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Jewish Emigration

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority NLR-170-17-21-8-3  
BY JN NARA DATE 3/1/2019

Total:

13,209 adults received visas to Israel during 1975.\* Compared with the 1974 total of 20,200 and the 1973 total of 34,780, the 1975 total marks a decline of 35% and 62%, respectively. With the addition of those who received a visa directly to the US, the Jewish emigrant total for 1975 is 13,789.

In terms of numbers of visas issued, the yearly totals of emigrants since 1970 describe a sharply rising, and almost as sharply falling curve.

The annual average for the 1960s, based on a range of 100 per year to 2900 per year, is 900. Thus,

1960s	900 average per year
1970	1000 total
1971	14,300
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Drop Out Rate

The drop out rate has become a problem of serious dimensions for Israeli demographic planners and for Israel's supporters. Of some 13,000 plus individuals with visas to Israel, only 8534 actually settled there while 4918 went elsewhere, thus maintaining a drop out rate for the year of some 37% according to Israeli figures. According to the count made at the Vienna transit point, the drop out rate may have reached as high as 46% for the year. Recent Soviet propaganda statements claim that the number of those

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applying for reentry to the Soviet Union has almost doubled from 574 in 1974 to over 1000 in 1975 and that fully 90% of emigrants wish to return. By recent official Soviet acknowledgment, however, only 300 persons have applied, and only 15 have been permitted, to return to the USSR. In any case, the drop out rate continued the high tendency begun late in 1974 and reached a high point of 47%, based on Israeli figures, in January 1976. If one judges by the Vienna figures, the number of those who dropped out in January 1976 may even have exceeded the number of those who went on to Israel. Most of those who settled elsewhere than Israel in 1975 came to the United States. These number some 4,789. Thus, Israel is obtaining a reduced share of a declining total at a time when its migration balance with the world as a whole is taking an unfavorable turn. In 1975 total Israeli immigration was about 20,000 as compared with about 32,000 for 1974 and 59,000 for 1973. At the same time emigration from Israel in 1975 was 18,500.

continued

Analyzed by geographic origin, the 1975 emigrants, <sup>group</sup> seems to come largely from the peripheral areas of the Soviet state, as shown by the following table.

	<u>Total Jewish Emigration for each area, 1975.</u>	<u>Area's Total as % of Grand Total of Jewish Emigration, 1975,</u>	<u>Area's Total Jewish Population as % of National Total of Jewish Population</u>
Baltic Republics	535	6.37%	3.0 %
White Russia	213	2.54	6.9
Central Asia	2384	28.40	7.3
Georgia	910	10.84	2.6
Great Russia	701	8.35	37.6
Moldavia	1132	13.48	4.6
Ukraine	1909	22.74	36.1
Other	611	7.28	1.1
Grand Total	<u>8395*</u>	100.00	<del>100.0</del> 99.2

\*Figures available only for those who ~~arrived in Israel~~ <sup>went on to</sup> <sub>from Vienna,</sub>

Thus only the Ukraine had a Jewish emigration figure anywhere near proportionate to its share of the total Soviet Jewish population, while Areas with relatively small Jewish populations contributed disproportionately large shares to the emigration. It is generally assumed that the disproportionate exodus of Jews from the peripheral areas of the country reflect a policy of letting out only rural, relatively uneducated Jews, and this assumption has some basis in officially expressed Soviet concern about a "brain drain" and in the small numbers permitted to leave Moscow and Leningrad which have large activist Jewish populations. Distribution of those who arrive in Israel by occupation, however, tends to dispute this assumption, and even points up the danger of a "brain drain."

Occupational Distribution for 1975

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage of Grand Total</u>
Students	110	1.3%
Unskilled Workers	257	3.1
Skilled Workers	1741	20.7
Professionals	1190	14.2
Without Occupation	4929	58.7
Grand Total	<u>8395</u>	100.0%

Allowing the large category "without occupation" to include children, the aged, and the disabled, the occupational distribution does not at all reflect a conscious effort by the regime to rid itself of the less useful citizens. Doctors, for example, account for 2% of the entire group, while engineers account for 5.5% with goodly numbers of such professionals as teachers, chemists, and economists also represented. By way of comparison, the ~~ratio~~ <sup>percentage</sup> of doctors and engineers to the Soviet population as a whole is .2% and 3.5% respectively.

It is true, however, that urban Jews do figure prominently among those who settle elsewhere. ↑ Israeli figures show the following drop out rates for Jews coming from four major cities:

Moscow	71.8%
Leningrad	72%
Kiev	70%
Odessa	91.6%

↑ For example, a comparison of a breakdown by area of origin of those issued visas in Moscow in October compared with a similar breakdown of arrivals in Israel for October and November (to eliminate the problem of overlap)

\*\*cont. below

If, as late indications have it, the proportion of urban Jews from the central provinces increases, the drop out rate will likely also increase, and recent evidence indicates a shift in the emigration pattern from the periphery to the center

Outlook: The actual magnitude of the Jewish emigration problem in the USSR over the coming years is hard to gauge. Although there are some 2.2 million Jews represented in the population, many, if not most, are, as Soviet propaganda asserts relatively contented citizens. Many of the complaints of would-be returnees about their alienation in the strange culture of Israel and the West, which are played up in Soviet propaganda, ring true, although such <sup>considerations</sup> arguments should not be permitted to obscure the true human rights issue involved: people who wish to move from one country to another--and even return--should be free to do so.

It is also difficult to gauge the <sup>emigration</sup> problem by means of the formal invitations sent from Israel to would-be emigrants in Russia. These "vyzovs" <sup>have been</sup> sent out at the rate of 3000-5000 per month. In 1975 a total of 34,145 were sent and 16,000 were revalidated (extended). Current estimates of the total valid vyzovs outstanding range up to 200,000. If it is likely true that not all Jews who receive them will use them, or even wish to receive them, it is probably also true that all would wish them do not receive them. It is certainly true that expiring vyzovs are renewed at a high rate since people apparently wish to keep <sup>open</sup> their option to emigrate, <sup>open</sup> In fact, recent information indicates a quickening in the rate of renewals.

As a consequence, the Jewish emigration issue is likely to remain a lively one for a long time to come even at present levels of emigration. The new Soviet regulations on emigration may have the effect of heartening would-be emigrants despite trials of refuseniks, and other harassments, <sup>including</sup> loss of jobs, etc, designed to hold down the application rate. The long term <sup>trend</sup> also depends, of course, on the nature of US-USSR relations and upon the economic and political fortunes of Israel.

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Table 1. Soviet Jewish Emigration 1973-74; Numbers of Emigrants With Visas for Israel<sup>1/</sup> (rounded numbers)

~~2376~~ ~~2271~~

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
January	2,700	2,400	1208	1064
February	2,400	1,600	1038	<del>1227</del>
March	2,600	2,000	825	
April	2,700	1,700	1291	
May	2,200	1,500	879	
June	2,300	1,500	1012	
July	2,300	1,500	980	
August	3,000	1,500	946	
September	3,700	1,600	1099	
October	4,300	1,900	1460	
November	3,500	1,500	1214	
December	3,100	1,500	1257	
Totals	<u>34,800</u>	<u>20,200</u>	<u>13,209</u>	
Monthly Average	2900.	1683	1100	

~~Notes for post~~  
~~Decade~~

<sup>1/</sup> These figures are for emigrants originally destined for Israel; they differ somewhat from statistics of arrivals in Vienna and in Israel.

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Arrivals*

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February	1565/143	890/405
March	1727/205	525/351
April	1596/260	671/437
May	1225/262	517/327
June	1226/277	679/407
July	1290/353	531/311
August	1318/327	620/338
September	1090/300	624/384
October	1400/350	673/555
November	1214/600	872/499
December	870/500	904/486
Total	16,900/3800	8534/4918

Drop Out Rate	16%	37%	47%
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of 6345. During the 1960s, German emigration averaged 350 per year; ~~after~~ the onset of Ostpolitik in 1970 the curve rose sharply for several years

1970	438
1971	446
1972	3313
1973	4436
1974	6345
1975	5752

As in the case of Jewish emigration, figures for January 1976 augur well, and in the German case even promise positive improvement. In that month 640 visas were issued--twice as many as in January 1975. If that rate continues throughout the year, the 1976 total will be more than 7500. <sup>for 1971-1975</sup> These figures ~~corroborate~~ <sup>generally agree with</sup> Soviet statistics which also show a decline, albeit a sharper one (to 4800) for the past year. For <sup>Overall</sup> Armenian emigration, we have only Soviet statistics. They show that unlike the Jews and Germans, the Armenians enjoyed a sharp upsurge in emigration for 1975 of some 60 % over 1974 totals.

1972	800
1973	1000
1974	1500
1975	2400

Curiously, the same Soviet figures also show a category of "other nationalities" which has steadily accounted for 3500 to 4000 emigrants yearly since 1972.

The figures for Soviet emigration to the US reflects the trends for Jewish and Armenian emigration. While emigration to the US rose again, as it has every year since 1970, to a 1975 total of 1162, the Armenian share of it rose to 39% of the total while the Jewish portion declined from 61% to 50% <sup>of the total.</sup>

Arriving in Israel/Settling Elsewhere

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
January	2377/186	899/355	482/424
February	1565/143	890/405	
March	1727/205	525/351	
April	1596/260	671/437	
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continued

# SOVIET JEWRY: PLIGHT AND PROSPECT

by  
Dr. William B. Korey, Director  
B'nai B'rith International Council

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DECLASSIFIED/Released

Authority NLR-170-17-21-92

BY JN NARA DATE 3/1/2019

## Introduction

With the rejection by the USSR of the Jackson amendment in December, 1974, the struggle on behalf of Soviet Jewry entered upon a new period, one of retreat and frustration, in contrast to the advance and enthusiasm that had characterized the previous four year period. Brussels II in February 1976 constituted but a pale reflection of Brussels I, held five years earlier. Periods of retreat have historically warranted a reexamination of basic issues in order to determine the change and direction of forces shaping the issues. The formulation of new strategies to correspond with the changes would ineluctably follow.

This paper is oriented to such a purpose. It explores the processes now taking place within Soviet Jewry and how those processes are related to the critical issues of Jewish consciousness and emigration. It examines the factors affecting Soviet policy on Jewish emigration and suggests the kind of strategies that might be pursued.

## Assimilation

A major characteristic of Soviet policy toward Jews especially since the thirties and with even greater vigor since World War II has been forcible assimilation, the dismantling of virtually every institutional structure to maintain a sense of identity and self-consciousness. The pulverization and obliteration of ethnic consciousness has gone on apace with results that are painfully evident. Ignorance of Jewish history and tradition is extraordinary, almost total, except in certain pockets, like the Western borderlands of the USSR, which were not fully incorporated into Soviet life until after World War II, or areas in the Caucasus or Central Asia which, for special reasons, the centralizing arm of Moscow did not or could not reach.

## Urbanization and Inter-marriage

The assimilation process has been accelerated by urbanization and mixed marriages. Ninety-eight per cent of the Jews live in urban areas, a far higher percentage than any other ethnic group. With the absence of distinctive ethnic neighborhoods in urban areas, it is scarcely surprising that the powerful force of assimilation would exert a maximum impact, particularly when no institutional means exist to resist it. (As for Birobidzhan, the so-called Jewish Autonomous Region, it never had much of a Jewish character. The Jews living there, in dispersed fashion, constitute but six per cent of the local population. As a percentage of the total Soviet Jewish population, Birobidzhan's Jewish inhabitants -- only 11,000 -- are numerically negligible.)

Intermarriage in the two principal union-republics, Russia and the Ukraine -- where 75 per cent of Soviet Jewry live -- is fairly widespread. In Russia, at least one-quarter of Jewish males are married to non-Jewish women; in the Ukraine, more than a third of Jewish males are married to non-Jewish females. (The intermarriage rate in the Baltic and Caucasus areas, and among Oriental Jewry is far lower.) It is among the progeny of mixed marriages that the loss of Jewish identity takes the greatest toll. Only approximately 15 per cent of such progeny, selected case studies indicate, register themselves as Jews.

An important index of assimilation is the numerical decline of Jews in the 1970 census. Most ethnic groups in the USSR increased in numbers, the overall jump in population being 16 per cent. Only a handful declined, with the Jews showing the greatest drop by far. The overall Jewish decline, as compared with 1959, was 117,000, with the biggest drops in Russia and the Ukraine. The size of the decline is not explicable in physical terms. Rather, the explanation is to be found in the way the census was conducted. The census-taker was officially instructed to accept whatever nationality a Soviet citizen might claim. No proof was required. If Soviet Jews so chose, they could lie about their ethnic origin, a practice which the Soviet regime would have desired for reasons of its own. 2,150,000 persons said they were Jewish (as compared with 2,268,000 in the 1959 census.) The disappearance of 117,000 constituted a measure of the striving for assimilation. Indeed, since available evidence suggests that there are close to three million Soviet Jews, the extent of lying was undoubtedly even greater. The overtly assimilated may be in the three-quarters million range.

#### Decline of Yiddish

A second index of the assimilation trend is the decline in use of the mother tongue -- Yiddish -- among European Soviet Jews. The bulk, as late as the twenties, considered Yiddish their mother tongue. By 1960, only 18 per cent stated that Yiddish was their mother tongue, with the vast majority stipulating Russian as their language. The 1970 census showed a drop to 13 per cent among Soviet European Jews. Since most users of the Yiddish tongue were from Lithuania and Latvia, and since many from these areas have emigrated, the next census in 1980 will very likely indicate that less than five per cent of Soviet European Jews consider Yiddish their mother tongue. (The 1970 census showed 7.6 per cent of Moscow Jews and 5.2 per cent of Leningrad Jews regard Yiddish as their native language.)

Over the long run, linguistic assimilation will probably be total. There are no Yiddish schools anywhere in the USSR and Soviet authorities have frowned on all proposals to establish them. Nor are Soviet Jewish activists inclined to press for the study of Yiddish, as the language of their forebears only evokes memories of oppression and decay. Nor is there any clamor for the restoration of pre-1948 Jewish institutions. Even if there

were such a clamor, and it were supported vigorously in the West, it is most unlikely that the regime would respond favorably. The thrust of Kremlin nationality policy, in general, is toward a greater degree of assimilation and the reduction, if not the elimination, of institutional means for the maintenance of national self-consciousness. The thrust of this policy was intensified in recent years. Any challenge to the regime in this area, which, in fact, is regarded as vital by the Kremlin, would be considered as a subversive threat. An indication of the official view was strikingly provided by the brutal repression of a planned seminar on Jewish culture scheduled for December 21-23, 1976.

