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**Collection:** European and Soviet Affairs  
Directorate, NSC: Records  
**Folder Title:** Reykjavik (1)  
**Box:** RAC Box 12

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC  
: RECORDS

**Withdrawer**

MJD 4/27/2005

**File Folder** REYKJAVIK (1)

**FOIA**

F05-097

**Box Number** 90907  
*Box 12*

HARRIS, WILLIAM

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9080	MEMO	STEVE STANOVICH TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE ICELAND PRE-SUMMIT <b>R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</b>	2	9/30/1986	B1
9081	PAPER	RE GOALS <b>D 8/31/2006 NLRRF05-097</b>	3	10/2/1986	B1 B3
9082	PAPER	RE REYKJAVIK <b>R 8/31/2006 NLRRF05-097</b>	4	10/2/1986	B1
9083	PAPER	RE POSITION <b>PAR 8/31/2006 NLRRF05-097</b>	4	10/2/1986	B1 B3
9084	PAPER	RE REYKJAVIK (ANNOTATED) <b>R 8/31/2006 NLRRF05-097</b>		10/2/1986	B1
9085	NOTES	RE REYKAJVIK <b>R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</b>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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9086	NOTES	RE SCHEDULE <b>R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</b>	2	ND	B1
9087	PAPER	<b>D 8/31/2006 NLRRF05-097</b>	6	10/2/1986	B1 B3
9088	PAPER	RE POSITION <b>R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</b>	3	ND	B1
9090	DRAFT CABLE	RE MEETING IN ICELAND <b>R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</b>	2	ND	B1
9092	PAPER	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (ANNOTATED) <b>R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</b>	3	10/3/1986	B1

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 30, 1986

~~SECRET~~

## INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *RS*

SUBJECT: The Iceland Pre-Summit

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR *FOS 097 + 9080*BY *CN* NARA DATE *11/21/07*

The ambiguous end of the Danilooff affair makes it crucial that the President bolster his position in the Reykjavik run-up. Charges that he accepted a swap won't go away, and the early date of the next meeting may imply the Soviets can extract concessions in return for a summit. That Gorbachev proposed the meeting could also leave the impression that he's now controlling the action. Remembering Geneva, he will certainly try to put us on the defensive, and make the meeting a test of US seriousness. If they can weaken the President publicly in this way, the Soviets will be inclined to drive a much harder bargain.

These concerns suggest some guidelines for the meeting:

- 1) Don't emphasize the summit date. Making this the goal of the meeting invites Gorbachev to toy with us and suggests we don't take substantive differences seriously. The President will gain by stressing substance, and even (as with Peres) by feigning indifference on the date. The meeting can be a "success" if it clears away the accumulated underbrush, and leaves the two sides in position for a productive summit. A date is less important, and (unless Gorbachev wants to set it) should be handled "through channels."
- 2) Grant that differences have built up. While hoping for progress, we should stress that on some issues our message hasn't gotten across. The President wants to set things straight, e.g., on human rights: he'll tell Gorbachev he's not sure that "quiet diplomacy" is working and that there will be real problems in his visit unless emigration goes up. Broad theme: the Soviets should stop screwing around.
- 3) Show the President is in charge. Gorbachev calculates that this meeting will get our system moving (Shultz said as much today). The President should be known to tell his staff he doesn't want to see proposals to negotiate with ourselves just to get agreements. The group with him in the meetings at Reykjavik should also be extremely small.
- 4) Keep spying (but not spies) on the agenda. The espionage issue can't really be put behind us. To round out this week's events, we might background that the President is angry that the Soviets think they can spy with impunity, and will offer Gorbachev some ideas on the issue. We should also note that the 25

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR



names will not be changed. Leaving this issue open will only put the President under pressure to cave in Iceland.

5) Avoid a storm with allies. An INF deal that alarms the allies would be especially costly if caused by haste just to produce a good result at Reykjavik. (It'd also make it much harder for us to affect what happens when Gorbachev visits Japan.) With too little time for real advance consultations beyond a Presidential letter, the meeting must leave us flexibility to take allied views into account later.

