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File Folder PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK, ICELAND
10/10/86-10/12/86: OVERALL BRIEFING BOOK (1)

FOIA

M08-125/5

Box Number RAC BOX 2

CHARLES

64

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
67182	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE YOUR MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK R 6/10/2010 M125/5	2	ND	B1
67183	TALKING POINTS	FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FINNBOGADOTTIR AND PM HERMANNSSON R 6/10/2010 M125/5	2	ND	B1
67184	SCENE SETTER	FOR REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING R 12/9/2005 NLRRM03-1472 #1	1	ND	B1
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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
TRIP TO
REYKJAVIK, ICELAND
OCTOBER 10-12, 1986

OVERALL BRIEFING BOOK

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 11/6/93

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SENSITIVE

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO REYKJAVIK

OCTOBER 10 - 12, 1986

O V E R A L L B R I E F I N G B O O K

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SENSITIVE

OVERVIEW PAPERS

67182

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER 

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Gorbachev in Reykjavik

Gorbachev's immediate objective in meeting you in Iceland is to define one or more agreements in the arms control area which can be completed during his trip to the United States. Your objective will be to impress upon him the necessity for progress across the range of issues as you have defined them, and to determine how far he is likely to go to reach concrete agreements.

The most favorable outcome from our point of view would be an agreed date for Gorbachev's trip to the United States. However, the best way to maximize the odds that Gorbachev will commit himself to a date is to avoid seeming too eager. If Gorbachev feels that the fact of a meeting in the United States is supremely important to you, he is more likely to try to extract a substantive payment for it. It will be best to maintain the attitude that Gorbachev is welcome to come at any reasonable time convenient to him, and that you wish his visit to be as productive as possible (thus your agreement to the meeting in Reykjavik), but it is up to him to make agreements possible on fair terms if he seeks them.

In Geneva, you engaged him in considerable debate about philosophical attitudes and historical experience. In Reykjavik, Gorbachev is likely to be more goal-oriented, concentrating on what can be achieved -- though he will doubtless rise to sharp debate if he feels challenged on matters affecting his pride or the prestige of his country.

Since time will be severely limited, you will want to concentrate on a few key issues which either seem good candidates for further movement on the Soviet part, or else are of such importance that firm markers must be set down. Several arms control issues fall in the first category, while regional issues like Afghanistan and Central America fall in the second. Human rights issues fall somewhere in between: they are unlikely to be candidates for formal agreements, but Gorbachev must be convinced that more progress is required in this area if some of the other things he wants are to become feasible.

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NLRR M08-12515 #67182

BY RW NARA DATE 6-10-10

Although Gorbachev may possibly throw in a few "sweeteners" at the outset, he probably will reserve most of his real concessions (if he is bringing any) until late in the day (or rather, until the second day). Therefore, it will probably be wise to use the first day to lay out and defend our current positions and listen carefully to what he says. By your final session, it should be clear whether we are near closure on any important points -- and whether Gorbachev is prepared to move enough on some key issues to justify movement on our part.

The people Gorbachev has named to his "official delegation" are all very close to him personally and bureaucratically: all, except for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, come from his immediate office or the Central Committee Secretariat which is under his direct command. This means that he retains considerable flexibility to interpret the results of your meetings as he wishes in reporting to his Politburo colleagues.

My guess is that he has a keen interest in a "successful" meeting, which would enhance his prestige and authority at home and prepare the way for a visit to the U.S. -- which could bring further domestic benefits. If so, you will enter the meeting with a very strong hand, and should be able to secure some significant movement in some Soviet positions. On the other hand, if Gorbachev turns out to be unyielding, your willingness to meet him in Reykjavik should make clear to U.S. and allied publics that Gorbachev is the problem.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

SCHEDULE

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PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO REYKJAVIK
October 9-12, 1986

ANNOTATED AGENDA

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9

9:30 a.m. President departs White House.
7:05 p.m. Arrive Iceland (Brief Arrival Ceremony).
(local time)
8:05 p.m. Arrive Ambassador's Residence.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10

Morning Briefing and private time.
Briefing to focus on general strategy for the meeting.
12:30 p.m. Briefing lunch at Residence
Afternoon Briefing and private time.
Briefing to focus on arms control issues.
4:30 - Meetings with Iceland President, Prime
5:00 p.m. Minister and Foreign Minister.
General discussion of U.S.-Icelandic relations.
Evening Private dinner at Residence.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11

10:30 a.m.- First Session. Emphasis: Overview, concentrating
12:30 p.m. on human rights and regional issues; listen to
Gorbachev's arms control proposals. At Hofdi
House.

