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TALKING POINTS: NST ISSUES

1. INF Treaty
2. START
3. Defense and Space
4. Compliance
5. Follow-on Negotiations

TALKING POINTS: NON-NST ARMS CONTROL

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NSI ISSUES

POINT PAPER: NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS (NST)Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

- Basic agreement on final issues associated with the INF Treaty was reached by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Geneva on November 24.
- Last issues settled involved verification.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

- Expectations rising for START agreement by Spring; can be done, but no time to waste.
- On sublimits, should try to pin down numbers during summit:
 - On Ballistic Missiles, US wants 4800, Soviets 5000-5100
 - On ICBMs, US proposed 3000, Soviets 3000-3300
 - On heavy ICBMs, US proposed 1650 limit that includes heavy ICBMs plus missiles with 6 or more warheads; Soviet offer would cap heavy ICBMs only at 154 -- equivalent to 1540 warheads -- we should try to pocket this proposal.
- Soviets have succumbed to US insistence on 50% cut in throwweight, but are only offering unilateral statement; should get commitment to write 50% level into Treaty.
- Soviets see our demand to ban mobile ICBMs as disingenuous. Should put burden on them to prove limits can be monitored; should also seek agreement that if acceptable verification regime can't be agreed upon, mobiles would be banned.
- Agreed at Reykjavik to find way to limit nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) outside 6000 limit. Soviets want numerical limit of 400 on two submarine types, none on surface ships. No way to verify their proposal -- should press instead to exchange data on deployment plans.
- Verification is key tool to resolving remaining issues. INF showed again that "devil is in the details." Solutions to many US and Soviet agenda items may emerge from intensified focus on verification. Want Soviets to propose measures, not just react to ours.
- Soviets may raise - "obstacles" introduced by US:
 - Backfire bomber: US wants it included as strategic bomber; Soviets do not. In SALT II, Soviets made unilateral statement that Backfire was medium-range bomber and would not be given intercontinental capability; also

promised to limit production to 30 per year -- seem to have kept both promises. President Carter said US considered Soviet commitments essential obligations of SALT II; signed Treaty on that basis.

- Air-launched Cruise Missiles: US says range permitted under SALT (600 km. maximum) may not be adequate, but has not yet tabled alternative. Soviets concerned we may seek to raise the limit to exempt future US long-range conventional ALCMs; internal USG decision is near.
- Counting Rules: Soviets not pressing this issue, but US says SALT-era rules (which Soviets want) are not good enough for warhead-limiting START Treaty; we haven't tabled proposals because USG is still considering alternatives.

Defense and Space (D&S)

- Shevardnadze said in October that the Soviets no longer want to discuss SDI but rather find mutually acceptable language on the ABM Treaty that will ensure "strategic stability" as we move ahead with offensive reductions.
- In his October 30 letter to you, Gorbachev said that "what remains is, in effect, to agree on the period of nonwithdrawal."
- Gorbachev's first priority at the Summit will likely be to get a formal US commitment to observe the ABM Treaty regime.
- It is not clear whether he will seek an understanding now on what "observance" would entail or propose to leave that for the future. The recent trend suggests the Soviets may prefer putting it aside.
- Gorbachev's approach will likely combine some of the following:
 - Affirmation of Adherence to the ABM Treaty: In the October 30 statement, we agreed that an objective for the Summit is to consider instructions to delegations on "...the observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period."
 - Emphasis on Resolving the Duration Issue: Shevardnadze and Gorbachev have stressed that agreement on 10 years is the key issue. In his October 30 press conference here, Shevardnadze said this was an issue "to be discussed."

