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Withdrawer

CAS 3/19/2009

File Folder [BRIEFING BOOK: THE MEETINGS OF
REAGAN/GORBACHEV DECEMBER 1987] (3)

FOIA

M08-125/5

Box Number RAC BOX 2

CHARLES

170

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
67295	TALKING POINTS	RE NUCLEAR TESTING <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67296	TALKING POINTS	RE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67297	TALKING POINTS	RE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67298	TALKING POINTS	RE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67299	TALKING POINTS	RE SOVIET MILITARY PRACTICES <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67300	TALKING POINTS	RE NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES (NWFZ) <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67301	TALKING POINTS	RE GORBACHEV'S MURMANSK SPEECH <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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170

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
67302	TALKING POINTS	RE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN ASIA <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67303	PAPER	POINT PAPER RE REGIONAL ISSUES <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	3	ND	B1
67304	TALKING POINTS	RE REGIONAL ISSUES <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67305	TALKING POINTS	RE AFGHANISTAN <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	2	ND	B1
67306	TALKING POINTS	RE AFGHANISTAN (IF RAISED) <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	4	ND	B1

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TALKING POINTS: NUCLEAR TESTING

- The first round of negotiations got off to a good start in November.
- It's important that we make progress on verification improvements for the existing treaties, so they can be ready for ratification as soon as possible.
- I am also pleased by the Soviet decision to accept my long-standing invitation to visit nuclear testing sites. This can provide a good basis to move forward.
- Our next step, however, should be taking those actions needed to improve verification so that we can finally ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET).

TALKING POINTS: CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

- Now that we've reached an INF agreement, conventional stability deserves our priority attention. Warsaw Pact conventional superiority is largest obstacle to greater stability.
- We are encouraged by your businesslike approach in Vienna on a negotiating mandate for conventional stability from the Atlantic to the Urals.
- Our objectives in the new negotiations will be to establish a more stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels and more openness in military activities.
- We will not agree to address nuclear weapons or capabilities in these negotiations, nor should neutral and nonaligned nations have a right of review over NATO-Warsaw Pact agreements that emerge from these negotiations.
- Our final decision to proceed with new conventional stability talks -- as well as with distinct negotiations on confidence-and security-building measures -- will depend on getting a balanced result at the Vienna CSCE meeting. We'll be looking for significantly improved Soviet performance in human rights.

TALKING POINTS: CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING

- We are hopeful that this conference in Vienna can successfully conclude soon with a balanced final document.
- However, we are prepared to stay in Vienna as long as necessary to get a satisfactory result.
- We believe it essential that the outcome reflect satisfactory progress in human rights and the other parts of the Helsinki accords as well as the security area.

TALKING POINTS: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

- I think we both agree with the principle that proliferation of nuclear weapons should not occur.
- The most dangerous place right now for potential proliferation is South Asia.
- Soviet support for non-proliferation talks between India and Pakistan would encourage those two states to negotiate.
- I would urge you to agree to a joint statement calling on India and Pakistan to halt their nuclear arms race.

TALKING POINTS: SOVIET MILITARY PRACTICES

- I am concerned by several recent instances in which actions by the Soviet military either did or could have resulted in serious injury -- even death -- to Americans or our Allies.
- On September 17, a two-man US Military Liaison Mission team was fired on by a group of Soviet soldiers in East Germany, and the US driver was injured.
- I understand that Soviet officials have already apologized for the incident and have said they are taking steps to prevent similar incidents from happening in the future. That's a welcome development.
- But, given the killing of Major Nicholson in 1985, this most recent incident should not have occurred at all.
- I'm sure you'll agree with me that our number one priority should be preserving life. When life is lost because of senseless actions, it is up to you and me to look into the matter to ensure that it does not happen again.
- Likewise, I was very concerned about the test-firing of Soviet ICBMs near Hawaii. It could have had very grave consequences if something had gone wrong.