Despite recent contacts and communications, we remain uncertain as to what will happen in this meeting. We don't know what Gorbachev's minimal requirements for a summit are, and how he will react if they are not met. As a result, the sessions could be somewhat tenser than in Geneva, and the Soviets more insistent on concessions.

The President should prepare for this in two ways: first, by repeating publicly that the idea of paying for a summit is simply out of the question; and secondly, by making clear that he too expects tough exchanges because the issues dividing the two sides are themselves very tough. Gorbachev has many reasons of his own to make the meeting a "success," but if it doesn't go well the President must not seem to be taken by surprise.

cc: Peter Rodman  
Bill Cockell  
Rod McDaniel  
Jack Matlock  
Bob Linhard

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2 October 1986

HOW TO MAXIMIZE YOUR LEVERAGEUnderstand What Gorbachev Wants

His main goals for now and the future: To deflect your administration away from defense and foreign policies that challenge the USSR (e.g., SDI and support of anti-communist rebels), or, failing that, to create political pressures in US and NATO that will assure you are followed by a more accommodating president.

His goals at Reykjavik: Minimum goal is to keep up the political process of dialogue, including prospects for summits (but not necessarily agreement to a date) so that he can continue pursuing his main goals. Maximum outcome he aims for would be a few areas of agreement for a follow-on summit (e.g. INF) plus some movement by you toward the Soviet position that SDI should be reliably blocked to facilitate nuclear force reductions. He wants, but doesn't really expect the latter at this point.

He also has a negative goal: He does want to let you look like your managing US-Soviet relations effectively without making concessions. If Gorbachev has or hears from his colleagues any skepticism about his tactics, it's exactly on this point. This is way he isn't interested in a summit without serious agreements.

Overall aim in policy toward the US is to recreate something like detente and the 1970s arms control environment so that he can manage his economic difficulties more easily and predictably, while not paying for this by significant changes in Soviet foreign, military, and other policies.

Know what Gorbachev thinks is his leverage on you.

He thinks you, or the rest of Washington, want a summit more than he does. He wants to exploit this.

He believes (from Geneva and your correspondence) that you really want a breakthrough toward a nuclear reductions agreement. He wants you to accept his terms, most importantly, backing away from SDI.

He sees that you are committed to your goals personally, but also believes you are susceptible to appeal on grounds of "fairness" and "put yourself in my shoes."

He sees the US government and Congress disorganized and fractious, but capable of pressuring you toward his positions, especially if the pace of negotiations is fast. He expects Reykjavik to add to that pressure, and also that getting you away from the "hard-liners" in Washington may help.

**DECLASSIFIED**NLRR F05-097-19082~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

1

BY CIS NARA DATE 8/31/06



He believes that US economic sluggishness, budget problems, decline in popularity of defense, and coming elections in 1986 and 1988 put you -- or others in the administration -- under some pressure to move toward Soviet terms now.

Gorbachev may believe that the impending mid-term elections put exceptional pressure on you at Reykjavik because -- with all the controversies in Congress -- you won't want to come back from a meeting that Gorbachev can advertise as a failure.

Know your sources of leverage on Gorbachev, and their limits.

Gorbachev wants and needs detente/arms control for two reasons. First, he saw how such a situation muffled all US challenges to the USSR in the 1970s, giving it a freer hand in the world. Second, and very important for the 1990s, he needs it to control the burden of defense so he can better revive his economy.

But these pressures/desires are not so acute in the short term to force Gorbachev to accept US terms right now, especially if they involve concessions on Soviet superpower aims (e.g., holding on to communist regimes) or accepting new US challenges (e.g., SDI).

Gorbachev needs the process of dialogue -- including the prospect of summits, but not necessarily their occurrence -- to put pressure on you and the bureaucracy for concessions. He'll take pains to maintain the process (like proposing the Reykjavik meeting when the Daniloff case threatened everything).

But this does not mean he'll make major substantive concessions or that he desperately needs a summit. He'll dangle the next summit to encourage you to make the next move.

