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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name *European & Soviet Affairs Directorate*
SOMMER PETER FILES NSC Records

Drawer

DLB 6/16/2006

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM - 1983 - 10/24/1983-10/27/1983

FOIA

Box Number 90424 *RAC Box 4*

F01-050/1

CHARTRAND

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
25617	CABLE	#241847Z OCT 83 R 1/13/2011 F2001-050/1	3	10/24/1983	B1
25618	CABLE	#242200Z OCT 83 R 1/13/2011 F2001-050/1	2	10/24/1983	B1
25619	CABLE	#250102Z OCT 83 R 6/16/2010 M207/1; UPHELD 1/13/2011 F01-050/1 #25619	3	10/25/1983	B1
25620	CABLE	#250656Z OCT 83 R 1/13/2011 F2001-050/1	2	10/23/1983	B1
25621	CABLE	#261416Z OCT 83 R 1/13/2011 F2001-050/1	2	10/26/1983	B1
25622	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: RECOMMENDED PHONE CALL TO MARGARET THATCHER R 6/16/2010 M207/1; UPHELD 1/13/2011 F01-050/1 #25622	1	10/26/1983	B1
25623	MEMO	SOMMER TO MCFARLANE, RE: RECOMMENDED PHONE CALL TO MARGARET THATCHER R 1/13/2011 F2001-050/1	1	10/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name *European & Soviet Affairs Directorate*
SOMMER, PETER FILES *NSC: Records*

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File Folder UNITED KINGDOM - 1983 - 10/24/1983-10/27/1983

FOIA

F01-050/1

Box Number 90424

CHARTRAND

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
25624	MEMCON	TELEPHONE CONVERSATION REAGAN/THATCHER, OCTOBER 26, 1983 R 1/13/2011 F2001-050/1	4	ND	B1
25625	CABLE	#270143Z OCT 83 R 6/16/2010 M207/1; UPHELD 1/13/2011 F01-050/1 #25625	3	10/27/1983	B1
25626	CABLE	#270217Z OCT 83 R 6/16/2010 M207/1; UPHELD 1/13/2011 F01-050/1 #25626	5	10/27/1983	B1
25627	CABLE	#271839Z OCT 83 R 6/16/2010 M207/1; UPHELD 1/13/2011 F01-050/1 #25627	1	10/27/1983	B1

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

25617

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8192 DTG: 241847Z OCT 83 PSN: 068036
SIT561 AN009164 TOR: 297/1819Z

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OP IMMED
DE WTE #8192 2971819
O 241847Z OCT 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CABINET OFFICE

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH08192

OCTOBER 24, 1983

DEAR MARGARET,

I HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN GRENADA IN RECENT DAYS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY CONCERN FOR THE IMPACT WHICH THE KILLING OF THE LEADERSHIP THERE HAS HAD ON OUR FRIENDS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PARTICULARLY ON THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN STATES. THE PROSPECT THAT THE BLOOD-STAINED GROUP WHO APPEAR TO BE THE ONLY AUTHORITY ON THE ISLAND COULD PERPETUATE THEIR POWER ALSO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA THEMSELVES, AS WELL AS OUR OWN NATIONALS RESIDENT THERE.

THE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECs) HAVE RAISED SIMILAR CONCERNS WHICH ARE, OF COURSE, MAGNIFIED BY THEIR PROXIMITY TO AND LIMITED ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST THE THREAT WHICH GRENADA NOW POSES. THEY HAVE A WELL FOUNDED FEAR OF AGGRESSION BY OR SUBVERSION FROM GRENADA, OR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR OWN DEMOCRATICALLY-CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENTS MAY BE CHALLENGED BY SOME WHO MIGHT SEEK TO IMITATE THE EXAMPLE SET BY GENERAL AUSTIN AND THE

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/13/11

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8192 DTG: 241847Z OCT 83 PSN: 068036

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IF THIS SITUATION IS NOT RECTIFIED. THE NATIONS OF THE OECS HAVE UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO PURSUE A COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA AND HAVE FORMALLY REQUESTED UNITED STATES SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT A SIMILAR REQUEST WAS TO HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

I AM WRITING TO INFORM YOU THAT I AM GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE OECS REQUEST. ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1983, I DISPATCHED A SPECIAL EMISSARY, AMBASSADOR FRANCIS MCNEIL, TO BRIDGETOWN TO CONFER WITH PRIME MINISTER ADAMS AND OTHER OECS AND CARIBBEAN LEADERS REGARDING THEIR PLANS. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY ASSEMBLED FORCES IN BARBADOS FROM THE VARIOUS ISLAND NATIONS. AMBASSADOR MCNEIL HAS INFORMED PRIME MINISTER ADAMS THAT THE UNITED STATES FIRMLY ENDORSES THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THEIR PROPOSED OPERATION; NAMELY, TO RESTORE ORDER AND SECURITY SO AS TO PERMIT THE FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD HOLD EARLY ELECTIONS.

WE BELIEVE THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA COULD BE A KEY FIGURE IN THIS OPERATION, SINCE HE IS THE ONLY REMAINING VOICE OF LEGITIMACY ON THE ISLAND AND SHOULD BE THE ONE WHO DESIGNATES A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. SUCH A GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE LANDS IN GRENADA. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS BE HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO RE-ESTABLISH A TRULY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

AMBASSADOR MCNEIL HAS ALSO CONSULTED WITH THE CARIBBEAN STATES ON THEIR INTENTION TO REQUEST AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, IN WHICH THEY WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING AN ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT.

I WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF ANY ROLE THE UNITED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8192 DTG: 241847Z OCT 83 PSN: 068036

STATES MAY DECIDE TO PLAY IN SUPPORT OF THE ISLAND NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN. I WILL, THEREFORE, UNDERTAKE TO INFORM YOU IN ADVANCE SHOULD OUR FORCES TAKE PART IN THE PROPOSED COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE, OR OF WHATEVER POLITICAL OR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WE PLAN TO PURSUE. IT IS OF SOME ASSURANCE TO KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR ADVICE AND SUPPORT ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

0632

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

25618

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0000 DTG: 242200Z OCT 83 PSN: 068035
SIT560 AN009163 TOR: 297/2216Z

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2

OP IMMED
DE WTE #0000 2972216
O 242200Z OCT 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CABINET OFFICE

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH08195

DEAR MARGARET,

IN A MESSAGE TO YOU EARLIER TODAY, I EXPRESSED MY DESIRE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO A FORMAL REQUEST BY THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECs) TO SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATE IN A COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE, ORDER, AND DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA. I HAVE DECIDED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS REQUEST. I UNDERSTAND THAT BARBADOS AND JAMAICA HAVE ALSO RESPONDED FAVORABLY.

