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File Folder MATLOCK CHRON - NOVEMBER 1983 (2)

FOIA M08-244 JONES

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8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1.	78434	MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE R 8/5/2010 M244/1	1	11/18/1983	B1
2.	78435	MEMO HILL TO MCFARLANE (ATTACHMENT TO 78434) R 8/5/2010 M244/1	1	11/16/1983	B1
3.	78436	TRANSLATION RE SOVIET SUBMARINE (ATTACHMENT TO 78434) R 8/5/2010 M244/1	2	ND	B1
4.	78437	MESSAGE TEXT IS IN RUSSIAN (ATTACHMENT TO 78434) R 8/5/2010 M244/1	1	ND	B1
5.	78438	MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE CULTURAL PROGRAMMING R 8/5/2010 M244/1	1	11/18/1983	B1
6.	78439	MEMO MCFARLANE TO WICK ~~R 10/28/2009 GUIDELINES~~	1	ND	B1
7.	78440	MEMO WICK TO MCFARLANE R 8/5/2010 M244/1	1	11/10/1983	B1
8.	78441	CABLE MOSCOW 14013 (070923Z NOV 83) R 8/5/2010 M244/1	2	11/7/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10.	78443 TELEGRAM	RE CULTURAL PROGRAMS	3	11/9/1983	B1
11.	78444 NSDD	NSDD 102 P. 3 ONLY (PARTIAL)	1	9/5/1983	B1
12.	78445 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE ***R 8/5/2010 M244/1***	1	11/18/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
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File Folder: Matlock Chron – November, 1983 [2 of 4]

Archivist: jas/jas
FOIA ID: F95-074, Pfeiffer
Date: 10/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Matlock to McFarlane, 1p	11/18/83	P1/B1
2. memo	Hill to McFarlane, 1p (attached to item #1)	11/16/83	P1/B1
3. translation	re: Soviet submarine, 2p (attached to item #1)	ND	P1/B1
4. message	text in Russian, 1p (attached to item #1)	ND	P1/B1
5. memo	Matlock to McFarlane, 1p	11/18/83	P1/B1
6. memo	McFarlane to Wick, 1p	ND	P1/B1
7. memo	Wick to McFarlane, 1p	11/10/83	P1/B1
8. cable	070923Z Nov 83, 1p	11/7/83	P1/B1
9. cable	Hartman to Wick, 1p	11/7/83	P1/B1
10. telegram	re: cultural programs, 3p	11/9/83	P1/B1
11. NSDD	NSDD #102, 1p partial	9/5/83	P1/B1
12. memo	Matlock to McFarlane, 1p	11/18/83	P1/B1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

78434

8339

Matlock

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

November 18, 1983

NOTED

RCM HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Soviet Response on Submarine Repair in Cuba

Attached is State's report (Tab I) on the Soviet reply to our demarche of November 9 regarding the repair of the damaged Soviet submarine then in Cuban waters. The Soviets, in effect, reaffirmed their commitment to the 1962 understanding. State had sought assurances that no repairs to the nuclear power plant or any nuclear weapons aboard be undertaken in Cuban ports. The Soviets asserted that damage to the propeller would be repaired in Nipe Bay and that the submarine would depart Cuba in three to four days.

We cannot yet confirm that the submarine has in fact left Nipe Bay, since there has been cloud cover yesterday and today. There is, however, no evidence that the submarine has moved to Cienfuegos or any other Cuban Port. The Intelligence Community continues to monitor the situation.

Lenczowski, Menges, Fontaine and North concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memo from State

Late Note: The sub has been spotted NE of Cuba, apparently on its way home under its own power (morning of Nov. 21).

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

S/S 8335186 78435

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

8339

83 NOV 16 P11 : 53

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

November 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Response on Submarine Repair in Cuba

Attached are the Russian text and the Department's translation of the "oral statement" made to Under Secretary Eagleburger by Ambassador Dobrynin November 14 in reply to our November 9 démarche on the damaged Soviet nuclear-powered submarine now in port in Cuba. In our démarche we had told the Soviets that, in line with the 1962 Understanding, we wanted Soviet assurances that the submarine's stay in Cuba would be brief and that no repairs or servicing would be done to the nuclear plant or any nuclear weapons on board.

In response, the Soviets reaffirmed their commitment to the 1962 Understanding and explained that -- after work to correct a damaged propeller, to be performed by the crews of the submarine and the Soviet ships which towed it -- the submarine would depart Cuba in 3-4 days. We shall carefully monitor work on the submarine to see that its handling is consistent with these assurances.

Our early approach to the Soviets raising this issue in terms of the 1962 Understanding was effective in ensuring they handled the problem within terms of the agreement and in the brief time frame specified in our démarche. Although a relatively minor incident as it turned out, the exchange demonstrates our ability to use the Understanding to constrain Soviet behavior in this Hemisphere. Soviet willingness authoritatively to reaffirm their adherence to the restraints imposed by the Understanding on their deployment of nuclear-capable weapons to Cuba was also useful and possibly provides further evidence that they do not intend to reopen the issue by deploying nuclear systems in Cuba as counters to our upcoming INF deployments in Europe.

