule one is that the General is always right and rule two is that when the General is wrong people should remember rule number one.

When Kryuchkov was asked his first impressions on visiting the United States, he commented on how powerful it seemed -- that you could "feel the power". Several times he referred to how rich and economically powerful the United States is. In this connection at one point he turned to Gates and said that he hoped that CIA was telling the US leadership that the Soviet Union was not a weak, poor country that could be pushed around. Gates assured Kryuchkov that we had a very good understanding of the strength of the Soviet Union and of its power. Gates reminded him of their history in terms of the large armies they had maintained in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries at a time when the West European kingdoms were just getting organized. Gates recalled their history of constant warfare as they expanded to the east and to the south and that he could be assured that we did not underestimate their power or their pride. We then had a discussion, in which Dubinin participated actively, about World War II. Gates recalled General Powell's conversation with Marshal Akhromeyev about the



seige of Leningrad and that one one could not fail to be moved by the sacrifice and courage of the people of Leningrad -- and one did not have to be Russian in listening to Shostakovich's Leningrad Symphony in order to be moved.

In the discussion of Soviet history, Dubinin noted that whenever Russia had relaxed its vigilance whether during the time of the Mongols or in the 1930s, they had been invaded and paid a terrible price and that therefore they must not relax vigilance ever again. He refused to be drawn into a discussion with Ermarth over Stalin's responsibility for the German invasion.

In the context of Kryuchkov's reference to cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II, Gates said, expressing his personal opinion, that he felt it was a special responsibility of the two intelligence services to ensure that movement toward a more constructive and mutually beneficial relationship should be based on complete realism. Gates quoted Gorbachev's comments to Secretary Shultz some time ago that intelligence was valuable because it reduced the danger of miscalculation out of ignorance and contributed to stability and understanding. He added that there are, in fact, very deep differences between the two countries and that their gigantic arsensals did not simply appear out of nowhere but are a manifestation of deep distrust and even fear on the



part of both sides. Gates said that the detente of the 1970s had been a false start. There had been a great deal of unwarranted optimism that surrounded the 1972 summit and the period that followed and yet the deep differences between the countries came to the fore as problems associated with human rights, the Third World and strategic forces quickly dissipated the warm feelings of the early 70s.

Gates continued that if we were to have a more enduring relationship in which the purposes of peace and lessening tensions were served -- more than a passing bit of sunshine -- it had to be based on a realistic assessment of the deep differences between the sides and a willingness to confront those problems, that we not confuse rhetoric and reality. Only thus could a lasting relaxation of tensions take place. While Kryuchkov seemed to take these comments on board, his only response was to pick up on Gates' reference to human rights, to object to its being raised, and to say that there had been unwarranted interference in the 1970s. Gates said that Kryuchkov misunderstood. While human rights is an issue of continuing concern to us and a real problem between the two countries, Gates had recalled it simply as being one of the factors that helped destroy detente in the early 1970s. He reminded Kryuchkov of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. There then followed a discussion about whether the law was still in effect and Kryuchkov asking what had become of Mr. Vanik.

There was considerable discussion of Afghanistan. Kryuchkov confirmed that they wanted to get out of Afghanistan but had to find some kind of a political solution in order to do so. He expressed particular concern about the possibility of a rise to power in Afghanistan of another fundamentalist Islamic state. He noted that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States needed a second fundamentalist state like Iran. He observed in passing that the United States seemed to be fully occupied trying to deal with just one fundamentalist Islamic state. Ermarth noted that in contrast to Iran, if the Soviet Union left Afghanistan they would confront very much the kind of Afghanistan that existed before they invaded -- that is, a fragmented, weak state that posed no danger to anyone. Gates said they had the additional advantage in comparison to our experience in that there was no Cam Ranh Bay in Afghanistan.