OUR FORCES WILL ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN GRENADA. THE COLLECTIVE CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCE WILL DISEMBARK ON GRENADA SHORTLY THEREAFTER. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS INFORMATION TO THE SECURITY OF THESE OPERATIONS AND THE SAFETY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

WE WILL INFORM YOU OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR. OTHER ALLIES WILL BE APPRISED OF OUR ACTIONS AFTER THEY ARE BEGUN.

I EXPECT THAT A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORMED IN GRENADA SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE ARRIVES. WE

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NLRR FOL-050/1 #25618

~~SECRET~~

BY RW NARA DATE 1/13/11

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0000 DTG: 242200Z OCT 83 PSN: 068035

HOPE THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN US BY EXTENDING SUPPORT TO GRENADA'S NEW LEADERS. THE UNITED KINGDOM CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN STRENGTHENING THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BY OFFERING POLITICAL SUPPORT AND BY PROVIDING A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

RON

0255

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

25619

PAGE 01 OF 03 CABINET OFFICE 0001 DTG: 250102Z OCT 83 PSN: 068037
SIT562 AN009165 TOR: 298/0103Z

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DE WTE24 #0001 2980102
O 250102Z OCT 83
FM CABINET OFFICE

T-1

TO WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TWO MESSAGES ABOUT GRENADA.

I WAS ABOUT TO REPLY TO YOUR EARLIER MESSAGE INVITING MY THOUGHTS
WHEN YOUR SECOND ONE ARRIVED.

I MUST TELL YOU AT ONCE THAT THE DECISION WHICH YOU DESCRIBE
CAUSES US THE GRAVEST CONCERN.

I MUST ASK YOU TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS INTO ACCOUNT.

(A) THE ONLY JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH IS LIKELY
TO SEEM CREDIBLE IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD IS THE NEED TO
PROTECT THE SAFETY OF US AND BRITISH CITIZENS.
THE REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM GRENADA SO FAR
SUGGEST THAT THE LIVES OF THESE CITIZENS ARE NOT AT RISK.
THEY COULD BE PUT VERY MUCH AT RISK IF AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO TAKE
THE ISLAND BY MILITARY FORCE.

(B) THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS RECEIVED NO FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE OECS.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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(C) JAMAICA AND BARBADOS ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE OECS.

(D) OUR INFORMATION IS THAT CARICOM, WHICH INCLUDES THE MEMBERS OF THE OECS, WAS DIVIDED IN ITS VIEWS WHEN IT MET YESTERDAY, THAT A MAJORITY WERE AGAINST A RESORT TO FORCE AND THAT THE DECISION TAKEN WAS TO ADOPT A SERIES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES INSTEAD.

(E) I HAVE A PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA. AS THE QUEENS REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ISLAND HE IS IN A VERY DELICATE POSITION. HE TOLD A BRITISH OFFICIAL WHO VISITED GRENADA ON 23 OCTOBER THAT IF HE MADE ANY MOVE WHICH DIRECTLY CHALLENGED THE AUTHORITY OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL, HE WOULD PROBABLY BE KILLED. IN A DISCUSSION TODAY OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN GRENADA, HE STRESSED THE POSITIVE EFFECT THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEASURES COULD HAVE ON AUSTIN.

(F) WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP WHO COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE AFTERMATH OF A MILITARY OPERATION (BISHOP HIMSELF WAS, OF COURSE, A MARXIST AND WAS IN POWER UNCONSTITUTIONALLY).

(G) THIS ACTION WILL BE SEEN AS INTERVENTION BY A WESTERN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SMALL INDEPENDENT NATION, HOWEVER UNATTRACTIVE ITS REGIME. I ASK YOU TO CONSIDER THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR WIDER EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND OF THE FACT THAT WE WILL BE HAVING IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO PRESENT TO OUR PARLIAMENT AND PEOPLE THE SITING OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THIS COUNTRY. I MUST ASK YOU TO THINK MOST CAREFULLY ABOUT THESE POINTS. I CANNOT CONCEAL THAT I AM DEEPLY DISTURBED BY YOUR LATEST COMMUNICATION. YOU ASKED FOR MY ADVICE. I HAVE SET IT OUT AND HOPE THAT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE YOU WILL TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE EVENTS ARE IRREVOCABLE.

YOURS EVER,

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 CABINET OFFICE 0001

DTG: 250102Z OCT 83 PSN: 068037

MARGARET THATCHER.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25620

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Free UK

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8211
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DTG: 250656Z OCT 83 PSN: 068033
TOR: 298/0459Z

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DE WTE #8211 2980459
O 250656Z OCT 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

(3)

TO CABINET OFFICE

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH08211

DEAR MARGARET,

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE ON GRENADA. I HAVE WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY THE ISSUES YOU HAVE RAISED AND HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS.

I CONTINUE TO BE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF OUR CITIZENS. THE VIOLENT EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE CAUSED A LARGE NUMBER OF THEM TO SEEK ANY POSSIBLE MEANS OF EVACUATION. GIVEN THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING MILITARY COUNCIL, AND ITS PROVEN BRUTALITY, WE ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT THE SITUATION WILL HOLD MUCH LONGER. I WELL APPRECIATE THE DANGERS INHERENT IN A MILITARY OPERATION TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THESE CITIZENS, BUT, ON BALANCE, I SEE THIS AS THE LESSER OF TWO RISKS. IN THIS REGARD YOU MAY BE SURE THAT WE WILL COMPLY FULLY WITH YOUR REQUEST THAT WE SAFEGUARD ALL BRITISH CITIZENS. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION HAS GONE INTO OUR OPERATIONAL PLANNING TO PROTECT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

ON OCTOBER 23 I RECEIVED A FORMAL REQUEST IN WRITING FROM THE OECS ASKING FOR OUR SUPPORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE

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NLRR FDI-050/1 #25620

SECRET

BY RW NARA DATE 1/13/11

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8211 DTG: 250656Z OCT 83 PSN: 068033

SITUATION IN GRENADA. JAMAICA AND BARBADOS HAVE GIVEN THEIR STRONG SUPPORT. QUITE FRANKLY, THIS REQUEST HAS WEIGHED HEAVILY IN MY CONSIDERATION ON WHETHER TO COMMIT US FORCES. WITH SO CLEAR AN EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE NATIONS OF THE REGION I WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN EITHER TO THEM OR TO OTHERS WHO DEPEND UPON US WHY WE HAD NOT ACTED.

