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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Date: 11/8/99

Box 92 ~~69~~ *RAC Box 1*

Schroek - F96-076-2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Michael Armacost to George Shultz, re: My Trip to Pakistan: Next Steps on Afghanistan, 7 p.	1/8/88	P1/F1/P5
2. Draft Letter	Colin Powell to Shultz, 3 p. <i>Part F96-076/2 #27 1/2/01</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
3. Memo	Edward Djerejian to Armacost, re: Whether to Hold an Afghanistan Signing Ceremony at the White House, 2 p. <i>R 11/21/00 NLSF96-076/2#28</i>	3/15/88	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



0165
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

January 9, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memo from Undersecretary Armacost on his
Trip to Pakistan

I am attaching a note from Mike Armacost on his recent trip to Pakistan. He asks that the report be closely held.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 24, 2017
By dlb NARA, Date 11/8/99

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL:OADR



United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

Colin,

Attached is a summary memo
I prepared for the Secretary following
my recent talks in Islamabad.
You may have had Bob Oakley's
own assessment. We both feel
the trip was useful, and that
the stage is set for the hard
bargaining of the end game.
Would appreciate it if you
and John would hold this
close.

Mike

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

cc: ~~very important~~
From ~~Bob Oakley~~

DRAFT LETTER FROM GENERAL POWELL TO SHULTZ

Afghanistan

1. The President wishes to make it very clear to the Soviet leadership that he would find unacceptable a situation whereby the USSR privately accepted the continuation of military assistance to the Resistance in the context of a signed, guaranteed Geneva agreement yet publicly blamed the US and/or Pakistan for violating the agreement. Without a precise, authoritative Soviet statement on this point, presumably in the reply to your message of 31 March to Shevardnadze, this is the situation we and Pakistan would almost certainly confront, and we would be without an effective, credible defense. (This would cause serious complications for general long-term US-Soviet relations, including the good faith and credibility of any US-Soviet agreement, as well as complicate the issue of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

2. Therefore the President believes that you should communicate right away with Shevardnadze or he should send a message to Gorbachev along the lines of the draft which follows.

3. Dear Foreign Minister or General Secretary:

In order to avoid further friction and misunderstanding on the subject of Afghanistan and the negotiations in Geneva, as well as casting doubt upon the good faith and credibility of US-Soviet

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F96-076/2 # 27
By GL, NARA, Date 1/2/01

~~SECRET~~

2

agreements generally, it is essential that there be a clear, precise, definitive agreement between us that the continued supply of military assistance to parties inside Afghanistan would not constitute a violation of the Geneva instruments by any of the four prospective signatories of those instruments.

This subject of military supply was explicitly discussed in Moscow last February and in Washington last month between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The related issue of continued military supply to the Afghan Resistance was discussed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington last December. The position of the US on the importance of continuing these supplies was made very clear. The position of the USSR rejecting the only condition under which we could envisage this supply being stopped was made equally clear. In order to bridge this difference and allow the Geneva process to be concluded, our government and that of Pakistan have made a new proposal. It has been discussed at length between officials of our governments bilaterally as well as in the talks taking place in Geneva under the auspices of Mr. Cordovez. It is the subject of Secretary Shultz' letter of March 31 to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. ~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~R~~

~~SECRET~~

3

Assuming you desire to conclude and sign the Geneva negotiations on the above basis, it is very important that there be a clear response from your government on the issue of continued military assistance. If at some future date you or we should wish to revisit this issue, perhaps in the context of an agreement upon neutrality and non-alignment for Afghanistan, we could always do so.

Sincerely,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 9, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ALISON B. FORTIER

SUBJECT: Afghan Day Proclamation

We recommend that the President hold a signing ceremony on or before March 21, 1988 in which he would issue a proclamation, in accordance with S.J. Res. 257 (at Tab II) declaring that March 21, 1988 is Afghanistan Day. S.J. Res. 257 passed the Senate on February 26, 1988; the House should take up and pass the Senate resolution shortly.

