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JEWISH EMIGRATION DECLINE

Q. What in your view is the primary cause of the decline in Soviet Jewish emigration?

A. We see the continuing decline in Soviet Jewish emigration as part of a larger phenomenon involving cutbacks in emigration of all types -- Jewish, Armenian, and Volga German as well as direct emigration to the United States and Canada and to other Western countries. This phenomenon also involves increased repression of Jewish cultural and religious activists, other religious and ethnic activists, Helsinki monitors and other dissidents. While we cannot be sure of the exact cause of the Soviet crackdown, it does seem clear to us that it is related both to internal Soviet factors and the present international situation.

DECLASSIFIED/Released
Authority NLR-170-17-22-118
BY JN NARA DATE 3/7/2019

Dear Mr. Margo:

Canonization

I wish to ^{express} convey my ancient support for the significance of an

Emergency N. Amer. Conf. on Soviet strategy to address the dramatic decline in Jewish emigration.

decline in Jewish emigration.

In the last years, we have witnessed a ~~steadily declining~~ ^{drastic} steady decrease in the number of Jews permitted to emigrate from the Sov. Union. This number has dropped from ~~emigration from the USSR~~ ¹⁹⁴⁴ in 1944.

51,331 = migrants in 1979 to only 21,470 arrivals in 1980. The emigration

Recent month of August, Jewish emigration reached the lowest ^{or} ^{appalling} level in a decade. These figures clearly signify the intensification ^{appalling} of Soviet repression of harassment against the Jewish ^{Soviet}.

(I want to assure you) that I want you to know that the fate of these people, as well as that of other Soviet citizens deprived of their freedom, is deeply concerning about the tragic

plight of the Soviet ~~and~~ have had made it have wanted of their
 at benign is of course to this ~~and~~ ^{freedom} ^{basic human}
 assiduously to induce more flexible practices by the Soviet government rights of

w/ req. to freedom of movement. The issue of Jewish emigration has been an integral issue on the agenda of such recent ~~has been addressed repeatedly~~ w/ the Sovs. in

mtg. of the UN Human Rights Commission, we have ^{also} striven

to make the Sov. Govt. ~~aware~~ ^{strong} Cognizant of the importance we attach to ^{Jewish} emigration as an essential component of security & cooperation in Europe. ~~It~~ as a major issue in US-Sov.

uncovering
bilateral relations, Our stance has ~~not~~ been confined to

~~Defence alone, that progress in the security area ~~of the~~~~
cannot be achieved w/out 2
~~ASCT~~ must be balanced by concurrent progress in human rights

Particularity that of emigration & family reunification.

(This Admin has not confined itself to pressuring Sov authorities on general overall emigration numbers, we have also been extremely

appearing

concerned w/ numerous indiv. cases. In July, I met w/ ^{both} Mrs. Sch. & Josef Mendele. He indicated my awareness of the plight of the Jewish Prisoners of Conscience.

I can assure you we will continue to seek opportunities to encourage the Sov. govt. to liberalize its policies on emig. & Freedom of movement. Our commitment to H.R. is ^{spurred} ~~spurred~~ by the spirit of freedom which is the cement of our democratic society. We will not accept the egregious violations committed by the Sov. govt. In providing ^{an effective} ~~an effective~~ response to these actions by ^{citizens of the free world are extremely imp.} ~~citizens of the free world are extremely imp.~~ ^{constitutes} ~~constitutes~~ ^{an imp. part of our common struggle} ~~an imp. part of our common struggle~~ ^{for the promotion of a rights of the} ~~for the promotion of a rights of the~~ ^{oppressed Soviet Jews.} ~~oppressed Soviet Jews.~~ Yet we feel that H.R. ought to be promoted not only because of moral considerations but the world can't be safe for democracy while the

As _____ aptly put it...

Please accept my best wishes.

For us the pursuit of H. Rights is not only important for moral reasons but also is directly tied to our nat'l interests. A state which practices the brutal oppression of its own citizens can't be expected to pursue a benign f. policy conducive to the maintenance of peace. Thus, a construction of a stable world order ~~and~~ for democracy is ~~imp.~~ w/out a concomitant promot. of the rights.

Dear _____

I wish to express my deep sympathy for the worthy cause to which this conference is dedicated. ~~It is~~ ~~an especially opportune time to seek~~ It is another attestation to the spirit of freedom which ~~exists~~ ~~exists~~ exists in our own democratic society, that our citizens concern themselves w/ the fate of those who are currently deprived of the fruits of Liberty.

My Administration has been committed to the furtherance of human rights & basic freedoms which the citizens of any state should enjoy. ~~The Sov.~~ The US in concert w/ our allies ~~have~~ ^{has} consistently sought ~~doing~~ to impress the Sov. Union as to how seriously we view their inhuman & unacceptable H.R. policy. During the ~~recent~~ ^{cost} OSCE mtg, our delegation presented the Sovs w/ a long list of egregious violations committed by the Sov. Govt. which clearly contravene the basket Three of the Helsinki accords & also violate numerous ^{other} int'l agreements entered into ^{by} the S. Union. ~~However,~~ Moreover, throughout such discussions our purpose has been not to criticize past Sov. perf. but to seek assurances that fut. ↓

behavior could more closely conform to int'l legal standards. Unfortunately, the Sov. Govt. has not been very forthcoming & has not made the slightest effort to rectify its deficiencies in the H.R. field. If anything the sit. has gotten worse. One of the most signif. areas which has been indicative for the overall worsening of H.R. has been their policy w/ regard to Jewish emigration. I need not remind you about the drastic decrease —

Plight
of Sov.
Jewry

in the no. of Jews permitted to leave in 1980.

Now, for auth. - stopped of harassment
at leave inst. - more restrictive procedures
involved in processing req. appl.

The Admin. will continue to do what it can
to assist.

Dear Mr. Mann,

I wish to express my ardent support for the convocation of ^{the 18th} ~~an~~

Emergency North American Conference on Soviet Jewish to address the ^{pleading} ~~drainage~~ ^{debt} ~~deadline~~ in Jewish emigration.

In the last ^{few} years, we have witnessed a steady decrease in the number of Jews permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

This number has dropped from 51,331 emigrants in 1979 to only 21,470 arrivals in 1980. The emigration levels have continued to decline even further in 1981 and in the ~~most recent~~ ^{most recent} worth of August, Jewish emigration reached the lowest level in a decade. These figures ^{clearly} ~~clearly~~ signify the intensification

of Soviet repression of arbitrary harassment against Soviet Jews ^(The inhumane actions of Soviet authorities violate both the letter of the spirit of the Helsinki accords as well as other relevant intl agreements entered into by the Soviet Union) ~~to such I want you to know that the fate of these people, the Soviet people, is a tragedy)~~.

As far as that of other Soviet citizens deprived of their basic human rights & freedoms is of immense concern to this Administration, we have worked assiduously to induce more flexible & benign practices by the Soviet government with regard to the freedom of movement. The issue of Jewish emigration has been an integral issue on the agenda of such recent intl fora as the Madrid Review Meeting on CSCE & the meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission. We have strived to make the Soviet Govt. cognizant of the strong importance we attach to Jewish emigration as an essential component of security & cooperation in Europe. As a major issue in US-Soviet bilateral relations, our unwavering stance has been that progress in the security area cannot be achieved w/out concurrent progress in human

1
human rights, particularly that of emigration & family reunification

I can assure you we will continue to seek opportunities to encourage the Soviet govt. to liberalize its policies on ~~emigration~~ freedom of movement. Our commitment to basic human rights is spurred by the spirit of freedom which is the cement of our democratic society. We will not accept the egregious violations committed by the Soviet govt. To provide an effective response to these violations, actions by concerned citizens are extremely important. This emergency meeting of the North American Conference on Soviet Jewry constitutes an important part of our common struggle for the rights of the oppressed Soviet Jews.