If Soviet Jewish activists have consciously and deliberately refrained from demanding the restoration of Jewish institutions, it is partly a consequence of their acute awareness that the Kremlin would consider such demands as anti-regime, a striving for modification of the internal structure of power relations. It is also a consequence of a strategy that is oriented to emigration, to the opting out of a Soviet system.

#### Jewish Self-Education

That strategy does not preclude a seeking of means for self-education of Jews in their language, history and tradition. On the contrary, the activists, desperately conscious of the ignorance of Jews from the central provinces concerning their history and tradition -- a result of forcible assimilation -- have made demands upon the authorities for establishing formal courses in the Hebrew language. Aside from such formal demands, the activists have created other self-educational instrumentalities -- ulpanism, journals focussing upon Jewish history and tradition, and seminars. These informal devices are structured to fit into the Soviet legal framework, although the authorities have not usually perceived the law in the same way.

But the critical and decisive feature of the activists' strategy is that these instrumentalities are designed to prepare, educationally, would-be emigrants for Israel, and not to restructure Soviet society. The proposed institutions are not seen as permanent but as transitory and transitional -- on the passage-way to Israel. Nor are the proposed institutions to be oriented to the general Jewish public, but rather to those already committed, who have cast their die for emigration. Were they to be successful in their initiative -- it is clear -- a significant inroad would be made in solving the serious problem of the "drop-outs," the "noshrim."

Precisely because of the restricted focus of the activists' strategy, it is by no means certain that the Kremlin will continue to regard their initiative as unacceptable -- a condition that has prevailed until now. And, given such a focus, there is no reason for assuming that the authorities will reject in the future technical cultural assistance from the Western Jewish community. Indeed, the Helsinki "Declaration," to which

the Soviet Union is committed, provides for cultural exchanges of this character. The "Declaration" obligates the signatories generally to promote "cooperation and exchanges in the field of culture" generally and specifically to "facilitate" the contribution that national minorities can make to culture "taking into account the legitimate interests of their members." Another section of the "Declaration" requires signatories to permit religious institutions and organizations to "have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information."

#### Educational and Occupational Patterns

The more distinctive feature of the Kremlin's policy toward Jews in the last few years relates to the role assigned them in the scientific-technological sphere in Soviet society. It is here that one must look to ascertain the dynamic of the emigration urge today and tomorrow. Until recently, they were permitted to enter into this sphere in comparatively great numbers. A 1973 volume on census data testifies to this fact. Of every 1000 Jews in the Russian Republic, more than one-third, or 344, have had a higher education. Only 43 of every 1000 Russians completed a higher education. In other major union-republics, the ratio of educated Jews to educated national groups is similarly high although not quite as marked as in the Russian Republic.

The volume also reveals that 68 per cent of the Jews in the Russian Republic are designated as "specialists" with either a higher or secondary school education. Only 19 per cent of Russians are listed in this category. In other major union-republics, again the percentage of Jews who are specialists far outdistances the percentage of other national groups.

Data on Moscow, published in another volume, is even more illuminating since Moscow is the center of the scientific-technological elite, employing slightly more than one-quarter of all the scientific workers in the USSR. Of Moscow's scientific community, nearly 11 per cent are Jewish. It is estimated that a fourth of all Moscow Jews are supported by individuals who are employed in science and technology. Large numbers of Jews are also members of the scientific-technological elite in two other key scientific communities in the Russian Republic -- Leningrad and Novosibirsk.

#### Advanced Scientific Degrees

The impressive character of Jewish involvement in the higher reaches of the scientific-technological elite is apparent from other data published in 1974 on advanced scientific degrees from Soviet universities. Nine per cent of all holders of the Candidate of Science degree -- equivalent to our Ph.D. -- are Jews. And, more significantly, 14 per cent of all holders of the even higher degree -- Doctor of Science -- are Jews. They outnumber in absolute terms every other nationality in the USSR in the latter category except Russians.

Since Jews constitute, according to official census data, somewhat less than one per cent of the entire Soviet population, their remarkably high membership in the elite is illuminating. The key to this successful achievement was, of course, their ability to enter the university or higher technical institutes. (One-third of all Soviet Jews acquired such an education; only 4 per cent of the rest of the Soviet population did so.) The educational performance of Jews was attained despite the existence, since the post-war period, of "annually planned preferential quotas" in admission to Soviet universities. It was the flexibility of the quota system, which varied from place to place and from university to university, that enabled the Jew to hurdle the formidable obstacles. Where the quotas were especially flexible -- in, for example, Azerbaidzhan and the Central Asian Republics -- a fairly significant Jewish enrollment existed even if the percentage of Jews in the local population was negligible.

The stress placed by Jews upon education in scientific-technological fields ineluctably followed from their veritable exclusion, in the late forties and early fifties, from other careers they had pursued since the October Revolution -- politics, diplomacy, foreign trade, and the military and security branches. Specialized higher schools and institutes in these fields were made totally Judenrein. Other disciplines with which Jews had been previously preoccupied such as the humanities had also become dangerous for them. A study of doctorate degree-holders among Jews in Ukrainian universities shows that 80 per cent of them are in the fields of physics, mathematics, the technical sciences, and medicine. Only 8 per cent of these Jewish doctorate holders are in the humanities and social science disciplines.

#### Imposition of Quotas

The past of extraordinary educational achievement is, however, not prologue. The contrary is the case. For a variety of reasons, with which this paper does not deal, the Kremlin reached the conclusion in 1968 that the historic functional role of Jews among the scientific-technological elite in Soviet society must be curtailed. The critical focal point was the matter of enrollment in the university system. The screws of the quota device were now, in stages, severely tightened. If earlier, quotas had resulted in a relative percentage decline in Jewish enrollment, though most significantly not in an absolute decline, now the decline would be in absolute figures. Between 1969 and 1971, the number of Jewish students dropped from 111,900 to 105,800. During 1972-73, it dropped to 88,500.

These data are from official published sources. Such sources did not carry, last year, the statistical tables with designated enrollment by nationality, thereby leading Hedrick Smith to speculate that "a more dramatic drop took place." Unwittingly, Novosti, this past year, divulged data which, when analyzed, show that, by 1975, the enrollment of Jews declined to 75,250. In a seven year period, Jewish enrollment had plummeted by 30 per cent.

The same percentage decline had already taken place during 1970-73 on the post-graduate level. Official data showed that the number of Jewish post-graduate students had dropped from some 5000 to some 3500. The subsequent two years more than likely resulted in a further serious decline.

How far will the plunging of Jewish enrollment go? A major work by a leading Soviet ideologist, V. Mishin, published in 1970, contended that admission to universities must be governed by the principle of "proletarian internationalism." The principle, he went on, justifies a numerus clausus to limit the number of students of each nationality to the percentage of the nationality in the total population. As the Jews constitute .9 per cent of the population, in official census data, one can anticipate, on the basis of Mishin's principle, that the number of Jews enrolled in universities will fall to about 40,000. The almost geometric rate of decline since 1968 suggests that this figure will be reached fairly soon.

Whether it will remain at this point is by no means certain. Two factors have come into play which may very well be exerting a force that accelerates the present trend. The pressure for emigration from the Jewish community has certainly stimulated among Kremlin policy-makers the view that it is risky to provide Jews with a higher education since an indeterminate number will wish to leave. Georgy Arbatov, a leading adviser to the Politburo, strongly hinted at this perspective when he declared a few years ago that increased emigration would place "the 90 per cent who want to stay in an unfavorable light."

#### Anti-Zionist, Anti-Semitic Factors

The second factor is the anti-Zionist propaganda campaign, with its transparent anti-Semitic stereotypes. Intensified and given official sanction by a major article in Pravda in February, 1971, the campaign cannot but signal to personnel officers and other bureaucrats that Jews are to be regarded with a certain degree of suspicion. The Pravda article, for the first time since the late thirties, emphasized that a Zionist is "an enemy of the people" -- a characterization that was bound to arouse undifferentiated hostility against a group especially when the distinction between Zionist and Jew is blurred.

The blurring of the distinction is made manifest in a variety of ways, most notably by virulent attacks upon Judaism, the Torah, the Talmud, and the concept of the "Chosen People." What is echoed to a remarkable degree in the propaganda campaign, which literally saturates the mass media, are the basic themes of the notorious "protocols of the Elders of Zion."

The adoption by the United Nations General Assembly in November, 1975, of the "Zionism-equals-racism" resolution has spurred the campaign to heights previously unknown in Soviet history. Hardly a week goes by that the press organs, radio broadcasts, and

lecture platforms do not become channels of unrestrained ideological warfare against Jewish tradition and belief. The impact is felt throughout Soviet society and most likely on the sensitive process of the selection of students for higher education.

The decline in Jewish enrollment in universities can be expected to lead to a precipitous drop in the number of Jews entering the scientific-technological professions. Already the number of Jews entering the profession annually has been cut in half from what had been the case between 1955 and 1971 when 2 to 3 thousand per annum became scientific workers. Since 1971, only 1000 per annum entered the professions and this average will plunge downwards in the next few years. In medicine, the decline is already far advanced, in both relative and absolute terms.

Compounding the problem is the practice since 1968 and especially since 1970 both of excluding Jews from higher administrative positions in the scientific and academic world and from sensitive positions in institutions connected with the defense and security apparatuses. Even half-Jews face difficulties of obtaining such positions today. It is scarcely accidental that Jews who hold academic posts -- as selected studies indicate -- are, on the average, significantly older than their non-Jewish colleagues.

#### Impact on Jewish Urge to Emigrate

Analysis of enrollment and employment trends makes palpably clear that the urge to emigrate will markedly intensify. As one prominent Jewish scientist who occupied an important position told an American colleague, "there is no future here for my children" and for that reason, he had applied for an exit visa. His comment is typical. One hundred leading Soviet activists sent a message to the Brussels II conference which stressed that there exists an "ever-stronger realization" that "Soviet Jews have no future in the USSR."

It would be idle to speculate about how many would want to leave if given the opportunity of doing so. Dr. Armand Hammer, two years ago, expressed a view that 200,000 could be expected to emigrate. But that opinion failed to take account of either the unfolding worsensng trends or, even more significantly, of an inner dynamic which will accelerate the drive to emigrate among the yet uncommitted and the more timid once the door to exodus is opened wider and the opportunity for obtaining exit visas is eased.

#### Detente and Soviet Jewish Emigration

Soviet policy on emigration of Jews is determined by a variety of factors of which the intensity of the desire to emigrate is but one. If the door for emigration was opened slightly in 1971 and even wider in 1972-73, it was due in large measure to other critical factors. The ardent Soviet pursuit of detente and trade with the West, especially the United States, during those years, was of decisive importance. For it required the Kremlin to take

account of Western public opinion and pressure which shaped the context within which negotiations for detente and trade would take place. While the impulse to emigrate within the USSR was crucial, it would have found no outlet within a powerful totalitarian state unless the latter's external interests as well as other domestic interests were also satisfied by its fulfillment.

Forces propelling the Soviet pursuit of detente in those years included the growing threat of conflict with China and Russia's consequent need both to stabilize its immediate Western flank (i.e., obtain formal recognition of territorial arrangements in Eastern Europe achieved at Yalta and in the post-war period) and to prevent a full U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. Reducing tensions with the West was especially important under circumstances of the technical advances made in nuclear and missile weaponry. Not only did a nuclear holocaust hang over the heads of all states but the escalating costs of advanced weaponry placed sharp limitations upon how far the domestic Soviet economy could be developed.

#### Detente and Trade

Lagging productivity rates within the USSR enhanced the drive for detente and trade. The Soviet Union sought to acquire from the West large-scale advanced technology, including computers and electronics, in addition to a variety of other goods and equipment, in order to achieve the objectives of its faltering economic plans. And the acquisition of these commodities required massive credits from the West, an aspiration which was ineluctably linked to the reduction of tensions which detente would bring about. An additional consideration in the trade picture was the uncertainty of adequate grain harvests in the USSR, a condition with which the USSR is afflicted at regular intervals.

Thus, a certain degree of Jewish emigration was finally allowed in order both to diminish a potentially explosive situation within the USSR generated by a disaffected and alienated activism among various categories of Jews and to pacify an outraged Western public opinion that would have certainly circumscribed and possibly even prevented the negotiations for detente and trade.

#### The "Reunion of Families" Concept

The character of Jewish emigration, as allowed by the Kremlin, was shaped by an important consideration. Soviet policy, in the past, had permitted emigration (and encouraged immigration) not in absolute terms -- a principle foreign to totalitarian society -- but in terms of "reunion of families." The phrase was meant to be understood in an ethnic or national context. Emigration, in the past, had been allowed for Soviet citizens of German, Polish, Greek, Spanish, Mongolian and Korean nationalities who sought to be reunited with their families resident in states where that nationality predominated. The policy was a product of Soviet theory (and, to a certain degree, practice) that gave emphasis to the nationality

principle. "Reunion of families" only rarely and to a very limited degree was interpreted in an absolute sense, unrelated to nationality.

Emigration of Jews to Israel, under the concept of "reunion of families," thus was a logical application of general policy and, indeed, it had been applied, although to an extremely limited degree, since the creation of the Israel state. Implementation requires that the affidavit of invitation must come from a family in Israel and that the exit visa granted the emigrant be duly marked for Israel. When the fairly large exodus to Israel began in 1971, the absence of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel (resulting from the unilateral Soviet action during the Six Day War) created a special problem. Planes could not fly directly to Lod Airport. Instead, arrangements were made for planes to carry the emigrants to Vienna and, from there, Israeli planes would bring them to Israel. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that "drop-outs" -- "noshrim" -- would make their appearance in Vienna. Initially, the percentage of "drop-outs" was small but, due to a variety of factors, it grew to become a serious burgeoning question.

#### Managing the "Brain Drain"

The decision in 1971 to open the doors for the exodus of Jews was accompanied by another key decision: to manage the emigration process in such a way so as to prevent a significant "brain drain." The existing, although declining, role of Jews among the scientific-technological elite, already alluded to in this paper, obliged important power sectors of the Soviet bureaucracy, concerned with a large-scale loss of skills, to press for limitations upon the exodus, particularly upon those who were products of university training. This was the basis for the "diploma" tax of August, 1972. Forced to retreat from the tax in March, 1973, by a massive world-wide outcry and powerful Congressional reaction, expressed through the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the Kremlin used a variety of other means to discourage emigration. Harassment and intimidation techniques, sometimes of a sophisticated nature, sometimes crude and cruel, were intensified. During the past year, the following forms of harassment of would-be emigrants were used: military conscription, university expulsion, demotion or dismissal from jobs, deprivation of apartments, reduction of outside material assistance and threat of arrest.

