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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: LEDSKY, NELSON C.: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Afghanistan: [88 Cables]

Date: 11/10/99

Box 92X69 RAC Box 1

Schroeck - F96-076-2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	No cable #, re: Letter to Prime Minister Junejo, 3 p. R 1/2/01 F96-076/2 #35	3/7/88	P1/F1
2. Cable	No Cable #, re: Letter to President Zia, 5 p. Part " " " #36	3/9/88	P1/F1
3. Cable	No Cable #, re: Afghanistan: Border Issue, 3 p. R F96-076/2 #37 9/29/00	4/4/88	P1/F1
4. Cable	Cable #051020Z Apr 88, 1 p. R " " #38	4/5/88	P1/F1
5. Cable	Cable #050726Z Apr 88 (attached to email), 9 p. R " " #39	4/5/88	P1/F1
6. Email	Fritz Ermarth to Ledsky, Nicholas Rostow, et al., re: Ewd from Islamabad, 1 p. R F96-076/2 #40 1/2/01	4/6/88	P1/F1
7. Cable	Cable #051155Z Apr 88 (attached to email), 8 p. R F96-076/2 #41 9/29/00	4/5/88	P1/F1
8. Cable	No Cable #, re: Afghanistan - Soviet Assurances, 2p R " " #42	4/7/88	P1/F1
9. Email	Ermarth to Herbst, Ledsky, re: From Kabul, 1 p. R F96-076/2 #43 1/2/01	4/8/88	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #080609Z Apr 88 (attached to email), 4 p. R F96-076/2 #44 9/29/00	4/8/88	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #091052Z Apr 88, 5 p. R " " #45	4/9/88	P1/F1
12. Cable	Cable #130156Z Apr 88, 4 p. R " " #46	4/13/88	P1/F1
13. Cable	Cable #140801Z Apr 88, 2 p. R " " #47	4/14/88	P1/F1
14. Cable	Cable #150130Z Apr 83, 2 p. R " " #48	4/15/88	P1/F1
15. Cable	Cable #191721Z Apr 88, 2 p. R " " #49 9/29/00	4/19/88	P1/F1, F3
16. Em/Cable	Em: Ledsky to Herbst, Cable #101202Z May 88, 3p. R F96-076/2 #50 1/2/01	5/10/88	P1/F1
17. Cable	Cable #220811Z Sep 88, (attached to email), 3 p. R F96-076/2 #51 9/29/00	9/22/88	P1/F1
18. Cable	Cable #240548Z Oct 88, (attached to email), 6 p. R " " #52	10/24/88	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

9/7

F96076/2 #35

CAS

1/2/01

SECRET

22021

NEA/PAB:RAFLATEN
3/7/88 EXT- 77543
THE SECRETARY

P:MHARNACOST
EUR/SOV:SMYOUNG
S/S-O:
S/S-S:JALBA

NEA:JMEALUM
S/S:
NSCS:ROAKLEY

IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

IMMEDIATE GENEVA

NOBIS
GENEVA EYES ONLY DAS PECK

DECL: OADR

PREL, PK, AF

LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO

1. ~~EST~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO AT THE FIRST
OPPORTUNITY. THERE WILL BE NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THE EARLY REPORTS FROM GENEVA REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION
SECRETARY SHULTZ RECEIVED DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO
MOSCON THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE INDEED REACHED A FIRM
DECISION TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. AS
SUCH, THEY PROVIDE ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE THAT OUR COMMON
EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE HAVE ENTERED
A DECISIVE PHASE AND THAT WE MAY SOON WITNESS A HISTORIC
SUCCESS.

YOU DESERVE MUCH OF THE CREDIT. YOU HAVE PURSUED A FIRM
AND PRINCIPLED POLICY; YOU HAVE PROVIDED GENEROUS SUPPORT

SECRET

Handwritten notes and initials:
GHS
RAF
MHA
JME
SMY
S/S:
S/S-O:
RO
S/S-S

~~SECRET~~

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FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES ON YOUR TERRITORY; AND YOU HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE WIDER COMMUNITY OF NATIONS COMMITTED TO THE RESTORATION OF AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE. IN SO DOING, YOU HAVE BROUGHT A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THIS EPIC STRUGGLE WITHIN REACH.

CREDIT IS ALSO DUE THE BRAVE MUJAHIDIN, WHOSE RESISTANCE TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION WE HAVE TOGETHER SUPPORTED. WE SHALL MAINTAIN THAT SUPPORT UNDIMINISHED UNTIL IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE EMBARKED ON AN IRREVERSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES, THEREBY CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE AFGHANS CAN DETERMINE THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURE, AND THE REFUGEES CAN RETURN HOME IN SAFETY AND HONOR. IMPORTANT DECISIONS LIE AHEAD, AND WE WILL WANT TO HANDLE THEM IN THE SAME SPIRIT OF CLOSE CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION THAT MARKS OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.

WE HAVE INFORMED SOVIET LEADERS THAT WE INTEND TO CONTINUE THE NON-MILITARY HUMANITARIAN COMPONENT OF OUR AID TO THE AFGHANS AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWALS COMMENCE. TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR ASSISTANCE, WE INTEND TO DELIVER IT DIRECTLY TO THE AREAS TO WHICH THE REFUGEES ARE RETURNING. AND AS LONG AS KABUL IS CONTROLLED BY THOSE WHO HAVE DRIVEN THE REFUGEES OUT OF THEIR LAND, WE WILL NOT CHANNEL OUR ASSISTANCE THROUGH THEIR HANDS.

AS THE REFUGEES BEGIN TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND, THE NEED FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN ITS VARIOUS FORMS WILL GROW. WE SHALL WORK WITH YOU TO ENCOURAGE THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO SUPPORT THE RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES AND THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AS GENEROUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

WE RECOGNIZE THE MERITS OF YOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. WE HAVE NEVER QUESTIONED THE DESIRABILITY OF AGREED ARRANGEMENTS, ONLY THE EFFICACY OF SECURING THE COOPERATION OF THE KABUL AUTHORITIES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THAT ENDEAVOR. NONETHELESS, WE HAVE ENCOURAGED BOTH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR TO CONTINUE TO WORK ACTIVELY FOR AGREED INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION OF A GENEVA AGREEMENT.

WE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S WILLINGNESS TO SERVE AS A GUARANTOR OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS DEPENDS ON A SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CEASE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE KABUL REGIME UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A GENEVA AGREEMENT. IT

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IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE GUARANTORS BE BALANCED AND THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-INTERVENTION BE EQUITABLY APPLIED. I AM PLEASED THAT IN YOUR MARCH 6 CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR RAPHEL, YOU AGREED THAT WE WILL PROCEED IN TANDEM ON THIS ISSUE. ATTAINMENT OF A SOVIET COMMITMENT ON THIS POINT, IN OUR VIEW, SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO INSURE SUCCESS OF THE MUJAHIDIN AND CREATE CONDITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN FOR THE EARLY AND SAFE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES.

YOUR GOVERNMENT'S CLOSE COOPERATION WITH AMBASSADOR RAPHEL AND WITH OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN GENEVA HAS BEEN VITAL TO THE COORDINATION OF OUR JOINT EFFORTS AND TO THE SUCCESS WE HAVE ACHIEVED TO DATE. I TRUST THAT THIS COLLABORATION WILL CONTINUE AS WE LOOK AT THE DETAILS OF THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED.

WE HAVE WALKED A LONG ROAD TOGETHER THESE PAST SEVEN YEARS. DURING THE COURSE OF OUR COOPERATION IN SEEKING FREEDOM FOR THE AFGHANS, WE HAVE BOTH BROADENED AND DEEPENED OUR BILATERAL TIES. IT IS MY EARNEST DESIRE THAT THIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD STAND AS A LEGACY OF MY ADMINISTRATION. I INTEND TO WORK IN THE MONTHS REMAINING TO ENSURE THESE TIES ENDURE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT. VVV

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224

NEA:RAFLATEN:P:AEASTHAN

3/9/88 EXT. 2

P:MHARNACOST

NEA:EDJEREJIAN

INR:HABRAHOWITZ

NSCS:

S/S-0:

NEA:JMEALUM

EUR/SOV:SYOUNG

S/S:

IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

IMMEDIATE GENEVA

MODIS

GENEVA EYES ONLY FOR DAS PECK

DECL: OADR

PREL, PGOV, AF, PK, UR, US

AFGHANISTAN: LETTER TO PRESIDENT ZIA

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST POSSIBLE OCCASION TO DELIVER THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN IN PARA 5 BELOW TO PRESIDENT ZIA. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. ON DELIVERY OF LETTER, AMBASSADOR SHOULD ALSO SEEK TO OBTAIN A CLEARER SENSE OF ZIA'S BOTTOM LINE ON GENEVA STRATEGY ISSUES.

4. FOR OUR PART WE HAVE SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF DISCUSSIONS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS.

-- WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED PAKISTANI EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A BROAD-BASED INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR ARE UNASSAILABLE: IT WOULD FACILITATE THE DEPARTURE OF THE SOVIET FORCES, ENCOURAGE

MA
RAF/AE

ED
JME

MA

SY

NSCS:

S/S:

S/S-0:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS 94-076/2 #36

By CES, NARA, Date 1/2/01

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THE ORDERLY AND SPEEDY RETURN OF THE REFUGEES TO AFGHANISTAN, FINESSE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET MILITARY AID TO KABUL, AND FACILITATE THE FLOW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

-- OUR CONCERNS HAVE CENTERED AROUND THE FEASIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING AN AGREED FRAMEWORK IN THE NEAR TERM.

-- IN ADDITION, CURRENT EFFORTS APPEAR TO BE PRODUCING TACTICAL PROBLEMS IN GENEVA AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN PESHAWAR -- AND, PERHAPS, INSIDE AFGHANISTAN AMONG RESISTANCE COMMANDERS.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, WE FIND OURSELVES IN THE AWKWARD POSITION OF HAVING URGED CORDOVEZ TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN CONTRIVING AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEING UNABLE TO DELIVER TO HIM WHAT HE NEEDS TO DO THE JOB, WHETHER IN THE FORM OF NEGOTIABLE PROPOSALS OR REPRESENTATIVE INTERLOCUTORS.

-- MOJABDEDI'S APPARENT BREAK WITH THE ALLIANCE ILLUSTRATES ANOTHER FACET OF THE PROBLEM: ANY PROPOSAL WHICH IS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE AN AGREEMENT WITH CONTENDING AFGHAN FACTIONS IS VIRTUALLY GUARANTEED TO CAUSE DISSENSION AMONG THE PESHAWAR LEADERS. WHILE WE HAD URGED THE MUJAHIDEEN AND PAKISTAN TO DESIGN PROPOSALS WHICH WERE NEGOTIABLE AND WHICH REFLECTED POLITICAL REALITIES, IT APPEARS TO US THAT A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN AN UNINTENDED FRAGMENTATION OF THE ALLIANCE.

-- THERE IS ANOTHER PROBLEM: THE FIRST PESHAWAR PROPOSAL DID NOT, APPARENTLY, INCLUDE A ROLE FOR THE COMMANDERS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. IN OUR VIEW, THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDERS WILL BE DECISIVE DURING AND AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. SOVIET STRATEGY FOR RETAINING INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WILL AIM AT COOPTING A NUMBER OF COMMANDERS. TO COUNTER THIS EFFORT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT INTERIM GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS SURFACED BY OUR FRIENDS ENJOY THE ENDORSEMENT AND SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDERS. WE ARE UNEASY ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY ARE BEING CONSULTED AS HAMID GUL STRUGGLES TO GAIN MUJAHIDIN CONSENT FOR NEW PROPOSALS.

-- THESE CONCERNS ARE REINFORCED BY WORD THAT THE PAKS ARE PUSHING A NEW CONCEPT INVOLVING COALITION OF AFGHAN EMIGRES WITH THE PDPA, LEAVING ASIDE A ROLE FOR THE PESHAWAR ALLIANCE AS WELL AS THE COMMANDERS.

