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WITHDRAWAL SHEET **Ronald Reagan Library**

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File Folder: Afghanistan: [88 Memos - Letters] (3 of 3)

Date: 11/8/99 1 506 056 0

30x 92369 KA	/ 150x 1	Schroeck - F96-076-2		
DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	
1. Memo (elec.)	Fritz Ermarth to Colin Powell, John Negropone, et al. re: State View of Shev Response, 1 p.	4/10/88	P1/F1	
2. Memo (elec)	re: State View of Shev Response, 1 p. FOLT FOL 076 2 # 32 1/2/01 Ermarth to Dennis Ross, Nicholas Rostow, et al., re: Afghan Issues, 2 p.	4/11/88	P1/F1	
3. Memo	Port # 33 Peter Rodman to Powell, re: Afghanistan: Next Steps, 3 p.	4/11/88	P1/F1	
	Part " *34 "			
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RESTRICTION CODES

- Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
 P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
 F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- (b)(4) of the FOIA].

 F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection: LEDSKY, NELSON C.: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Afghanistan: [88 Memos - Letters] (2 of 3)

Date: 11/8/99

Box 92169 RAC BOX1 Schroeck - F96-076-2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE Memorandum of Conversation - Special Working Group on Afghanisatan - Armacost, Matlock, Offey, Adamishin, Mekseyev, Dubinin, Zolotov, 25 p Memorandum of Conversation - Secretary's Fourth Restricted Session with Shevardnadze, 29 p 3. Memon - Memorandum of Conversation - Secretary's First One-on-One-with Shevardnadze, 14 p- Restriction DATE RESTRICTION RESTRICTION 13/22/88 P1/F1 Adamishin, Alekseyev, Dubinin, Zolotov, 25 p Memorandum of Conversation - Secretary's Fourth Restricted Session with Shevardnadze, 14 p- Restriction Nemorandum of Conversation - Secretary's First One-on-One-with Shevardnadze, 14 p- Restriction		$DUX \mathcal{I}Z\mu U\mathcal{I} \qquad (\forall \mathcal{I})$	SCHOOCK - 170-070-2			
Group-on-Afghanisatan - Armacost, Matlock, Coffey, Adamishin, Alekseyev, Dubinin, Zolotov, 25 p. 2. Memcon Memorandum of Conversation Secretary's Fourth 3/23/88 P1/F1 Restricted Session with Shevardnadze, 29 p. 3. Memcon Memorandum of Conversation - Secretary's First 3/21/88 P1/F1 One-on-One with Shevardnadze, 14 p.			SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	
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		3. Memcon-	One-on-One-with-Shevardnadze,-14-p	.3/21/88	P1/F1	

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SECRET/SENSITIVE (5674F)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Secretary's First One-on-One with Shevardnadze

TIME:

4:55 to 6:30 pm, Monday, March 21, 1988

PLACE: Secretary's Outer Office

SUBJECTS:

Organizational Questions, ABM Treaty, Nuclear

Testing, Afghanistan, Central America

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

U.S.S.R.

THE SECRETARY Gen. Powell

FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

EUR/SOV Director Parris (Soviet Notetaker)

(Notetaker) Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

THE SECRETARY welcomed Shevardnadze, noting that the two were meeting frequently. But the more they met, the more they seemed to have to do. The present meeting was no exception.

The President was looking forward to seeing Shevardnaze on Wednesday, the Secretary indicated. It was well that the two ministers could have this Monday afternoon meeting. It would enable them to go over the agenda and begin discussion of certain issues. The Secretary thought that it might be particularly useful to talk about Afghanistan in a preliminary way. That was a current issue, and one important to both sides.

SHEVARDNADZE expressed his own warm greetings and those of the Soviet leadership, including General Secretary Gorbachev. He agreed with the Secretary that the more often the two ministers met, the more problems seemed to pile up. As he had driven to the Department in his motorcade, he was interested that people in the street seemed to take no notice. They seemed to think that this was natural, as it should be, especially as the President would soon be in Moscow. Shevardnadze emphasized that the Soviet leadership believed that the summit would be an important event, even if, for the

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moment, it could not be said that all was in readiness. And, the Foreign Minister noted, there was little time remaining.

Much, therefore, depended on the ministers discussions this week. Decisions on the President's visit would have to be taken, both with respect to dates and the substance of the visit. Substance, of course, was the important thing.

Shevardnadze said he was glad that the two ministers could have this initial meeting one-on-one. It would be well to get the agenda squared away. The Minister was also prepared to discuss other questions, including the situation around Afghanistan. This was indeed a subject of interest, particularly in the wake of the discussions which had taken place during the Secretary's last visit to Moscow. Shevardnadze said he would also be interested in having the Secretary's views on Central America.

THE SECRETARY suggested that they turn first to the agenda. He expressed his regret that Mrs. Shevardnadze had not been able to accompany the Minister, and that it had proved impossible to schedule a side trip to Boston during the visit. SHEVARDNADZE noted that it was the first time he had visited the U.S. without Mrs. Shevardnadze. Normally, she always accompanied him on his trips abroad. This time she was not feeling well, and the doctors had recommended against the trip. Shevardnadze was also disappointed to have missed Boston, but he had to be back in Moscow on March 24. Maybe next time, he suggested.

The SECRETARY and SHEVARDNADZE spent about fifteen minutes discussing organizational matters. They agreed to retain what had become the traditional pattern of small group meetings at the ministers' level, supplemented by working groups. They agreed that there should be a single arms control group which could break off sub-groups as necessary. They agreed to establish working groups on regional and human rights questions, and that Ambassadors should oversee a discussion of bilateral issues, including those relating to the functioning of embassies in Moscow and Washington. THE SECRETARY noted that he would prefer to postpone discussion of the Middle East and other regional issues until the return Wednesday morning of Asst. Sec. Murphy.