Gorbachev needs to show the Soviet people, his party elite, his colleagues and the world that he is a statesman to be reckoned with, tough but reasonable and pragmatic, ready for business but able to defend Soviet vital interests and prestige.

Gorbachev has enough power in the Politburo to take foreign policy pretty much where he thinks necessary. Only major concessions or very risky moves would get him in political trouble now.

How to maximize your leverage at Reykjavik

Be realistic about your own goals in communicating. You will not get Gorbachev to see the rightness or wisdom of your arguments on basic things like the SDI, the Third World, or human rights. You can, however, convince him that you are committed and can get enough popular support to stay the course, and that he has somehow to come to terms with this.

Know your own strengths: American economic and technological vitality, the stability (if not predictability) of our political system, the strength of a truly voluntary alliance, the great power of a US president to lead.

In stating your positions on issues, emphasize your commitment and ability to get support for your positions.

For example, your proposal on space arms is very visionary, bold, and generous. If it were fully explained to the American people, rejection of this proposal would look small minded, and Gorbachev won't be able to get away with the argument that you are "militarizing space" or seeking "superiority." If he challenges the proposal on grounds of practicality, say that you're quite eager to discuss practical application.

Don't be defensive or apologetic about your positions on issues sensitive to the USSR, e.g., human rights. At the same time, avoid moralistic attacks on the USSR because this will evoke a counterpunch especially from the Gorbachev personality.

Human rights is a good example for do's and don'ts with Soviet leaders. The right psychological approach is to assert our case because we believe it morally and because we see, in very hard-headed political terms, the link between Soviet efforts to tyrannize at home and abroad. The wrong approach is to say you must raise human rights because of domestic or congressional pressure or, at the other extreme, that Gorbachev must see the evil of Soviet human rights policies.

Gently communicate your willingness to downgrade the importance of formal summits if they get in the way of real substantive negotiations. Such a signal would alarm Gorbachev because he thinks your eagerness for another summit is his prime leverage on you.

Ask him some challenging questions, but in as non-provocative a manner as possible. For example,...

Why doesn't he at least discuss the possibility of a controlled transition to defensive arms like you propose? He can reserve judgment until a dialogue has taken place.

Why does he claim that the communists in Afghanistan are defending a popular revolution when obviously all the people hate it?

We have heard reports that Gorbachev wanted personally to explain Chernobyl to the Soviet people right after the disaster. Why did he wait more than two weeks before going on TV? An American president would not want to act like nothing had happened. [This is a key point for Gorbachev because it gets at his economic policies and his policy of "openness." If you're careful about it, you may get an honest response, one political leader to another.]

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Be alert to and deflect ploys designed to get at what Gorbachev may think are your soft sentimental spots.

For example, in Geneva he took you aside to drop hints about an impending earthquake in California and how the Soviets could help predict it. Your reaction of low-keyed interest was about right.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



2 October 1986

GORBACHEV'S POSITION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

General Secretary Gorbachev will be coming to the meeting in Iceland in a strong domestic political position, and will be able to exercise broad latitude in negotiating and tactics. He wants to cut a deal on arms control in part to advance his long-term economic agenda, but is under little immediate economic or political pressure to reach a quick agreement and would probably prefer to shelve the US visit than concede too much in Iceland.

Since your last meeting Gorbachev has strengthened his position in the leadership.

- He has added additional allies to the Politburo and put remaining Brezhnev holdovers on the defensive.
- Although there were reports of tension between Gorbachev and the number two man in the party--Ligachev--last year, recent evidence indicates that Ligachev supports the full range of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies.
- Gorbachev's month long summer vacation in the Crimea, his extensive plans for foreign travel over the coming year, and especially his vigorous pursuit of a summit suggest that he feels politically secure and self confident.

Over the past year Gorbachev also enhanced his power over the decisionmaking process by gaining operational control over the central party apparatus, particularly in the foreign policy sphere.