The President has issued similar proclamations in each year since 1982. There has not been a Presidential signing ceremony each year; there was a signing ceremony at least in 1982 and, of course, in 1987. There is a high level of interest in Congress this year in the Afghan issue; some Conservatives are concerned about the direction of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan. They would view a decision not to hold a Presidential signing ceremony for Afghanistan Day 1988 as an indication that the Administration is backing down from its support of the Afghan Freedom Fighters and a free and independent Afghanistan.

In recommending that the President hold a signing ceremony this year, we do caution that some Congressional participants may use the occasion to express concern about U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.

MM
Fritz E. E. Marth, Robert Oakley, and Marybel Batjer concur.

Alan Kranowitz concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Paul Schott Stevens Memo to Frederick J. Ryan,
Director, Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

Tab II S.J. Res. 257

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1438

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director Presidential
Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

REQUEST: Signing Ceremony to issue a proclamation
designating March 21, 1988 as Afghanistan Day

PURPOSE: Legislation has passed the Senate and will
have passed the House by the date authorizing
and requesting the President to issue a
proclamation designating March 21 as
Afghanistan Day to commemorate the struggle
of the people of Afghanistan against the
occupation of their country by Soviet troops.

BACKGROUND: A similar signing ceremony was held by
President Reagan and a proclamation issued in
1987; proclamations have been issued annually
since 1982.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: 1982 and 1987

DATE AND TIME: Prior to March 21, 1988, 30 minutes

LOCATION: Roosevelt Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President, the Vice President, The
Secretary of State, Howard Baker, Kenneth
Duberstein, Alan Kranowitz, Pam Turner, Jim
Dyer, Fritz Ermarth, Alison Fortier, Robert
Oakley, 10-20 Members of Congress

OUTLINE OF EVENTS:

REMARKS REQUIRED: Proclamation and brief remarks

MEDIA REQUIRED: Photo coverage

RECOMMENDED BY: The Department of State, NSC, White House
Legislative Affairs

OPPOSED BY: No one

Attachment

Tab A List of Participants
(To be provided by White House
Legislative Affairs)

have followed the Afghan scene to pretend that they imagine that an informal and secret agreement initiated by an anonymous person is somehow binding on the United States government. This could not be the case. And anyone sophisticated enough to concern themselves with these affairs surely understands that. So I regard it as almost frivolous for any part of the government of the United States to speak and act as though any such informal anonymous initialling of a secret agreement could be binding on us.

Thank you very much.

The joint resolution was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was agreed to.

The joint resolution, and the preamble, are as follows:

S.J. Res. 257

Whereas more than eight years after the Soviet invasion, more than one hundred and twenty thousand Soviet troops are waging war against the Afghan people, with thirty thousand more positioned in contiguous areas of the Soviet Union, available for use against the Afghan population;

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly by increasing majorities has in nine annual resolutions called for the "immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan";

Whereas Soviet policies in Afghanistan are directly responsible for driving more than five million Afghans into foreign exile, creating the largest refugee population in the world, and for the deaths of more than one million Afghans;

Whereas a recent report of the Independent Council on International Human Rights, as distributed to the United Nations by the United States Mission as an official document, finds "there is considerable evidence that genocidal acts have been committed against the Afghan people by the combined forces of the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) and the Soviet Union";

Whereas Kabul regime aircraft violated Pakistan's airspace more than five hundred and seventy four times during 1987, killing more than one hundred and eighty three innocent people and wounding more than four hundred and thirty seven;

Whereas over four hundred and fifty Soviet and Kabul-inspired terrorist incidents took place in Pakistan during 1987, in circumstances calculated to cause the deaths of innocent civilians;

Whereas Public Law 100-204 declares it to be the policy of the United States to support a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan war providing for the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a timeframe based solely on logistical criteria; and to communicate clearly to the Government and people of the Soviet Union the necessity of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a condition for better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union;

Whereas on May 16, 1985, the Afghan Resistance took an historic step by forming the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen, representing a unified coalition of the major Afghan organizations dedicated to ending the Soviet occupation;

Whereas, as enunciated by the President of the United States following a meeting with the President of the Afghan Resistance Alliance, any negotiated settlement to the war in Afghanistan that is unacceptable to the Resistance is destined to fail;