THE MINISTERS agreed that there would be an initial plenary meeting to provide a photo op and to commission working groups. THE SECRETARY indicated that, on the U.S. side, Gen. Powell and Amb. Ridgway would participate in the restricted

ministerial sessions. Outside experts could be brought in as needed.

THE SECRETARY suggested that their initial small group meeting open with a discussion of human rights, followed by initial presentations on arms control. The ministers would then break to open the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, and proceed to lunch. After lunch, they could deal with other arms control questions. The Secretary explained his suggestion for an informal buffet dinner that evening, possibly coupled with a showing of the movie, "That's Entertainment," as an opportunity for unstructured discussion of the issues. SHEVARDNADZE said he had told John Whitehead the previous evening that he was at the Secretary's disposal.

The Secretary briefly ran through the Wednesday schedule, beginning with a morning small group meeting focusing on regional issues. The ministers would then break briefly before Shevardnadze's visit to the White House, which would include a working luncheon. Should there be agreement on dates, they could be announced in a short joint press event immediately thereafter. The ministers could then reassemble at the Department for two to three hours of concluding discussion. They would hold separate press conferences thereafter.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the arrangements the Secretary had outlined corresponded to Soviet desires, and could be considered agreed.

THE SECRETARY indicated that the U.S. would be prepared to issue a joint statement at the end of their discussions if there were something to report. Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh could look into this, as they had done so successfully in the past. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was a good approach.

ABM Treaty

SHEVARDNADZE asked if he could raise one question with respect to the Núclear and Space talks. The issue was sensitive, and he had not wanted to address it in either the plenary meeting or in working groups. It had to do with the ABM Treaty.

Until recently, Shevardnadze explained, Moscow had been convinced that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev had reached a meeting of the minds on this question. The Washington Summit had produced a statement on the subject. It

had not been easy to reach agreement on the language of the statement. But there had been agreement.

On January 22, however, the U.S. delegation in Geneva had introduced a new draft document on the ABM question. When the Secretary had come to Moscow, he had seemed to agree with Shevardnadze that the solution to the problem which had arisen was to incorporate the language of the Washington Joint Statement into the new document on defense and space, and to work on that basis. Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had referred to the Washington Statement as a "Bible," which should not be complicated with new language.

The ABM Treaty existed and there was a need to reaffirm the two sides' attitude toward it, Shevardnadze affirmed. The attitude had found expression in the Washington Statement. As to the form, there was an understanding that a separate agreement on the subject should be concluded. But negotiators in Geneva seemed unable to agree on how to go about this. Thus, Shevardnadze asked himself, should the two sides stick to the Washington Statement? Or should they seek new language to interpret what had been agreed? This was an important question.

Shevardnadze said that it had proven impossible to elaborate a joint draft document in Geneva, because the U.S. January 22 proposal was incompatible with the Washington Joint Statement. Perhaps it would be best just to confine the effort to the Washington Statement itself. All that would be needed in that case was to amplify verification considerations to ensure against violations.

THE SECRETARY volunteered to describe the U.S. view. We agreed that there should be a separate agreement. We agreed that the Washington Statement should serve as our "Bible." The Washington Statement had treated certain issues: the concept of the non-withdrawal period; what the parties could do at the end of the period; that no later than three years before the end of the period there would be strategic stability discussions; that, during the non-withdrawal period, each side would do research, testing and development, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. liked those words, the Secretary said. We realized, however, that they could be interpreted differently. In this connection, he noted Shevardnadze's suggestion in Moscow that there was a need to focus on verification of any new agreement. Soviet proposals had contained some of the same predictability ideas that the U.S. considered important. The Secretary thought that it might be possible to use the

discussion of predictability to reduce ambiguities created by the final words of the Statement. We were thus trying to be responsive to Soviet suggestions.

The Secretary noted that another issue which had come up after Washington, and which he had discussed at some length with Gorbachev, was the "supreme national interest" problem. The Secretary had made the point that this was standard language in all treaties to which the U.S. was a party. We had not intended for it to be an escape hatch for deployment, and were prepared to say so. The Secretary felt that his conversations in Moscow had made this less of problem.

That then, was the U.S. approach, the Secretary concluded. The ministers needed to find a way to reaffirm all of this to their negotiators. The Secretary had the impression that the drafting process in Geneva had become more difficult than it had to be. Part of the problem was that the issues being discussed in Geneva were not "Geneva issues," but issues which had to be resolved at a political level. This made for frustration on the part of the negotiators, but it appeared that the two sides' basic approaches were not dissimilar.

SHEVARDNADZE emphasized that he had raised the issue in private because he felt an urgent need to decide "right now" on a document dealing with the ABM Treaty. Once this were accomplished, it would be possible to move boldly in all other areas. This was a fundamental issue which needed to be resolved at the ministers' level. It could not be done in Geneva.

THE SECRETARY said he was willing to try while Shevardnadze was in Washington. He was sure that there were areas where they could make progress, but he was less sure that they could complete the job. We had been working on ideas for responding to Shevardnadze's suggestions on verification, but they could not yet be considered mature. The Secretary was prepared to push where he could, but he was not certain it would be possible in Washington to eliminate all the ambiguities of the Washington Statement.