TALKING POINTS: NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE-ZONES (NWFZ)

Contingency Points:

If Gorbachev raises his proposals involving nuclear weapon free zones:

- The best way to limit the spread of nuclear weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- The US has supported certain nuclear weapon free zones, e.g., the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which advance non-proliferation objectives and do not place other security interests at risk.
- However, as a matter of policy, we oppose nuclear weapon free zones that erode nuclear deterrence and undercut existing security arrangements.
- This is why we oppose them in Europe.

TALKING POINTS: GORBACHEV'S MURMANSK SPEECHContingency Points:

If Gorbachev raises the proposals in his Murmansk speech:

- We and our Allies see little for us in the security aspects of your Murmansk speech.
- Many of these issues are already being treated in existing fora; other proposals which you endorsed, such as a nuclear weapons free zone, would not contribute to stability and security.
- Main tasks now are clear:
 - A START Treaty implementing 50 percent reductions;
 - A global chemical weapons ban;
 - Conventional stability talks covering the whole of Europe.
- We noted the reaction of your European neighbors was not enthusiastic: some said the speech represented "a step backward."

TALKING POINTS: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN ASIAContingency Points:

If Gorbachev raises his proposals for confidence-building in Asia mentioned in his Vladivostok speech or his interview in Merdeka magazine:

- The confidence-building proposals included in your Vladivostok speech and Merdeka interview are asymmetrical and fail to address the real sources of tension in the region.
- These stem from the massive build-up of Soviet forces in Asia over the past 25 years and the use of force by the Soviet Union, Vietnam and North Korea against their Asian neighbors.
- If you want to contribute to stability in the region, these are the issues you need to start with.

REGIONAL ISSUES

67303

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POINT PAPER: REGIONAL ISSUES

OVERVIEW

- Stress that if Soviet conduct makes negotiated solutions impossible, this will have serious repercussions for overall health of US-Soviet relations. Cite the negative experience of 1970's.
- We want to explore vague Soviet hints of flexibility on Afghanistan and Angola, and push Gorbachev to take concrete steps on these and Iran/Iraq. In other areas--particularly Cambodia--briefly lay down markers.
- Soviets may raise Mideast peace process, Central America.
- Key in most areas is to get foreign troops out, turn issue over to indigenous populations for negotiated settlement (as in your 1985 UNGA speech).

AFGHANISTAN

- Soviets hint Gorbachev will have "something to say" to you about withdrawal timetable, but are silent on details.
- Kabul regime announced 12-month withdrawal time table linked to end "outside interference."
- This likely to be center of Gorbachev's summit presentation on Afghanistan, but he could surprise us still.
- We should pressure him to announce all troops will leave Afghanistan by a date certain before end of 1988.
- Soviets should talk to the Resistance, as well as to Pakistan. Must recognize that Kabul regime has to go.
- Gorbachev may complain about your meeting with Resistance leaders.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

- The Soviets hold the key to our efforts to end the war, but they have been unwilling to bite the bullet and support sanctions against Iran.
- Soviets claim they would consider a second (enforcement) resolution in Security Council, but they are clearly stalling and, in effect, shielding Iran from UN sanctions.
- When Iran attacked US ship and you responded by hitting command-and-control platform, Soviets denounced us for "aggressive acts."
- Soviets denounce our fleet buildup as cause of tensions. They propose a UN naval peacekeeping force, which they themselves know is not a serious proposal, although it plays well in some quarters, including in the U.S.

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- We would propose to Gorbachev that we instruct both our UN Ambassadors to sit down together this week in New York and begin drafting language for a second resolution.
- It is dangerous for our relations for the Soviets to be shielding Iran when Iran is shooting at American ships; for Soviet-made and Bloc equipment to be finding its way to Iran, possibly to be used against Americans; and for the Soviets to be caught in the middle if we have to strike back again at Iran.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- We are concerned about a stagnation; but Soviets are the demandants in this issue, seeking a greater role at no cost to them.
- The process is stalled, partly due to continued Soviet encouragement of intransigent positions by their friends in the region (e.g., Syria, PLO).
- If Gorbachev raises international conference, our answer is direct negotiations, launched in an agreed manner. Burden remains on Moscow, moreover, to prove its willingness to play constructive role.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

- You should reiterate our interest in exploring further possibility of cooperation with Soviets on Resolution 435.
- In this connection, emphasize importance of agreement on withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola and Namibia.
- Savimbi just routed the Angolan regime's forces (with some South African help).
- Clearly a military stalemate; ripe for political solution. Our talks with Angolan regime going well. They accept need for Cuban withdrawal but haven't offered a quick enough timetable.

