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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memcon	Memorandum of Conversation - Special Working Group on Afghanisatan - Armacost, Matlock, Coffey, Adamishin, Alekseyev, Dubinin, Zolotov, 25 p. R F96-076/2 #29 9/29/00	3/22/88	P1/F1
2. Memcon	Memorandum of Conversation - Secretary's Fourth Restricted Session with Shevardnadze, 29 p. R " #30 "	3/23/88	P1/F1
3. Memcon	Memorandum of Conversation - Secreatary's First One-on-One with Shevardnadze, 14 p. R " #31 "	3/21/88	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

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SYSTEM II
90321

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Special Working Group on Afghanistan

Afghanistan

TIME: 9:30 to 11:30 am; 11:45 am to 12:00 pm; 2:00 to 4:00 pm, Tuesday, March 22, 1988
PLACE: Under Secretary Armacost's Office

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

U. S.	U.S.S.R.
UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST	DEPUTY MINISTER ADAMISHIN
Amb. Matlock	Mr. Alekseyev
	Amb. Dubinin
P Staff Steven Coffey (Notetaker)	Mr. Zolotov (Notetaker)
Peter Arfanasenko (Interpreter)	

Armacost began the discussion by noting that the Ministers had given them a job which he hoped could be done swiftly and to mutual satisfaction. He had read the transcript of the Secretary's conversation the night before with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and had concluded that there had been a useful conversation.

Armacost said he welcomed Shevardnadze's statement that the troop withdrawal would be completed by the end of the year and the support expressed by Shevardnadze for the personal efforts of Cordevez to foster intra-Afghan dialogue on future Afghan governmental arrangements. He thought that Shevardnadze's formulation could provide a basis for taking care of this issue in Geneva.

Armacost noted that Shevardnadze had also raised the question of the Pakistani/Afghan border. This was basically a matter between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The language in the Geneva Accords on the border had been had been taken by Cordovez from a 1981 UN resolution which Afghanistan had voted for and which perhaps the Soviet Union had also voted for -- he was not sure. The point he wanted to make was that Pakistan had not demanded inclusion of this language for its own particular purposes. This language had been included at Cordevez' initiative.

Armacost said that for us (U. S. and Soviets) symmetry regarding military assistance was the key issue. The job he and Adamishin had was to find a way to come up with a balanced formula which reflected the interests of both sides. He wanted to sum up the areas where the two sides agreed in order to have a better understanding of where the areas of disagreement might lie.

Both sides agreed, said Armacost, that it would be useful to have a Geneva agreement. The Soviet side wanted a predictable environment for the withdrawal of troops. A Geneva agreement would also provide for the Soviet side a rationale at home and abroad for Soviet policy in Afghanistan.

For the U.S., a Geneva agreement would enhance assurances of early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and a means by which this could be accomplished consistent with the desire to allow Afghans to determine their own political future and for the refugees to return home. The U.S. did not, however, need a Geneva agreement. Although it was somewhat awkward to endorse the actions of others, the U.S. side had agreed to participate in the Geneva process and believed that an agreement would be a positive step in US-Soviet relations. If there were no agreement, things could still be managed. But this was not as constructive a way to go, in terms of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relationship. The two ministers had agreed that it would be useful to have an agreement.

The sides also agreed, Armacost continued, that there was no legal impediment in the Geneva text to providing arms to a legitimate recognized government. There was a difference over whether the Kabul government qualified as such a government. The Soviet side said it did; the U.S. side said it didn't; but there was no dispute over the right of a sovereign government to receive supplies of arms.

Armacost said that he thought the sides agreed -- here he said he would be interested in Adamishin's view -- that there was no practical requirement for introducing additional arms into Afghanistan. Vorontsov had told Cordovez and the Pakistanis that the shortcomings of the Kabul regime did not

arise from an insufficiency of arms, but from incompetence in their use. When it came to the Soviet desire to continue arms supply, the requirement seemed to be more political than practical.

Armacost cited as a fourth area of agreement the desire of each side to approach this issue in a principled manner. Each wanted to honor political and moral obligations to its Afghan friends.

There was also agreement that, if the Geneva agreement were to provide an impulse to the resolution of other regional conflicts, both sides would have to be in a position to defend the agreement. The obligations of both sides would have to be balanced. The sides might disagree where that balance should be, but both sides understood that an agreement had to be balanced if they were to be in a position to defend it publicly.

Finally, Armacost said there could be a sixth area of agreement on the possibility that neutrality arrangements provided a means of reducing the flow of arms. In all past discussions, the U.S. side had heard that the Soviet side accepted neutrality in principle but did not believe it feasible now and therefore found discussion of it premature.

He and Adamishin had the task of achieving a balanced solution. There were two alternative ways to accomplish this.

The first alternative, Armacost said, was to reaffirm the right to continue military supplies while foreswearing the exercise of those rights in practice lest the sides add fuel to the fire in Afghanistan. The purpose would be to encourage a process of national reconciliation and foster conditions that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had mentioned the night before -- letting the situation in Afghanistan wind down. A moratorium on military supplies would promote this trend. Without prejudicing the legal rights of either side, a practical understanding might be reached that would meet these requirements or conditions having to do with national reconciliation and that both sides could endorse.

A second possibility, Armacost said, was to preserve the right to supply arms with the intention of exercising that right. If it were the Soviet intention actually to continue arms deliveries to the Kabul regime based on an historical relationship, then to preserve balance in the agreement, the U.S. side would assert not only a reciprocal right to supply the mujahidin but also would need the practical means to make that right effective. There would be no balance if Soviets arms continued to go Kabul, but the U.S. had no practical means to deliver arms.

Vorontsov had suggested to Ambassador Matlock that the US had the right to supply the resistance on Pakistani territory. To be meaningful, this right had to include as a corollary the right to get the supplies across the Afghan border. It would not be a satisfactory outcome for the U.S. to have this right and then have Pakistan accused of violating the Geneva accords when the U.S. right were exercised.

These were the two ways, Armacost concluded, in which the U.S. and Soviet sides could work out a balanced arrangement. Armacost asked Adamishin whether they could pursue these two areas or had he misunderstood some aspect of the Soviet position?

Adamishin said that he had listened very carefully to what Armacost had said. He had noted in his presentation areas of disagreement and he had noted areas of agreement.

Concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the US side should now be clear that the Soviet Union had taken a firm political decision and this would be carried out under any circumstances. Adamishin said he could not help but recall his first meeting with Armacost one and a half years ago when he had told him that the Soviet side would resolve the Afghan problem in any event. He had said it would be "good" if the U.S. helped, but, as a matter of principle, the Soviet side would deal with the situation even if the U.S. did not help. Shevardnadze had told Shultz the night before that the withdrawals would be completed within 1988, that half of the troops would be withdrawn in the first three months, and that Cordovez could perform mediation services among the Afghan parties.

As for the question of the language on the Pak-Afghan border in the Geneva accords, Adamishin said that Soviet Afghan friends were not happy with the language and hadn't given their

consent to it. This was not, however, a subject for discussion between the U.S. and Soviet sides, but one for discussion between the parties in Geneva.

The task the foreign ministers had given them was to work toward an understanding that would make possible rapid signature of the Geneva accords. That was his mandate, in any event. His mandate was not to create obstacles, but to do everything possible for making signature possible. If Armacost had the same mandate, their conversation would go much easier.

Armacost interjected that the issue of symmetry was the only real remaining issue. If this could be resolved, there should be no obstacle to concluding Geneva. But the U.S. side couldn't ask Congress and the people to support an agreement where obligations were unabalanced. He and Adamishin should try to find a formula that allowed them to move forward.

Adamishin replied that this was very good, but that he wanted to raise another issue involving Pakistani behavior. Adamishin said he had in mind last-minute demands that went beyond the Geneva framework that could postpone signing of the Geneva accords and could delay for an indefinite period withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Armacost responded that he couldn't speak for Pakistan, but that it was his belief that Shevardnadze's remarks on the role Cordovez could play in helping to arrange an interim government would resolve that issue. The U.S. side had a representative in Geneva and it would have him confirm this with the Pakistani representative. Armacost said the U.S. representative would be contacted that morning.

Adamishin said this was not a bad idea and that he would have the Soviet representative in Geneva also be in touch with the Afghans on this.

As a result of the meeting between the two ministers last night, Adamishin continued, it should be clear that the proposal that the Soviet side must cease arms supplies to the present Afghan government was unacceptable.

The Soviet position had a legal basis. It had to do with the right of a sovereign government to conclude an agreement with another sovereign government.

The Soviet position also had to do with historical relations between two neighboring countries. There had been a

treaty in effect between the two countries (USSR and Afghanistan) since 1921, regardless of which regime were in control of Afghanistan.

The Soviet position also had to do with the way the question has been handled in the Geneva instruments. Armacost had mentioned that there was no provision inhibiting assistance to the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The real issue had to do with American assistance to the rebels.

Armacost interjected that he had tried to make a distinction between affirmation of the legal right to supplies and the intention to exercise that right. The Soviet side invariably proposed moratoria in arms control and other areas, irrespective of the legal obligations and historical traditions that were affected by them. In the present case the sides could declare a time-limited moratorium out of recognition of the fact that additional arms were not needed in Afghanistan. This could be done without violation of anyone's juridical rights and would be in keeping with the overall purpose of Geneva to facilitate an orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops, return of the refugees, a process of national reconciliation, and a general disengagement of outside powers from an internal Afghan conflict.

Adamishin said that, speaking frankly, this proposal would not be suitable or workable for the Soviet side. But he wanted to ask a couple of questions. Was his understanding correct that the Soviets were being asked to institute a moratorium on the supply of arms to the legitimate government in Kabul for a period of time, while the US side ceased supplies to factions fighting that legitimate government? If this was the idea proposed by the U.S. side, it would not be accepted.

Armacost explained that, in canvassing ideas on ways to inject balance into the agreement, he had simply wanted to suggest that a moratorium would not prejudice legal rights and would not have practical effect on the regime in Kabul. There was already more than enough weaponry inside Afghanistan. There would be some time before the agreement entered into force during which there would be no restraints on military assistance; information of the U.S. side showed that the Soviet side was already turning over weaponry in Afghanistan to its friends in Kabul.

Adamishin replied that he was not responsible for U.S. intelligence and had no experience in intelligence matters. In international law there were legitimate governments and illegitimate governments. From the point of view of

international law, a moratorium put the legal government of Afghanistan on an equal footing with the forces fighting against it. From a practical standpoint, the situation was such that the Kabul government could only count on Soviet arms, whereas the mujahidin had diverse sources of arms supply. While it would be easy from a theoretical point of view to monitor the flow of Soviet arms to Kabul, it would be hard to verify arms moving to and from Pakistan. Injection of a moratorium into the discussion would delay the preparation and signing of the Geneva accords. He had looked at this option in a theoretical perspective and had not simply rejected it because it came from the American side. He and Armacost should return to the practical task at hand.

Adamishin said he had expressed the attitude of the Soviet side toward Soviet arms supply to Kabul. He now wanted to say something about U.S. supplies to the opposition. Armacost had mentioned two possibilities. Adamisahin said he would mention three.

First, the United States could unilaterally stop its arms supplies to groups inside Afghanistan. This would be the best option.

Armacost interjected that Shevardnadze the night before had acknowledged that this option was unacceptable. So what was the second option?

Adamishin interjected that he was mentioning the first option again because he liked it so much.

Armacost responded that he would like to see him defend it before Congress.

Adamishin replied that he thought he could defend it before the Supreme Soviet.

The second option, Adamishin continued, was that the United States not sign the Geneva accords. Armacost noted that the Soviets had requested U.S participation in the Geneva process. Adamishin responded that it was useful for both countries to participate and that it was in the interest of the rest of the world as well to see this regional conflict resolved.

There was a third option. It was an idea rather than something definitely formulated, something impeccable or flawless. The sides could agree to comply with those obligations imposed by the Geneva instruments. Whatever was not called for by the agreement would not be a subject for discussion or subject to implementation. Nothing was said in the Geneva accords about military assistance.

Armacost asked about the practical effect of Adamishin's suggestion that there was nothing in the Geneva accords prohibiting the United States from supplying the mujahidin. Would the Soviet side declare Pakistan in violation of the Geneva accords if supplies were delivered across the Afghan border?

Adamishin replied that they did not need to anticipate problems and should not force the pace of events. Their job was to remove the last obstacle for signature of the Geneva accords.

