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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: LEDSKY, NELSON C.: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Afghanistan: [88 Cables]

Date: 11/10/99

Box 92169 RAC Box 1

Schroeck - F96-076-2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	No cable #, re: Letter to Prime Minister Junejo, 3 p. R 1/2/01 F96-076/2 #35	3/7/88	P1/F1
2. Cable	No Cable #, re: Letter to President Zia, 5 p. Part u " #36	3/9/88	P1/F1
3. Cable	No Cable #, re: Afghanistan: Border Issue, 3 p. R F96-076/2 #37 9/29/00	4/4/88	P1/F1
4. Cable	Cable #051020Z Apr 88, 1 p. R u #38	4/5/88	P1/F1
5. Cable	Cable #050726Z Apr 88 (attached to email), 9 p. R u #39	4/5/88	P1/F1
6. Email	Fritz Ermarth to Ledsky, Nicholas Rostow, et al., re: Ewd from Islamabad, 1 p. R F96-076/2 #40 1/2/01	4/6/88	P1/F1
7. Cable	Cable #051155Z Apr 88 (attached to email), 8 p. R F96-076/2 #41 9/29/00	4/5/88	P1/F1
8. Cable	No Cable #, re: Afghanistan-- Soviet Assurances, 2 p. R u #42	4/7/88	P1/F1
9. Email	Ermarth to Herbst, Ledsky, re: From Kabul, 1 p. R F96-076/2 #43 1/2/01	4/8/88	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #080609Z Apr 88 (attached to email), 4 p. R F96-076/2 #44 9/29/00	4/8/88	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #091052Z Apr 88, 5 p. R u #45	4/9/88	P1/F1
12. Cable	Cable #130156Z Apr 88, 4 p. R u #46	4/13/88	P1/F1
13. Cable	Cable #140801Z Apr 88, 2 p. R u #47	4/14/88	P1/F1
14. Cable	Cable #150130Z Apr 83, 2 p. R u #48	4/15/88	P1/F1
15. Cable	Cable #191721Z Apr 88, 2 p. R u #49 9/29/00	4/19/88	P1/F1, F3
16. Eml/Cable	Eml: Ledsky to Herbst, Cable #101202Z May 88, 3 p. R F96-076/2 #50 1/2/01	5/10/88	P1/F1
17. Cable	Cable #220811Z Sep 88, (attached to email), 3 p. R F96-076/2 #51 9/29/00	9/22/88	P1/F1
18. Cable	Cable #240548Z Oct 88, (attached to email), 6 p. R u #52	10/24/88	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F96-076/2 #46

<DIST>SIT: VAX

BY

CAS

NARA, DATE

9/29/00

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLASS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHC #<DTG> 130156Z APR 88
 <ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 <TO>TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
 ALL NATO CAPITALS
 UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
 RUEHNL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUSK/K/AMEMBASSY KAPUL IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHND/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW ROUTINE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: POINTS TO MAKE ON U.S. SIGNATURE
 -- AS GUARANTOR OF GENEVA ACCORDS.

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 115353

GENEVA FOR DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: POINTS TO MAKE ON U.S. SIGNATURE
 -- AS GUARANTOR OF GENEVA ACCORDS.

1. ~~CONF.~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH HOST
 GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO PRESENT FOLLOWING
 POINTS ON USG ROLE AS GUARANTOR OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON
 THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN. (FOR USNATO: AMBASSADOR PLEASE
 BRIEF PERMITS).

3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

-- ON APRIL 14, SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL WITNESS THE SIGNATURE
 OF THE NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN AND
 SIGN THE GUARANTEE INSTRUMENT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON
 BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE SUCCESSFUL CULMINATION OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS IS
 AN HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT.

-- TRIBUTE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE OF COURSE GOES TO THE
 THOUSANDS OF VALIANT AFGHANS WHO HAVE FOUGHT AND DIED TO
 RID THEIR COUNTRY OF ITS SOVIET INVADERS, AND TO PAKISTAN
 WHICH TOOK IN MILLIONS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES AND DID NOT
 FLINCH UNDER THAT BURDEN OR UNRELENTING SOVIET POLITICAL
 PRESSURE AND MILITARY HARASSMENT.

-- CREDIT GOES TO THE MANY FRIENDS AMONG THE INTERNATIONAL
 COMMUNITY WHO HAVE PROVIDED MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT TO
 THE CAUSE OF AFGHAN FREEDOM AND IN SO DOING MADE PLAIN THAT
 THE CONTINUED SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOT BE
 TOLERATED.

-- THE UNSYG AND HIS SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR ALSO DESERVE GREAT
 CREDIT FOR PATIENTLY AND PERSISTENTLY SHEPHERDING THE
 INDIRECT TALKS IN GENEVA TO THEIR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

-- REMOVAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, PHASED AND WITHIN THE
 CONSTRAINTS OF A SET TIMEFRAME THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABSENT
 HAD NO AGREEMENT BEEN SIGNED, WILL BEGIN THE PROCESS OF
 ENDING A SIGNIFICANT CAUSE OF TENSION IN A REGION TOO LONG
 PLAGUED BY INSTABILITY. FOR OUR PART, WE WELCOME THE
 PROSPECTIVE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AS WELL AS A STEP FORWARD IN
 OUR EFFORTS TO FORGE A NEW, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL
 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION.

U.S. OBJECTIVES

- WE HAVE SHARED WITH YOU THE SAME OBJECTIVES STIPULATED BY OVERWHELMING MAJORITIES OF THE UNGA: PROMPT AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES; RESTORATION OF AFGHANISTAN TO INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED STATUS; SELF-DETERMINATION FOR AFGHANS; AND RETURN OF THE REFUGEES IN SAFETY AND HONOR.
- THE KEY REQUIREMENT ALWAYS HAS BEEN THE NEED TO SECURE MOSCOW'S AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW ALL SOVIET TROOPS. THAT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS DUE TO BEGIN MAY 15, WITH 50 PERCENT LEAVING WITHIN 90 DAYS. PREPARATIONS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY.
- THE SOVIETS HAVE TOLD US PRIVATELY THEY EXPECT THE WITHDRAWAL TO BE COMPLETE BY THE END OF 1988. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR CORDOVEZ AGREES WITH OUR INTERPRETATION THAT WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES INCLUDES ALL FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISORS.
- IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT THEY WILL NOT CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE ONCE THE ACCORDS COME INTO EFFECT. WE EXPECT THEM TO HOLD TO THIS UNDERTAKING. COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENTS CAN OF COURSE BE TRACKED THROUGH THE UN MONITORING MECHANISM AND OUR OWN NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.
- THE USG AND THE GOP WILL MAKE CLEAR ON SIGNING THAT OUR SIGNATURES IN NO WAY CAN BE CONSTRUED AS RECOGNITION OF THE KAHUL REGIME AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. THERE IS AMPLE LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR THIS POSITION.