The intimidation was accompanied by outright refusals, frequently repeated, compelling the "refusenik" to suffer a pariah existence. The purpose of the latter was to transform the "refusenik" into an object lesson for others in the scientific-technological elite who might venture to apply for emigration. Application for an exit visa was not only risky; it required the applicant to run the gauntlet of prolonged torment. The effect of systematic harassment could be seen in the drop in the emigration rate during the last few years. From a high of 35,000 in 1973, it plummeted to 20,000 in 1974 and then to 12,000 in 1975 and to 14,000 in 1976.

Other considerations also played a role, albeit a lesser one, in managing and restricting the emigration process. Obsession with secrecy has always been characteristic of Soviet officialdom. Fears, more often than not irrational, that the skilled emigrant would carry secrets to the West dominated certain sectors of the Soviet bureaucracy. Others in the bureaucracy feared the impact that large-scale emigration would have on other national groups in the USSR. Finally, there was the pressure of the Arab world upon the Kremlin to restrict the flow of technically trained Jews to Israel.

Still, and this is of critical importance, the Soviet Union has not retreated from its 1971 decision to allow emigration of Jews. Repeatedly, Soviet officials have publicly stated that they are permitting and will continue to permit reunion of families. This past October, Leonid Brezhnev told Dr. Armand Hammer that the USSR would not curtail emigration even if the current heavy drop-out rate in Vienna is maintained or grows. The decision has become a policy of principle intimately related to detente and will remain as long as detente continues. And the Soviet need for detente is as great, if not greater, than it was in 1971. The forces which propelled it in that direction persist. Moreover, emigration serves as a convenient means to rid the USSR of an indigestible element in the population, totally disaffected from the process of assimilation. Even prominent non-Jewish dissidents are encouraged by the authorities to seek out exit visas for Israel.

#### Jackson-Vanik

The key problem is not emigration; it is the rate of emigration. How is the rate to be maximized? The Jackson-Vanik amendment, with its linkage of trade and credits to higher levels of emigration had precisely this objective in mind. Its advocates assumed correctly that Kremlin policy-makers always weigh in the balance gains to be derived from a particular action as against losses. In the case of the Jackson amendment, the losses of currently available Jewish skills would be weighed against (and outweighed by) an increase in trade (through the granting of most-favored-nation tariff treatment) and, far more importantly, large-scale credits. Dr. Henry Kissinger acknowledged to the Senate Finance Committee on December 5, 1974, that the Kremlin had finally agreed to accept the Jackson amendment. Assurances were given at the highest levels of both governments. And these assurances were made despite the fact that Soviet officials had repeatedly denounced the amendment as an intrusion into its domestic affairs.

What wrecked the understanding which had been reached was the Stevenson amendment (to the Export-Import Bank Bill) which placed a ceiling of \$300 million in credits to the USSR over a four-year period. Kissinger accurately described the amount as "peanuts." Credits could be obtained elsewhere. Moreover, 1974 turned out to be a bonanza year for the USSR. As a result of the quadrupling of oil prices which the USSR, as an exporter of oil, could exploit advantageously, it ended up the year, for the first time in a fairly

lengthy period, with a one-half billion dollar surplus in its balance of payments. The urge for credits was no longer as intense. On December 18, 1974 the Soviet Union unilaterally repudiated the October, 1972 trade agreement with the United States. The Jackson amendment to the Trade Reform Act became a dead letter.

#### Payment Balance

But trade and credit patterns involving the USSR have been significantly altered since the end of 1974. During 1975, its balance of payments registered a stunning \$5 billion deficit and during 1976, the deficit is estimated in the \$3-4 billion range. The imbalance in its trade with the United States, due to a considerable extent to heavy Soviet grain purchases, was particularly large even as over-all trade between the two countries had more than doubled. The deficits, in part, were paid for by the sale of Russian-produced gold on the world market. An estimate placed the sale of the precious metal at twice the size of the previous year. The Kremlin is unlikely to permit a continual drain of the invaluable commodity, especially as its price had declined.

Even more serious is the question concerning the availability of future credits -- the principal means for payment of the burgeoning deficits. During 1975-76, large-scale credits were obtained from West German, English, Italian and Japanese bankers. Total Soviet indebtedness was estimated at more than \$20 billion. The European money market was beginning to reach the limit for further loan extensions. As one European banker put it in July, 1976, "You can be pretty sure that most major banks are pretty close to those limits." At best, future borrowing by the USSR would probably mean higher interest terms. The Japanese, too, are cutting back on loans. According to press reports in August, the Japanese told the Soviet Union that its Finance Ministry and Export-Import Bank will make no more loans available to the USSR until at least April, 1977.

The likelihood, therefore, of the pursuit by the Kremlin of American credits is sufficiently great as to warrant, once again, special concentration upon the subject of the linkage between credits (and trade) and eased emigration. In this connection, a comment made by the new Secretary of the Treasury, Michael Blumenthal, is especially appropriate:

I think the Soviets need and want access to Western markets and our technology. We can build on all of that, but I think we ought to reassess a little what we're asking in return. I believe we might be able to get more than we've been asking for without blowing up the mutual effort to find common ground. Some say Kissinger didn't have enough fire in his belly to do this.

Flexibility in application of the linkage principle is essential to avoid a challenge to the self-esteem of a Great Power. The waiver provision appended to the Jackson amendment could become

the focal point of such flexibility. It enables the President to make a determination as to whether progress in the area of eased emigration procedures is being made by the Soviet Union. Favorable determination would lead to the Kremlin receiving MFN and becoming eligible for credits. Full adherence to the provisions of the Jackson amendment would not, initially, be required. What is required is a showing of "good faith" by the USSR in the form of reduced harassments and stepped up rates of emigration. The U. S. could stimulate or reinforce a more responsive Soviet attitude by modifying the Stevenson amendment in the direction of a far higher ceiling on credits. An effective bargain could then be struck.

### Helsinki Declaration

Weighing gains against losses is not only an activity that operates in the sphere of economics. It also applies to the area of world opinion. At stake is prestige and the image a government strives to project for itself. In this context, the Helsinki "Declaration" takes on particular meaning. For it has become a central moral standard for the populations of the 35 governments which are its signatories. The "Declaration," as the first interstate document to establish guidelines in the human rights field, is certain to be used for measuring the civilized conduct of states.

Indeed, the Kremlin and its Warsaw Pact allies have been busily engaged in promoting through the mass media, both for internal and external consumption, an image of vigorous fulfillment of Helsinki's obligations. At the same time, they castigate the West for its alleged deficiencies in meeting the standards set by the Helsinki "Declaration."

Preparation of the Warsaw Pact powers for the first meeting of the Helsinki signatories, scheduled for June 1977, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, is already well advanced. In contrast, according to a report of December 2, 1976 of a "study mission" to Europe by the Fenwick Commission, there exists "only a limited consensus" among the Western powers on "what to expect and seek" from the Belgrade Conference. An even more serious vacuum prevails in the West with respect to the question of "future review sessions" of the Helsinki signatories -- the only means of the Declaration for achieving some form of compliance with the human rights provisions of the Declaration. While the Communist countries are expected to seek "the blandest possible nation-by-nation accounting" of what each has done to implement the Declaration, the West -- according to the "study mission" report -- has developed "no definite strategy to pursue" periodic review sessions.

The Helsinki Declaration, particularly its "Basket 3," incorporates critically important standards with respect to emigration. Signatories are obligated to "deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family." Applications for exit visas are to be

dealt with "as expeditiously as possible." The signatories are "to ensure" that the fees charged in connection with exit visas "are at a moderate level." Most vital is a section that goes to the heart of the question of harassment. Signatories are to treat exit visa applications in such a way that they do "not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family."

The United States and the West could focus a glaring searchlight upon Soviet non-compliance with these provisions thereby critically affecting world public opinion to which the USSR is not immune. Whether the West will rise to the occasion should provide a test of how determined it is to advance freer emigration as well as other human rights. Both President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance have expressed criticism of the previous Administration for failure to appeal sufficiently to the standards of Helsinki. While their statements are encouraging, Congress and the American public must exert the kind of pressure upon the new Administration that will require it to develop, along with its Western allies, an effective strategy for Belgrade.

Along with the leverage provided by trade and credits, the leverage of public opinion might very well oblige the USSR to increase significantly the level of Jewish emigration. Insistence, too, by the West upon those provisions of Helsinki dealing with cultural exchanges could help raise the level of Jewish consciousness in the Soviet Union, which, in turn, might reduce the "drop-out" problem to more manageable proportions. The retreat phase of the Soviet Jewish question would appear to be approaching an end. Objective forces are creating favorable circumstances for the resumption of forward movement. The opportunities must not be lost.

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REMARKS BY REP. DANTE B. FASCELL (D-FLA.)

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY BOARD OF GOVERNORS

OCTOBER 26, 1976

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLR-70-17-21-3-8  
BY JN NARA DATE 3/1/2019

I am very pleased and very honored to be here today, but telling the National Conference about the work of the Helsinki Commission is a little bit awkward for me. It takes me back to my school days when I was bringing report cards home to my parents.

The fact is that the National Conference is the father -- at least the god-father -- of the Commission. Without your work, without the commitment and energy of the organization and especially of Jon Rotenberg, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe could very well have ended up in a Congressional pigeonhole -- a fine idea that never saw the light of day. Thanks to the Conference, though, I can give you an encouraging first report:

The Commission gets A for effort and B-plus for achievement. The only question is what grade to give for attitude. In my book, that should be an A too.

But there are other views on that score and there are some in Washington who would like to send us to the bottom of the class, even flunk us out of school.

Before I talk about them and that problem, let me just fill you in a little on some of the effort that has gone into our first achievements. We have offices -- and that is no easy trick for a new operation in Washington -- and a top-flight staff of thirteen, including ten researcher-analysts whose language skills include French, German, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Czech, Serbo-Croatian, Hebrew and Yiddish. Three of the staff people are on loan from other government agencies -- the State Department and the U.S. information Agency -- and two of them have recent experience in the Helsinki negotiations themselves. We have good working relations with a number of U.S. government departments and are drawing on the expertise of both Congressional and Executive agencies active in East-West affairs. We are getting fine help from a range of private organizations--businessmen, publishers, broadcasters and, especially, those groups -- like yours -- whose primary concern is the full and free expression of basic human rights.

We have taken -- and completed -- as our first job the tough task of dissecting the Helsinki Final Act and arranging its provisions out of the language of cautious diplomacy into the common-sense prose of standards of international behavior. As you know, the Commission's specific mandate is to monitor compliance with that Final Act.

Well, you cannot measure smoke without the tools to break it down into solid particles. A lot of people thought the Final Act was nothing but smoke. They saw the years of negotiation that went into formulating the Helsinki accord and the summit hullabaloo of the signing in August, 1975, as nothing more than an empty exercise in rhetoric for the striped-pants set.

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That view is mistaken. The Final Act is more than a scrap of paper -- or sixty pages of paper. It is less than a treaty; it has no binding force on any of the 35 signatories. But it is more than a one-shot declaration of intent to respect each other's frontiers and ignore what goes on on the other side of those frontiers. Its specific provisions -- and every one of them has equal weight with every other one in defining compliance -- amount to a code of good conduct for nations toward one another and toward their own citizens.

What the Commission is doing is, first of all, defining the standards so that everyone can understand them. Even if they could read all the "understandings" of the Salt I pact, for instance, average Americans would have a hard time deciding which technicality, if violated, was a serious breach of faith and which was a marginal error. The Final Act is as good a guide to the health of detente as is the progress on arms reduction. And it is much easier to understand.

If families in the Soviet Union are having just as hard a time since Helsinki as they had before it in seeking to reunite with relatives abroad, a significant standard is being violated. If none of the censorship -- direct and indirect -- of books, papers, magazines and radio broadcasts going from West to East is being relaxed or reduced, another part of the code is being disregarded. If businessmen and newsmen are getting no nearer their sources of information in 1976 than they did in 1975, compliance is being jeopardized. And if men and women are suffering now, as so many have before, for professing their religion or their political beliefs in the open, one signatory of the Final Act has every right to question the sincerity of another one where such repression continues.

One of the most significant aspects of the Final Act is that it carved a place on the international agenda for those questions of human rights which matter enormously to individuals but which have often been slighted by their governments in dealing with one another. The right to leave one's country and to return to it -- the right to marry whomever one pleases -- the right to profess belief in God -- all of these are now, through the Final Act, rights whose observation is as much a key to good standing in the community of nations as the right of one government to be safe from attack or threat of attack from its neighbors.

I do not intend to overstate the case for the importance of Helsinki. It is no magic wand changing long-established practices -- including some questionable ones of our own -- overnight. And monitoring compliance, the charge our Commission is carrying out, is not the same thing as enforcing it.

Indeed, in many areas of the Final Act, we know that no one can expect perfect conduct. The Act does not obligate the signatories to make the flow of information, ideas and people among them free ... only freer. It does not open wide doors to emigration that have long been almost completely closed. It only specifies the ways and, in a few cases, the actual means of making that flow more orderly and less subject to arbitrary political interference.

As far as family reunification goes, for instance, the Soviet Union is one signatory which has made an obvious effort to adjust some of its practices to bring them more nearly into compliance with the thrust of the accord. Exit visa fees -- since the signing in Helsinki -- have been reduced from 400 rubles to 300, although that still leaves them at a level roughly twice the average Soviet wage earner's monthly income. At any rate, a gesture was made. It was very probably a hollow one, but the Commission is obligated to assess its true significance.

The Soviet Union has also considerably expanded the number of ethnic Germans allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. for West Germany. Right after the Helsinki summit, Polish First Secretary Gierk and Chancellor Schmidt reached their agreement permitting the emigration of 125,000 Germans in Poland to the West over a four-year period -- and in return for credits from Bonn, amounting to nearly one billion dollars.

At least there has been some movement. Sadly, it has not extended to those Soviet Jews still seeking -- against formidable obstacles -- to migrate to Israel. For the, the Final Act's promise that application to join separated family members "will not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family" is still an empty one. Instances of harassment -- of interrupted mail and telephone contact, of jobs lost, of outside income cut off, of public humiliation and private threat -- mount as the numbers of successful applicants continue to decline.