Attachments: As Stated

for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

78436

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 111249

DZ
Russian

With regard to the demarche of the US side regarding the towing of the Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine to Cuba, we would like to emphatically stress that the Soviet Union is not doing anything that would contradict the 1962 agreement on Cuba, and intends to continue to abide by its part of the agreement provided that the US continues to abide by its part of the agreement, as it has confirmed it would.

As a gesture of good will and guided by the desire to avoid a possible misunderstanding, we are informing the US side of what happened to the Soviet submarine.

During a training mission the submarine suddenly lost power. As it turned out, this occurred because its propeller got entangled in a cable. The situation made it necessary to tow the submarine to the nearest place protected from waves and wind, which was done with the help of two Soviet ships. On November 10 the submarine was brought to Nipe Bay on Cuba's

northeast shore. The intention is that the crews of the Soviet ships and submarine, using their equipment, will complete the necessary work to correct the problem within three to four days, after which the submarine will leave Nipe Bay.

We trust that the US side will properly appreciate this information which we have provided.

78437

В связи с обращением американской стороны по поводу отбуксировки на Кубу советской торпедной атомной подводной лодки мы хотели бы со всей определённостью подчеркнуть, что Советский Союз не делает ничего такого, что противоречило бы договоренности 1962 года по Кубе, и намерен впредь придерживаться своей части договоренности, исходя из того, что американская сторона, как она эт подтверждала, будет выполнять свою часть этой договоренности.

В порядке проявления доброй воли и руководствуясь стремлением устранить возможное недопонимание, мы информируем американскую сторону о фактических обстоятельствах происшедшего с советской подводной лодкой.

В ходе учебного плавания эта подводная лодка внезапно потеряла ход. Как выяснилось, это произошло из-за того, что на ее винт оказался намотанным трос. В этой ситуации возникла необходимость отбуксировки подводной лодки в ближайшее укрытое от волны и ветра место, что и было осуществлено с помощью двух советских судов. 10 ноября подводная лодка была приведена в бухту Нипе на северо-восточном побережье Кубы. Имеется в виду, что в течение трех-четырех дней [силами и средствами экипажей советских кораблей и подводной лодки] будут проведены необходимые работы по устранению неисправности, после чего подводная лодка покинет бухту Нипе.

Мы полагаем, что американская сторона должным образом оценит это наше сообщение.

cc
870

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

83 NOV 21 P4:48

System # I

Package # 8339

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
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Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	M	I
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

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COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

78438 C
8211

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ November 18, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Cultural Programming at Spaso House

Charlie Wick has sent you a memorandum requesting guidance on continuation of a program of cultural events scheduled for Ambassador Hartman's residence in Moscow (Tab II).

Since the object of these presentations is to create a modicum of reciprocity in the absence of a cultural exchange agreement, I think it is clearly in the U.S. interest that they continue. They also facilitate Embassy contacts with non-official intellectuals, with whom meetings are often difficult to arrange in the absence of a specific event to justify their visiting U.S. Embassy premises.

Therefore, I recommend that you inform Mr. Wick that continuation of the program is consistent with U.S. policy.

Walt Raymond and John Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum (Tab I) to Director Wick.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Mr. Wick
Tab II Memorandum from Mr. Wick

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

78439

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK
Director, U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Cultural Programming at Spaso House, Moscow (U)

In reference to your memorandum of November 10, 1983, the continuation of cultural programming at Spaso House is consistent with current U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. (S)

Robert C. McFarlane

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

78440

United States Information Agency

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

USIA

~~SECRET~~
(Confidential Upon Removal of Secret Attachment)

November 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM : Charles Z. Wick CZW
Director

SUBJECT : Cultural Programming at Spaso House in Moscow

REFERENCE : Moscow 14013-C

After the KAL atrocity, USIA-assisted cultural programs at Ambassador Hartman's residence (Spaso House) were interrupted.

I am sending for your assessment a copy of the Ambassador's cable which outlines in paragraph four his program plans (Tab A), a copy of our responding cable (Tab B), and a copy of NSDD 102 "U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner" (Tab C).

We will relay to the Ambassador your decision on proceeding.

Classified by: Charles E. Courtney
Office Symbol: EU
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7844

ACTION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 #22917 ICA484
#7/8923Z

ACTION OFFICE DSO-04
INFO /004 A3 12

O #7#923Z NOV 83 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5536
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION #1 OF #2 MOSCOW 14#13