U.S. COMMITMENTS

- AS PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE CLEAR TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV LAST WINTER IN WASHINGTON, AND AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY TOLD THE SOVIETS SINCE, OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE GUARANTORS MUST BE BALANCED AND SYMMETRICAL.
 - IN THIS SPIRIT, WE PROPOSED, BUT THE SOVIETS REJECTED, A MORATORIUM ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN.
 - WE ASSERT CONFIDENTLY OUR RIGHT TO SUPPLY OUR FRIENDS IN AFGHANISTAN AS WE SEE THE NEED TO DO SO. OUR SENSE OF THE NEED WILL BE AFFECTED BY EVIDENCE OF SOVIET RESTRAINT, WHICH WE WOULD WELCOME. THE SOVIET UNION UNDERSTANDS OUR INTERPRETATION OF OUR OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR AND HAS CHOSEN TO PROCEED ON THAT BASIS.
 - WE BELIEVE AND HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT RESTORATION OF PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN IS BEST SERVED IF BOTH GUARANTORS REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ANY OF THE CONTENDING AFGHAN PARTIES.
- PAKISTAN'S POSITION
-

- FROM THE BEGINNING, WE HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH PAKISTAN WHICH TOOK THE LEAD AS ONE OF THE TWO NEGOTIATING PARTIES AT GENEVA. PRESIDENT ZIA AND PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO DESERVE ENORMOUS CREDIT FOR THEIR STATESMANSHIP, AND FOR THEIR COURAGE IN RESISTING PRESSURES TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE KEY ELEMENTS OF FAIRNESS AND BALANCE WERE FULLY ASSURED.
- SIGNATURE WILL INDICATE THAT THESE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN MET. PAKISTAN HAS SHOWN OVER THE YEARS THAT IT IS PREPARED TO STAND UP TO HARSH SOVIET PRESSURE. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN HAS THE CAPACITY AND WILL TO SEE THE SETTLEMENT THROUGH UNTIL ALL SOVIET FORCES ARE COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN.

WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE?

-- SOVIET WITHDRAWAL IS HARDLY THE END OF THE AFGHAN SAGA. REGRETTABLY, FIGHTING AMONG AFGHANS SEEMS INEVITABLE, AND THE KABUL REGIME WILL SEEK TO EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES AMONG THE RESISTANCE GROUPS.

-- OUR BEST CURRENT ESTIMATE IS THAT THE LATTER STRATEGY WILL FAIL AND THAT THE KABUL REGIME CANNOT LONG SURVIVE WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS, AND MAY FALL BEFORE WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETE.

-- AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS ARE NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE GENEVA ACCORDS. THEY WERE NOT INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH PAKISTAN HAS CONSULTED WITH THEM. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ACCORDS COULD BE CONSTRUED AS CONFERRING LEGITIMACY ON THE PDPA. WE AND PAKISTAN HAVE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SIGNATURE OF THE ACCORDS DOES NOT IMPLY RECOGNITION OF THE KABUL REGIME.

-- THE ACCORDS ACHIEVE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SYMMETRY OF OBLIGATIONS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION. FREED OF THEIR SOVIET INVADERS, WE EXPECT THE RESISTANCE TO GIVE A GOOD ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES.

-- WHAT IS NEEDED IS A TRUE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION, I.E. A PROCESS THAT ALLOWS AFGHANS THEMSELVES TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FATE AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

-- THE SOVIET UNION AGREES IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE AFGHANS TO MOVE RAPIDLY, EVEN BEFORE WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETE, TO FORM AN INTER-IM GOVERNMENT.

-- DIEGO CORDOVEZ, "ACTING IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY," OFFERED TO FACILITATE WORK ON THIS EFFORT. WITH THE AGREEMENT AND ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES, HE ISSUED A STATEMENT ON APRIL 8 WHICH LAUNCHES A PROCESS AND OFFERS THE PROSPECT OF SATISFYING PAKISTAN'S LEGITIMATE CONCERN THAT IT HAVE A STABLE AND PEACEFUL NEIGHBOR, CONDUCIVE TO THE SAFE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES. WE FULLY SUPPORT THIS INITIATIVE.

-- THE TEXT OF THE CORDOVEZ STATEMENT READS IN PART: "I AM AUTHORIZED TO STATE . . . THAT . . . AT THIS CRUCIAL STAGE, ALL CONCERNED WILL THEREFORE PROMOTE THE ENDEAVORS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT AND WILL SUPPORT AND FACILITATE THAT PROCESS."

-- A BROAD-BASED SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT COULD THEN DEAL LEGITIMATELY WITH THE ISSUE OF NEUTRALITY. GORBACHEV'S ENDORSEMENT IN THE APRIL 6 TASHKENT COMMUNIQUE OF A "NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED" AFGHANISTAN, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH OUR PRIVATE EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS, SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW WOULD JOIN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES IN SUPPORT OF A FORMAL NEUTRALITY UNDERTAKING BY AFGHANISTAN IN THE FUTURE.

REFUGEE RETURN

-- WE EXPECT THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WILL TRIGGER A MASSIVE MOVEMENT BY REFUGEES OUTSIDE AND INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. WHEN THEY RETURN, THERE WILL BE ENORMOUS SOCIAL DISLOCATION, AND SUFFERING.

-- IN THE PAST, WE AND OTHERS HAVE SUPPLIED MONEY AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT THEIR FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. EVEN MORE MONEY WILL BE NEEDED TO HELP SET AFGHANISTAN ON A PATH TO ITS FUTURE, TO HELP AFGHANS TO RETURN HOME AND BEGIN TO REBUILD.

-- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A MORAL OBLIGATION TO HELP EASE THIS TRANSITION. IN ALL THEIR YEARS OF DESPAIR, WE AND OTHER FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD HAVE STOOD WITH THESE

VALIANT AFGHANS, OFFERING THEM MATERIAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND HOPE FOR A DAY WHEN THEY ALONE WOULD DETERMINE THEIR NATION'S DIRECTION. WE CANNOT, AND MUST NOT, ABANDON THEM NOW.

-- WE HAVE URGED UNSYG TO ACCEPT THE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN COORDINATING INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AND TO APPOINT A SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR THE JOB.

-- THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO DO ITS PART AND URGES THE BROADEST AND MOST GENEROUS INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN WHAT HAS TO BE A JOINT ENDEAVOR. WE URGE YOUR GOVERNMENT TO OFFER FULL PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE SETTLEMENT AND TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY HOW YOU CAN CONTRIBUTE TO EFFORTS THE U.N. WILL ORGANIZE.

SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SN> 5383<STOR> 880412221240 MSG000198195160
<TOR>88041222103

DECLASSIFIED

S F96 D74/2 #47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY CAS N

TE 9/5/00

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Adams

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: ERMARTH OAKLEY SIT

SIT: ROSSDB VAX

<PREC? PRIORITY <CLAS? CONFIDENTIAL <DTG? 140801Z APR 88

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8639

INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2318

RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 5057

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5174

RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 6960

RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 3479

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1907

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ KABUL 00854

GENEVA FOR DAS PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: UPCOMING REGIME/SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CZECH AND EAST GERMAN AMBASSADORS TOLD ME SEPARATELY, APRIL 13, THAT RA REGIME PLANS TO HOLD PEACE JIRGA (TRIBAL ASSEMBLY) TO DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR REGIME IN WAKE OF GENEVA SIGNING. JIRGA WILL PROBABLY BE HELD AFTER CONCLUSION OF RAMAZAN (MID-MAY).

3. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (ELECTIONS FOR WHICH WILL BE COMPLETED TOMORROW, APRIL 15) WILL ALSO PROBABLY BE CONVOKED AT THE END OF RAMAZAN. THE ASSEMBLY WILL RECOMMEND A NEW "COALITION GOVERNMENT" (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) CONSISTING OF THE PDPA AND REGIME-SPONSORED AND ENCOURAGED PARTIES (PRESUMING THAT MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE). HIGH-LEVEL AFGHAN OFFICIALS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE TARGET DATE FOR FORMATION OF THIS "COALITION GOVERNMENT" IS ON OR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ABOUT MAY 29.