Whereas the Afghan Resistance continues to control more than 75 per centum of the territory of Afghanistan, despite more than eight years of brutal warfare;

Whereas in a statement on November 12, 1987, the President stated: "The support that the United States has been providing the Resistance will be strengthened rather than diminished, so that it can continue to fight effectively for freedom";

Whereas, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Congress has in numerous resolutions declared the solidarity of the American people with the struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet invaders; and

Whereas the people of Afghanistan observe March 21 as the traditional start of their New Year and as a symbol of their nation's rebirth: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating March 21, 1988, as Afghanistan Day, and calling upon the people of the United States to observe such day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

NATIONAL CHILD CARE AWARENESS WEEK

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 260), to designate the week beginning April 10, 1988, as "National Child Care Awareness Week," was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was agreed to.

The joint resolution, and the preamble, are as follows:

S.J. Res. 260

Whereas the status and composition of the family in the United States is constantly changing;

Whereas women hold 53 percent of all jobs in the United States;

Whereas 80 percent of the women in the United States who are employed are of childbearing age;

Whereas, while child care is no longer considered the sole responsibility of women, the percentage of single-parent families headed by women has increased by more than 51 percent in 12 years;

Whereas it is estimated that 80 percent of the women with children of preschool age will hold jobs by 1990;

Whereas the increasing participation of women in the workforce will continue to increase the demand for child care during the working hours;

Whereas communities across the United States are planning special activities to honor child care providers and to illustrate the importance of quality child care as part of the Child Care America project of the Public Television Outreach Alliance;

Whereas the National Association for the Education of Young Children and the Public Television Outreach Alliance are sponsoring a week of the child, and it is appropriate for the Congress to designate the same week as a period devoted to increasing public awareness of child care issues; and

Whereas all children deserve quality child care, and all parents have a profound obligation to provide a safe and wholesome environment for their children at all times: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the week beginning April 10, 1988, is designated as "National Child Care Awareness Week", and the President of the United States is

authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe the week with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

Mr. BOSCHWITZ. Mr. President, I rise today to call the Senate's attention to the pressing problem of child care. In our Nation today, over 8 million preschool children need some kind of child care. Many parents are able to provide care in their own home. But for a growing number, especially single parents and the working poor, affordable child care outside the home is one of their greatest needs.

We in this body need to recognize that need. Last year, I joined as a cosponsor of the child care bill introduced by our colleague from Utah, Senator HATCH, which develops new child care initiatives and supplements existing programs. I will soon be introducing my own bill, which will especially bolster the child care food program, a program I have worked on and supported for years.

Today, I have the privilege of placing before the Senate a joint resolution that will focus the attention of Congress—and the country—on the problem of providing good and affordable child care. This joint resolution designates the week beginning April 10, 1988, as "National Child Care Awareness Week." Already, a number of activities are being planned in Minnesota and across the rest of the Nation.

"National Child Care Awareness Week" will also be marked by a number of important television shows on the public broadcasting network. A nationally televised program, "Who Cares for the Children?" will give an overview of the issues involved. Activities are also planned for parents, child care centers, businesses, child care professionals, and educators.

Obviously, this joint resolution is only the first step in what Congress must do to support quality care for our children. We must begin by recognizing and assessing the challenges we face in child care. I look forward to working with my colleagues in the months ahead, as we develop an effective response to these problems.

WOMEN'S HISTORY MONTH

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 262) to designate the month of March 1988, as "Women's History Month," was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was agreed to.

The joint resolution, and the preamble, are as follows:

S.J. Res. 262

Whereas American women of every race, class, and ethnic background have made historical contributions to the growth and strength of the Nation in countless recorded and unrecorded ways;

Whereas American women have played and continue to play a critical economic, cultural, and social role in every sphere of

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1988

Dear Senator Byrd:

It was good to talk recently with you about my determination to help the Afghan Mujahidin achieve rapid, complete and irreversible withdrawal of Soviet troops and freedom for the Afghan people. This was the same position I expressed forcefully to General Secretary Gorbachev during the Summit here in December and which Secretary Shultz spelled out in greater detail during talks late last month with the General Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

In view of your statement on Afghanistan before the Senate last week, I would like to bring some points to your attention which deal with the concerns you have expressed.