Armacost said that if the U.S. had a right, it should be able to use it. The United States would not be interested in arrangements according the U.S. a right, but then have the exercise of it expose a friendly country to the charge of having violated its obligations.

Adamishin rejoined, in English, that they "shouldn't trouble trouble until trouble troubles us."

Armacost responded that if troubles were forseeable, they should try to avoid them.

Adamishin said that he proposed that the two sides come to an internal understanding that whatever is in the agreement should be carried out, but that there would be no discussion of issues not mentioned in the agreement.

Ambasador Dubinin interjected that the U.S. side could do what was not prohibited.

Armacost replied that it was still not clear to him what Adamishin's intent was. A cosmetic symmetry formula would not work. Congress would want to know whether the U.S. right to military assistance could be implemented in view of the commitments Pakistan had undertaken. Would the Soviet side allow the ambiguity of its proposed formula to cover both the US and Pakistan or did the ambiguity cover only the U.S. so that the Soviet side could use Pakistani commitments to frustrate the practical exercise of the US right to supply?

Adamishin replied that, as he saw it, nobody had raised before the question of Pakistan. The question had been that of U.S. arms supplies to the mujahidin.

The Soviet side had proposed, Adamishin continued, three options. The first option was to remove the issue completely

by a unilateral U.S. cessation of arms supplies. The third suggestion was an internal understanding with the U.S. that only the contents of an agreement had to be complied with. But the Soviet side was not going to applaud the transfers of arms first to Pakistan and then to the resistance.

Armacost interjected that he was not asking for applause, he was simply asking whether the Soviets would accuse Pakistan of violating the agreement.

Adamishin replied that he had the idea from these questions that maybe the U.S. would not want to go forward with signing. Armacost had attached such importance to drawing a distinction between the right to supply military assistance and the exercise of that right.

It was even more important for the Soviet side, interjected Armacost. Soviet supplies end up with the mujahidin.

Then the first variant should be the best, joked Adamishin. Let us (Soviets) become suppliers to both Kabul and the mujahidin.

Armacost reiterated that there were two possibilities for a balanced outcome. Either both sides refrained from supplies, or both could continue to supply. Armacost said he couldn't understand why the Soviet side thought it would be easier within the context of a Geneva agreement to defend publicly the continuation of supplies, when both sides recognized that these supplies were not necessary. Earlier the Soviet Union had been accusing the United States and Pakistan of being an obstacle to concluding a Geneva agreement. But failure to resolve this issue of symmetry could put the Soviet Union in the position of being accused of holding up Geneva in order to insist on continuing arms supplies to a discredited regime.

Armacost noted that he was not challenging Soviet legal rights, but was merely suggesting a practical understanding that both sides would refrain from the exercise of those rights. There were enough arms piled up in Afghanistan already. It would be sufficient to acknowledge the right to supply, but in fact not supply and explain this in the context of the objectives of the Geneva accords. Whatever its legal rights might be, each side could pubicly say that it would honor a cessation of supplies if the other side did.

Adamishin said he wanted to comment parenthetically on Armacost's remark about the "discredited Kabul regime." He and

Armacost could have a good discussion about the Pakistani regime and the mujahidin, but that was not the subject of their conversation.

The question of arms supply did not figure in the Geneva accords. The question had arisen because of the need of the U.S. side to explain its position to the congress. The Soviet side had proposed three options. The third option was a formula for an internal understanding between the sides which would make it possible to explain the Geneva accords to congress.

Armacost said that if there were reciprocity, this could be a solution. But the U.S. side had to know how this internal understanding related to Pakistani obligations.

We should interpret those as written, said Adamishin. He was reluctant to draw the analogy, but the two sides had been able to find the formula "as signed" for the ABM treaty. The Geneva accords were silent on the subject of military assistance, so why introduce it? The Soviets had not approved arms supplies to Pakistan or to the resistance in the past and the Soviet side would not approve them in the future. The two sides had criticized each other on many subjects and would do so in the future. But this was a different question, he said, from the question of the contents of the Geneva accords.

Armacost said that if we could assume reciprocal restraint, then the implications for Pakistani obligations would not be so important. But if we could not assume reciprocal restraint, then the U.S. side needed to know whether U.S. exercise of its right would be leading to charges against Paklistan. He was not seeking special advantages for the United States. He simply wanted a balanced agreement. If the Soviet side exhibited restraint, it could expect restraint from the U.S. side.

Armacost noted that Adamishin had said that the Soviet side would not applaud U.S. supplies to the resistance. The U.S. side did not expect Soviet applause. However, if the Soviet side was willing to tolerate the U.S. supplying arms in the event the Soviet side supplied them, then that could be a workable arrangement. But the U.S. could not enter into an agreement where the exercise of its rights would expose Pakistan to charges of committing a violation. It did not want a purely formal symmetry that in practice meant nothing. That was why he wanted to be sure about the interpretation and implications of this understanding. Questions would have to be answered to the Congress about the practical meaning of the

accords. He was not trying to be argumentative; he just wanted to be sure what was understood on this.

Adamishin replied that the Geneva instruments were few in number. The one they were talking about was the one placing obligations on the United States and the Soviet Union. There was nothing in the Declaration on International Guarantees that would prohibit either party from supplying arms to Afghanistan. But there was also an instrument -- a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan -- that imposed certain obligations on those two countries. If Pakistan violated the obligations it assumed under that bilateral agreement, neither the US nor Soviet sides should overlook that fact. To do so would undercut the Geneva accords as a whole. Otherwise, what would be the meaning of the agreement on the principles of non-intervention and non-interference? So the obligations that were contained in the instruments would be in effect and were the ones that had to be complied with. The declaration signed by the U.S. and Soviet sides should also be complied with. But what was not contained in the declaration did not need to be discussed.

Armacost replied that he had understood Adamishin's answer but found that it would not be convincing to the Congress or to the American people.

Adamishin replied that the U.S. side had been "smart enough" in providing answers to the Congress. It's hardly imaginable, he said, that just to please Congress, the parties to an international agreement should be allowed to violate it.

Armacost said it wasn't only a question of the Congress; in Adamishin's proposal the balance was more theoretical than real. The Soviet side had an unimpeded right to supply what it called a legitimate government. It said the U.S. side had a right to make supplies, but if the U.S exercised that right, a third party would be accused of violating the agreement.

Adamishin responded that the bilateral accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan placed obligations on both sides. What was the meaning of non-intervention if Pakistan did not have to comply? Pakistan had not raised any questions about this. Armacost should go ahead and examine the documents carefully and see how he could find justification for the U.S. political course. That was a problem for the U.S. side to solve. He told Armacost to look at the documents and all the obligations written there.

Armacost responded by saying that the Soviet side had

asserted the legitimacy of the Kabul regime. The U.S. side did not believe that regime to be legitimate. The U.S. was supoporting a legitimate resistance fighting an outside invader. Adamishin might reject that. The two sides had different theories about legitimacy and each was not going to persuade the other. But despite these differences, Armacost said he believed the sides could find a formula for reaching agreement. Everything, he said, again came back to the question of balance.

There were two possibilities. There was no requirement for more arms deliveries. The U.S. side was not challenging Soviet rights to supply arms to a friendly regime based on a historical relationship, but the sides could reaffirm their rights while in practice not exercising theme. This solution would encourage the process of national reconciliation. It would create a stable and predictable environment for Soviet troop withdrawals, the return of the refugees, and would be consistent with the overall purpose of the Geneva accords of disengaging external powers from the internal struggle among Afghans.

The second possibility would be for both sides to have the right to supply and to continue the supplies. In that case the U.S. right could not be just theoretical. The U.S. right had to be defined. This agreement would have to be defended before Congress, the people, and the press. The sides were so close to agreement in Geneva now that it was hard to understand why the Soviets were insisting on piling more arms into Afghanistan.

Adamishin replied that the issue was not who is best, the Kabul regime or the mujahidin. That issue had no relevance to the question under discussion. The question was how the Geneva agreements should be observed. The Soviet formula proposed that what was written in the documents should be implemented; what was not written there would not be subject to implementation.

Adamishin then asked Armacost how he saw the second Soviet option if Armacost's moratorium idea was unacceptable.

Armacost, in turn, asked Adamishin how he would describe the supply arrangement under the Soviet formula. His point in asking the question, he said, was to to know whether Pakistan would be accused of violating the accords if the U.S. exercised its rights in response to perceived Soviet continuations of arms supplies. That facts of geography, Armacost said, could not be ignored. How was U.S. aid to be delivered?

After talking privately with Ambassador Dubinin and Alekseyev, Adamishin told Armacost that the Soviet side was trying to take account, to the maximum extent possible, of US concerns. The Ministers had tasked them to discuss the question of the Soviet side's arms supply to the Afghan government and U.S. supplies to the mujahidin and find a satisfactory formula. Admishin then repeated the Soviet proposed formula.

Adamishin continued that now the American side was saying that it was not sufficient to have the right to supply. Now it was demanding that the Soviet side provide a guarantee that the Pakistanis would not be criticized if they violated the bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan had not raised this issue. Why not leave hypothetical situations for the future? Why should it be decided now that the Pakistanis would violate the Geneva accords? In any event, how could the Soviet side give a guarantee for its attitude toward actions by Pakistan in contravention of the agreement?

At this point Armacost suggested to Adamishin that they should perhaps take a half-hour break. They might consider drafting language so that each would have a more precise understanding of the other's proposals.

In response to Adamishin's questions, Armacost noted that in Geneva the Soviet representative in Geneva Kozyrev had spoken of the US right to supply the mujahidin in Pakistan. Armacost said he simply wanted to be sure that if the United States did that the Soviet side would not regard that as a violation by Pakistan of its undertakings.

Armacost again repeated that he saw two basic formulas. One was the US proposal for a moratorium without prejudice to legal rights. The other proposal was the Soviet proposal, an internal understanding that what was not expressly prohibited in the Geneva accords would be permitted. He asked Adamishin whether under this formula Pakistan would be relieved of its obligation to prevent transfer of military supplies across the Pak-Afghan boundary. Crticizing Pakistan for this was one thing, but accusing it of a violation was another.

Adamishin responded that Pakistan should fulfill its obligations under its bilateral agreement with Afghanistan. He was not going to go into the details of what Pakistan had to do. Armacost should look at this document carefully.

Adamishin said he wanted to raise still one more question

regarding the proposed Soviet formula. If an understanding were reached, the Soviet side would regard it as an internal understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It didn't need to be in writing, since it was absolutely clear that obligations not contained in an agreement did not have to be complied with. He asked Armacost whether the two saw eye to eye with this approach.

At this point, the meeting recessed for a half hour. The Soviet party left to attend ceremonies connected with inauguration of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center.

After the break, Armacost began the discussion by explaining to Adamishin that, since the Soviet side had given him language for their proposal, he wanted to propose language in the other direction that could be discussed with Shevardnadze. This language could be embodied in an agreed minute, announced at the time of signature of the Geneva accord, or take some other form. There were various possibilities.

Armacost then read the following proposed language of a draft agreed minute:

"With reference to the political settlement of the Afghan conflict (signed this day in Geneva), the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that each asserts an interpretation of those accords which would permit the continued provision of assistance by the parties to the political settlement to parties to the conflict in Afghanistan. The United States and the Soviet Union each declare their intention to refrain from exercising the rights they assert to provide military assistance to any party in Afghanistan for a period of three years so long as the other parties to the settlement refrain from exercising any rights they might assert to provide military assistance."

As an alternative formulation, Armacost read the following draft agreed minute:

"With reference to the political settlement of the Afghan conflict (signed this day in Geneva), the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that each asserts an interpretation of those accords which would permit the continued provision of assistance by the parties to the settlement to parties to the conflict in Afghanistan. The United States and the Soviet Union each declare that, if military assistance is supplied to any Afghan party by any party to the Geneva settlement, they will each consider the other parties to the Geneva settlement free to supply military assistance to the other Afghan party."

Adamishin responded that it would be very hard for the Soviet side to accept either one of these variants. "Extremely difficult," he said. This would represent a remaking of the Geneva accords. "Other parties" in the second draft agreed minute referred to Pakistan, but what about Pakistani obligations regarding Afghanistan?

Armacost observed that the easiest solution from the practical point of view would be to continue to reaffirm the right to supply, but in practice not exercise it. The sides could explain to the public that they would not supply arms because there were ample arms in existence and because they were trying to promote the goals of the Geneva Accords: troop withdrawal, national reconciliation, and an end to the civil war. This formulation would square everything. But if the Soviets were going to exercise their right, the US would insist on exercising its right.