4. ACCORDING TO THE CZECH AND EAST GERMAN AMBASSADORS, SOME HIGH-LEVEL AFGHAN OFFICIALS HAVE TALKED ALSO ABOUT CONVENING A LOYA JIRGA (GRAND ASSEMBLY) AFTER COMPLETION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL TO ELECT/RE-ELECT THE PRESIDENT (CURRENTLY NAJIBULLAH).

5. REGARDING CONTACTS WITH THE MUJAHIDIN, THE CZECH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT NO PROHIBITION EXISTS AGAINST DIRECT CZECH CONTACTS WITH THE MUJAHIDIN. (COMMENT: AN EAST GERMAN EMBASSY OFFICER, APRIL 9, INDICATED THAT EAST GERMAN EMBASSIES NOW HAVE INSTRUCTIONS ALLOWING THEM TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACTS WITH ALL AFGHAN FACTIONS, INCLUDING THE MUJAHIDIN.) THE CZECH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET POSITION ON CONTACT WITH THE MUJAHIDIN MIGHT BE MODIFIED AFTER GENEVA SIGNATURE TO ALLOW CONTACT WITH THEM AS "INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL PERSONALITIES" (RATHER THAN AS OFFICIALS OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT/RESISTANCE ALLIANCE).

6. COMMENT: THE REPORT OF CONTEMPLATION OF A LOYA JIRGA TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF THE PRESIDENCY IS STRIKING. THIS SUGGESTS CONTEMPLATION OF AN ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH NAJIBULLAH MIGHT BE REMOVED IN WAKE OF SOVIET

DEPARTURE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO US, AND REPORTEDLY SHEVARDNADZE TO EACH PDPA POLITBURO MEMBER, HAS STRESSED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NAJIBULLAH. NONETHELESS, BASED ON COMMENTS BY THE EASTERN EUROPEANS AND THEIR APPARENT SOFTENING OF POLICY ON CONTACTS WITH THE MUJAHIDIN, WE SENSE THAT MOSCOW MAY BE SEEKING TO KEEP OPEN POLITICAL OPTIONS IN THE EVENT THAT THE PDPA REGIME IS UNABLE TO SUSTAIN ITSELF AS SOVIET WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS.

7. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GLASSMAN

BT

#0854

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Apparatus

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: ERMARTH FITZWATER OAKLEY POPADUIK SDO
SIT: ROSSDB NSSRT VAX

<PREC? IMMEDIATE <CLAS? ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG? 140430Z APR 88

FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L SECTO 7002

GENEVA FOR PECK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AF, PK, US UN, UR, OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: REVISION OF US STATEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SECRETARY HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING REVISED US STATEMENT WHICH IS TO BE CIRCULATED AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE AFGHAN ACCORDS IN GENEVA. REVISION IN SUB-PARAGRAPH (2) IS INTENDED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US RETAINS THE RIGHT TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN.
3. QUOTE:

U. S. STATEMENT

THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED TO ACT AS A GUARANTOR OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN. WE BELIEVE THIS SETTLEMENT IS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD IN RESTORING PEACE TO AFGHANISTAN, IN ENDING THE BLOORIHED IN THAT UNFORTUNATE COUNTRY, AND IN ENABLING MILLIONS OF AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO, THEIR HOMES.

IN AGREEING TO ACT AS A GUARANTOR, THE UNITED STATES STATES THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL OBLIGATIONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF THE INSTRUMENT ON INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Dep'tment of State
By alb NARA

July 21, 1984
11/10/94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

ARE CENTRAL TO THE ENTIRE SETTLEMENT. COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE OBLIGATIONS IS ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT'S PURPOSES, NAMELY, THE ENDING OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE RESTORATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF SELF DETERMINATION AS CALLED FOR BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN.

(2) THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE GUARANTORS ARE SYMMETRICAL. IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES HAS ADVISED THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE U.S. RETAINS THE RIGHT, CONSISTENT WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS AS GUARANTOR, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN. SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE U.S. SIMILARLY WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT.

(3) BY ACTING AS A GUARANTOR OF THE SETTLEMENT, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO IMPLY IN ANY RESPECT RECOGNITION OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN KABUL AS THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

UNQUOTE

3. FOR GENEVA: PECK SHOULD SHARE COPY OF STATEMENT WITH PAKISTANIS ASAP. WE ASSUME THEY WILL HAVE NO PROBLEM. YOU MAY

THEN PROVIDE COPIES TO CORDOVEZ AND THE SOVIETS.

SHULTZ

BT

#0002

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<DIST>RT: DARLEY 100 1ATJPR DONLEY MESROPOWTE PERITO POWELL SIT STEVENS
SIT: PENKO 2PMARTH MESFT 100MAN ROSE SIGLER VAX BRANSCUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLASS> ~~SECRET~~<ORFI> RUEHAI<DTG> 150130Z APR 88
<OSID>FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT
<TO>TO RUEADWW/THF WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MY DAY IN GENEVA - APRIL 14, 1988

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ ECTO 07011

NOTES

E.O. 12354: DECL: OADR

TAGS: DVP (SHULTZ, DEOTE P.)

SUBJECT: MY DAY IN GENEVA - APRIL 14, 1988

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

- FROM: GEORGE F. SHULTZ

- SUBJECT: MY DAY IN GENEVA - APRIL 14, 1988

TODAY, WE HELPED OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN AFGHAN HISTORY. UNDER THE PATENT EYE OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUILLAR AND THE ELECTRONIC GAZE OF NASTED CAMERAS, WE, THE SOVIETS, THE PAKISTANIS, AND THE KABUL REGIME WENT THROUGH A CAREFULLY CHOREOGRAPHED CEREMONY. ONE BY ONE, WE ASSOCIATED OURSELVES FORMALLY WITH THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON AFGHANISTAN. NEITHER THE US NOR THE PAKISTANI DELEGATION ACKNOWLEDGED THE PRESENCE OF THE DELEGATION FROM KABUL. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CEREMONY GATHERED IN THE FORMER COUNCIL CHAMBER OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REMEMBERED AS THE SETTING FOR MANY FAILURES OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS--NOTABLY THE LEAGUE'S INABILITY TO END THE ITALIAN OCCUPATION OF ETHIOPIA. NOW, A HALF CENTURY LATER, WE FOUND OURSELVES IN THIS CHAMBER FOR AN EVENT THAT PROMISED TO REVERSE AN OCCUPATION. THE ACCORDS WITH WHICH WE ASSOCIATED OURSELVES AND THE UNDERSTANDINGS WE WORKED OUT WITH THE SOVIETS ENVISAGE A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR, THE FULL RESTORATION OF AFGHAN CONTROL OVER THEIR DESTINY FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1979, AND THE SPEEDY RETURN OF THE REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE. THE MOOD ON THIS OCCASION WAS PROPERLY SOLEMN. BUT SHEVARDNAZE FLASHED A QUICK SMILE AT ME AS HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE TO THE DOCUMENTS. TODAY'S ACHIEVEMENT IS A MOMENTOUS ONE--WITH OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, TO PAKISTAN, TO US, AND TO THE SOVIETS. ONLY THE REGIME IN KABUL STANDS TO LOSE--AND THIS REALIZATION WEIGHED HEAVILY OVER ITS DELEGATION. MUCH IS STILL TO BE DONE. THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE EXPECTED TO COORDINATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE ACCORDS, ESPECIALLY THE EXECUTION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, AND TO SPONSOR AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO HELP THE AFGHAN REFUGEES. THE UN NEGOTIATOR, DISCO COMBEEZ, WILL, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, TURN HIS EFFORTS TOWARD NEW GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE RESISTANCE WILL SOLELY SEEK TO BOLSTER ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITION INSIDE THE COUNTRY. AMONG THE TASKS THAT WE AND PAKISTAN WILL FACE IS THAT OF MONITORING SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO

Alghamista

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F96-076/2 #48

BY CAS NARA, DATE 9/29/00

THE KARUL REGIME; WE WILL BE READY TO MEET RESTRAINT WITH RESTRAINT IN THIS REGARD.