Please accept my sincere best wishes. -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS Executive Waiver
BY JN NARA DATE 3/7/2019

(U) SOVIET EMIGRATION TO THE US: 1970-79

(U) Summary

Soviet emigration to the United States has risen dramatically over the past decade, from an estimated 1,250 in 1970 to approximately 33,000 in 1979. The total for the decade is more than 92,000. Incomplete ethnic data reveal that Jewish emigrants to the US are by far the largest group, with Armenians a distant second.

* * * * *

(C) Over 300,000 emigrants have left the Soviet Union in the past decade, according to present estimates. Of these, more than 92,000 have chosen to come to the United States. Although their ethnic composition cannot be determined precisely, well over 80 percent are estimated to be Jews. Another 10 percent are Armenians, with Russians and very small numbers of other Soviet ethnic groups making up the remainder.

(C) While the causes and nature of the sizable Soviet Jewish emigration are well known, information about other ethnic groups has rarely surfaced. Only recently, for example, did a survey of recent Armenian emigrants reveal that the vast majority of those coming to the US were urban families headed by Armenians who had themselves immigrated to Armenia during the late 1940's when the Soviets were encouraging a "return to the Motherland." When asked why they left, many complained of economic dissatisfaction coupled with educational and job discrimination due to their foreign connections. Most had close relatives in the US and named California as their destination.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 3/20/86 (Mautner, M.)

Report No. 1346
March 20, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

(U) Ethnic Data Incomplete

The US Immigration and Naturalization Service does not record the nationality (as the term is used in the Soviet Union, referring to ethnic background rather than citizenship) of persons entering the United States. Therefore, the attached table, "Soviet Emigration to the US: 1970-79," had to be compiled from various other incomplete sources; it thus represents only a very rough estimate of the number of Soviet emigrants of each ethnic group who have come to the US over the past decade.

The figures in the table, with ethnic breakdowns, are based essentially upon the Immigrant Visa and Visa Workload Monthly Reports submitted by the US Consulate in Moscow. These reports record the ethnic identity of persons to whom the US Consulate has issued either immigrant visas or approval for third-country processing for direct immigration to the United States.

The table also includes the number of Soviet emigrants arriving in Vienna who, in order to obtain exit permission, had declared themselves to be Jews emigrating to Israel, but who then switched their destination to the United States. It is important to note that although this group emigrated via the so-called Jewish channel, a large number, perhaps over 10 percent, are believed to be Russians, Ukrainians, or others, in many cases married to Jews. While the number cannot be determined, it may amount to as high as a statistically significant 8,000 persons who should have been included under other ethnic totals rather than in the Jewish total.

Another group of Soviet emigrants to the United States, not included in the table at all, consists of those who, after having lived abroad for some time, entered the US from third countries. Their incorporation by ethnic group in the totals might have altered the table somewhat.

Despite these many caveats, the table does reveal the very strong ethnic preponderance of Jews and Armenians in the group as a whole, and the relative paucity of emigrants to the United States from among the other Soviet nationalities.

Prepared by E. B. Sutter
x29186

Approved by M. Mautner
x29212

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Soviet Emigration to the US: 1970-79¹

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>Total²</u>
Armenian			75	185	291	455	1,779	1,390	1,123	3,581	8,879
Azerbaydzhani			0	0	5	5	1	3	6	4	24
Belorussian			1	1	4	2	2	2	1	11	24
Estonian			2	3	4	7	5	0	4	8	33
Georgian			0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	3
Latvian			3	2	1	3	7	4	8	12	40
Lithuanian			6	5	5	9	10	13	9	14	71
Moldavian			1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Russian			13	18	35	35	50	54	74	72	351 ³
Turkmen			0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Ukrainian			16	18	34	28	30	47	27	62	262
Uzbek			0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
German			0	3	1	8	2	9	0	1	24
Greek			12	11	11	20	20	11	4	3	92
Jewish (total)			3,357	3,502	4,422	5,470	7,652	8,977	17,296	29,139	81,815
1. direct			357	502	622	585	650	493	430	345	3,984
2. via Vienna ³	c1,000	c1,000	c3,000	c3,000	3,800	4,885	7,002	8,484	16,866	28,794	77,831 ³
Polish			1	1	1	3	0	3	6	12	27
Other			12	9	7	5	13	17	18	19	99
Total	c1,250 ⁴	c1,300 ⁴	3,499	3,758	4,821	6,050	9,576	10,531	18,576	32,940	92,301

1. Except where noted, figures are based on the assumption that all Soviet residents granted US immigrant visas or approved for third-country processing by the US Consulate in Moscow are now residents of the US.
2. Because ethnic breakdowns are unavailable for 1970 and 1971, ethnic totals may be slightly off the actual figures for the 10-year period.
3. Emigres whose destination was Israel, but who opted in Vienna to come to the United States. Although the majority are Jews, a significant percentage (perhaps over 10 percent) are Russians and others whose numbers, if known, would have been added to the statistics for their respective ethnic groups.
4. Includes total direct immigration, all ethnic groups: 250 for 1970, 300 for 1971.

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NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ON

SOVIET TREATMENT OF ETHNIC GROUPS

THE JEWISH MINORITY

BY

LEV ULANOVSKY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1980

DECLASSIFIED / Released
Authority NLR-17D-17-224-6
BY JN NARA DATE 2/7/2019

Dear Chairman
Dear Members of the Commission

I left Russia only half a year ago. Now I live in Israel. I can tell you what it is like to be a Jew in the Soviet Union today. I can tell you about the growing anti-Semitism resulting from the massive anti-Semitic campaign in the mass media organized by the Soviet government. The anti-Jewish campaign, officially called an anti-Zionist campaign, has become so strong and dirty that people are sometimes beaten in the streets only because they have Jewish faces. They are insulted in buses, stores and other public places. In schools the Jewish child can be in an especially terrible situation. If the children know that the child is Jewish he is held in contempt by the whole class. Sometimes his schoolmates do not know he is Jewish. In this case the child lives in constant deadly fear that the schoolchildren would learn of his being Jewish. A case was reported in the Ukraine. A Jewish schoolboy was hanged by his classmates in a school toilet. He survived by chance because a teacher went into the toilet and saw him hanging on the rope, still alive. He could have been already dead. Nobody was punished. It all happened to this boy after his family applied for a visa to Israel. Such families are in an especially difficult situation because they are projected by the mass media as the worst kind of traitors, who deserve no mercy. And indeed nobody would defend them. Quite the opposite -- the police and KGB would themselves harass such people in all possible ways. And, of course, hooligans and anti-Semites feel free to do with such Jews whatever they wish. Probably the most important obstacle to emigration is the psychological barrier of fear. Jews are simply afraid to become, suddenly, an object of total blind hatred unrestrained by any law or police.

The very word "Jew" has acquired a new meaning in the Soviet Union. It has become a curse and incarnation of everything evil in the world, and

It would be perfectly right to say that in the modern Russian language the word "Jew" is one of the dirtiest words. It is interesting that the usage of the word "Jew" as a dirty word has become so common, that non-Jewish people simply use the word "Jew" as a curse word/ when cursing each other. Many young people know nothing about the word "Jew" except that it is a dirty word. Russian people are totally ignorant about the true meaning of the words "Zionism" and "Jew". If you ask a common Russian man what Zionism is, he would say that Zionism is an especially evil sort of fascism typical for Jews. This is what he knows from the media. Jews in the USSR are understood as an ethnic group and not as a religion. Even if a Jew converts to Christianity he remains a Jew, not only for the simple people around him, but also for the authorities. His registration of his nationality as a Jew is not changed by his conversion. In his internal identity card, which is called "passport", he has his fifth paragraph nationality marked as Jewish and he has no right to change this.