News reports of the brutal beating last week of a dozen peaceful Jewish protesters in Moscow offer more bleak evidence that basic Soviet attitudes toward would-be emigrants have not changed. The arrest and imprisonment of at least 26 of the demonstrators seem to add further proof that Soviet officials are still trying to suppress legitimate demands with illegitimate terror. The version we have of the entire incident amounts to important evidence of two facts:

courageous men and women in the Soviet Union have not given up their efforts to obtain the rights the Helsinki accord confirmed;

Soviet authorities have not given up their efforts to thwart those rights.

And the Commission, in compiling its record of compliance, has to look at that evidence and weigh it in the same scale as it uses to measure the few, heartening signs of good intentions and improved practices. No one gesture of good faith can, by itself, wipe out the memory or the fact of patterns of poor conduct. But no pattern is so bleak that we should not take heart from the evidence we may find that it is being changed.

The Final Act amounts, really, to a set of rules of the game for the conduct of East-West relations. It is a general and a specific traffic code for the potholed highway of detente. The Commission is one referee -- not the final arbiter -- watching the way drivers obey the code. But we are not traffic cops. We can issue warnings, and I expect we will, but we cannot impose penalties on the violators. That is the role of government and, importantly, of informed public opinion which shapes government policy.

The Commission will be successful to the extent that it is able to inform the public and channel opinion toward a correct evaluation of the progress in East-West relations since Helsinki. Just as compliance with the Final Act is a matter of gradual -- but steady -- progress, so the Commission is a monitor not of a single set of actions but of a record of behavior and the direction of developments.

We have started down a long road. Helsinki was a milestone. The preliminaries to the review conference next year in Belgrade are also important markers on the way. I don't expect that we can keep up the same speed between every stop, but the crucial consideration is a minimum speed and a sense of the right direction.

The Helsinki Commission plays a major role in fixing that speed and direction and making sure others keep to it.

To do that job, we need your help as much as we did before the Commission was even created. We need the information you gather, the public attention you are able to arouse and, let me be frank, the pressure you can bring to bear on officials who need occasional reminders that their performance is being watched.

You will find the Congress already very receptive to the role of the Commission. No Senator or Representative on the Commission is there by accident. All are interested in its work and committed to its success. In addition, there are many others -- old stalwarts in the battle for human rights -- whose support is enthusiastic and essential.

But there is an enduring problem, one I spoke about at the start and one that will not go away after Election Day, no matter who wins. In one sense, the Commission is very much a product of American politics in a Presidential election year. Given Dr. Kissinger's undisguised opposition to the creation of the Commission, I've occasionally wondered if President Ford might have vetoed the Fenwick-Case bill if he had had no primary opposition. Given the four-month delay in appointing our Executive Branch Commissioners, I've also wondered whether those posts would have been filled at all, if there had been no debate scheduled on foreign policy between President Ford and Governor Carter. And given the recurring difficulties we have in obtaining information from the State Department, I sometimes wonder whether our main concern is compliance with the Helsinki code of conduct or with the rules for bureaucratic in-fighting in Washington.

The State Department -- and I suspect the same would be true under a Carter Administration -- is naturally suspicious of the Commission. Professional foreign-policy-makers see the Commission as an unwelcome intruder on the secretive and sensitive process of negotiating the follow-up to the Helsinki summit. Since the Commission makes no bones about its primary interest in questions of human rights, those professionals who view such issues as secondary aspects of detente are worried that we are bulls in the china shop of detente. Finally, by its nature, the State Department takes a very dim view of any Congressional interest in any foreign policy matter.

Ours is a problem of institutional tension. It is also a problem of policy priorities. It is not going to go away. But I am confident that the Commission can and will perform responsibly and complement the work of the Department. All we have to do is convince the Department that our purpose is constructive and our attitude is positive. None of us wants to see the fragile structure of detente demolished. None of us seeks to tear up the Final Act or tear down the tentative structure of cooperation it formalized.

Yet all of us recognize that Congress -- and the advisory bodies, such as ours, which it creates -- must have an influential role in setting the direction and purpose of foreign policy. The Executive must implement it, but it takes a great risk when it excludes the public and the Congress from the formation of policy. Over and over, I've heard Secretaries of State admit the obvious; a policy without public backing is a policy doomed to failure. The Commission is now the primary channel for a two-way dialogue between the American people and the policymakers. We are bent on keeping that channel open and that dialogue lively. I am glad that your voice will be heard. I pledge to listen.

New Leader  
29 Jan 79

2X

# A SOVIET MEDIA CAMPAIGN Updating the 'Protocols of Zion'

BY WILLIAM KOREY

DECLASSIFIED/Released  
Authority NLR-170-1721-4-7  
BY JN NARA DATE 3/1/2019



GUEST OF HONOR  
(FROM "IZVESTIA")

On flag: Zionist Congress; On figures:  
Against Detente! For the Cold War!  
Racism, Anti-Soviet Provocations

**W**Henever the Kremlin shows signs of relaxing its reins, the West tends to see an encouraging movement toward humaneness. Thus the recent arrival in Israel of physicist Veniamin Levich and his ailing wife, the permission granted the Boris Kats' to come to this

country with their sick girl, and the overall rise in the monthly rate of Jewish emigration from the USSR—surpassing even the record 1973 level—have generated enthusiasm in many official and unofficial circles here.

Yet a closer look at these developments in their larger context suggests that there is scant reason to be encouraged, let alone enthusiastic, about the emergence of a new Soviet humanitarianism. Rather, the "liberalization" appears to be of a more political—and therefore, of a more transitory—nature. For one thing, it has come at a time when Moscow is particularly eager to improve its image in the U.S. because the SALT talks are at a climactic stage, and when its anxieties are high over the Sino-American rapprochement.

Second, apart from the Levich and Kats cases, little dent has been made in the "refusenik" problem. The approximately 800 families who repeatedly have been refused exit visas are still being refused them. And the "prisoners of conscience," from Edward Kuznetsov to Anatoly Shcharansky, continue to suffer the endless hardships of exile, hard labor, or prison.

But perhaps the most tempering fact of all, where Soviet Jewry is concerned, has been the little noticed step-up in the last two years of an already massive anti-Zionist propaganda campaign in the Soviet media. Moscow is today equating Zionism with every conceivable evil—racism, imperialism, capitalist exploitation, colonialism, militarism, crime, murder, espionage, terrorism, prostitution, even Hitlerism. Its power is portrayed as bordering on the Divine, although a divine that is Satanic in character. This a decidedly Manichean vision: Displaying conspiratorial and perfidious talents, the Zionist force of darkness strives for domination of the world—the only thing standing in its way being the great Soviet power, the force of light. Over the last decade, no ideology, no "enemy" has received so much attention or been subjected to so much abuse. Even Maoism has fared better.

The campaign only thinly masks anti-Semitism. Stereotypes of the Jew dominate its paranoid descriptions of

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WILLIAM KOREY, a veteran NEW LEADER contributor, is International Policy Research director of B'nai Brith.

zionism. In fact, the distinction between Jew and Zionist has increasingly blurred, and lately the words have often been used interchangeably. For the root of the Zionist evil is traced to Judaism. The Torah and the Talmud are presented as works preaching racism, hatred and violence. Fundamental tenets of the Jewish faith, appropriately distorted and vulgarized, are pictured as the embodiment of inhuman aspirations.


Launched in the summer of 1967, the drive draws its inspiration from a document written 75 years ago by a leading Tsarist reactionary and anti-Semitic publicist, Pavel Krushevan. Purporting to be the secret protocols of the World Zionist Congress held in Basle in 1897, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* has exerted a profound influence on the mind of the bigot. It has generated virulent anti-Semitic movements, triggered pogroms, and provided the Nazis with a "warrant for genocide."

The five long-discredited principal themes of the *Protocols* merit special attention, because they have been repeated or echoed in countless Soviet articles, books, speeches, and TV programs. They are: 1) International Jewry, believing itself the "Chosen People," strives for world domination. 2) That goal is to be reached through guile, cunning and conspiracies. 3) Control of international banking is essential to the Jewish plan. 4) Equally important is control and manipulation of the press, to enable Jews to acquire "the power to influence while remaining . . . in the shade." 5) The deception is to be maximized by the infiltration of free Masonic lodges; in so doing, the Jews will be able to "throw dust in the eyes of their fellows."

The Kremlin campaign was started in August 1967, with an article published simultaneously in the main provincial magazines that was entitled, "What Is Zionism?" Picking up on the first four *Protocols* themes, it began: "A wide network of Zionist organizations with a common center, a common program, and funds exceeding by far the funds of the Mafia 'Cosa Nostra' is ac-

tive behind the scenes of the international theater." This global "Zionist Corporation," it continued, is composed of "smart dealers in politics and finance, religion and trade" whose "well-camouflaged aim" is the enrichment by any means of the "international Zionist network." Exercising control over more than a thousand newspapers and magazines in "very many countries," the Zionist "ma-

Then, in the fall of 1974, the Party Central Committee formally adopted a directive that removed all doubt about the official character of the effort to combat Zionism—a seven-point "Plan of Measures to Strengthen Anti-Zionist Propaganda and Improve Patriotic and National Education of the Workers and Youth." It called on every District Committee "to intensify the struggle against [the] anti-Soviet activity of



THE ISRAELI ARMS-BEARER  
(FROM "PRAVDA VOSTOKA")  
On figure: U.S. Military-Industrial Complex

chine" with its "unlimited budget" services the vast monopolies of the West in their attempt "to establish control over the world."

As the campaign evolved over the next 10 years, it passed two more landmarks. On February 18, 1971, *Pravda* carried a lengthy article by Vladimir Bolshakov labeling Zionism "an enemy of the Soviet people"—a phrase that recalled the terror of the Great Purges of the late '30s.

Zionism." It also was the signal for the flood of books attacking Zionism that have since been produced by various official publishing houses.

NOT UNTIL 1977, however, did the most significant push in the propaganda onslaught get underway, with initiatives taken on three fronts. The first further intensified the use of the media as a weapon. Anti-Semitic literature started to ap-

appear in editions two or three times larger than those of previous years. Vladimir Begun's *Invasion Without Arms*, for example, was issued in an edition of 150,000 copies. This work justified Tsarist pogroms and described the Torah as "a textbook unsurpassed for bloodthirstiness, hypocrisy, betrayal, perfidy, and moral dissoluteness." It contended, too, that the Zionists were out to win "mastery over the whole world" by getting "into their hands the most powerful propaganda apparatus," and by Jewish bankers gaining "control of national governments." A similar volume, Tsesar Solodar's *Wild Wormwood*, equated Zionism with Hitlerism and the "Chosen People" concept with Aryan racism. It had an extraordinary run of 200,000 copies, and was heavily promoted in many Soviet journals.

In addition, the Kremlin began to employ television to spread its message. On January 22, 1977 Russian TV carried—on prime time, 7 P.M.—a vicious hour-long documentary, *Traders in Souls*. London's Institute of Jewish Affairs, in a paperback on *Soviet Anti-Semitic Propaganda*, has provided a concise and accurate summary of the program. "It depicts Jewish activists in the USSR as agents of international Zionism, in contact with the CIA and engaged in anti-Soviet subversive activity. They are called 'soldiers of Zion inside the USSR,' paid from abroad. The Jewish prisoners of conscience are presented as criminals engaged in deceit and speculation. The Jews abroad, who support the struggle of their brethren in the USSR for their rights, are no better; twice . . . a fat Jew—a stereotype of anti-Semitic cartoons—appears distributing £5 notes to Jewish demonstrators in Great Britain." Bowing to "popular demand," the authorities decided to rerun *Traders in Souls* on March 11.

The second initiative to broaden the anti-Semitic campaign has focused on the Soviet public's deepest fears and most painful memories—espionage, war and Hitlerism. For instance, the weekly *Ogonek* (with a circulation of 2 million) charged in its January 29 issue

that "Zionist agents" have succeeded in the "direct penetration of foreign secret services," including America's and England's.

The author of that absurdity was Lev Korneyev, whose vitriolic pen has brought him into the front ranks of the professional hate peddlers (a position he shares with six other men: Yevgeny Yevseev, Trofim Kichko, Yuri Ivanov, Begun, Valery Yemelyanov, and Bol-

that Zionism and Fascism were secretly allied against the Soviet Union. Indeed, the ties between these two movements, the writer claimed, date back to the time Chaim Weizman and Mussolini got together "to exploit the expansion of international Zionism in the Eastern Mediterranean." The relationship with Hitler was termed even more intimate.

In November 1977, Korneyev began



FAMILIAR HANDWRITING  
(FROM "BAKINKSY RABOCHY")

On Bombs: Zionism

shakov). A week later, he turned his attention to militarism and found Zionism responsible for dumping arms into the world market to foil détente, thereby swelling the chance of war. Two weeks afterward, he declared that the U.S. military-industrial monopolies are "to a considerable degree controlled or belong to the big pro-Zionist bourgeoisie," and that "many" of the oil companies who are among the largest suppliers of the Pentagon are "directly controlled by Zionist capital."

During the summer, in a two-part series for *Ogonek*, Korneyev—who is nothing if not prolific—discovered

to link Zionism-Hitlerism with the present-day military-industrial complexes of the West. "Of the 165 largest 'death concerns' in the West," he maintained, "158 are controlled or directly owned by the pro-Zionist bourgeoisie of Jewish origin." He expanded his analysis in the summer of 1978, contending in an *Ogonek* essay that Lockheed Aircraft is "controlled" by Lazard-Frères, "one of the largest finance empires founded and directed by bankers of Jewish origins"; that McDonnell-Douglas is controlled by the Rockefellers' Chase Manhattan Bank, "which constantly supports interna-

tional Zionism and the ruling circles of Israel"; and General Dynamics by "the finance supergiant of Jewish bankers—the Lehman bankers." The list was virtually endless; even such "multinational corporation giants" as General Motors, Ford, General Electric, IBM, Mobil Oil, and Chrysler were said to be indirectly tied to Zionism through complex capital relationships that "integrate" Jewish capital with "non-Jewish capitalist enterprises."

For all of its vigor, though, what the anti-Semitic campaign clearly lacked was intellectual and ideological legitimization. A moral sanction had been provided by the UN General Assembly resolution of November 10, 1975 defining Zionism as a "form of racism and racial discrimination." But that was hardly of ideological use. Nor was Lenin of much help in this case. The *Collected Works* of the founder of the Soviet State have a mere 15 references to Zionism, and only one of them is more than a passing remark.