QUESTIONS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE I HEARD AFTER THE SIGNING CEREMONY FOCUSED ON OUR ABILITY TO KEEP SUPPLYING THE RESISTANCE, AND I INDICATED THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT OF OUR CAPACITY TO DO SO.

IN A SHORT MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUILLAR, I STRESSED THAT THE UN MONITORING MECHANISM FORESEEN UNDER THE GENEVA ACCORDS MUST OPERATE IN A BALANCED WAY--THAT IS, IT MUST LOOK BOTH AT ALLEGATIONS OF "INTERFERENCE" AND AT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. I ALSO ASKED PEREZ TO NAME A SENIOR UN COORDINATOR FOR AFGHAN RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION AS THE FIRST STEP IN DEFINING AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES. FOR HIS PART, PEREZ EXPRESSED GREAT CAUTION ABOUT THE LIKELY SUCCESS OF DIEGO CORDOVEZ IN FACILITATING NEW GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS. IN A LONGER MEETING WITH PAKISTANI MINISTER OF STATE NOORANI, I FOUND THE PAKISTANIS PLEASED WITH THE GENEVA ACCORDS AND WITH THE PROSPECT THEY OPEN UP FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. NOORANI FIRMLY REPEATED PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR SYMMETRY BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIETS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE. AND HE PREDICTED THAT THE RESISTANCE WOULD, IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE, CEASE ITS ATTACKS ON THE GENEVA ACCORDS AND COME TO APPRECIATE THE ADVANTAGES THAT FLOW FROM THEM.

MY STAY IN GENEVA ENDED WITH A MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE THAT I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY. ALL IN ALL, THIS WAS AN EXHILARATING AND PRODUCTIVE DAY. SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<END> 0011<TOR> 380415011340 MSG000198378820
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RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 15 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-May-1988
10:04 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

John E. Herbst	(HERBST)
Peter Rodman	(RODMAN)
Rudolf V. Perina	(PERINA)
Tyrus Cobb	(COBB)

FROM: Nelson C. Ledsky

SUBJECT: ~~Afghanistan~~

Of some possible help for week-end reading and NSPG.

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with RSCS id 7080
for LEDSKY@VAXC; Tue, 10-MAY-1988 16:13 EDT
Date: Tue, 10-MAY-1988 16:12 EST
From: \$WHSR@VAXE
To: LEDSKY@VAXC

\$DIST
PRT: OAKLEY SDO
SIT: BENKO LEDSKY NSSRT RODMAN ROSS SIGLER

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

\$TO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8895
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2368
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 5230
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5269
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7172
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1931
RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 3587

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
F96-076/2 #50
BY GLS DATE 1/2/01

~~SECRET~~

2

SSUBJ SUBJECT: DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN

STEXT

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02KABUL 01113

EXDIS KHYBER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, AF SUBJECT: ~~DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN~~

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN THE COURSE OF THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND LATER THIS MONTH AT THE SUMMIT, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO DESCRIBE THE AFGHAN AGENDA AS COMPRISING THREE INTER-RELATED ELEMENTS:

A. REGIONAL SECURITY/NEUTRALITY -- THIS ADDRESSES THE DEFENSE/FOREIGN POLICY STANCE OF THE FUTURE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THIS RUBRIC COVERS PROBLEMS THAT THE SOVIETS ASSERT THEY FEAR FROM A NON-PDPA GOVERNMENT (E.G., USE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A BASE FOR SUBVERTING THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS, CONDUCT OF AN "EXTREMIST" FOREIGN POLICY) AS WELL AS PROBLEMS THAT CONCERN US (E.G., AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, FUTURE PRESENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL, SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE.)

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW GOVERNMENT/PEACE -- THIS HEADING ADDRESSES OF NEW GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS, NOT DOMINATED BY THE PDPA, THAT WOULD BRING PEACE TO AFGHANISTAN. WHILE THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO STAND BEHIND THE FORMULA OF A PDPA-DOMINATED COALITION FOR THE PRESENT, THE EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION SHOULD MAKE THEM MORE FLEXIBLE BY LATE SUMMER (SEE KABUL 1045).

C. ECONOMIC RECOVERY -- THIS RUBRIC UNDERLINES THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATIVE U.S./WESTERN-SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHAN RECOVERY BUT ONLY AFTER A NON-PDPA GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED.

3. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THESE CATEGORIES IS THAT PEACE WILL NOT COME TO AFGHANISTAN UNTIL A BROADLY- ACCEPTED, NON-PDPA GOVERNMENT IS IN PLACE. THE U.S., SOVIET UNION, AND PAKISTAN HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT SUCH A NEW GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DISRUPT REGIONAL SECURITY. WITHOUT PEACE, ECONOMIC RECOVERY CANNOT OCCUR AND MAJOR NON-SOVIET FUNDING COMMITMENTS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE.

~~SECRET~~

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3

4. THE LAYING OUT OF THIS AGENDA WOULD NOT MEAN THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD THEMSELVES SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. CORDOVEZ, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS THE LEAD CURRENTLY ON INTERNAL GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SOVIETS ARE ADAMANT FOR NOW ON NOT DELIVERING CONCESSIONS FROM THE PDPA ("FUTURE GOVERNMENT MUST BE DECIDED BY THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES.") NOR DO WE WANT TO BE PLACED IN THE POSITION OF BARGAINING WITH AND AMONG THE MUJAHIDIN. ALSO, FUTURE NEUTRALITY AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS COULD NOT BE IMPOSED BUT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED BY A SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT.

5. NONETHELESS, THE SETTING OUT OF AN AGENDA WOULD PLACE THE AFGHAN PROBLEM AS A CONTINUING THEME OF DISCUSSION WITHIN A COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET FRAMEWORK-- ONE THAT MAY LUBRICATE DEVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER FROM THE PDPA AS THE RA'S MILITARY POSITION DETERIORATES. IT WOULD ILLUSTRATE OUR CONSCIOUSNESS THAT THERE IS A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN MOSCOW'S ULTIMATE SACRIFICE OF THE PDPA AND THE MAINTENANCE OF REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS. IT WOULD ALSO PROMISE A RETURN AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO TRADITIONAL COLLABORATIVE PATTERNS IN AFGHANISTAN. (U.S.-SOVIET DIVISION OF LABOR ON AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT.)

6. CONCRETELY, WHAT WE MIGHT SEEK TO DO IN SOVIET-U.S. EXCHANGES DURING THIS SUMMER AND BEYOND IS TO DEVELOP A COMMON UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIETS ON WHAT EACH OF US WOULD DO AND NOT DO IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER COMPLETION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL (E.G., MILITARY BASING, PRESENCE OF ADVISORS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE). WE COULD ALSO SET OUT THE DESIRABLE PARAMETERS OF AFGHAN NEUTRALITY--BENCHMARKS THAT WE WOULD HOPE ANY FUTURE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT.

7. IN PARALLEL, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ON THE SOVIETS THE NEED TO REMOVE THE PDPA AS A CONDITION FOR ACHIEVING PEACE.

8. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GLASSMAN BT #1113

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SECTION: 01 OF 99
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SECTION: 02 OF 02
\$SSN¶
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\$TOR¶
880510160852 MSG000200592532

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Jul-1988 11:58 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LEDSKY
TAHIR KHELI
PROFS "NSMS@CPUA"
OAKLEY

Agreement

FROM: VMS MAIL user RODMAN
(RODMAN@VAXC@MRGATE)

SUBJECT: FYI

VORONTSOV BEATS UP ON THE PAKS.