SHEVARDNADZE stressed the importance of identifying at the political level what had and had not been agreed to on this issue. For example, both nine and ten years had been mentioned in connection with the non-withdrawal period. This point could be left blank for the moment. They should take the same approach to other questions. But the negotiators could not go on talking forever in Geneva without results. It would affect

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other areas. Shevardnadze suggested that the experts be told to look into the problem so that they could report by the following afternoon what was and was not agreed.

THE SECRETARY said he thought this was a constructive approach. He agreed there was a need to get this negotiation back on track. One of the advantages of trying to work a joint statement, he pointed out, was that it highlighted areas of difference and agreement. The two sides ought to try to get to that point.

On the question of amplifying the verification aspect of the ABM Treaty, the Secretary agreed that this was not a problem for Geneva — it was for capitals. There was a need to bear down in this area so that, when a START agreement was completed, there would be a parallel understanding on Defense and Space. The Secretary knew Shevardnadze would agree that, if there were massive reductions in strategic arms, there would be a parallel need for predictability on the defensive side.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the issue be taken up the next morning.

THE SECRETARY said that he would see that the U.S. working group was alerted to the ministers' conversation. We would try to organize ourselves to deal with the issue. The Secretary said he would put Counselor Kampelman on the job.

SHEVARDNADZE urged that the Washington Statement be the basis for the effort. If the two sides retreated from that Statement, nothing could be achieved.

THE SECRETARY and POWELL said, "Absolutely."

Nuclear Testing

Turning to nuclear testing, THE SECRETARY observed that, in Moscow, he had felt agreement had been reached to go for a "high option" — draft verification protocol language by the present meeting so that there could be a significant nuclear testing event at the Moscow summit. Since then, the Soviet delegation's insistence in Geneva that a joint verification experiment (JVE) precede agreement on protocol language had threatened to preclude not only ratification of pending testing treaties by the time of the summit, but even completion of the verification protocol.

The U.S. did not believe that the JVE was necessary to

complete the protocol. What was necessary was for the Soviet side to agree that the U.S. was entitled to use CORRTEX whenever it chose to verify compliance. The Secretary had thought this issue had been resolved in Moscow. This had made possible agreement on the "high option." We were still prepared to seek the most ambitious outcome, and we were aware that both sides had tabled drafts in Geneva. But we would need to work hard to make up for lost time. For our part, our negotiators had returned to Washington and were ready to work hard. We were puzzled as to where the Soviet side wanted to go. It was up to them to set the pace. We wanted to get the job done. But if Moscow insisted on doing JVE's first, there was no way.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had looked into the matter, and concluded that work on the JVE and protocol should proceed in parallel. It was possible to proceed in this manner.

THE SECRETARY agreed that it was possible, but pointed out that a JVE could not be done in time for the summit. It might be possible to agree on the design for the JVE. It might be possible to agree on protocol language. But the actual conduct of JVE's required certain physical preparations. These were not easy. They took time.

SHEVARDNADZE argued that parallel work on JVE's and the protocol need not delay anything. Time would tell whether or not the JVE could be conducted before a summit. Shevardnadze was certain that a formula could be found for the protocol. He reminded the Secretary that the Soviet side had already agreed to the use of CORRTEX, noting that seismic methods should not be ruled out. The sooner the JVE were conducted, the better. That did not mean that the protocol should be delayed. The two should go forward in parallel.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that that was one approach. He suggested that the experts work hard on the problem during Shevardnadze's stay. He reminded Shevardnadze, however, that if the two pending treaties were to be ratified, time had to be alloted to legislative hearings, voting, etc. The process would not take as long as the INF Treaty, which was shaping up nicely. But we had hoped that, once INF was out of the way, we would be in a position to present the testing treaties for ratification. The sooner we had revised protocols, the better.

SHEVARDNADZE expressed confidence that a formula could be found.

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POWELL noted that the U.S. was working hard to design JVE's which would meet our needs, but pointed out that no tests could take place before early summer — after the summit. He agreed that work should continue on a parallel basis, but warned that time was short if the two sides were to seek advice and consent before a summit.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that the issue could be revisited the next day. It would be a mistake, he said, to delay the JVE until after the summit. It could be done sooner.

Afghanistan

Moving to Afghanistan, THE SECRETARY recalled that the two ministers had discussed the issue the previous fall in the Secretary's private office. Shevardnadze had told him then that Moscow had decided to withdraw. The Secretary had accepted that. The ministers had agreed that it would be in the interest of all concerned were that to happen as soon as possible.

In the intervening months, they had discussed the problem a number of times. Some things had fallen into place or were about to. There had been extensive discussion of a possible interim government. The Secretary had shared some views with Shevardnadze at various points, and the Soviets had subsequently broken the linkage between their withdrawal and establishment of an interim regime. All seemed to agree that agreement on an interim government was desirable, but it was a hard thing to bring about. The Secretary believed that the Pakistanis had come to see that, too, although they felt that the more that could be done, the better.

Thus, the remaining issue was one which, in large part, had to do with the way any Geneva accords presented themselves. We felt that the accords must present themselves as balanced. The U.S. could not be asked not to support those it had supported, while the Soviet Union was allowed to continue supplies to those it had supported. What one guarantor was allowed to do, the other should be, as well. Otherwise, there would be a perception of imbalance. This was something the Secretary and Shevardnadze had discussed at some length in Moscow. The Secretary felt that there were a var ety of ways to get at the problem. But it appeared that our attempts to engage the Soviets had hit a stone wall. So the Secretary had been looking forward to Shevardnadze's visit to see what progress might be made at their level. He would be interested in the Foreign Minister's views.