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-- IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE WHY THE ALLIANCE WOULD FIND SUCH A PROPOSAL ATTRACTIVE, OR THAT PAK SPONSORSHIP OF IT WILL ENHANCE ALLIANCE COHESION AT THIS DIFFICULT MOMENT OF PREPARATION FOR A POSSIBLE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

-- THERE IS NO NEED TO SPELL OUT THE POLITICAL DOWNSIDES HERE OF THIS PARTICULAR IDEA. MOREOVER, PUSHING THESE PROPOSALS IS AT ODDS WITH OUR VERY SENSIBLE PUBLIC POLICY LINE, I.E., THAT FUTURE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE FOR AFGHANS TO WORK OUT.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO SUSTAIN OUR PUBLIC LINE THAT INTERIM GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE DESIRABLE FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT WE SHOULD NOT INVOLVE OURSELVES IN FORMULATING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OR FLACKING THEM TO THE MUJ OR CORDOVEZ. WE REMAIN DUBIOUS THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

--THE COROLLARY OF THAT EXPECTATION IS OUR SUPPOSITION THE POLITICAL CONTEST FOR THE CONTROL OF AFGHANISTAN WILL CONTINUE AFTER A GENEVA AGREEMENT IS SIGNED, AND THAT WE NEED TO COORDINATE WITH THE PAKS ON MOVES THAT WILL HELP UNDERMINE FURTHER KABUL'S POSITION WHILE ENHANCING RESISTANCE PROSPECTS FOR CAPITALIZING POLITICALLY ON THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

-- SINCE URGENT EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS MAY HAVE THE INADVERTENT EFFECT OF WEAKENING OUR FRIENDS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL. WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS IN A PRELIMINARY WAY ON A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ROUTE.

-- IT MIGHT ALSO BE POSSIBLE, AS PAK REPRESENTATIVES IN GENEVA HAVE SUGGESTED, THAT AN AGREED FRAMEWORK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT COULD BE ANNOUNCED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

-- WE ARE UNCERTAIN, HOWEVER, WHAT THIS FRAMEWORK MIGHT BE. ONE POSSIBILITY COULD BE A LOYA JIRGA, ALTHOUGH FOR OUTSIDE PARTIES TO ENDORSE A LOYA JIRGA COULD RUN THE SAME RISK OF STIMULATING MUJAHIDEEN FRAGMENTATION, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE LOYA JIRGA IDEA HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE "TRADITIONALIST" RESISTANCE PARTIES AND REJECTED BY THE ISLAMISTS SUCH AS HEKMATYAR.

-- ANOTHER POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK WOULD BE A PROCESS OF ELECTIONS. THE DIFFICULTY WE SEE WITH AN ELECTIONS PROCESS IS THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD SUPERVISE THEM.

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AFGHANISTAN HAS NEVER HAD A SUCCESSFUL ELECTION, AND WE QUESTION WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE QUICKLY ON ORDERLY PROCEDURES, MUCH LESS IMPLEMENT THEM, GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- HOWEVER, ANNOUNCING A FRAMEWORK HAS CERTAIN CLEAR ADVANTAGES. AMONG THEM ARE AVOIDANCE OF THE QUESTIONS OF PERCENTAGES AND PORTFOLIOS WHICH HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BEDEVILED GENERAL GUL DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIANCE.

-- THESE ARE SOME OF THE CONCERNS CURRENTLY TROUBLING YOUR WASHINGTON COLLEAGUES, AND YOU MIGHT WISH TO DRAM ON THEM IN PROBING ZIA'S THINKING ABOUT HOW WE REACH CLOSURE ON A SETTLEMENT THAT ACHIEVES THE IMPORTANT AIMS WE SHARE.

5. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ON AFGHANISTAN WHICH YOU SENT ME BY ARMAND HAMMER FOLLOWING HIS RECENT VISIT TO ISLAMABAD. YOUR LETTER RAISED TWO KEY ISSUES WHICH OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO RESOLVE.

WE ARE AGREED ON THE NEED TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDIN. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET LEADERS AND IN PUBLIC THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE GUARANTORS OF A GENEVA SETTLEMENT MUST BE BALANCED. THEREFORE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE A SYMMETRICAL CESSATION OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE REGIME IN KABUL BEFORE WE CEASE MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE RESISTANCE. I BELIEVE THAT THE TERMINATION OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO KABUL, COMBINED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, WILL HELP CREATE THE CONDITIONS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN FOR A SAFE AND DIGNIFIED RETURN OF THE REFUGEES. IT WILL ALSO FACILITATE THE REPLACEMENT OF NAJIBULLAH'S REGIME WITH A BROADLY BASED ALTERNATIVE.

THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES WITH DIGNITY AND HONOR HAS ALWAYS BEEN A KEY ELEMENT OF ANY SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE UNITED STATES. BECAUSE WE AGREE WITH YOU ON THIS AND OTHER ADVANTAGES OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, WE HAVE SUPPORTED YOUR OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN. WE HAVE ENCOURAGED SOVIET LEADERS AND THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR TO WORK URGENTLY FOR THIS OBJECTIVE. DESPITE OUR OWN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF THIS EFFORT, WE HAVE

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CONTINUED TO URGE AN EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS. EVEN AS THESE CONTINUE, WE WILL COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH YOU ON SECURING A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND ON THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT AGREEMENT ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT ELUDES US.

FINALLY, I COMPLETELY AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE ARE APPROACHING A GREAT MOMENT IN HISTORY. BUT THE CREDIT, MR. PRESIDENT, BELONGS TO VALIANT AFGHANS AND THE RESOLUTE SUPPORT YOUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HAVE EXTENDED THEM. PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE HAS NEVER FLAGGED. YOU HAVE SET A SHINING EXAMPLE FOR THE WORLD BY PROVIDING REFUGE FOR MILLIONS OF AFGHANS WHO HAVE FLED THEIR COUNTRY FOR SAFETY. AND IT IS PAKISTAN WHICH HAS PERSEVERED AT GENEVA. I TAKE REAL SATISFACTION FROM HOW CLOSELY WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER ON THIS NOBLE ENDEAVOR, FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

I HAVE ALSO WRITTEN ABOUT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS TO YOUR PRIME MINISTER. I KNOW THAT BOTH YOU AND HE ARE COORDINATING CLOSELY WITH AMBASSADOR RAPHEL AS WE NEAR OUR OBJECTIVE IN AFGHANISTAN. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE WAY TO REACH THE GOAL THAT WE SHARE, BOTH FOR AFGHANISTAN AND FOR OUR CONTINUING CLOSE RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT. VVV

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

FILE #96-076/2 #37

SECRET

BY CAS

DATE 9/29/00

P: AWEASTHANJR.
04/04/88, EXT. 74313
P: NHARMACOST

NEA: RFLATEM
NSCS:
S/S:

EUR/SOV: SYOUNG
L/NEA: PNORTON
S/S-0:

NIACT/IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

IMMEDIATE SECRETARY, GENEVA IMMEDIATE, USSR IMMEDIATE,
KABUL IMMEDIATE
MODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR RAPEHL FROM ARMACOST

DECL: OADR

PREL, PGOV, PK, AF, UR

AFGHANISTAN: BORDER ISSUE

REF: MOSCOW 8742

1. ~~X~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL (REPEATED TO YOU) REPORTS FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VORONTSOV'S DEMARCHE ON BEHALF FM SHEVARDNADZE (NOW IN KABUL) REGARDING THE BORDER ISSUE.

3. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A DEMARCHE MADE IN PARALLEL BY AMBASSADOR DUBININ TO ARMACOST ON APRIL 4.

BEGIN TEXT OF DUBININ PRESENTATION: {INFORMAL TRANSLATION}:

0 OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR FRIENDS ON AN AFGHANISTAN SETTLEMENT ARE NOT GOING VERY EASILY. WELCOMING ON THE WHOLE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS BY ALL PARTIES, KABUL VIEWS AS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE THE POSITION OF PAKISTAN WHICH DOES NOT WISH TO DROP FROM THE TEXT OF THE ACCORDS THE PHRASE "INTERNATIONALLY

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2.

RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES" BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.

0 AS IS WELL KNOWN, EVER SINCE THIS WORDING APPEARED IN THE TEXT, THE AFGHANISTAN SIDE HAS ALWAYS RESOLUTELY OPPOSED IT SINCE IT MEANT RECOGNITION OF THE SO-CALLED DURAND LINE. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE TO ALL PUSHTUNS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE IN AFGHANISTAN OR IN PAKISTAN. ALREADY RESENTMENT AGAINST THE PAKISTAN POSITION HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY LOUD ON THE PART OF PUSHTUNS ON PAKISTANI TERRITORY.

0 SERIOUS OPPOSITION TO THIS PAKISTANI LINE HAS ARISEN IN INDIA, WHICH IS CATEGORICALLY OPPOSED TO A SETTLEMENT WHEREBY THE 104 KILOMETER BORDER WITHIN THE PAKISTANI-OCCUPIED PORTION OF KASHMIR WOULD BE CONSIDERED THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN BORDER.

0 EDWARD SHEVARDNADZE BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ATTAIN A DEFINITIVE, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE ENTIRE PROBLEM IF SECRETARY SHULTZ COULD PERSUADE PAKISTAN TO DROP ITS INSISTENCE RELATING TO THE "INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES" AND TO GENERALLY TAKE THE QUESTION OF THE BORDERS OUT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, SINCE THIS QUESTION HAS NO RELATIONSHIP TO SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN AND EVEN LESS TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

END TEXT OF DUBININ PRESENTATION

4. AS WE UNDERSTAND THE ISSUE, THE BORDER QUESTION AT GENEVA TURNS AROUND THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF THE DURAND LINE BY THE AFGHAN SIDE MIGHT BE MADE DE JURE BY THE INCLUSION OF THE PHRASE "INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED" IN ARTICLE II(3) OF INSTRUMENT ONE. THE AFGHAN POSITION (AS REFLECTED IN REFTEL AND DUBININ'S PRESENTATION) IS THAT THE WORDS SHOULD BE DELETED, SINCE THEIR INCLUSION IN THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO RECOGNITION OF THE DURAND LINE, WHICH NEITHER AFGHANISTAN NOR THE SOVIET UNION HAVE EVER ACCEPTED AS THE BORDER BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. THE PAKISTANI POSITION IS THAT IT IS NOT PAKISTAN'S INTENTION TO FIX THE BOUNDARY THROUGH THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, BUT THAT PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE BY FM WAKIL AT GENEVA, AND THE FACT THAT THE DRAFT ACCORDS HAVE BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED WITH THE PAKISTANI OPPOSITION, MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR PAKISTAN TO DROP ITS INSISTENCE ON THE LANGUAGE IN THE CURRENT DRAFT OF INSTRUMENT 1.

5. EMBASSY ISLAMABAD IS INSTRUCTED TO RAISE THIS ISSUE

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WITH PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO, NOTING THAT MOSCOW APPEARS TO BE SAYING THAT IF THE BORDER ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED, WE CAN PROCEED TO A GENEVA SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE JUNEJO PROPOSAL AGREED TO BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OUTLINED IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. YOU SHOULD DESCRIBE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND SEEK PAKISTANI REACTION.

6. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY TREATED THE BORDER ISSUE AS ONE FOR PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN TO RESOLVE, AND WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT TO INTERPOSE OUR JUDGEMENT FOR THAT OF PAKISTAN ON SUCH A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE. NOR DO WE WISH TO COMPROMISE WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS ON THE KASHMIR DISPUTE. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THE DURAND LINE AS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND DO NOT REGARD THE QUESTION AS AN OPEN ONE.