Armacost noted that it was time to go to the Secretary's luncheon. It was agreed that Armacost and Adamishin would meet after the luncheon to decide when to resume the discussion. With this, the session broke up for lunch.

After returning from lunch, Armacost and Adamishin had a long one-on-one.

They were then joined by Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Dubinin, Mr. Alekseyev and notetakers.

Adamishin observed that the Soviet formula raised no legal issues regarding the obligations of third parties.

Armacost pointed out that two different situations were involved here. The issue of obligations, he said, became serious in the context of Soviet intentions. If the Soviet intention were to maintain the right to render military assistance but not to make deliveries, then that was one situation. If the Soviets, however, were going to maintain the right to deliver supplies, sign the accords, and then make the deliveries, then the U.S. side needed to know how the Soviet formula would impinge on the Pakistanis and on the exercise of the U.S. right.

Adamishin asked whether Armacost's question indicated that the U.S. side had withdrawn its proposals.

Armacost responded that the implications of ech side's formulations should be understood.

Adamishin rejoined that, as he had said in his one-on-one with Armacost, the US formula was absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet side. He had run through the arguments and didn't think he needed to repeat them unless Armacost wanted to hear them again.

Armacost said that he would like to hear the arguments again.

Adamishin said that the Soviet side had not raised the issue of the right of supplying military aid, nor was the Soviet side asking for U.S. permission to supply military aid in accordance with bilateral treaties between the Government of Afghanistan and the USSR. Adamishin saw no need for U.S. military assistance to the mujahadin. The Soviet side would not give its blessing in an open public statement to U.S. supplies to the mujahadin. It would not do this for a variety of reasons, including those involving relations with allies. The Soviet formula was one of an internal understanding between the U.S. and Soviet sides.

Adamishin said the proposals of the U.S. side would undercut the Geneva accords. They gave a right to Pakistan to assist parties in the conflict in Afghanistan and to circumvent the obligations in the Pak-Afghan bilateral agreement. The issue would arise of which agreement was operative -- the bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan or the US-Soviet understanding? This kind of proposed statement was totally unacceptable.

In general, Adamishin said, the question of arms supplies was not one raised in the Geneva accords. The U.S. side had raised it for political reasons in order to explain the agreement to the Congress. The Pakistanis had not raised this issue.

The Soviet side had proposed three options, Adamishin continued. The third option was designed precisely to meet U.S. domestic political concerns. Under that formula, the US and the Soviet Union would comply with the obligations imposed on them by the instrument of guarantee. The parties could not be expected to fulfill obligations not contained in that instrument.

The U.S. side had raised the question of how the Soviet Union would react to US supply of arms to Pakistan and the mujahidin. It would criticize those actions. It criticized them now. But it would be hard for the Soviet side to invoke the Declaration of International Guarantees because there was no obligation in that declaration not to supply.

The question had arisen: what if Pakistan continued to interfere in Afghanistan? That concerned the bilateral Pak-Afghan agreement. If Pakistan violated that agreement, of course, it would be criticized. To act otherwise, to provide assurances not to criticize Pakistan in that circumstance, would undercut the agreement.

The U.S. side had raised, said Adamishin, the question of actual Soviet intentions regarding arms supplies. He was not in a position to answer that question. He could not guarantee that the Soviet side would terminate supplies or what would happen in the coming months in Afghanistan. The Soviet side could not give any guarantees on this.

Adamishin said the third option was the maximum position of the Soviet side. Armacost may have thought this a bargaining position, but the Soviet bargaining positions were options one and two. If Armacost didn't like the third option, then they could go back to the first two. The guarantees Armacost was insisting on were impossible for the Soviet side.

Armacost responded that he had read the conversation the night before between the ministers and, in that conversation, the Secretary also had indicated limits to the US bargaining position. The U.S. side needed balance and had scrutinized the Soviet proposal to see if it was really as balanced as the Soviet side said. The U.S. side was accountable to the press, the Congress, and the public. They would ask about the meaning of these agreements.

Armacost then read again the Soviet formulation that "the sides will comply with those obligations that are imposed on them by the Geneva instruments. Whatever is not a subject of the Geneva agreement or called for by the agreement cannot be a subject for discussion or implementation."

The Congress would ask, he said, what were the US rights to supply under this understanding. What were Soviet rights? Did the Soviet Union intend to continue to supply? Was it the intention of the US Government to continue to supply the resistance? How could the United States exercise its rights?

The U.S. response could be that if the Soviet Union intended to exhibit restraint, then the U.S. would do so. But this would lead to the question: what if the Soviets continued to turn over large amounts of equipment to the Kabul regime? What would the U.S. do in those circumstances? Would it be

able to make actual deliveries in the context of the Geneva accords without the Soviet side making charges that Pakistan was violating the agreement?

If "yes" could be said to this question, if the U.S. could continue the deliveries, the problem with the Congress could be handled. But, if the Soviet side shouted "foul -- this is a violation," then Congress would say that this whole understanding was a trick and that the U.S. side had been outmaneuvered. They would say the Soviet side had taken back with one hand what had been given with the other. They would say that the Soviet side had conceded a theoretical parity only.

Adamishin said he understood that problem. But the whole world could not be expected to adjust to problems regarding relations with Congress. The U.S. side was suggesting that, in order to satisfy the appetites of Congress, the whole logic of the Geneva accords would have to be destroyed. The U.S. and Soviet sides could answer only for their own bilateral relations. They could sign the declaration and have an understanding that nothing expressly prohibited could be permitted, that the Soviet side could supply the Kabul regime and vice versa for the U.S. side; it could supply the mujahadin.

But the U.S. side wanted to go further. It insisted on allowing Pakistan to transfer supplies to the Mujahidin. Adamishin said the Soviet side could not bless U.S.supplies, but it could agree that it would not use arguments based on the Geneva accords in criticizing those supplies. It could not go further than that without destroying the entire structure of the Geneva accords.

The Soviet side had presented an opportunity to deal with this problem. But from now on the U.S. side could deal with it itself. Adamishin could only repeat the Soviet formulation.

Armacost interjected that the Soviet side wanted U.S. signature at Geneva.

Adamishin replied that Armacost's terms would overturn the entire structure of the Geneva accords. The guarantee the U.S. side was asking for would make the Geneva Accords absurd. How could the Soviet side conclude an agreement with a guarantee that it could be violated? He suggested that Armacost work with the Soviet formula.

Ambassador Dubinin interjected that the formula proposed by Adamishin was a step forward in comparison to the one that had been given in Geneva and the one given to Ambassador Matlock.

When asked to explain this remark, Dubinin said that the Soviet formula would give the US side an opportunity to explain the agreement to Congress. The Soviet formula mades no reference to Pakistan. That had been dropped.

Another point about the Soviet formula, said Dubinin, was that it drew attention to the fact that nothing is said in the Geneva accords about supplies. Each side could interpret this fact as it desired. Each side could make supplies at its own risk. The other side might express its view of this. There could be talk of illegitimate factions, etc., but the U.S. side would supply and the Soviet side would supply. There was nothing in the Geneva documents referring to military supplies. Everyone must comply with the obligations contained in those accords, but only with those obligations that were specified.

Armacost asked Adamishin whether the Geneva accords required Pakistan to prevent the United States from transferring supplies across the Pak-Afghan border.

Adamishin suggested that Armacost answer this question himself.

Armacost then read paragraph 8 from Article II of the draft bilateral agreement between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention.

"For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, each high contracting party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:... to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries, from whatever origin, for the purpose of hostile activities against the other high contracting party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other high contracting party, and accordingly, to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries."

Armacost suggested that perhaps the sides could agree that "mercenary" is not the term appropriately applied for the resistance. According to his understanding of the word, a "mercenary" is a soldier hired for pay in the service of another country. This was not an accurate desciption of the Afghan resistance. The Afghans were patriots fighting for the

cause of their own country. Perhaps the sides could reach some sort of agreement that this term was not applicable to the resistance.

Adamishin responded that the Soviet formula referred to the document that was to be concluded between the U.S. and Soviet sides and how that document was to be interpreted. The sides could interpret that document as not preventing supplies from them to parties in Afghanistan. But he couldn't comment either privately or publicly on the meaning of the bilateral Pak-Afghan agreement.

Armacost asked Adamishin whether, if the Geneva accords were completed, the Soviet side would continue to take the position that the parties to the Afghan-Pak bilateral agreement would themselves interpret it.

Adamishin responded that that was a complicated issue. There was a kind of inner relationship among all the documents and he was reluctant to give a rash answer to that question. The parties themselves would be able to make complaints about violations, and there was a mechanism in the documents for field inspections, etc. If Afghanistan made a complaint about Pakistani behavior, the Soviet side would probably support the Afghan, rather than the Pakistani, position.

Armacost interjected that the U.S. side would support the Pakistani position.

Adamishin continued that the US side had presented a whole list of concerns and that the Soviet side had tried to meet those concerns. The United States side had said that the troop withdrawal period should be shortened. The Soviet side had announced a ten-month timetable and had now agreed in Geneva to nine months. The US side had asked that the troop withdrawal be frontloaded. Now the Soviet side had agreed to remove fifty percent of its troops within three months. The United States had asked the Soviet side to drop the linkage between the formation of a coalition government and troop withdrawal. That linkage had been dropped. There was no need to complicate the negotiations with new issues. And now the United States side had brought up a new issue regarding arms supplies. In response, the Soviet side had proposed its formula.

Armacost said he wanted to comment on Adamishin's remark that symmetry was a new issue. The issue had not arisen earlier because Soviet troop withdrawal had been envisioned either in the context of an interim government or in the context of neutrality arrangements. But as the Soviet side had

shortened the timetable for withdrawal, broken the linkage with interim government, and deferred neutrality arrangements, then the question of arms supplies naturally arose. It was the result of the natural rhythm of the negotiations rather than any new demand from the American side.

Armacost said that he wanted to make one more run at explaining the US formula. The sides needed to think about what would be said in public. The Geneva agreement had, as its basic aim, the disengagement of external powers from the internal struggle among Afghans. The Soviet proposal maintained symmetry by assuring that both sides could continue to supply arms in a civil war in which both the U.S. and Soviet sides said their objective was strengthening peace and stability, national reconciliation, return of refugees, and withdrawal of Soviet troops. Trying to solve the conflict by leaving legal rights in place but agreeing not to exercise those rights would be more consistent with that overall objective than continuing the supplies of arms. The situation called for restraint and humanitarian aid; it called for food, seeds, agricultural implements, etc., rather than arms.

Armacost recalled Shevardnadze statement of the evening before, saying that the Soviet Union wished Afghanistan to become neutral, that such neutral status could be incompatible with a military supply relationship, but that neutrality arrangements would have to be decided in the future. Why would it be impossible for the sides to continue to affirm their rights but leave those rights in abeyance for a fixed period of time pending clarification of Afghanistan's international status and efforts by Cordovez to pursue an intra-Afghan dialogue on national reconciliation. The sides could say as a matter of public policy that they had adjusted their actions to the needs of the situation in Afghanistan and were rendering support to the parties in Afghanistan in the form of humanitarian assistance rather than arms.

Armacost then proposed that Adamishin present the two US formula to Shevardnadze for his consideration. Armacost said that he would report to the Secretary the formula proposed by Adamishin. The difference between the U.S. and Soviet proposals was that the US formula provided a solution to the Afghan conflict.

Adamishin said that Armacost's comments and the remarks made by Shevardnadze the evening before on a neutral Afghanistan were food for thought and suggested that perhaps the two ministers could talk about it at dinner that evening.

Armacost said that both US formulas solved the problem. Both met a test in principle and practice. In principle, there was no renunciation of rights, and in practice, there was an emphasis on humanitarian aid. The Soviet formula, on the other hand, gave a rationale for continuing weapons' supplies. The US had limited its moratorium to three years, but its duration could be keyed to the formation of a broad-based government. In either event, the objective was to let the dust settle and let the Afghans settle their own affairs.

Switching subjects, Adamishin noted that Armacost had postponed discussion about how to deal with public presentation of an internal understanding, if such an understanding were reached. He had proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States each explain independently the internal understanding to their respective publics. Was it not possible that the sides had reached such a degree of understanding in their relationship to be able to have a "gentlemen's agreement"? Both sides would have a text, but they would keep it in their desk drawers and make their own public explanations.