- At the party congress in March, Gorbachev successfully packed the Secretariat--the party's executive arm. All but three of the ten other members of this key body gained their positions under Gorbachev.
- Gorbachev tightened his already strong grip over foreign policy by building up Dobrynin's department in the Secretariat as a counterweight to the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR 105-097 #9083

BY CIS NARA DATE 8/31/06

SECRET

Major elements of Gorbachev's domestic policy--the discipline campaign and anti-corruption measures--have enhanced the KGB's role and by most accounts KGB chief Chebrikov appears to be an ally.

For now, moreover, Gorbachev also appears to have the backing of the military for his economic strategy.

- He has successfully muzzled forces in the military that put top priority on current defense needs and won support for his strategy that Soviet long-term security interests require building up the country's overall economic base.
- He told top military leaders in July 1985 that the party runs the military, and that if they can't use their resources better he will find generals who will--subsequently he made a number of top-level changes in the military.

Gorbachev's new foreign policy team is pressing a strategy of arms control primarily to undercut long-term pressure for increased defense expenditures.

- His economic strategy requires keeping a lid on current defense spending in order to modernize the economy and allow it to compete more successfully with the US over the long haul.
- To this end he wants a stable, predictable relationship with the US.
- He does not need an "agreement" for its own sake and will hold out for terms that advance these objectives, e.g., blocking SDI.
- At the same time he appears to have a more realistic appreciation than past Soviet leaders that he may not be able to get such an agreement cheaply, even though he will try.

Gorbachev's efforts to pursue this strategy have almost certainly led to some arguments over specific moves and skepticism in some quarters about the wisdom of his approach--particularly to summitry. But, he does not appear to face concerted opposition to his foreign policy. While the Politburo ultimately decides Soviet foreign policy, it appears to be giving him considerable leeway to take the lead.



- Gorbachev's letter to you proposing the Iceland meeting indicates that the Politburo has given him a mandate to conduct negotiations even though there is no promise of success.
- He has demonstrated his ability to get approval of controversial arms control measures, such as the nuclear testing moratorium and concessions on INF, that impinge on the interest of the military.
- In making foreign policy he does not have to contend with the large number of entrenched and powerful bureaucratic interests of the sort that impinge on his ability to shift domestic policy. The Soviet foreign policy apparatus is very small.
- Most Politburo members have little experience in foreign policy and are more concerned with domestic policy issues that directly affect their own spheres of influence.

A positive summit would clearly be a plus for Gorbachev at home, and would give him political momentum he could transfer to his domestic agenda. But even though his Politburo colleagues are giving Gorbachev wide latitude to negotiate with you, he will still need to convince them that the results of the meeting advance Soviet interests.

- The other Politburo members are politically independent and Gorbachev cannot automatically count on their support; [REDACTED]

- Since your last meeting he appears to have been spending a lot of time defending his US policy.
- Some reports suggest Gorbachev drew criticism in the Politburo following your Geneva meeting for not achieving more tangible results.

If he missteps in the negotiations with you--for example by being perceived as too accommodating--he would damage his political position at home, limiting his future freedom of action in the foreign policy sphere and making it more difficult to confront entrenched interests at home.

- Unhappiness with the results of the meeting, particularly within the military, could provide ammunition for opponents who are threatened by his domestic policies and want to limit his power.



It is perhaps for this reason that Gorbachev chose to seek a meeting with you outside the United States to explore--first hand--whether there are real prospects for concrete agreements addressing Soviet concerns.

- If he can't get results in Iceland that advance his longer term objectives, Gorbachev would put the Washington summit on hold for now, arguing that more preparation is necessary to make it successful and hoping that the delay will bring pressure on the US to be more forthcoming.

2 October 1986

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOS-097 #9084

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BY AV NARA DATE 8/31/06

*not much I've  
here -  
marked a  
few  
useful  
pts*



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based in Kiev  
past

DECLASSIFIED/RET

NLRR F95-097 #9085

BY C1 NARA DATE 1/21/04

- "anti Sov"

- human rights

- activist  
physicist

- 31

- arrested '82

7 struct

+ 5 internatls

- Longest serving female

- Recently transferred back to  
Kiev prison from labor camp.

- Pressured to recount?