Since 1985, we have indicated our conditional willingness to serve as a guarantor if a satisfactory settlement was reached. Our objectives have been: prompt and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces; restoration of Afghanistan to an independent and nonaligned status; self-determination for the Afghans; and return of refugees in safety and honor. These are the same basic points contained in the resolutions adopted overwhelmingly by eight successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. I have emphasized these points and our support for the brave Afghan Mujahidin in my meetings with Yunis Khalis in November and General Secretary Gorbachev last December.

We have told the Soviets that to be credible for the United States, the Government of Pakistan, the Resistance and the entire free world, their withdrawal must be front-loaded (i.e. fifty-percent (50%) out within first three months), must actually begin to take troops out on the first day an agreement enters into force, and must be irreversible. If this occurs, we are confident of being able to detect and verify by our own national means whether the Soviets are acting in good faith. If not, any commitment by the United States would be off.

We have also told General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in recent months that any commitment to guarantee the Geneva instruments must be symmetrical, i.e., cessation of military or other aid to the Resistance must be matched by a cessation of similar aid to the regime in Kabul. We are confident that the above conditions, combined with the steadily increasing quantity, quality and sophistication of military equipment for the Resistance will enable them to deal effectively with military problems they might face. The Senate Select Intelligence Committee was briefed in detail on March 3 about current and programmed support from various sources for the Resistance. Contrary to erroneous reports, there have been no decisions to reduce or suspend military support and the overall rate of delivery continues to increase, although there has never been a steady, even rate of delivery from week to week and month to month. The enhanced support which the Resistance will receive over these several months, plus that already on hand, will actually strengthen rather than weaken their position vis-a-vis the remaining Soviet forces and the weak armed forces of the Najibullah regime. We, of course, wish to see that regime relinquish political power as soon as possible and be replaced by a regime which represents the vast majority rather than a small minority of the Afghan people.

Looking ahead, the Administration and Congress must be prepared to assist Pakistan, the Afghan refugees and whatever new, non-Communist government emerges in Kabul. The problems of refugee return and relief, plus reconstruction of wartime damage, will be demanding ones and will require broad international assistance. However, we must continue our own outstanding leadership role and set an example for others to follow.

Sincerely,

R on

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Majority Leader of the Senate
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 10, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL 

SUBJECT: Your Response to Senator Byrd on Afghanistan

Issue

Whether to sign the letter to Senator Byrd.

Fact

Senator Byrd has written to you recently regarding his concerns on Afghanistan issues.

Discussion

Last week you met with Senator Byrd and discussed Afghanistan. Since then the Senate passed a Resolution on February 29 by a vote of 77-0. Attached at TAB A is a detailed response to the issues which the Senator raised with you in the Oval Office and on the Senate floor. Office of Legislative Affairs concurs.

Recommendation

OK	NO	That you sign the attached letter to Senator Byrd.
	_____	

Attachments:

TAB A Your Letter to Senator Byrd

TAB B Incoming Letter from Senator Byrd
dated February 25, 1988

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff (2)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 4, 1988

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RBO*
SUBJECT: Response to Senator Byrd on Afghanistan

The President answered in person Senator Byrd's queries (TAB B) on a cutoff of aid to the Mujahidin. As a follow-up, I believe a letter from the President will help in view of the Senate resolution on Afghanistan which passed 77-0 (TAB II). Dissemination of the President's views is necessary given the disinformation going around about a "sellout" of the Mujahidin.

Jul
Fortier and Ledskey concur.
S.T.K. for
(see earlier note)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to The President at TAB I.