CAMBODIA

- You have promised our friends and allies in Asia you would raise this with the General Secretary.
- This can be done briefly: Soviets should urge Hanoi to get troops out, promote prompt settlement. (Recent Hanoi troop withdrawals were a rotation, not real.)

CENTRAL AMERICA

- We support Guatemala plan. Soviet arms buildup in Nicaragua is one big problem. Other is Nicaragua's tyrannical attempt to suppress all internal opposition.

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KOREA

- Latent Northern ambitions to reunify the peninsula and ROK political turbulence, despite movement toward greater tranquility between North and South, make it worthwhile to enlist Soviet support for stabilizing trends.

SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

- We want the Soviets to encourage India toward moves that dampen the Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition.

BERLIN INITIATIVE

- You should push Gorbachev to respond positively to your June 1987 Berlin initiative. You proposed to improve air access to the city, to promote exchanges, encourage sports events, and bring international meetings to Berlin. With the UK, France, and FRG, we will soon have ideas to present to the Soviets.

EASTERN EUROPE (If raised)

- You have called in speeches for Soviet repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Soviet press spokesman Gerasimov indicated in a British interview that Moscow would no longer find it possible to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe.
- As opportunities arise, we want to reinforce this Soviet position because Eastern Europe is entering a period of instability and change. Soviet intervention in the region would be an enormous setback to East-West relations.

THE SOVIET "COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" (If raised)

- We should tell the Soviets that this is an impractical proposal that unnecessarily duplicates existing UN bureaucracies; but we would consider individual elements of the package in the appropriate UN bodies.

CYPRUS (If raised)

- We should tell the Soviets that an international conference would only complicate the problem; but both we and the Soviets should lend greater support to the UN Secretary General's mediation efforts between the two communities on the island.

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B. TALKING POINTS

67304
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TALKING POINTS: REGIONAL ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

- As we set out to do at Geneva, we have expanded our regional dialogue. This has been useful.
- I propose that we affirm that this dialogue is a permanent fixture, and that we begin another cycle of expert talks early next year.
- But in itself, this dialogue is far from enough. Serious differences remain on these issues, and they could prove dangerous.
- My concern is twofold:
 - o Regional crises constantly risk drawing us into direct conflict. We all remember Berlin, Cuba, and the 1973 Arab/Israeli war.
 - o Even when they aren't major East-West confrontations, they can sour our relations. Angola and Afghanistan sounded the deathknell for detente in the '70s and for ratification of SALT II. These conflicts are still with us. Now Nicaragua and Iran-Iraq have joined the list.
- My goal (as in my 1985 UNGA speech) is reaching political solutions, a process that must begin with negotiations between the warring parties.
- Failure to end these conflicts--especially where Soviet forces or the forces you support are involved--will undermine the effort to promote cooperation on other issues.
- So, we should explore ways to resolve key regional issues. At the top of the list are Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, southern Africa, and Cambodia.

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TALKING POINTS: AFGHANISTAN

- I hardly need to emphasize to you the positive impact of ending the Afghan conflict during the coming year. This can only come with rapid Soviet withdrawal.
- While we seek a rapid political settlement, our support for those striving to restore Afghan independence will continue until a settlement is reached.
- You tell us you have already decided to withdraw. But none of your proposals has any hope of acceptance by the Resistance and the refugees.
- We agree with you:
 - o that a short withdrawal timetable is essential; and that it not be linked to prior agreement on an interim government in Kabul;
 - o that there should be guarantees for the neutrality of Afghanistan.
- On the other hand, the timetable you propose (12 months) is too long; what we need is a shorter timetable and a date certain before the end of 1988 when it begins and ends.
- You have made no effort to negotiate with the Resistance. The role of the Resistance is central. How can you possibly settle this conflict without negotiating with them?