The gap was finally filled—and the third initiative wheeled into place—with the publication of the prestigious Academy of Science's *International Zionism: History and Politics* in the summer of 1977. The 176-page work, a compilation of articles written by "scholars" drawn from various institutes of the Academy, was trumpeted by Tass in a special release and commentary on July 22. It is remarkable for its ability to combine the language of Leninism with the thoughts of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

• According to the *Protocols*, Jewry hopes to take over the world through the international banking system. According to the principal essay (by V. Kiselev) in the Academy volume, the "Jewish bourgeoisie," using Zionism as a cover, seek "the expansion of their positions in the economy of the largest capitalist states . . . and in the economic system of world capitalism as a whole." Several banking firms—besides the bugbear of the *Protocols*, the Rothschilds—are listed as "large financial-industrial Jewish monopolies whose sphere of interests spreads over many countries of Europe, America,

Asia and Africa." Singled out in the United States are six Wall Street investment firms—Lazard-Frères, Lehman Brothers, Kuhn-Loeb, Loeb-Rhoades, Bache & Co., and Goldman-Sachs.

• According to the *Protocols*, Jewish magnates are intimately linked by family in a giant conspiracy. (This is a variation on the classic notion of clanishness that, in the eyes of the prejudiced, stamps the Jew.) According to *International Zionism*, "Among the Jewish bourgeoisie . . . the use of all sorts of extra-market . . . kinship relations through 'one's own' . . . has always been practiced in a particularly wide manner." Lazard-Frères and Lehman are said to have "firm ties" with one another—ties that symbolize an "international amalgamation of Jewish finance capital."

• According to the *Protocols*, the concept of the "Chosen People" gives the Jews a religious and ideological rationale for world domination. According to the Academy version, Judaism considers the non-Jew as the "enemy" against whom "violence" is required. The authors then spice this medieval brew with an original interpretation of Messianism: The belief in the Messiah, they argue, is inculcated in Jews to motivate their pursuit of "mastery over all mankind."

The net effect of *International Zionism* was to give a "scholarly" imprimatur to a refurbished *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. A decade ago, Andrei Sakharov publicly chastised the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences for supporting anti-Semitic discrimination in personnel appointments. In retrospect, the president's act seems mild compared to the blatant and vulgar anti-Semitism the Academy is endorsing nowadays.

**I**T IS DIFFICULT to measure the impact of the Kremlin's propaganda drive on public attitudes. Yet from reports of Soviet Jewish activists in *samizdat* literature and in their appeals to the West, there can be little doubt that the level of popular anti-Semitism has been significantly raised. Verbal abuse of Jews was particularly

marked after *Traders in Souls* was aired, and following the trials of dissidents in 1978. True, there has been no overt violence, and to suggest that pogroms are around the corner would be a serious exaggeration. Nonetheless, given some social convulsion in the Soviet Union, the stirrings of the embers of hate could have a fiery outcome. It was 40 years, after all, before the genocidal consequences of the *Protocols* became apparent.

Other developments, running parallel to the anti-Semitic media barrage, or perhaps flowing from it, have worsened the situation of Soviet Jews as well. Primary among these are the restrictions that have been placed on the number of Jews allowed to enter higher education. Between the academic years 1968-69 and 1976-77, Jewish student enrollment in Soviet universities declined for the first time, plunging from 111,900 to 66,900—a drop of over 40 per cent. Post-graduate Jewish students were similarly affected, their number declining from 4,945 in 1970 to 2,841 in 1975. This, of course, will bring about an absolute decline in the number of Jews entering the professions.

Discrimination in certain fields has also circumscribed opportunities for Jews. In 1970, Roy Medvedev pointed to a secret Party circular that called for a reduction in the quota of Jews allowed to hold responsible posts in highly sensitive scientific institutions. Since then, *samizdat* publications report, the trend has spread to other areas.

Medvedev, in a perceptive analysis of the Soviet Jewish question written over eight years ago, noted that anti-Semitism was "the chief factor" behind the emergence of "Zionist tendencies in the USSR." He warned that only if it is systematically countered will Jews stop trying to emigrate. The Kremlin still is not convinced. It continues to take the exact opposite course—and in the process is spurring the desire to escape.

So the news that it is now easier for Jews to leave the Soviet Union is welcome. But we ought not to forget why they want to leave in the first place.

Wed., May 2, 1979

# Zionism Denounced by Soviet Academy

BY JOHN MORRISON

Reuters

MOSCOW—The Soviet Union has published a new book attacking Zionism, which it describes as "the chauvinist ideology of the powerful Jewish bourgeoisie" in the capitalist West.

"The Ideology and Practice of International Zionism" is the work of the influential Soviet Academy of Sciences and is published by the Political Publishing House in Moscow.

It was written under the close supervision of academician Mark Mitin, who, under dictator Josef Stalin, supported the official view that a group of Kremlin physicians, many of them Jewish, planned to murder Soviet leaders in the so-called "Doctors' Plot."

Praised in an authoritative review by the Communist Party daily Pravda, the book not only attacks Israel and its policies but also accuses "Zionist centers" of controlling Western news media and waging a secret subversive campaign against the Soviet bloc.

It also bitterly attacks Judaism as a religion, quoting early writings by Karl Marx in which the Jewish founder of communism said the real religion of the Jews was money.

"Where rabbis and Zionists rule, all is subordinated to one goal—serving the interests of capital," the book says.

Saying that there was no difference between Orthodox, Reformed and other currents in modern Judaism, it traces the origin of Zionism to the Jews' belief that they are God's chosen people, a common theme in Soviet attacks on Zionism in recent years.

Israel has frequently complained that Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda is anti-Semitic, but the Soviet Union has always denied this, arguing that anti-Semitism is against the law in the Soviet Union. The new 270-page work may reopen the controversy.

The 77-year-old Mitin, a veteran Communist Party ideologist, headed the party's Institute of Marxism-Leninism for a period in the 1940s under Stalin.

In 1953, just before Stalin's death, he played a major part in the propaganda campaign to accuse foreign "Zionists" of links with the "Doctors' Plot," which climaxed several years of anti-Jewish purges.

Mitin, at the time editor of the Cominform journal—For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy—wrote an article on "The Zionist Agency of American Imperialism" in

which he denounced "the vile crimes of the terrorist doctor-killers."

After Stalin's death the campaign was called off and the Doctors' Plot was said to have been an invention of Stalin's police chief, Lavrenti Beria.

The new work does not repeat the plot allegations, but it resurrects charges made in the Stalin era that Jewish charitable and cultural organizations in the West are fronts for subversion against the Soviet Union.

It lists as "Zionist centers" the American Jewish organization B'nai B'rith, the League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism in France, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in Paris, Israel's Weizman Institute and the Documentation Center for Nazi Crimes run by Simon Wiesenthal in Vienna.

It devotes a large amount of space to describing the control alleged to be wielded over the media in the West by "Zionist centers" financed by the "powerful Jewish bourgeoisie."

"It is known that 80% of American and international information agencies are under the influence of international Zionist centers," the book says, adding that Zionists also use radio stations such as the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corp. and the West German Deutsche Welle.

The book says that Zionists are in control of half of the magazines in the United States, half of the radio stations and three-quarters of the foreign bureaus of U.S. news media.

Official Zionist organizations today are led by "rabbis, millionaires, bankers, stock exchange speculators and representatives of monopolies," it says.

The book draws a parallel between the activities of present-day Zionists and the attempts of foreign Jewish organizations, such as B'nai B'rith, to set up secret societies among the Jews of 19th-century Russia.

The picture it draws of Jews in prerevolutionary Russia departs from the generally accepted one of widespread discrimination, officially encouraged pogroms and confinement to the special pale of settlement in Western Russia.

The authors mention pogroms only in passing and say they did not affect the interests of the Jewish bourgeoisie, which included many "capitalist Jews" and rich bankers who supported the czar and wielded considerable political power.

It deals in detail with the left-wing and Socialist movements which developed among the Jews before the revolution and says that they were Socialist in name only.

When the revolution came, the book says, the Socialist Jewish organizations, the best known of which was the Bund, opposed Lenin and the Bolsheviks and sided with their opponents.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLR-170-17-17-21-5-6  
by JN NARA DATE 3/1/2019

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, May 16, 1979

• A Polish dissident group, the Public Self-Defense Committee, called on the government in Warsaw to televise in full next month's visit by the pope and to allow church-appointed commentators access to the Polish media.

# Any in Soviet Concerned Over a Surge of

19

*NYT, 27 June 79*

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY  
Special to The New York Times

## Anti-Semitism

MOSCOW, June 26 — Soviet anti-Semitism, in both official and unofficial forms, has taken on new and unsettling forms at a time when the authorities are allowing more Jews than ever before to leave for Israel and the United States. The official campaign against Zionism in the press, in books and in propaganda has been particularly intense this year, perhaps as a way of discouraging even more people from emigrating. About 100,000 Soviet Jews are expected to be given exit visas for Israel this year.

The unofficial echo is a swell of deep xenophobia that combines historical Russian anti-Semitism and paranoia. Soviet sources, both dissidents and intellectuals with good standing with the Government, say they are disturbed by parallels with the Stalinist "anticosmopolitan" secret police repressions that began in the late 40's and continued until the dictator's death in 1953.

Some of the worst examples of anti-Semitism are clearly being tolerated by elements within the bureaucracy. Last winter, an exhibition of paintings by the official Soviet painter Mikhail A. Savit'yev in Minsk included one canvas that led scores of people to protest to the authorities.

### Painting Is Not Withdrawn

It was part of a collection depicting the brutalities of the Nazi occupation of Byelorussia. The painting, titled "Summer Theater," showed a pile of naked Russian corpses in a concentration camp. Standing over them, a helmeted Nazi officer and a prison camp trusty, a Jew wearing a Star of David, grin sadistically at each other, as if in satisfaction over a job well done.

Despite protests in Minsk and in Moscow that the painting was both anti-Semitic and a gross distortion of history, the painting was not withdrawn. It was even printed in the journal *Literatura i Iskusstvo*, the organ of the Byelorussian Ministry of Culture.

Some of what is happening raises more complex questions about the leadership's ability to control the situation.

In February, for instance, mimeographed pamphlets signed "Russian Liberation Movement" appeared in apartment houses in Leningrad and Moscow. They charged that "Zionists" had seized control of the Politburo, the highest decision-making body of the Soviet Communist Party. The chief Zionist, the pamphlets said, was none other than Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, the Soviet leader.

### Anti-Zionist Letter Circulated

In any other country, such pamphlets might be discussed as the work of lunatics. Here, they raise the question of who allowed them to be duplicated — duplicating machines are strictly controlled — and handed out. The pamphlets identified the only "real Russians" on the Politburo as Prime Minister Aleksei N. Kosygin, the chief ideologist Mikhail A. Suslov and the Leningrad party chief, Grigory V. Romanov.

Last month, an anti-Zionist letter that is being much discussed by the intellectual establishment in Moscow was sent to scores of influential people by a man calling himself "Vasily Ryazanov." Again, the letter was mimeographed. Again, it seemed to some of its recipients that only someone with powerful connections would have dared to write it.

"Not only in the United States Senate, but in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party there exists a powerful Zionist lobby," the letter says. "They do not allow themselves to be attacked, with the excuse that this would bring on accusations of anti-Semitism, negative reactions in world public opinion, and damage to the policy of détente."

"The letter is written in a cool, rational style," said the writer Lev Kopelev, who is of Jewish descent himself. "It is not the work of a fanatic or a madman."

Nobody knows who "Ryazanov" is. Jewish activists in the emigration movement do not believe the letter or the pamphlets are a reaction to the increased emigration now being permitted to Jews and to few others.

### 'White Paper' Is Published

"I think it's a traditional, historical Russian anti-Semitism at work," said one, "and it's a reflection of the struggle within the party involving Slavophile, Russian nationalist tendencies."

The "unofficial" anti-Semitism and the

official campaigns directed against "Zionism" appear, however, to feed on each other. A couple of months ago, the authorities issued a "white paper" to "document" the evils of Zionism. It calls it "modern-day fascism" and warns readers that it is financed and controlled by foreign espionage agents who blackmail and victimize innocent Soviet citizens.

Another book edited by one of the white paper's authors, and written by Yevgeny S. Yevseyev, a member of the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, was published in a controlled edition of 500 late last year and calls Zionism "one of the varieties of fascism, which is however more dangerous than the German, Italian, Spanish and other varieties of fascism."

### Ministry Said to Print Book

Informants who have seen the book say it was printed by the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, which controls the police. Some of its official descriptions are not as farfetched as another set now being circulated in Moscow by Prof. Vladimir N. Yemelyanov, who teaches foreign students at the Patrice Lumumba University here. He charges that only Jews are allowed to rise to the highest levels of Freemasonry, and that Freemasons rule the world.

According to Roy A. Medvedev, the dissident Marxist historian, Professor Yemelyanov maintains that President

Carter, described as a 33d-degree Mason, actually takes orders from the head of the B'nai B'rith organization in the United States.

Even official Soviet explanations of why the authorities are now allowing more Jews to leave sometimes have an anti-Semitic tinge.

"A fundamental decision has been taken within the party to let go everyone who wants to leave," an official said, "but in practice that's only Jews and ethnic Germans. We don't want a disloyal fifth column here."

Diplomats and many Jews here believe the main reason for the decision is that the Soviet Union wants more access to American trade and technology to modernize its economy. Under United States law, the only way the Soviet Union can get that is by relaxing curbs on emigration. Mr. Brezhnev and President Carter were unable to make any breakthroughs on the question at their recent meeting in Vienna.

How many Soviet Jews want to leave is not known. According to the last available census figures, there were 2.15 million Jews in the Soviet Union in 1970, and at least 170,000 have left since then.

"If the present climate of anti-Semitism persists," an activist in the emigration movement said the other day, "all of them will leave, and there will be no more Jews in the Soviet Union in 20 years."

*I.B.  
Packman asks if there is anything to be done or said on this subject.*

*PT*

*NYT  
6-27*

# U.S. Unit, at Babi Yar, Stunned by Soviet Silence on Jews

By ANTHONY AUSTIN

Special to The New York Times

KIEV, U.S.S.R., Aug. 3 — A United States Presidential commission charged with drawing up plans for an American memorial to the Holocaust laid a wreath of carnations today at the monument at Babi Yar, on the edge of Kiev, where Nazi troops machine-gunned more than 70,000 Jews over a 10-day period in 1941.