<ORIG> FBIS

<TEXT>FBIS 128

VORONTSOV SUMMONS PAKISTANI ENVOY

TAKE 1 OF 3--~~VORONTSOV SUMMONS PAKISTANI ENVOY~~

LD1207141088 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1404 GMT 12 JUL 88

[TEXT] MOSCOW JULY 12 TASS -- SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YULIY VORONTSOV TODAY SUMMONED PAKISTAN'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY AND MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"WE HAVE ALREADY REPEATEDLY DRAWN ATTENTION OF THE PAKISTANI LEADERSHIP TO THE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF THEIR COMMITMENTS UNDER THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SO-CALLED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN ON PAKISTANI TERRITORY BY AFGHAN OPPOSITION WAS ANOTHER GROSS VIOLATION OF THESE ACCORDS. IT OBVIOUSLY CONTRADICTED THE COMMITMENTS ASSUMED BY PAKISTAN UNDER THE BILATERAL AFGHAN-PAKISTANI AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-INTERVENTION, ABOVE ALL CLAUSE 4 OF ARTICLE II IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH THE TERRITORY OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES SHOULD NOT BE USED TO DISRUPT THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STABILITY OF THE OTHER CONTRACTING PARTY.

BY ALLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 'TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT' OF AFGHAN OPPOSITION ON ITS TERRITORY, PAKISTAN VIOLATES SUCH COMMITMENTS UNDER THE AGREEMENTS AS OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AND RENUNCIATION OF ACTIONS TO SUBVERT THE POLITICAL ORDER OF THE OTHER PARTY.

THIS ACTION, WHICH WHIPS UP AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFRONTATION IN THE APPROACH TO DOMESTIC AFGHAN PROBLEMS, IS VERY FAR FROM THE SIDES'

READINESS, RECORDED IN A STATEMENT BY DIEGO CORDOVEZ, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, AT THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS, TO FACILITATE THE AFGHAN PEOPLE'S STRIVING TOWARDS ELABORATING BROADLY ACCEPTABLE MEASURES TOWARDS CREATING A GOVERNMENT ON A WIDE BASIS, SUPPORT AND FACILITATE THIS PROCESS PROVIDED THAT ANY QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN CONSTITUTE THE SUBJECT OF AFGHANISTAN'S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AND CAN BE RESOLVED ONLY BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES. [SENTENCE AS RECEIVED]

(MORE)

12 JUL 1515Z MS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: LEVIN LOWENKRON NEGROPONTE OAKLEY PERITO RODMAN SIT
SIT: BENKO CURTIN LEBRAS SHIRIN SIGLER

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <DTG> 171929Z AUG 88

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7218
INFO RUEHUU/AFGHAN/WAR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 02467

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, PK, UR, UN

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN - U.N. STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE
WITH GENEVA ACCORDS

1. THE SPOKESMAN OF UNSYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR ISSUED A
STATEMENT AUGUST 16 EXPRESSING SATISFACTION THAT THE
PACE OF WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN
IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS MADE TODAY BY THE
SPOKESMAN FOR SECRETARY-GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE
CUELLAR:

THE SPOKESMAN OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS AUTHORIZED
TO STATE THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE UNITED NATIONS GOOD OFFICES MISSION IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (UNGOMAP), IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ITS MANDATE UNDER THE GENEVA ACCORDS, HAS BEEN
MONITORING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM
AFGHANISTAN SINCE 15 MAY 1988, WHEN THE GENEVA ACCORDS
ENTERED INTO FORCE.

2. UNGOMAP WAS INFORMED, ON 14 MAY 1988, BY THE
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN AFGHANISTAN, THAT THE
NUMBER OF FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN AFGHANISTAN ON
THAT DATE WAS 100,300.

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PAGE 02 OF 03

3. ON 15 MAY 1988, FOREIGN TROOPS WERE PRESENT IN 18 MAIN GARRISONS LOCATED IN THE FOLLOWING 17 OF THE 30 (AT PRESENT 31) PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTAN, AS FOLLOWS: BADAKSHAN, BAGHLAN, FARAH, GAZNI, HELMAND, HERAT, KABUL, KANDAHAR, KUNAR, KUNDUZ, LOGAR, NANGARHAR, PAKTIYA, PARWAN, SAMANGAN, TAKHAR AND ZABUL.
4. FROM 15 MAY TO 7 AUGUST 1988, THE FOLLOWING 10 MAIN GARRISONS PREVIOUSLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN TROOPS WERE EVACUATED AND HANDED OVER TO THE ARMED FORCES OF AFGHANISTAN: BARAKI, DAULATABAD, FEIZABAD, GARDEZ, GAZNI, JALALABAD, KANDAHAR, KUNDUZ, LASHKARGAH AND RUHA.
5. AFTER 15 AUGUST 1988, EIGHT MAIN GARRISONS REMAINED UNDER THE CONTROL OF FOREIGN TROOPS. THEY ARE SITUATED IN THE FOLLOWING FIVE PROVINCES: BAGHLAN, HERAT, KABUL, PARWAN, AND SAMANGAN. FURTHER, IN THE BALZ PROVINCE THERE WILL BE SOME FOREIGN TROOPS AROUND MAYRATAN WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO BE USED AS A BORDER CROSSING POINT FOR THE WITHDRAWING TROOPS.
6. UNGOMAP TEAMS OF MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE MONITORED THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AT BAGRAM, JALALABAD, KABUL, KANDAHAR, KUNDUZ AND SHINDAND, AS WELL AS AT THE HAYRATAN AND TORGHUNDI BORDER TOWNS WHERE UNGOMAP HAS ESTABLISHED PERMANENT OUTPOSTS. FURTHER, AN UNGOMAP TEAM VISITED GARDEZ AFTER THE EVACUATION OF THE GARRISON.
7. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS REPRESENTATIVE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS HAS BEEN PROCEEDING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOURTH INSTRUMENT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THEY WISH TO EXPRESS THEIR SINCERE APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES, FOR THEIR CONTINUED ASSISTANCE AND

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PAGE 03 OF 03

FULL COOPERATION.

END TEXT

OKUN

BT

#2467

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

22-Sep-1988 06:51 EDT

Apples for

MEMORANDUM FOR:

LEDSKY

FROM: VMS MAIL user WHSR
(WHSR@VAXE@)

SUBJECT:

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with Jnet id 9032
for LEDSKY@VAXC; Thu, 22 Sep 88 06:51 EDT
Date: Thu, 22-SEP-1988 06:51 EST
From: <WHSR@VAXE>
To: LEDSKY@VAXC

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220811Z SEP 88

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

<TO>
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8606
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4663

<SUBJ>
SUBJECT: **SOVIETS AND AFGHANISTAN**

<TEXT>
BT
~~SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 20293
EXDIS KHYBER
FOR UNDER SECRETARY FROM BOB OAKLEY
S/S-O PLEASE DELIVER AT OOB, SEPT 22
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UK, AF, PK

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-076/2 #51

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 9/29/00

SUBJECT: SOVIETS AND AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. KABUL 2362, B. ISLAMABAD 18227

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN VIEW OF TALKS TO BE HELD THERE TODAY AND TOMORROW (SEPT. 22-23) WITH SHEVARDNADZE, THIS IS A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE IMPORTANT JUNCTURE THE SOVIETS FACE IN AFGHANISTAN. THEY SHOULD BE REMINDED TO PAY PARTICULARLY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE POINTS YOU MADE TO VORONTSOV ABOUT WHERE THEIR INTERESTS REALLY LIE AND HOW THEIR ACTIONS WILL IMPACT HEAVILY ON WHAT THE RESISTANCE (AND GOP AND USG) WILL DO. THE APPROACH WE OUTLINED IN REF B ON DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS REMAINS VALID. THE RESISTANCE APPEARS FROM HERE TO BE IN A VERY STRONG POSITION TO WAGE WAR AND BETTER ABLE TO HANDLE POLITICAL ISSUES THAN IN THE PAST.