Let me now read for you some examples of the anti-Semitic campaign in the Soviet Union. I believe you will be interested to know how the American administration is depicted by some of the authors. Here are extracts from a report compiled for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR by a leading lecturer of the Znanie Society, Mr. Valery M. Emelyanov. This report was published by the Central Committee for its staff only and was never released to the mass media, for fear of international repercussions. Nevertheless, quite a few copies were leaked out and were widely discussed in Moscow. The report says:

"James Earl Carter belongs to a special Masonic order 'International Lions', or, in English 'Lions International', created and directly subordinate at the 33rd degree of order to the purely Jewish Masonic order of B'nai B'rith. Consequently, Carter knows very well that in case of deviation from the discipline and the instructions of the order, he would have to deal with the B'nai B'rith Gestapo in the person of the so-called Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith, the Vice President of which, Senator Jacob

Javits, is obeyed unquestioningly by the entire Zionist-Masonic Mafia of the US Congress in such instances."

Another extract reads:

"Henry Kissinger (the real name of this Jewish Immigrant from Germany is Alfred Hais Kissinger) is member of the Masonic Order of Phi Beta Kappa; he is also member of the Masonic clubs: Cosmos, Federal City, Century, etc.

President Gerald Ford is member of the Masonic Order Delta Kappa Epsilon and Phi Delta Pi.

In Carter's new government can be seen a significant Masonic continuity: 1) Secretary of State the Jew Cyrus Vance (wife - also a Jew, Annie Roberts) - member of the Great Lodge of the B'nai B'rith no. 1 (New York) - member of the Masonic clubs: Century and Metropolitan. Appointed to the post of Secretary of State on the direct instruction of the B'nai B'rith, as proved by the fact that the Vice-Obershturmfuhrer of the B'nai B'rith Gestapo, Senator Jacob Javits, who was in Paris when Carter announced that appointment, frankly told newspaper correspondents that he had known about this even before his departure from the USA to Europe.

2) Secretary of the Treasury, Michael Blumenthal, also a Jew from Germany, member of the Masonic order Phi Beta Kappa, and also of Masonic clubs: Princeton and Barton Hills Country.

3) President Carter's aide on questions of national security, Zbigniew Brzezinski, married to a Jewish woman, Emily Ann Benes, member of the Masonic Federal City Club which operated under the direct management of the B'nai B'rith.

4) Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, the Jew Josef Califano, married to the Jew Gertrude Zavatskaya, is the director (that is Grossmeister) of the Federal City Class."

Then the author describes Defense Secretary, Harold Brown; Secretary of Housing, Patricia R. Harris, and Secretary of Energy, James R. Schlesinger, and permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations, Negro Andrew Young, as members of various Jewish Masonic orders. Then giving similar explanations about European countries, the author remarks:

"On the instruction of the invisible Zionist-Masonic ruling concern, many West European countries, or rather, their Masonic leaders, also need to increase in their countries the "critical mass of Jews", feeling that in them too is widening the dissatisfaction of the wide masses of the

population with the Masonic-Zionist dominance. Thus, about the shortage of Jews in Western Berlin there recently spoke in Israel the ruling Mayor of that city, Klaus Shutz: 'We need a larger Jewish community than those five or six thousand Jews that live in the city at present. Western Berlin without Jews is not what it had been and not what it should be. Even before the Weimar Republic the Jewish community exercised an exceptional influence on the intellectual and commercial life'. ('Jerusalem Post' 22.10.76).

This desire to increase the 'critical mass of Jews' in Western countries is covered up before their Goyish population by the motto: 'Better Jews than communists'. At the same time the Jews are presented by the Masonic mass information media as the only reliable, innate anti-Communists, because the chief dogma of Judaism is 'that every Jew should have his own fig tree', that is, a Jew in his philosophy is presented as a born adherent of PRIVATE PROPERTY, and, consequently, a born and implacable anti-communist, and in such a way, is a sincere defender of the capitalist system of the West."

Here is Emelyanov's view on Jews in Communist countries. This view is repeated by many other Soviet commentators.

"Already several years back a law was passed in Israel in accordance with which all the Jews in all the countries of the Diaspora, including our country, were granted the citizenship of the State of Israel. In this way all the Jews of the Diaspora are now people with dual citizenship and dual allegiance, in addition, according to the law, allegiance no. 1 is allegiance to Israel and allegiance no. 2 is allegiance to the country of residence. Every Jew who does not obey this law can be subjected to severe punishment as a traitor to his 'historical Homeland', that is, Israel. In connection with this the Zionist-Masonic propaganda has long been preparing all the Jews of the Diaspora for the formation of their fifth column - and the Goyish Masons for an open sabotage and subversive activity at the first signal of the ruling Zionist-Masonic International Concern. The sad experience of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, when at such a signal were activated as agents of Zionism practically all the citizens of Jewish origin, should alert vigilance. In such a situation it is necessary to see already now to a timely guarantee for the safety of our rear.

The struggle against the highly organized international secret organization of Zionism and Masonry, an organization that cleverly joins illegal and legal methods of struggle, is not easy. It demands great civil courage and personal bravery."

As you may know, at the present time the author of this report, Mr. Emelyanov is on trial for killing his wife in a fanatically cruel way. (see appendix C).

In August, 1978 a leading literary magazine Nash Sovremennik published a review by Valery ~~Ilchenov~~ ^{Emelianov} of a highly anti-Semitic book, "Invasion Without Arms" by V. Begun, published in enormous quantities and distributed all over the USSR. In this article, under the name "Zionism Without a Mask", Mr. ~~Ilchenov~~ ^{Emelianov} teaches

"The Jewish national culture serves the aims of a spiritual ghetto. There is also one more quite interesting aspect of this renewed under present-day conditions Zionist demand for 'national culture', which is put forward by them, in particular for Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality. This too is pointed out by V. Begun 'in the usual Zionist concept, this is not an entertainment club or theatrical institution with Jewish actors, but a sect with its own ideology and fitting system of political institutions, covered up by cultural signboards At present, American Zionists, publishing in the 'New York Times' their program of 'cultural' infiltration into the Soviet Union, blab out that in Jewish theaters and clubs the Jewish youth would be able to gather 'with cultural, educational and social aims'. What are these 'social aims', if not the organizational and ideological work of the Zionists, directed against the socialist system? In short, the Zionists want to get from Soviet people by 'peaceful means', what their Imperialist protectors have so far been unable to achieve with the help of arms."

In another place he says:

"If one compares the Torah, (the most important part of the Old Testament Bible) with the statement of Zionists then the clear plagiarism of ideas becomes obvious. It is precisely by references to the dogmas of Judaism that Zionists strengthen their hegemonic aspirations and their claims to mastery of the world."

More translations into English of the Soviet anti-Semitic press can be found in Appendix A.

I would like to talk a little bit about anti-Semitism and discrimination against Jews in governmental bodies and institutions such as universities and places of work. At present most universities have become virtually closed for Jews. Only a few technical colleges still admit limited numbers

of Jews. These are low level technical schools, such as refrigerating colleges, forestry or road-building colleges. Jews used to represent more than half of the best Soviet physicists and mathematicians. Now the new generation of Soviet scientists is virtually free of Jews.

The discrimination against Jews was especially aggravated in the late sixties, and gradually increased all through the seventies. For example, the mathematical faculty at Moscow University, from which most of my friends were graduated, used to have between one-third and one-half Jewish students. Now the number of Jewish students in this faculty is hardly more than one percent. Last summer I took part in collecting statistics about the acceptance of Jews and non-Jews to this faculty. We collected data on six leading mathematical high schools of Moscow with traditionally high percentages of Jewish students. So far high schools do not discriminate against Jews.