This morning the Americans climbed the upsweep of stone toward a monument erected by the Soviet Union in 1976 that depicts men, women and children at the point of being shot. The plaque, in Ukrainian, reads: "Here, from 1941 to 1943, the German fascist invaders shot and killed more than 100,000 citizens of Kiev." From the visitors came exclamations of disbelief: "Not a word about the Jews!"

The 10 members of the President's Commission for the Holocaust, accompanied by 34 advisers, dependents and others, arrived yesterday after spending four days in Poland. The group, which is on a journey that will take it to Moscow, Copenhagen and Jerusalem, is gathering information to help it decide the kind of memorial, probably to be built in Washington, to recommend. Established by President Carter last November, the group represents Jewish and Christian organizations.

## A Contrast in Emphasis

The visitors arrived last night after inspecting Polish memorials at the Nazi death camps at Maidanek, Treblinka and Auschwitz, where museums make what happened explicit. The absence of the word "Jewish" from the Babi Yar memorial appeared to take them aback.

Their chairman, the author-educator Elie Wiesel, stepped forward, a yardstick on his head, and spoke:

"When I stood here 15 years ago there was no monument at Babi Yar. But we all knew what Babi Yar meant. Now there is a monument at Babi Yar.

But what kind of monument is it? We all had hoped to find a memorial for all the Jews who died as Jews, as well as for all the others who died here. But the Jews are not being remembered.

"O Jews of Babi Yar! We shall remember you. For 10 days in 1941, from Rosh ha-Shanah to Yom Kippur, you were brought here and shot. We shall not forget when we are home and when we say the Kaddish, we shall remember you as well."

## Memorial to a Catastrophe

He then laid the wreath, with ribbons brought from the United States and bearing English, Russian, Yiddish and Hebrew inscriptions saying that it was from a Presidential commission formed to establish a memorial "to the catastrophe that overtook European Jewry."

Cantor Isaac Goodfriend of Congregation Havath Achim of Atlanta conducted a service. In a voice that carried over the landscaped grounds where once a deep ravine was filled high with corpses, he sang: "I believe with perfect faith in the coming of the Messiah. O, though he tarry, yet will I wait for him."

Mr. Wiesel then asked Bayard Rustin, a commission member and president of the A. Philip Randolph Institute of New York, to sing. Mr. Rustin sang "O Freedom," which he said was the favorite spiritual of the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.: "We shall remember, we shall remember, we shall remember, O God."

## Impassive Soviet Onlookers

To the rear a handful of Soviet men and women stood listening impassively to the sounds of Jewish prayers and an American Negro spiritual rising from the hillock on which the monument stands.

Intourist guides, questioned persistently by Western reporters, maintained that the Soviet people make no differentiation between the Jews, Ukrainians and Russians who were killed at Babi Yar and say that Jews amounted to perhaps half the total.

Anatoly Kuznetsov, a Soviet author who has emigrated to the West, estimated in his book "Babi Yar" that 70,000 Jews were killed when they were rounded up at the end of September and beginning of October 1941. The same figure may be heard in Kiev's small community of observing Jews. Mr. Wiesel, author of several books about East European Jews, says that this is a conservative estimate and that the toll was probably 90,000 or so.

Americans with experience in the Soviet Union felt that the authorities of the Ukrainian Republic had made a special effort to accommodate themselves to this unusual mission even though its emphasis on Jewish suffering and Jewish deaths went against the grain of Soviet policy. Mr. Wiesel, saying that he agreed with this assessment, commented: "I am very pleased with the spirit of cooperation we found here in Kiev. The Soviets seem ready to establish a program of exchange of information, archives and other material. This means that for the first time the Soviets recognize the Holocaust as such."

Prior to the visit to Babi Yar, the commission was cordially received by the Mayor of Kiev, Vladimir A. Gusev, who responded warmly to Mr. Wiesel's remarks and requests for exchanges of material and showed a Soviet documentary file of Nazi atrocities perpetrated against the Soviet people in the Ukraine and elsewhere.

At the end of the ceremony Soviet newsmen asked Mr. Wiesel to explain the nature of the commission and inquired whether Americans realized that the Nazis did not differentiate between Jews, Russians and Ukrainians in their genocidal practices. Mr. Wiesel replied: "That is not what we know from history. I say it not with bitterness but with sadness. In those 10 days that I spoke of, only the Jews were killed, not as citizens of Kiev but as Jews. I would like to see here — please — one word about the Jewishness of the Jewish victims."

NEW YORK TIMES  
4 Aug. 1979

## Swedes Oust 2 Polish Diplomats

STOCKHOLM, Aug. 3 (Reuters) — Sweden has expelled two Polish diplomats after a police investigation into their activities, the Foreign Ministry said today. Radio Sweden reported that Jerzy Krawczyk, the first secretary at the Polish Embassy, and Jan Strzelichowski, the commercial attaché, were expelled July 6 for industrial espionage. On July 10, Poland expelled two Swedish diplomats.

# WOMENT



DECLASSIFIED / Released  
Authority NLR-170-17-216-5  
BY JN MARA DATE 3/1/2019

*May you be inscribed for*

KV

# VOL. 1, NO. 8

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MOMENT is published monthly except January/  
February and July/August, when bi-monthly,  
by Moment Magazine, a division of Jewish  
Educational Ventures, Inc., 462 Boylston Street,  
Suite 301, Boston, Massachusetts 02116.  
Subscriptions: \$18.00 for one year, \$36.00 for  
two years for United States; single copy, \$2.00;  
Foreign, including Canada: surface mail \$22.00,  
air mail \$30.00.

Direct all subscription and circulation queries  
to: MOMENT Subscription Department, P.O.  
Box 922, Farmingdale, New York 11737.

Copyright © 1979 by Moment Magazine, all  
rights reserved. Unsolicited manuscripts should  
be sent to Editorial Office, MOMENT, 462  
Boylston Street, Suite 301, Boston, Massachusetts  
02116, and must be accompanied by self-  
addressed, stamped envelope. Second class  
postage paid at Boston, Massachusetts, and at  
additional mailing office. ISSN 0099-2080  
MOMENT is indexed in *Index to Jewish  
Periodicals* and is available on microfilm  
through University Microfilms, Ann Arbor,  
Michigan.

MOMENT was founded by Leonard Fein and  
Elie Wiesel.

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Cover: "Kapparot," oil painting by Arie Sartani, Kibbutz Merchavia, Israel. Whirling a chicken around the head ("shloggen kappores") is a folk tradition for the expiation of sin during the High Holiday season.	

# WHITHER SOVIET JEWS THE DEBATE GOES ON

The issue of the so-called "dropouts" (noshrim in Hebrew)—Russian Jews who exit the Soviet Union on Israeli visas, but who then opt to go to the United States rather than Israel—has been festering for several years now. American Jews, by and large, have argued that we are obliged to help any Jew who needs help; Israelis have countered that American help is, in fact, a form of enticement. The debate has sharpened as the numbers of Jews leaving the USSR has grown, and as the proportion choosing to come to the United States has grown.

The principal advocate of the Israeli position is Leon Dulzin, Chairman of the Jewish Agency. Last month, MOMENT had the opportunity to talk about the problem with Dulzin. His remarks appear below. They are followed by excerpts from the epilogue to the second edition of Leonard Schroeter's highly regarded *The East Exodus*, a book which first appeared in 1974 and which chronicles the history of the Jewish Jewry movement.

Schroeter, a Seattle attorney, takes a very different position from Dulzin. When read together with Jon Weiner's update on Soviet resettlement in America (MOMENT, July/August 1979), the complexity of the problem emerges starkly.

**LEON  
DULZIN**  
**LEONARD  
SCHROETER**

# LEON DULZIN

**MOMENT:** Mr. Dulzin, you've been in the forefront of the effort to change Jewish public policy with respect to the noshrim, the Russian Jews who exit Russia on Israeli visas, but who then elect to go to the United States rather than to Israel. Can you summarize your position for us?

Dulzin: First, let me try to set the record straight. I never said that HIAS is conducting a special activity to divert the immigrants to America. That's just not true. It's a very simple process. A fellow arrives in Vienna. Before he's even asked, on the railroad to Vienna, he tells you, "I'm not going to Israel, I'm going to HIAS." So those who are going to Israel are taken to a special camp. It's a very beautiful camp, but it's a camp. That is, it's closed—for security reasons. Those who are not going to Israel are taken by us—by the Jewish Agency—to some kind of hotel, and the next day, they come to the office of HIAS. The first person that they meet is a representative of the Jewish Agency. He tries to talk to the fellow, to ask him why, and what, and so forth. And after they talk, the Agency representative clears him; he gives him a tzetl, a form, and passes him over to HIAS. HIAS will keep him for a week or two in Vienna, and then send him over to Rome.

That's the procedure. I never made a claim against HIAS. What was my claim? My claim was that by its attitude, HIAS indirectly encourages the emigrant not to go to Israel. After all, HIAS stands for America. And if they don't have a very deep and strong motivation—and, after all, there are a lot of Zionists in this world with deep Jewish and Zionist motivation who also don't come to live in Israel—why should we expect more of these Russian Jews? Sometimes I think to myself, if we still have 20 or 30 percent coming to Israel, the others were disconnected, they were second and third generation, completely

assimilated, people who remained Jews because of the passport regulations. If not for that, they would have disappeared as Jews a long time ago. So if a person like this has the option to go to America, why should he go to Israel? That's what I mean by "indirect." By the very fact that HIAS is there, ready to help, ready to make America possible, it diverts the Jews to America.

The second thing is that I've been warning all along that if we don't take measures against this problem, we will find that 60 percent, then 70 and even 80 percent will reject Israel. And we will simply kill our hope for aliyah from Soviet Russia. Unfortunately, we have now already reached the 70 percent mark. And it's not 70 percent of a small number, of, say, a thousand a month. We are expecting 50,000 this year, and 70 percent of 50,000 is a very large number. We will be losing 4,000, maybe even 4,500 every month. You in the United States will be getting 30,000, maybe 35,000. Your honeymoon is over.

So we are facing a new situation, and a very dangerous situation. What is my argument? I have been saying one thing all along, and I say it today: I cannot force a Jew who doesn't want to come to Israel to come to us. He wants to use his Israeli visa to escape Soviet Russia? Alright. He can simply say that when he got to Vienna, he changed his mind. He doesn't even have to say it. He doesn't have to say anything, and I can't help it. But then, he should be on his own.

Why? Because there has been no such thing as a Jewish refugee since 1948, since the State of Israel. What is a refugee? A refugee is someone who runs away from where he lives and has no place to go. A stateless person is a refugee. The Vietnamese are refugees, the Hungarians were refugees, the Poles. But not the Jews. First of all, the Jews come out on Israeli visas. He gives up his Russian citizenship based on his Israeli visa, and Israel receives him. We pay for him. We pay for his passport in Russia, we take care of him, we bring him to Israel. So how can he be a refugee?

But if there is no such thing as a Jewish refugee, then the situation is completely different from what it was in the old times, when we were cheating governments and bribing consuls and so forth. Let's be clear about this. One of the arguments the people who disagree with me use is that the emigrant has the moral right to use the Israeli visa even if he knows he's not going to Israel—after all, we've been doing that kind of thing forever. But this is different. This is an Israeli visa, it's not a fiction, it's not a forgery. We are here for him. He's not a refugee.

So I say, while I can't force him, if he doesn't want to come to us, he's on his own.

And to be on his own means that he doesn't get assistance. Because what does the assistance mean? It means that we are competing. And I have to admit—we can't compete with America. And I tell you that if he's on his own, he will come to Israel.

I was in Vienna three times. And I interviewed a number of the Russians, and I asked them all one question: What would happen if you didn't have the possibility of going to the United States? Would you come to Israel? Of course they would come to Israel. I had only one case that was different, a young boy from Kiev who told me that if he could go only to Israel, he would rather stay in Kiev. And I said, in a remark which was widely misinterpreted, that if he wants to stay in Kiev, he is responsible for his own fate, not me.

Freedom of choice, yes. But freedom of choice does not oblige me to help, when by helping, I enter into a competition between Israel and the United States. I can't compete.

Now all of that is only a part of the issue. It's the Jewish aspect of the problem. Most of the argument has been about tachlis, not about theory. And I have never heard anybody, no matter how much he disagrees with the position I've taken, say "No, we would not like them to go to Israel." Everybody—the Joint, HIAS—they all want them to go to Israel. But they all insist that it

is their moral obligation to help them once they've decided not to. And I say no, that's an unfair competition. I say you could have an argument with me if you tell me that we in Israel can't absorb them, if you tell me we don't have work for them. But we can absorb them; we do absorb them. We have absorbed 150,000 so far.

We had one experience which proves my case. It was in 1973, after the war. Although in the month of October we had a record number of Russian Jews arriving—4,200—day in, day out, during the war they kept on coming—right after the war, in November and December, almost 2,000 of the Russian Jews left Israel. They were frightened by the war, or whatever. And they went to Rome. And HIAS took care of them in Rome. They knew that HIAS would take care of them so the outflow continued.

I called in the people of HIAS and the Joint, and I warned them. I told them that we simply couldn't allow them to help Jews who want to leave Israel. They are free people, there is an American Consulate. They can go and they can get a visa; everybody is free to leave Israel if he wants to. But you will help them? You will help people to leave Israel? If so, why only Russian Jews? Why not Moroccan Jews, Yemenite Jews, Argentinian Jews? Do you know what you are doing?

At that time, I had Golda's full support. She said, "This will stop," and it stopped. We had, since that time, only another 2,000 Russians who left Israel. All in all, 150,000 came, and 4,200 have left. With the exception of the Yemenites, that's the smallest number of departees from any group. That's the point, and that's my case. If we tell them they're on their own, they'll come to Israel, and they'll stay.

That's the Jewish aspect of it. Now I come to the Zionist aspect. And here I think we face a very serious crisis. I've said it in public every chance I've had. We're all for peace. We're all for the best and most secure borders. But we should know one thing: even with a full peace and the best borders possible,

if we remain a people of three, or three and a half million, the State of Israel will be in danger. So that we must know that our major task is aliyah, is immigration and absorption, it is also the quality of life, building an Israel that will attract Jews. We have to be a people of four, five, six million Jews, at a minimum.