Armacost said that the American public thought the Geneva accords imposed restraint on the US ability to supply the mujahidin. The Soviet proposal contained an understanding of the guarantor's role different from what had been commonly understood. Consequently, the U.S. side would have to be in a position to explain to Congress and the press that the Geneva accords did not impair the US right to supply the mujahidin. And the U.S. side would need Soviet concurrence with this. It would need to be able to say that the Soviet Union did not oppose this interpretation.

Adamishin interjected that the U.S. side could say this and the Soviet side would not contradict it.

Ambassador Matlock said that, naturally, it would be well to be able to add that the U.S. side had an understanding that there would be no need to make arms supplies.

Adamishin responded that that was why it would be well for both sides to make their explanations independently.

Ambassador Matlock responded that there needed to be confidence that the need for arms supplies would in fact not arise.

Armacost asked Adamishin why the Soviet side wouldn't go beyond its formula and say something to the effect that, to the extent the United States didn't engage in delivering arms, the Soviet Union would not see the necessity for it either.

Adamishin replied that now Armacost was returning to the idea of a moratorium.

Armacost stated that a public presentation would be far more credible if it embodied the idea of a moratorium rather than the idea of simply continuing military assistance that will fuel the civil war.

Adamishin said that the Soviet side wouldn't go as far as a moratorium. The sides could simply agree that what was in the Geneva accords would be honored and what was not didn't need to be discussed. But, he told Armacost, other ideas regarding a future neutral Afghanistan are views that should be brought to the attention of the ministers.

Armacost said that he had mentioned neutrality as a rationale for dampening down arms supplies. When Dick Murphy was in Moscow, he had proposed a time-limited moratorium, a moratorium of three years, to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, but the Foreign Minister hadn't replied.

Adamishin said that it was a new idea for him and that the Foreign Minister had said nothing to him about it, but that he would accurately report it to the minister.

Armacost said that the issue was one of public presentation. He saw problems with the Soviet proposal. The Soviet answer seemed to be that the delivery of military supplies to Afghanistan from Pakistani territory would be regarded as a violation by Pakistan of its obligations under the Geneva accords.

Adamishin said they had already talked about that. Here the Soviet side could not give a guarantee. This was a question that fell under the Afghan-Pakistani agreement and that agreement was for those parties to interpret. The Soviet side had proposed nothing regarding a formula for interpreting the Pakistani-Afghan agreement. The Soviet side had no responsibilities in that area. There were actions, however, not prohibited by international law, just as there was no prohibition on making assessments of those actions. It was all a matter of interpretation.

Armacost suggested that they set down in writing the Soviet proposal so that he could report it to Secretary Shultz. As he understood it, the Soviet proposal consisted of the following elements:

First, the US and the Soviet Union would have an understanding that the parties would comply with those obligations imposed by the Geneva instruments. Whatever was not a subject of negotiations in Geneva could not be discussed nor could it be an issue with respect to implementation.

Second, in explanations to the Congress, the US side could assume that, if it continued arms supplies to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union would criticize those actions, just as it criticized them now. The Soviet Union would not criticize these arms deliveries, however, as a violation of the Geneva accords.

Third, with respect to Pakistan, the Soviet Union could give no guarantee that there would be no criticism of Pakistan if supplies to the mujahidin went across the Pak-Afghanistan border, but that it was not the responsibility of the Soviet side to interpret the responsibilities of Pakistan to Afghanistan or vice versa. In a public sense, there might be some ambiguity or disagreement about the obligations of Pakistan.

Fourth, if the sides reached a private understanding, each side would explain to its own public its interpretation of that understanding. There would be no agreed bilateral statement.

Adamishin interrupted Armacost to say that he could not agree to the third point. He could not guarantee that there wouldn't be criticism of Pakistan as violating the Geneva agreement. It would be absurd, he said, to take that position.

Armacost asked whether Pakistani violations would call into question Soviet obligations.

Adamishin said that the Soviet Union would maintain a principled position.

Armacost asked him to explain.

Adamishin repeated that the Soviet side could not guarantee that there wouldn't be criticism of Pakistan as violating the accords. If that was expected from the Soviet Union, then it

would sign the accords without the US. What would be the meaning of the accords if they could be violated? Adamishin said that he had spotted Armacost's concern when Armacost had hinted that the Soviet side might link its troop withdrawal plans with Pakistani violations. There was a only a very small chance -- he would say maybe one in a thousand -- that the Soviet side would find it necessary to reverse the troop withdrawal. And if the Soviet side wanted to do that, there would be a thousand other reasons or pretexts for doing so.

Armacost suggested that perhaps the third point could be rephrased to say that, with respect to Pakistan, the Soviet side could give no guarantee that there wouldn't be criticisms of Pakistan for allowing supplies to cross the border and that Pakistan would be criticized for violating the accords, but that this would not call into question Soviet obligations.

Adamishin said he could not agree to this, that his statement on troop withdraw had been "emotional." It was impossible to say that the Soviet side would blink at the violation of an agreement. He simply wanted to say that the troop withdrawal was a question of policy.

The Soviet side asked to have Armacost's third point deleted.

Armacost then summarized the US side's moratorium proposal and asked Adamishin to convey that proposal to Shevardnadze.

Adamishin said he would do so, but as he and Ambassador Dubinin had indicated, this proposal would be unacceptable from the Soviet standpoint. He agreed, however, to convey the moratorium proposal to Shevardnadze and would add this as a fifth point to Armacost's list.

Armacost asked that they give the moratorium proposal a fair shake. He hoped the foreign minister would carefully consider it.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
(5698F)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Secretary's Fourth Restricted Session with Shevardnadze

TIME: 2:30 to 8:10 pm, Wednesday, March 23, 1988
PLACE: Secretary's Outer Office

SUBJECTS: Ministerial Dates, Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Other Regional Issues, Working Group Reports, Joint Statement

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
THE SECRETARY Gen. Powell	FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
Under Secretary Armacost Amb. Ridgway	Amb. Bessmertnykh Amb. Adamishin Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker) Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	Soviet MFA Notetaker Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

Ministerial Dates

SHEVARDNADZE said it had been a good meeting with the President. It was good to have the question of a summit date resolved.

THE SECRETARY agreed. Having a date would allow work to begin on the details -- both in terms of arrangements and substance. Setting dates was a way of saying we were serious. For the same reason, it might be a good idea in the joint statement to be issued after the ministers met to give the dates for their April meeting, and to indicate they would meet in May as well.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that the best time for him in April would be April 25. But he understood that was a problem for the Secretary.

THE SECRETARY said he thought agreement had been reached on the dates April 21-22 for the Secretary's discussions in Moscow, with some travel outside Moscow the following weekend. The Secretary had to be back in Washington the evening of April 25.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the April meeting should be April 21-25. As for May, the middle of the month would be best for him. THE SECRETARY agreed that the statement would say "mid-May," with precise dates to be determined later.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that the ministers seemed to have said as much as was necessary on the Middle East that morning. If their experts came up with something in the meantime, it could be reflected in the joint statement. Shevardnadze continued to believe that there ingredients of a common approach. Perhaps these could be discussed in greater detail in April, during the Secretary's Moscow visit.

THE SECRETARY said that the statement should say that the two sides had discussed the Middle East and would continue to do so. But we would have to say that our respective concepts of an international conference and how to go about it were quite different.

Iran-Iraq

SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers needed to finish their discussion of Afghanistan.

The Foreign Minister had already dealt with the Iran-Iraq war. In the spirit of the understanding the ministers had, Shevardnadze could confirm that, after the Secretary General had completed his consultations with the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq, the Soviet Union would be able to act in the Security Council.

THE SECRETARY welcomed this. The U.S. proposed to return to the U.K. draft without the modifications which the two sides had considered in Moscow for a suspension period during which the Secretary General could seek implementation of the first resolution. Perez de Cuellar was already, in effect, doing this.

SHEVARDNADZE was not sure about such an approach. The Soviet Union had agreed in principle to work on the basis of the U.K. draft, but since then many amendments had been attached to it. The time before the Secretary General's meeting with the Iranians and Iraqis should be used to work on the text.

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze if he would be willing to say publicly what he had said to him in private.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, for public consumption, it might be better to state simply that, if the Secretary General's consultations produced no results, the U.S. and Soviet Union would favor "strong action." The two sides had already decided that this meant voting for a second resolution.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the phrase "strong action" should be recorded in the joint statement. If asked what this meant, the U.S. would say it refered to voting a second resolution. If asked what about the Soviet view, we would suggest putting the question to the Soviet Union. The Secretary remarked that the President's comments at the White House made clear how deeply he had been moved by recent reports of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood. He appreciated the need for a resolution, even though it would give him a "big headache" with Iran after the vote.

THE SECRETARY reemphasized that a decision was needed. If there were a subsequent need for further follow-up, the two sides could consult.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that the current U.S. proposal called for the 30 day suspense period the ministers had discussed in Moscow.

THE SECRETARY repeated that the idea in February had been to enable the Secretary General to use the suspense period to seek Iranian compliance with Resolution 598. Time had passed since then, and the consultations which had been foreseen were happening. This argued for going back to the original U.K. draft.

SHEVARDNADZE said he felt the suspense period should be retained. Implementation should be based on whatever situation prevailed at the time.

THE SECRETARY said that, if the modification were retained, the suspense period should be very short.

Afghanistan

SHEVARDNADZE asked about Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY said it was hard. He asked to review the bidding to be sure he understood the Soviet position, laying aside for the moment the question of arms supplies.

The Soviet side agreed, he recounted, that half its troops would leave in the first three months. If the Geneva accords were signed, the withdrawal would be over by the end of the year. The Soviet Union and the parties agreed that Cordovez could in a private capacity mediate efforts to reach agreement on an Afghan interim government acceptable to all parties. We assumed that was something the Soviet side would be prepared to make public. (Shevardnadze shook his head in the affirmative when the Secretary asked, "Right?").

The Secretary recalled that the Soviet side had suggested that, as far as it was concerned, the U.S. could say it would continue to support those we had supported in the past. The Soviet Union would reserve the right to complain about this, but would not claim that the Geneva accords were being violated.

The most sensitive issue, the Secretary said, had to do with Pakistan, because there was no other realistic route for transporting supplies to the resistance. Any U.S. statement of its right to deliver arms, if it chose to do so, had to be credible. As a practical matter, we hoped this would not be necessary. We would say we would observe restraint if the Soviet Union did. If the Soviet side showed restraint, so would we. We would say this publicly.

The Secretary said he would like to have from Shevardnadze some indication as to how the Soviet Union would comment on Pakistan's position in light of such a statement by the U.S. If, for example, the U.S. said it would continue arms supplies, and Moscow said that Pakistan would be in violation of the accords if they transited that country, that would be too contentious for us.

There were a number of factors to consider in this context, the Secretary emphasized. One was an actual supply operation by the U.S. Then there was the question of what the Soviet Union would say under those circumstances. We needed to understand what kind of position Pakistan would be in if we accepted the Soviet proposal. The U.S. would make a statement -- and be ready to act on it. But under the withdrawal timetable that Shevardnadze had described of seven months or so it was not at all clear that the U.S. would deliver any supplies. We would, however, reserve the right to do so. These were the kinds of considerations the Secretary would like to get Shevardnadze's feel for.

SHEVARDNADZE said it would not be possible to just invent something here in Washington. The Soviets had no desire to criticize the U.S.'s discharge of its obligations to Pakistan. As for American military assistance to groups opposing the Kabul government, that Moscow would criticize. The U.S. frequently criticized Soviet military assistance. The ministers could discuss this kind of thing. But to go beyond that and decide what might happen if Pakistan supplies the resistance would lead nowhere.

THE SECRETARY said he had asked a different question. Pakistan would not supply anything. The U.S. would provide any assistance. But since it was most practical for U.S. aid to go through Pakistan, questions would emerge in response not to what the U.S. did, but what it said, if we accepted the formula the Soviet side had proposed. It would be one thing for Moscow to criticize the U.S. It would be another if Pakistan were criticized. It would help for Shevardnadze to say the Soviet Union would say nothing, at least not until an actual act of supply had occured.

After a lengthy pause, SHEVARDNADZE said that if there were no actual act of supply, there would be no reason for Moscow to invent one.

THE SECRETARY said, "Thank you."

SHEVARDNADZE added, "If there is no supply." The document the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were to sign made no reference to arms supplies. The issue was simply not covered.