SHEVARDNADZE said that what he had told the Secretary in his private office remained in effect. The Soviets had decided to withdraw. They had announced a timetable: Gorbachev had initially indicated it would be ten months; in Geneva they had agreed it could be nine. The U.S. had raised phasing of withdrawals, and Moscow had decided on that, as well. Half its forces would be out in the first three months, the rest in the remaining period. Shevardnadze could not provide any further breakdown. He had personally looked into the matter, and it could not be done. But this was not a fundamental issue. By the end of the year, the withdrawal would be complete -- and this would happen under the Reagan Administration.

As for the relationship between withdrawal and establishment of an interim government, Shevardnadze said, this was something which could not be worked out in the context of the Geneva talks. Whether one talked in terms of an interim government, a coalition government, or a transitional government, such an approach was not realistic. If one looked at the range of players — from the current regime, to the Peshawar "7", to Zahir Shah and his supporters, to the internal combatants, it was clear that it would be very hard to find a common language. It would take time. The Soviets did not want to postpone their withdrawal by establishing a linkage to interim government arrangements. Let the Afghans decide the matter.

There was a better approach, Shevardnadze suggested. Cordovez had indicated he would be prepared in a "private" capacity to use his good offices to mediate among the parties in the wake of a Geneva agreement. The Soviets and Afghan government had not yet endorsed his mission. But now the Kabul regime had reached the conclusion that such an attempt would be not only possible, but desirable. Thus, once Geneva were signed, work could get underway promptly on a coalition government.

Shevardnadze noted that the problem had recently been complicated by Hekmatyar's election as leader of the Peshawar Alliance. Hekmatyar was a fundamentalist, a person of extreme views. It was doubtful that he could deal with the Zahir Shah faction, to say nothing of the current regime in Kabul. Hekmatyar had said he did not rule out that, in the event of an agreement in Geneva, the camps now in Pakistan would be moved to Iran. It was no accident that he had come to the fore at this juncture; trouble was in store. This had made the possibility of any linkage between withdrawal and interim government arrangements even less workable.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

As for the situation in Afghanistan itself, things were winding down. Skirmishing continued, but with waning intensity. Shevardnadze had previously told the Secretary that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from twelve provinces. The figure was now thirteen, maybe fourteen. In some villages, counter-revolutionary forces reigned; in others, the Kabul regime held sway. But they lived as neighbours. That was the Afghan way. It had taken the Soviets time to understand this.

As to the problem of supplying arms, Shevardnadze wanted the Secretary to understand the situation. Since 1921, the Soviet Union had cooperated continuously with Afghanistan in various fields, including the military. Weapons being supplied to the current regime were in accordance with the terms of a bilateral treaty. It would not be understood if Moscow now sought to break that contractural relationship. Much thought had been given this point by the Soviet side, and Shevardnadze could tell the Secretary that Moscow could not accept such a step. The decision to withdraw had not been an easy one. If followed by "such an action" it would not be understood. The Soviet Union had said it did not drop its friends. Were it to cut off their weapons, it would not be understood.

Thus, Shevardnadze, said, cooperation would continue with the current regime, as it had under the King. Moscow had no desire to terminate a relationship which had existed for decades. Afghanistan was a neighbor. The Soviet Union wanted normal relations with it.

But this raised a question. Were Afghanistan to become a neutral state, as the Soviet Union wished, what would its status be? Neutral status could be incompatible with a military supply relationship. But that would have to be decided in the future.

Another question was the military aid supplied by the U.S. to Pakistan. This was done on a government-to-government basis. The Soviet Union had no problem with that. As for those supplies which went to "anti-government" forces, the Soviet Union considered this illegal. It would be in Moscow's interest, and in the interest of all countries in the region, for that aid to stop. If the U.S. continued such aid, it would be inconsistent with any obligations it might undertake as a guarantor of non-interference. Thus, the ideal solution would be for the U.S. not to supply Hekmatyar.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that this would be ideal for the Soviet Union, but not for the U.S. The Soviet Union, would also take on the role of a guarantor in the event there was a

Geneva agreement. If the Geneva accords required that a guarantor stop the supply of arms, it applied to both guarantors equally. There had to be a consistent standard. The practical effect of such an arrangment would not be so great. The political effect would. What was needed was a way of balancing things; it was largely a question of how it appeared. The Soviet Union would have withdrawn its forces. All the factions would have to work out the aftermath. It would not be easy, but that was their task.

In the meantime, the Secretary stressed, there had to be a balance. The U.S. wanted to settle. It was in everyone's interest that the situation in Afghanistan be settled in an orderly way. We wanted to work something out. We hoped it was possible to find a balanced way of expressing would would take place. The Secretary had been asked how this might be done. He had said that there were various ways, but that experience had shown that it was possible to work out some very difficult problems with the Soviet Union. Both sides seemed to want to resolve this one.

SHEVARDNADZE said that there was a big difference between U.S. and Soviet aid with respect to Afghanistan. Soviet assistance was on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement. The factions the U.S. supported were not the government of Afghanistan. At the same time, Shevardnadze recognized that the U.S. had a moral and political responsibility to those it had supported. There were various options for dealing with this problem.

The first, as he had suggested earlier, was for the U.S. unilaterally to end supplies to the resistance. As much as Moscow might welcome such an outcome, Shevardnadze acknowledged that it would be unacceptable to the U.S.

A second outcome -- although an undesirable one from the Soviet standpoint -- would be for the U.S. not to sign on as a guarantor of the Geneva accords. The problem with such an option was that the U.S. would thereby remove itself from participation in the resolution of one of the most acute problems of the time. This was not desirable to Moscow, but could be considered. Under such a scenario, the Geneva accords would be mostly a bilateral document, with the Soviet Union participating to the extent it dealt with the dates for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Shevardnadze emphasized yet again that this option was not desirable.