All together 87 students of these high schools attempted to enter the Mathematical Faculty
 These six schools traditionally supply the best students for the mathematical faculty of Moscow University. Forty-seven of them were non-Jewish. Twenty-one were also registered as non-Jews although they had at least one Jewish parent or grandparent, something which the administration of the faculty usually knows from the questionnaire submitted with the applications. Nineteen were registered as Jewish. Of the first group of 47 non-Jews, 39 were accepted. Of the second group of ²¹ students who were registered as non-Jews, but had some Jewish origin, three were accepted. Of the 19 who registered as Jews, only one was accepted.

After the publication of the list of accepted students, there was a standard procedure of appeal, which means that a student dissatisfied with the results could appeal, asking to change the mark, claiming that this or that problem was in fact solved correctly, and the low mark was unjust. During the appeals the results may be reconsidered and some students

have a chance to be reaccepted. Before the appeal, we organized a press conference for foreign correspondents, where the result of the first two exams, out of four, were announced. These statistics were quite impressive. It was the first time that statistics of that kind were published. The appeal which followed our press conference was absolutely remarkable. As a result of it, two students of the first group were accepted, as were two Jewish students of the last group. The tripling of the number of the Jewish students accepted from our sample definitely justified all of our effort and the dangers connected with the organizing of the press conference. It was a remarkable success. More details on these statistics can be found in appendix B.

The situation with acceptance to professional jobs and promotion of Jews is no better. Unfortunately I do not possess any statistics on this issue.

The emigration policy of Soviet authorities is at present worse than it has ever been since the emigration began. It looks as if the doors of emigration are closing. An extremely low percentage of the people who desire to leave are allowed to do so. Out of the 128,000 Jews who requested affidavits from Israel last year and were sent them, very few are allowed out. The present rate of emigration is less than 2,000 a month. April 1980 emigration figures are down by more than half as compared to April of last year. New regulations were gradually introduced in the second half of 1979 in most areas of the Soviet Union. According to the new rules, a Jew can apply for emigration only if he has parents or children in Israel; sometimes brothers and sisters are also counted. Since very few Jews have such close relatives in Israel, it means that the bulk of Soviet Jews are deprived of an opportunity to apply for emigration and receive any replies from the OVIR offices, which means,

Ironically, that to become a refusenik has become a privilege. Nevertheless, the latest reports from various towns speak about many thousands of "new refusals" in each town.

I would like briefly to mention the legal side of what was said. The text of the Helsinki Final Act has a provision about compliance with the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights. The Covenant on Political and Civil Rights became international law in 1976, after being ratified by 35 nations, including the Soviet Union. Unlike the Helsinki agreement, the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights is law, and not an agreement. This means that the states which ratified it are legally obliged to comply with it, and to introduce all points into its internal legal system. The Covenant on Political and Civil Rights has a clear provision on the right of the individual to emigrate freely from his country of origin. --- . Article 12/2 "Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own." Furthermore, there is the provision in the fundamental civil law of the USSR which says that in case of a contradiction between the national civil law of the USSR and any international civil law accepted by the USSR, the international civil law has priority over the national law. This is not the case for Soviet national criminal laws. But the right to emigrate clearly refers to civil and not criminal law. That is why the latest attempts by Soviet authorities to limit Jewish emigration only to reunification with parents and children abroad are contrary not only to international law, but also to Soviet national law as formulated in the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

For the last five years I worked as an unofficial private Hebrew teacher in Moscow. Let me tell you in brief about the situation of Hebrew education. In spite of the fact that the Hebrew language officially has the status of a legitimate foreign language, as have English, French, and

others, private teachers of the Hebrew language are still refused registration as legal private teachers, a right which teachers of all other languages have. In 1976 Isif Begun, one of the Moscow Hebrew teachers, was sentenced to Siberia for parasitism because he was not officially registered as a private teacher. Since then charges of parasitism and harassment by police have become a nightmare for the Hebrew teacher in the Soviet Union.

See appendix D.

XX
April 1980

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY
Task Force on Culture and Education
10 East 40 St., New York, N.Y. 10016

DECLASSIFIED/released

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BY JN NARA DATE 3/7/2019

HEBREW IN THE SOVIET UNION

by Lev Ulanovsky

In July, 1977, five months after Anatoly Shcharansky was arrested, the KGB stepped up interrogations of his friends. One morning a black KGB Volga stopped outside my house. A KGB official rang the doorbell and handed me a written warrant summoning me immediately for interrogation on the Shcharansky case. The official escorted me into the black car, and delivered me to the KGB Interrogation Department in Lefortovo containing the KGB Investigation Prison where Anatoly was being held. The initial interrogation lasted eight hours. The senior investigator of the KGB, Mr. Sherudillo, wanted me to testify against Anatoly and I used every possible means to avoid giving any answers at all. It was suggested that I at least testify in an indirect way: my friend Tolya was involved in smuggling out of Russia information about Soviet space missions -- which was obviously absurd.

After a day which yielded no results for the KGB, I was given a second warrant, requesting that I come for a second interrogation in three days' time. At the second interrogation, the pressure was increased. They used all possible means, including threats, to put me on trial, to get the required testimonies. The formal part of the interrogations is a protocol which contains written questions by the interrogator and answers by the interrogatee. In my case, I demanded that I be given the right to write my answers myself. In this way I hoped to avoid deliberate distortions by the KGB of my answers.

When the pressure reached its peak, I wrote in the protocol, "I do not fully understand your question and, therefore, I demand the legal right to use an interpreter from the Russian language into my native language which is Hebrew." Sherudillo's face grew dark. The interrogator knew very well that my first language was Russian. He also knew that I learned Hebrew and had begun to teach it only a few years previously. There was a moment of silence in the room. Then he wrote, "The interrogation is over," and said to me: "You may go."

There are three symptomatic elements in the story about my fortunate escape from the interrogation. One is that the interrogator did not reject outright my request for an interpreter, as would definitely have happened in the old days. It reflects the fact that the status of the Hebrew language in the Soviet Union has undergone a considerable change.

During Stalin's time, Hebrew was considered an instrument of counter-revolutionary subversive activities by Jewish religious clericals and

Zionists. Anyone connected with Hebrew was automatically considered an enemy of Socialism and was severely punished. However, during the "50s, Hebrew acquired a completely new status -- that of a "foreign language" -- which theoretically put it on a par with English, French or any other foreign language. The change resulted not as much from the death of Stalin as probably from the establishment of the State of Israel.

Although the Hebrew language began to be taught in the universities, admission to the lectures was severely restricted. The students for these classes were carefully selected by the authorities. Of course, Jewish students were not allowed to study Hebrew. The Hebrew specialists were trained mainly for KGB and military purposes.

The publication in Moscow in 1963 of the famous Hebrew-Russian dictionary by Felix Shapiro marked a highlight of the new situation. This book not only helped to educate a new generation of private Hebrew teachers after three generations of suppression of Hebrew culture in the USSR, but it also gave a kind of legality to unofficial Hebrew teaching in Russia. After the dictionary was published, dealing with the Hebrew language was no longer considered formally a criminal offense.

The second symptomatic element was that the interrogator did not actually supply the interpreter as I had requested. This reflects the fact that at present in the USSR the right to use the Hebrew language outside the synagogue and the right to teach it privately are not officially recognized. Had the interrogator brought in a Hebrew interpreter it would have been a de facto recognition of the right to use this language.

It should be pointed out that a teacher of English, French or any other foreign language can apply and be registered as a private teacher of a foreign language. He is then required to pay taxes and be registered in a District Financial Department which, in turn, registers and gives him a legal status as a private teacher of a foreign language. How many private teachers -- including myself -- have tried to apply for registration as private teachers of a foreign language and have all been refused by the District Financial Department! It was later learned that these offices had been given secret instructions forbidding them to register teachers of Hebrew. This makes private Hebrew teaching an illegal activity.