FINALLY, I HAVE ALSO WEIGHED U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN MY DECISION. AS YOU KNOW WE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY GRENADA'S RECENT DRIFT INTO THE SOVIET BLOC. THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE DONE NOTHING TO EASE OUR CONCERNS. TO THE CONTRARY, IT IS CLEAR THAT GRENADA HAS NOW BEEN TAKEN OVER BY A GROUP OF LEFTIST THUGS WHO WOULD LIKELY ALIGN THEMSELVES WITH CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO AN EVEN GREATER DEGREE THAN DID THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THE ARRIVAL MONDAY IN GRENADA OF A HIGH LEVEL CUBAN DELEGATION HIGHLIGHTS THIS CONCERN. THE ALTERNATIVE TO DECISIVE ACTION ON OUR PART MAY WELL BE TO ALLOW THE IMPOSITION BY THE CUBANS OF A REGIME WHOSE ACTIONS WOULD BE EVEN MORE INIMICAL TO OUR INTERESTS. IN OUR VIEW, RELYING UPON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS WOULD PROVIDE TIME FOR CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO CONSOLIDATE THE POSITION OF THE NEW REGIME.

AGAIN, I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS; I SHARE MANY OF YOUR CONCERNS, BUT BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE OUTWEIGHED BY THE FACTORS OUTLINED ABOVE. I WOULD HOPE THAT AS WE PROCEED, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OECS COUNTRIES, WE WOULD HAVE THE ACTIVE COOPERATION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WILL EXERCISE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO FORM AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD RESTORE DEMOCRACY TO GRENADA AND FACILITATE THE RAPID DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

WARM REGARDS,
RON

0522

SECRET

25621

Free UK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 LONDON 2997
EOB982 AN010943

DTG: 261416Z OCT 83 PSN: 070569
TOR: 299/1532Z CSN: HCE922

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S E C R E T LONDON 22997

NODIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON,
OTTAWA
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, GJ, UK
SUBJECT: GRENADA: BRITISH THOUGHTS ON ROLE OF GOVERNOR
-- GENERAL AND NEXT STEPS
REF: (A) STATE 305204, (B) LONDON 22880

1. (SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR MORNING OF OCTOBER 26, FCO PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY ACLAND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF USG HONORING CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. HE SAID HMG IS NOW BEGINNING TO ADDRESS FUTURE STEPS, INCLUDING ROLE OF COMMONWEALTH, BUT ADDED THAT SHORT-TERM WORRY WAS DAMAGE LIMITATION IN EMERGENCY PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE OCTOBER 26. END SUMMARY.
3. ACLAND WELCOMED NEWS IN THE MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO HOWE OF THE SAFETY OF GOVERNOR GENERAL SCOON, AND ALSO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S PHONE CALL TO HOWE ON OCTOBER 25.
4. HE REITERATED POINTS BRITISH MINISTER THOMAS HAD BEEN ASKED TO MAKE IN WASHINGTON TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE ABSOLUTE IMPORTANCE THAT USG NOT SEEK TO PUT HIM IN AN UNTENABLE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL POSITION. HMG FEARS PRECIPITATE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL COULD PUT HIS AND OTHER BRITISH LIVES AT RISK.
5. ACLAND COMMENTED THAT GOVERNOR GENERAL'S ROLE AND THAT OF QUEEN AND HMG ARE AMBIGUOUS GIVEN LACK OF VALID CONSTITUTION. FCO LAWYERS ARE LOOKING AT OPTIONS BUT ACLAND UNDERScoreD THAT HMG WOULD BE GUIDED BY COMMON SENSE AND BY DESIRE TO WORK TOWARDS IMPROVED FUTURE FOR AREA. ACLAND SAID FCO IS FOCUSsing ON FOLLOWING PRIORITIES: A) PACIFICATION OF GRENADA; B) RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT; AND C) MOVING TOWARDS ELECTIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FDI-050/1 #25621

BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 LONDON 2997

DTG: 261416Z OCT 83 PSN: 070569

6. ACLAND SPECULATED THAT AFTER THINGS CALM DOWN A BIT IT WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE FOR THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO IDENTIFY A GROUP TO FORM AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO LEAD THE WAY TO ELECTIONS. ~~IN THIS PROCESS~~ THE FCO AND THE QUEEN'S PRIVATE SECRETARY WOULD EXPECT TO PLAY AN OFFICIAL ADVISORY ROLE. ACLAND STRESSED THAT USG SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY WITH HMG ON THIS MATTER AND HE URGED THAT WE NOT SIMPLY PRESENT GOVERNOR GENERAL WITH LIST OF PEOPLE AND ASK HIM TO ACT QUICKLY.

7. IN CONCLUSION ACLAND SAID HMG WAS TRYING TO ADDRESS POSITIVE FUTURE STEPS AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A ROLE IN THE PROCESS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH ~~SECRETARIAT AND PERHAPS FOR CANADA~~ HE ALSO THANKED WASHINGTON FOR EFFORTS TO KEEP HMG INFORMED ABOUT EVOLVING SITUATION. THE ONE PRACTICAL CONCERN RAISED BY ACLAND WAS WHETHER GRENADAN MILITIA COULD BE DISPERSED OR CONTROLLED AND WORRY THAT THEY MIGHT TAKE TO HILLS AS AN EFFECTIVE GUERRILLA FORCE TYING DOWN US FORCES, SINCE IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT SMALL OECS FORCES WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE CARE OF SUCH A SITUATION, LOUIS
BT

~~SECRET~~

1933 OCT 26 PM 12:23

October 26, 1983

7671

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED PHONE CALL

Summer
25622
Free UK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of England

DATE: October 26, 1983

RECOMMENDED BY: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

PURPOSE: To consult about the Grenada situation and its implications for our wider interests.

BACKGROUND: The British have been unhappy over what they consider lack of advance consultations with regard to Grenada. Mrs. Thatcher has made her unhappiness known to you in a phone call and by message. As we move into the next phase in Grenada it is crucial that Britain support us, particularly in regard to the establishment of an interim government. Britain's stance will also influence the position of European governments. A brief phone call should help smooth over differences and pay longer term dividends.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION
1. Appreciated the opportunity to correspond and discuss personally Grenada. Understand your concerns. Governor General is safe.

2. Even though we disagreed with some of your Falklands position, we understood the broader imperative of standing behind a key Ally with fundamental interests at stake. We hope we can count on your support. We cannot let a fissure develop between us. If transatlantic differences emerge our enemies could exploit them.