A third variant took as its point of departure the fact

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that the documents elaborated in Geneva did not deal directly with the question of arms supply. Thus, the issue could be omitted from the discussion entirely. The U.S. might at some point, e.g., in the event the Afghans resolved their internal political differences, decide assistance was no longer necessary. In the meantime, maybe the issue should just be dropped. Obviously, if Shevardnadze were asked by the press, he could not say he approved of the U.S. supplying forces hostile to Soviet friends. But that was the U.S.'s business.

Summing up, Shevardnadze reiterated that the first option was the ideal, but would not be acceptable to the U.S. The second was probably as unacceptable to the U.S. as it was undesirable to Moscow. The Soviets would prefer another outcome. It believed that the U.S. had a voice to be heard. U.S. involvement would make for a more stable settlement.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He suggested that what Shevardnadze had described as the third option held the most promise. Noting that the Geneva accords imposed certain obligations on Pakistan with respect to what went across the border, the Secretary emphasized the need to be able to state that, as far as the U.S. was concerned, we would be able to supply those whom we had aided if the Soviet Union supplied those it had supported. If we saw that the Soviet side had ceased its assistance, the U.S. would no longer have to continue its own supply effort.

In any case, the Secretary pointed out, humanitarian aid would continue. The refugees would have a tough time of it when they returned. They would have an urgent need for seed, supplies, equipment.

The Secretary proposed that the two sides make an effort while Shevardnadze was in Washington to find a way in the context of Shevardnadze's third alternative to describe an arrangment which would be balanced in such a way that both sides could live with it. The Secretary did not know whom Shevardnadze might charge with the task, but the Secretary would ask Under Secretary Armacost to work the problem. They ought to get to work the following morning. There were a variety of possibilities which should be explored openly.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin, seconded by Middle East Countries Department Chief Alekseev, could work with Armacost. It seemed to Shevardnadze that, in the event the two sides agreed to sign the Geneva accords, it would be unnecessary to advertise that arms supplies were

continuing, since the Geneva accords did not address that issue. At the same time, he supposed, Congress would probably ask questions.

THE SECRETARY assured him that this would be the case. The U.S. would have to be able to say that what we would do would depend on what the Soviet Union would do. But, he reiterated, the experts should have at the problem and come up with some ideas. If they had something to say to the ministers, they could interrupt them. It would be well to reach some meeting of the minds by the time of Shevardnadze's session with the President.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the two sides appeared to have the basis for a good discussion the following morning. If it proved possible to reach agreement on the military aid question, he added, and if the Afghan parties agreed to Cordovez's private mediation, the only obstacle to signing in Geneva was the question of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Briefly reviewing the history of the matter, Shevardnadze pointed out that Pakistan was insisting on language in Geneva which referred to respect for the "internationally recognized border" — i.e., the Durand Line. But Afghanistan had witheld recognition of the Durand Line since 1922, because it artificially divided the Pushtun nation. India also had an interest in the matter, which it had registered with the Kabul government and the U.N. Afghanistan had proposed a simpler formulation — "existing borders" — to resolve the issue. Shevardnadze expressed the hope that, if the other issues he and the Secretary had discussed could be resolved, Pakistan would withdraw its demands on the border issue. This would make conclusion of the Geneva accords a real possibility.

Central America

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two ministers brief their delegations on their discussion, and be prepared to meet again the following morning at 8:30.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would first like to ask a question. What about the troops that the U.S. had sent to Honduras? Would they stay there?

THE SECRETARY replied that our troops had been sent to the region at the request of the Honduran government, and in response to Nicaragua's incursion across into Honduras. We had indicated that the force would be withdrawn within about ten

days from the date of thier arrival. But no precise dates had been sent. POWELL noted that this meant withdrawals could start the following weekend.

SHEVARDNADZE said he raised the question because he had been asked on arrival in Washington what the Soviet response would be. He had said that he was concerned that, at a time when Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, another country was moving its troops in elsewhere. If these were just exercises, it was not a good idea.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Honduras, confronted by a Nicaragua heavily armed by the Soviet Union, had "screamed for help." We had provided a symbolic movement of troops. There was no intention that they should become involved in combat.

SHEVARDNADZE said that was for the U.S. to decide. But the best, most reasonable solution was for them to return home quickly.

THE SECRETARY noted that Nicaragua had now withdrawn from Honduras territory, noting parenthetically that there was no way Sandinist forces could have "innocently" wandered across the sizeable river that separated the two countries. Ceasefire talks between the Manuagua government and the freedom fighters had taken place on schedule that same day. The U.S. continued to believe that success in those talks, followed by national reconciliation and greater openness in Nicaragua as called for by the Guatemala accords, was the way to go. But the fact that Soviet arms supplies to Nicaragua were higher than the previous year, despite the cut-off of U.S. aid to the freedom fighters, was not a good sign.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled Gorbachev's Washington summit suggestion that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. halt supplies of arms to the countries of Central America, with the exception of police weapons. This was a serious proposal. Nicaragua had accepted it. If a country's neighbours were not receiving weapons, the first country would not need them either. What Nicaragua needed was to address its serious economic problems. Shevardnadze said he pressed the issue not to embarrass the Secretary, but because Moscow was interested in a serious discussion.