- One of 5 or 6 of short list of most  
prominent human rights

- Brits in particie

- Husband in Igor Gorishenko

- Main case
- Pub is believes, but human rights.

-



World wide audience to Paul (Hawley?)

## Press books?

Presence ~ Summer

- USIA <sup>two lines</sup>

- official letter State to submit

Briefing Books - on track

Press ~~Books~~ Books

- Human Rights Outlook

- Ref + Jewish leaders

- Wed remarks

- 9th Nitzke + Ridgway brief NAC

- 12th Pres message to NATO + Australia

- 13th Shultz brief NATO

- Russian? how

EEur? Not sure if will do.

- Movie - How the Sons Played Geneva.

Says } - 4 } Sherv, Dobrynin, Yakobov, Chernoyev  
besides } Rosa Gorbachev  
Gorbachev }

all in one locate - Uptn Guest House.

- agree to Press blackout.

- 4 press

arrival, Thanks, Fri  
meetings with Seidenberg

- photo opp at first session Sat, Speech to troops  
IDF Commander (old out) , <sup>could give highlights</sup>

- Dinner Sat night? Fri

NLRR F95-097 #9086

CFS 11/21/07

Thurs

9 Depart

1 pm local arrival

8 pm arrive Amb-Nuise house  
(Pres res)

Fri

- Briefings + consults

- ~~Courtesy~~ meetings with Icelanders  
5:05-5:30- Icelandic Pres  
PM

Sat

10:30-12:30 1st session at Uddi

3:30-5:30 2nd " "

Sund

11-1 final session

res depart 2 pm for base

3 pm arrive base

15-30 min address?

45 min drive Rey to airport

Sunday news talk show (assuming Pres  
talks end in time.)

- copy of world wide cable.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

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9087 PAPER

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~~SECRET NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON~~

BY CA NARA DATE 11/21/07

# GORBACHEV'S POSITION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

General Secretary Gorbachev will be coming to the meeting in Iceland in a strong domestic political position, and will be able to exercise broad latitude in negotiating and tactics. He wants a deal on arms control in part to advance his long-term economic agenda, but is under little immediate economic or political pressure to reach a quick agreement and would probably prefer to shelve the U.S. visit than concede too much in Iceland.

Since your last meeting Gorbachev has strengthened his position in the leadership.

- He has added additional allies to the Politburo and put remaining Brezhnev holdovers on the defensive.
- Although there were reports of tension between Gorbachev and the number two man in the party--Ligachev--last year, recent evidence indicates that Ligachev supports the full range of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies.
- Gorbachev's month long summer vacation in the Crimea, his extensive plans for foreign travel over the coming year, and especially his vigorous pursuit of a summit suggest that he feels politically secure and self confident.

Over the past year Gorbachev also enhanced his power over the decision making process by gaining operational control over the central party apparatus, particularly in the foreign policy sphere.

- At the party congress in March, Gorbachev successfully packed the Secretariat--the party's executive arm. All but three of the ten other members of this key body gained their positions under Gorbachev.
- He has built up Dobrynin's department in the Secretariat as a counterweight to the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

Major elements of Gorbachev's domestic policy--the discipline campaign and anti-corruption measures--have enhanced the KGB's role and by most accounts KGB chief Chebrikov appears to be an ally.

For now, Gorbachev also appears to have the backing of the military for his economic strategy.

- He has successfully muzzled forces in the military that put top priority on current defense needs and won support for his strategy that Soviet long-term security interests require building up the country's overall economic base.

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- He told top military leaders in July 1985 that the party runs the military, and that if they can't use their resources better he will find generals who will-- subsequently he made a number of top-level changes in the military.

Gorbachev's new foreign policy team is pressing a strategy of arms control primarily to undercut long-term pressure for increased defense expenditures.

- His economic strategy requires keeping a lid on current defense spending in order to modernize the economy and allow it to compete more successfully with the U.S. over the long haul.
- To this end he wants a stable, predictable relationship with the U.S.
- He does not need an "agreement" for its own sake and will hold out for terms that advance these objectives, e.g., blocking SDI.
- At the same time he appears to have a more realistic appreciation than past Soviet leaders that he may not be able to get such an agreement cheaply, even though he will try.