3. In the case of Grenada, important U.S. and world interests are at stake. Also vitally concerned about the welfare of U.S. citizens. Moreover, had to honor a request for help and support from our Caribbean friends.

4. In the days ahead Britain's role will be critical as Grenada returns to democracy. We need your government's active cooperation in assisting an interim government. I have asked George Shultz to discuss our plans in detail on the margins of MNF Foreign Ministers Meeting in Paris later this week.

Date of Submission:

Action: Call made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CC Vice President

BY RUS
NLRN MDR-207#25622
NARA DATE 6-16-10
DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

October 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*

SUBJECT: Recommended Phone Call to Margaret Thatcher

I recognize that in dealing with the Grenada situation immediate relations with our European Allies must be secondary. However, after reviewing the exchange of correspondence between the President and Mrs. Thatcher I believe the President should again call her to protect our long term interests both in the Caribbean and Europe.

When I discussed this earlier in the day with John Poindexter and Bob Kimmitt, they both felt that in light of the President having already spoken and corresponded with Mrs. Thatcher a phone call was not necessary.

I recognize how burdened the President is, but I believe a phone call is well worth the few minutes it would take. As we move to some form of interim government in Grenada the British will have a crucial role to play. Moreover, on non-European issues the Europeans normally consult within the EC context and look to the EC country with the most direct interests -- in this case the U.K. -- in formulating their position. Furthermore, I believe there is a Commonwealth Conference coming up in the next few weeks where the U.K.'s role will be important. So let's call Mrs. Thatcher. In my view, we need the President's personal touch.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the recommended telephone call at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Tab I Recommended Phone Call

DF Fortier and Oliver North concur.

(not walkable)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOL-050/1 #25623

BY RW NARA DATE 1/13/11

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Sommer

SECRET

ACTION

October 27, 1983

*Free
UK*

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain

Attached for your review and approval is a summary of the President's conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher on October 26. I believe we should provide State a copy of our summary.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the summary to State.

Approve _____

Disapprove *[Signature]*

Tab I Kimmitt to Hill
Tab A Memcon of Phone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *dlb* NARA, Date *10/3/05*

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Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Thatcher (C)

Attached for your information is a summary of the President's
phone conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher on October 26.
It should be accorded highly restricted circulation. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Tab A Memcon of Telephone Conversation

*We do not send
these to State.*

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 10/31/05

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ronald Reagan
 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain

DATE, TIME: October 26, 1983
 AND PLACE: 1:28 - 1:38 p.m.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Hello, Margaret Thatcher here.

President Reagan: If I were there Margaret, I'd throw my hat in the door before I came in.

Prime Minister Thatcher: There's no need to do that.

President Reagan: We regret very much the embarrassment caused you, and I would like to tell you what the story is from our end. I was awakened at 3:00 in the morning, supposedly on a golfing vacation down in Georgia. The Secretary of State was there. We met in pajamas out in the living room of our suite because of this urgent appeal from the Organization of East Caribbean States pleading with us to support them in Grenada. We immediately got a group going back here in Washington, which we shortly joined, on planning and so forth. It was literally a matter of hours. We were greatly concerned, because of a problem here -- and not at your end at all -- but here. We have had a nagging problem of a loose source, a leak here. At the same time we also had immediate surveillance problem -- without their knowing it -- of what was happening on Cuba to make sure that we could get ahead of them if they were moving; and indeed, they were making some tentative moves. They sent some kind of command personnel into Grenada.

Incidentally, let me tell you that we were being so careful here that we did not even give a firm answer to the Caribbean States. We told them we were planning, but we were so afraid of this source and what it would do; it could almost abort the mission, with the lives that could have endangered.

When word came of your concerns -- by the time I got it -- the zero hour had passed, and our forces were on their way. The time difference made it later in the day when you learned of it. For us over here it was only 5:30 in the morning when they finally landed and at last we could talk plainly. But I want you to know it was no feeling on our part of lack of confidence at your end. It's at our end. I guess it's the first thing we have done since I've been President in which the secret was actually kept until

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 BY RW NARA DATE 1/13/11

it happened. But our military and the planning only had -- I really have to call it a matter of hours -- to put this together. I think they did a magnificent job. Your Governor General and his wife are safe. One of our primary goals was to immediately sequester him for his safety. He is safe in our hands down there.

Prime Minister Thatcher: I know about sensitivity, because of the Falklands. That's why I would not speak for very long even on the secret telephone to you. Because even that can be broken. I'm very much aware of sensitivities. The action is underway now and we just hope it will be successful.

President Reagan: We're sure it is. It's going beautifully. The two landings immediately took the two airfields. Then we managed to secure that medical school, St. Georges Medical School, where we have about 800 students. We've moved on, but there is still some combat. All those several hundred Cuban construction workers down there must have been military personnel or reserves, because, and as I told you, we got word that a little group had arrived before we could get anything underway. They looked like they were pretty prominent Cubans because they were being treated with great deference. They turned out to be a military command and the opposition that still remains, as of the last word we have here -- in about three spots on the Island -- is led by those Cubans. They are the leading combat forces, not the Grenadian forces. We have captured 250 of them already.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Well let's hope it's soon over Ron, and that you manage to get a democracy restored.

President Reagan: We're very hopeful that it is going to be short and then your role is going to be very critical, as we all try to return Grenada to democracy under that constitution that you left them. The leader that was murdered, and of course those that murdered him, have abandoned that constitution.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Well the constitution, I'm afraid, was suspended in 1979.

President Regan: Yes, that's when Bishop made his coup and took over. We think he was murdered because he began to make some noises as if he would like to get better acquainted with us. He no more got back on the Island -- he was here and visited our State Department -- and he was murdered. The people who murdered him are even further over in the Cuban camp. So things would be worse, not better, for the people on Grenada.

Prime Minister Thatcher: That is right. Is there any news about Coard, his rival?

President Reagan: No. The man that seems to be out in front is named Austin. We believe that the same thing has happened to Coard that happened to Bishop. We won't be sure of that until we get the situation controlled, but we have the radio stations, so we can communicate with the people. They have just these three spots and we're very optimistic. There have been very limited casualties, certainly on our side. We don't want a lot of casualties on the Grenadian side. The troops that are out in front now seemed to be those several hundred Cubans. We know that you and through the Queen's Governor General there -- all of us together -- can help them get back to that constitution and a democracy.

Prime Minister Thatcher: I just hope Ron, that it will be very soon and that they will manage to put together a government which can get back to democracy.

President Regan: Those people on those other islands are pretty remarkable. I had with me Prime Minister Charles when I made the announcement to the press here that our forces are on shore and D-Day has happened.

Prime Minister Thatcher: I know her. She's a wonderful person.