3. SHOULD THE SOVIETS AND THE RA DECIDE TO FOLLOW THE COURSE THE PDPA SUGGESTED IN REF A -- EMPLOYING AGGRESSIVE MILITARY ACTION, PERHAPS COMBINED WITH ADDITIONAL, BUT PRIMARILY COSMETIC, POLITICAL MOVES (SUCH AS REPLACING NAJIBULLAH BUT RETAINING CONTROL) -- THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING WILL INCREASE, TO THEIR SHORT AND LONG-TERM DETRIMENT. THE GOP WILL NOT BACK DOWN ON KEEPING SUPPLY LINES OPEN. THE MUJAHIDIN HAVE REACHED A NEW CONSENSUS ON CONDUCT OF THE WAR WHICH RESPONDS TO RECENT SOVIET/RA TACTICS. THE MUJAHIDIN ARE ALSO IN THE MIDDLE OF A MAJOR AUGMENTATION OF LONG-RANGE FIREPOWER; THEY INTEND TO USE IT MORE AND MORE AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS SUCH AS AIRPORTS (E.G. KANDAHAR, KABUL, ETC.), TO CUT STRATEGIC ROADS AND TO ATTACK MILITARY STRONG POINTS. THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT GOING TO CARRY OUT DIRECT ASSAULTS ON MAJOR CITIES, BUT HAVE AGREED UPON SLOWLY SQUEEZING THEM, UNDERMINING POLITICAL/AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS IN EXPECTATION OF COLLAPSE AFTER FEB 15. THE MUJAHIDIN ARE AGREED ON NOT FORCING THE SITUATION NOW.

4. POLITICALLY, A MODICUM OF COHESION HAS BEEN RESTORED; GULBADDIN'S STOCK IS BEGINNING TO DECLINE. WE ARE ALSO SEEING SOMEWHAT GREATER CONTACT BETWEEN ALLIANCE LEADERS AND FIELD COMMANDERS. TO ILLUSTRATE: THE GREAT RUSH FOR KANDAHAR IS OVER AND HAS GIVEN WAY TO MORE A PATIENT, CONSENSUS-ORIENTED STRATEGY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE RESISTANCE HAS REACHED OR WILL REACH ANYTIME SOON WHAT WE WOULD CALL AGREEMENT ON A POLITICAL STRATEGY. IT ALSO DOES NOT MEAN THAT A CONSENSUS APPROACH HAS ACTUALLY REPLACED THE USUAL SHIFTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION AND RIVALRY. NEVERTHELESS, THERE APPEARS TO BE MORE COHESION THAN BEFORE. THE GOP IS HELPING PROMOTE THIS MORE THAN IN THE PAST, WHEN GULBADDIN WAS GETTING SUCH SPECIAL ATTENTION. THIS ALLOWS THE RESISTANCE NOT ONLY TO RESIST SOVIET AND RA PRESSURE, BUT ALSO TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY WITH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTION.

5. GIVEN THIS SITUATION, THE SOVIETS MAY WISH TO
AVAIL THEMSELVES OF OPENINGS OFFERED BY YAQUB KHAN:
THE GOP'S WILLINGNESS TO TRY AND PROMOTE A REASONABLE
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THEY ALSO CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF DIRECT TALKS WITH THE RESISTANCE (WHICH OBVIOUSLY
CAN BE USED FOR SUBJECTS ADDITIONAL TO POW'S).
SHOULD THE SOVIETS DO SO IN A CREDIBLE FASHION, IT
WOULD MAKE WITHDRAWAL LESS COSTLY MILITARILY AND
POLITICALLY AS WELL AS REDUCE THE PROSPECTS OF
HOSTILITY EMANATING FROM AFGHANISTAN INTO SOVIET
CENTRAL ASIA AFTER WITHDRAWAL.

6. I WOULD APPRECIATE A QUICK READOUT OF THE
SECRETARY'S AND THE PRESIDENT'S TALKS WITH
SHEVARDNADZE SO THAT I CAN DISCUSS THE TALKS HERE
WITH THE GOP LEADERSHIP EITHER ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY
(SEPT. 25 OR 26). OAKLEY

BT

#0293

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

0293

<TOR>

880922063426 MSG000212222066

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Oct-1988 17:27 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RODMAN

FROM: VMS MAIL user WHSR
(WHSR@VAXE@)

SUBJECT:

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with Jnet id 1768
for RODMAN@VAXC; Mon, 24 Oct 88 17:26 EDT
Date: Mon, 24-OCT-1988 17:26 EST
From: <WHSR@VAXE>
To: RODMAN@VAXC

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SIT: BENKO BURNS CHARLES LEDSKY NSSRT RODMAN

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240548Z OCT 88

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6208
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5728
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8411
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 4244
RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 4132

<SUBJ>
SUBJECT: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN



DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

FILED 196-076/2 452

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 9/29/00

<TEXT>

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 02566

EXDIS KHYBER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, UR, PK, AF

SUBJECT: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS AND RA ARE LIKELY SOON TO EMBRACE THE MAJOR PREMISE OF THE CORDOVEZ PLAN--THE CONCESSION OF A MAJOR PDPA GOVERNING ROLE. MOSCOW MAY USE RESISTANCE INTRANSIGENCE AND INCREASED PRESSURE AROUND KABUL AND KANDAHAR TO DELAY THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PHASE OF WITHDRAWAL BEYOND NOVEMBER 15. HEAVY SOVIET BOMBING OF MUJAHIDIN CONCENTRATIONS AROUND KABUL, ALONG WITH INTIMIDATION OF PAKISTAN, SHOULD BE EXPECTED AFTER THE NOVEMBER 16 PAKISTANI ELECTIONS. NOTWITHSTANDING THESE HEIGHTENED THREATS, MOSCOW IS LIKELY TO COMPLETE ITS WITHDRAWAL AND ACCOMMODATE MUJAHIDIN-GOP POLITICAL DESIDERATA IN DECEMBER AND JANUARY. END SUMMARY.

3. NEW POLITICAL MOVES IN KABUL: IN SEPTEMBER, NAJIBULLAH ANNOUNCED THAT NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVES WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN THE AFGHAN MONTH OF MIZAN (WHICH ENDED OCTOBER 20). FOREIGN JOURNALISTS WERE SUMMONED BEGINNING OCTOBER 10 TO HEAR IMPORTANT NEWS EXPECTED FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM. NOTHING OF THE NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE SO FAR HAS BEEN HEARD.

4. THE OPENING OF THE PLENUM WAS DELAYED UNTIL OCTOBER 19 AND PRECEDED BY THE ARREST OF 360 DISCREPANT, LARGELY PRO-BABRAKIST PARTY MEMBERS (ACCORDING TO GDR AMBASSADOR). BEFORE THE PLENUM SESSION ITSELF, SEVENTEEN CENTRAL COMMITTEE WERE DETAINED (ACCORDING TO A SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER). DESPITE THESE ARRESTS AND THE EXPULSION FROM THE POLITBURO OF KHALQI DISSIDENT SALEH MOHAMMED ZEARY (OVER THE OPPOSITION OF KHALQI LEADER GULABZOI) AND PRO-BABRAKIST ABDUL ZOHUR RAZMJO, FOREIGN MINISTER WAKIL TOLD HIS STAFF THAT THE REPORT OF THE PLENUM WAS STILL THE SUBJECT OF SHARP DISAGREEMENT.