Approve *✓*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Your Memorandum to the President

TAB A The President's Letter to Senator Byrd

TAB B Senator Byrd's Letter to The President
dated February 25, 1988

TAB II Copy of Congressional Record (February 29, 1988)
(PP 1588 - 1608)

Prepared by:
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, DC 20510-7010

February 25, 1988

The President
The White House
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am cautiously optimistic that recent statements by Mr. Gorbachev and his associates in the Soviet leadership concerning their intentions to terminate their occupation of Afghanistan will be implemented in practice. It would be an historic victory for the courageous and tenacious Afghan people, and we can be proud that we played some role in assisting them in their fight. Nevertheless, I have been disturbed by recent reports that indicate our aid program and political support for the Mujahadeen may be subject to some pressure in order to accommodate a Soviet settlement of their occupation on terms which might have the unintended effect of facilitating a continued Soviet presence or role in Afghanistan's future.


I believe that we should not adopt any policies which tend to reward the Soviet Union for terminating their outrageous occupation and behavior in Afghanistan over the last decade. I strongly support the uninterrupted continuation of our aid program and it should not be in any way restricted until it is clear that Soviet forces and advisors are essentially out of the country, that they show no signs of a quick redeployment, and that the Mujahadeen is well enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to elections.

In addition, I believe it is critical to continue to provide our strong support to the government of Pakistan during the upcoming round of Geneva negotiations, and there should be no pressure to make concessions to the Soviets or their puppet government in Kabul. We must be prepared for the Soviets to blame us and the Pakistanis for holding up their withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the solution is one of necessity for them, not of generosity. They should simply remove themselves as expeditiously as possible.

The President
Feb. 25, 1988
Page 2

I want to assure you of my full support for the continuation of our aid program to the Mujahadeen and support for the position of Pakistan during the critical period ahead.

Sincerely,



Robert C. Byrd

Vol. 134

WASHINGTON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1988

No. 21

Congressional Record



United States
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 100th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 15, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Signing Ceremony at the White House for Afghanistan
Day - March 21

Attached is suggested language for a Presidential Proclamation to be issued on Afghanistan Day (March 21). The Proclamation will be authorized by Senate Joint Resolution 257 (attached), which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary after its introduction in the Senate. We expect that the House will also pass a resolution authorizing the President to sign the Proclamation.

We recommend that the White House hold a brief ceremony for the President to sign the Proclamation. We would recommend that key members of Congress and selected representatives of the Afghan community be invited to the ceremony.

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Draft Presidential Proclamation.
- Tab 2 - Draft Senate Joint Resolution.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 11/8/99

AFGHANISTAN DAY, 1988

March 21 marks the beginning of a new year for the people of Afghanistan. This should be a joyous event, and we hope with the Afghan people that the new year will see the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return of their homeland to the control of the people of Afghanistan. For over eight years, the Afghans have lived in the shadow of the Soviet Army which invaded to prop up an unrepresentative regime. Let us use this occasion, therefore, to salute the resolve of the Afghan people. They have fought to free themselves from the yoke of oppression, and from the assaults on their sovereignty, their dignity, and their very lives brought on by that oppression.

It now appears that the determination and sacrifices of the Afghan people may achieve the goal of a free Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership may have recognized that the will of the Afghan people to be free cannot be defeated. Agreement has been reached at the proximity talks in Geneva on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We welcome the Soviet commitment to withdraw. Though we are not a party to the negotiations, we are willing to serve, with the Soviet Union, as a guarantor of a satisfactory settlement which will secure

our objectives, which are a rapid and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, the return of the refugees to their homes in safety and honor, the restoration of an independent and nonaligned Afghanistan, and self-determination for the Afghan people.

Our commitment to the freedom of the Afghan people will not end should the Soviets withdraw. We will join other nations and international organizations to help the Afghans reestablish themselves in an independent, non-aligned, and neutral Afghanistan. Millions of refugees will be returning to a country devastated by war. Massive resources will be required to enable the Afghan people to reestablish their livelihoods and to rebuild their country. I call on the international community to be generous in helping the Afghan people.

The United States has supported the Afghans in their long ordeal. We will rejoice with them should peace be achieved and Afghanistan once again is able to take its rightful place in the community of nations.

The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 257, has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation designating March 21, 1988 as "Afghanistan Day."

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America do hereby proclaim March 21, 1988, as Afghanistan Day.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this _____ day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twelfth.