- Factors influencing the Soviet position on duration seem to include how long START reductions will take, when and if subsequent negotiations will occur, and when the results of the SDI program will emerge.
- Compliance with the ABM Treaty During Period: In lieu of an explicit agreement on what it means to "observe" the ABM Treaty, the Soviets have suggested two ideas for ensuring compliance with the ABM Treaty during the period:
 - using a "rejuvenated" Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for settling disputes over ABM Treaty compliance during the period; and,
 - having the right to terminate START obligations should a side grossly violate the ABM Treaty.
- These concepts are likely to remain integral to the Soviet approach if Gorbachev is counting on US domestic pressures -- political, budgetary -- to constrain SDI in the future.
- D&S Contingency: Possible Wild Cards. Possible variations that Gorbachev could push include the following:
 - Sensors vs Weapons: In the context of the Soviet "list," Gorbachev could offer a more relaxed regime on sensors (such as for early warning) in exchange for no development or testing of "weapons" in space. Keeping "weapons" from space has been a recurrent theme since the Geneva summit.
 - Defining Other Physical Principles (OPP): Gorbachev could argue that the real problem is that no one knows what OPP systems and components are and that this is the issue to which the sides should now turn their attention.
 - Role for Defense Ministers: Since the April Ministerial, the Soviets have hinted at involving Defense Ministers in the permitted/prohibited activities dispute. Gorbachev could suggest that Yazov (if he comes), Akhromeyev, Carlucci and Crowe get together at the Summit or thereafter.
 - Combining START and D&S: Several Soviet officials have plugged the idea of a "one-Treaty" formulation involving essentially two obligations on D&S: adherence to the ABM Treaty for the duration of the START agreement and the right to escape a START Treaty in the event of a serious breach of the ABM Treaty.
 - New Ideas on Verification; Soviet scientists/academics say that having observers witness a Soviet space launch, perhaps even inspecting a payload, is under consideration in Moscow. At NST, Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), and elsewhere, the Soviets have urged pre-launch inspection of space payloads.

Compliance

- Although not one of the areas of negotiation at the Nuclear and Space Talks, Soviet compliance with past arms control agreements, especially the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk), must be considered as we move forward with new treaties.
- Your annual report to the Congress on Soviet compliance, due on December 1, has just been completed. We have found an additional violation -- the Soviets have violated the ABM Treaty by moving certain radar equipment to a prohibited location (Gomel).

Follow-on Negotiations

- During the negotiation of the INF Treaty, the Soviet version included a provision which would commit both sides to follow-on negotiations on nuclear systems below the 500 km range.
 - Such negotiations would focus on dual-capable tactical aircraft, short-range missiles, and nuclear artillery.
- The Soviet Union has tried to include these systems within the new talks on conventional stability, but the US and NATO have resisted.
- A number of our key NATO allies (especially the UK and France) are firmly opposed to moving towards further reductions in NATO nuclear forces until the conventional and chemical imbalances have been resolved.
 - Mrs. Thatcher has written to you recently on this point.
- Germany does not want to delay further negotiations on the short-range nuclear missiles that directly threaten the FRG until the conventional and chemical issues are settled, but they are not pushing us to commit immediately to further negotiations. Rather, they feel that the next necessary step is for NATO to consider its options for the future.
- We would not recommend that you raise this subject. However, you should expect Gorbachev to do so.
 - When he does, you will need to deflect him since we cannot and should not commit to further negotiations on nuclear systems below 500 km at this time.

B. TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS: INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

- INF is a fine Treaty.
- The key to its success is full implementation of its provisions, including all of the verification measures that were so painstakingly negotiated.
- The measures that we have agreed to are new and there will no doubt be wrinkles to iron out as we proceed.
- What is important is for both sides to have confidence from the very beginning that it is going to work.
- We will be under terrific scrutiny. But I think we should take our cue from the successful first year of the Stockholm Document's inspection regime.
- I think we both agree that the INF Treaty should only be the first step.
- It wasn't easy getting here, so let's make this hard work serve as a guide for future agreements.
- Specifically, let's remember the importance of the principles of US-Soviet equality and effective verification as we hammer out the details of a START treaty.
- For as the security of our two countries increases, so will the prospects for peace and security throughout the world.
- Our INF verification experience will provide a good foundation for the comprehensive verification measures that will be necessary in other arms negotiations, especially in START.