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- PARA 3 AND 4

USIA

DIRDIS

FOR DIRECTOR WICK FROM AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF CULTURAL PROGRAMS AT SPASO HOUSE

REF: (A) USIA 61994, (B) MOSCOW 12388, (C) USIA 55#85

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS I WAS NOT ABLE TO EXPLAIN FULLY TO YOU ON THE PHONE, I AM SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF CULTURAL PROGRAMS AT THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCES IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD. THAT CONCERN HAS INCREASED IN LIGHT OF THE UNEXPECTED COLLAPSE OF THE VISIT BY THE DAVE BRUBECK GROUP. DESPITE INDICATIONS IN LATE OCTOBER FROM USIA THAT THE BRUBECK PROGRAM WAS SET FOR MID-NOVEMBER AND VISA SUPPORT INFORMATION ON THE WAY, USIA APPARENTLY FAILED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO GET THE GROUP HERE. BRUBECK'S MANAGER EVENTUALLY TELEPHONED THE EMBASSY ON NOVEMBER 2 TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION, AND WE HAD TO TELL HIM TO PUT OFF THE VISIT SINCE THE SOVIETS--GOING INTO THEIR BIGGEST HOLIDAY PERIOD--WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE USED THE EXCUSE THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO PROCESS THE VISA REQUESTS. USIA'S LACK OF SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE FLIES IN THE FACE OF THE UNDERSTANDING I THOUGHT I HAD REACHED ON MY RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON. THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT OF THESE PROGRAMS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR PURPOSE AND I SO INFORMED THE AGENCY. WHAT SEEMS TO BE LACKING, HOWEVER, ARE CLEAR AND FIRM ASSURANCES FROM USIA THAT THE DECISION TO GO FORWARD WITH CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS AT THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCES HERE IS IN FORCE, AND THAT FULL SUPPORT FOR PROGRAMS WILL BE FORTHCOMING. IN THE EVENT OF PROBLEMS WITH PROGRAMS, I WOULD EXPECT THE AGENCY TO INITIATE TIMELY CONSULTATIONS WITH ME AND MY PAO.

3. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY DETAILED THE REASONS FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS AT SPASO HOUSE AND THE LENINGRAD CONSULATE GENERAL, BUT CLEARLY THEY BEAR REEMPHASIZING. BRIEFLY, OUR PROGRAMMING AT THE TWO RESIDENCES IS ESSENTIAL FOR MAINTAINING SOVIET CONTACTS AT A TIME WHEN ACCESS TO SOVIET SOCIETY IS SEVERELY CIRCUMSCRIBED. OUR PROGRAMMING DOES NOT DEPEND ON ANY COOPERATION WITH OR INPUT FROM SOVIETS, EXCEPT FOR THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS. PROGRAMS AFFORD US A WAY TO REALIZE TWO PRINCIPAL GOALS: COMMUNICATING TO OUR SELECTED AUDIENCES THE VITALITY OF AMERICAN CULTURE, AND PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT U.S. VIEWS TO SUCH HANDPICKED AUDIENCES. SINCE WE DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO INVITE SOVIET OFFICIALS TO ANY GIVEN EVENT, WE CAN USE (AND HAVE USED) PROGRAM EVENINGS AS A VENUE FOR CONVEYING

#22917 ICA484

NANCES, HOWEVER, IS THE CULTURAL INTELLIGENTSIA--SOVIET INTELLECTUALS WHO ARE OFTEN REJECTED OR IGNORED BY THEIR OWN REGIME AND WHO LOOK PRIMARILY TO THE U.S. FOR THE SUPPORT WHICH THEIR GOVERNMENT DENIES THEM. IN FILLING THIS NEED, THE EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL THUS FULFILL AN IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVE. IN ADDITION THESE PROGRAMS AFFORD ME AND MY STAFF A FINE OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS TO THIRD COUNTRY DIPLOMATS, MANY OF WHOM ARE UNHAPPY IN MOSCOW AND ARE THUS HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO OUR MESSAGE. BUT IT IS THE SOVIETS WHO ARE OUR PRIMARY AUDIENCE, AND THE ROLE OF SPASO HOUSE PROGRAMMING ASSUMES EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE WHEN RELATIONS ARE ESPECIALLY STRAINED--AS THEY ARE NOW--SINCE MANY OTHER FORMS OF INTERACTION WITH SOVIETS AT VARIOUS LEVELS ARE CUT OFF. THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT THESE PROGRAMS ARE WORKING IS THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO CUT THEM OFF THROUGH THE VISA PROCESS (THE LAST SCHEDULED GROUP WAS IN FACT TURNED DOWN).

4. A NUMBER OF AMERICAN PERFORMING ARTISTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING FTHEIR TRAVELLING TO THE SOVIET UNION ON GUEST-OF-THE-AMBASSADOR VISAS TO PERFORM IN MY OFFICIAL RESIDENCE. ALL OF THEM HAVE AGREED EITHER TO WAIVE THEIR FEE OR TO PERFORM FOR A FRACTION OF THEIR USUAL RATES. THESE ARE THE GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS WE HAVE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION:

PERFORMING ARTISTS	TENTATIVE DATE
PEARL BAILEY	MARCH 1984
MUIR QUARTET	DECEMBER 1983 OR IN 1984, TIME TO BE

BT
#4#13

83 NOV 7 A 5:37

ACTION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

PAGE Ø1 Ø22916 ICA402
Ø7/Ø924Z

ACTION OFFICE DSO-Ø4
INFO /ØØ4 A1 15

O Ø7Ø923Z NOV 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5537
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION Ø2 OF Ø2 MOSCOW 14Ø13

USIA

DIRDIS

FOR DIRECTOR WICK FROM AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF CULTURAL PROGRAMS AT SPASO HOUSE

	DECIDED
BEN VEREEN	JANUARY 1984
PHYLLIS CURTIN	FEBRUARY 1984
NEW YORK VOCAL ARTS ENSEMBLE	APRIL 1984
WILLIE RUFF AND DWIKE MITCHELL (MUSICOLOGIST, JAZZ SPECIALISTS)	MAY 1984
LEO SMITH (CONDUCTOR-COMPOSER)	MAY 1984
WEEKLEY-ARGANBRIGHT PIANO DUO	MAY 1984
JOHNNY CASH	1984, TIME TO BE DECIDED (ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 1983; POSTPONED BY CASH)
DAVE BRUBECK	WILLING TO RESCHEDULE FOR JUNE-JULY 1984