Drafted: NEA/PAB: SGGhitelman/JBruno *SG*

1841f 3/08/88 6479552

Clearances: NEA: RAFlaten

NEA: JMEalum

H: WMiele

EUR/SOV: SYoung

SG
BM

Report for S.J.R.257 Afghanistan Day, Designation
As introduced in the Senate
Complete Text of this version

100th CONGRESS
2d Session

II

S. J. RES. 257

To authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation designating March 21, 1988, as "Afghanistan Day", a day to commemorate the struggle of the people of Afghanistan against the occupation of their country by Soviet forces.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 17 (legislative day, February 15), 1988

Mr. Humphrey (for himself, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Durenberger, Mr. Dole, Mr. Symms, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. Hecht, Mr. Gore, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Wallop, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Simon, Mr. McClure, Mr. Boschwitz, Mr. Karnes, Mr. Riegle, Mr. Proxmire, Mr. Tribble, Mr. Biden, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Domenici, Mr. McCain, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Quayle, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Dixon, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Helms, Mr. Boren, Mr. Burdick, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Cochran, and Mr. Graham) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

To authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation designating March 21, 1988, as "Afghanistan Day", a day to commemorate the struggle of the people of Afghanistan against the occupation of their country by Soviet forces.

=====

Whereas more than eight years after the Soviet invasion, more than one hundred and twenty thousand Soviet troops are waging war against the Afghan people, with thirty thousand more positioned in contiguous areas of the Soviet Union, available for use against the Afghan population;

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly by increasing majorities has in nine annual resolutions called for the "immediate withdrawal of foreign

troops from Afghanistan";

Whereas Soviet policies in Afghanistan are directly responsible for driving more than five million Afghans into foreign exile, creating the largest refugee population in the world, and for the deaths of more than one million Afghans;

Whereas a recent report of the Independent Council on International Human Rights, as distributed to the United Nations by the United States Mission as an official document, finds "there is considerable evidence that genocidal acts have been committed against the Afghan people by the combined forces of the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) and the Soviet Union";

Whereas Kabul regime aircraft violated Pakistan's airspace more than five hundred and seventy four times during 1987, killing more than one hundred and eighty three innocent people and wounding more than four hundred and thirty seven;

Whereas over four hundred and fifty Soviet and Kabul-inspired terrorist incidents took place in Pakistan during 1987, in circumstances calculated to cause the deaths of innocent civilians;

Whereas Public Law 100-204 declares it to be the policy of the United States to support a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan war providing for the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a timeframe based solely on logistical criteria; and to communicate clearly to the Government and people of the Soviet Union the necessity of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a condition for better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union;

Whereas on May 16, 1985, the Afghan Resistance took an historic step by forming the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen, representing a unified coalition of the major Afghan organizations dedicated to ending the Soviet occupation;

Whereas, as enunciated by the President of the United States following a meeting with the President of the Afghan Resistance Alliance, any negotiated settlement to the war in Afghanistan that is unacceptable to the Resistance is destined to fail;

Whereas the Afghan Resistance continues to control more than 75 per centum of the territory of Afghanistan, despite more than eight years of brutal warfare;

Whereas in a statement on November 12, 1987, the President stated: "The support that the United States has been providing the Resistance will be strengthened rather than diminished, so that it can continue to fight effectively for freedom";

Whereas, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Congress has in numerous resolutions declared the solidarity of the American people with the struggle of the Afghan people against the Soviet invaders; and

Whereas the people of Afghanistan observe March 21 as the traditional start of their New Year and as a symbol of their nation's rebirth; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating March 21, 1988, as Afghanistan Day, and calling upon the people of the United States to observe such day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520 *my*
3/15~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION MEMORANDUM *BP*
3/11

S/S

TO: P - Mr. Armacost

FROM: NEA - Edward P. Djerejian³ (Acting)

SUBJECT: Whether to Hold an Afghanistan Day Signing Ceremony at the White House

I. ISSUE

Whether to recommend a White House signing ceremony for the Presidential Proclamation in commemoration of Afghanistan Day.