TALKING POINTS: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS (START)

- We have come a long way since we first met in Geneva. Expectations are rising that we can reach a START agreement before next summer.
- I think it can be done, but we can't waste any time. At the same time, I'm only interested in a sound, verifiable treaty. You should be under no illusions that the fact that I have only a year remaining can be used to pressure us into a hasty or unwise agreement.
- We have agreed that our meeting here should result in specific instructions to our negotiators. I'd like to run through some issues that require our attention now.
- (Sublimits) We are close on both the concept and levels.
- Sublimit on all ballistic missile warheads.
 - We prefer 4800. You say 5000 or 5100. We should solve this while you are here.
- Sublimit on ICBM warheads.
 - A sublimit on ICBM warheads would help stability.
 - You obviously don't disagree in principle since you proposed 3000-3300 in October. We should try to reach final agreement on this now.
- Sublimit on heavy ICBMs.
 - You have offered to limit your heavy ICBMs to 154 and heavy ICBM warheads to 1540 -- this is constructive and should be written into the treaty.

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- (Throwweight) Your side has said it will reduce throwweight by half, and not exceed this limit. So we agree on the basic substance.
- This issue is important to us.
- Your missiles can deliver much more payload than ours.
- Without reductions and enduring limits on throwweight, many here will question seriously whether a START agreement actually improves our security.
- Your side has offered a unilateral statement about reducing and limiting throwweight.
- We think this matter is too central to our security and the viability of a START treaty to be handled that way.
- We should agree in Washington to instruct our negotiators to work out a way to record this limit in the treaty.
- (Mobile ICBMs) You have objected to our proposed ban on mobile ICBMs.
- You are deploying two varieties. The SS-25, which goes on roads, and the SS-24, which goes on the railroad.
- We, too, are developing plans for ICBMs that would move along highways and railroads. If you have such missiles, we must too.
- We recognize that such missiles might be attractive, but we have serious concerns over verification and stability.

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- Verification is the key.
- As Secretary Shultz has told you, we are willing to work very hard on this with you, but thus far we see no acceptable verification approach, and you haven't been able to suggest one.
- You and I should agree that since we can't find such an approach, mobile ICBMs should be banned.
- (Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles) At Reykjavik, both sides agreed that nuclear-armed SLCMs would be dealt with outside the 6000 limit. We agreed to find a solution to limiting these weapons.
- Your solution is a specific limit on SLCMs. We see two major problems with this:
 - Your proposed limits would severely hamper our conventional naval capabilities. We cannot accept that in an agreement on strategic nuclear forces.
 - And, we just don't see any effective way to verify limits.
- Perhaps we should look at the problem in a new way -- as one of predictability, not hard limits. Under this approach, the goal would be to provide each other a sense of each side's plans and programs.
- This would help ensure against surprises, and allow each side an opportunity to plan intelligently.
- (Verification) We need to focus the work of our Geneva delegations on the issue of verification.

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- There are two reasons this is crucial:
 - Our experience with INF points out that important issues will arise; many unexpected. so it is not too soon to get cracking on this.
 - Second, intensified work on this issue might point the way to solutions to the remaining problems.
- So a real effort is needed now.
- (Link to Defenses) I need to tell you frankly that we cannot accept your tactic of holding strategic offensive reductions hostage to your efforts to cripple our SDI program.
- Strategic offensive reductions are long overdue, on their own merits. It is time to get on with them.
- On the other hand, there is no need for further limits on defenses beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty, and we cannot accept them.

TALKING POINTS: DEFENSE AND SPACE (D&S)

- (Preserving or Foreclosing Options) As Secretary Shultz and Secretary Carlucci framed the issue for you in Moscow, we need to find out whether there is a formulation which gives you assurances for the future but which preserves the strength and thrust of the SDI program.
- What the issue comes down to, for me at least, is the question of preserving options for the future.
- When we met in Geneva, you tried to convince me to renounce the SDI program altogether.
- At Reykjavik, we had a good discussion going, but you insisted on restricting SDI to the laboratory.
- What both Geneva and Reykjavik said to me was that you were trying to foreclose options.
- You were trying to cut SDI off at the knees before it ever had a chance to prove itself -- and before we ever had a chance to consider its possibilities.
- I will not do this. I will not give up what I believe is an opportunity -- for the first time since nuclear weapons came into existence -- to reduce the risk of war by learning how to defend effectively and efficiently against ballistic missile attack.
- I am not saying you must sign onto this opportunity now. I wish you would, but you may not have as much faith as I do in

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technology and our ability to use it to create effective defenses.