President Reagan: She certainly is. She's captured our city by storm. She's up on the Hill meeting with some of our Congress right now. And then, Adams, from Barbados, we are getting him up here. We've gotten both of them on some of our television shows so they can talk to the people. We are getting him on, we've had her on. He's a remarkable man also.

Prime Minister Thatcher: He is a very cultured man and very wise. He's been in politics for a long time.

President Reagan: Yes. Mrs. Charles doesn't even have an army. She did away with an army completely. She has a police force. She told me that her constables in her police force were coming in from out in the country and asking her if they couldn't go with the forces to Grenada.

Prime Minister Thatcher: They wanted to help.

President Reagan: They all feel -- and dating from the days when they were under the Crown -- she used the expression: kith and kin. I don't know if that's one of our expressions or one of yours.

Prime Minister Thatcher: It's one of ours.

President Reagan: Well, we still use it here. We still have the heritage. She used that several times to describe their feelings. They have no feeling of the people on the other islands being foreigners. They still think of themselves as all one group. We want to put them out ahead in helping with the restoration of a government, so there will be no taint of big old Uncle Sam trying to impose a government on them.

Prime Minister Thatcher: There is a lot of work to do yet, Ron.

President Reagan: Oh yes.

Prime Minister Thatcher: And it will be very tricky.

President Reagan: We think that the military part is going to end very shortly.

Prime Minister Thatcher: That will be very, very good news. And then if we return to democracy that will be marvelous.

President Reagan: As I say, I'm sorry for any embarrassment that we caused you, but please understand that it was just our fear of our own weakness over here with regard to secrecy.

Prime Minister Thatcher: It was very kind of you to have rung, Ron.

President Reagan: Well, my pleasure.

Prime Minister Thatcher: I appreciate it. How is Nancy?

President Reagan: Just fine.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Good. Give her my love.

President Reagan: I shall.

Prime Minister Thatcher: I must return to this debate in the House. It's a bit tricky.

President Reagan: All right. Go get 'em. Eat 'em alive.

Prime Minister Thatcher: Good-bye.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR UK
SUBJECT: UK POSITION ON POSITION OF GOVERNOR GENERAL
- OF GRENADA

1. ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL.

2. UK AMBASSADOR WRIGHT CALLED ON ME OCTOBER 26 TO PRESENT NOTE (TEXT IN PARA 7 BELOW) EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF GOVERNOR GENERAL. TONY MOTLEY AND TOM NILES SAT IN ON MEETING. IN PRESENTING NOTE, WRIGHT EXPLAINED THAT UK AUTHORITIES HAD NO POWER TO OFFER ADVICE OR EVEN LESS GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO GOVERNOR GENERAL. HOWEVER, SINCE GOVERNOR GENERAL IS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE QUEEN, THE SOVEREIGN IN GRENADA, "THE PALACE" COULD COMMUNICATE WITH THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. WRIGHT ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY QUESTIONS WE WISHED TO POSE TO GOVERNOR GENERAL AND SAID THAT LONDON WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ASSISTANCE WE COULD PROVIDE IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT BETWEEN UK AUTHORITIES AND THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

3. I SAID WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO GET HMG IN TOUCH WITH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL. TONY MOTLEY SAID THAT WE HAD DETERMINED THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WAS IN A HOUSE NEAR THE AIRPORT AND ADDED THAT WE WOULD SEEK THROUGH AMBASSADOR BISH IN BARBADOS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT BETWEEN GOVERNOR GENERAL AND UK HIGH COMMISSIONER.

4. WRIGHT ASKED WHETHER THE US HAD GIVEN THOUGHT TO THE "POST-MILITARY PHASE" IN GRENADA. I SAID WE HAD CONSIDERED QUESTION, AS HAD THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES, BUT HAD COME UP WITH NO ANSWERS THUS FAR. I NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT WE HAD NO "PRE-COOKED GOVERNMENTS," TO WHICH MOTLEY ADDED THAT SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO MIGHT WELL BE CANDIDATES FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT WERE AT LAST REPORT IN THE PRISON, WHICH HAD NOT YET BEEN LIBERATED. WRIGHT SUGGESTED THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE SOME IDEAS OF HIS OWN REGARDING PERSONALITIES FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT WE WOULD SEND UK NOTE TO YOU AND THAT

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BY RW NARA DATE 6-16-10

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FOLLOWING YOUR RETURN FROM PARIS WE WOULD WISH TO SIT DOWN WITH THE AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS SUBJECT IN DETAIL. IN CONCLUSION, I ASKED WHETHER WRIGHT HAD ANY INFORMATION ON HOW UK WOULD VOTE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. WRIGHT SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION, TO WHICH I RESPONDED THAT WE ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN THIS POINT.

6. FROM EAGLEBURGER AND MOTLEY: IN QUICK READING IT APPEARS THAT THE BRITISH NOTE GIVES US GREAT LATITUDE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH OUR LEGAL PROBLEMS. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IS VIRTUALLY AN INDEPENDENT AGENT. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES -- AND WITH THE PROPER CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM WORKED OUT WITH THE BRITISH -- THIS GIVES US THE FLEXIBILITY THAT WE NEED.

7. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UK NOTE.

GRENADA: POSITION OF GOVERNOR GENERAL

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WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IS MAKING A BROADCAST THIS EVENING ANNOUNCING THAT UNDER ARTICLE 57 OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER HE HAS ASSUMED CHARGE OF THE ADMINISTRATION. WE THINK THAT THIS IS PROBABLY IN ORDER.

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IN OTHER RESPECTS, OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS. THE 1973 GRENADA CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER WAS SUSPENDED BY THE DECLARATION OF THE GRENADA REVOLUTION OF 28 MARCH 1979. BY PEOPLE'S LAWS NO. 3 AND NO. 16. THE HEAD OF STATE REMAINED HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN AND THE GOVERNOR GENERAL CONTINUED TO BE HER REPRESENTATIVE AND PERFORMED SUCH FUNCTIONS AS THE CABINET OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT FROM TIME TO TIME ADVISED. HE ALSO PERFORMED, BY VIRTUE OF PEOPLE'S LAW NO. 18, CERTAIN FUNCTIONS RELATED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC OFFICERS UNDER REVIVED PORTIONS OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION. THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY GOVERNMENT WAS DEPOSED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL WHICH, AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, ENACTED NO LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S FUNCTIONS. THIS LEFT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN OFFICE AS HER MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVE BUT, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SOURCE OF ADVICE STIPULATED BY EXISTING LAW, IN EFFECT IN A VACUUM. IN THE EVENT THAT THE MILITARY COUNCIL IS NOW DEPOSED, THIS VACUUM WILL REMAIN.