5. I BELIEVE THAT WE WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT THESE PROGRAMS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AND PARTIALLY FUNDED BY USIA. I ASK FOR ASSURANCE THAT USIA IS PROCEEDING TO TIE DOWN THE PROGRAMS CITED ABOVE.
HARTMAN
BT
#4Ø13

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No. NSDD 102

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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September 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH H. DOLE
The Secretary of Transportation

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

THE HONORABLE JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK
United States Representative to the United Nations

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK
Director, United States Information Agency

THE HONORABLE J. LYNN HELMS
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

SUBJECT: NSDD-102: U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner (S)

The President has approved National Security Decision 102, subject as above. A copy of the approved NSDD is attached. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

Attachment:
NSDD-102

~~SECRET~~
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THE WHITE HOUSE

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NATIONAL SECURITY
DECISION DIRECTIVE 102

September 5, 1983

U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF KAL AIRLINER (U)

INTRODUCTION

This directive defines the measures the United States will undertake to respond to the Soviet Union's shooting down of a Korean Airlines civil airliner, an act that resulted in the loss of 269 lives. This action demands a serious international and U.S. response, with primary focus on action by the world community. This Soviet attack underscores once again the refusal of the USSR to abide by normal standards of civilized behavior and thus confirms the basis of our existing policy of realism and strength. (U)

OBJECTIVES

o Seek Justice. We must consult with, and help to lead, the international community in calling for justice. Civilized societies demand punishment and restitution to deter, and raise the costs of, future egregious acts. We have a responsibility to impress upon the world that the Soviets, at a minimum, owe the international community:

-- A full account of what happened, an apology, an admission of responsibility, and appropriate punishments to those responsible. (U)

-- Immediate access to the crash site for joint efforts by Korea, Japan, and the United States to recover the bodies of their citizens and, if possible, the wreckage of the Korean airliner. (U)

-- Firm assurances that the USSR will not use destructive force against unarmed aircraft in the future, including necessary alterations in Soviet procedures for handling cases in which aircraft mistakenly cross its airspace. (U)

-- Agreement to provide compensation for the benefit of the aggrieved families and KAL. (U)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

COPY 82 OF 9 COPIES

USIA

- Demonstrate Resistance to Intimidation. Bolster the confidence of our Asian friends, and others, and demonstrate that Soviet intimidation will not achieve its intended end of discouraging our friends from cooperating with us, particularly on mutual security concerns. ~~(S)~~

- Advance Understanding of the Contrast Between Soviet Words and Deeds. Soviet brutality in this incident presents an opportunity to reverse the false moral and political "peacemaker" perception that their regime has been cultivating. This image has complicated the efforts of the Free World to illuminate the USSR's true objectives. (U)

ACTION

In order to realize the objectives above, the United States will take the following bilateral and multilateral actions in the areas of diplomacy, aviation security and safety, and regional confidence building:

- Diplomacy and Justice. The following steps should be continued or undertaken immediately to mobilize the international community:

  -- Conduct intensive efforts to secure coordinated international action. (U)

  -- Seek maximum condemnation of the Soviet Union in the U.N. Security Council and provide wide dissemination of statements made in these sessions. (U)

  -- Announce that the US-Soviet Transportation Agreement will not be renewed and suspend all discussion on the issue of consulates in Kiev and New York and on a new exchanges agreement. (U)

  -- Continue to conduct a search in international waters, in consultation with Japan and Korea, for the remains of the aircraft. Assure the government of Korea that we will vigorously support their request to conduct, participate in, or observe salvage operations. Indicate our clear willingness and desire to assist the government of Korea in recovering the bodies and flight recorder as appropriate and in accord with international law. (U)

  -- Make joint request with the government of Japan for Soviet authorization for access to Soviet territorial waters and airspace to search for remains of the downed aircraft. (U)

-- Initiate a major public diplomatic effort to keep international and domestic attention focused on the Soviet action and the objectives outlined above. (U)

o Aviation Safety and Security. The United States will work with--and help to lead--other members of the international community in formulating and implementing measures that will [redacted] 1.5(d) The United States will also focus immediate attention on measures to enhance airline safety and security, while vigorously pursuing recovery efforts and the issue of reparations. Accordingly, we will:

-- Seek international governmental support for punitive actions in the civil aviation area for a period to be determined, with duration dependent upon the extent to which the Soviets demonstrate a willingness to honor essential standards of aviation safety. If the Soviets fail to provide concrete reasons to show that they are truly willing to observe such standards, we will consult with other nations about renewing the measures. ~~(S)~~

-- [redacted] 1.5 (d) We will avoid any actions that could affect the safety of international civilian aviation. ~~(S)~~

-- [redacted] 1.5 (d) (S)

-- [redacted] (S) 1.5 (d)

-- Work to achieve a meaningful censure of the Soviet Union at a special meeting of ICAO Council, with reinforcing measures at ICAO to be pursued. (S)