7. YOU SHOULD EXPLORE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER PAKISTAN'S REACTION TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO ENABLE US TO REPLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

UV

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

FILE # PG 6-076/2738

BY OKS , IARA, DATE 9/29/00

<DI>IT: 500001 VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLASS> ~~SECRET~~ <REF> RUHFC # <DTE> 051020Z APR 88
<ORIG> F4 SECRETARY WASHDC
<TO> TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NTA CT IMMEDIATE 7215

<SUJ> SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: REPLY TO SHEVARDNADZE

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ STATE 105700

NOBIS

PLAT: WAST S/C H. MULLER WITH SECRETARY'S PARTY
FOLLOWING STATE 105700 DATED APRIL 5, 1988 SENT ACTION
MOSCOW SECRETARY ISLAMABAD GENEVA KAPUL, BEING SPTD FOR
YOUR ACTION:

REFERENCE STATE 105700

QUOTE ~~SECRET~~ STATE 105700 TOSCC D60171

NOBIS

GENEVA CYL ONLY DAS PICK

F.O. 12350: DECL: DAD

TAGS: PRC, US, AF, PK

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: REPLY TO SHEVARDNADZE

REF: (A) MOSCOW 747, (B) STATE 105138, (C) STATE 105322,
(D) ISLAMABAD 7266

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR RAHUL IN ISLAMABAD MET EARLY APRIL 5 WITH
PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO TO DISCUSS THE BORDER
ISSUE (REFTELS). THE SECRETARY HAS REQUESTED THAT THE
SUBSTANCE OF THIS CONVERSATION BE PASSED IMMEDIATELY TO
MFA FOR TRANSMISSION TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE IN
KAPUL. EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS, WHICH
WERE SHARED WITH SOVIET EMBASSY WASHINGTON AT 0210 EDT
APRIL 5:

O IN RESPONSE TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S REQUEST,
THE U.S. HAS CONSULTED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN ON
THE BORDER ISSUE.

O THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN EMPHASIZED THAT THIS ISSUE
IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND THAT TO ALTER THE LANGUAGE IN
THE CURRENT DRAFT INSTRUMENT ONE WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP.

O NONETHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IS WILLING TO
COOPERATE IN RESOLVING THIS ISSUE BY FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTION IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE GENEVA PROCESS.

O THE GOP BELIEVES THAT UNDERSTANDINGS ON
NON-INTERFERENCE BETWEEN TWO STATES MAKE LITTLE SENSE
WITHOUT SOME REFERENCE TO THE BORDER BETWEEN THOSE
STATES. THE GOP IS WILLING TO ENTERTAIN ALTERNATIVES
WHICH THE SOVIET OR KAPUL SIDE MAY WISH TO PROPOSE TO THE
CURRENT LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFT OF INSTRUMENT ONE.

O WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL IN RESOLVING THIS
ISSUE, IT IS ONE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY TO
PAKISTAN, AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAY WISH TO EXPEDITE A
SOLUTION BY DISCUSSING IT DIRECTLY WITH PAKISTAN THROUGH
ITS EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD OR THROUGH ITS REPRESENTATIVE AT
GENEVA.

WHITEHEAD UNQUOTE WHITEHEAD

<SECT> SECTION: 01 OF 01<ISA> 5700<TOR> 880405121273 MS6000197554353
<TOR> 880405122007

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DECLASSIFIED

N F96076/2 #39

BY CAS

TE 9/29/00

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5-Apr-1988 09:41 EDT



MEMORANDUM FOR:

LEDSKY

FROM:

VMS MAIL user ERMARTH
(ERMARTH@VAXC@MRGATE)

SUBJECT:

FYI

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<DTG> 050726Z APR 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY MEETING WITH AFGHAN
- RESISTANCE LEADERS
SUMMARY

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 07285

GENEVA FOR NEA/DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY MEETING WITH AFGHAN

- RESISTANCE LEADERS

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

SUMMARY

1. AT A DINNER AT THE IUAM HEADQUARTERS IN PESHAWAR ON 2 APRIL, THE ALLIANCE LEADERSHIP TOLD VISITING SENATOR HUMPHREY THAT THEY ARE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS AND FEEL LET DOWN. THEY ASKED THAT THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN NOT SIGN THE ACCORDS AND URGED HIM TO HELP STOP THE GENEVA PROCESS. THEY PROCLAIMED THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE THE JEHAD UNTIL A MUJAHEDIN GOVERNMENT BRINGS PEACE AND SECURITY TO AFGHANISTAN. SENATOR HUMPHREY ASSURED THE LEADERS OF HIS SUPPORT AND REASSURED THEM THAT THE USG WOULD NOT PLACE THE RESISTANCE AT RISK. HE REAFFIRMED THAT THE USG WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE MUJAHEDIN AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED THE PUPPET REGIME IN KABUL. THE CODEL CLEARED THIS CABLE. END SUMMARY.
SETTING

2. SENATOR GORDON HUMPHREY, STAFF ASSISTANTS PILLSBURY AND KLEINE, DCM JOHN MCCARTHY, CONSULATE PRINCIPAL OFFICER MALINOWSKI, AND BRANCH PAO HOAGLAND (NOTETAKER) MET WITH THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP AT THEIR HEADQUARTERS APRIL 2. THE SESSION LASTED ABOUT THREE HOURS. ATTENDING WERE SIX OF THE SEVEN RESISTANCE PARTY LEADERS: GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR OF HEZB-E ISLAMI (HEKMATYAR) AND CURRENT ALLIANCE ; MAULVI YUNUS KHALIS, LEADER OF HEZB-E ISLAMI (KHALIS) AND THE FORMER RESISTANCE RAIS; PROFESSOR BURHANUDDIN RABBANI, JAMIAT-I-ISLAMI; MAULAVI MOHAMMAD NABI MOHAMMADI, HARAKAT-E-INQILAB-I-ISLAMI; PROFESSOR SIBGHATULLAH MOJADDEDI, JABHA-E-NIJAT-MILLI; AND PIR SAYYID AHMAD GAILANI, MAHAZ-E-MELLI. ITTIHAD-I-ISLAMI (SAYYAF) WAS REPRESENTED BY ITS DEPUTY LEADER ENGINEER AHMAD SHAH, WHO HAS BEEN NOMINATED AS PRESIDENT OF THE PROPOSED INTERIM GOVERNMENT. ALSO PRESENT WAS NAWAB SALEEM, HEZB-E ISLAMI (HEKMATYAR), WHO IS SERVING AS AN ALLIANCE PRESS OFFICERS AND WHO ALSO SERVED AS TRANSLATOR. HEKMATYAR'S PRE-DINNER SPEECH

3. HEKMATYAR, CURRENT ALLIANCE SPOKESMAN, OPENED THE SESSION WITH A PRE-DINNER SPEECH. HE ASSURED SENATOR HUMPHREY THAT THE ALLIANCE IS MORE UNITED THAN EVER BEFORE. ANYTHING ELSE THE SENATOR MIGHT HAVE HEARD IS PROPAGANDA. WHEN THE SOVIETS PROMULGATE SUCH PROPAGANDA, THE ALLIANCE IS NOT WORRIED. IT BOTHERS THEM, HOWEVER, WHEN THEIR FRIENDS USE SOVIET LANGUAGE AGAINST THEM. THE SEVEN LEADERS ARE ALL BROTHERS WITH A SINGLE GOAL THAT UNITES THEM. THEY UNANIMOUSLY AGREE THAT THEY WANT ELECTIONS AFTER LIBERATION TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. HEKMATYAR OBJECTED THAT THE MEDIA TRIES TO SHOW AN ARTIFICIAL SPLIT IN THE ALLIANCE, SUPPOSEDLY PITTING LIBERALS AGAINST FUNDAMENTALISTS. HE FURTHER OBJECTED TO MEDIA PORTRAYAL OF FIGHTING INSIDE AFGHANISTAN AMONG THE PARTIES. AFGHANISTAN HAS ALREADY LOST 1.3 MILLION PEOPLE. THE AFGHANS ARE PREPARED TO SHED BLOOD ONLY FOR LIBERATION, NOT FOR POWER STRUGGLES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. AFTER THE SPOKESMAN'S ADDRESS, THE GROUP WENT IN TO DINNER. HEKMATYAR CONTINUES AFTER DINNER

4. HEKMATYAR EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR SENATOR HUMPHREY'S COURAGEOUS STAND CALLING FOR A TOTAL AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. EVEN WHEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT SEEMED TO BE AGREEING TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS IN THEIR PRESENT SHAPE, HE SAID, THE SENATOR HAD SAID THAT THAT WOULD BETRAY THE JEHAD IN AFGHANISTAN. HE ADDED IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE CONCERNED PARTIES SEEM ABOUT TO SIGN IN GENEVA WITHOUT HAVING RESOLVED TO THE ALLIANCE'S SATISFACTION THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MUJAHEDIN

INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THE TOTAL CESSATION OF SOVIET AID TO THE KABUL REGIME. HE SPECULATED THAT IF PAKISTAN DOES INDEED SIGN, AID TO THE RESISTANCE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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GENEVA FOR NEA/DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY MEETING WITH AFGHAN THROUGH PAKISTAN WILL CEASE OR AT LEAST BE IMPOSSIBLE AT THE CURRENT LEVEL. "I DON'T THINK THESE PEOPLE WILL BE PREPARED TO VIOLATE THE ACCORDS," SHOULD AID CONTINUE THROUGH PAKISTAN, THEN THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE REASON TO BLAME PAKISTAN FOR VIOLATING THE ACCORDS.

5. "IN OUR VIEW," HEKMATYAR SAID, SPEAKING FOR THE ALLIANCE, "SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS WILL BE A GREAT HISTORICAL MISTAKE. PAKISTAN'S CREDIBILITY WILL BE DAMAGED, AND THE REFUGEES WILL FEEL THAT THEY'VE BEEN LET DOWN IN MID-COURSE."

6. HEKMATYAR ASSERTED THAT THE RESISTANCE HAS WON THE WAR ON THE MILITARY FIELD. WHY SHOULD THEY NOW ACCEPT SOVIET TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT. THE SOVIETS' PERSISTENCE IN PRESSURING PAKISTAN TO SIGN IN GENEVA PROVES THAT THE ACCORDS ARE IN THE INTEREST ONLY OF THE USSR.

7. HEKMATYAR THEN SAID THE USSR HAS BEEN TALKING WITH SOME ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, OFFERING TO HELP WITH THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IF THEY PRESSURE ISLAMABAD TO SIGN AT GENEVA. HE EXPRESSED AMAZEMENT THAT THESE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES HAVE ABANDONED SUPPORTING THE JEHAD SIMPLY FOR THEIR OWN SELF-INTEREST.

8. THE HEZB-E ISLAMI LEADER SAID SIGNING THE GENEVA ACCORDS IN THEIR PRESENT SHAPE IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THE ACCORDS ARE NOT IMPLEMENTABLE. THE RESISTANCE WILL FIGHT UNTIL THE LAST SOVIET HAS LEFT AFGHANISTAN AND THE MUJAHEDIN ESTABLISH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME QUARTERS SEE A MUJAHEDIN GOVERNMENT AS A THREAT BUT A MUJAHEDIN GOVERNMENT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL, FOR IT WOULD PREVENT SOVIET EXPANSIONISM IN THE REGION. HE ADDED, "I WANT TO SAY EXPLICITLY THAT WE WILL BE A DANGER TO NO ONE BUT THE SOVIET COLONIAL POWER."