Kryuchkov invited Gates to come to the Soviet Union on several occasions through the dinner. The first time was in connection with Gates' comment about human rights when he said that Gates should come and see for himself and indicated that he was quite serious. The second was in connection with a discussion of technology transfer, and about our respective embassies. We had been talking about economic relations and technology transfer, during which Gates had commented on our concerns over Soviet use of advanced western technology for

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military purposes. Kryuchkov asked if we could draw a firm distinction between technology for civilian and for military purposes. We acknowledged that in many instances that was quite difficult. Ermarth noted the COCOM process and the effort to try and make distinctions in that forum. In this context, Gates noted that technology transfer probably could come in the other direction in some areas if our new embassy building was any indication. Kryuchkov laughed at that and indicated there was "no problem" with our embassy in Moscow. He said that we were being too modest about our own technical capabilities and that Gates should come to Moscow to look not only at our embassy but also look at what they had taken out of their embassy here in Washington.

At the end of the conversation when Gates said that perhaps he would visit after he retired from CIA, he responded "If you wait, I certainly will be gone". He urged Gates to come sooner and said that he could "give you a visa tomorrow".

Commenting on his visit to Washington, he noted that he had gone to the Kennedy Center to see a Polish conductor. He said that the theater scene in Washington is "very pale" compared to the forty or more theaters in Moscow. He noted that there are never tickets available to those theaters in Moscow, but, of course, "I can always get tickets". Gates said CIA had no such influence in the US, and added that CIA is forbidden by law to



be active within the United States. Kryuchkov responded very firmly, "that is not quite so".

We had a discussion on who had responsibility for monitoring American compliance with arms control treaties in the Soviet Union, Kryuchkov indicated it was the KGB's responsibility to draw together information about American activities but that there was nothing comparable to our National Security Council that would draw together the views of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs as well as the intelligence services.

At one point during the dinner, Gates told Kryuchkov that because he had shared a secret, Gates would share one with him. He said that CIA had been told by the State Department that the General Secretary would like to have tapes of the Moscow evening news so that he could see how his visit is being handled on Soviet television. Gates indicated that there is only one place that can do that and that Kryuchkov should tell the General Secretary those tapes are a gift from CIA to him in the hope of a successful summit. He thanked Gates and then added, "That is probably the only thing you are doing," presumably he meant to help make the summit a success. Dubinin was genuinely surprised at Gates' information, indicating they had been told the tapes were being provided by "a friendly television station". Gates said that is not altogether untrue, but that this would remain our secret.



The Soviets were clearly having a problem keeping under control the number of members of Congress being invited to the embassy to meet with Gorbachev and they discussed with Powell certain people who wanted to be invited but were being told no. Powell indicated he would help in anyway he could. Gates commented that they would have to rely on his discretion to keep secret the fact that the Soviet side and the American Administration were colluding together against the Congress in this way. At that point Kryuchkov rather deftly made some reference to Gates' personal relationship with the Congress. Gates responded that it was "wonderful".

As we left the dinner, Gates told Kryuchkov that it had been a very interesting conversation and that he hoped it would not be harmful to either of their careers.

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Note to Robert M. Gates, DDCI  
From Fritz W. Ermarth  
Subject: Kryuchkov Memcon

The memcon looks good and thorough. One little exchange I recall is missing and should be plugged in on page 4, right after the first paragraph. It follows:

Referencing the Yeltsin affair, Ermarth wondered whether we were seeing some political backsliding in Moscow. Kryuchkov replied by saying that Yeltsin had simply turned out to be inadequate to his job, seeking to impose reform from above in the old ways. Did we think, asked Kryuchkov, that Yeltsin was some kind of democrat? Ermarth replied that Yeltsin probably had both strong and weak points, but that informed Americans were concerned about something else, namely the way the party boyars pounced on Yeltsin when he went down. This was reminiscent of something rather frightening in Soviet politics. Kryuchkov responded rather thoughtfully that he understood this point, adding that he found this conversation useful because it gave him insight into the American mentality.

I'll try to get Colin's additions to this little gem of history. I fear this may prove difficult, but I'm pretty sure you've captured what the history books and the files will most value. I'm still somewhat puzzled that this leaky gossip town has not got wind of the meeting.

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NLRR 5628 #157676

BY CH NARA DATE 8/14/13