ARMACOST pointed out that the instrument of guarantee in Geneva committed the guarantors to respect the undertakings of the high contracting parties. That was why the U.S. had to be concerned about Pakistan's position. A lawyer would argue that, to the degree the contracting parties have undertaken not to supply, the guarantors were involved. That was why the U.S. was suggesting a moratorium.

ADAMISHIN asked for a clarification. It was his understanding that the Soviet side was being asked not to criticize not a statement, but only actual provision of supplies. His question was: "Whose statement?"

THE SECRETARY asked what if the U.S. were to say it would support "as needed" those it had supported.

ADAMISHIN said that would be a U.S. statement, not the Pakistani statement.

THE SECRETARY speculated that Pakistan might say that it had noted the U.S. statement, and supported the U.S. in that statement.

ADAMISHIN posed a second question: would the statements be made before or after signing? And, in the second case, would the statements be seen as an interpretation of the Geneva accords? Obviously, if the statements were made before signing in Geneva, it would sound one way; if after, another.

THE SECRETARY asked Adamishin to explain. ADAMISHIN said it would make a difference in how Moscow responded.

THE SECRETARY explained that if the U.S. did what he had described, and it would be difficult for us to do so, we would say that we intended to act as a guarantor of the Geneva accords. We would say further that we felt that continuing support for those we had been supporting was consistent with our role as guarantor. So the question of a violation would not arise. If asked, we would say that the people we supported were not covered by the accords' definition of "mercenaries," etc, since they were fighting for the freedom of Afghanistan.

ADAMISHIN interrupted to comment that, from what the Secretary was saying, it appeared that such a statement would be made before signature.

THE SECRETARY said that, when the U.S. said it would sign, it would make a statement about what it intended to do. We had major problems on this issue with Congress. The Secretary had just gotten off the phone with Sen. Byrd, who had expressed concern that the Secretary was going to give away Afghanistan. So we needed a posture we could defend. As he had said at the outset, however, the Secretary was talking about how to present what was taking place, not what would really be taking place.

POWELL observed that, if the U.S. signed and the accords were in place, the first question from Congress would be, "Does that mean we will stop aid?" We would say, "Only if the Soviet Union does." If the Soviet Union continued, we would continue. The Soviet side, Powell speculated, would criticize the U.S. statement, but not allege a violation of the Geneva accords.

The next questions would be, "If the U.S. continues arms supplies, or has to resume supplies, and if U.S. aid can only go through Pakistan, what will the Soviet reaction be if Pakistan agrees to allow such aid to transit its territory?" It was Powell's understanding that the Soviet Union would not only criticize such a decision by Pakistan, but would allege a violation.

BESSMERTNYKH clarified that the formula discussed by Armacost and Adamishin did not provide for symmetry between U.S. and Soviet obligations. The concept was not appropriate, because the situations were not analagous. To try to say that the U.S. would supply the opposition if the Soviet Union supplied the government of Afghanistan would be to add a new element to the formula. The Soviet formula contained no linkage to supplies.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. was talking about a unilateral statement. We would say we were prepared to resume supplies, and that our readiness to take that step would be affected by what the Soviet Union did. That implied no undertaking by the Soviet side. It was a unilateral view.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the discussion had shown there were only two ways to resolve the problem.

The first was based on the fact that the Geneva accords imposed no obligations on guarantors not to supply arms. There was thus no need for the U.S. and Soviet Union to discuss the matter. If the U.S. wanted to supply the resistance, it should do it. The Soviet side would not be "consultants" as to how that should be done. It was not in Soviet interests for the aid to continue. How the U.S. provided aid was its business. For public opinion purposes, the U.S. could simply point out that Geneva did not deal with arms supplies by guarantors.

A second option was for the U.S. to refrain from signing in Geneva. This was a bad option, but could not be ruled out. A document signed in Geneva on a three-way basis would involve the Soviet Union only insofar as it addressed troop withdrawals. This was clearly a less satisfactory approach. These were the two options. There was no other way.

THE SECRETARY recalled that Shevardnadze had earlier seemed to suggest that there were circumstances under which it would not allege that Pakistan had violated the Geneva accords, if the U.S. had stated its intentions along the lines the Secretary had described, and Pakistan had endorsed that statement. The Secretary asked if Shevardnadze could elaborate on that, emphasizing that he was trying to distinguish between how the Soviets would react to statements on one hand, and an actual flow of arms on the other.

SHEVARDNADZE responded somewhat testily that he wanted the Secretary to know Moscow was not tied to the Geneva process. If an agreement were signed, that would be good. It not, it would mean that the process of reaching a settlement in Afghanistan would take a different path. But Shevardnadze said he felt that the two sides had come very close to a meeting of the minds. There were still a few days in which to give legal force to something they had been discussing for many years.

Shevardnadze said he had the impression that the U.S. and Pakistan had obtained what they had most wanted from this process -- dates for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Now the U.S. was trying to get more. This tactic would not work. Moscow could have not set dates and continued to bargain. Instead, it had sought to convince the U.S. and Pakistan that it was serious, that it would withdraw. So dates had been set.

The U.S., Shevardnadze alleged, had not really believed that the Soviet Union would get out of Afghanistan. As a result, it had not adequately studied the drafts when they were being prepared in Geneva. It was too late for second thoughts. To try now to nullify the accords would lead nowhere. If the U.S. wanted to continue to supply the resistance, it could go ahead, since this was not covered by the Geneva documents. In practical terms, how the U.S. did this was its problem. The Soviets knew how to get their troops out of Afghanistan. How the U.S. got arms in was up to it. But the question had to be settled today, now. That was the direction Shevardnadze thought their conversation in Moscow -- and previous conversations -- was leading.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that there had been a lot of discussion on Afghanistan. That discussion had included the need for a balanced outcome. We welcomed the steps which had been taken thus far. We wanted to see the Geneva process come to fruition. But we also wanted to be in a position to avoid political turmoil here which would have an adverse impact on that process. Were we to say that nothing in the accords prevented us from continuing to support those we had supported, and that we intended to do so, we would expect the Soviet Union to criticize that statement, but not to charge that it violated the accords.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet Union would not invoke the accords under such a scenario.

THE SECRETARY said that there also had to be clarity when the question was asked as to how this affected Pakistan. If Pakistan were to state that they supported our statement, and would cooperate with us if it were necessary to resume aid, we understood that, to use Shevardnadze's words, the Soviet Union wouldn't have to "invent" anything. In effect, Moscow would criticize Pakistan's statement, but not say Pakistan had violated the accords.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Pakistan was bound by the accords not to supply the opposition. That did not apply to the guarantors. It was up to the U.S. to decide what intermediaries it used to supply aid to the resistance. But it should realize there would be efficient monitoring mechanisms, including UN inspectors, to ensure Pakistan did not supply arms. That, however, had no relation to the U.S.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to recognize that the Soviet Union had already made very substantial concessions. General Secretary Gorbachev himself had said that the U.S. should cut off supplies to the resistance once the Soviet Union had made its decision to withdraw. Shevardnadze did not want to dwell on the matter, but this was an important statement by the leader of the Soviet Union. Now the Soviet position was quite different: the U.S. could supply the opposition, and the Soviet Union would not claim a violation, although it would criticize such action.

THE SECRETARY suggested a caucus. He moved to his private office, accompanied by Powell, Armacost, Ridgway and Parris.

After a ten-minute break, the Secretary and his advisors returned. THE SECRETARY outlined the U.S. position in light of the previous discussion.

The U.S. welcomed, he said, the steps which had been taken toward a settlement of situation in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country. We felt there was a clear understanding that these objectives were close to being achieved. We also believed, however, that any negotiated outcome must provide for a balance of obligations among its signatories. It was also most important that conditions be created during the withdrawal period and thereafter which would ensure the safe and honorable return to Afghanistan of refugees. In this context, the U.S. welcomed the agreement under which Cordovez would work in a private capacity to mediate among the various Afghan parties on interim government arrangements.

Under these circumstances, the Secretary continued, the U.S. felt it important for all parties -- the U.S., Soviet Union, and others -- to agree to a moratorium on arms shipments. The moratorium would initially run for the period during which Soviet forces would be withdrawn, and for three months thereafter. It could be extended if, as all the Afghan parties had called for, agreement could be reached on a neutral status for Afghanistan.

The U.S. side had proposed such a moratorium during the course of the morning's discussion. The Soviet side had said it could not agree. Our proposal remained on the table. Under the circumstances the Secretary had described, the U.S. was prepared to assume the responsibility of guarantor of the Geneva accords. In the absence of such arrangements, we would not be able to undertake those obligations.

ARMACOST added that acceptance by either side of the U.S. moratorium proposal would be without prejudice to its rights to supply arms to parties in Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY said this was an important point. Acceptance of a moratorium would be without prejudice to any rights held by either side. It would be an act designed with the best interests of Afghanistan in mind.

The Secretary said that, while he could not speak for Pakistan, he knew that the Pakistanis, like ourselves, wanted to see Geneva signed.

After a lengthy pause, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers move on to the next regional issue. "On the basis which you have indicated, it will not be possible to reach agreement."

After a further pause, Shevardnadze asked what the consequences of such an arrangement would be. The negotiations in Geneva were between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They could continue. Everything that had to do with the Soviet Union had already been stated, and declared acceptable by Pakistan and Afghanistan. If Pakistan was prepared to sign, the accords could be concluded without guarantors. There was nothing tragic about that. If there was no signature at all, that, too, would not be so terrible.

Central America

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze wished to take up Central America. SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers had discussed the basic elements of that issue Monday evening.

THE SECRETARY offered to describe the situation as the U.S. saw it. Over the previous seven or eight years there had been steady movement toward more openness and democracy among most f the governments of the region. The U.S. had welcomed this trend. All of the countries involved were relatively poor. Their traditions were more feudal than militaristic.

In Nicaragua, there was a different pattern, although we saw some prospect for positive change. Nicaragua was like its neighbours in being a small, poor country. It was unique in that its government was seeking to develop a centralized, more totalitarian form. That government was putting into place a military force triple the size of any other country in the region. The ultimate scope of Nicaragua's military plans had been revealed by a senior defector and, incredibly, confirmed by Nicaragua's Defense Minister. All of this was taking place against a backdrop of massive Soviet military support -- support which remained at a level of a quarter billion dollars this year, despite the conclusion of the Guatemala City agreement. This was a massive sum by Central American standards, and there was no sign that the flow of supplies was decreasing.

In the Guatemala City accords, Nicaragua had committed itself to a pattern of internal development consistent with an open, democratic society. The standards set in these accords were frankly higher than those prevailing in the Soviet Union today, despite words like glasnost.

Unfortunately, the trends in Nicaragua seemed to be retrogressing, particularly in the wake of the House of Representatives' cut-off of aid to freedom fighters. Nicaragua had recently moved 1,500-2,000 troops into Honduras in an apparent effort to wipe out the freedom fighters and their supply sources. The attempt had failed, because the freedom fighters had given a good account of themselves, because of the outrage the action had provoked in the region, and because the U.S. had responded to Honduras' request for a show of support. As the Secretary had indicated on Monday, our forces would probably begin returning home over the weekend.

It had not escaped our notice that the Soviet Union maintained an aircraft in Nicaragua -- ostensibly for mapping purposes. We knew, however, that that aircraft was being used for aerial reconnaisance to provide tactical intelligence for Sandinist counterinsurgency operations. Such activities by the Soviet Union on the eve of ceasefire talks between the freedom fighters and Managua was hardly in keeping with Soviet calls for reduction of tension in the region and implementation of the Guatemala City accords -- one feature of which was the ceasefire talks. Those talks were continuing, and the initial reports were positive. But there was never an agreement until there was an agreement. We would await the results.

The policy of the U.S. was to support the Guatemala City accords; to support the ceasefire negotiations; to join other countries in insisting that Nicaragua meet its obligations under the accords; and to be ready for direct talks with Managua in a regional setting.

When Gorbachev had been in Washington, he had said that the Soviet Union also supported the Guatemala City accords. He had also said something which apparently he had repeated to Senator Nunn and others when they were in Moscow -- that the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce military assistance to Nicaragua to the level of police weapons if the U.S. did not supply arms to the freedom fighters. If the Soviet side were really interested in such an undertaking, we would welcome the opportunity to explore it. It was an observable fact that the U.S. was not currently providing assistance to the fighters.