In 1976, Iosif Begun was sentenced to three years' exile in Siberia on charges of parasitism because he was refused official registration as a private Hebrew teacher. Since then, the possibility of prosecution for parasitism has become a nightmare for Hebrew teachers. Refusing to register Hebrew teachers is in open contradiction to the recognition of the Hebrew language as a legitimate foreign language.

The third symptomatic element was the fact that the interrogation was stopped. It shows that the authorities are aware of the contradiction between the first two facts. Moreover, they are embarrassed when they are

reminded of it. This weak element of the situation may offer a good opportunity for pressing Soviet authorities through international cultural and trade union organizations for the legalization of private Hebrew teaching in the Soviet Union. Such pressure would be tremendously helpful to thousands of private students and teachers of Hebrew in the Soviet Union and, even more, would provide invaluable encouragement to thousands of Jews who lack the courage to join existing classes.

At present, in Moscow alone, there are about 40 active Hebrew teachers and about 500 adult students. The efficiency of these courses is fantastic due to the high motivation of both students and teachers. There are also numerous classes in Judaism, Jewish culture and Jewish History, both in Hebrew and in Russian. The Jewish Cultural Movement in Russia is developing rapidly. However, there are two problems which are yet to be overcome.

The major stumbling block is the great shortage of dictionaries and basic Hebrew textbooks. At the moment, the Jewish Cultural Movement is based mainly upon learning the Hebrew language first before proceeding to learning Torah and other elements of Jewish Culture. The second problem is the need for the legalization of private Hebrew lessons. These two problems are inter-connected, because the legalization of Hebrew would make it much easier to supply Hebrew books to the Soviet Union which, in turn, would be of great help to the teachers.

Here, I must dwell in greater detail on the fundamental differences of status between the Hebrew and Yiddish languages in the USSR. From the very beginning of the Soviet State, the language of Soviet Jews was officially considered to be Yiddish. There were numerous attempts on the part of the authorities to create a Soviet Jewish culture based on the Yiddish language which would be Communistic in its contents. Lenin and other Communist writers were extensively published in Yiddish. All these attempts failed because the Russian Jews were not enthusiastic about this absurd combination of the Yiddish language and Communist culture. The Moscow published Sovietische Heimland, a Yiddish magazine, is not widely read in Russia because it is basically a reprint of articles from Pravda in Yiddish.

When the Soviet authorities claim from time to time that Jewish culture is flourishing in the USSR, they mean exactly this sort of culture. Actually they cannot mean anything else because the national cultures of other minorities are more or less the same, perhaps on a larger scale, with schools and radio programs. On the other hand, the number of people who can speak and understand Yiddish is diminishing rapidly because the last two generations of Jews have had no opportunity to study it. There are no Jewish schools or even courses in Yiddish in the whole of the Soviet Union.

Recently the Soviets, trying to show the outside world a heightening of Jewish culture in the USSR, organized two Yiddish theatres. However, they could not find enough Yiddish-speaking actors and had to teach those who agreed to appear (some of them non-Jewish) the language from the very beginning. A spectator can see that a considerable part of the audience does not understand the language. They come to the performance as a social event and out of Jewish solidarity and curiosity.

In May, 1979, Riva Feldman, in Moscow, started to teach privately two Yiddish classes, something unheard of heretofore. At the same time, she applied to the taxation authorities for registration as a private Yiddish teacher, mentioning that her profession was a language teacher. After some time, she received a written reply saying that she cannot be registered as a Yiddish teacher because her diploma states she is a teacher of German, not of Yiddish. Since no one in Russia can receive a diploma as a Yiddish teacher, it follows that the teaching of Yiddish is not legal in the USSR.

The Soviet Union is a multi-national state, and the Jews comprise one of the largest minorities in the country. Yiddish is considered to be one of many official languages. Although books, magazines and newspapers are still published in Yiddish in the USSR, very soon only very old people will be able to read them. When talking about Jewish Culture in the USSR, it is important to bear in mind that the Soviet authorities understand it to be Soviet Yiddish Culture. That is why all efforts to extract from them concessions on Jewish Culture in general will lead, at best, to an increased publication of Yiddish books, magazines, newspapers, more theatres and, maybe, even Yiddish schools -- all with Communist contents which will be a total failure.

The best way to pressure the Soviets about the true Jewish Culture in the USSR is to begin with the legalization of private Hebrew language classes which are already functioning so effectively in the large cities. Foreign language status for the Hebrew language in the USSR provides a good basis for fresh pressure and the success of such a campaign would give a tremendous boost to a true Jewish education in Russia, which is so urgently needed at present.

(This article will appear in the forthcoming issue of the periodical, "The Jewish Intelligentsia in the USSR" published by the Israel Public Council for Soviet Jewry.)

April, 1980.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JUNE 8, 1980

Jewish Leader Says Stiffer Soviet Rules Cut Emigration

By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON

An abrupt tightening of Soviet emigration procedures has resulted in a decline in the number of Jews leaving for the West, according to Arye Dulzin, chairman of the World Zionist Organization.

"We are facing a very serious situation," Mr. Dulzin said Friday in an interview during a visit to New York. He added that a high dropout rate of Jews on the way to Israel, with two-thirds choosing to go to the United States, was adding to Israel's concern.

For the first time since substantial Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union began early in the 1970's, Mr. Dulzin went on, the Soviet visa authorities are demanding that would-be emigrants submit affidavits of invitation signed by an immediate relative in Israel. Only relatives living in Israel are recognized as qualified to sponsor Jewish emigrants.

Over the years, the Zionist leader went on, Soviet officials began accepting affidavits from more distant relatives; in some instances all that was needed was an affidavit from someone who happened to have the same surname. As part of détente, emigration was the aim, and "relatives" were part of the game.

In the tactics of détente, in which Moscow sought trade and technological aid, even dissident ethnic Russians have been allowed on occasion, with a wink by Soviet officials, to depart for the West with visas granted ostensibly for reunion with "relatives" in Israel.

Decline Began Last January

"In 1979," Mr. Dulzin said, "180,000 Soviet Jews applied to emigrate. Of those 51,000 did emigrate. Last December there were 4,800 Jewish emigrants. Then it began to fall. In January the number was down to 3,000. We thought it was perhaps just because of the holidays. But by May the total was down to 1,900."

The Soviet visa office's new procedure of accepting sponsorship of Jewish emigrants only by immediate family members, Mr. Dulzin said, was introduced first in the Ukraine, Leningrad and Moldavia and then began to spread to other regions and cities with Jewish populations.

"We don't know what is behind it—whether it's some factor like Afghanistan or something internal," he said. "We

don't know whether it's just temporary. But we do know that thousands of Jews are being turned away from the visa offices, which won't accept their emigration applications."

The preference of at least two-thirds or more of the Jewish emigrants for the United States instead of Israel is a matter of deepening concern, said Mr. Dulzin, who emigrated from Minsk in 1928 to settle in Mexico and then in Israel. As head of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Israel, with headquarters in Jerusalem, he oversees immigration and aspects of settlement such as housing, welfare and education.

Relatives' Emigration Barred

"If a Soviet Jew settles in the United States or anywhere other than Israel, he automatically cuts off his relatives from leaving the Soviet Union, because Moscow accepts only sponsors living in Israel," Mr. Dulzin said. "This is a grave matter and a special commission is now studying what to do about it." The commission, he said, is headed by Max Fish-

er, the Detroit executive and philanthropist.

The dropout rate has been growing over the years, with Jews making a choice upon arrival at the Vienna transit point either to proceed to Israel, where they gain immediate citizenship, or to go elsewhere, in most cases the United States.

Those who choose the United States are helped initially by Jewish volunteer agencies and they now qualify for assistance under the United States Refugee Act. Some Israelis feel that it is a questionable practice to confer refugee status on someone who has a valid Israeli visa and is eligible for Israeli citizenship.