You will host this session, which means you will
arrive first, greet Gorbachev and initiate the
meeting.

1:00 - Briefing lunch. At Residence
2:00 p.m.

3:30 - Second Session. Emphasis: Arms control,
5:30 p.m. including comment on Gorbachev proposals. At
Hofdi House.

Gorbachev will host this session, which means that
he will arrive first to greet you and initiate the
meeting.

Evening Private dinner at Residence.

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SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12

11:00 a.m. Third Session. Emphasis: Wrapup.
1:00 p.m. At Hofdi House

You host this meeting.

1:00 - Private Lunch. At Residence
2:00 p.m.

3:00 p.m. Drop-by event for U.S. military and Embassy
personnel and families.

This will be an opportunity to thank them for the
job they are doing, and particularly for their
assistance in helping with the meeting this
weekend. It will also provide a forum for any
post-meeting public remarks.

3:00 - Farewell ceremony at Keflavik.
3:20 p.m.

3:45 p.m. Depart Iceland

5:50 p.m. Arrive at Andrews

6:05 p.m. Arrive at White House

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ICELAND

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10

SCENE SETTER

MEETING WITH ICELANDIC PRESIDENT VIGDIS FINNBOGADOTTIR AND
PRIME MINISTER STEINGRIMUR HERMANNSSON

Setting

- You will meet for a brief courtesy call with President Finnbogadottir, Prime Minister Hermannsson and Foreign Minister Mathiesen. All Icelandic participants speak English.
- Mrs. Finnbogadottir was elected to the largely ceremonial post of President in 1980 and was re-elected in 1984 without opposition. Prime Minister Hermannsson, a member of the Progressive Party, is the head of a center-right coalition that came into office following elections in 1983. New elections are scheduled to be held no later than the spring of 1987. Foreign Minister Mathiesen is a member of the senior coalition partner, the Independence Party.
- The government has turned around a long period of poor economic performance. Inflation has been brought down to a projected 10% this year from a high three years ago of 80%. Unemployment is negligible and real economic growth for this year is projected at 3.5%.
- Although there is a strong tradition of isolationism and support for a neutralist foreign policy, Icelandic support for NATO has strengthened in recent years.
- You will want to thank the Icelandic government for its many efforts to make the meetings with Gorbachev a success. Other possible discussion topics include East-West relations and bilateral issues, such as the military cargo transport treaty and civil aviation. The Icelanders are not expected to pursue any substantive issues in detail during your courtesy call.

TALKING POINTS

67183

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR
THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FINNBOGADOTTIR
AND PRIME MINISTER HERMANNSSON

GENERAL: -- I want to relay to you Madame President, our gratitude for all you have done to assist us in our preparations for this week's meetings, especially in light of the very short notice we were able to provide.

BILATERAL
ISSUES -- I am very pleased that we were able to resolve the military cargo transport issue. As you are aware, a Treaty has been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

 -- I am pleased to inform you that we are planning to act positively on Icelandair's request to move some of its operations to Boston. The Department of Transportation will be in touch with Icelandair in Washington with further details.

EAST-WEST
RELATIONS: -- My meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev represents another step in the dialogue which started at Geneva. We are realistic--our differences can not be resolved through a single meeting. But we can take steps wherever the other side is willing. We are hopeful that this meeting will lead to a productive summit in Washington later this year.

 -- We are going to cover all the items on our agenda: arms control, human rights, regional issues, trade and bilateral issues. In particular, we wish to make clear the importance human rights play in our relationship. There is a fundamental difference in how our two nations regard

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BY RW NARA DATE 6-10-10

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this issue. The Danilooff case has reminded us that our attempts to develop our relationship can be endangered if we do not deal forthrightly with these differences.