9. HEKMATYAR EXHORTED THE SENATOR TO PREVENT THE GENEVA ACCORDS FROM BEING SIGNED IN THEIR PRESENT SHAPE. HE ASKED FOR HELP IN COUNTERING WHAT HE CALLED THE NEGATIVE PROPAGANDA ATTACKING THE ALLIANCE. DIFFERENCES IN OPINION DO NOT CONSTITUTE DISUNITY. HE ONCE AGAIN ASSERTED THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO SOLVE ITS PROBLEMS. THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE EVEN AFTER THE SOVIETS LEAVE AND THE MUJAHEDIN GOVERNMENT REPLACES THE KABUL REGIME. "WE ARE NOT A BELLICOSE PEOPLE," BUT WE WANT PEACE AND SECURITY." AFGHANS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND THEIR LAND RAVAGED. THE RESISTANCE, HE CONCLUDED, WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A

PSEUDO-PEACE BASED ON THE TERMS OF THE ENEMY.
YUNUS KHALIS SPEAKS HIS MIND

10. A ROUND OF OPINION FROM ALL OF THE OTHER LEADERS THEN BEGAN WITH FORMER RAIS YUNUS KHALIS. HE STATED HIS AGREEMENT WITH GULBUDDIN. HE THEN SAID THAT WHEN HE WENT TO THE U.S. LAST OCTOBER, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT HIS HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. KHALIS SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE BEST SERVED UNDER AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD REPLIED THAT THE AFGHANS AND THE AMERICANS HAVE A COMMON GOAL IN FIGHTING AGAINST THOSE WHO DON'T BELIEVE IN GOD.

11. THE FIGHTING CONTINUES IN AFGHANISTAN. HE WONDERED WHY, IF THE WEST THINKS A STRONG MUJAHEDIN FORCE IS IN ITS FAVOR, THAT ENOUGH MILITARY AID ISN'T PROVIDED. HE THANKED THE SENATOR FOR HIS SUPPORT BUT WANTED TO KNOW WHY MILITARY AID TO THE RESISTANCE IS BEING CUT OFF AND THE MUJAHEDIN HANDED OVER TO THE ENEMY WITH THEIR HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

12. KHALIS ASSERTED THAT THE U.S. AND THE USSR ARE MAKING PLANS AND COUNTER-PLANS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. THIS CONSTITUTES PROOF THAT NO ONE BUT THE AFGHANS CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF AFGHANISTAN. HE THEN ASKED RHETORICALLY WHO IS GAINING FROM THE GENEVA ACCORDS? THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN ARE GAINING IN SEEING THE SOVIETS LEAVE AFGHANISTAN. LIKEWISE, THE KABUL REGIME GAINS THE RECOGNITION OF PAKISTAN AND THE U.S. WITH THE RESULT THAT THE REFUGEES WILL BE FORCED TO

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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GENEVA FOR NEA/DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY MEETING WITH AFGHAN RETURN HOME. AND, IF THE REFUGEES ARE FORCED HOME, THEY WILL BE DRAFTED INTO THE REGIME'S MILITARY AND FORCED TO FIGHT AGAINST THE MUJAHEDIN. PAKISTAN IS CAVING IN, DESPITE PRESIDENT ZIA'S PROCLAIMED REFUSAL TO SIGN ANYTHING WITH THE KABUL REGIME, BECAUSE IT IS TIRED OF THE PRESSURE CAUSED BY SOVIET-SPONSORED TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN.

13. KHALIS SAID THAT THE RESISTANCE HAD ASKED THE U.S. TO STRENGTHEN PAKISTAN MILITARILY SO THAT IT COULD PROTECT ITS OWN BORDERS. BUT THIS REQUEST WAS IN VAIN. HE IMPLIED PAKISTAN IS NOW FORCED TO SIGN AT GENEVA BECAUSE OF A U.S. FAILURE TO PROTECT PAKISTAN.

14. KHALIS ASSETED THAT THE ONLY ADVANTAGE WILL GO TO THE SOVIETS IF THE ACCORDS ARE SIGNED. SOVIET EXPANSIONISM WILL HAVE DRIVEN A WEDGE BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. HE HAD CATEGORICALLY STATED HIS VIEWS TO SECRETARY SHULTZ IN WASHINGTON AND ASKED WHO THE SECRETARY WANTED TO SEE

RULING IN KABUL. THE SECRETARY, HE INSISTED, DIDN'T LIKE HIS WORDS, TURNED HIS BACK, AND WALKED OFF.

15. HE CONCLUDED WITH AN APPEAL TO THE SENATOR. THE GENEVA ACCORDS ARE NOT YET SIGNED. THE SENATOR SHOULD TELL THE U.S. NOT TO LEAVE PAKISTAN STRANDED AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME. PAKISTAN HAS NO POWER TO SAY NO TO GENEVA. BUT YOU, SENATOR HUMPHREY, CAN CREATE CONDITIONS IN THE U.S. AGAINST SIGNING AT GENEVA. THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, THE ONLY WAY TO HAVE STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN, HE INSISTED, IS A MUJAHEDIN GOVERNMENT IN KABUL.

16. IN A CODA, KHALIS PROMISED THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOT BECOME ANOTHER IRAN. IF WE BECOME AN IRAN, IT WILL ONLY BE FOR THE SOVIET UNION, NOT FOR OUR FRIENDS. HEKMATYAR QUIPPED THAT MAULAVI KHALIS CAN BE AFGHANISTAN'S KHOMEINI.
THE SENATOR REPLIES

17. HUMPHREY TOLD THE SPEAKERS THAT THEIR ANALYSIS IS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. HE HAD COUNSELLED HIS GOVERNMENT AS FORCEFULLY AS POSSIBLE NOT TO BE A PARTY TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS. THE STATUS QUO WOULD BE MUCH BETTER THAN WHAT WOULD COME OUT OF GENEVA. BEFORE HE LEAVES PAKISTAN, HE SAID, HE INTENDS TO RESPECTFULLY COUNSEL THE GOP NOT TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN THE FAULTY GENEVA PROCESS. HE ALSO PROMISED TO RALLY SUPPORT IN CONGRESS WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON.

18. THE SENATOR COUNSELLED REALISM, SAYING THAT HE DOES NOT MAKE FOREIGN POLICY. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE GENEVA AGREEMENT MIGHT EVEN BE SEALED BEFORE HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. HE RECOGNIZED THE CURRENT DANGER BUT THAT HIS AUTHORITY IS LIMITED. NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS IN GENEVA, HE PROMISED, THE USG IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE RESISTANCE AS FULLY AS IT HAS THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS. SUCH A PROMISE, HOWEVER, IS MEANINGLESS UNLESS PAKISTAN AGREES TO COOPERATE. HE SAID THAT HE CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE GOP BUT THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IT, TOO, WILL STAND WITH THE RESISTANCE.

PROFESSOR RABBANI SPEAKS

19. RABBANI OF JAMIAT-ISLAMI SAID THAT HE HOPED THE RESISTANCE CAN MAKE SOME GAINS EVEN THOUGH THE GENEVA ACCORDS ARE ON THE CUSP OF BEING SIGNED. HE ASSERTED THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF GAINING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR AFGHANISTAN WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA. THE ONLY THING THAT WILL BE ACHIEVED IS THAT THE KABUL REGIME, IMPOSED BY THE TANKS OF A SUPERPOWER, WILL GAIN STABILITY. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHY THE USSR IS SO EAGER TO CONCLUDE THE GENEVA ACCORDS. THE KABUL REGIME KNOWS IT CANNOT STAY IN POWER. WHAT ELSE DOES THE USSR HAS UP ITS SLEEVE. THE USSR'S INSISTENCE ON CONTINUED AID TO KABUL MAKES CLEAR ITS INTENTION TO CONTINUE INTERFERING IN AFGHANISTAN. THE KGB-TRAINED

ADVISORS, TECHNOCRATS, AND LABORERS WIVX ALL BE LEFT
BEHIND. NOTHING IN GENEVA PREVENTS THAT. THE SOVIET

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 07285
GENEVA FOR NEA/DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY MEETING WITH AFGHAN
MILITARY WILL TAKE COVER AS CIVILIAN ADVISORS. HE
CITED THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE CITIES IN NORTHERN
AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET CITIES AS FURTHER PROOF THAT
THE SOVIETS INTEND TO CONTINUE INTERFERING.

20. RABBANI SAID THAT A WESTERN JOURNALIST HAD
RECENTLY TOLD AN ALLIANCE OFFICIAL THAT GORBACHEV
INTENDS TO ANNEX AFGHANISTAN IF THE MUJAHEDIN
CONTINUE FIGHTING.

PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI TAKES A TURN

21. MOJADDEDI OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL LIBERATION
FRONT SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAS TRIED TO RESIST SIGNING
THE GENEVA ACCORDS BUT THAT ITS RESISTANCE IS OVER.
HE ASKED THE SENATOR TO THINK WITH HIM HOW THE
RESISTANCE CAN GET OUT OF THIS MESS.

22. HE POSED TWO QUESTIONS. HE ASKED THE SENATOR
HOW LONG AID WILL CONTINUE TO THE RESISTANCE -- ONLY
UNTIL THE LAST SOVIET SOLDIER LEAVES OR UNTIL THE
KABUL REGIME FALLS? AID SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE
PUPPET REGIME IS GONE. HE ASKED THE SENATOR HOW AID
CAN CONTINUE IF PAKISTAN IS NO LONGER ABLE TO HELP.
THE WEST CANNOT SEND AID THROUGH IRAN.
THE SENATOR RESPONDS AGAIN

23. SENATOR HUMPHREY SAID RABBANI HAD PERFECTLY
DESCRIBED THE TRAP. HE REPEATED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
PROMISE TO AID THE MUJAHEDIN AS LONG AS THEY NEED
HELP. BOTH THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN APPEAR WILLING TO
VIOLATE THE TREATY IN ORDER TO BE HONORABLE TOWARD
THE AFGHANS. "BUT I CAN'T SAY HOW IT WILL TURN OUT,"
HE SAID.

MAULAVI NABI MOHAMMADI SPEAKS HIS MIND

24. NABI MOHAMMADI ASKED HOW THE GENEVA ACCORDS CAN
BE A SOLUTION WHEN THE PROBLEM WILL STILL EXIST? THE
BASIC PROBLEM IS NOT THE SOVIET MILITARY BUT THE
COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN. GENEVA REMOVES THE
SOVIETS BUT LEAVES BEHIND THE SYSTEM. IT WAS THE
SYSTEM THAT CALLED IN THE SOVIETS. IF THE SYSTEM
REMAINS, THE USSR WILL WIN AND THE MUJAHEDIN AND
THEIR FRIENDS WILL LOSE. IF THE MUJAHEDIN CONTINUE
FIGHTING AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, THE SOVIETS
WILL HAVE REASON TO REINVADE AND MAKE THEIR PUSH
TOWARD THE WARM WATERS OF THE GULF. IN THAT CASE THE
ENTIRE FREE WORLD WILL BE ENDANGERED.

25. THE SOVIETS WENT INTO AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT

PROVOCATION, HE SAID. IF AID TO THE MUJAHEDIN WERE TO CONTINUE, THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE PROVOCATION AND ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO STAY IN AFGHANISTAN ON THE PRETEXT OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

26. MOHAMMADI NABI POINTED OUT ANOTHER DEFECT IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS. HE REMINDED THE SENATOR THAT KABUL AND NEW DELHI HAVE A MILITARY AGREEMENT. THE USSR MAY INDEED STOP ITS INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT THERE'S NOTHING TO STOP THE INDIANS.
PIR GAILANI TAKES HIS TURN

27. PIR GAILANI TOLD THE SENATOR HE CAN TRY TO STOP THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS BUT THAT IT LOOKS HOPELESS. THE RESISTANCE IS FIGHTING AGAINST A SYSTEM AND WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT THAT SYSTEM UNTIL IT IS REMOVED FROM THE SOIL OF AFGHANISTAN. HE ASKED THE SENATOR TO TRY TO FIND A WAY TO HELP THE PAKISTANI BROTHERS. IF AID IS CUT OFF, GOD FORBID, PAKISTAN WILL BE ENDANGERED IN THE FUTURE. NO COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN WILL EVER ALLOW THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THAT IS THE RIGHT OF OUR PEOPLE AND WE WILL TOPPLE THIS INHUMAN REGIME. IF OUR AID IS NOT CUT OFF, HE ADDED, WE WILL TOPPLE IT SOON.
AHMAD SHAH SPEAKS

28. AHMAD SHAH, REPRESENTING ITTIHAD AND HEAD OF THE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 07285
GENEVA FOR NEA/DAS PECK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, PK
SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY MEETING WITH AFGHAN
PROPOSED INTERIM GOVERNMENT, ASKED , "WHY DOES THE
U.S. SUPPORT THE MUJAHEDIN? TO TOPPLE COMMUNISM? IF
SO, THE GENEVA ACCORDS SOLVE NOTHING." HE THEN
INSINUATED THAT IF THE U.S. WAS LOOKING FOR SOMETHING
ELSE MAYBE IT HAS ALREADY GAINED WHAT IT WANTED AND
CAN SIGN AT GENEVA WITH A CLEAR CONSCIENCE.