The ministers ended the meeting, agreeing to met the following morning at 8:30.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ARMED SERVICES
JUDICIARY
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

COMMUTTEES

831 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING (202, 224-2841 NEW HAMPSHIRE TOLL FREE NUMBER 1-800-852-3714

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510 March 30, 1988

Lt. General Colin L. Powell
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

affirm to

Dear General Powell:

I understand that the President will meet today with his senior advisors to decide how to respond to a request yesterday from Pakistan to support the abandonment of the U.S. - Pakistan position on symmetry.

Under the Geneva agreements as they now stand, Pakistan and Afghanistan pledge not to interfere in affairs of each other. In practical terms, that means the Soviets are free to resupply the puppet regime in Kabul, but Pakistan must cut off aid to the Resistance, and the U. S. must act as a guarantor of this one-sided arrangement. It was precisely, the one-sidedness of the arrangement, I understand, that led the Administration two weeks ago to publicly call for symmetry.

I urge you to counsel the President against acceding to the Pakistani request. Indeed, we should tell Pakistan we simply cannot act as guarantor to such a disadvantageous arrangement.

I understand there are certain private assurances about what recourse we might have in the event of difficulties. But please point out, that Pakistan would have to violate the Geneva agreements in order to resupply the resistance, should that prove necessary. And we, as a guarantor, would have to work hand in glove with the Pakistanis in violation of our role as guarantor.

After eight years of struggle to restore Afghanistan, we are at a critical moment. Firmness on our part is essential.

In my view, there would be no support in the Senate for any decision by the U.S. to abandon our policy of symmetry, in favor of the Geneva agreements which do not contain symmetry provisions. Any agreement that the Government of Pakistan must violate in order to resupply the Mujahideen, while the Soviets would be within their rights to supply Kabul, would be a sharp departure from the policy unanimously endorsed by the U.S. Senate.


Lt. General Colin L. Powell March 30, 1988
Page Two

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Gordon J. Humphrey, USS

GJH/tk



afghan"

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Apr-1988 17:52 EDT

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM:

Fritz W. Ermarth

(ERMARTH)

SUBJECT:

State View of Shev Response


Armacost's assessment of the Shevardnadze reply is, at the very least, a fine example of "looking on the bright side." But it probably doesn't matter how the letter is assessed. We are not going to get a better Soviet response. With our planned unilateral statement, we shall have done the best we could to document our position. That the Soviets should proceed with signing in the face of it, however, should not be interpretted to mean they will not lean on us and on the Paks as effectively as they can to do exactly what the Geneva Agreement stipulates: Shut down military support to the Resistance. Whatever its origins, the Faizabad ammo dump explosion has already prompted popular demonstrations against the US and obliged our diplomatic people to reduce their visibility. Over the weekend there were also a fire in an arms factory in Lahore and a bomb attack on a Saudia office in Karachi. This kind of thing could easily stimulate public pressures to end arms support to the Muj and force refugees to go home after signature in Geneva.

ourselves against charges of violating the Geneva agreements is misplaced.

Despite serious efforts, the Soviets could not orchestrate a terror campaign in Pakistan sufficiently impressive to force Zia to change his policy on the war. In the immediate aftermath of a Geneva "settlement", however, there could be a political/psychological window during which Soviet/WAD terror operations are more effective. Even if accidental, the ammo dump explosion will spotlight this possibility. We shall be under some pressure to say how we would respond to a Soviet/WAD terror campaign. We have two options, it seems to me: We simply sit tight and help the Paks tough it out. Or we try to put some diplomatic pressure on the Soviets by threatening to abrogate the Geneva deal, and to urge the Paks to do likewitse, if there is an upsurge in terror clearly aimed at destroying "symmetry."

Distribution:

FOR:	Colin L. Powell	(POWELL)
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CC:	John E. Herbst	(HERBST)
CC:	Peter Rodman	(RODMAN)
CC:	Nelson C. Ledsky	(LEDSKY)
	-		



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

adam 13 fm

11-Apr-1988 08:52 EDT

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Dennis B. Ross (ROSSDB)
Nicholas Rostow (ROSTOW)
Peter Rodman (RODMAN)
John E. Herbst (HERBST)
James F. Collins (COLLINS)

FROM:

Fritz W. Ermarth

(ERMARTH)

SUBJECT:

Afghan Issues

Some points for our 10:00 AM meeting in Rostow's office. I think the following truths are clear and relevant.

Signing in Geneva is not likely to change the character of the war immediately. Unless the Paks collapse on symmetry de facto, the war inside will intensify and we are likely to see the terror campaign in Pakistan.

The exchange of notes and paper with the Soviets does not in fact protect us much against charges of violation. It does not protect Pakistan at all. The Soviets want us to believe that all will work out fine in the end. But they have reserved the right and will do what they can to enforce the Instruments, namely to get Pakistan to stop supporting the Muj. If they achieve that, it doesn't matter what our position is. Our paper trail does nothing about this.

As diplomatic and legal documents the Geneva package is so squirrely that it will draw severe doubts and ridicule until the Soviets actually start leaving and the PDPA regime falls...if it does.

Even if the ammo dump disaster was an accident, it will inspire much public pressure in Pakistan to end the program. Zia will have to deal with that, and the Soviets will move to exploit it.

survive in a rump but viable form than we would have thought reasonable.

What's at issue really is whether the Geneva signing is going to sulley the appearance and perhaps undermine the reality of the victory represented by the Soviet decision to withdraw combat forces.

Action issues for the US:

How high a political profile to give to the Geneva signing? Should Shultz go? How should the packages be defended? How much should the President be identified with them? We have two basic choices: We can call Geneva a big deal in itself (wrong), or we can call it a "fig leaf" wanted for different reasons by the Soviets and the Paks, and we went along without illusions.