ARMS

CONTROL:

--

After considerable delays, we seem to be making progress, and we believe there is potential for more. We need to continue our give-and-take at the Geneva negotiations. We remain committed to deep cuts in offensive arms. We believe that an interim agreement on LRINF missiles, leading to equal numbers of warheads on both sides, is possible.

NATO:

--

We are pleased by Iceland's continued strong support for common Alliance goals. Iceland's willingness to make available the base at Keflavik is a crucial part of NATO's strategy for protecting the Alliance's northern flank. We will continue our close consultations with Allies on NATO concerns.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

ICELAND

Iceland is one of Europe's smallest and least populated nations, with only 240,000 people. Nearly one-half the population is found in the capital of Reykjavik. Iceland is a NATO member, but it has not joined the European Economic Community. However, due to its shared heritage, culture and similar language with other Nordic states, it is a member of the Nordic Council. Iceland has a very high standard of living, comparable to other Northern European states. Icelanders are very nationalistic and sensitive to any impression that they are being treated in a less than equal manner.

During World War II Iceland was occupied first by U.K. forces and later by the U.S. in order to prevent this strategically located island from falling into the hands of Nazi Germany. Icelanders are particularly proud of their sacrifices during the war and point out that they had one of the highest per capita mortality rates of any ally.

Following the war, Iceland became a charter member of NATO. In 1951, NATO requested that the U.S. and Iceland make arrangements for the defense of Iceland and the NATO area. The U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty was signed, providing a framework for the establishment of a base and the stationing of U.S. military forces. Today there are approximately 3,000 American military personnel in Iceland from all four services along with 2,000 dependents. The forces are under the command of a U.S. Navy Rear Admiral and are referred to as the Icelandic Defense Force (IDF). Iceland has no military forces of its own; however, there is a Coast Guard which is part of the Ministry of Justice.

Our largest defense facility is at Keflavik, headquarters of the IDF; it is co-located with the international airport. There are several communication and radar facilities at other locations. The United States does not pay any compensation for the use of Keflavik or other sites. Although the 1951 Defense Agreement is subject to review by either side at any time, there is no requirement for periodic renewal.

Iceland's political spectrum ranges from conservative to far-left, including a small but active Communist party. The present coalition (Independence Party and Progressive Party) is the most favorable to U.S. and NATO interests in recent years. As a result, several long-pending matters, such as defense upgrades to the base at Keflavik, have been successfully resolved after being long stalled. Nevertheless there remains important internal opposition to the U.S. activities in Iceland undertaken in support of NATO objectives. This makes it especially important to manage carefully our relationship with Iceland.

While the current coalition government is pro-U.S., there have been a number of contentious and complex bilateral issues over the last three years that strained overall relations. These issues include a 2-1/2 year-long dispute over the transport of military cargo to and from Keflavik, whaling, civil aviation and various base-related matters. Although none of these issues command widespread attention in Washington, they are central to Iceland's foreign policy and receive intensive attention from the public, media and Parliament. Progress has been slow and difficult on all these matters, although they now seem to be heading for resolution. The most persistent and politically dangerous of the disputes has been the military cargo transport issue.

In 1984, a newly formed American company availed itself of the monopoly rights under the 1904 Cargo Preference Act for the carriage of military cargo and largely displaced two Icelandic lines which had carried all cargo for the previous 14 years. Intensive efforts to resolve the matter between 1984 and 1986 were unsuccessful. Earlier this summer, the Icelanders threatened unilateral legislation that would have denied entry to Icelandic ports for U.S. military cargo ships if the transport had not been subject to competitive bidding. This was averted by the negotiation and subsequent September 24 signing of a Treaty providing a unique exemption to the 1904 Cargo Preference Act for the Keflavik route so that competitive bidding can occur between U.S. flag vessels and Icelandic lines. The Treaty has been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

The other major bilateral issue was a dispute over Iceland's whaling program. The U.S. position was a result of legislation (the Pelly Amendment) that calls for sanctions against nations which undermine international fisheries agreements. Although a compromise was reached, the issue left a strong impression among Icelanders of U.S. insensitivity and interference in their domestic affairs. The matter will almost certainly be reopened at the 1987 International Whaling Convention meeting. The importance of the dispute is made clear by Iceland's heavy dependence on its fisheries sector for exports -- nearly 80% in 1985. The U.S. is Iceland's largest market for fish, with approximately \$200 million worth of imports last year.