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- We're also disturbed by your campaign of pressures against Pakistan. You should resume your dialogue with Pakistan, which you have let lapse. We will continue to support Pakistan, as will other governments.
- The essential step is for the Soviet Union to commit to a specific timetable with beginning and end dates in 1988, including provisions for the early removal of a substantial body of your forces, i.e., front-loading.

(Proposal to Make:) I propose as our objective this week: announcement of a date certain before the end of 1988 by which time all Soviet troops will have returned home.

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TALKING POINTS: AFGHANISTAN (IF RAISED)

12-Month Timetable

- We are aware of the 12-month withdrawal timetable proposed by the Kabul government. Your own interests as well as the interests of our relationship would best be served by a more expeditious withdrawal schedule; that is, in well less than a year.
- We're aware that it's linked, also, to an "end to outside interference." You know that that issue is covered by the documents already negotiated in Geneva. So it's not a real issue.
- We understand your desire to withdraw without unnecessary bloodshed and without extraordinary political turbulence in Kabul. For that to occur, however, you will need the acquiescence or active cooperation of the Resistance. Their experience with the DRA over the past eight years as well as past sham withdrawals and recent political developments that have consolidated power in Najib's hands obviously make them unwilling to accept offers by Kabul.
- The resistance will have no incentive to stop fighting unless your withdrawal is accomplished promptly, and unless there is a tangible earnest of your intent up front. This might be provided by removal of a substantial number of your troops -- say 40,000 -- within 60 days following signature of a Geneva Agreement, with comparable increments at regular intervals thereafter.

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- If you are prepared to take steps of this nature, there could be agreement at Geneva including an end to outside interference. We would also be willing to use our influence to facilitate ceasefires for your withdrawal and to avoid massive retaliation against the PDPA.
- If you are serious, the Geneva negotiations should be resumed as quickly as possible. Signature of the Geneva accords in January or February would permit a final withdrawal well before the end of 1988. You need to talk to Pakistan right away to confirm clear understandings on modalities prior to the next Geneva Round.
- The central issue is your withdrawal.

U.S. Support for the Resistance

- We want a political settlement and are prepared to be helpful.
- But, support by the U.S. and other countries for the Afghan resistance will continue until the signature of the Geneva accords.
- The vote of 123 governments at the UNGA shows the strength of support for the Resistance.

Peacekeeping Forces

- We would be prepared to discuss creation of an international peacekeeping presence as well as a massive international humanitarian presence as a means of enhancing stability in Afghanistan during a transitional period.

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- The record of such peacekeeping forces in situations of acute civil strife is not promising, and Afghanistan is a very difficult country. A limited peacekeeping role, say in Kabul, might make sense.
- Other issues to be addressed are economic reconstruction, relief, and return of refugees. International help here can also reduce civil strife and bloodshed.

Interim Arrangements

- We favor a government of genuine national reconciliation. This cannot be accomplished in the shadow of foreign troops. Only the Afghan people themselves can decide their own future, and this means reaching agreement with the Resistance.
- The announcement of a date certain timetable will provide a strong impetus for Afghan resolution of interim arrangements.
- We agree with you that the former King could play an important role in the process of forming an interim government -- provided the Resistance can be persuaded to accept him.
- However, you cannot expect the Resistance to welcome a significant role for the PDPA in any such process.

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Neutrality

- We agree to the idea of Afghan neutrality and nonalignment. Preferably, the Afghans should declare their own neutrality and nonalignment, so it doesn't seem to be something imposed on them.
- At the same time, the guarantor powers could undertake certain obligations -- including forming no alliance or security arrangement with Afghanistan, and neither introducing foreign military personnel nor establishing military bases or facilities there.
- Afghanistan would undertake similar obligations but would remain free to determine its political orientation and to participate in regional or international organizations.

Avoidance of Bloodbath and Soviet Withdrawal

- We believe that a major bloodbath can be avoided; and that a Soviet withdrawal can be done safely.
- This will require acceptance by the Resistance of proposals for withdrawal and political arrangements, establishment of international humanitarian presence and perhaps some peacekeeping forces, and departure from Afghanistan of some personnel from present regime (such as the Khad or secret police).

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