In 1973, Mr. Dulzin said, about 5 percent of 35,000 Soviet Jewish emigrants dropped out; the next year the rate was 20 percent and it reached 67 percent in 1979.

The 1979 Soviet census showed 1,811,000 Jews in the country, but Mr. Dulzin said he and his associates were convinced that the number was closer to three million. He added that he believed most would leave if given the opportunity.



Arye Dulzin, chairman of the World Zionist Organization, during an interview

The New York Times/Sara Krulwich

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December 9, 1980

RECENT TRENDS IN THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION

The Helsinki follow-up meeting in Madrid has become a forum for heated exchanges on questions of human rights, and Soviet policy towards the emigration of Jews from the USSR has figured prominently in the debates. In response to Western charges that the USSR is not living up to its commitments under the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Soviet delegation has suggested that there is a definite connection between the state of international relations and such issues as emigration. As S. A. Kondrachev, the third-ranking member of the Soviet delegation, is reported to have told a closed session of the conference:

The more détente prospers, the more Basket Three prospers. Thus those circles who do not want détente also limit the implementation of Basket Three.¹

While Kondrachev's formulation is noteworthy for its bluntness, his message can hardly be surprising to anyone familiar with Soviet emigration policy. Over the years it has become abundantly clear that, in allowing emigration from the USSR, the Soviet authorities act not out of a commitment to human rights but out of a variety of pragmatic considerations.

The emigration of Jews from the USSR did not start with the signing of the Final Act of CSCE. Rather, it has a recent history quite apart from the Helsinki process. Gaining momentum in the early 1970s, it reached the substantial level of some 35,000 persons for the year 1973. Before the Helsinki accords came into being, the emigration of Soviet Jews had already become an issue of international concern in general and of US-Soviet relations in particular. Still, the signing of the Final Act on August 1, 1975, seemed to signal a renewed commitment to human rights and brought with it the hope that the emigration question might somehow be satisfactorily resolved. Indeed, in keeping with the provisions of Basket Three, the USSR introduced certain positive new measures

1. The New York Times, November 25, 1980.

facilitating family reunification.² On the whole, however, the number and scope of such measures have been conservative and contrast sharply with the many obstacles that Soviet authorities have put in the way of would-be emigrants.

That shifts in East-West relations influence Soviet emigration policy was particularly evident in 1974 and 1975, when the number of Jews allowed to leave the USSR fell off dramatically. Ironically, by the end of 1975, the year the Final Act of CSCE was signed, the flow of emigrants hit its lowest point--fewer than 14,000 persons--since the Soviet authorities opened the floodgates a few years earlier. Much of that drop can be attributed to a loss of incentive to please on the part of the USSR. In January, 1975, the USSR unilaterally abrogated the Soviet-American trade agreement of October, 1972, that had promised it most-favored-nation status. The scrapping of the trade accord was prompted by the passage on Capitol Hill of legislation linking trade benefits for the Soviet Union with the USSR's policy on emigration--a linkage condemned by Moscow as interference in its internal affairs.³

In 1976 the number of Soviet Jews permitted to emigrate from the USSR rose, if only modestly, to slightly over 14,000.⁴ The following year the increase was somewhat more marked, with some 16,700 Soviet Jews arriving in Vienna, the main transit point for Jews emigrating from the USSR. It can hardly be considered coincidental that in 1977 much of the increase came about during the second half of the year and coincided with the Belgrade meeting to review implementation of the CSCE accords.⁵ Still, the higher level of Jewish emigration, while attributable at least in part to an official effort to limit criticism of the USSR in Belgrade, seems to have had other motivation as well--namely, the hope of winning support in the United States for the granting of trade concessions. In November, 1977, Soviet Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin

2. See RL 2/77, "Emigration from the USSR in the Post-Helsinki Period," January 1, 1977, and Report to the Congress of the United States on Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Five Years after Helsinki, compiled by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1980. It should be noted that the USSR does not recognize the right to emigration in general, but only for reasons of family reunification and marriage to a foreign national. This distinction came up again at the Madrid meeting, where a Western spokesman said that Moscow and its allies seem to be using the issue of family reunification to restrict a broader interpretation of emigration (AP, December 1, 1980).

3. On the differences between the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the Stevenson Amendment as they relate to the question of emigration from the USSR, as well as on Moscow's attitude towards both pieces of legislation, see William Korey, "The Future of Soviet Jewry: Emigration and Assimilation," Foreign Affairs, Fall, 1979.

4. Second Semi-Annual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, December 1, 1976, to June 1, 1977.

5. Fourth Semi-Annual Report by the President.... December 1.

December 9, 1980

is reported to have told a top American Jewish leader: "We are sending you signals. When will you do something in return?"⁶

The upward trend continued in 1978, when the level of Jewish emigrants from the USSR reached about 29,000 persons.⁷ In 1979 it reached an all-time high of more than 51,000 emigrants.⁸ Here again, the desire to attain such foreign policy goals as trade concessions and the ratification of the SALT II treaty doubtless played a considerable role in Moscow's relatively liberal policy. Unfortunately, the high level of Jewish emigration from the USSR has fallen off drastically, and to all appearances the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union this year will be less than half of what it was in 1979.

Obstacles to Jewish Emigration from the USSR

In effecting the latest dramatic downturn in the number of Jews allowed to leave the USSR, the Soviet authorities have made the process of applying for emigration more difficult in some important ways. Most important in the terms of its impact on the rate of Jewish emigration from the USSR is the current practice of denying exit visas because the invitation from abroad to leave the USSR does not come from a close enough relation. Hence, it is claimed, there are no grounds for family reunification. While Soviet authorities have, in the past, refused permission to emigrate because of "insufficient closeness of kin," the practice of applying a first-degree-relative rule has now become widespread. Beginning in May, 1979, in Odessa,⁹ it spread to other cities--both in the Ukraine and elsewhere--with Jewish populations. Apparently, the idea that an invitation to emigrate must come from a near relative is most narrowly applied in the Ukraine, where such a relative is taken to mean parents or children. In Moscow and Leningrad, it seems, brothers and sisters are also ranked as eligible initiators of invitations.¹⁰ However narrowly the Soviet authorities define "a close relative," the fact that it is an issue at all--when, in the past, visa offices generally allowed a much more liberal interpretation of "family"¹¹--is a major

6. The International Herald Tribune, December 5, 1977.

7. AP, UPI, January 11, 1980.

8. Report to the Congress...

9. Ibid.

10. The New York Times, November 4, 1980.

11. Frequently, nephews and nieces were considered "family" for the purpose of family reunification. Soviet authorities even allowed Jews to emigrate when their invitation came from no relative at all but merely from someone with the same surname. See The New York Times, June 9, 1980.

obstacle to Jewish emigration from the USSR.¹²

Other forms of punitive bureaucratic practices designed to inhibit the emigration process in the USSR have also been applied. In late 1979, it was reported that in many Ukrainian cities local authorities had begun to question the legitimacy of Israeli invitations, dismissing them as Zionist propaganda. These invitations must be presented by would-be emigrants when seeking an application for an exit visa.¹³ Then, visa offices in certain cities with large Jewish populations limited receipt of applications for exit visas to one or two days a week.¹⁴ Furthermore, it has been reported that in Moscow invitations are not being delivered through the Soviet mail, although visa offices require that an invitation from Israel be presented in the envelope in which it was sent to prove it arrived through the Soviet post.¹⁵

Most recently, Soviet Jewish activists have reported that in the Ukrainian city of Kharkov, Soviet authorities are refusing to reconsider applications to emigrate if such requests have once been denied. This is contrary to previous Soviet policy, which for some time has been to allow the review of rejected applications every six months. It has also been asserted that a prospective emigrant whose application has been refused is now required to sign a declaration to the effect that he has been warned of being denied permission to emigrate, "that my refusal is final, and that I have no right to reapply. I must get a job within a month."¹⁶ The concept of a final refusal is a threatening one and could further seriously complicate the Jewish emigration picture were it to become widespread.