Gorbachev's efforts to pursue this strategy have almost certainly led to some arguments over specific moves and skepticism in some quarters about the wisdom of his approach-- particularly to summitry. But, he does not appear to face concerted opposition to his foreign policy. While the Politburo ultimately decides Soviet foreign policy, it appears to be giving him considerable leeway to take the lead.

- Gorbachev's letter to you proposing the Iceland meeting indicates that the Politburo has given him a mandate to conduct negotiations even though there is no promise of success.
- He has demonstrated his ability to get approval of controversial arms control measures, such as the nuclear testing moratorium and concessions on INF, that impinge on the interest of the military.
- In making foreign policy he does not have to contend with the large number of entrenched and powerful bureaucratic interests of the sort that impinge on his ability to shift domestic policy. The Soviet foreign policy apparatus is very small.
- Most Politburo members have little experience in foreign policy and are more concerned with domestic policy issues that directly affect their own spheres of influence.



A positive summit would clearly be a plus for Gorbachev at home, and would give him political momentum he could transfer to his domestic agenda. But even though his Politburo colleagues are giving Gorbachev wide latitude to negotiate with you, he will still need to convince them that the results of the meeting advance Soviet interests.

- The other Politburo members are politically independent and Gorbachev cannot automatically count on their support; in unpublished remarks Gorbachev has referred to the "clashes" and "arguments" that go on in the Politburo.
- Since your last meeting he appears to have been spending a lot of time defending his U.S. policy.
- Some reports suggest Gorbachev drew criticism in the Politburo following your Geneva meeting for not achieving more tangible results.

If he mistakes in the negotiations with you--for example by being perceived as too accommodating--he would damage his political position at home, limiting his future freedom of action in the foreign policy sphere and making it more difficult to confront entrenched interests at home.

- Unhappiness with the results of the meeting, particularly within the military, could provide ammunition for opponents who are threatened by his domestic policies and want to limit his power.

It is perhaps for this reason that Gorbachev chose to seek a meeting with you outside the United States to explore--first hand--whether there are real prospects for concrete agreements addressing Soviet concerns.

- If he can't get results in Iceland that advance his longer term objectives, Gorbachev would put the Washington summit on hold for now, arguing that more preparation is necessary to make it successful and hoping that the delay will bring pressure on the U.S. to be more forthcoming.



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NIACT IMMEDIATE Telegram to:

ACTION: NATO Capitals; USNATO, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Canberra, Islamabad

INFO: All Diplomatic Posts

SUB: Meeting of President and Gorbachev in Iceland

1. At 10:00 A.M. Washington time today, the President made the following announcement:

(quote)

2. Action posts should immediately brief the highest available officials of the host government, using the following talking points:

-- The meeting will be a private and informal session to review the agenda for General Secretary Gorbachev's trip to the United States.

-- Mr. Gorbachev proposed the meeting, making it clear that it is not to take the place of his visit to the United States, but is for the purpose of making concrete preparations for his meetings in the United States.

-- The President accepted Mr. Gorbachev's proposal since he wished to stress his commitment to real progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.

-- We consider it symbolically important that Mr. Gorbachev suggested holding the meeting on the soil of a member of the NATO Alliance. We are most appreciative of the willingness of the Government of Iceland to make their facilities available for the meeting.

-- The upcoming meeting does not imply any change in U.S. substantive positions previously conveyed to our friends and Allies.

-- The President will, of course, address the key issues across the range of the U.S.-Soviet agenda: regional conflicts, arms control, human rights and the expansion of contacts.

-- Since this will be a preparatory meeting, no agreements are expected.

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*not sent  
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-- (for Allied governments only) We will continue to keep the Allies informed as we prepare for the meeting, and will continue to consult with them on the issues which may arise.