II. BACKGROUND

March 21 will mark Afghanistan Day. In previous years we have used this occasion to highlight the Soviet occupation and the suffering of the Afghan people through issuance of a Presidential Proclamation authorized by a joint resolution of Congress. This is being done again this year (draft Proclamation - Tab 1; draft joint resolution - Tab 2). Issuance of the Proclamation was accompanied by a brief signing ceremony at the White House attended by key members of Congress.

We must decide whether to recommend that the White House hold a signing ceremony this year. What makes this year different from the past, of course, is the Geneva negotiations and the visit to Washington on March 22 of Shevardnadze. The key problem is that the outcome of the Geneva talks may still be uncertain by March 21. In addition, we would want to avoid any actions which might be seen as insulting on the eve of Shevardnadze's visit in which we may be seeking his agreement on key issues.

On the other hand, we cannot be seen as relaxing our public diplomacy efforts while Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan. We also must avoid giving grist to those who accuse us of "selling out" the Afghans. Sen. Humphrey has already called for a signing ceremony and has been in touch with the White House on this matter. Bob Oakley believes that we cannot afford not to hold a ceremony this year. We believe that a White House signing ceremony, appropriately managed, is advisable. We would emphasize in the Proclamation language the hope that peace is at hand and the need to help the Afghan people get back on their feet. We would be able to avoid pitfalls by this approach.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

F96-076/2 #28

LBJ

12/21/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

III. RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize transmission of the attached Levitsky-Powell, recommending that the White House hold a signing ceremony:

ms Approve

_____ Disapprove

MAR 15 1988

Attachment:

Draft Levitsky-Powell memorandum on signing ceremony.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, DC 20510-7010

EE
at
566743

March 22, 1988

Administration

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of March 11 outlining the Administration's policy on several aspects related to an Afghanistan settlement, particularly on the issue of termination of assistance to the Afghanistan resistance. I have serious reservations about the policy you have outlined.

You indicate that in recent months the Administration has told the Soviets that "any commitment to guarantee the Geneva accords must be symmetrical, i.e., cessation of military or other aid to the Resistance must be matched by a cessation of similar aid to the regime in Kabul." However, the question of the "symmetry" of withdrawal or suspension of assistance is a murky one, with obvious dangers. What, in fact, constitutes "aid?" Certainly a reasonable definition would include the in-country military forces, military and civilian advisors, as well as material and financial aid. I fail to understand why we would terminate our only form of aid, namely military assistance, in return for Soviet agreement to terminate only one form of their efforts to subjugate that nation. The shocking result of that formula is to telegraph the end of our commitment to the mujaheddin while the Soviets maintain the major portion of leverage in Afghanistan.

In terms of the Geneva negotiations, it is unclear what exactly the United States is being asked to guarantee. I understand that no one in the Senate has been shown copies of these proposed accords. I certainly have no idea what is in these agreements, particularly the instrument which the United States is considering signing, the accord on guarantees.

It is also my understanding that the Administration has opened bilateral discussions with the Soviets on a mutual termination of assistance. While this new Administration position may appear to some to be equitable and balanced, I believe it involves a withdrawal of a long-standing American commitment to the Afghanistan resistance to support them until the Soviets have withdrawn totally from Afghanistan.

I call attention to the position taken by the Senate in a unanimous vote on February 29, 1988, that "the government of the United States should not cease, suspend, diminish, or otherwise

restrict assistance to the Afghan resistance or take actions which might limit the ability of the resistance to receive assistance until it is absolutely clear that the Soviets have terminated their military occupation, that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and that the mujaheddin is well enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to new elections." I enclose a copy of this resolution.

Mr. President, you state in your letter that to be credible, the Soviet withdrawal must be front-loaded, must actually begin on the first day an agreement enters into force, and "must be irreversible." How is it possible to determine that the Soviet withdrawal is "irreversible" on the first day of withdrawal? How can the United States give up the only leverage we have--military assistance to the resistance--and rely on the Soviets' good intentions to complete their withdrawal?

Reliance on, in your words, "our own national means...to detect and verify...if the Soviets are acting in good faith" obviously is essential. But if we determine that they are not acting in good faith, what recourse do we have if we have terminated our assistance program? It would place the Government of Pakistan in an extremely difficult position for the United States to ask for assistance to restart the aid program. I simply do not believe that course of action is feasible.