-- Develop an omnibus U.S. claim against the Soviet Union for compensation for the loss of life and property. Offer to present to the USSR similar claims on behalf of the Korean victims. Also coordinate claims with the

governments of other countries with citizens on the aircraft to dramatize the USSR's responsibility for its actions. (U)

-- Reaffirm the existing U.S. sanctions against Aeroflot that predate the Soviet attack on KAL. (U)

o Regional

-- Recognize that this act occurs in a theater where the Soviets have increasingly sought to intimidate our friends and discourage them from expanding security cooperation with the United States. (S)

-- Continue to consult actively with our Asian friends to develop measures we can take to further bolster their confidence. Provide tangible signals to the Soviets through this allied cooperation that the USSR's campaign of intimidation will only accelerate, not retard, our support for friends. (S)

-- Actions taken to advance this objective need not be directly linked to the aircraft tragedy, but should stand as a quiet, independent signal to the Soviets of our resolve to resist their intimidation. (S)

IMPLEMENTATION

The Secretary of State, in concert with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of USIA, and the Administrator of the FAA, will develop a coordinated action plan to implement the provisions of this Directive. This plan should include a legislative, public affairs, and diplomatic strategy and be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by Wednesday, September 7, 1983. (U)

Under the direction of the Secretary of State, an interagency group will continue to evaluate and explore additional possibilities for international and U.S. actions consistent with this Directive. The first report on this continuing effort should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by September 14, 1983. (U)

Ronald Reagan

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 11 LISTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

C

8342

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
JAS, 10/19/00

November 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Reply to Hellman Letter to the President on CTB

We concur in the attached draft reply to a letter from Professor Martin E. Hellman to the President and to Chairman Andropov.

Attachment

8342

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 18, 1983

FOR BOB KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Hellman Letter to President

State's draft reply looks fine, and I recommend you send it to Kelley.

John Lenczowski (OOT) and Ray Pollock (RP) concur.

Jack Matlock

JACK MATLOCK

S/S 8318771

8342

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 16 1983

83 NOV 18 P11 : 54

SITUATION ROOM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Hellman Letter to the President on CTB

Attached is a draft reply to a letter from Professor Martin E. Hellman to the President and Soviet Chairman Andropov concerning a moratorium on nuclear testing.

for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
1. Draft Reply.
2. Letter from Professor Hellman.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Proposed Draft Reply

Dear Professor Hellman:

You recently wrote me and President Andropov to suggest a moratorium on nuclear weapon and missile tests. I would like to share with you some of the reasons I decided not to resume negotiations toward a comprehensive test ban, and why I have not changed my mind on that subject.

The overall objective of my Administration is to restore and enhance the nuclear balance and international stability through a combination of sound arms control agreements and a carefully considered program of force modernization that leave us with a strengthened deterrent at the lowest feasible level. A ban on all nuclear weapons tests will remain a long-term objective of mine as well. But its achievement would be realistic only when we are much less reliant on nuclear weapons for deterrence and only if it is accompanied by effective verification measures. Moreover, a testing ban would do nothing in itself to reduce the number and destructiveness of nuclear weapons in the world, which must be our first priority. Accordingly, I have made the START and INF negotiations the centerpiece of my Administration's arms control efforts. As

Mr. Martin E. Hellman,
Professor of Electrical Engineering,
Department of Electrical Engineering,
Stanford University,
Stanford, California.

you may know, my top priority is the reduction of the most destabilizing land-based systems in START, and the elimination of the Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range missiles that threatens our Allies in Europe and Asia.

I can assure you I am leaving no avenue unexplored in the search for an acceptable agreement on START and INF: the U.S. has shown flexibility in both negotiations. Unfortunately, we have witnessed little movement on the Soviet side. The Soviets appear content to wait and see if domestic forces in the U.S. and in Europe will succeed either in blocking NATO's limited response to the massive Soviet SS-20 deployment, or in preventing procurement of the MX Peacekeeper needed to modernize U.S. strategic forces and encourage Soviet compromise in the START talks. I remain confident that both Allied and U.S. citizens understand the stakes involved and the need for resolution that will encourage Soviet flexibility at the bargaining table.

Effective verification of any agreement with the Soviets has always been a firm principle of mine. The verification of a total ban on nuclear weapons tests by national means is nearly impossible. That is why in past talks the U.S. has emphasized on-site monitoring. With the realization that verification has proved a major impediment to a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), we supported last year the commencement of talks in

the Conference on Disarmament about CTB verification and compliance. I hope progress will be possible on this key aspect of the issue.

Deterrence has kept the peace for over a generation. If we engage in prudent modernization of our forces and in arms control that reduces the most destabilizing systems, it will continue to do so.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

8328771

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

SEPTEMBER 21, 1983

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF RONALD REAGAN

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 172359

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 1983

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. MARTIN E. HELLMAN
PROFESSOR OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
INFORMATION SYSTEMS LABORATORY
DEPT. OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
STANFORD CA 94305

SUBJECT: OFFERS SUGGESTS ON HOW RONALD REAGAN OR ANDROPOV MIGHT BE AWARDED A NOBEL PEACE PRIZE NEXT YEAR

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

rec'd 5/5-I
9/20/83 2305

ID # 172359

MA036

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING
☐ H - INTERNAL
☐ I - INCOMING
Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 83/09/07