29. HE TOLD THE SENATOR THAT CONTINUATION OF AID HAS BEEN DUE TO THE SENATOR'S EFFORTS. YOU RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, BUT, WHEN UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE ARMACOST MET WITH THE ALLIANCE, HE SHOWED NO INTEREST IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OR IN THE CONTINUATION OF MILITARY AID. HE RECOUNTED THAT KHALIS HAD ASKED ARMACOST FOR RECOGNITION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THAT ARMACOST HAD RESPONDS THAT MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS SUFFICIENT. "WE WERE ALL INSULTED," HE SAID.

30. AHMAD SHAH CONTINUED, "THIS MAY SOUND STRANGE, BUT WE FEEL THAT THE USSR IS ALWAYS AHEAD OF THE U.S. IN POLITICAL PLANNING AND PROPAGANDA. WE ALSO FEEL THAT THE U.S. ALWAYS LETS DOWN ITS FRIENDS." THE RESISTANCE HAD RESOLVED THAT THE REFUGEES WOULD NEVER

RETURN UNLESS THE CONDITIONS WERE FAVORABLE. PAKISTAN HAD ALSO PROMISED NOT TO FORCE THE REFUGEES BACK INTO AFGHANISTAN. BUT WITH THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS THE SOVIET UNION, A POWERFUL FORCE IN THE U.N., WILL FORCE THE UNHCR TO CUT OFF ITS AID TO THE REFUGEES. HOW COULD PAKISTAN BE EXPECTED TO HANDLE THE ENTIRE BURDEN OF SUPPORTING THE REFUGEES. HE PREDICTED THAT AFTER THE SIGNATURES AT GENEVA, THE USSR WILL DEMAND THAT INTERNATIONAL RELIEF BE CHanneled THROUGH KABUL. IF THE GENEVA ACCORDS ARE SIGNED, HE PREDICTED, THE BLOODSHED IN AFGHANISTAN WILL INCREASE. LIKEWISE, PAKISTAN'S REFUGEE AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS WILL INCREASE.

31. AHMAD SHAH SAID THAT THE RESISTANCE IS SKEPTICAL OF ANY PROMISES OF CONTINUED AID. PAKISTANI OFFICIALS HAD RECENTLY TOLD HIM THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL RECEIVE DOLS U.S. 70M IN AID. HOW CAN THAT AID BE GIVEN? "WE HAVE NO IDEA HOW IT CAN BE DISTRIBUTED." HE URGED THE SENATOR TO USE HIS FRIENDSHIPS AND POLITICAL ALLIANCES TO CONVINCE THE U.S. NOT TO SIGN AT GENEVA. THE GENEVA ACCORDS ENDANGER THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD. NABI MOHAMMADI ADDS ANOTHER POINT

32. NABI MOHAMMADI SAID THAT HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE U.S. HAS GOTTEN SO WEAK THAT IT IS WILLING TO GO AGAINST THE U.N. 123 NATIONS VOTED IN THE U.N. FOR THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIETS FROM AFGHANISTAN. A U.S. AGREEMENT AT GENEVA NEGATES THIS U.N. VOTE AND ACCEPTS CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIET ADVISORS WILL STAY BEHIND AND THE REFUGEES WILL BE UNABLE TO RETURN IN SAFETY AND DIGNITY. HE ASKED IF IT WOULD BE DIGNIFIED FOR THE REFUGEES TO BE LED BACK INTO AFGHANISTAN AND DELIVERED TO THEIR ENEMIES WITH THEIR HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS. HEKMATYAR'S FINAL COMMENT

33. HE ASKED THE SENATOR KINDLY TO QUESTION THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE GOP IF THEY ARE SIGNING AT GENEVA WITH THE INTENT TO VIOLATE THE ACCORDS. HE COUNSELLED THAT NO ONE SIGN IF VIOLATION IS INTENDED. HE DOUBTED THE USG TRULY INTENDS TO CONTINUE AID TO THE MUJAHEDIN. SUCH PROMISES ARE MADE ONLY TO SATISFY MEN LIKE THE SENATOR. GAILANI'S LAST WORD

34. PIR GAILANI COMPARED AFGHANISTAN TO VIET NAM. AMERICANS HAD OBJECTED TO THE U.S. PRESENCE IN VIET NAM. IN OUR CASE, HE SAID, YOUR PEOPLE WANT TO SUPPORT US BUT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS TYING OUR HANDS BEHIND OUR BACKS AND HANDING US OVER TO THE COMMUNISTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE IN A STATE OF DEFEAT. WE WHO ARE THE MILITARY

VICTORS, HE INSISTED, ARE BEING HANDED OVER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 07285

GENEVA FOR NEA/DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY MEETING WITH AFGHAN

SENATOR HUMPHREY CONCLUDES

35. THE SENATOR SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S.
AND PAKISTAN INTEND TO CHEAT AND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE
ARMS. THAT, HOWEVER, IS TAKING AN UNNECESSARY RISK.

36. MOSCOW AND KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RAPHEL##

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Alghant
6-Apr-1988 09:21 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Nelson C. Ledsky
Nicholas Rostow
Alison B. Fortier

(LEDSKY)
(ROSTOW)
(FORTIER)

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
(ERMARTH)

SUBJECT: fwd from Islamabad

In the following cable on Humphrey with Zia, I think Zia doesn't understand and Humphrey doesn't explain the difficulties the US will have in both serving as a guarantor of the present instruments and an arms supplier under positive symmetry.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

FILE # 196-076/2 #40

BY CAS DATE 1/2/01

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5-Apr-1988 19:47 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ERMARTH

FROM: VMS MAIL user WHSR
(WHSR@VAXE@)

SUBJECT:

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with RSCS id 8584
for ERMARTH@VAXC; Tue, 5-APR-1988 19:47 EDT
Date: Tue, 5-APR-1988 19:18 EST
From: <WHSR@VAXE>
To: ERMARTH@VAXC

<DIST>
PRT: OAKLEY SDO SIT
SIT: BENKO ERMARTH LEBRAS NSSRT RODMAN ROSS SIGLER

<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
~~SECRET~~
<OSRI>
RUEHIL
<DTG>
051155Z APR 88

<ORIG>
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

<TO>
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0845
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA, IMMEDIATE 5080
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4584
RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5909

<SUBJ>
SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY: AFGHAN DISCUSSION WITH
PRESIDENT ZIA

<TEXT>
BT

DECL 1 IEU/RELE SED

N S F96076/2 #41

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 9/29/00

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 07350

EXDIS/KHYBER

STATE FOR P AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY: AFGHAN DISCUSSION WITH
PRESIDENT ZIA

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOR H AND NEA: SENATOR HUMPHREY DID NOT HAVE A
CHANCE TO CLEAR THIS CABLE BEFORE DEPARTURE. H AND
NEA SHOULD PASS TO THE SENATOR'S STAFF FOR CLEARANCE.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

3. SUMMARY. IN A LENGTHY AND FRANK EXCHANGE, SENATOR
HUMPHREY INDICATED THAT HE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS WERE CONCERNED THAT BY BEING WILLING TO SIGN
THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND ALLOW SUPPLIES TO CONTINUE
TO FLOW TO THE MUJAHIDDIN, PAKISTAN WOULD BE FALLING
INTO A SOVIET TRAP AND WOULD EXPOSE ITSELF TO
INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION. HE ALSO WORRIED ABOUT
DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON THE GOP. ZIA SAID THAT PAKISTAN
HAD NO CHOICE ABOUT WHETHER TO SIGN BUT ONLY ABOUT
WHEN. HE PRAISED THE POLITICAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME
MINISTER JUNEJO FOR ITS ACTIONS TO DATE BUT AGREED
THAT AT SOME POINT DOWN THE ROAD ITS RESOLVE MIGHT
WEAKEN. EVEN IF SO, HOWEVER, BY THAT TIME THE BULK OF
THE SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. ZIA SAID THAT
HIS MAJOR CONCERN IS THE REACTION OF THE MUJAHIDDIN
WHOSE CONCERNS HE HAS TRIED TO ALLAY. THE BEST WAY TO
REASSURE THEM, HE SAID, WAS TO "FRONT LOAD" MILITARY
ASSISTANCE IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. ZIA AGREED WITH
HUMPHREY THAT A UNILATERAL FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT BY THE MUJAHIDDIN WAS A POSSIBILITY BUT
SAID IT SHOULD ONLY BE TRIED AFTER CORDOVEZ HAD TRIED
AND FAILED TO FORM AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.
END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

4. SENATOR HUMPHREY, ACCOMPANIED BY STAFFERS DR.
MICHAEL PILLSBURY AND THOMAS KLEINE, AMBASSADOR AND
DCM MET WITH PRESIDENT ZIA EVENING OF APRIL 4. WITH
ZIA WERE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
GENERAL AKHTAR, ISI DIRECTOR GENERAL HAMID GUL, CHIEF
OF THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF GENERAL REFAQAT AND AZIZ
KHAN AND MUNIR AKRAM FROM MFA.

5. ZIA OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY THANKING THE SENATOR
FOR THE "NICE BOOST" GIVEN TO THE GOP BY THE SENATE
RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN OF FEBRUARY 29. HUMPHREY
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE HOSPITALITY EXTENDED
TO HIM DURING HIS VISIT AND ASKED WHETHER HE COULD
SPEAK FRANKLY ABOUT HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE US-GOP
APPROACH TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. ZIA SAID HE
WELCOMED FRANKNESS AND WOULD PROVIDE AN EQUALLY FRANK
REPLY. HUMPHREY SAID HE IS WORRIED THAT UNDER THE
TERMS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT THE SOVIETS ARE FREE TO
RESUPPLY THE KABUL REGIME BUT PAKISTAN IS NOT ABLE TO

SUPPORT THE MUJAHIDDIN EXCEPT BY VIOLATING THE AGREEMENT. HE BELIEVES THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO TURN WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST PAKISTAN, BRING IT UNDER INCREASING CRITICISM AND EVENTUALLY EVEN GENERATE A UN RESOLUTION CONDEMNING PAKISTAN. HE IS ALSO WORRIED ABOUT DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION IN PAKISTAN IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE NEXT ELECTIONS. HE ASKED WHY ZIA IS ASKING FOR ALL THIS TROUBLE.