5. WHAT CAUSED UNREST AND DISAGREEMENT THAT REQUIRED ARRESTS AND THE PERHAPS TEMPORARY WITHHOLDING OF THE PROMISED POLITICAL INITIATIVE? BEFORE THE PLENUM, PRIME MINISTER SHARQ TOLD UN DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SEVAN THAT THE RA WAS PREPARED TO TALK TO THE OPPOSITION ABOUT ANY GOVERNMENT POST, INCLUDING DEFENSE, INTERIOR AND STATE SECURITY MINISTRIES. SHARQ'S OFFER LEFT VAGUE WHAT SHARE OF POWER IN THE GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES, IF ANY, WOULD BE RETAINED BY THE PDPA. NONETHELESS, PROPOSALS OF THIS NATURE--OFFERING THE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SURRENDER OF THE PARTY'S GOVERNING ROLE--PRESUMABLY WERE AT THE CORE OF

THE DISPUTED CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT.

6. GIVEN SOVIET/REGIME RESOLUTENESS DEMONSTRATED BY THE ARREST OF PARTY DISSIDENTS, ONE CAN PRESUME THAT THERE IS AN INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH THE NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE SHOULD THIS BE THE CASE, WE WOULD EXPECT THE REGIME TO SIGNAL ITS WILLINGNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT TO RELINQUISH A MAJOR, IF NOT TOTAL, SHARE OF THE PDPA GOVERNING ROLE. THE PARTY, AS A COUNTERPART, WOULD REQUEST EQUALITY WITH OTHER

PARTIES AND GUARANTEES FOR ITS MEMBERS IN THE BUREAUCRACY AND ARMED FORCES. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EMBRACE OF THE MAJOR ELEMENT OF CORDOVEZ PLAN--AN ACCEPTANCE FLAGGED BY GORBACHEV'S SEPTEMBER RECEPTION OF SHARQ AND HIS NON-PARTY DELEGATION.

7. THE PURPOSE OF EMBRACING THE CORDOVEZ CONCEPT WOULD BE A LAST DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO SPLIT THE RESISTANCE COALITION ALONG MODERATE/FUNDAMENTALIST LINES. INTEREST IN SUCH AN EFFORT HAS BEEN FORESHADOWED BY FAVORABLE REMARKS BY PDPA OFFICIALS TO SEVAN ON CERTAIN NEUTRALS ON THE CORDOVEZ LIST (SUCH AS USAID ISLAMABAD'S ABDUL WAKIL) AND THE EFFORTS--THROUGH HEALTH-MINISTER NAJM AND OTHERS--TO REACH OUT TO ZAHIR SHAH. BUT NEITHER THE EXPATRIATE NEUTRALS NOR ZAHIR SHAH WILL COME TO KABUL UNLESS THE PDPA STANDS ASIDE. (SEE ROME 23989 FOR ZAHIR SHAH'S OCTOBER 14 STATEMENT THAT THE COMMUNISTS MUST GO AND ROME 23903 FOR SHEVARDNADZE'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO FM ANDREOTTI OF ZAHIR'S RELUCTANCE

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 KABUL 02566

EXDIS KHYBER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, UR, PK, AF

SUBJECT: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN
HERETOFORE TO BECOME INVOLVED.)

8. CORDOVEZ' ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS INVITATION TO ZAHIR SHAH AND THREE PROMINENT NEUTRALS TO HELP FORM A BROAD-BASED COALITION GOVERNMENT (NEW YORK TIMES, OCTOBER 22), ACCORDING TO SEVAN, WAS NOT COORDINATED BEFOREHAND WITH THE RA AUTHORITIES. SEVAN INTERPRETS IT AS AN IMPETUOUS GESTURE BY CORDOVEZ DESIGNED TO UNBLOCK THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE. EXPECTED SHARP REJECTIONS OF THE NEW CORDOVEZ INITIATIVE BY HEKMATYAR, RABBANI AND OTHER FUNDAMENTALISTS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ENCOURAGE NAJIB AND THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT THE UN NEGOTIATOR'S CALL AS A MEANS TO PLAY ON THE OPPOSITION'S DIVISIONS AND TO PORTRAY MOSCOW AND KABUL AS "MODERATES INTERNATIONALLY. (THIS ROLE REVERSAL WILL BE SEEN AS PARTICULARLY USEFUL IF THE SOVIETS CHOOSE TO DELAY THE START OF THEIR SECOND-PHASE DEPARTURE AS A DEVICE TO PRESSURE THE NEWLY-ELECTED PAKISTANI AND U.S.

ADMINISTRATIONS.)

9. POSSIBLE DELAY IN SOVIET WITHDRAWAL: THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF IN EARLY SEPTEMBER INFORMED ITS LOCAL COMMANDERS THAT THE SECOND PHASE OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN NOVEMBER 15. TECHNICAL PREPARATIONS (COMMUNICATIONS LINKS) FOR THIS WITHDRAWAL HAVE BEEN SET UP. BUT--NOTWITHSTANDING THE THREE WEEKS REMAINING--NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO UNGOMAP ON THE STAGING OF THE WITHDRAWAL. MEANTIME, THE RA CONTINUES ITS STREAM OF NOTES ON PAKISTANI VIOLATIONS AND THE REGIME MEDIA DAILY REPORT THE ALLEGED CAPTURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISORS. GORBACHEV, IN SPEAKING WITH ITALIAN PM DE MITA TEN DAYS AGO (SEE ROME 23903), POINTED OUT THAT AFGHANISTAN IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR AND THAT "EVERYONE" SHOULD TAKE CARE TO ENSURE THAT "IMPLEMENTATION (OF GENEVA) CAN CONTINUE."

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10. THE SOVIETS AND RA FOR NOW ARE WITHHOLDING THREATS IN ORDER TO AVOID PREJUDICING THE PAKISTANI ELECTIONS (NOTE THE POSSIBLY TEMPORARY HALT TO THE DELIBERATE OR INADVERTENT LIMITED SEPTEMBER SOVIET BOMBING IN PAKISTAN). ONCE A CIVILIAN REGIME IS ELECTED, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WILL BE SURE TO PLAY ON ITS LEADERS' NERVOUSNESS AND SEEK TO EXPLOIT CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND ARMED FORCES. THE THREAT OF DELAY OR CANCELLATION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL--ACCOMPANIED BY RENEWAL OF INTIMIDATION AGAINST PAKISTAN --MAY BE SEEN BY MOSCOW AS POTENT. THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY ESTIMATE THAT THE POLITICAL PRESSURE IN PAKISTAN THAT LED BOTH JUNEJO AND ZIA TO REMOVE THEIR OBJECTIONS TO GENEVA SIGNATURE WILL ONCE AGAIN COME TO THE SURFACE AFTER THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CIVILIAN RULE.

11. THE ABSENCE OF CONTROVERSY ON THE TEXT OF THIS YEAR'S UNGA RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN WILL LESSEN SOVIET INHIBITIONS TO THREATENING DELAY IN RENEWED WITHDRAWALS. EXPECTED HEIGHTENED MUJAHIDIN ACTION AGAINST KABUL AND THE POSSIBLE FALL OF KANDAHAR WILL BE AVAILABLE AS A CONVENIENT PRETEXT FOR A WITHDRAWAL SLOWDOWN.