- That's all right. I am willing to convince you of the validity -- and viability -- of my vision for the future as time goes by and it becomes clear without a doubt.
- What I am asking -- indeed, I cannot accept anything but -- is that you not try to foreclose that option now.
- If your intent is to shut off possibilities before they've had a chance, then our efforts to find common ground in this area will ultimately fail.
- But if we can agree that our fundamental objective here is to preserve options, then perhaps we can work this out.
- (Specific Formulations) So how do we find that formulation?
- Seems to me we agree on one basic thing: that there will be a nonwithdrawal period from the ABM Treaty for a certain length of time and, during this time, the sides will observe the ABM Treaty.
- That seems straightforward enough but, as we both realize, it really isn't complete.
- Three things are missing. There are also a number of smaller problems that our delegations have been working on, but I think that if you and I resolve the bigger questions, the other problems might become easier.
- (Length of Nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty) The first is how long the nonwithdrawal period will last.

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- You say ten years. We say through 1994.
- Our proposal would take us into the middle of the next decade
 - a very long time if you consider that we would be undertaking an obligation affecting at least two future U.S. Presidential terms.
- (What Happens After) The second is the question of what happens after the nonwithdrawal period ends.
- I would like to see spelled out a "right to deploy."
- Having the right to deploy would not obligate a side to exercise that right, any more than having the right to withdraw obligates a side to withdraw.
- Rather, getting back to the point I was making earlier, it is needed to preserve options.
- Should effective defenses prove feasible -- and that means meeting the criteria that I set of military effectiveness, survivability, and cost-effectiveness at the margin -- then I want to make sure that we can see it through.
- If effective defenses do not prove feasible or as long as we are still evaluating their potential, then we would not exercise the right to deploy and -- as long as you did not exercise that right -- we would continue to respect our ABM Treaty obligations.
- (Activities During Period) The last big issue with regard to a formulation on "observance of and nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty" is what the sides mean when they say "observe."

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- I think you know my views very well on this. I will not accept any restraints that go beyond those agreed to in 1972.
- This means that we should be able to take advantage of our full rights, including development and testing of systems based on new technologies.
- I am less clear about what your position is.
- You now say that some ABM testing could occur in space. I think that's a welcome development.
- But I have heard several different interpretations about your position; perhaps you would tell me yourself now.
- However, it is clear that some of your proposals would place limits on research and associated testing which go beyond the ABM Treaty. Given what I have said about maintaining future options, we can't accept this.
- We also have our top experts with us. They should get together and report back to us through Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Contingency Points

If Gorbachev argues that "right to deploy" forecloses Soviet options:

- As I said, having the right to deploy would not obligate a side to use it. Rather it preserves that option.
- I'm not sure what we're arguing about; even under your proposal, the sides could deploy.

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- Currently, either side can deploy after giving six months' notice of intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
- So even under your proposal either side could deploy after the nonwithdrawal period if it gave six months' notice.
- So what is the real concern here? A six-month notification period or making explicit what already is an implicit right?

TALKING POINTS: COMPLIANCE WITH PAST AGREEMENTS

- Full compliance with the obligations of all the agreements between us is essential.
- The record of the Soviet Union in this regard is very troublesome. No example stands out more clearly than the large radar you are building in Siberia near Krasnoyarsk (Kraz-NOH-yarzk).
- To my mind, Krasnoyarsk is something like the SS-20 -- a Soviet deployment decision taken years ago that has caused deep suspicion in the West about Soviet intentions.
- You must decide whether Krasnoyarsk adds to your security -- or whether, like the SS-20, it is more of a liability.
- What I want you to understand clearly is how large a liability it really is.
- The suspicion aroused by Krasnoyarsk will make itself felt in all else you and I are trying to do:
 - For example, I must answer this basic question -- if the Soviet Union has not complied with past agreements, why should the Senate ratify new ones?
 - This will be a tough question to deal with on INF. And it could stop a START agreement in its tracks.
- You have said you are stopping construction of the radar. But that is not enough.
- The only real solution -- one that will dispel the mistrust caused by Krasnoyarsk -- is to dismantle the radar.