In short, the Secretary concluded, the U.S. wanted to see Central America removed from the list of trouble spots, an area of greater stability, whose citizens would be free to get about the business of improving their economic well-being. He could assure Shevardnadze that in the context of implementation of the Guatemala City accords, and with the behaviour Moscow had volunteered, we were prepared to talk to the Nicaraguans in a regional setting, and to work with the nations of the region, including Nicaragua, to improve economic conditions.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that the Soviet delegation had made clear during the Washington summit its support for the Contadora process, later the Contadora group and its support group, and finally the Guatemala City agreement. Moscow felt that these efforts provided the right basis for a settlement of the problems of Central America.

Unfortunately, not everything resolved in Guatemala City had been implemented. And this was not the fault of Nicaragua. Shevardnadze recalled the steps already taken by the Sandinist government: it had taken the initiative to engage in negotiations on a ceasefire; it had been the first in the region to establish a commission on national reconciliation. Looked at objectively, much had been done to advance democratization in Nicaragua. The media had been opened to the opposition on an equal basis. Nicaragua had taken the initiative at the UN to ask for monitoring/inspection of the Nicaragua - Honduras border.

Nicaragua's "solid" military forces, Shevardnadze explained, were a function of its needs. If a country did not feel threatened, it would obviously prefer to devote scarce resources to its economic development. The situation around Nicaragua was such that it did not have this luxury, and this was largely the result of U.S. policy. The U.S. appeared to be "organically incompatible" with the Sandinist regime. This was totally inappropriate. What did the U.S. have against Nicaragua's government? How were they a threat to the U.S.? Did Nicaragua need Honduran territory? No. Were it not for the bands of extremists fighting the current government, the countries of Central America would have found a solution to these problems long ago.

Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that he had already said the U.S.'s despatch of troops to Honduras was inappropriate. But the decision was America's. It was not for Moscow to order the U.S. about. But the action was totally unjustified and had caused alarm not only in the region, but around the world. But the U.S. appeared to think that this was its personal hemisphere and it could do what it wanted.

But where was the solution?, Shevardnadze asked. The U.S. could not strangle the Nicaraguan revolution. It was the people's struggle. It was bigger than Nicaragua. The only way out was to engage in direct dialogue with Nicaragua -- and Cuba, too. Unfortunately, it appeared that some Administration officials still hewed to the old, notorious policy of trying to establish an order acceptable to the U.S. in every country and in every region of the world. The U.S. had complained about Soviet shipment of arms to Nicaragua. On what basis did the U.S. ship arms to Pakistan? The U.S. did not even stop at shipping arms to governments close to the Soviet Union's borders. It aided groups fighting legitimate government all over the globe. Why should the Soviet Union not supply a government which was represented in the UN and was universally recognized.

THE SECRETARY asked to interject some comments on the U.S.'s relations with the government of Nicaragua. When the Sandinist revolution took place, the U.S. had supported it. We had welcomed Somoza's ouster. We were quick to provide economic assistance to the new regime, assistance which, on a per capita basis, had been the highest of any of our aid programs. But the revolution had gone sour. The proof of that was that many of the people who had made the revolution left Nicaragua, or were forced to leave. So we had to shift our policy.

Even then, some years later, in response to recommendations by many countries, but notably Mexico, the President had authorized the Secretary to go to Managua and talk to Ortega. Bilateral talks had been set up to support the Contadora process. There were a series of meetings in Manzanilla. But we soon found that Nicaragua was going to other governments adn saying that it would not deal with them because it was working directly with the U.S. We had been forced to break off talks,

although we said we would resume them in a regional context. We had reaffirmed that position with the conclusion of the Guatemala City accords. We wanted to encourage the success of the accords, and of the ceasefire, so that the region could focus on economic development.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that that was needed. But he felt the Secretary was ignoring one fundamental issue -- neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could tell Nicaragua or any other people how they should live. This was what the U.S. was trying to do. It did not like the Managua government, so it kept raising additional requirements. The Nicaraguan people had established an order of their own.

As for Soviet arms supplies, the General Secretary had told the President that both countries should refrain on a mutual basis from providing arms. That offer remained on the table. If the U.S. was prepared to stop supplying arms to all Central American countries, so was the Soviet Union. The only exception would be police-type arms, which could continue to be provided. If the U.S. were interested, the idea could be explored further.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. had long-standing relationships with the countries of Central America, some of which involved the supply of military assistance for purposes of keeping order. The most obvious case was El Salvador, where there was a guerilla movement supported by Nicaragua and Cuba. This forced the Salvadoran government to maintain a larger military than they would like. We could not cut off those who were simply seeking to maintain order in their country in the face of a challenge from Nicaragua and Cuba.

As for Nicaragua, there was no U.S. assistance flowing to those opposed to the government. Even over the past few years, what aid had been provided was relatively little.

SHEVARDNADZE said the Secretary's logic was odd. The Secretary called those fighting against the Nicaraguan government "freedom fighters." He used the same term to describe those opposed to the governments of Afghanistan and Angola. Those who opposed the regimes he liked were bad people. There was an inconsistency here.

As for arms supplies, if Gorbachev's proposal was acceptable, why not get down to discussions on that basis? If it was not, the Soviet Union would meet the obligations it had to Nicaragua, just as the U.S. met its obligations to many of the Soviet Union's neighbours. Moscow didn't complain about that. Why should the U.S. The U.S. had ringed the Soviet Union with bases -- big bases, and lots of them. Yazov had shown Carlucci a map the week before. When Shevardnadze had seen the map, it had frightened him.

THE SECRETARY said that all our forces were for defensive purposes. Besides, the Soviet Union was so big, it was hard not to surround it.

SHEVARDNADZE said it would cost the U.S. a lot to do so. But there were some good trends that the two sides should try to take advantage of. That was why Shevardnadze had raised the question of limiting naval activities the day before.

SHEVARDNADZE said Moscow really had no desire to arm Nicaragua if that country were not threatened. He proposed the two sides discuss the matter and see whether some mutually acceptable solution could not be found. He assured the Secretary that Moscow was not getting rich by providing weapons to Managua. It would welcome the opportunity to stop.

THE SECRETARY noted that there was now a good rationale -- the U.S. was no longer sending arms to those we had formerly supported in Nicaragua. That should remove the need for Soviet arms supplies.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what about Honduras.

THE SECRETARY said that was a different question. Honduras was not invading Nicaragua.

SHEVARDNADZE asked where the contras were based. How were they armed, trained? Honduras was not rich enough to do that. There was a need for mutuality.

THE SECRETARY underscored that there was no aid going to the freedom fighters, wherever they were. Honduras was indeed in no shape to supply anyone. It was a poor country.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Honduran weapons were good, modern. Some said they looked much like American weapons. But there was no need to get specific.

Regional Dialogue

Recalling a point Shevardnadze had made on an earlier occasion, THE SECRETARY said he sometimes thought our regional dialogue with the Soviet Union would be more productive if there were a different approach. Some headway had been made as a result of experts discussions on the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, and Afghanistan.

SHEVARDNADZE interrupted to say with some feeling that there had been no progress on Afghanistan. If asked at the conclusion of their meeting what had been achieved on that subject, Shevardnadze would say that it had been impossible to find common language, that no positive elements had emerged from the discussion.

THE SECRETARY replied that what he had in mind was to try to focus on what we would like to see in certain regions in, e.g., 1995 or 2000. It would not be too difficult to define emerging trends. It would be interesting and potentially fruitful to discuss their implications for U.S. - Soviet relations.

Following further elaboration by the Secretary of this concept, SHEVARDNADZE agreed that such an approach might have merit, but pointed out that certain problems had to be addressed now. Otherwise any plans which might be developed would be in vain.

Apparently in this context, Shevardnadze said he was reminded of the relationship between the problems of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. The Soviet Union had been true to its word in both cases. The Soviets had said what they would do, and had made clear they would follow through on any obligations they had assumed, even where it would be difficult for them. But, on Afghanistan, the U.S. had pulled back from its commitments. It had not been as good as its word. This was not a tragedy, but the point had to be made.

The Secretary in his comments on improving the regional dialogue had referred to the Soviet Union's providing missiles to Iraq. It was a fact that Moscow provided arms to Iraq. No one complained about it because it was done on a legal basis.

THE SECRETARY said he had not meant to complain about Soviet arms supplies to Iraq. He only wanted to make the point that ballistic missile proliferation was occurring.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, even if the Soviet Union voted for an embargo on arms to Iran, it was not certain the U.S. would not itself arm Iran. That was the way things were in the U.S. The Secretary of State said one thing; other members of the Administration did something else.

THE SECRETARY said that the earlier U.S. attempt to provide arms to Iran was a misguided enterprise. Its scale was inconsequential. It would not be repeated.

SHEVARDNADZE said there was no guarantee of this. The whole administration had been involved. This was not just a private firm. One of Powell's predecessors had been intimately involved.

THE SECRETARY said that the discussion was going downhill. If the ministers started down this path it would lead nowhere.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that there was a fundamental question involved. When the Soviet Union was considering what to do about a second UN resolution on the Gulf war, one reason for its delay was uncertainty as to whether the U.S., or some private firm sponsored by the U.S. , would not supply arms to Iran. Shevardnadze was still not sure.

THE SECRETARY said that, under the circumstances, he could not believe Shevardnadze was saying this.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had believed the Secretary until that afternoon, until they had discussed Afghanistan. Now his confidence was shaken. There were certain norms in any business, including "this one." But Shevardnadze would drop the subject.

Afghanistan

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. had played it straight on Afghanistan. We had made known our concerns on what we called "symmetry" for some time. This was not a new idea.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the U.S. wanted the Soviet Union to abandon its friends, friends to whom Moscow was linked by legitimate relations. The U.S. wanted to equate the government of Afghanistan to fundamentalist bands. "We can't accept that. You have put forward demands that are unacceptable."

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. had listened carefully to the concerns the Soviet side had expressed, just as, we hoped, Shevardnadze had listened to us. We had tried to put out an idea which got to the Soviet problem. The Secretary did not see why it would be so difficult for Moscow to supply Kabul with what it needed before an agreement entered into force. We had tried to respect the Soviet need to preserve the right to be able to supply the Kabul regime. We had not challenged that. We had tried to come up with a solution consistent with that. We had tried to work with Adamishin's formula. We had not been able to find language which did the job. We were still ready to seek formulae which could describe what both sides wanted to see happen.

SHEVARDNADZE said his conclusion was that the U.S. would remain outside the Afghan settlement process. The U.S. would not be able to give orders to Pakistan. The Soviets knew the Pakistanis would make their own decisions. It was up to the U.S. to say what it would do.

THE SECRETARY confirmed that Pakistan would make its own decisions. The U.S., for its part, was ready to sign in Geneva, but subject to finding a formula which would be workable. We had tried to fit such a formula into Adamishin's proposal. We had tried out the idea of a moratorium. The Soviet Union traditionally favored moratoria. What was wrong with one in this case?

SHEVARDNADZE replied that he could give the Secretary a long list of Soviet moratorium proposals that the U.S. had derided.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Shevardnadze offer one on Afghanistan. Or perhaps the Kabul government, which had stated its desire that Afghanistan be neutral, could, with the comfort provided by Soviet weapons provided prior to entry into force of the Geneva accords, might itself call for a moratorium. The Soviet Union and the U.S. could honor that appeal.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had come to Washington well prepared to deal with this issue. He had had extensive consultations with those dealing with Pakistan and Afghanistan on Afghanistan questions. If he saw options other than those he had proposed, he would have given them to the Secretary.

But there was no need to dwell on the question. Shevardnadze understood that the U.S. would not act as a guarantor for the Geneva accords. Accordingly, the Soviet Union would not either. The process would proceed on a different basis. There was no need to add new language; it was simply a matter of deleting. So, what was next, Shevardnadze asked.

Cambodia/Korea

THE SECRETARY suggested Cambodia. Sihanouk was an asset with respect to a settlement there, because he was someone the people could rally around. The key, however, remained for Vietnam to leave Cambodia.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that there were certain positive elements. The dialogue between Sihanouk and Hun Sen was very important. Sihanouk certainly supplied a certain prestige. He was occasionally ridden by doubts and hesitations, but who wasn't? The situation was complicated, but the issues of a political settlement and national reconciliation were proceeding in a positive way in the context of the Sihanouk - Hun Sen dialogue.

As for Vietnam, its course was clear. By 1990 it would have withdrawn its troops. The process was already underway; a substantial number was already out. The Vietnamese had their own plan. There was no reason for anyone else to interfere. Sihanouk himself, Shevardnadze speculated, might have an interest in seeing certain issues resolved before the Vietnamese left. Among them: questions relating to Cambodia's governmental and national structure; relations between the opposing parties; and China's attitude. Until China's attitude were clear, one could not speak with confidence on prospects for a settlement.