Yesterday, I met with the Ambassador from Pakistan, to commend his government for its longstanding efforts and courage in supporting the mujaheddin. I believe it is more important than ever to closely coordinate our program and policy with that nation as well as with the mujaheddin leaders.

Mr. President, as I have said repeatedly on the floor of the Senate, I do not believe the Soviets need enticements from the United States to leave Afghanistan. We should not reward the Soviets for having failed to devour Afghanistan.

I respectfully urge you to make a thorough review of any commitments which may have been made without your full support or knowledge.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert C. Byrd", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Robert C. Byrd

RCB:jeh/crd

S1588

S. Res. 386

Whereas the Soviet Union invaded the sovereign territory of Afghanistan on December 17, 1979, and continues to occupy and attempt to subjugate that nation through the use of force, relying upon a puppet regime and an occupying army of an estimated 120,000 Soviet troops.

Whereas Pakistan has harbored more than 3 million Afghan refugees and has endured hundreds of brutal raids across its borders by Afghan and Soviet aircraft and artillery, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians;

Whereas on February 8, 1988, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan could begin on May 15, 1988 if the agreements on the settlement being negotiated between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva were signed no later than March 15, 1988;

Whereas General Secretary Gorbachev also announced that the Soviet Union could complete the troop withdrawal within 10 months and that it could arrange the withdrawal such that during the first phase, a relatively greater portion of the Soviet contingent could be withdrawn;

Whereas Pakistan has made it clear that it will not sign any agreements with the current Soviet puppet regime headed by Najibullah;

Whereas the Congress condemned Soviet policy toward and behavior in Afghanistan in Public Law 99-289, calling for appropriate provision of material support to the people of Afghanistan, so long as the Soviet military occupation continues; and

Whereas Public Law 100-204 declares it to be the policy of the United States to support a negotiated settlement to the Afghanistan war providing for the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan within a time frame based solely on logistical criteria;

Therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate hereby—

(1) reiterates its belief that the only acceptable formula for settlement of the Afghan situation is one which provides for the self-determination of the Afghan people and results in a government genuinely representative of the Afghan people, outlines a definite timetable based solely on logistical criteria for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops in the near future, and provides for the return of refugees in safety and dignity;

(2) expresses its belief that the Pakistani government should not be put under any pressure to agree to Soviet terms for a settlement and that the future of Afghanistan should not be driven by the desire or schedule for a U.S.-Soviet summit;

(3) urges the President to—

(a) support strongly a political solution in Kabul acceptable to the resistance;

(b) insist in talks with the Soviet Union that all Soviet advisers be removed from Afghanistan at the same time as Soviet troop withdrawal takes place;

(c) address the issue of the future status of the nearly 400 bilateral treaties the Soviets have made with the puppet Kabul regime;

(d) address with the Soviets the deployment of Soviet troops across the Soviet-Afghan border after the completion of the withdrawal period;

(e) stand firm on the necessity for the Soviets to terminate all forms of military assistance and logistical support to the Kabul regime;

(f) address the repatriation by the Soviet Union of the more than 18,000 Afghan children who have been forcibly deported to the Soviet Union; and

(g) ensure that international assistance to the refugees continues at least until all Soviet and Soviet bloc forces have been withdrawn from Afghanistan and peace has been restored;

(4) expresses its belief that all Soviet and Soviet bloc advisers must be removed from Afghanistan during the period of troop withdrawal;

(5) expresses its support for increased U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people both during and following the withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet bloc forces from Afghanistan;

(6) expresses its support for a U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping force to help guarantee that Soviet forces can withdraw in an orderly way without being attacked on the way out and to help keep the peace in the major cities while an interim government organizes the nation's future; and

(7) expresses its strong belief that the government of the United States should not cease, suspend, diminish, or otherwise restrict assistance to the Afghan resistance or take actions which might limit the ability of the resistance to receive assistance until it is absolutely clear that the Soviets have terminated their military occupation, that they are not redeploying their forces to be inserted again, and that the mujahadeen is well

enough equipped to maintain its integrity during the delicate period of a transition government leading up to new elections.