Name of Correspondent: Martin E. Hellman

☐ **MI Mail Report** **User Codes:** (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: offers suggests on how RR or Andropov might be awarded a Nobel Peace Prize next year

ROUTE TO:		ACTION		DISPOSITION		
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	Co Dono	CS ORIGINATOR	83/09/19			/ /
	✓ DOS	CS	83/09/21 for W	H signature		/ /
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Referral Note:

ACTION CODES:
A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:
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Comments: _____

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5/81

8328771

INFORMATION SYSTEMS LABORATORY
Department of Electrical Engineering
STANFORD UNIVERSITY Stanford, CA 94305

MARTIN E. HELLMAN
Professor
Electrical Engineering
(415) 497-4002

172359

September 2, 1983

President Ronald Reagan and President Yuri Andropov
The White House The Kremlin
Washington, DC Moscow, USSR

Dear Presidents Reagan and Andropov:

I would like to propose that one or both of you win the Nobel Peace Prize next year. Here is how: Declare a unilateral, six month comprehensive test ban on underground nuclear blasts, missile flights, and similar weapons testing which allows accurate verification. Also declare that after the six months, you would only resume testing if the other side did. Clearly, treaties and other reductions would be needed, but this would go a long way toward stabilizing the world situation and creating an atmosphere of trust in which such further steps could be accomplished.

Limited test bans and freezes on development are difficult, if not impossible, to verify. But I know from first hand discussions with experts in arms control here at Stanford University that a comprehensive test ban is totally verifiable.

The main military argument against a comprehensive test ban is that you would not know if your weapons had grown "stale". But I agree with Paul Warnke when he said that he never heard a stronger argument for a comprehensive test ban. No one would dare attempt a first strike with weapons of uncertain value, but deterrence would still be present.

This is a step that either of you could take with no real danger. If you do, you will go down in history as truly courageous, great men. If you and your successors do not, there will be no history to record your lack of courage. I beg you to consider this proposal seriously. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Martin E. Hellman

Martin E. Hellman
Professor of Electrical Engineering

Matlock
File

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 21, 1983

Dear Senator Nickles:

Thank you for your letter of October 27 regarding the proposal by the Customs Service to ban imports of certain products from the USSR on grounds that they may be produced by forced labor.

We take this matter extremely seriously. Although the question has not yet been referred to the NSC for review, I understand that it is being examined on an interagency basis. One of the questions which has arisen is whether the evidence of the use of forced labor to produce specific products is adequate to withstand a possible challenge in court by U.S. importers.

I can assure you that the question will be given the most careful examination.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Don Nickles
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 21, 1983

Dear Senator Rudy Boschwitz:

Thank you for your letter of October 28, 1983, regarding the Reader's Digest article on the importation of products which might have been produced by slave labor in the Soviet Union.

We take this matter extremely seriously. Although the question has not yet been referred to the NSC for review, I understand that it is being examined on an interagency basis. One of the questions which has arisen is whether the evidence of the use of forced labor to produce specific products is adequate to withstand a possible challenge in court by U.S. importers.

I can assure you that the question will be given the most careful examination.

Sincerely,

Bud

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Rudy Boschwitz
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

78445

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7831

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK SIGNED

SUBJECT: Letters from Senators Regarding Action by Customs to Ban Certain Soviet Goods for Import

Senators Boschwitz and Nickles have written you separately (Tab II) urging that U.S. Customs Service ban the import from the Soviet Union of certain commodities, on grounds that they are produced by forced labor. The importation of articles produced by forced labor is prohibited by Title 19, Section 1307 of the U.S. Code.

Customs Commissioner von Raab has in fact recommended that such a ban be imposed on a rather extensive list of commodities, and an interagency meeting was held last month to consider the question. The meeting indicated sharp differences of opinion among the various agencies represented, and within Treasury itself. In particular, the evidence available to support a finding that the imports in question were in fact produced by forced labor seems thin. In most cases, the Agency could only state that there was evidence on file that some commodities in that category had, at some recent time, been produced at forced labor camps. There was concern that, in any legal test of the ruling, the evidence on hand would be insufficient to sustain it in court. State took the position that the ruling should also be considered from the point of view of its political impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, and Commerce requested the opportunity to check on what volume of U.S. imports would be affected, pointing out that if the volume is large and the evidence slim, the Soviets could retaliate by suspending the Long-Term Grain Agreement, which would have a major political impact in the United States.

In short, all agencies, including Treasury, asked for a thorough review, and one was ordered. I have not been notified whether it has yet been completed. Although I attended the interagency meeting at Treasury, the issue has not been formally sent to the NSC for review.

I believe that the best way to answer the Senators' letters is to inform them that the matter is still under interagency consideration, with particular attention being directed to the sufficiency of evidence available to sustain the ruling they request.