12. PREMATURE MUJAHIDIN EXPOSURE TO HEIGHTENED RISK: THE CONCENTRATION OF MUJAHIDIN AROUND KABUL--WHILE SOVIET FORCES IN THE CITY REMAIN AT FULL STRENGTH--APPEARS INJUDICIOUS. ROCKET/MORTAR STRIKES AT KABUL AND BAGRAM AIRPORTS AND SOVIET FORTIETH ARMY HEAD-QUARTERS CANNOT ACHIEVE STRATEGICALLY DECISIVE RESULTS BECAUSE--EVEN IN THE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY EVENT THE AIRPORTS CAN BE CLOSED DOWN--THE SOVIETS HAVE PLENTIFUL AIR ASSETS IN THE USSR TO CARRY ON MASSIVE BOMBARDMENT AROUND THE KABUL PERIMETER. THEY HAVE SHOWN NO HESITATION IN USING SOVIET-BASED AIRCRAFT IN AFGHANISTAN AND PUBLICLY ADMITTED IT DURING THE KUNDUZ OPERATIONS IN AUGUST.

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13. WHILE LOGISTICS AND TROOP MOVEMENT THROUGH THE

KABUL AND BAGRAM FACILITIES MAY BE MOMENTARILY
DISRUPTED, THE SOVIETS HAVE DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY
TO REPAIR RAPIDLY RUNWAY DAMAGE AND TO OPERATE AT

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 KABUL 02566

EXDIS KHYBER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, UR, PK, AF

SUBJECT: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN

NIGHT. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOVIET TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT USED HERE--MINUS THE IL-76 AND TU-154--ARE
ALL DIRT-STRIP CAPABLE.) THE INFLECTION OF DAMAGE ON
SOVIET FACILITIES AND WITHDRAWAL ROUTES WILL STIMULATE
MOSCOW TO DELAY WITHDRAWAL AND TO OPERATE AGAINST THE
MUJAHIDIN WHO HAVE BEEN CONVENIENTLY CONCENTRATED
FOR THEM.

14. THE PAKISTANI MILITARY'S DESIGN TO PUT THE
MUJAHIDIN INTO PLAY IN KABUL BEFORE PAKISTANI ELECTIONS
DEFIES LOGIC SINCE IT EXPOSES THE RESISTANCE TO MAJOR
RISK FOR MINOR GAIN. INSTEAD OF ENGAGING WEAKENED
REGIME TROOPS AFTER SOVIET DEPARTURE, THE RESISTANCE
WILL BE EXPOSED TO COUNTERATTACK BY A SOVIET ELITE
AIRBORNE AND MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION WITH UNDIMINISHED
ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT. RESISTANCE USE OF LIMITED
NUMBERS OF STAND-OFF WEAPONS WILL INCREASE THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION BUT WILL NOT DISRUPT
THE COHERENCE OF REGIME MILITARY UNITS WHICH MUST BE
DIRECTLY ENGAGED. IN THE KABUL AREA, THIS CANNOT
HAPPEN IN A MAJOR WAY UNTIL SOVIET TROOPS DEPART.
(NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE VAST POTENTIAL FOR SMALL-UNIT
INFILTRATION AND DISRUPTION IN KABUL HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY
UNTAPPED. THERE ARE NUMEROUS PURELY RA MILITARY AND
POLITICAL TARGETS IN KABUL THAT REMAIN UNTOUCHED, E.G.,
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF
STATE SECURITY BUILDINGS, THE MASSIVE PDPA CENTRAL
COMMITTEE BUILDING, RA MILITARY GARRISONS.)

15. ENDGAME: IF THE MUJAHIDIN AVOID MAJOR LOSSES AROUND
KABUL BY MELTING AWAY IN THE FACE OF SOVIET COUNTER-
ACTION (AS THEY HAVE DONE IN THE PAST), AND KANDAHAR
FALLS OR REMAINS TEETERING ON THE BALANCE, MOSCOW IN
DECEMBER WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT TO COMPLETE
ITS WITHDRAWAL BEFORE FEBRUARY 15. THE STAKES FOR IT
TO DO SO REMAIN VERY HIGH.

16. CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN WHEN VISITING
MOSCOW WILL PRESUMABLY REPEAT INSISTENCE ON COMPLETION
OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL (ALONG WITH A KAMPUCHEAN
SETTLEMENT) AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR GORBACHEV'S HIGHLY-
DESIRED SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT. MOREOVER, GORBACHEV WILL
NOT WISH TO PUT AT RISK HIS MAJOR EUROPEAN AND ARMS
CONTROL INITIATIVES BY KEEPING ALIVE THE AFGHAN
DISTRACTION.

17. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS FACE A FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC CHOICE IN AFGHANISTAN--THEY CAN EITHER: A) PUT IN PLACE A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL CAUSE THE MUJAHIDIN TO STOP FIGHTING--THEREBY PROVIDING THE PEACE REQUIRED FOR MOSCOW TO BUILD FUTURE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OUT OF AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR, OR B) THEY CAN LEAVE THINGS TO CHANCE, HOPING THAT THE WEAKENED PDPA, WITHOUT ANY PROSPECT FOR IMPROVEMENT, CAN SOMEHOW HANG ONTO POWER IN EMBATTLED SLIVERS IN KABUL AND THE NORTH. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES OF A CONTINUED CIVIL WAR, THE SOVIETS--LIKE NOW--WOULD BE UNABLE TO PURSUE THE ECONOMIC PROJECTS FUNDAMENTAL TO THEIR FUTURE INFLUENCE HERE.

18. THE INTERNATIONAL AND AFGHAN EQUITIES SEEM SO CLEAR, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT MOSCOW WILL CHOOSE TO COMPLETE ITS WITHDRAWAL ON OR ABOUT FEBRUARY 15 (PROBABLY REMOVING THE OVERWHELMING BULK OF ITS FORCES BY AIR FROM KABUL IN JANUARY-FEBRUARY; FORCES IN SHINDAND AND HERAT MAY DEPART BY ROAD).

19. THE DISPATCH OF VORONTSOV TO KABUL IS INDICATIVE OF MOSCOW'S JUDGEMENT THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION MUST BE PUT IN PLACE BEFORE SOVIET DEPARTURE. SHEVARDNADZE REPORTEDLY TOLD DEPARTING AMBASSADOR YEGORYCHEV THAT AN IMMEDIATE POLITICAL SOLUTION WAS REQUIRED. THE CURRENT ARRESTS IN THE PDPA TESTIFY TO SOVIET DESIRE TO POSITION THE PARTY FOR ULTIMATE FUNDAMENTAL ACCOMMODATION.

20. IN THE FIRST STAGE, THE PDPA CAN BE EXPECTED TO EMBRACE THE PREMISES OF THE CORDOVEZ PLAN--EVENTUAL

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 KABUL 02566

EXDIS KHYBER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, UR, PK, AF

SUBJECT: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS IN AFGHANISTAN

SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OR DEPARTURE FROM POWER IN EXCHANGE FOR NEUTRAL/ZAHIR SHAH RULE. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY POSSIBLE DELAYS IN SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, OTHER THREATS AGAINST PAKISTAN, AND SOVIET MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE MUJAHIDIN. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, PROBABLY IN DECEMBER-JANUARY, THE PDPA OFFER TO STAND ASIDE WILL PROBABLY BE JOINED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE MUJAHIDIN PREFERENCES IN A FOLLOW-ON INTERIM ADMINISTRATION--THE ESSENCE OF YAQUB KHAN'S SEPTEMBER 28 NEGOTIATING OFFER.

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