Should we, at this late point, go back to the Soviets for any more in the papertrail on symmetry? Probably not because we are not going to get anything better, and it could get worse as the Soviets assess the game following the explosion.

Should we go at the Soviets with some sort of threat to counter the prospect of a terror bombing campaign in Pakistan?

We need to find out what Peck has been backgrounding in Geneva, telling Cordovez and the Soviets, about "ratcheting down reciprocally" on the aid. Is this in fact part of the side deal? If so, we've really blundered because it will intensify the pressure on the Paks to curtail the program.

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

System II

INFORMATION

April 11, 1988

admistor

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM:

PETER W. RODMAN

SUBJECT:

Afghanistan: Next Steps

Without dwelling on all the risks inherent in our present course, it may be useful to sum up the things we need to focus on in order to improve the odds for a successful outcome. Our key concern, of course, has been Pakistan's exposure -- how Pakistan will be able to withstand the expected Soviet onslaught

The Soviets will almost certainly play hardball while they retreat, to maximize the regime's chances.

Warning the Soviets

Whatever is the cause of the depot explosion, it is essential that we react sharply. We must warn the Soviets, as soon as possible, that any attempts to intimidate Pakistan will produce a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. This is something we should have been saying anyway even before the depot disaster, but now we have a peg to hang it on. If the Soviets are not responsible for the disaster, it does not hurt to advertise our hypersensitivity. If they are responsible, a failure to react will send a terrible signal. They must understand that most military pressures, subversion and terrorism, or other attempts to exploit ethnic divions within Pakistan, would likewise provoke a sharp reaction from us.

The Soviets talk of their decades-old relations with Kabul; we can point to a U.S. security commitment to Pakistan going back at least to the Kennedy Administration. We have it on Embassy Moscow's authority that the Soviets would prefer to insulate the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship from a messy Afghan endgame, both before the Summit and afterwards. If so, we should be sharp in our warnings and put the burden on them.

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

NLS 9601612 #34
By GA, NARA, Date 1/2/01



Bucking Up the Paks -- and the Muj

The President's, the Secretary's and Frank's conversations with the Pak leaders were a good start in what must now be an intensified effort to bolster the Paks. Publicly and diplomatically we must mobilize international opinion to back our interpretation of the Geneva outcome and to warn the Soviets off of beating up Pakistan. The Chinese, the Saudis, and the Europeans should be briefed and engaged ASAP (and they must be urged to continue their support to the Muj.) The Congress needs to be reminded of the continuing importance of our security assistance to Pakistan as a buttress to the Afghan settlement as it unfolds over the coming months (and years).

We should also intensify our contact with the Mujahedin leadership, in order to reassure them too of our continued material and political support. The President has assured them that we would not deal behind their backs. Now is not the time to shrink from talking to them. It is true that the commanders are taking on a more crucial role. But this cannot be used as an excuse to avoid contact with the Muj's internationally recognized political leadership.

Delegitimizing Kabul

It has been suggested that we sever diplomatic relations with Kabul at the moment of signature in Geneva, in order to intensify the political pressure on Kabul and further delegitimize it. I am agnostic on this. Kabul remains a valuable listening post.

Even more useful, perhaps, would be for Pakistan to do this, as Zia had earlier contemplated. Zia was considering ways of signing so as not to imply recognition, coupled with recognizing



a Mujahedin "coalition" government at the same time. This would most effectively deny Kabul the legitimacy it might claim to derive from being a signatory.

Watching the Northern Provinces

With a signature on the Geneva instruments, we should pay close attention to Soviet intentions in Afghanistan's northern provinces. We have witnessed for some time a growing Soviet economic interest in this area and the working out of several economic agreements between these provinces and Soviet republics. A Soviet diplomat in Kabul has spoken of Moscow's desire to build up economic influence in these areas. Conceivably, this could be the start of some kind of de facto partition of Afghanistan. The Soviets could now, moreover, try to justify their measures here as a response to Pak "violations" on arms supply. We may well want to lay down a public marker on this issue soon. To do so would also detract from some of the credit the Soviets are bound to reap internationally once withdrawal begins.

Brazening It Through

We will have to switch mental gears quickly if this course is adopted. For all our inner doubts, we will have to sell this as the real achievement of our basic goal of symmetry and as a brilliant way of outmaneuvering the Soviets.

We -- and the Paks and the Muj -- will have to face the world with absolute self-confidence that this is an advantageous solution and that this arrangement -- if the Soviets sign Geneva and withdraw -- is a defeat for the Soviets.

If we can maintain international and Pakistani support for the crucial principle of symmetry and the continuation of aid -- and sustain this under the likely Soviet onslaught -- then it will indeed turn out to be so.

Dennis Ross and Fritz Ermarth concur.

Prepared by: Peter W. Rodman John E. Herbst





S/S 8811527 United States Department of State 2802

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 12, 1988

Alghoris In

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: FINAL TEXTS OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS

Attached are the final texts of the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan. This version contains certain punctuation and capitalization changes resulting from our comparison of the telegraphed text with a photocopied version of the final texts. Please disregard all previous versions.

Melvyn Levitsky Executive Secretary

Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of States freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and non-intervention by States in the affairs of other States.

Article II

For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

- (1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people;
- (2) to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;
- (3) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;
- (4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party;
- (5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;
- (6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;

- (7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert political order of the other High Contracting Party;
- (8) to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;
- (9) to refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other States designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;
- (10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;
- (11) to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;
- (12) to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;
- (13) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

Article III

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Article IV

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agreement enters into force.