6. IN A LONG REPLY, ZIA NOTED THAT THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE FROM PAKISTAN'S POINT OF VIEW HAD BEEN TO FORCE THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW, TO ALLOW THE REFUGEES TO RETURN AND TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR A FREELY CHOSEN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD RETURN TO A POSITION OF NON-ALIGNMENT. PAKISTAN WAS ALONE IN THIS EFFORT IN THE EARLY YEARS, AND EVENTUALLY WAS JOINED BY THE US AND OTHERS. AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT IN DECEMBER, AFGHANISTAN WAS BARELY MENTIONED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. IN ZIA'S OPINION, GORBACHEV HAD GOT THE BETTER OF THE US AT THAT TIME AND, WHEN HE SPOKE TO THE PRESS THE NEXT DAY, HE DWELLED AT LENGTH ON AFGHANISTAN, MENTIONING WITHDRAWAL AND SETTING A TIME FRAME OF A YEAR OR LESS. HE ALSO INDICATED US-SOVIET AGREEMENT TO DELINKING THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION FROM WITHDRAWAL. IN HIS FEBRUARY 8 STATEMENT, HE WENT A STEP FURTHER, YIELDING ON FRONT-LOADING AND SETTING FIXED DATES FOR BEGINNING AND ENDING THE WITHDRAWAL. THE US AND GOP

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 07350

EXDIS/KHYBER

STATE FOR P AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY: AFGHAN DISCUSSION WITH COULD AGREE TO THE BROAD OUTLINES OF GORBACHEV'S APPROACH BUT THE GOP WAS LEFT WITH A FEW POINTS UNRESOLVED IN TERMS OF ITS BASIC OBJECTIVES.

7. ZIA THEN MENTIONED THAT THE BASIS OF HIS HIGH REGARD FOR KURT WALDHEIM LIES IN THE FACT THAT, AS UN SECRETARY GENERAL, HE HAD HELPED PAKISTAN LAUNCH THE GENEVA PROCESS. GENEVA IS PAKISTAN'S CREATION, SAID ZIA, EVEN THOUGH THE GOP HAD INSISTED ON THE INDIRECT FORMAT FOR THE TALKS. THE INSTRUMENTS AS NEGOTIATED ARE "PRETTY GOOD" BUT THE GOP ALSO REQUIRES AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO CREATE THE ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES. EARLIER, THE GOP HAD INSISTED THAT AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED WITH BABRAK KARMAL AND THE SOVIETS HAD REMOVED HIM. THE GOP'S POSITION THEN WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT SIGN WITH KARMAL BUT WOULD WITH ANYONE ELSE. ZIA SAID THAT, WHEN HE HAD MORE RECENTLY

SUGGESTED TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY REMOVE NAJIBULLAH, THEY HAD REMINDED HIM OF HIS EARLIER STATEMENT.

8. IN ZIA'S VIEW, PAKISTAN HAS NEVER HAD THE CHOICE OF NOT SIGNING AT GENEVA. WHAT IT CAN CHOOSE IS WHEN TO SIGN. HE TOLD HUMPHREY THAT THE POLITICAL GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO DESERVES FULL CREDIT FOR NOT SIGNING ON MARCH 15 AND FOR INDICATING THAT IT WOULD SIGN ONLY WHEN ALL FOUR SIGNATORIES WERE READY AND WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO US TERMS ON SYMMETRY.

9. IN ZIA'S VIEW, THE PROBLEM OF SYMMETRY HAD EMERGED OVER TIME. AS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS DEVELOPED, THE SUPPLY QUESTION BECAME INCREASINGLY UNBALANCED. LUCKILY IT WAS DETECTED IN TIME. HUMPHREY INTERJECTED THAT IT WAS DETECTED BARELY IN TIME. ZIA AGREED AND SAID SECRETARY SHULTZ DESERVES FULL CREDIT FOR RAISING IT AND FOR PRESENTING IT FORCEFULLY TO THE SOVIETS. ZIA RETURNED TO HUMPHREY'S INITIAL QUESTION, SAYING THAT IF THE SOVIETS ARE WITHDRAWING, SOMETHING HE HIMSELF DOUBTED UNTIL NOW, THE ONLY QUESTION IS WHETHER IT SHOULD BE DONE THROUGH AN AGREEMENT OR NOT. THE GOP BELIEVES AN AGREEMENT IS BETTER AS DO MOST OF ITS FRIENDS. HE CITED MRS. THATCHER OF THE U.K., WHO HAS URGED HIM TO GET THE SOVIETS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO WITHDRAW THROUGH SIGNATURE AT GENEVA, AS WELL AS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, PAKISTAN'S ARAB BROTHERS AND TO SOME EXTENT THE U.S. PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL GOVERNMENT WAS OBLIGED TO ACCEPT THE OPINIONS OF THESE FRIENDS.

10. ZIA THEN MENTIONED THE UNGA VOTE IN THE FALL, WHEN 123 COUNTRIES HAD VOTED FOR THE AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTION. HE ADDED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT, WITH ITS UNTIRING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, DESERVED MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR THIS VICTORY. HOWEVER, PAKISTAN HAD RELAXED AFTER THE VOTE AND, SUDDENLY, IN MARCH AT THE OIC CONFERENCE IN AMMAN, FACED WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN A HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE. PRIOR TO THE UNGA, THE SOVIETS HAD SENT EMISSARIES TO MORE THAN 60 COUNTRIES AND WERE FULLY EXPECTING NO MORE THAN 106 VOTES AGAINST THEM. STUNG BY THEIR DEFEAT, THEY IMMEDIATELY WENT TO WORK ON THE 46 MOSLEM STATES IN THE OIC, OFFERED SOME CARROTS (WHICH IN A LATTER CONVERSATION OVER DINNER HE EXPLAINED TO HAVE BEEN LARGELY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MOVE FORWARD ON A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR) AND A LOT OF MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION. SUDDENLY, PAKISTAN FOUND AS MANY AS 30 COUNTRIES OF THE 46 LEANING TOWARD THE SOVIET POSITION. AND, IF THEY HAD WON ON THAT ISSUE, OTHERS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE WOULD HAVE SUFFERED TOO. ONLY HARD WORD AND THE FORTUITOUS PRESENCE OF KING HUSSAIN IN ISLAMABAD AT THE TIME HAD SAVED THE DAY.

11. ZIA ADDED THAT CHINA HAD BEEN THE ONLY FRIENDLY COUNTRY WHICH HAD NOT URGED PAKISTAN TO SIGN EARLY AT

GENEVA. HE HAD ASKED THEIR AMBASSADOR THREE QUESTIONS: WHETHER PAKISTAN WOULD BE ADVISED TO SIGN INSTRUMENTS I AND III, WITHOUT KNOWING WHETHER THE SOVIETS AND U.S. WOULD GUARANTEE; WHETHER SYMMETRY SHOULD BE RETAINED AS A CONDITION AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS, THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR HAD INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDING FULL SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN'S POSITION.

12. IN THE EVENT, DESPITE EXTERNAL PRESSURE, THE POLITICAL GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO SIGN ONLY IF ALL

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 07350

EXDIS/KHYBER

STATE FOR P AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY: AFGHAN DISCUSSION WITH FOUR PARTICIPANTS WERE ON BOARD. IN ZIA'S VIEW, THIS IS THE RIGHT DECISION. THE OUTCOME, IF SUCCESSFUL, WILL BE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL WITHDRAW AND THE REFUGEES WILL RETURN. THEN, ONLY THE FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN AS AN ISSUE. ZIA RECOUNTED THAT WHEN VORONTSOV WAS HERE IN FEBRUARY, HE HAD URGED HIM TO WITHDRAW BUT TO TAKE NAJIBULLAH WITH HIM BECAUSE HE CANNOT BE SUSTAINED WITHOUT SOVIET TROOPS. VORONTSOV'S REPLY WAS "HE COULDN'T CARE LESS." ZIA ACCUSED HIM OF TRYING TO CREATE CONDITIONS OF CHAOS SIMILAR TO THOSE IMMEDIATE PRECEDING THOSE OF THE DECEMBER 1979 INVASION. WOULDN'T THE SOVIETS DO BETTER TO HELP CREATE A GOVERNMENT THAT HAD THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT. ZIA SAID HE URGED VORONTSOV TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT CORDOVEZ SECOND TRACK, AT LEAST UNTIL MARCH 31. VORONTSOV HAD INITIALLY AGREED AS LONG AS THE GOP WAS SIMPLY NOT MANEUVERING FOR MORE TIME. LATER IN THE VISIT, AFTER CHECKING WITH MOSCOW, HE TOLD ZIA THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN PERSUASIVE ENOUGH.

13. HUMPHREY PICKED UP ON THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO DECEMBER 1979, AND SAID THAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION, THE US AND PAKISTAN HAD AGREED TO RID AFGHANISTAN OF COMMUNISM, NOT JUST THE SOVIET ARMY. IF THAT WAS OUR OBJECTIVE, THEN TOGETHER WE HAVE FAILED. MOREOVER, SAID HUMPHREY, PAKISTAN BELIEVES THAT THE CHIEF BENEFIT OF GENEVA IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WRIGGLE OUT OF IT. HOWEVER, IF PAKISTAN VIOLATES THE AGREEMENT, THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE EVERY CAUSE TO WRIGGLE OUT. IN HIS VIEW, PAKISTAN IS PROVIDING THE SOVIETS AN EXCUSE TO STAY. ZIA SAID THIS IS NOT SO. WHEN SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD RAISED SYMMETRY WITH SHEVARDNADZE, HE SAID THAT BOTH SIDES STOPPING SUPPLY WAS PREFERABLE BUT HAD BEEN CLEAR IN ADDING THAT IF THEY AGREE TO CONTINUE TO

SUPPLY, SUCH SUPPLY WOULD BE THROUGH PAKISTAN. EVEN
THOUGH SHULTZ HAD PUSHED FOR A REPLY, SHEVARDNADZE
HAD REMAINED SILENT. NONETHELESS, HE UNDERSTOOD THE
PROPOSAL AND SHOULD PAKISTAN ALLOW ASSISTANCE TO GO
ACROSS THE BORDER, WHO COULD PROVE THE VIOLATION. THE
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER IS 1200 MILES LONG AND
POROUS. PAKISTAN HAD POINTED OUT THAT PROBLEM TO THE
SOVIETS AS LONG AGO AS 1983. VIOLATIONS MIGHT EARN
PAKISTAN SOME NOTES OF PROTEST FROM THE SOVIETS BUT,
IF THEY HAVE AGREED WITH THE US TO WITHDRAW THEIR
TROOPS AND NOT TO COME BACK, WHAT ELSE CAN THEY DO.

14. HUMPHREY POINTED OUT THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD STILL
NOT AGREED TO POSITIVE SYMMETRY AND ZIA REPLIED THAT
HE DOUBTED THAT HE WOULD ACTUALLY DO SO OPENLY.
HUMPHREY THOUGHT THIS WAS BECAUSE THE SOVIETS
INTENDED TO HOLD PAKISTAN ACCOUNTABLE FOR ANY
VIOLATIONS, A POINT WHICH ZIA CONCEDED, ADDING THAT
HE EXPECTED SOME PRESSURE. HOWEVER, ZIA HIMSELF HAD
PRAYED FOR POSITIVE SYMMETRY AND CONTINUATION OF
SUPPORT TO THE RESISTANCE AS THE OUTCOME OF THESE
NEGOTIATIONS. HUMPHREY REPLIED THAT, IF THE SOVIETS
ARE LEAVING, IT IS BECAUSE PAKISTAN HAS MADE LIFE TOO
UNPLEASANT FOR THEM. ZIA ACCEPTED THE COMPLIMENT BUT
ADDED THAT US ASSISTANCE AND THE MUJAHIDDIN
THEMSELVES WERE ESSENTIAL TO MAKE THIS HAPPEN.

15. HUMPHREY NOTED THAT HIS CONCERNS WERE SHARED
WIDELY IN THE SENATE, PARTICULARLY BY THOSE WHO HAD
STOOD BY PAKISTAN IN THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DEBATE
AND WHO WOULD BE NEEDED IN THE E-3A DEBATE. HE
WONDERED IF PAKISTAN WOULD REMAIN FIRM. ZIA SAID THAT
HUMPHREY HAD A POINT AND THAT IT WAS NOT
INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE POLITICAL GOVERNMENT MIGHT
BUCKLE AT SOME LATER STAGE. IF SO, HOWEVER, THERE
WOULD BE A HIGH DOMESTIC PRICE TO PAY BUT, AT LEAST,
BY THEN THE SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE GONE.