Though some of these obstacles have, apparently, been applied less systematically than others, they all serve to discourage emigration by making it more difficult to apply for an exist visa while reducing the chances of getting one. Nor should it be forgotten that more "traditional" means of harassment of prospective emigrants (loss of job, etc.) persist. The effectiveness of these measures combined can be seen in the serious decline in the level of Jewish emigration since last year.

12. In applying the first-degree-kinship, Soviet authorities have taken advantage of the fact that a high percentage of Jews leaving the USSR do not settle in Israel but in the United States. These persons are, therefore, not in a position to provide their close Soviet relatives with Israeli invitations. The overwhelming majority of Jews that are allowed to emigrate do so on visas for Israel. In 1979, for instance, 51,320 Soviet Jews left the USSR for Israel, while 345 were allowed to leave for the United States. Whether Moscow would be willing in the future to permit large-scale emigration of Soviet Jews with close relatives in the US to leave the USSR for the US is unclear. Report to the Congress....

13. The Los Angeles Times, October 9, 1979.

14. Jewish Emigration from the USSR: Up in 1979--Down in 1980, The National Conference on Soviet Jewry, revised June 15, 1980.

15. The Financial Times, September 19, 1980.

Why the Clampdown?

The motivation behind Moscow's current emigration policy is not entirely clear. Given the connection between emigration from the USSR and the international climate, there can be no doubt that the severe cooling in Soviet-American relations over the last year has adversely affected the number of Jews permitted to leave the USSR. A number of factors have contributed to the frigid atmosphere between Moscow and Washington. Important among these was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December, 1979.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan prompted the United States to take a number of countermeasures including the imposition of a partial embargo on the sale of grain and a tightening of controls on the sale of high technology goods to the Soviet Union, as well as a boycott of the summer Olympic Games in Moscow. Moreover, changes of ratification on Capitol Hill of the SALT II treaty--already in doubt before the invasion of Afghanistan--virtually disappeared following the Soviet action. Combined with such irksome issues (from Moscow's point of view) as the swift passage through Congress of the bilateral trade agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China granting most-favored-nation status to Peking (the agreement went into force in February, 1980), these factors have certainly not created an atmosphere conducive to Moscow's maintaining a high level of Jewish emigration from the USSR.

Since the beginning of 1980, the number of Soviet Jews arriving in Vienna has averaged under 2,000 persons a month. To be sure, some of the cutback can be attributed to the slowdown and, in some places, halt in the processing of applications for permission to emigrate while visa offices were busy with the influx of tourists for the Moscow Olympics. Nevertheless, the decline in the number of Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union was noticeable long before the games and has persisted since then, as a look at the monthly figures for emigration during the last year indicates. (See Table.)

Given the delay between the time an exit visa is issued and the actual departure of the emigrant, it is apparent that the downward trend in the level of Jewish emigration from the USSR began some time before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent slide in Soviet-American relations. Indeed, after the all-time high monthly figure for October, 1979, the drop-off soon became evident. A month-by-month analysis of recent Jewish emigration trends led a report issued by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry to conclude that "while we cannot ignore the impact on emigration of the present international climate, the cutback should not be seen as a Soviet reaction to US measures undertaken after the invasion of Afghanistan."¹⁷

17. Jewish Emigration from the USSR:

Jews Arriving in Vienna from the USSR since October, 19791979

October	4,746
November	4,193
December	4,145

1980

January	2,803	July	1,205
February	3,023	August	770
March	3,049	September	1,307
April	2,496	October	1,424
May	1,976	November	789
June	1,767		

Source: Figures provided by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

It seems likely that certain domestic considerations must also be a factor in the fall-off in the number of Jews being allowed to leave the USSR. While the exact nature of these considerations remains a matter of speculation, possible areas of official Soviet concern do suggest themselves. It has been pointed out, for example, that Soviet authorities are worried about the economic consequences of massive Jewish emigration.¹⁸ Since October, 1968, over 240,000 Soviet Jews have left the country, most of them well-educated persons from the urban areas. In one city where the clampdown has been particularly severe, Kharkov, Jewish activists have cited rising fears of a brain drain as one of the reasons for it.¹⁹ In Odessa, people were told that the well-being of the city as a whole was being adversely affected by the exodus of Jews.²⁰

It has also been suggested that the Soviet authorities were surprised by the very large numbers of Jews who began applying to emigrate and wish to limit the rate of emigration to more politically acceptable levels.²¹ Whereas in the period from 1974 through

18. The New York Times, July 11, 1980.

19. The Washington Post, September 17, 1980.

20. The New York Times, July 11, 1980. In Odessa 20.4 percent of the city's Jewish population, or 23,840 persons, emigrated in the period from January, 1970, to January, 1979 (Jewish Emigration from the USSR:....).

21. The Los Angeles Times, April 14, 1980.

December 9, 1980

1977, an average of 39,000 new invitations were sent from Israel annually, in 1978 alone 107,212 invitations were sent. That figure rose to 128,900 in 1979. While by no means all Soviet Jews who receive invitations eventually apply for exit visas, it has been estimated that some 370,000 Jews still living in the USSR have seriously considered emigration.²²

It is, of course, impossible to predict the future of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Both domestic and foreign concerns combine to shape Moscow's policy towards the question. Still, if history is any guide, the course of Soviet-American relations will doubtless influence the level of emigration of Jews from the USSR. Should the USSR make serious efforts to temper the chilled atmosphere that has prevailed between Washington and Moscow for some time now, a more liberal emigration policy could be one of many signals the Kremlin leadership might send the new Reagan administration or a tangible result of any relaxation of recent East-West tensions.

--Elizabeth C. Scheetz

22. Jewish Emigration from the USSR:....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOS Waiver

BY JN NARA DATE 3/7/2019

In 1981 the Soviets permitted approximately 9500 Jews to emigrate - the lowest annual total recorded since large numbers of Jews began leaving the USSR in the 1970s, but much higher than the figures recorded during the 1960s when emigration was a virtual trickle. In 1979 a record-high figure of 51,300 were permitted to leave. Although we are not optimistic that there will be any improvement in the near future, we also do not think the Soviets will cut off emigration completely.

It is apparent that a relationship exists between the level of emigration and the tone of US-Soviet relations. In the last few years, as US-Soviet tensions have increased, the Soviets have become less responsive to official US appeals to increase emigration. Despite this, we remain committed to pressing the Soviets on this issue - through diplomatic channels and at CSCE and the UN Human Rights Commission meetings. In order to provide a durable basis for emigration over time, our policy is to build a relationship of restraint and reciprocity and to convince the Soviets to observe international norms of behavior.

As the drop in emigration has meant fewer Soviet Jews settling in Israel, the Israelis have become unhappy that so many Soviet Jewish refugees who reach Vienna decide to "drop-out" and go to the United States rather than Israel. Last August, the Israelis unilaterally announced that they would not assist Soviet Jews who did not wish to go to Israel except those who had parents, children or spouses in other countries. They placed great pressure on the American Jewish voluntary agency HIAS to cooperate with them (reportedly Prime Minister Begin himself intervened). Other American voluntary agencies continue to offer assistance to Soviet Jewish refugees.

Thus far, the Israeli effort to reduce the "drop-out" rate has not been successful, primarily because Austria has decided to uphold the principle, which we share, of freedom of choice. Our position, which was enunciated by Undersecretary Stoessel to Israeli Ambassador Evron last August, will continue to be that Soviet Jewish refugees arriving in Vienna should have the freedom to choose where they wish to resettle if there are several countries willing to offer them refuge. We also remain committed to the principle of family reunification and will continue to assist Soviet Jewish refugees who wish to resettle with their relatives living in the United States. We contribute funds for resettlement both in Israel and in the US.