Like most other Western European nations, Iceland's economy went through a very difficult period in the late 1970s and early 80s. However, the present government has made remarkable strides in bringing inflation under control -- down from 80% three years ago to an expected 10% this year. Unemployment remains negligible, while real economic growth is expected to reach 3.5% for 1986. This good news will help strengthen the position of the Independence Party in elections, which are scheduled to take place no later than next spring.

SCENE SETTERS AND TALKING POINTS

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11

SCENE SETTER
(Morning)

NLS MO3-1472-41BY CAS, NARA, DATE 12/19/05REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETINGFirst Day
October 12, 1986Setting and GoalsMorning Session

Since Gorbachev hosted your last meeting, you will be the "host" at this meeting. Following the photo op, you will probably wish to engage Gorbachev in a private conversation long enough to make your initial points and for him to make his -- perhaps an hour -- after which you might wish for Secretary Shultz and Shevardnadze to join you for a more detailed discussion of the initial points.

Your goals in this first meeting should be: (1) to indicate to Gorbachev that you are serious about planning a successful visit to the United States for him; (2) to make clear that a "successful meeting" will require more than an agreement or two on approaches to arms control; (3) to cover a couple of the more delicate of these issues; (4) to stress that, so far as arms control is concerned, strategic arms reduction remains our first priority -- and should be his; and (5) to get across the idea (indirectly) that you really do not need the meeting just for its own sake and will not pay a price just to get it.

Afternoon Session

With respect to arms control, our objective is to move the discussion to our agenda. During the first day's session, you will want to lay out the rationale for our positions on START, INF and, especially, for your proposal with respect to the mutual movement to advanced strategic defenses.

- Regarding START, we want to make it clear that our priority is on immediate reductions in existing levels of strategic systems, and that a common framework for such reductions is now close at hand.
- Regarding INF, we wish to press for Soviet movement with respect to reductions of Soviet SS-20s in Asia, limitations on Soviet shorter-range INF missiles, and on the duration of an interim INF agreement so that we can reach such an agreement promptly.
- Regarding the Defense and Space area, we would like to hear Gorbachev's views of your proposal so that if there are additional concerns, you can return to this subject and show how Gorbachev's concerns can be met within the context of your proposal -- and do this during the second day's meetings.

You also have points to make regarding nuclear testing, risk reduction, and verification and compliance. You have contingency points to use if Gorbachev raises other subject like ASAT, US interim restraint policy, chemical weapons, or conventional arms control.

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TALKING POINTS

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Talking Points: Private Meeting

- Glad you proposed meeting. Important to make sure your visit to the U.S. is as productive as possible.
- Note he seems to feel U.S. has been dragging feet since Geneva. Not the case -- actually we have the same feeling re USSR. (Took you until June to make a concrete proposal on offensive weapons reduction -- the area we agreed at Geneva to concentrate on.)
- Important thing here, however, is to look ahead, and to find practical solutions to problems.
- Suggest that we alternate private sessions and sessions with foreign ministers [or with other advisers if seems appropriate].
- Ask what he thinks. [He presumably will agree.]
- Ask which issues he feels you should concentrate on. [He will presumably name INF, Space Arms (ABM Treaty), and nuclear testing.]
- Ask if he has any new proposals to make in these areas.
- These are very important issues, and we certainly need to discuss them in detail. However, there are others that are equally crucial to a successful meeting.
- Some may not be suited to formal agreements -- actions on these are more important than words.
- For example, unless there is a substantial improvement on issues such as family reunification and emigration, your visit cannot be as successful as we both want it to be.
- An example in another area is Afghanistan. Realistic movement toward Soviet withdrawal would make all the other issues much easier.
- And, of course, if you don't scale back on your military involvement in Nicaragua and distance yourself from that crazy man Qadhafi, some incident could make our meeting very difficult.
- Now, when it comes to arms control, it is no secret that our highest priority is reducing the level of strategic nuclear weapons. We both agreed at Geneva that we should aim for a 50% reduction, but you seem to be backing away -- and always finding other issues to distract us.
- Is there anything you can tell me now about your approach to these issues in general?