16. HUMPHREY SAID THAT HE WAS SORRY THAT ONLY CHINA
HAD BEEN PREPARED TO STAND BY PAKISTAN. AMBASSADOR
REMINDS ZIA THAT THE US HAD ALSO NOT URGED PAKISTAN
TO SIGN ON ITS OWN. ZIA CLARIFIED THAT THE US HAD NOT
BEEN PRESSURING PAKISTAN TO SIGN, BUT INSTEAD HAD
EMPHASIZED THAT MARCH 15 WAS NOT A MAGIC DATE AND
THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD PROCEED ACCORDING TO ITS
JUDGMENT ABOUT ITS OWN BEST INTERESTS.

17. HUMPHREY STATED THAT CLEARLY THE SOVIETS INTEND
TO PURSUE THEIR OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN BY OTHER
MEANS WITH MASSIVE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AND THOUSANDS OF ADVISERS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE

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#7350

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 07350

EXDIS/KHYBER

STATE FOR P AND NEA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK

SUBJECT: CODEL HUMPHREY: AFGHAN DISCUSSION WITH PDPA WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD ON.

18. ZIA CONFESSED THAT HIS MAJOR CONCERN IS THE REACTION OF THE MUJAHIDDIN TO A GENEVA AGREEMENT. THEY ARE SUSPICIOUS OF PAKISTAN AND THINK IT WILL SIGN IN ORDER TO GET RID OF THEM, THAT PAKISTAN HAS BUCKLED TO SOVIET PRESSURE AND THAT IT WILL FORCE THE REFUGEES TO GO HOME. THE MUJAHIDDIN ARE CONCERNED THAT THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES WOULD INTERFERE WITH THEIR ABILITY TO PURSUE MILITARY OPERATIONS. ZIA SAID HE HAS TRIED TO ALLAY THEIR FEARS BUT KNOWS THAT HE HAS NOT CONVINCED THEM TOTALLY. HE SAID HE HAS ASSURED THEM THAT NO REFUGEES WOULD RETURN FOR AT LEAST FIVE OR SIX MONTHS (HE CLARIFIED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING PARTICULARLY OF THE TWO MONTHS BETWEEN SIGNATURE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE AND THE THREE MONTHS WHEN 50 PER CENT OF THE SOVIET TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRAWING). MOREOVER, HE TOLD THE RESISTANCE THAT ON ITS OWN, KABUL WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MOUNT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON ANY SCALE WHICH WOULD IMMEDIATELY PROVIDE THE MUJAHIDDIN WITH LARGE SAFE AREAS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN.

19. ZIA THOUGHT THE ONLY WAY TO REASSURE THE ALLIANCE LEADERS WAS TO INCREASE SUPPLY FLOWS. IF THE FLOW CAN BE DOUBLED OVER THE NEXT THREE MONTHS, THEN THEY WOULD BELIEVE THE US AND PAKISTAN. HE THOUGHT THAT THE RESISTANCE WOULD "EVENTUALLY SEE THE LIGHT" AND ADDED THAT THEIR SINCERITY CANNOT BE DOUBTED. HUMPHREY ASKED WHAT THE GOP WOULD DO IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT ACCEPT THE SHULTZ FORMULATION. ZIA REPLIED THAT THEN THINGS WOULD CONTINUE AS THEY ARE.

20. HUMPHREY SAID HE WANTED TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF PAKISTANI VIOLATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, SAYING THAT HE THINKS IT MOST UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW WHILE VIOLATIONS ARE OCCURRING. ZIA EXPRESSED BASIC AGREEMENT WITH THIS COMMENT BUT SAID THAT THE FIRST THREE MONTHS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE ARE THE MOST CRITICAL TIME. HE SAW NO REASON WHY THE US OR GOP SHOULD VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS WHEN WE WILL HAVE ALREADY "FRONT LOADED" THE MUJAHIDDIN WITH ALL OF THE SUPPLIES THEY WILL NEED AND AS 50 PER CENT OF SOVIET TROOPS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWING. HUMPHREY ASKED IF THIS MEANT A CUT OFF OF SUPPLIES FOR A THREE MONTH PERIOD. ZIA CLARIFIED HIS REMARK BY SAYING THAT IT DID NOT. HE WAS TALKING ABOUT A FRONT LOADED BUILD UP BEFORE ENTRY INTO FORCE AND THEN TO CONTINUE SUPPLIES AS NORMAL. THE FLOW WILL CONTINUE. US AND GOP AID TO THE RESISTANCE IS A FLOW, SAID ZIA, NOT SOMETHING TIED TO A SPECIFIC DAY WHEREAS THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW IS TIME BOUND. HUMPHREY REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WE COULD OBTAIN SOVIET WITHDRAWAL JUST AS WELL WITHOUT THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. HE HOPED ZIA

WAS RIGHT BUT DOUBTED IT. IF THINGS GO BADLY, IS THERE A BACK DOOR THROUGH WHICH TO GET OUT AND MIGHT A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT BE SUCH A BACK DOOR.

21. ZIA AGREED WITH THE IDEA, SAID THE GOP HAD CONSIDERED IT BUT THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE ACCEPTABLE IF THIS GOVERNMENT CAME THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF CORDOVEZ. HUMPHREY ASKED HOW LONG WOULD ZIA ALLOW CORDOVEZ TO WORK BEFORE CONSENTING TO MUJAHIDDIN FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. ZIA SAID THAT SUCH A UNILATERAL STEP COULD BE TAKEN NOT MORE THAN TWO TO FOUR WEEKS AFTER CORDOVEZ INDICATED HE COULD NOT SUCCEED. HE ASSURED SENATOR HUMPHREY THAT THE BEGINNING OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A GREAT VICTORY FOR US ALL.

22. HUMPHREY THEN ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE PAKISTANI REACTION SHOULD THE SOVIETS COME BACK WITH A SUGGESTION FOR NEGATIVE, RATHER THAN POSITIVE, SYMMETRY. ZIA RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD NEVER HAPPEN. THE SOVIETS ARE TOO FAR COMMITTED PUBLICLY TO THEIR RIGHT TO SUPPLY KABUL AND WILL NEVER AGREE TO GIVE IT UP. THEY WOULD FEAR THE REACTION IN EASTERN EUROPE. THIS PLEASES HIM, HE SAID, AS HE ALWAYS THOUGHT THAT NEGATIVE SYMMETRY AND CUTTING OFF SUPPLIES TO THE RESISTANCE WAS THE WORST OUTCOME OF ALL FOR US.

23. MOSCOW AND KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RAPHEL##

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SECTION: 01 OF 04

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SECTION: 02 OF 04

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SECTION: 03 OF 04

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880405182346 MSG000197576626

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SECTION: 04 OF 04

<SSN>

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96076/2 #42

SECRET

BY CIS, NARA DTE 9/29/00

Admission

EUR/SOV:MRPARRIS/P:CMSROSS
04/07/88, EXT. 76729
P:MMHARMACOST

NEA:EDJEREJIAN
S/S:MLEVITSKY
NSCS:JNEGROPONTE
S/S-01

EUR:MRPARRIS
L/NEA:PNORTON
S/S:

IMMEDIATE

MOSCOW, GENEVA IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

ISLAMABAD

NOBIS

MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR/GENEVA FOR PECK FROM ARMACOST

DECL: OADR

PREL, UR, US, AF

AFGHANISTAN -- SOVIET ASSURANCES

NHA
HRP
ED
TUS
ML
S/S-0
NSCS

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ONE ISSUE WE EXPECT QUICKLY TO ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH SERVING AS A GUARANTOR OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS IS WHETHER THE U.S. HAS SIGNED AN AGREEMENT IT INTENDS TO VIOLATE. WE WANT TO BE IN A POSITION TO ANSWER SUCH CRITICISM BY DOCUMENTING (A) THAT WE HAVE BEEN CANDID WITH THE SOVIETS IN EXPLAINING THE CONCEPT OF "POSITIVE SYMMETRY," AND (B) THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ASSURED US THAT THEY DO NOT VIEW U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE AS A VIOLATION OF THE ACCORDS ON OUR PART.

3. THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO SHEVARDNAZDE SHOULD TAKE CARE OF THE FIRST CONCERN -- ESTABLISHING THAT WE HAVE CLEARLY ADVISED THE SOVIETS THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY THOSE AFGHANS WHOM WE HAVE SUPPORTED IF THEY CONTINUE TO SUPPLY MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO KABUL.

4. THE SECOND CONCERN IS REFLECTED ONLY IN ORAL ASSURANCES PROVIDED BY SHEVARDNAZDE AND ADAMISHIN DURING

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THEIR RECENT DISCUSSIONS HERE WITH THE SECRETARY AND WITH ME.

5. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE SEEK AN URGENT APPOINTMENT WITH SHEVARDNADZE TO STATE THAT:

-- WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE TASHKENT COMMUNIQUE, PARTICULARLY ITS WELCOME OF OUR POSSIBLE ROLE AS GUARANTORS

-- THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 30 LETTER AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A ROLE AS GUARANTOR ARE BASED ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET POSITION AS IT EMERGED IN THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN MINISTERS IN WASHINGTON. OUR TRANSCRIPTS OF THOSE CONVERSATIONS INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS AS FOLLOWS:

DO THE TWO SIDES COULD AGREE TO COMPLY WITH THOSE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS; U.S. OBLIGATIONS WERE DEFINED IN THE DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES; WHATEVER WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THIS DECLARATION WOULD NOT BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION; NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE;

DO SINCE THE PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE WAS NOT COVERED BY THE DECLARATION, U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT, AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT SO CHARGE;

DO HOW THE U.S. PROVIDED SUCH ASSISTANCE, IF IT CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO DO SO, WAS "NOT THE CONCERN" OF THE SOVIET UNION.

-- WHILE WE HAVE RECEIVED INTERIM RESPONSES TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER IN THE DAYS SINCE ITS DELIVERY, WE ARE STILL AWAITING THE DEFINITIVE RESPONSE WE ASSUME IS TO COME.

-- WE URGE THAT THIS RESPONSE STATE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OUTLINED IN THE MINISTERS' WASHINGTON MEETINGS AND REITERATED IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER OF MARCH 30.

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Alphamistr

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8-Apr-1988 09:52 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

John E. Herbst
Nelson C. Ledsky

(HERBST)
(LEDSKY)

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
(ERMARTH)

SUBJECT: From Kabul on Symmetry

The attached makes clear we and the Paks are going into this deal at our own risk.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E96-076/2 #43

BY GS DATE 1/2/01

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8-Apr-1988 09:40 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ERMARTH

FROM:

VMS MAIL user WHSR
(WHSR@VAXE@)

SUBJECT:

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F96076/2 #44

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 9/29/00

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with RSCS id 2728
for ERMARTH@VAXC; Fri, 8-APR-1988 09:40 EDT
Date: Fri, 8-APR-1988 09:40 EST
From: <WHSR@VAXE>
To: ERMARTH@VAXC

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PRT: OAKLEY SDO
SIT: BENKO ERMARTH LEBRAS NSSRT RODMAN ROSS SIGLER

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8574
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2308
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1891
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 5011
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5153
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 6902

<SUBJ>
SUBJECT: SOVIET AMBASSADOR COMMENTS ON SYMMETRY

<TEXT>

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 00791

EXDIS KHYBER

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USDEL SECRETARY
GENEVA FOR DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MCAP, UR, PK, AF

SUBJECT: SOVIET AMBASSADOR COMMENTS ON SYMMETRY

REF: KABUL 0781

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR NIKOLAY YEGORYCHEV TOLD ME, DURING COURSE OF WORLD HEALTH DAY RECEPTION, APRIL 7, THAT SOVIET POSITION ON "SYMMETRY" QUESTION IN THE WAKE OF THE TASHKENT SUMMIT IS AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO SUPPLY MILITARILY THE RA;

-- IF PAKISTAN WERE TO TRANSSHIP TO AFGHANISTAN ANY AMERICAN HELP PROVIDED TO THE MUJAHIDIN, IT WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT. (COMMENT: AMBASSADOR YEGORYCHEV DID NOT MAKE CLEAR HOW THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REACT TO A "VIOLATION.");

-- SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO THE RA WOULD BE DETERMINED BY TWO FACTORS:

A. OBSERVATION OF WHAT THE U.S. PROVIDES TO THE MUJAHIDIN. AMBASSADOR YEGORYCHEV ADDED, WITH REGARD TO THE PERIOD BEFORE GENEVA IMPLEMENTATION, THAT, "IF THE U.S. DELIVERS 300 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE MUJAHIDIN, AS REPORTED BY THE PRESS, IT WILL BE MAKING A BIG MISTAKE."