To date we have seen no evidence which suggests to us that the recent decline in Jewish emigration is due to the high drop-out rate.

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GDS 1/15/88 (Scanlan, John D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DOS Waiver

BY JN

DATE 3/7/89

Jewish Emigration Slows to a Trickle

For all practical purposes, emigration has ceased to be an option for Soviet Jews. Soviet authorities have achieved this goal by lowering the visa issuance rate to a trickle under 300 a month without incurring the onus of a total cut-off. At the current levels, emigration in 1982 may be less than half of the 1981 total.

* * *

The 9,127 visas issued in 1981 was the lowest annual total since Moscow opened the doors to Jewish emigration in 1971, and emigration appears to ^{be} have fallen ^{ing} even further. After maintaining the monthly level in the 350-450 range during the last five months of 1981, authorities issued 290 exit visas in January.

Given these statistics, the report from Embassy Moscow that Soviet emigration officials have been telling prospective applicants that "Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has come to an end" is a description of an accomplished fact. The monthly levels will probably not drop to zero. Soviet authorities can maintain a trickle of emigration as evidence that those who are truly deserving can still leave.

The Soviet regime regards emigration pressures as an embarrassing sign of internal weakness and prefers to suppress them unless it can use the emigration issue to advantage in negotiating economic or political concessions with the West. This attitude has not changed in ~~ten years~~ all the years that the status of Soviet Jews and Germans figured as an issue in bilateral relations with the US and West Germany. At the same time, the regime insists on keeping its skirts clean by never permitting an overt linkage between bilateral issues and emigration as a quid pro quo.

Moscow occasionally blames the high dropout rate (i.e., the inclination of emigres to settle in the US rather than Israel) for tightening emigration eligibility, [This explanation, however, is not a convincing one and Soviet officials use it] primarily in contacts with Israelis and prominent Western Jews, apparently as a calculated tactic to arouse controversy and dissention among Israelis, the American Jewish community, and the US government over the dropout issue. Soviet authorities have been quick to exploit the resulting frictions in order to heighten the already

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considerable level of uncertainty and apprehension among Jews in the USSR, who are no longer sure what to expect if they emigrate.

A recent scandal in the Soviet emigration office (OVIR) may have served as an additional factor in depressing emigration levels. Emigration chief General Konstantin Zotov was recently fired amid rumors that OVIR officials have been charging up to 3,500 rubles for an exit visa instead of the official fee of 350 rubles. Authorities are presumably investigating pending emigration cases for evidence of corruption and bribery.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOS WaiverBY JN PARADATE 31272019Moscow's Explanations as Jewish Emigration Dwindles

The monthly level of Israeli visas dropped to 290 in January after remaining in the 350-450 range during the last 5 months of 1981. The 9,127 visas issued in 1981 was the lowest annual total since Moscow opened the doors to Jewish emigration in 1971 and allowed 14,000 to leave that year.

Soviet officials generally offer one of three explanations for declining emigration when pressed by foreigners: that all the Jews who wanted to leave have already left; that emigration cannot be expected to be high during a period of East-West tensions; and that emigration had been cut back because of the high "dropout rate" (i.e., by Jews who leave the USSR with an Israeli visa and then choose to settle in the US). ^{elsewhere, especially} To the degree that use of these explanations reveals a pattern, the first two seem to be offered most often to American officials. But in contacts with Israelis and prominent Western Jews, Soviet spokesmen usually cite the dropout rate as the reason for dwindling emigration:

-- July 15, 1981: by K.I. Zotov (then-chief of OVIR, the Soviet agency responsible for processing emigration applications) to Sonya Lerner (an Israeli citizen and daughter of Soviet refusenik activist Aleksandr Lerner);

-- September 24, 1981: by Foreign Minister Gromyko to Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir (as reported by Jewish press sources);

-- October 1981: by the Chief Rabbi of Moscow in telephone conversation with ^{Israel's Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi,} Rabbi Shlomo Goren (Jerusalem Post, October 12, 1981);

-- November 1981: by a Soviet diplomat in Australia, in conversation with a prominent Australian Jewish activist (Jewish press ~~report~~ ^{report}).

-- December 1981: by Dr. Kislov, chief of Middle East Department of USA-Canada Institute, to members of Israeli Peace Delegation visiting the USSR.

^{The apparently well-} ~~This~~ orchestrated, ~~calculated~~ ^{stirred up a row} Soviet tactic has ~~had the effect of confusing public opinion in the West and stirring up dissension~~ among groups engaged in assisting Jewish emigres--in the first instance, between those representing Israel and those representing the American Jewish community. The Israelis, long distressed by the high dropout rate, seized upon the Soviet explanation because it allowed them to justify stronger measures

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designed to persuade more Soviet Jewish arrivals in Vienna to go to Israel. Under heavy Israeli pressure, HIAS (the largest American Jewish agency engaged in providing assistance to Jews settling in the US) agreed temporarily to extend aid only to those Soviet Jews who already had first degree relatives living in the US. In practice, this measure did not affect the dropout rate (which remains at about 75 percent) because emigres could still receive assistance from other US refugee relief groups. Soviet emigres in the US--in perhaps their first display of solidarity on a public issue--are expressing outrage in the ~~American~~^{US} Russian-language press and subjecting both Israel and HIAS to scathing criticism for, in their view, succumbing to KGB-inspired ~~disinformation~~ tactics. For their part, Soviet authorities are exploiting the resulting malaise and recriminations in order to heighten the already considerable level of uncertainty and apprehension among Jews in the USSR, who are no longer sure what to expect if they were to emigrate.

A ten years' accumulation of evidence strongly indicates that Soviet authorities use the emigration issue as an instrument of policy in the pursuit of detente and that the case for linkage between the dropout rate and emigration levels is not a convincing one. Prominent Jewish refuseniks in Moscow, including their titular head Aleksandr Lerner, regret the high dropout rate and offer various suggestions how it could be lowered, but they also regard the chill in US-Soviet bilateral relations to be the principal reason for the drop ~~in~~ emigration.

^{While} (The evidence for Moscow's use of disinformation tactics ^{in the present instance} is largely circumstantial, ~~At the same time~~, the results achieved by the orchestrated Soviet explanations ~~in the present instance~~ would surely have justified the most careful, elaborate planning by the KGB's ^{number 2} _____ (Disinformation) Department.

SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION -- PERCENTAGE CHANGE BY YEAR

<u>Year</u>	<u>Arrivals in Vienna(rounded)</u>	<u>Change from Previous Year</u>
1960-70	10,000 (estimated)	-----
1971	14,000	+ 40.0%
1972	31,500	+ 125.0%
1973	33,500	+ 06.3%
1974	20,700	- 38.2%
1975	13,300	- 35.7%
1976	14,300	+ 07.5%
1977	16,700	+ 16.8%
1978	28,900	+ 73.1%
1979	51,300	+ 77.5%
1980	21,470	- 58.2%
1981	9,459	- 55.9%

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SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION - ARRIVALS IN VIENNA

<u>Month</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>
January	969	1245	1761	3727	2803	850
February	1218	1063	1812	3837	3023	1407
March	1391	1030	2038	4418	3049	1249
April	1115	1204	1938	4296	2469	1155
May	1120	1193	1958	4163	1976	1141
June	1173	1268	1983	4357	1767	866
July	823	1305	1899	4068	1205	780
August	815	1474	2275	4719	770	440
September	1030	1622	2523	4663	1307	405
October	1254	1850	3286	4746	1424	369
November	1542	1543	3194	4193	789	363
December	1814	1940	4197	4144	889	434
 Total Year	 14,264	 16,737	 28,864	 51,331	 21,471	 9459