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BY

CHS

NARA, DATE

12/9/05

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- I must be frank and say that progress in these other areas is going to have some effect on how far we can go on the arms control issues.
- Suggest we break for a few minutes: I'd like to consult my advisors on your proposals. Why don't we reconvene with our foreign ministers for a look at the issues outside the arms control area. We can take up arms control in more detail this afternoon.

Break for five or ten minutes to brief Secretary Shultz and John Poindexter on Gorbachev's proposals, then reconvene with Secretary Shultz for more detailed discussion of human rights and regional issues.

Continuation of Morning Meeting with Secretary Shultz

Regional Issues

Afghanistan:

- Most important case. You said "bleeding wound" but long timetables, tiny (maybe phony) withdrawals won't end war.
- Key: short timetable plus self-determination. Told this to resistance delegation that visited me.
- We won't exploit Soviet decision to get out, (e.g., no bases). Non-aligned Afghanistan can protect both sides' interests.
- Until then freedom fighters will have all support they need. And Pakistan will have help in protecting self.

Nicaragua:

- Two crucial points: 1) we won't accept Soviet beachhead in Central America, 2) real democracy taking root in the region.
- These mean our policy has support of Central American governments and of American people and Congress.
- Your involvement (and especially upgrading military presence or equipment) will bring you no gain.

Libya:

- Qadhafi has launched a war against us. That's why we acted in April. And now have increasing European cooperation against him.
- He continues to act. We'll use force again if needed.

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- Since you don't seem willing to restrain, your support only exposes you to risk.

Middle East (If raised by MSG):

- Promising trends in peace process: Israel-Morocco, Israel-Egypt summits; moderate Palestinian leadership emerging.
- We don't rule out international conference, but skeptical: might deepen paralysis, delay direct talks.
- Look for constructive signs from you: relations with Israel, increased emigration. Stop supporting those whose actions block peace (Syria, Libya, radical Palestinians).

Human Rights

- Last several months have shown that we can narrow differences and resolve some problems. Record in human rights area, however, has been deeply disappointing.
- We noted and welcomed new willingness on part of Soviet Union to consider human rights legitimate topic of discussion.
- Americans care about this issue at a very profound level. The strong American reaction to Danilooff should tell you something about the importance we attach to individual rights and the lengths we are prepared to go to when individual rights are violated.
- The Danilooff affair seriously damaged our relations. I am concerned that if there is not early and substantial improvement in human rights, particularly emigration, reunification of divided families, and better treatment of prominent human rights activists such as Sakharov, we could be moving toward the same result.
- In Geneva you made a commitment to resolve humanitarian cases in a spirit of cooperation and consistent with Soviet law. Resolution of a large number of our divided family cases this year reflects that spirit, and we welcomed it, and other steps.
- But this represents a small fraction of the problem: it is important to resolve the remainder of these American divided family cases now, especially separated husbands and wives.
- Emigration is today at a 20-year low, and Soviet Jewish activists subjected to increased persecution. There is growing domestic political pressure to do something about it. Influential American groups and many members of Congress have been asking us how we can sign agreements with you on cultural and scientific cooperation while this situation continues.

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- On the positive side, if emigration rises to levels of 1978-79 -- and is sustained -- this would open the way to increased U.S.-Soviet cooperation in many areas. Prompt resolution of several hundred "long-term" refusenik cases would remove a major irritant. There will be strong public and Congressional support for more normal economic relations if emigration returns to the levels of the late 1970's and harassment ends.
- Improve treatment of prominent human rights activists such as Sakharov and others would also go a long way toward improving atmosphere.
- I urge you to act now. The sooner we can resolve these issues, the easier it will be for us to create the most propitious atmosphere for your visit.

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SCENE SETTER
(Afternoon)

Afternoon Meeting

The afternoon session will focus on arms control. The setting and goals are outlined above in the introduction.

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White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 11/6/99

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