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IN THIS SITUATION, IT WOULD BE PROPER FOR THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO TAKE STEPS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING, SO THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN GRENADA MAY BE CARRIED ON:

A) TO ISSUE A PROCLAMATION APPEALING FOR A CESSATION OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF PUBLIC ORDER. HE MIGHT ALSO WISH TO APPEAL TO THE HOLDERS OF CERTAIN OFFICES TO REMAIN AT THEIR POSTS;

B' TO CALL TOGETHER A GROUP OF RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS CHOSEN BY HIM WHO MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACT AS AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE TO RESTORE ORDER, TO ENSURE THAT THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT MAY PROCEED AND TO INTRODUCE INTERIM CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED, INTER ALIA, TO LEAD TO THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS TO ELECT A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD, IN TURN, INTRODUCE NEW LONG TERM CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

IN DECIDING WHEN AND WHETHER TO TAKE ALL OR ANY OF

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THESE STEPS, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE RIGHT FOR THE
GOVERNOR GENERAL TO HAVE REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL SAFETY.

BRITISH EMBASSY
26 OCTOBER 1983

END TEXT OF UK NOTE DAM
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OTTAWA FOR SECDEF PARTY ONLY, PARIS FOR BURT ONLY
E. O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, INF, UK
SUBJECT: INF: PUBLIC HANDLING OF GLCM DELIVERIES

REFS: (A) STATE 303860, (B) STATE 304013

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE HAVE ALREADY COMMENTED ON THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY MINISTER HESELTINE TO PARLIAMENT AND ON OTHER HMG SUGGESTIONS REGARDING PUBLIC HANDLING OF THE EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES. PER REFTEL, WE WISH TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH HMG ON INFORMING OTHER ALLIES OF THE INITIATION OF GLCM EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES IN THE UK ON NOVEMBER 1. EMBASSY SHOULD THEREFORE IMMEDIATELY CONTACT APPROPRIATE FCO AND MOD OFFICIALS TO CONVEY FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE SCENARIO FOR INFORMING OTHER ALLIES, AS WELL AS THE PUBLIC LINE WE WOULD TAKE HERE:

3. WE BELIEVE THE UK AND US SHOULD MAKE A COORDINATED EFFORT TO INFORM OTHER ALLIES THAT GLCM EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES ARE BEGINNING IN THE UK AS OF NOVEMBER 1. TO MINIMIZE THE CHANCES OF LEAKS THAT WOULD PREEMPT HMG'S PLANS FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES AND WHICH WOULD GIVE INF OPPONENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ORGANIZE PROTESTS, WE PROPOSE THAT EACH CAPITAL SEND CABLES TO ALL ITS POSTS IN ALLIED CAPITALS THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 30 FOR DELIVERY TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AT OPENING OF BUSINESS ON OCTOBER 31. THESE CABLES WOULD CONTAIN THE PUBLIC LINE THAT EACH OF US PLANS TO TAKE. SO THAT HMG CAN COORDINATE ITS EFFORTS WITH OUR OWN, WE ARE PROVIDING BELOW THE DRAFT OF THE CABLE WE WOULD SEND TO OUR EMBASSIES IN NATO CAPITALS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE BRITISH COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT CABLE NO LATER THAN OPENING OF BUSINESS WASHINGTON TIME FRIDAY, OCTOBER 28.

4. WITH RESPECT TO OUR PRESS LINE, WE BELIEVE THE ALLIANCE MUST STEER A MIDDLE COURSE BETWEEN TAKING JUSTIFIABLE PRIDE IN SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

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1979 DECISION, AND AVOIDING STATEMENTS OR ACTIONS THAT FACILITATE SOVIET EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY DEPLOYMENTS AND MILITARY COUNTERACTIONS TO THE DEPLOYMENTS, OR THAT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR OTHER ALLIES TO TAKE THE STEPS REQUIRED OF THEM IN COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS TO CARRY FORWARD THE ALLIANCE DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM.

5. THUS, WE SUGGEST THAT OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES EMPHASIZE SEVERAL THEMES:

-- THAT EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES ARE THE LATEST STEP IN A LENGTHY ALLIANCE PROCESS WHICH BEGAN WITH THE 1979 DECISION AND WOULD CONCLUDE WITH COMPLETION OF THE DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM IN 1988;

-- THAT NATO HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS, UNDER THE TERMS OF A BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE INF AGREEMENT, TO REVERSE MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS ALREADY MADE;

-- THAT THE U. S. AND ALLIES BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA CAN AND SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED, INCLUDING BEYOND THE END OF THE YEAR IF NECESSARY.

6. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT US CABLE TO ALLIED CAPITALS:

TO: ALL NATO CAPITALS.

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. INITIAL DELIVERY OF GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT WILL BEGIN IN THE UK ON NOVEMBER 1. SINCE THE DELIVERIES WILL BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT TO THE PUBLIC AND MAY GENERATE CONSIDERABLE PRESS INQUIRIES IN ALLIED CAPITALS AS WELL AS LONDON AND WASHINGTON, WE WISH TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS ON PUBLIC HANDLING OF THE EVENT.

3. THEREFORE, EMBASSIES SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT FOREIGN MINISTRY AND DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THE PUBLIC HANDLING MATERIALS BELOW. IN PASSING THESE MATERIALS, YOU SHOULD STRESS TO HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT THE MATERIALS ARE STRICTLY EMBARGOED FOR USE UNTIL AFTER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS CONFIRMED TO THE BRITISH PUBLIC ON NOVEMBER 1 THAT EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES HAVE BEGUN. IN PARALLEL WITH OUR OWN EFFORTS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL BE CONTACTING HOST GOVERNMENTS TO INFORM THEM OF THE IMPENDING INITIATION OF EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES AND OF THE PUBLIC LINE HMG PLANS TO TAKE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO ANY PRESS INQUIRIES PRIOR TO THE BRITISH ANNOUNCEMENT TO ITS PUBLIC, WE URGE THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS NOT GO BEYOND NOTING THAT DEPLOYMENT PREPARATIONS ARE PROCEEDING THROUGHOUT THE FALL IN ORDER TO MEET THE SCHEDULE ESTABLISHED IN THE 1979 DECISION.