Now if you believe that, look at the facts. Jews will come from America. Instead of 3,000 a year, maybe we'll reach 10,000 a year, maybe even 15,000. That would be a godsend. But there won't be 50,000 or 100,000. From the whole free world we now have 10 to 15,000 a year? So we can reach 25,000. That depends on conditions inside Israel. I say that in the Jewish world outside Israel today there are at least 200,000 people who think seriously about aliyah. So we could double the current rate. Alright.

But the Russians are our great reservoir. They are sent from heaven. There are hundreds of thousands. For eight or nine years now, we've been sending 5 to 6,000 affidavits a month. You know how many we're sending now? Fifteen, maybe 16,000 a month. More people are daring to ask, more people are actually coming out. This is the future of Israel. This is a historic opportunity. We have hundreds of thousands of Jews who could come here. And if we allow the present process to continue, they will continue to go to America, and our great historic opportunity will be lost.

To me, Russian Jewry is the savior of the State of Israel. The issue is not less serious than the creation of the State. It's a Zionist problem.

What's the situation in the United States today? Now, people are becoming concerned. It's not so simple to get money for such large numbers, the UJA will lose money, and they know that if they take the UJA money and use it for the Russians, we'll not let them; we'll conduct a separate campaign, because people are not giving for the Russians, they are giving for Israel. And the Americans are beginning to

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understand that the problem isn't so simple.

And then the honeymoon is over. Two or three hundred Jews—that's simple. But a thousand? I once asked a fellow in Rome, "Tell me, why do you want to go to America?" And he said, "I know that when I get there, I'll get a furnished flat, I was told that the community is nice, there will be a refrigerator full of food, and I will even get a color television." In America, you can buy a used color television set for \$200. So why not? But I say that we cannot allow this to happen when the future of the State of Israel is at stake.

And, of course, some of them are running away from Judaism altogether.

So, now we brought a proposal. We said that if an emigrant comes to Vienna, and he's got parents or children or a brother or sister in America, fine. If not, the Jewish community does not help him; he comes to Israel. That's a compromise. That would include about 25 percent of all the Russians arriving in Vienna.

But if that were to start happening, wouldn't the Arabs bring fierce pressure on the Russians to stop the flow? Isn't it possible that the Russians have opened their doors ever wider precisely because they don't have to defend themselves against the Arabs, since the Jews aren't going to Israel after all?

The Russians have increased the flow for one reason and one reason only: the Jackson amendment. The Russians tried to be stubborn for three years or so, and when they finally realized that the U.S. Senate wouldn't back down, they started to let the Jews go. Now I think it's time to respond, to signal them that we understand what they're doing and what they want. Our luck was Jackson—after all, Nixon and Ford and Carter were all against the amendment, and much of the Jewish leadership, too. And remember, the Russians let the Jews out even during the '73 war. And that was at a time when there were no dropouts.

If the 35,000 Russian Jews who came out in 1973, 33,700 came to Israel. So this isn't the major problem. The Russians are responding to the Jackson amendment, and to intense world pressure. On this issue, we have much support, even from countries that aren't friendly to Israel.

So yes, there is a human problem here, but there is also a historic problem. Russian Jewry and the State of Israel need each other, they belong to each other. The Jewish people must make a decision on this matter. Rabin didn't act on this matter and Begin hasn't acted on it either. Why? Not because they don't know that we need the people. But because they are afraid to get into a quarrel with the leadership of American Jewry. Who is the leadership of American Jewry? Thirty or 40 people. Begin tells me that he agrees with me, and I tell him that his agreeing isn't enough. He has to do something, to take action here, or he will be responsible for the greatest historical calamity. I've told him that.

## LEONARD SCHROETER

Over 200,000 Jews have been permitted to leave the USSR since the contemporary Jewish movement began in 1967. As I write, in mid-1979, virtually all of the Lenin-grad trial defendants have been freed, and most of the Prisoners of Conscience and Movement leaders I discussed in *The Last Exodus* now live in Israel, their heroic period behind them, pursuing more or less normal lives except for the permanent emotional scars left by long years in the Gulag. The most intractable refusenik cases have proved not to be "impossible" at all.

Polina Epelman, the wife of a defector, and thus by conventional wisdom a permanent prisoner of the regime, received an exit visa; joined her professor husband in Israel; bore a new child; emigrated to Canada and then the United States; has returned to her profession as a

pharmacist; and is well on the way to American citizenship. Refusenik scientists, who by virtue of their international status and their indisputably seminal minds were Soviet national assets, and whose emigration was a meaningful technologic increment to the receiving country, have now departed. When Academician Venyamin Levich is permitted to leave as he has been, it would appear that there is no logical, comprehensible constraint that exists to prevent any individual Jewish exodus. By now, refuseniks such as the most distinguished artistic celebrities (Valery Panov); famous scholars (Vitaly Rubin); great scientists (Levich); "dangerous" prisoners serving long terms (Dymshits and Kuznetsov)—all have been freed. No reason exists to believe that there is any category of person who will be permanently held by the regime. But many believe that the *policy* of the regime is purposely unpredictable. There are some hard-core refusenik cases, such as Academician Aleksandr Lerner, whose applications for exit visas, made almost a decade ago, have still not been granted despite constant reapplication, political agitation, and support from abroad. Activist Movement leaders, notably Vladimir Slepak, Grigory Goldstein, Ida Nudel, and Yosef Begin, after years of struggle, have been prosecuted, receiving sentences in labor camps and exile. For some, rights deprivation, harassment, repression and hopelessness have become chronic. The brutal bureaucracy of the regime has eclipsed hope—despite the activists' knowledge that no hope is too extreme, that nothing is impossible, and that even for them the great Soviet prison doors may open. Conscious random irrationality and example-setting remain a potent weapon to discourage the right to leave. The lack of predictable logic as to why some are victimized tends to inhibit all.

Yet, as of this writing, it would appear that 50,000 to 60,000 Jews may be released from the USSR during 1979—by far the largest

annual emigration in the history of the USSR. Most of these (perhaps 65–70 percent) are expected to choose the United States as their ultimate haven. The raw statistics, however, do not tell more than a small part of the meaningful story, do not provide us with the historical perspective which alone makes the Soviet Jewry Movement comprehensible. It is certainly relevant, for example, that the Soviet Jews who came to Israel, became Israeli citizens, and then left—i.e., those who became *yordim* (Jewish emigrants from Israel)—are still much less than 10 percent of those who become *olim* (Jewish immigrants to Israel). This is in marked contrast to *olim* from Western countries who leave Israel at a ratio five to ten times higher than that of Soviet *olim*. Further, the number of *yordim* among Israeli-born Jews has increased. There are now approximately as many *yordim* as *olim* each year, and many times more Israeli *yordim* in America than there are American *olim* in Israel. Viewed in this context, the Zionist steadfastness of the Soviet Jewish Movement remains remarkably high in contrast to overall Jewish constancy toward Israel.

These fundamental patterns lead to other basic observations, distillable from the perspective of a dozen years.

In all likelihood the issue of Soviet Jewry will remain a chronic one, with exacerbations and remissions in its fever level and its effect on the world outside the USSR. Absent some even more extraordinary events than have occurred, or some unspeakable, genocidal tragedy—both essentially not predictable but not excludable—Jews will still be seeking to leave and will be continuing their exodus from the USSR at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Few Soviet Jews have remained unaffected by the events of the past decade. Even those who are Communist Party members are dramatically affected by the emigration movement. Some documentation indicates that almost 300,000 Jews, constituting approximately 13 per-

cent of the Jewish population, are party members. It seems clear that the Soviet perception of the Jew as the "outsider"—the "rootless cosmopolitan"—has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Jewish alienation from Soviet society, always present, has become substantially institutionalized on a two-way basis. Although assimilation has been officially encouraged and frequently practiced, it is now increasingly being viewed as unachievable. All Jews, whether assimilated party members or not, are being seen in regime terms as unreliable. Thus, the ability of Soviet Jews to successfully penetrate the upper reaches of the Soviet power structure has been drastically reduced, with its inevitable concomitant—the near universality of Jewish alienation from the society.

The chronic nature of the issue arises from the awareness of the future long-term presence of the "Jewish problem"; the substantial size of the Jewish population; the awakening and revival of interest in Jewish religion, culture, and history—all the accoutrements of Judaism as a religious civilization; combined with the almost total absence of access to Jewish experience. Consequently, there will be increasing concern by Soviet Jews and the world Jewish community over the right to have Jewish identity and expression within the Soviet Union.

Endemic Russian anti-Semitism, now buttressed by the official anti-Semitism of the regime (often in the guise of anti-Zionism or anti-Israel politics), has substantially increased, and is seemingly institutionalized in its more overt, rabid form. Anti-Semitism is accompanied by increased discrimination, evidenced by an almost total absence of upward mobility; severe and increasing entry limitations into the heretofore heavily Jewish scientific and art sectors; and widespread understanding that economic opportunity is being curtailed, and that children will have far less chance for advanced educational opportunities than their parents had. Anti-Semitism and dis-

crimination have their profound long-term effect, fueling the already developed emigration pressures.

Any simplistic generalities concerning Soviet Jews should by now have been dispelled. We know that they are far more heterogeneous than Jewish populations in any European countries. The major differences in culture, language, and historical experience between the three broad groups (all of which have multiple subdivisions)—(1) Asian Jews (e.g., Georgian, Bukharan, and Mountain Jews), (2) Soviet heartland Ashkenazis (RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia), and (3) Jews from the Western borderlands (the Baltic states and pre-World War II Polish, Rumanian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian territories)—lead to ideologic, political, and emigration goal differences. These differences have dramatic manifestations, including the definition of the character of the Movement itself. Unquestionably, in its inception and early years, the Movement not only had the rhetoric of political Zionism, but its behavior was the most dramatic affirmation of Zionism in Zionism's eighty-year history. Until 1973, not more than 2 percent of all Jews who left the USSR chose to go anywhere other than Israel—thus fully supporting the thesis that the Soviet Jewry Movement was indeed a "repatriation movement." To Israeli ideologues this phenomenon was a euphorically staggering vindication. It was not at first noticed or understood that in these early years fully two-thirds of the immigrants to Israel came from the border states and Georgia, although less than 10 percent of all Soviet Jews reside in those areas. On the other hand, the 80 percent of the Jewish population residing in the largely urban heartland republics produced less than 15 percent of the Israel emigration. Soviet Jews from the large population centers (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Sverdlovsk, Minsk, etc.) are often third or fourth generation Soviet citizens, far removed in time and understanding from the religio-culture of

their people. They are heavy consumers and producers of Russian culture. In the main they are educated, impressed with Western technological and cultural values, urban, and alienated. It is little wonder then that once the reservoir of Zionist-committed Jews (e.g., in Latvia and Georgia) was substantially drained, the relative percentage of Jews emigrating from the far more populous heartland republics increased drastically as did the percentages of Jews going to Western countries rather than Israel. By 1978, almost two-thirds of all Soviet Jews were emigrating to the United States, most of these people from large heartland cities, the major Jewish population centers. This would clearly appear to be an irreversible trend. Similarly the high level of Zionist commitment of the early years would now seem to have been specific to the time, and of short-term duration. Although Zionist *rhetoric* remains a fundamental feature of Movement literature, emigration *conduct* is much more significant.

As the 1967 Six-Day War is a convenient bench mark for the beginning of the Soviet Jewry Movement, the 1973 Yom Kippur War can be similarly useful as the turning point from its predominantly Zionist character to its more historically traditional Jewish conduct. That war demonstrated that the belief in Israel's military invincibility was an illusion. The internal scandals in Israel following the war reminded Jews everywhere that Israel was not a utopian Zionist paradise, but a hard pressed, small nation with all the usual warts and blemishes of states, plus an extraordinary vulnerability to the likelihood of future war. The post-1967 euphoria was replaced by a post-1973 sober reality. The percentage of Soviet Jews going to countries others than Israel rose roughly from 5 percent in 1973 to 20 percent in 1974; 35 percent in 1975; 50 percent in 1976; and continuously upward since then.

All present indications are that the overwhelming majority of Soviet

Jews do not leave the USSR because they are Zionists, but because of their perception that their society is anti-Semitic, discriminatory, and that they and their children will be denied upward social mobility. Thus they move from a country where they are disadvantaged because of restrictions on Jews, lack of economic opportunity, and bureaucratic repression, which results in their political and intellectual alienation. They move to countries where they see the opportunity for upward mobility—particularly in terms of the advanced education of their children, economic opportunity, full utilization of their professional skill, freedom for creative growth and from bureaucratic repression, and where extended family exists. The United States is the principal land of such opportunity, freedom and family connection. It is therefore no surprise that close to 50,000 Soviet Jews have recently come to the United States and tens of thousands of others wish to do so, if the human right to leave becomes an institutionalized reality. Emigration motivation thus has little to do with Zionist ideology. It has a great deal to do with the characteristic patterns of modern Jewish history and the oppressiveness of Soviet life.

Between 1880 and 1925 (when open emigration to the United States was halted), over 2.5 million Jews, about one-third of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe, came to America. During the same period, despite the ideological and political activity of Zionist parties in all Eastern European Jewish communities, less than a tenth of that number emigrated to Palestine, and a large percentage of those emigrants left the rigors of that life, often moving on to America. Today, after more than thirty years of Jewish statehood, more than five times as many Israelis are living in the United States and Canada than there are American Jews living in Israel. Frustrating and disappointing as these facts are to many Zionists, they constitute a central reality of modern Jewish history. Denigrating epithets such as

"*noshrim*" (dropouts), employed with alacrity in recent years to those Soviet Jews who, receiving Israel exit visas, choose Western countries rather than Israel, not only fail to reverse the trend, they show a lack of comprehension of Jewish history and the basic human right of free choice.

Within the past century, during which freedom of movement has become increasingly technically feasible, Jews have moved from lands of oppression to lands of opportunity, when the country of oppression permitted migrations and the country of opportunity accepted immigrants. In such migrations the opportunity for full religious expression has been much less important than the opportunity for a college degree. Political Zionism—a land of one's own—has been much less important than a house or business of one's own. Much of the Jewish migration of the past century has been by East European Jews, from lands now within the present territorial boundaries of the USSR.