Chris Lehman and Doug McMinn unavailable concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letters at Tab I to Senators Boschwitz and Nickles.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8569

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 7831

RR

85 NOV 18 P8:17

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Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	M	A
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	5		D
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

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COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 28, 1983

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

An article in the September 1983 Reader's Digest included the information that the United States in 1982 imported from the Soviet Union $118 million worth of chemicals, $10 million worth of uranium, $4.2 million worth of gold, $3.5 million worth of wood and wood products, and other products. Much or all of these goods were produced by indentured or slave labor in Soviet camps and prisons. Since the importation of goods made by forced labor is specifically prohibited under Title 19, Section 1307 of the U.S. Customs Code, we urge you to take the necessary steps to ensure that importation of goods made by forced labor is halted.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

Rudy Boschwitz

Rudy Boschwitz

RB:tcm

1851

DON NICKLES
OKLAHOMA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES
SMALL BUSINESS

83 - 31 P1. 24

October 27, 1983

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

My understanding is that new regulations dealing with the importation of forced-labor products which have been proposed by the Customs Service have been referred to your office for review. This issue is of concern to me and I am supportive of Commissioner von Raab's action.

To assist in your review I have enclosed a copy of a letter I sent to the Commissioner last month. I urge your favorable action in assisting the Customs Service's enforcement of the current law.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this issue.

Sincerely,

DON NICKLES
U.S. Senator

DN/ssr
Enclosure

215 DEAN MCGEE AVE.
ROOM 820
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
#405 231-4941

3003 FEDERAL BLDG.
333 W. 4TH
TULSA, OK 74103

1916 LAKE ROAD
PONCA CITY, OK 74601

DON NICKLES
OKLAHOMA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES
SMALL BUSINESS

September 22, 1983

The Honorable William von Raab
Commissioner of Customs
U.S. Customs Service
1301 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20229

Dear Commissioner von Raab:

As you are undoubtedly aware, the U.S. Senate unanimously joined the House of Representatives last week in a resolution to condemn the inhumane and unjustifiable Soviet downing of flight KAL 007. During the floor debate there was strong support voiced for further sanction to be taken against the Soviet Union to occur subsequent to the resolution's passage.

From reading Section 1307 of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, I believe you not only have an opportunity to invoke a sanction against the Soviets, but also a legal obligation to do so. The Congress has prohibited the importation of any foreign goods made by forced labor or indentured labor. This is not only a good policy but has been the law of this country since the early 1900's.

The United States should not act in such a way that would serve to economically benefit a country's selling of products made by forced labor. Even more important, the federal government cannot be in the position of ignoring the law.

I would appreciate your informing me of the history on how this law has been enforced and implemented. If there has been no enforcement, what justification is there for such non-enforcement? Also, I would like to know what plans you have to insure enforcement of this law against not only Soviet imports, but imports of other nations in violation of the statute.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this issue.

Sincerely,

Don Nickles

DON NICKLES
U.S. Senator

DN/ssj

5 Dean McGee Ave.
OM 820
LAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
105, 231-4941

3003 Federal Bldg.
333 W. 4th
Tulsa, OK 74103
918, 581-7651

1916 Lake Road
Ponca City, OK 74601
405, 767-1270

Attachments:

Tab I	Letters to Senators Boschwitz and Nickles
Tab II	Letters from Senators Boschwitz and Nickles

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 21, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Congressional Testimony by Richard V. Allen

Richard Allen has sent you a copy of his testimony on U.S.-Soviet relations, which he delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 16 (Tab II). It is generally very supportive of our current policies.

I recommend that you send him a note of acknowledgement.

Chris Lehman and John Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send the letter at Tab I to Richard Allen.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments:

Tab I Mr. Allen's Testimony
Tab II Letter to Mr. Allen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dick:

It was very thoughtful of you to send me a copy of your testimony on November 16 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I appreciate your vigorous support of our approach to dealing with the Soviets. I believe that we are now dealing from sufficient strength that, when the Soviets have sorted out their leadership situation, we can hope to see some concrete results.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Richard V. Allen
905 16th Street, N.W.
Suite 303
Washington, D. C. 20006

November 15, 1983

RICHARD V. ALLEN
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Fred —

NOV 16 1983

You may find portions of these testimony interesting.

Best regards.

Dick

P.S. Percy called three witnesses: Fulbright, Adm. Zumwalt, and yours truly.

8370

TESTIMONY BY RICHARD V. ALLEN

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW AND CHAIRMAN, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

AND

SENIOR COUNSELLOR FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

NOVEMBER 16, 1983

"U.S.-Soviet Relations"

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is indeed a pleasure for me to appear once again before this Committee to discuss a subject central to our contemporary foreign policy concerns. United States-Soviet relations, as the former Chairman of this Committee had often said, have been subject to myths and realities. This is not to suggest that Chairman Fulbright and I agree on which are myths and which are realities, but I'm here to give you my views on what I consider to be the myths and realities currently affecting U.S.-Soviet relations, and my perception of the future course of those relations.

Just five months ago, Mr. Chairman, Secretary of State George Shultz appeared before this Committee to present a definitive statement of the Administration's policy toward the Soviet Union. In my opinion, his analysis remains the most lucid and important I have heard in many years, and I consider it to be a landmark document. It has received far too little attention,

especially in the media, and deserves the most serious study and reflection.

I am sure that you and your colleagues on this Committee, along with all Senators, can agree that the fate of the world depends in large measure on the outcome of the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. At the moment, that relationship is very delicate.

The purpose of this hearing is, clearly, to help shed some light on the relationship, to examine the performance of the Reagan-Bush Administration in its conduct toward the Soviet Union, and to assess the Soviet response to the Administration's policies and attitudes.