5. ONCE THE BRITISH HAVE PUBLICLY CONFIRMED ON NOVEMBER 1, THAT DELIVERIES OF GLCM MISSILES AND TELS HAVE BEGUN, USG SPOKESMEN WOULD PLAN TO DRAW ON THE

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FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. HOST GOVERNMENTS MAY DRAW ON THESE AS APPROPRIATE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS THEY MAY RECEIVE, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY ON INF, AND IN PARTICULAR THE NEED FOR ALL TO SUPPORT THOSE ALLIES WHO ARE TAKING THE LEAD ON INF DEPLOYMENTS.

5. BEGIN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Q1: CAN YOU CONFIRM REPORTS THAT DELIVERY OF GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT HAS BEGUN IN THE UK?

A1: I CAN CONFIRM THAT, IN COORDINATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES TODAY HAS BEGUN DELIVERY OF GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, PURSUANT TO THE 1979 NATO DECISION ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL.

THESE INITIAL DELIVERIES ARE THE LATEST STEP BY THE ALLIES TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1979 NATO DECISION. BASING FACILITIES FOR GLCM HAVE BEEN UNDER CONSTRUCTION SINCE 1980. TRAINING EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES WERE BEGUN IN 1982. THESE LATEST DELIVERIES ARE THUS PART OF A PROCESS THAT BEGAN WITH THE 1979 DECISION AND WOULD EXTEND UNTIL 1988, WHEN, UNLESS MODIFIED BY THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT WE ARE SEEKING, THE ALLIANCE'S LRINF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION.

THE U. S., IN CLOSE AND INTENSIVE CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES, HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS IN GENEVA TO REACH AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. THE UNITED STATES AND ALLIES REPEATEDLY HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS FOR AN AGREEMENT ARE ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA AND THAT THE OPPORTUNITY EXISTS FOR AN INF AGREEMENT THIS FALL. IF AGREEMENT CANNOT BE REACHED BY THE END OF 1983, THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE AS LONG AS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. THE ALLIES REPEATEDLY HAVE STRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HALT, MODIFY OR REVERSE DEPLOYMENTS -- INCLUDING REMOVAL OF MISSILES ALREADY DEPLOYED -- IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE INF AGREEMENT.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT AS A RESULT OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCING NATO'S RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT WAS INITIATED IN THE 1979 DECISION, APPROXIMATELY FIVE NUCLEAR WARHEADS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE FOR EVERY NEW ONE INTRODUCED UNDER THE LRINF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. THIS INCLUDES THE REDUCTION OF OVER 1200 U. S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS ANNOUNCED BY ALLIED DEFENSE MINISTERS AT THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING LAST WEEK IN CANADA, THE 1000 U. S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS REMOVED FROM EUROPE IN 1980 AS PART OF THE 1979 DECISION, AND THE ONE-FOR-ONE WITHDRAWAL OF WARHEADS AS EACH NEW GLCM OR PII IS DEPLOYED. THEREFORE, EVEN THOUGH THE GOAL OF AN INF AGREEMENT ESTABLISHED BY THE 1979 DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN ACHIEVED, THE ALLIANCE IS MAINTAINING AND

FURTHERING THE PROCESS, BEGUN IN 1979, OF REDUCING THE NUMBER OF U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

PREPARATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODERNIZATION TRACK OF THE 1979 DECISION WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE FALL IN THE FRG, ITALY AND THE UK, AND LATER IN BELGIUM

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AND THE NETHERLANDS, IN ORDER TO MEET THE SCHEDULE ESTABLISHED BY THE 1979 DECISION.

CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

DEPLOYMENTS:

Q2: WHAT DO THE EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES CONSIST OF? DOES THIS INCLUDE NUCLEAR WARHEADS? TO WHAT LOCATION ARE THEY BEING DELIVERED IN THE UK?

A2: THE SHIPMENTS INCLUDE MISSILES AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT. THE GLCM IS A NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEM. THE U.S. NEITHER CONFIRMS NOR DENIES THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT ANY SPECIFIC LOCATION. THE EQUIPMENT IS BEING DELIVERED TO GREENHAM COMMON ROYAL AIR FORCE BASE.

Q3: DOES THIS CONSTITUTE "DEPLOYMENT", OR DOES THAT OCCUR WHEN THE MISSILES BECOME OPERATIONAL? WHEN WILL THE MISSILES BE OPERATIONAL?

A3: THE ALLIES HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT DEPLOYMENTS WILL BEGIN BY THE END OF 1983 UNLESS AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT OBTAINING DEPLOYMENTS IS ACHIEVED. DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT IS ONE STEP IN THE PROCESS OF DEPLOYMENT. THE GLCM SYSTEM WILL BE OPERATIONAL BY THE END OF 1983.

Q4: WHAT ABOUT EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES TO GERMANY AND ITALY? WHEN DO THEY BEGIN?

A4: PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENTS WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE FALL IN THE FRG, ITALY AND THE UK. INITIAL DELIVERIES OF MISSILES WILL BEGIN IN THOSE COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS STATED, SUCH DELIVERIES WILL NOT BEGIN IN THE FRG BEFORE NOVEMBER 21.

Q5: THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT HAS PASSED A RESOLUTION WHICH SAYS THAT MISSILES CANNOT BE DELIVERED BEFORE A DEBATE BY THE BUNDESTAG, WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE ON NOVEMBER 21. WHY COULDN'T YOU HOLD UP DELIVERIES TO THE UK UNTIL THEN?

A5: THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. LRINF MISSILES IS A COMPLICATED PROCESS INVOLVING TWO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS AND DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS AND SITUATIONS IN EACH OF THE BASING COUNTRIES. IN ORDER TO MEET THE SCHEDULE FORESEEN IN THE 1979 DECISION, THERE INEVITABLY HAS BEEN SOME VARIATION IN THE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING FOR EACH OF THE INITIAL BASING COUNTRIES. REGARDING THE UK AND ITALY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES HAS REQUIRED CONSTRUCTION OF WHOLLY NEW FACILITIES. IN CONTRAST, THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II MISSILES TO GERMANY INVOLVES REPLACEMENT OF AN EXISTING SYSTEM; THUS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO USE THE EXISTING PERSHING I INFRASTRUCTURE IN GERMANY FOR THE PERSHING II DEPLOYMENT. I WOULD NOTE THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT DEPLOYMENTS WILL BEGIN ON SCHEDULE IN GERMANY AFTER THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE, UNLESS THERE ARE CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA THAT WOULD ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENTS.

Q6: WHAT DO YOU EXPECT TO BE THE SOVIET REACTION TO THESE DEPLOYMENTS? WILL THEY WALK OUT OF THE TALKS?