B. SOVIET ESTIMATION OF WHAT IS NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF THE AFGHAN MILITARY SITUATION. AMBASSADOR YEGORYCHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS "VITAL INTERESTS" (ZHIZNENNYE INTERESY) ENGAGED IN AFGHANISTAN. IT WOULD DETERMINE ITS MILITARY DELIVERIES BASED ON HOW THESE INTERESTS WERE AFFECTED.

3. AMBASSADOR YEGORYCHEV SAID THAT NO NEW STATEMENTS ON SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS BEYOND THAT OF GORBACHEV AND NAJIBULLAH WOULD BE MADE IN THE NEAR-TERM. WORK HAS BEEN PURSUED ON A NEW SOVIET-AFGHAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BUT IT WILL NOT BE COMPLETED FOR "SOME TIME." (COMMENT: SOVIET SOURCES, QUOTED BY EASTERN EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS IN REFTEL, INDICATED THAT WORK HAD BEEN PURSUED DURING THE SHEVARDNADZE VISIT ON A STATEMENT OUTLINING FUTURE SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS, POSSIBLY INCLUDING RELEASE OF TEXT OR OUTLINE OF A NEW SOVIET-AFGHAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY. STATEMENT WAS PLANNED FOR SATURDAY, APRIL 9.)

4. AMBASSADOR YEGORYCHEV ADDED THAT, NOW THAT A GENEVA AGREEMENT APPEARED IMMINENT, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE GOVERNMENT OF NAJIBULLAH. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE HOW THE UNITED STATES COULD MAINTAIN AN EMBASSY HERE WITHOUT RELATIONS WITH

THE GOVERNMENT. I REITERATED OUR POLICY OF NON-
RECOGNITION OF THE RA.

5. ON THE RECENT INFLUX OF SOVIET CIVILIAN "EXPERTS"
PROVIDING FAST-DISBURSING ASSISTANCE IN AFGHAN TOWNS,
SOVIET EMBASSY ECONOMIC MINISTER PETROV TOLD ME THEY
WOULD BE REMOVED BEFORE COMPLETION OF SOVIET TROOP
WITHDRAWAL. HE ALSO DENIED THESE INDIVIDUALS HAD ANY
MILITARY CONNECTION.

6. COMMENT: AS DESCRIBED BY AMBASSADOR YEGORYCHEV,
THE SOVIET POSITION ON SYMMETRY APPEARS TO BE THAT
MOSCOW WILL HEW TO ITS PUBLIC STANCE THAT THE USSR
HAS A RIGHT TO SUPPLY AND PAKISTAN WILL BE IN VIOLATION
IF IT TRANSSHIPS. PRIVATELY, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE
ASSERTING THAT--AT LEAST AFTER AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION--
THEY MAY NOT SUPPLY IF THE U.S. DOES NOT DO SO AND
THERE IS NO AFGHAN MILITARY SUPPLY SHORTFALL. THE
SOVIETS ARE, HOWEVER, HOLDING OPEN THE OPTION OF SUPPLY
IF THE REGIME SUFFERS MILITARY OR OTHER SETBACKS.

7. WE NOTE THAT RADIO MOSCOW'S COMMENTARY (RESHETNIKOV)

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EXDIS KHYBER

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USDEL SECRETARY
GENEVA FOR DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MCAP, UR, PK, AF

SUBJECT: SOVIET AMBASSADOR COMMENTS ON SYMMETRY
THIS MORNING, APRIL 8, ASSERTED THAT, BASED ON THE
NAJIBULLAH-GORBACHEV STATEMENT, THERE HAD BEEN AN
ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION
ON THE "SYMMETRY" QUESTION. HOW THIS ACCOMMODATION
WILL BE PUBLICLY CHARACTERIZED REMAINS UNCLEAR,
PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PAKISTANI
VIOLATIONS.

8. ALSO UNCERTAIN IS HOW MOSCOW WILL REACT PUBLICLY,
AND IN TERMS OF ITS OWN SUPPLY EFFORT, TO U.S.
SHIPMENT OF ASSISTANCE TO THE MUJAHIDIN BEFORE MAY 15
AND ANY U.S. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT TO MANDATE CONTINUED
SUPPLY TO THE MUJAHIDIN. END COMMENT.

9. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GLASSMAN

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1011

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NLS F94076/2 #45

BY CAS, NARS DATE 9/29/00

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 09216

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR, AF, PK, PARM

SUBJECT: SHEVARDNADZE LETTER ON AFGHANISTAN, APRIL 9

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

SUMMARY

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2. AMBASSADOR MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
ALEKSANDR BESSMERTNYKH AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST ON
APRIL 9 TO RECEIVE TEXT OF SHEVARDNADZE LETTER TO
SECRETARY SHULTZ ON AFGHANISTAN. (EMBASSY
TRANSLATION OF TEXT FOLLOWS PARA 6 BELOW.)
BESSMERTNYKH ALSO SUGGESTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE HOPED
TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY AT GENEVA TO DISCUSS THE
AGENDA OF NST QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED AT THE MOSCOW
MINISTERIAL

END SUMMARY

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3. AMBASSADOR MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
ALEKSAMDR BESSMERTNYKH AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST ON
APRIL 9 TO RECEIVE TEXT OF SHEVARDNADZB LETTER TO

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SECRETARY SHULTZ ON AFGHANISTAN. TAKING NOTE OF THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 30 LETTER AND THE ORAL MESSAGE PASSED BY THE AMBASSADOR ON APRIL 8, BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE U.S. WOULD FIND THE LETTER TO SECRETARY SHULTZ SATISFACTORY. HE ADDED THAT HE WANTED TO HIGHLIGHT THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE LETTER WHICH NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONDUCT ITSELF ON THE BASIS OF THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED DURING THE MARCH MINISTERIAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON.

4. BESSMERTNYKH READ FROM THE TEXT, NOTING THAT:

-- THE SIGNING IN GENEVA WOULD MARK THE END OF ONE PROCESS AND THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER;

-- THE WASHINGTON TALKS HAD HELPED WORK OUT THIS AGREEMENT;

-- THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF AFGHANISTAN COULD SERVE AS POSITIVE EXAMPLE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

5. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, ALL PARTIES WOULD BE FREE TO MAKE STATEMENTS AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING. HE ASKED HOW THE U.S. WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE AGREEMENT. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT, HE ASSUMED THE U.S. WOULD SAY THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS ALONG THE LINES INDICATED IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER AND THE ORAL MESSAGE PASSED TO BESSMERTNYKH ON APRIL 8.

6. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF SHEVARDNADZE'S LETTER:

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DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

-- IN RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF MARCH 31, WHICH WAS CONSIDERED POSITIVELY, I WANT TO NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE LONG AND QUITE COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. AND THAT THE CORRESPONDING MUTALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS HAVE BECOME, AT LAST, AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT. OBVIOUSLY, IT IS NOT AN OVERSTATEMENT TO SAY THAT EFFORTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES FACILITATED THIS GOAL IN A CERTAIN MEASURE.

-- NOW, THAT IN GENEVA IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THE LAST UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS. AND AFTER WE HAVE CONDUCTED THE NECESSARY CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN, WE CAN AFFIRM WITH YOU OUR MUTUAL READINESS TO BECOME GUARANTORS OF THE AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT, AND SIGN THE CORRESPONDING DOCUMENTS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT WE COULD DO THIS ON APRIL 14 IN GENEVA. IN THIS CASE, AS IS NOTED IN THE JOINT SOVIET-AFGHAN STATEMENT, THE UNDERSTANDING THAT SOVIET FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN IN THE PERIOD ESTABLISHED BY THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS BEGINNING ON MAY 15 WILL REMAIN IN FORCE.

-- I THINK YOU WILL AGREE THAT SIGNING THE AGREEMENTS IS, WHILE VERY IMPORTANT, ONLY JUST A BEGINNING. NOW IT IS NECESSARY TO BEGIN THEIR REALIZATION. THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE OBLIGATIONS, WHICH ARE CLEARLY

FORMULATED IN THE COMPLETED DOCUMENTS, AND EXPECTS THE SAME FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE. THAT IS TO ACT IN THE MANNER SET OUT IN THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

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ACHIEVED BY US IN WASHINGTON. THE CONSTRUCTIVE
MUTUAL ACTIONS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THIS QUESTION
WOULD SERVE AS A GOOD AND HOPEFUL EXAMPLE FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS.
WITH RESPECT,

E. SHEVARDNADZE

END TEXT.

7. BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD
THE SECRETARY WAS PRBPAED TO TRAVEL TO GENEVA TO
SIGN THE GUARANTEES INSTRUMENT AND AGREEMENT HAD BEEN
REACHED ON AN APRIL 14 DATE FOR SIGNATURE. THE
FOREIGN MINISTER HOPED THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE
A SEPARATE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY TO DISCUSS THE
MOSCOW MINISTERIAL. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, AND NOTING
THAT THE MINISTER MIGHT HAVE OTHER IDEAS AS WELL,
BESSMERTNYKH SAID HE BELIEVED FIVE QUESTIONS RELATED
TO NST SHOULD BE DISCUSSED:

- PRINCIPLES OF AGREEMENT IN THE ABM AREA;
- SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES INCLUDING THE COMPLEX
OF VERIFICATION MEASURES REGARDING SUCH SYSTEMS;
- AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH HE SAID POSED
"STILL QUITE A LOT OF TROUBLE;"
- SUBLIMITS;
- VERIFICATION AND DATA EXCHANGE.

8. AMBASSADOR RAISED QUESTION OF MOBILE ICBMS.
BESSMERTNYKH AGREED MOBILES WERE A PROBLEM, BUT THIS
QUESTIONS WAS MORE EASILY RESOLVED THAM THE FIVE
ISSUES HE HAD ENUMERATED. THE PROBLEMS HE HAD LISTED

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WOULD REQUIRE MORE EFFORT. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS
NOT SURE THAT MOBILE ICBMS WOULD BE AN EASY ISSUE TO
RESOLVE. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE MINISTERS SHOULD
NOT NECESSARILY GET INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE
QUESTION, BUT RATHER SET OUT THOSE AREAS WHICH WOULD
REQUIRE SPECIAL ATTENTION BETWEEN NOW AND THE
MINISTERIAL. THIS WOULD PREVENT THE TWO SIDES FROM
PREPARING TWO DIFFERENT AGENDAS. AMBASSADOR
UNDERTOOK TO REPORT SHEVARDNADZE'S DESIRE FOR A
SEPARATE MEETING AND BESSMERTNYKH'S COMMENTS TO
WASHINGTON.

9. BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE WOULD ARRIVE
IN GENEVA ON THE EVENING OF WEDNESDAY APRIL 13 AND
WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES, AS WELL AS
ATTEND THE SIGNING CEREMONY, ON APRIL 14.

10. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS ISLAMABAD, KABUL,
USMISSION GENEVA FOR PECK AND USDEL NST.

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