The behavior of contemporary Soviet Jewry can be appropriately contrasted to that of the parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents of most Western Jews who are descendants of this stock. Many commentators have observed that Russian Jewry has been the most prolific, vigorous, and creative people in modern Jewish history. It has supplied much of the leadership and creative vigor of Israel, a substantial part of the leadership of the Jewish communities of America, and has made enormous contributions to science, aesthetics, and scholarship both in the United States and in the USSR. The people composing the current Soviet Jewish Movement, in perspective, are often strikingly reminiscent of those portrayed in *World of Our Fathers: The Journey of the East European Jews to America and the Life They Found and Made*, by Irving Howe (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

Contrary to the early hopes and illusions, the majority of Soviet Jews, like the majority of their

ancestors and like the majority of other Jews from other lands, are *not* Zionists, despite the Holocaust and the foundation and continued existence of the State of Israel. (Since it is commonly said that most Jews have become Zionists, it should be noted that I mean by Zionism a commitment to live in Israel, not simply financial, political, and moral support of that country.)

Although in the early years almost 100 percent of Soviet Jews came as *olim*, casting their lot with the Jewish state and rejecting life in the USSR or any part of the diaspora, after 1973 in increasing numbers those who emigrated voted with their feet to go West. This development led to hysterical, insensitive, extreme reactions from Israeli and Jewish Agency officials. The first manifestation of this was the effort mounted to compel organized Jewish communities to deny any economic assistance to impoverished Soviet Jews who, having come to Israel, decided to live elsewhere. This was followed by a brutish insistence that funds be totally denied *noshrim*. This astonishing abdication of century-old Jewish community commitment to aid the poor and oppressed was justified to obsequious sycophants in diaspora countries by asserting that Soviet Jews had perpetrated a fraud by accepting visas to Israel and then going to the West. This sophistry ultimately failed, since it was well known that for the Soviet Union the ideology of "repatriation" to Israel and the concept of family reunification were merely convenient rationalizations for the current emigration policy. The regime even used the repatriation pretext when it issued exit visas to Israel for non-Jews who had publicly indicated their intent to go West. It has been obvious that the Israeli visa is a comforting fiction to Soviet authorities, and is a pragmatic mechanism for Jewish rescue from the USSR. The continued rejection of Israeli and Jewish Agency pressures to deny funds to Soviet Jews who do not go to Israel can only be counted as a triumph for traditional Jewish values.

These events help verify the perspective that the Soviet Jewry Movement conforms to the main creative forces of Jewish history, rather than being an idealistic Zionist aberration.

In the perspective of a dozen years, some earlier directions have now been confirmed. Most observers agree that once the Soviet Jewry Movement surfaced, was identified in the West, and had developed a sense of its own character and existence as a movement, its continued vitality and successes became largely reliant upon American Jewish supporters and the active and potential intervention of the United States government.

The publication and use of *The Last Exodus* constitutes a confirmation of that fact. Soviet Jews have best learned about themselves from their friends abroad, who by recording their history permit them to see a reflection of their own identity. A people or movement must be nourished by knowledge of their own history. Without a press, journals, research centers, and universities, how can a people know themselves? Soviet Jewry activists in the West have understood this lesson well. Their primary task has been to report, publish, document, spread, and return information to the activists within the Soviet Union. Telephone links, hot lines, newsletters, press conferences, all have had these purposes: securing popular and governmental support in the West; acting as the voice and reflection of the captive Movement; and being a communication system, keeping Soviet Jews informed about themselves, aware of and in contact with their Western supporters.

Shortly after the first publication of my book, activists in the United States began to smuggle copies of it into the USSR. Later travelers learned that the book had been seen in a number of cities and that typed *samizdat* copies of fifty to sixty pages of the book were being circulated in cities like Kharkov and Kiev. Later there were reports that translations of some of the chapters into Russian had occurred. It

became an important source book for Soviet activists preparing their own *samizdat* journals.

This kind of support was vital to the Movement. Crucial factors in the success it has achieved in recent years were extensions and reconfirmations of tactics and directions that had already emerged by 1972. The original assumption of Movement leaders was that the link to Israel and its government was the critical one for implementing their struggle. For many reasons, this became obviously erroneous. All contacts were to be with the Israeli government office with self-delegated authority to coordinate the Soviet Jewry struggle throughout the world. The activists soon learned to call this apparatus, headed since 1970 by Nechemia Levanon, the "office without a name." Levanon's office proved consistently inept; at times half-hearted and ambiguous; primarily concerned with *aliyah*, not rescue; and the prisoner of a largely inapplicable post-World War II experience and mentality. Most important, it lost the confidence of activists, both within the USSR and in Western countries.

The obsession of Soviet leaders with the perceived menace of Chinese powers led to a major Soviet detente gambit in February 1971, which has continued to this date. Detente for the Soviets meant at least the neutralization of the United States in the Sino-Soviet struggle. This, in turn, required the Soviet regime to be finely tuned to congressional sentiments and not to be too insensitive to American public opinion. Furthermore, the increasing dominance of oil in foreign policy changed the Middle East from a secondary focus of international power politics to the primary one, making evident what had long been true—that Israel was a client state of the United States, without power to control events, let alone free Soviet Jews.

Under these circumstances the Soviet Jewry issue became significant in the world politics of the 1970s. Next to the support of Israel it occupied the highest politi-

cal priority for most Jews in Western countries. Characteristic of the Movement's focus was their instigation of what became the Jackson-Vanik Bill, and their continued support of that legislation.

In August 1972, when the Soviet regime imposed the notorious education tax that required, as a precondition of emigration, repayment to the state of the claimed massive costs of secondary education, the response of Movement and Soviet democratic leaders was that the United States should condition any economic benefits to the USSR upon Soviet adherence to the fundamental human right to leave one's country. This proposed tactic found expression in Senator Jackson's insistence upon linkage between economic aid and free emigration. The Soviet government ceased requiring payment of the education tax, and the Movement marshaled its forces in support of the Jackson legislation. Years after the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Bill, efforts to eliminate linkage or neutralize its legislative effects still result in vigorous Movement opposition.

Activist Movement leadership knows that if changes are to occur in Soviet policy toward them, these changes will take place because of pressures, in fact or anticipated, from the United States government. Movement leaders appreciate that apart from their own capacity to make direct appeals, they have available to them a potent pressure group—the Jewish communities of the western world. Movement leaders know the names and political attitudes of members of Congress far better than they know details about Soviet elected officials. They have invoked the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement, prepared documentation for the Belgrade Conference, and endlessly cited international human rights covenants, because they know that the Soviet regime, under American prodding, has great sensitivity and vulnerability in these areas. Their first-line allies are the Soviet Jewry activists in the West. Their targets are American public opinion,

Congress, and the President. This is where the action is. This is where their *samizdat* literature, letters, petitions, telephone calls, and pleas are directed.

The classic illustrative case of the maturing directions of the Soviet Jewry movement and Soviet and Western responses to it is that of Anatoly Shcharansky.

Shcharansky, a talented computer scientist, was arrested in early 1977 to the accompaniment of extensive and exceptional Soviet news charges that he was a CIA-sponsored espionage agent. Shcharansky had, as a very young man, become a part of the Jewish movement in Moscow, applied for an exit visa, and been refused. His young wife, Natalya, received permission to leave Moscow the day after their marriage and has been in Israel (where she adopted the Hebrew first name of Avital) ever since. Meanwhile Shcharansky, who speaks fluent English, was the primary direct contact person for the Movement with the Western press. He was involved in multiple activist ways, his name, face, and voice becoming well known in the West. A British television film company produced two documentaries featuring Shcharansky and his commentaries—audaciously filmed in Moscow. Shcharansky acted as a tour guide of Soviet dissidents, covering the wide spectrum of human rights protest activities. He also became a founder and one of the spokesmen of the Helsinki Watch Committee, a monitoring group committed to seeing that Soviet regime failures to adhere to its Helsinki Agreement human rights commitments would become known to the world. Shcharansky, with his courageous confrontation politics, had committed too many cardinal sins for the regime. He, and virtually all members of the Helsinki Watch committees, were prosecuted, usually on catch-all bases such as “anti-Soviet” activity. Shcharansky was particularly targeted for regime revenge and example-setting by being charged with espionage on behalf of the

CIA. The President of the United States took the unprecedented step of publicly denying that Shcharansky had ever been any kind of a CIA agent. Worldwide protest over his arrest was ignored. He remained incommunicado in detention for well over a year, without an attorney or any semblance of what could be described as due process. Shcharansky then endured a predictably rigged trial, distinguished only by the paucity of evidence of anything other than that he was a dissident human rights and Jewish activist. The trial resulted in a thirteen-year sentence; cover pictures on news magazines all over the world; the strong protests of government leaders in the United States and other countries; and the continuing global crisscrossing in his behalf by his beautiful wife, Avital, and her articulate and indefatigable brother, Michael Stiglitz. Shcharansky is indeed a fitting modern hero, and his supporters are admirable and skillful proponents of his cause.

What then distinguished Shcharansky from earlier Soviet Jewish prisoners of conscience? First, more than any other such case, it has become an international incident of substantial proportions, involving the integrity of the President of the United States, and the stubborn vengeance of the example-setting Soviet authorities. Secondly, Shcharansky is not merely a Zionist hero—he is much more complex, embodying Zionist attachment, human rights commitments, intimate and interlocking connections with the democratic movement and other Soviet dissident groups, and a sophisticated political awareness that permitted him to recognize that political leverage could be applied most effectively by means of Western media and politicians (particularly American). The campaign for his release thus symbolically becomes the most important confrontation in the rapidly expanding Soviet Jewry struggle.

The Israel “office without a name” has, not so strangely, been ambivalent, lukewarm, and sometimes standoffish about the

Shcharansky case. The documentation of these attitudes and how they expressed themselves is highly instructive, illustrating some central theses that have become clearer with the passage of time. The Israeli authorities responsible for Soviet Jewry do not tolerate the heresy of diluting Zionism by solidarity with democrats and other dissidents. They fear Soviet Jewry political activity that is not under their control. Thus independent activists within the Soviet Union, in Israel, or in the countries of the West, are suspect to them and subjected to intense criticism. The activists feel that Levanon’s office has been consistently manipulative and obstructionist. The Israelis have felt that Shcharansky was never “their man.” The movement in his support has been wholly out of their control. They accurately perceive that it is Shcharansky and his supporters who characterize the future direction of the Movement and its tactics. This spells the end of their power and control.

Like King Canute commanding the waves to retreat, those who would attempt to roll back the Movement to its pristine Zionist days are fated to damp frustration. Soviet Jews are the legitimate descendants of the Jewish generations that preceded them. They are creating exciting new chapters in the long and rich history of the Jewish people—and in the process they are affecting detente and the delicate world power balance. ★

Mem Summary  
Apr 15, 1980

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2. THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS TO THE US AND ISRAEL

The number of Soviet Jews who decide to go to the US instead of Israel, though still high, is beginning to decline under the impact of a more restrictive Soviet emigration policy which has caused total Jewish emigration to decline for the last five months. Many Israelis, however, have long been distressed by the high "dropout" rate, as well as by the readiness of US Jewish groups and the US government to provide material support to the "dropouts." Prime Minister Begin has recently complained publicly about this and can be expected to raise the issue during his visit to Washington.

\* \* \*

The proportion of Soviet Jewish emigrants with Israeli visas who opt instead for the US has climbed steadily over the years: from 36 percent in 1975 to 64 percent in 1979. The monthly dropout rate peaked at 70.8 percent in September 1979. It then began to fall because of Moscow's enforcement of a requirement, primarily in the Ukraine, limiting emigration to applicants with primary relatives in Israel. During the first three months of 1980 the rate was 60.3, 57.9, and 59 percent, respectively (but it dropped to 53 percent during one week in March).

The proportion of emigrating Jews who have primary relatives in Israel will probably continue to climb; the dropout rate, therefore, can be expected to show a corresponding decline, perhaps reaching 50 percent during the summer.

Soviet Jews who go to Israel do so because of a strong sense of Jewish identity, or because they have relatives there. The majority of emigrants, however, respond to the traditional image of the US as a land of freedom, security and economic opportunity. Most emigrants are aware of the great wave of Jewish emigration to the US at the turn of the century; many have even managed to preserve some tie with those who came then or their descendants. There is also a subtle but potent psychological factor: many Soviet nationals tend to take pride and comfort in being citizens of a great power and find the prospect of life in a small vulnerable country to be unsettling.

We doubt that a high dropout rate in itself jeopardizes the emigration flow out of the USSR. Soviet authorities occasionally accuse Jews of emigrating under false pretenses, but Moscow is also disillusioned with emigration as a lever for influencing US policy on such bilateral issues as trade and SALT II. Afghanistan so far has not been a major factor.

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Soviet Emigration to the US: 1970-79<sup>1</sup>

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>Total<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>1980</u>
Armenian			75	185	291	455	1,779	1,390	1,123	3,581	8,879	6,103
Azerbaijani			0	0	5	5	1	3	6	4	24	1
Belorussian			1	1	4	2	2	2	1	11	24	3
Estonian			2	3	4	7	5	0	4	8	33	2
Georgian			0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	3	1
Latvian			3	2	1	3	7	4	8	12	40	1
Lithuanian			6	5	5	9	10	13	9	14	71	8
Moldavian			1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
Russian			13	18	35	35	50	54	74	72	351 <sup>3</sup>	68
Turkmen			0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Ukrainian			16	18	34	28	30	47	27	62	262	29
Uzbek			0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0
German			0	3	1	8	2	9	0	1	24	3
Greek			12	11	11	20	20	11	4	3	92	4
Jewish (total)			3,357	3,502	4,422	5,470	7,652	8,977	17,296	29,139	81,815	17,416
1. direct			357	502	622	585	650	493	430	345	3,984	216
2. via Vienna <sup>3</sup>	c1,000	c1,000	c3,000	c3,000	3,800	4,885	7,002	8,484	16,866	28,794	77,831 <sup>3</sup>	17,200
Polish			1	1	1	3	0	3	6	12	27	1
Other			12	9	7	5	13	17	18	19	99	10
Total	c1,250 <sup>4</sup>	c1,300 <sup>4</sup>	3,499	3,758	4,821	6,050	9,576	10,531	18,576	32,940	92,301	23,650

1. Except where noted, figures are based on the assumption that all Soviet residents granted US immigrant visas or approved for third-country processing by the US Consulate in Moscow are now residents of the US.
2. Because ethnic breakdowns are unavailable for 1970 and 1971, ethnic totals may be slightly off the actual figures for the 10-year period.
3. Emigres whose destination was Israel, but who opted in Vienna to come to the United States. Although the majority are Jews, a significant percentage (perhaps over 10 percent) are Russians and others whose numbers, if known, would have been added to the statistics for their respective ethnic groups.
4. Includes total direct immigration, all ethnic groups: 250 for 1970, 300 for 1971.

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