A6: THE U.S. HAS REMAINED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE FOR TWO YEARS WHILE SOVIET SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS HAVE

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CONTINUED; WE SEE NO EXCUSE FOR THEM TO DISRUPT NEGOTIATIONS NOW THAT NATO MODERNIZATION HAS BEGUN. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING FOR AS LONG AS IT TAKES TO ACHIEVE AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, AND THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, WE ARE PREPARED TO REMOVE AND DESTROY ANY MISSILES ALREADY DEPLOYED.

Q7: WHY NOT DELAY DEPLOYMENTS A FEW WEEKS TO GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS A CHANCE? WHY HAVE YOU TAKEN THIS STEP NOW?

A7: IT HAS BEEN NEARLY FOUR YEARS SINCE THE 1979 DECISION AND NEARLY TWO YEARS SINCE THE INF NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN IN GENEVA. THE ALLIES REPEATEDLY HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT DEPLOYMENTS WOULD TAKE PLACE BY THE END OF THE YEAR IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE RESULTS THAT WOULD ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENTS. A FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE SOVIET POSITION HAS BEEN TO BLOCK NATO MODERNIZATION WHILE PRESERVING THEIR SUBSTANTIAL MONOPOLY OF LRINF MISSILES; THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE THAT DELAYING U. S. DEPLOYMENTS WOULD MAKE THE SOVIETS ANY MORE WILLING TO ACCEPT AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT, AND SUBSTANTIAL REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE REVERSE WOULD BE THE CASE. DELAY WOULD ELIMINATE ANY INCENTIVE FOR THEM TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

Q8: THE SOVIETS HAVE THREATENED TO TAKE MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES IF U. S. DEPLOYMENTS BEGIN. DO YOU EXPECT THEM TO CARRY OUT THESE THREATS?

A8: I DO NOT WANT TO SPECULATE ON WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WILL TAKE ANY SPECIFIC ACTIONS. CERTAINLY, ANY MILITARY STEPS WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED GIVEN THE ENORMOUS SOVIET NUCLEAR BUILD-UP THAT HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOVIETS NOW CLAIM THAT THEY WILL INTRODUCE NEW SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES INTO EASTERN EUROPE AS A COUNTERMEASURE TO NATO'S INF DEPLOYMENTS. IN FACT, THIS IS PART OF A CONTINUING PROGRAM IN WHICH THEY ARE REPLACING THEIR SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ALREADY DEPLOYED THERE WITH NEWER MODELS. THEY ARE USING NATO'S DEPLOYMENTS AS A PRETEXT; THEY HAVE NEVER OFFERED TO FOREGO THIS MODERNIZATION REGARDLESS OF THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

Q9: WHAT ABOUT THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE? WILL THESE DEPLOYMENTS CREATE MORE DEMONSTRATIONS?

A9: WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE DEMONSTRATORS WOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS THE U. S., IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES, THAT HAS OFFERED AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ELIMINATE THE ENTIRE CATEGORY OF LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILES, AS WELL AS AN INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT WOULD REDUCE THE WARHEADS OF BOTH SIDES TO EQUAL GLOBAL LEVELS. IT IS THE SOVIET UNION THAT SO FAR HAS REFUSED THESE OFFERS, INSTEAD SEEKING AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL, THREATENING MONOPOLY OF LRINF MISSILES. NEVERTHELESS, WE AND THE ALLIES ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN INF AGREEMENT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OECS, GJ, UK
SUBJECT: GRENADA: BRITISH THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS

1. (SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DURING CONVERSATION CONCERNING BRITISH DESIRE TO CONTACT GOVERNOR GENERAL SCOON (SEPTTEL), FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY URE SPECULATED TO DCM ABOUT THE FUTURE BRITISH ROLE. WHILE THESE WERE "PERSONAL THOUGHTS" THEY SEEM TO REFLECT EVOLVING BRITISH THINKING ABOUT GRENADA.

3. URE EMPHASIZED THAT FIRST STEP MUST BE CONTACT BETWEEN THE PALACE AND GOVERNOR GENERAL SCOON. AS THE QUEEN'S AGENT, SCOON ORDINARILY WOULD TAKE ADVICE FROM GRENADIAN MINISTERS, BUT LACKING SAME, IT SEEMS LOGICAL THAT HE WOULD HELP TO IDENTIFY CANDIDATES FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL REQUIRE HIS BEING IN TOUCH WITH THE QUEEN.

4. REGARDING ADDITIONAL HELP FOR THE RESTORATION OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND THE PROVISION OF SECURITY FOR GRENADA, URE STRESSED THAT HMG FELT THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. HE HOPED THAT, IN SPITE OF A CRITICAL COMMENT BY COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL RAMPHAL, THE US WOULD TRY TO KEEP RAMPHAL IN THE GAME.

5. URE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT US FORCES WOULD BE ABLE TO GET OUT QUICKLY AND COULD BE REPLACED BY SOME TYPE OF COMMONWEALTH FORCE WITH A MORE "INDIGENOUS LOOK." HE THOUGHT RAMPHAL COULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN THIS EFFORT. MOREOVER, HE REMINDED US THAT THE QUEEN IS THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND WEARS MANY SEPARATE CROWNS INCLUDING ONE AS "QUEEN OF GRENADA." HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT BRITAIN DID NOT FEEL IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR HMG TO TAKE A PROMINENT ROLE SINCE GRENADA IS AN INDEPENDENT COMMONWEALTH NATION RATHER THAN "A BRITISH ISLAND."
LOUIS
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NLRR MD8-207 #25627

BY RW NARA DATE 6-16-10

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

October 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peer*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Price Requests an Appointment

Charlie Price, who is back in Washington to prepare for his confirmation hearings as U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, has asked via the State Department for an appointment with you on November 2 or 3.

I know of no overriding reason for you to meet with him, but as you know, he is close to the President, and indeed will be seeing him, I am told, while in Washington.

Should you wish to meet with him there are several ways we could handle it. For example, you could meet briefly with him privately, or we can set up a meeting in the Situation Room, which would include Jack Matlock and myself, and you could utilize the Judge Clark "drop-by" technique.

If your schedule only allows time for one European Ambassador next week, I would prefer that you agree to Abshire's request (NSC Log 7210) since there is a specific purpose associated with it.

RECOMMENDATION

Schedule permitting, that you meet with Ambassador Price on November 2 or 3.

Approve

Disapprove

If approved, that you meet with him privately _____;

or conversely,

In the Situation Room accompanied by Sommer and Matlock. *h h*

J Matlock Jack Matlock concurs.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guide Inc, August 28, 1997

alb

NARA, Date 10/3/05