Contingency Points:

If Gorbachev raises the modernization of THULE (Greenland) and/or FYLINGDALES (U.K.) -- two large radars the US is building to replace old equipment at those locations:

- The situation is not analogous to Krasnoyarsk. Krasnoyarsk is a crystal-clear violation of the ABM Treaty. It's the wrong type of radar, in the wrong location and pointed in the wrong direction.
- The US radars you mentioned are permitted by the Treaty. Early warning radars have always been there and modernization is permitted by the Treaty. We do not intend to, nor would Congress allow us, to trade legal radars for an illegal one.
- Even the Congressmen that visited Krasnoyarsk came back convinced that it was a clear violation of the Treaty.

TALKING POINTS: FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONSContingency Points:

If Gorbachev raises negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons:

- We have just agreed on a dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe. It's logical to think of next steps.
- My objective in arms control is to enhance security -- not to negotiate just for the sake of negotiating.
- Moreover, when I consider short-range systems, or dual-capable aircraft, I always do so in a NATO context.
- Right now, NATO has agreed that our arms control priorities must be to work for conventional stability at lower levels, and for a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons.

If Gorbachev raises short-range forces (below 500 km):

- As I said, we are discussing this within NATO. Our Allies agree with us on the need to give priority now to conventional and chemical arms control.
- I am not going to get into a discussion with you about how we consult on these questions with our allies.

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NON-NST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

POINT PAPER: NON-NST ARMS CONTROLChemical Weapons

- Soviets pushing for early completion of treaty; have publicly accused US of backing off global ban, encouraging proliferation through binary production.
- We continue to have serious concerns regarding verification; studying ways to enhance security within treaty regime.
- Round VII of bilateral talks began November 30 in Geneva. Encourage serious effort to tackle unresolved issues.

Nuclear Testing

- First round of Nuclear Testing Talks November 9-20 in Geneva. Agreed to exchange visits to testing sites in January 1988, in preparation for Joint Verification Experiments (JVEs).
- Stress need for constructive effort to complete verification for Threshold Test Ban Treaty/Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (TTBT/PNET).

Conventional Stability Talks

- Main threat to stability in Europe is substantial Eastern conventional superiority. New negotiations should focus on conventional ground forces; participation should be limited to NATO and Warsaw Pact members.
- NATO's objectives -- greater openness, stable balance at lower levels -- are in both sides' interest.

Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

- 1987 conclusion unlikely. East stalling on both security, human rights issues. Drafting moving at snail's pace.
- Stress US willingness to stay in Vienna as long as necessary to achieve balanced outcome.

Nuclear Non-proliferation

- Need to focus efforts on South Asia. Soviet support for Indo-Pakistani non-proliferation talks would encourage process.
- Soviets should also consider our suggestion for joint summit statement calling on India and Pakistan to halt nuclear arms race in South Asia.
- Tenth round of Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) bilateral consultations set for Washington in January.

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Soviet Military Practices

- The Soviet military has taken a number of actions which have killed, injured or endangered US military personnel.

Soviet Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Proposals

- Should Gorbachev raise his proposals for nuclear weapon free zones, contingency talking points are provided.

Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech

- Should Gorbachev raise the proposals suggested in his Murmansk speech, contingency talking points are provided.

Soviet Asian Initiatives

- Should Gorbachev raise recent Soviet initiatives in Asia, contingency points are provided.

B. TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS: CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

- When you and I met in Geneva in 1985, we agreed to "accelerate" negotiations on a chemical weapons ban.
- There has been progress since then, but our negotiators have a lot of hard work ahead.
- The Soviet Union has said that a chemical weapons ban can be concluded in the near future.
- The US remains committed to a ban -- but only to one that protects our security by being truly global and verifiable.
- That's a tall order to fill, but one we'll keep working at.

Contingency Points:

If Gorbachev Raises US Binary Program:

- The US chemical weapons modernization program is designed to provide a stable, safer deterrent at lower levels.