3. INFO posts may, at their discretion, draw on the points above (except the last) in briefing host governments.



~~SECRET~~

Public Diplomacy Strategy for Iceland Meeting

Oct 3  
Latest draft was done by Handel

Because of the short lead time and nature of the meeting -- i.e. private and substantive -- our public diplomacy strategy should neither hype them nor downplay Reykjavik. Reykjavik should be treated as a serious effort on the President's part to cut through the obstacles in the US-Soviet relationship, and to lay the groundwork for progress on our entire agenda.

Parameters

- Press and public focus will be on arms control issues, now that Daniloff irritant removed.
- Soviets will play up arms control, particularly their moratorium proposal to avoid having to make significant concessions in other areas of interest to the US. We will, therefore, need to ensure that other issues, such as regional conflicts, human rights and contacts/bilateral matters are kept in the forefront. We will also want to place public emphasis on what we see as the real arms control priority -- deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals.

US Objectives

- Keep public expectations realistic by stressing the preparatory nature of the meetings and that no agreements are expected in order to relieve pressures for "breakthroughs" or US concessions in order to reach agreements.
- Focus public attention on our four part agenda -- not only arms control -- and make clear that we are looking for Soviet actions not merely formal agreements.
- Portray U.S. attitude toward a summit as hopeful but not overeager.
- Deflect charges of recalcitrance, especially in arms control, by pointing out (as appropriate) US initiatives. Position ourselves to put onus on Soviets for lack of progress.
- Preserve perception of unity with allies.

Press and Public Materials

USIA has pointed up the need for more public materials on our objectives in the non-arms control areas, particularly background/information papers. These are being prepared by State and USIA, and will be disseminated to all USG spokesmen and our

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Embassies and key military commands for both public affairs officers and political officers. A shortened version of the Press Book prepared for the Geneva Summit is also being prepared by State and NSC.

In addition, a paper on arms control, entitled "Arms Control Update", was drafted by State and is being cleared interagency for use on the Hill and with constituents. This could be expanded to include material on the bilateral, human rights and regional issues, or separate papers done. Finally, between now and next week, at least one Op Ed piece on our Iceland objectives should be prepared and placed in the Times or Post, and USIA should seek to do the same in major papers in Europe. USIA and State will provide additional suggestions for backgrounders, worldnets, interviews, including some Presidential exposure in major European media, which will be coordinated with Larry Speakes office.

-- TASS has submitted a request for a Presidential response to their correspondents' questions on nuclear testing: we should use this to try to get points into the Soviet press about our broad 4-part agenda.

#### Press Plan and Concept

As was the case prior to Geneva, all USG officials will be instructed to adhere totally to the press guidance provided by the President's own statements and approved by the White House and Department of State. No official will be authorized to originate public statements regarding the Reykavik meeting, or to provide comments in background briefings that go beyond statements made publicly by the White House or Department of State. All written remarks concerning US-Soviet relations must be approved in advance by the White House or Department of State. Should public statements or background briefings or other U.S. Government officials on particular aspects of US-Soviet relations seem desirable, these may be undertaken only following the specific approval of the White House. Requests are to be submitted through the Operations Coordinating Committee of the NSC.

- Public discussion will be limited to very senior spokesmen through the weekend. Thereafter, case-by-case opportunities for qualified spokesmen. Arms control spokesmen, as well as others, to emphasize our other agenda areas, particularly human rights.
- Extensive, widely distributed talking points drawn from back-up for Presidential press conference, approved themes, and public statements by senior officials to be distributed and used.
- Very senior officials brief just before and after press blackout which coincides with talks.



## Themes

- Preliminary meeting's objective is to lay groundwork for future Gorbachev visit to US.
- President wants to identify areas where progress can be made by accelerating negotiating efforts.
- Reykjavik not a substitute for summit agreed upon last November. We expect Gorbachev to keep his part of the bargain.
- We will not sacrifice US interests in order to have a summit.
- We will focus on full range of issues, not just arms control. Overall US objectives remain:
  - o to encourage respect for human rights;
  - o to reduce arms and the risk of war.
  - o to reduce us and threat of force in solving regional problems;
  - o to broaden and deepen contacts and cooperation between our respective peoples; and
- No written agreements expected at Reykavik, nor necessary.
- Allied unity and strength are essential to achievement of our objectives.