Article V

This Agreement is drawn up in the Pashtu, Urdu and English languages, all texts being equally authentic. In the case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

For the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan

For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Declaration on International Guarantees

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America,

Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to ensuring respect for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment;

Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention;

Urge all States to act likewise.

The present declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988 in five original copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics For the Government of the United States of America

FINAL VERSION 4/12/88

Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement.

Article II

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland:

- (a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;
- (b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;

- 1 -

FINAL VERSION 4/12/88

- (c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to share in the welfare of the State;
- (d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on the basis of the Land and Water Reform;
- (e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article III

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article IV

For the purpose of organising, coordinating and supervising the operations which should effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the performance of their functions the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

Article V

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

Article VI

At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will cooperate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present Agreement. Special agreements may be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Contracting Parties.

Article VII

The present agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this Agreement shall commence.

The arrangements set out in Articles IV and V above shall remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

Article VIII

This Agreement is drawn up in the Pashtu, Urdu and English languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

For the Government of the

For the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan

For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan

- 1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the support of all Governments concerned and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end.
- Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a framework for good-neighbourliness and co-operation, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into negotiations through the intermediary of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General at Geneva from 16 to 24 June 1982. Following consultations held by the Personal Representative in Islamabad, Kabul and Teheran from 21 January to 7 February 1983, the negotiations continued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983. The Personal Representative again visited the area for high level discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984. It was then agreed to change the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity talks through the intermediary of the Personal Representative were held at Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. Another visit to the area by the Personal Representative from 25 to 31 May 1985 preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20 to 25 June, from 27 to 30 August and from 16 to 19 December 1985. The Personal Representative paid an additional visit to the area from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of negotiations began as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was suspended on 23 May 1986, and was resumed from 31 July to 8 August 1986. The Personal Representative visited the area from 20 November to 3 December 1986 for further consultations and the talks at Geneva were resumed again from 25 February to 9 March 1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The Personal Representative again visited the area from 18 January to 9 February 1988 and the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March to 13 April The format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988, when the instruments comprising the settlement were finalized, and, accordingly, direct talks were held at that stage. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of the progress of the negotiations throughout the diplomatic process.

- 3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be based on the following principles of international law:
 - + The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
 - + The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
 - + The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
 - + The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
 - + The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
 - + The principle of sovereign equality of States;
 - + The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

The two Governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political settlement:

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention;

A Declaration on International Guarantees by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America;

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees;

The present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan.

- 5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention; the Declaration on International Guarantees; the Bilateral Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and the present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months.
- agreed upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely, that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the Parties; the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be completed within the timeframe specified in the agreement on the voluntary return of the refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the foreign troops will start and be completed within the timeframe envisaged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments be completed in good faith.

7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required.

A representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. He may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.

In order to enable him to fulfill his tasks, the representative shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the Parties, the personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the provisions of the instruments and prepare a report thereon. For that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all the necessary co-operation from the Parties, including all freedom of movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Any report submitted by the representative to the two Governments shall be considered in a meeting of the Parties no later than forty-eight hours after it has been submitted.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the Parties are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding which is annexed to and is part of this Agreement.

8. The present instrument will be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It has been examined by the representatives of the Parties to the bilateral agreements and of the States-Guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions. The representatives of the Parties, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was present.

Done, at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five original copies each in the Pashtu, Urdu, English and Russian languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

In witness thereof, the representatives of the States-Guarantors affixed their signatures hereunder:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GORDON J. HUMPHREY
NEW HAMPSHIRE

531 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING (202) 224–2841 NEW HAMPSHIRE TOLL FREE NUMBER 1–800–852–3714



COMMITTEES

ARMED SERVICES

JUDICIARY

LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510 April 25, 1988

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Three weeks ago I returned from Pakistan where I met with the leaders of the Afghan Resistance Alliance. As I outlined in an urgent cable I sent to you from Islamabad, during my meeting, the leaders reiterated their call for official recognition by the United States.

Your long-standing support for the Alliance has been an important element in their success. Since your first meeting with the Alliance leadership in June 1986, they have made remarkable progress. The Resistance now controls almost 80% of the territory of Afghanistan. They have drawn a plan for an interim government. They have represented the people of Afghanistan at the United Nations and the Islamic Conference. Their increased cohesiveness on the battlefield has secured an historic Soviet commitment to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. As you noted, Mr. President, "the diversity of the Alliance, its roots in the faith and traditions of Afghanistan, shows that the Alliance is the true representative of the Afghan people."

Mr. President, last November the United States Senate unanimously adopted a resolution honoring the accomplishments of the Resistance Alliance and reaffirming support for the Alliance as the "representatives of the Afghan people in their struggle for freedom."

With the signing of the Geneva Accords, the time has come for the United States to move toward recognition of the Alliance. I met recently with Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zain Noorani. During our meeting, Mr. Noorani indicated that Pakistan is prepared to recognize the Alliance, as soon as they establish an interim government in Afghanistan. I urge our government to convey to the leaders of the Alliance and the Government of Pakistan, that the United States also stands ready to confer recognition.

There is clear precedent for recognizing the Alliance. Our nation takes great pride in our recognition of the Polish government in exile in 1939.

157 MAIN STREET

BERLIN, NH 03570

(603) 752-2600

The President April 26, 1988 Page #2

There are two choices. Either we continue to fly our flag at the seat of a regime responsible for the deaths of more than one million people, or we take tangible steps to confer legitimacy upon those who are successfully restoring independence to their own nation. Mr. President, you said it best when you remarked that the only voice that really counts is "that of the Afghan people, speaking through their resistance representatives."

Mith warmest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

GJH/tk