ASEAN was also playing an important role, Shevardnadze said, particularly Indonesia. The Vietnamese dialogue with Thailand was less fruitful, although Shevardnadze had heard some interesting things in his talks with the Thai foreign minister. Perhaps there were prospects in this area as well.

So, Shevardnadze concluded, there were some positive trends. But much depended on how the Afghanistan problem turned out. Afghanistan was the first time there was a real opportunity for the U.S. and Soviet Union to resolve a major regional issue. If national reconciliation proved to be an effective basis for a settlement, it would have a positive impact on prospects for solutions to the problems of Cambodia, southern Africa and elsewhere. Shevardnadze knew first-hand that the leaders of Afghanistan and Cambodia considered the trends in their two countries to be related.

Shevardnadze emphasized that it was the task of the great powers to encourage national reconciliation. This was sometimes difficult. But the choice boiled down to encouraging national reconciliation or encouraging civil wars. Afghanistan was the touchstone.

As for Korea, the ministers in Moscow had talked about the proposals which Kim Il Sung had asked Gorbachev to convey at the Washington summit. These were thoughtful proposals which warranted serious consideration. Shevardnadze did not rule out that South Korea might also come forward with serious proposals. If this happened, they, too, could be considered.

On a more general plane, Shevardnadze called for a broader U.S. - Soviet dialogue on Asia and the Pacific. The Secretary was aware of the Soviet Vladivostok proposals. The Soviet side knew of the U.S. reaction to some of those proposals; some elements of the U.S. position were by no means unacceptable. The Australian government had also had some good ideas. Could the U.S. and Soviet Union not seek to harness emerging trends and ideas in this vast area to formulate a mutually acceptable platform -- like they were already doing in the Middle East? This was an area which should not be ignored. Perhaps there could be a reference to this idea in the joint statement.

THE SECRETARY said it would be good to discuss Pacific issues.

On Korea, the Secretary noted that there was a new President in Seoul, whose popular mandate gave him a stronger power base. He was still sorting out his domestic program. Once national assembly elections were over, he would have a freer hand for foreign affairs. He clearly had a bolder approach than his predecessor to dealing with the North. Once South Korea's political transition was sorted out, he would be inclined to do things. Of course the Olympic Games were currently claiming all of the South's attention.

Southern Africa

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that Adamishin report on his Monday discussion of southern Africa with Asst. Sec. Crocker.

ADAMISHIN said that his talks with Crocker had revealed broad agreement on the theoretical plane, which, however broke down on questions of tactics. Both sides, for example, were opposed to apartheid. But the U.S. was not prepared to make a joint statement on recent anti-democratic moves by South Africa. Both sides wanted South Africa out of Angola, but disagreed over how this should be brought about.

Adamishin said that the most important segment of the experts' talks had to do with the U.S. - Angolan - Cuban talks. Adamishin had made clear that Moscow supported the talks and was by no means opposed to U.S. mediation efforts. But the Soviet Union strongly supported the positions Angola had taken in the discussions thus far. Adamishin's impression was that the U.S. was seeking the maximum number of concessions, particularly with respect to a Cuban troop withdrawal, without offering anything in return. Specifically, the U.S. had made clear it would not end aid to UNITA.

Both sides, Adamishin concluded, felt that the discussions were useful, and should continue.

THE SECRETARY asked to comment. Adamishin was right: both the U.S. and Soviet Union deplored apartheid. We wanted a different situation in South Africa. We had made that plain. Our own relations with South Africa were strained, although they existed.

We saw significant potential for movement on the complex of issues related to Angola, Namibia and a Cuban troop withdrawal. So, apparently, did the South Africans. Botha had recently asked to meet with Crocker; and a meeting had taken place in Geneva. So hoped to keep that dialogue open.

There was greater fluidity in the situation. If national reconciliation could get underway in Angola, it could contribute to the removal of both Cuban and South African forces from that country. That, in turn, would open up the Benguela railroad, which could have an enormous economic impact in the region. Savimbi was a genuinely popular leader, enjoying the support of 40% of Angola's population. He did not seek a military victory; he favored national reconciliation. Many African leaders were also in favor of reconciliation in Angola. Perhaps parallel demarches in African capitals to this effect would contribute to the process.

As for a Cuban troop withdrawal and Resolution 235, what we were calling for was not unilateral concessions, but putting together a package which would be credible enough to engage South Africa's attention. South Africa at least rhetorically was committed to implementation of 235 under the right circumstances. And, of course, once Namibia had gained its independence, Angola would be cut off from South Africa.

The Secretary noted that, on the other side of the continent, the U.S. was supporting the Chissano government, along with the Soviet Union. While some in the U.S. favored supporting RENAMO, that was not the Secretary's policy, or the President's. We would welcome reinvigoration of the Nkomate accords. If the situation in Mozambique could be brought under control, the Beira corridor could be reopened. In conjunction with the reopening of the Benguela railroad, the economic impact of such a development would be important.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had once commented on the potential importance of regional groupings to the resolution of local conflicts. We agreed. Southern Africa was an area where the concept could be given a chance to work. Setting local transportation systems back on their feet could make a major contribution. So these were some of the ideas we had on southern Africa. Some might be appropriate for parallel or joint efforts.

SHEVARDNADZE said that parallel efforts were probably most appropriate. Our consultations on southern Africa had nonetheless produced good results and should be continued.

Shevardnadze cautioned that national reconciliation was at a different stage in southern Africa than in such areas as Afghanistan or Cambodia. In those areas, conditions were ripe

for solutions. It was still early in Africa. It was not possible to force the process. There were some ideas on the table which could be studied. The African states, for example, had suggested a UNSC meeting. Perhaps this could be supported, although Shevardnadze didn't want to make any commitments at this point. It might prove useful in focusing public attention on the problem.

Cyprus

Shevardnadze noted that he and the Secretary had not in the past discussed Cyprus. But there had been requests from both the current and previous Cypriot governments that the problem be taken up in U.S. - Soviet bilateral discussions. Shevardnadze did not want to get into details, but there were some interesting ideas, e.g. for an international conference. Perhaps the U.S. and Soviet Union could do something to revive the process of finding a solution.

THE SECRETARY said he would think about it. It seemed to him that the most interesting thing going on with respect to Cyprus was the developing dialogue between Greece and Turkey. If their relations improved, it could have an important impact on the situation in Cyprus.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed. Intercommunal differences on the island would no doubt continue, but there were some positive factors: the Greek-Turkish dialogue; new leadership among the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Perhaps some way could be found to engage.

Bilateral Issues

After determining that joint statements were not yet ready for the ministers' review, THE SECRETARY touched briefly on bilateral issues. He said he particularly wanted to endorse the U.S. proposal that cultural centers be established in Moscow and Washington, and that an announcement be made at the summit. We were prepared to move ahead in this area, and were ready for detailed discussions if there were interest on the Soviet side.

Shevardnadze nodded in acknowledgement.

Working Group Reports

The Ministers then decided that, as the joint statement was still being prepared, they should hear from working groups. Nitze and Obukhov were summoned, and Obukhov briefly summarized the results of the Nuclear and Space group s discussions.

The thrust of OBUKHOV's opening remarks was that the U.S. had insisted on language which had nothing to do with the Washington Summit statement, which ministers had agreed in Moscow should be the basis for a new agreement on observance of the ABM Treaty. SHEVARDNADZE asked if that meant that nothing had been achieved in this area. OBUKHOV said that the issue had been discussed both in the working group and by Kampelman and Karpov. Obukhov was not informed on the outcome of their

discussions.

NITZE challenged Obukhov's presentation of the subject, noting that the real problem was that the Washington Summit Statement language was never intended to be a self-standing agreement. A formal agreement would require greater specificity as to the meaning on "non-withdrawal." It would also have to deal with issues like the supreme national interest clause, and what should happen at the end of the non-withdrawal period. So a number of questions remained on which work had to be done.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that there were also verification questions to be addressed. There seemed to have been some headway, but more was needed. We had some ideas on how to reduce ambiguity. NITZE said that our proposal on space sensors was one such idea.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Nitze what he meant by "sensors." Nitze briefly explained the concept.

OBUKHOV noted that the Soviet side had just received the U.S. proposal. It would require expert analysis and assessment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the key was to determine what should would take place during the withdrawal period. The Soviet side thought that should be compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the two sides could agree on this, it would make open the field to progress across the board.

THE SECRETARY noted that that was the virtue of trying to work from a joint draft text. As had proven the case in other areas, such a device forced negotiators to identify for ministers where the problems lay. This could be done for the April meeting.

SHEVARDNADZE said this could be considered. But the important thing was not the text itself, but knowing where the differences lay. The bottom line was that the present visit had added nothing to what had been achieved during the Washington summit. If anything, the situation was less clear. So, work should continue.

THE SECRETARY agreed, but on the basis of a joint text. SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet delegation didn't consider that a useful idea. OBUKHOV explained that the U.S. text would "drown" the principles which had been agreed to in Washington. Perhaps the U.S. could provide a revised text, which dropped the additional points. NITZE noted that the U.S. text contained all of the elements of the Washington Statement, as well as other elements we considered necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE said he disagreed with something Nitze had said earlier -- that the Washington statement was only "communique language." Rather, it should be seen as the basis for everything. THE SECRETARY pointed out that Nitze had said the Washington Statement language was incorporated into the U.S. text, adding that it did not provide adequate clarity. We had provided some ideas on how to achieve that.

"OK," SHEVARDNADZE said, "let's work on a joint document." But that was not the solution. It could not be recorded that progress had been made. NITZE noted that agreement to work a joint draft text was progress. THE SECRETARY said that, whether it was progress or not, it should be done. He agreed with Shevardnadze that, on the whole, little had been achieved. SHEVARDNADZE said that the two sides had gotten nowhere, and asked Obukhov to continue his report.

When Obukhov had finished, Shevardnadze asked him where, in the Soviet working group's view, there had been progress during the visit. OBUKHOV said that there had been some movement on ALCM's, in that the U.S. had revised upward its proposals for a counting rule. This did not solve the problem, since, in the Soviet view, the only realistic rule was the maximum number for which bombers could be configured, but the U.S. move suggested that this issue could ultimately be resolved. While there had been no definitive progress on the SLCM question, the U.S. had agreed to intensify experts discussions on verification questions, and this, too, was a step forward.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if there had been a discussion of the detailed proposals the Soviet side had made on SLCM verification. OBUKHOV said that the Soviet side had made a thorough presentation, that the U.S. had asked a number of questions, and that Nitze had raised no objections. From this, Obukhov assumed that the Soviet ideas would be studied. NITZE interjected that he had said the proposals would be studied. He had made no commitments.

THE SECRETARY asked if any brackets had been eliminated in the texts prepared to date. NITZE said Hamner felt it would be possible to remove some brackets. SHEVARDNADZE said that, as best he could tell, there had been no serious movement on NST. If the other groups had done no better, it was not clear there would be anything for the ministers to review in April.

Nitze and Obukhov were then dismissed, and Holmes and Palenykh summoned to report on the nuclear testing group's discussion.

Following their statements, THE SECRETARY asked how long it would take to complete a technical verification protocol after the JVE had been conducted. HOLMES said that remained to be seen, but that the JVE was being designed to minimize the gap. SHEVARDNADZE asked what there would be to sign in Moscow if there were no JVE results. Palenykh admitted that, without such results, it would be premature to sign anything. That was why the JVE was necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Palenykh to confirm his understanding that, without conducting the JVE, there would be no documents to sign in Moscow. Assuming ideal conditions, how much time would it take to prepare the necessary documents once a JVE had been conducted?

PALENYKH said that the JVE could be conducted by the end of May. The results would be available perhaps a week later. For

more substantive analysis, more time would be required. SHEVARDNADZE said that this was an important consideration for the ministers, because it bore on what could be signed at a summit.

THE SECRETARY said that Palenykh had provided a technically perfect answer. If we conducted enough tests, eventually we would know all there was to know about the subject. The question was, at what point would we know enough to be able to establish something, knowing that the situation could shift as we proceeded? We felt that it would be pssible to develop a protocol without first conducting a JVE. We wouldn't know everything, but we would know enough.

HOLMES noted that the U.S. felt that no JVE was necessary to complete a protocol on the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). The Soviets were considering this idea. If they agreed, the protocol could be signed in Moscow, although its submission for advice and consent would have to await agreement on a satisfactory protocol for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).

PALENYKH pointed out that the Soviet proposal was not to do many experiments. One would be sufficient to provide the data they considered necessary to familiarize themselves with the CORRTEX method proposed by the U.S. But even a single test would require some analysis.

SHEVARDNADZE said to the Secretary that he (Shevardnadze) had explored after the ministers' last meeting whether or not it would be possible to prepare testing protocols without conducting a JVE. Most of the experts had said it was not.

THE SECRETARY said it was up to the Soviet side. He propsed that the ministers conclude their discussion of testing. We would do it the Soviet way, even though that meant there would probably be nothing to sign at the summit.

Palenykh departed, to be replaced by Nazarkin. At the Secretary's invitation, HOLMES read a short agreed statement on the results of the CW working group's discussions. NAZARKIN then read a much longer "personal" comment on the talks, one element of which focused on the alleged U.S. insistence on a right to refuse challenge inspections of private facilities.

Asked by THE SECRETARY if this was correct, HOLMES indicated that the problem was how to define what facilities were "relevant." Privately owned facilities, as such, were not the problem. THE SECRETARY noted that the "relevant" problem would apply to government-owned, as well as to privately-owned facilities.

A brief discussion of CW verification questions followed, after which Nazarkin and Holmes departed, to be replaced by Grinevskiy and EUR/RPM Deputy Director Moffet.

Asked to proceed, GRINEVSKIY reported that it had not been possible to agree on a joint report. He described objections

raised by the U.S. to the Soviet proposal for an exchange of data on conventional forces in Europe.

THE SECRETARY said he would like to comment on that. Every effort was being made in Vienna to complete the mandate for conventional discussions. We were also insisting upon a balanced outcome to the Vienna meeting. It was not possible simply to leapfrog that process to, in effect, begin discussions of conventional arms in Europe before Vienna had concluded. The Soviet proposal would have that effect. Moreover, our experience in the MBFR negotiations was that years could be spent arguing about data. Ultimately, we had had to try a different approach altogether. We would of course take up the Soviet proposal with our allies, but saw little to comment it.

MOFFET noted that the U.S. had reiterated in the working group its opposition to a reference in any conventional mandate to dual-capable systems. We had also expressed reservations with respect to the proposal for discussions on naval activities which Shevardnadze had made the previous day.

Grinevskiy and Moffet were replaced by Simons and Kutovoy, who reported on the results of the bilateral working group.

SIMONS report focused on five sets of negotiations (fisheries, transportation, basic sciences, maritime search and rescue, and cultural exchanges) which could produce documents for signature in Moscow. He noted that the U.S. had handed over draft texts on transportation and basic sciences, and would soon be in a position to provide drafts on exchanges, as well as a draft memorandum on the establishment of cultural centers under the 1985 Exchanges agreement.

KUTOVOY's response noted that there had also been discussion of cooperation in what he termed the more "difficult" areas of AIDS research, trade, energy, and the Arctic.

In response to SHEVARDNADZE's request for clarification as to what agreements might be ready for signature in Moscow, SIMONS again went over the list. SHEVARDNADZE asked if this was a realistic assessment. Both SIMONS and KUTOVOY said it was.

Joint Statement/Final Assessments

At this point, the ministers received copies of the draft joint statements for their review.

After reading the texts, THE SECRETARY expressed regret that the Soviet side had not, as Shevardnadze had earlier indicated, been willing to include a reference to "strong actions" which would be undertaken in the event the UN Secretary General's early April consultations with Iran and Iraq produced no results. SHEVARDNADZE said that such language was not needed, as nothing was said about Afghanistan. THE SECRETARY said, "OK."

The ministers authorized release of the statements.

Reflecting on the results of his visit, SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that if progress continued at this rate there would be no serious documents to sign at the Moscow summit. It was of course possible to meet and talk without signing documents. But it was discouraging that the two ministers and their delegations could meet for two days without accomplishing anything substantive. The statement was a good one, but it contained no specifics.

Shevardnadze suggested that this pointed to the need for particularly thorough preparations before the ministers' next meeting. He would be in favor of removing as many brackets and disagreements as possible.

What then, should be said to the press? Was a press conference really necessary? How would the ministers assess their work?

THE SECRETARY said that he agreed that the visit had not been very productive. He had been asking himself why this should be. In the past, the ministers had dealt more successfully with some very difficult problems. That had not happened this time.

The problems which remained were the hard ones. But the Secretary felt that, with the right spirit on both sides, the ABM issue could be resolved. The ALCM discounting rule also seemed to be resolvable, even if, thus far, it had not proved possible to identify conceptually common ground. The SLCM issue remained tough, but we would look at Soviet suggestions. We thought that a declaration was a realistic way out of the problem; we were not optimistic about being able to verify a limit.

The U.S. desire to limit strategic arms was strong, the Secretary affirmed. The President shared this view. He wanted to get the job done. And the prospect was tantalizing when we looked at how much had been accomplished since the Secretary and Shevardnadze had first met in Helsinki. The difference was like night and day. The two START protocols and MOU which the ministers had commissioned in Moscow had been produced, albeit with lots of brackets. Many of these had to do with technical issues which should yield to further efforts. Others required resolution of broader questions.

The Secretary said he was as discouraged as anything by the failure to accomplish anything in the regional area. He felt that the overall effort we had been making in this area had been soured. Even at the most difficult moments in their relationship, e.g. during the Daniloff affair, he had not felt such a sourness, even though the discussions were tough.

The Secretary said that he had gained the impression from his experience going back to the Nixon administration that there were rythms to the relationship. One of the accomplishments of the past few years had been to atenuate the

swings of the pendelum, while keeping the trend line moving in a generally positive direction. Perhaps the relationship was entering a downward cycle; the Secretary hoped we could pull out of it.

POWELL said that, while both sides obviously would have liked to accomplish more, they knew that they would be dealing with the most difficult questions -- particularly on arms control. Powell agreed that we could work on ALCM's; SLCM's would be harder, even with the new Soviet ideas.

For his part, Powell had been most disappointed over the failure to make progress on the question of the ABM Treaty. We had felt after the Secretary's Moscow visit that there would be movement in this area. Since then, the Soviet side had not engaged. Powell emphasized that steps must be taken to eliminate the ambiguity in the Washington Summit Statement. This was an essential political imperative for the U.S. After the Washington summit, our negotiators had been instructed to use the Statement as the basis for a treaty, not as the text of a treaty itself. This ambiguity had to be resolved before we could take a possible treaty to the Senate. That was why we had put forward our proposals on sensors and verification procedures. Soviet acceptance of these would create a common understanding of what had been intended in Washington.

THE SECRETARY stressed that the approach Powell had described was intended to get away from the debate over the broad versus the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It sought to put out information on the nature of each side's programs. This would provide greater predictability and certainty, something which the Soviet side had sought, as well as a clearer idea of what would happen during the non-withdrawal period.

RIDGWAY said that she had been reminded by some of her colleagues that in "off cycle" periods, bilateral progress could provide useful buoyancy. The report of the bilateral working group had identified a number of areas where constructive progress was being made.

THE SECRETARY observed that, seen in the long term, there were clearly stages in the development of our relationship, each with its own dynamics. The Geneva summit had had a certain air. Reykjavik was a different sort of meeting -- highly charged, but, as summits went, the most productive ever. The Washington summit was a magnificent event, crowned by the signing of the INF Treaty. We hoped that there would be an even more important treaty to sign in Moscow.

But one could ask: "What about a 1989 summit?" If we concluded a START agreement for Moscow, what could be done for an encore? This was by way of saying that, for the relationship to become more normal, the time had to come when our leaders could meet, and, while it would be a major event, it need not be marked by gigantic achievements. This was a mark of maturity in the relationship. As people thought about the management of the relationship over the next five to ten

years, that needed to be kept in mind.

So, the Secretary concluded, he felt a little disappointed with their meetings. But the way one accomplished things in this area was to keep plugging away. Our people would be working in Geneva. It would be even more important that people in capitals do their homework. The work in Geneva reflected what was being done in capitals.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not think that the meetings had been useless -- particularly when he read the joint statement. What disturbed him was that he had expected to be able to identify some concept for the Moscow summit, even if only in general terms. If he were asked what that concept might be at this point, he could not answer. This did not imply that the ministers should set grandiose tasks for themselves, but they needed a clear idea of where the process was leading. Shevardnadze agreed that it would be possible to have a meeting which did not produce major results. There was plenty of precedent for that in visits by other world leaders. But U.S. - Soviet relations were special.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed completely. He thought that something could be accomplished in the time remaining. So did the President.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers should try to move positions closer together during their April meeting. They should try to identify more clearly a concept for the summit.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to return to all the problems the ministers had discussed. ABM was central. Unless some decisions were taken, there could be no expectation of progress in other areas. SLCM's were another important area which the Soviet side hoped the U.S. would be ready to address urgently. Shevardnadze wanted to emphasize that if there were not understanding on the ABM Treaty, there would be no agreement on 50% strategic reductions. The same went for SLCM's.

The U.S. and Soviet Union, Shevardnadze continued, had a unique chance to close off the main channels of the arms race. He did not know how Moscow's relations with the next administration would be. Perhaps they would be better. But the Soviet leadership felt that there was a unique chance to negotiate an agreement now. It should not be missed. Guided by this principle, the two sides should act more vigorously in Geneva, Washington and Moscow.

By way of a second general observation, Shevardnadze said he had known the Secretary now for some time. The Secretary knew the Foreign Minister did not hide his feelings. Shevardnadze had been deeply disappointed by the results of their discussion of Afghanistan. He did not know how to continue the discussion. The U.S. had simply decided it didn t want to help solve the problem. A major chance had existed to do something together, to resolve "the most acute problem of our time." Moscow would resolve the problem. But it would

have been well to demonstrate to the world that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could work together to solve such problems. This was Shevardnadze's most acute disappointment as he left Washington.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to overdramatize this. But he had believed the two sides could do better. There was every reason to expect success.

So, Shevardnadze summed up, he had been very frank. No purpose would be served by going over the issue once more. But success would have helped in the resolution of other problems, e.g. the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East. The two sides had to cooperate if these issues were to be resolved. Moscow knew the mentality of the Arab world. Resolution of the Afghanistan conflict on a negotiated basis would have been a good stimulus in the Middle East.f

But the meeting had been useful, despite the disappointments. There was a clearer idea of our differences. That was progress. And the atmosphere, as always, had been hospitable and constructive. Shevardnadze asked that the Secretary convey his thanks to the President for the time he had made available.

THE SECRETARY asked to respond on a few points.

On the ABM question, he urged that Soviet negotiators in Geneva be instructed to engage on a joint draft text. They should try to eliminate the inconsequential problems, e.g. the supreme national interests clause issue. We were surprised at the adverse reaction to our proposal that the ABM Treaty should remain in effect at the end of the non-withdrawal period unless a side exercised the six-month notice of withdrawal option, and hoped the Soviet side would look again at that. We urged the Soviet side to look closely at our sensors and verification proposals as a means of giving clarity to the Washington Summit Statement. Our objective was to put the issue on an operation basis, avoiding the question of broad versus narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

On Afghanistan, the Secretary expressed his own disappointment, for reasons paralleling those Shevardnadze had expressed. The Secretary felt the two sides had come close to an understanding. He hoped Shevardnadze had a better appreciation of the difficulties we had. Our moratorium proposal was an attempt to find solutions consistent with the Soviet need to maintain a certain posture, and with what, in practical terms, Moscow would want to do. It would give us the necessary sense of balance and even contribute to a solution to Afghanistan's internal problems.

If asked, the Secretary would say that there had been a thorough discussion of Afghanistan and that, from our standpoint, there were some positive results. We would welcome acceptance of Cordovez's mediation efforts. We would describe where the talks had ended up. We would not put it in a cataclysmic way, but would express our disappointment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, if he were asked by the press

whether the U.S. and Soviet Union would sign as guarantors in Geneva, he would say, "no." Was that correct?

THE SECRETARY said he would say the U.S. was prepared to act as a guarantor, and that the arrangements which had been agreed to were close to what we needed to do so. But he would indicate that an essential element -- balance -- was missing. He would say we had tried to resolve this and were not succesful. We remained glad to be a guarantor if the issue could be resolved.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, if he were asked what the U.S. would do, he would say the press should ask the Secretary.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of plans for press conferences that evening.