This is an important task, because the Senate plays an important role in our foreign and national security policies. Without the understanding and active support of the Congress, any policy will ultimately fail. Above all else, we urgently need a long-term policy toward the Soviet Union that is sustained by a broad bipartisan consensus on its fundamental tenets.

I think it is a myth to assume that U.S.-Soviet relations can be governed by a "personal chemistry" between whoever is in charge of the Soviet Presidium and the President of the United States. There are many who believe that summitry can resolve fundamental differences between our nations. In my view, it matters not so much who is in charge of the Soviet Union and what his particular musical or cultural tastes might be, but whether the Soviet leadership, which means essentially the leadership of the Party, will persist in a course of expansionism

-- or, better put, imperialism -- to exercise the use of force not to protect human freedoms, but to usurp and destroy them.

I believe the Soviet Union is committed to an essentially aggressive course in virtually every part of the world. Witness, for example, the military buildup in the Western Pacific; witness the activities of various communist parties throughout the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere which perpetrate terrorist activities to destabilize regimes friendly, or at least not openly hostile, to the West. They know full well that terrorism breeds a reaction that yields an ugly scene on American television, and that such spectacles can erode public support for strong and effective policies.

Too often we have concentrated on the symptoms of U.S.-Soviet relations without looking at the root causes of our differences. We have ignored the lessons of history and have made assumptions in dealing with the Soviet Union which have proven to be without foundation.

The policy of "detente" (as distinguished from the tactic of detente) theory, for example, appeared to be based on the assumption that we could build through economic, trade and credits a web of relationships with the Soviet Union which would somehow make them less aggressive, less dangerous, dependent upon and essentially respectful of our United States vital interests around the world.

For more than a decade successive Administrations declared that the policy of detente could not be "divisible;" that the Soviets could not expect to receive the benefits of that policy -- expanded trade credits, a more or less steady flow of

technology designed to bolster the efficiency and productivity of the stagnant and archaic Soviet economy -- and at the same time continue attempting to undermine and intimidate non-communist governments. This applied especially to the underdeveloped world, where the traces of direct Soviet involvement were less visible, and where subversion has typically been carried on by surrogates, often under the banner of "national liberation movements."

Instead of that moderating impact, detente was accompanied by: the largest buildup of arms in the history of the world on the part of the Soviet Union; the unbridled use of terrorism as a destablizing force throughout the world; assassinations of Americans, including our Ambassador in Afghanistan preceding a brutal invasion of that country by Soviet military forces; massive genocidal military actions in Southeast Asia against the Cambodian and Laotian people as well as the Vietnamese; the buildup of Soviet missiles in Western Europe and in the Western Pacific. This harvest was precisely the opposite responses which our detente policies were supposed to achieve, and hence it is fair to say that, as a policy, detente was an abysmal failure.

It is ironic that a system that is such a blatant failure because it denies basic human freedoms, that cannot feed its own people, has succeeded, through the use of military force and violent terrorist acts, in destroying the freedoms of millions throughout the world.

These were the realities which led President Reagan to reverse the weakening of American forces. He is not, as some

political cartoonists would have us believe, a gunslinging Western cowboy; he is a thoughtful man who believes that the only thing the Soviet leadership respects is strength. I firmly believe that he is right and that historians will record this period, though dangerous to be sure, as one in which the Soviet Union's ability to impose its will on other nations has been ended.

Another myth in U.S.-Soviet relationships is that famous China Card policy which was played by Presidents Nixon and Carter. There are, to be sure, deep divisions between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. These divisions are much deeper even than differences over the purity of communist ideology; they extend to the very nature of the peoples and the historical attitudes of the Chinese towards foreigners by whom they had been dominated for centuries.

Although these divisions are real, the United States must be extremely careful in attempting to exploit them. Chinese leadership as well as Soviet leadership is composed of aged men, men who will not be around for many years.

In every totalitarian or authoritarian system there is always a succession problem. It often happens that the pendulum will swing from the "hardliners" to the "capitalists." The Chinese appeared to be headed in a "capitalist" direction at the moment. However, the Russians were in the same mold in the 1920s when they embarked on their New Economic Policy. That era was abruptly ended by the rise to power of Mr. Stalin and the subsequent massacre of millions of Russian people.

Who is to say the Chinese leadership after Deng Xiao Ping will not revert to the hardline policies pursued by Mao and the so-called Gang of Four? Who is to say that Chinese leadership will not attempt a rapprochement with the Soviet leadership in 1985? Does it make sense, therefore, to provide the People's Republic of China with military technologies which could be used in the future, not against the Soviet Union but against our friends in the Western Pacific?

Wouldn't it be ironic if American weapons were used against South Korea, for example, after we lost 55,000 American lives to defend South Korea against the North? Wouldn't it be a sad situation if this country, which prides itself on the defense of freedom at home and the exercise of an alliance system aimed at defending freedom abroad, were to sell out, for the sake of an ephemeral China card, the freedom of eighteen million people in the Republic of China on Taiwan?

Mr. Chairman, I believe the Chinese, like the Russians, respect strength. It was this committee which strengthened -- indeed, fundamentally changed -- the Taiwan Relations Act when it was submitted in draft form by President Carter. This country is now committed to providing Taiwan with <u>defensive</u> capability against the mainland. Did that rupture our relationship with the People's Republic? The answer is no. That relationship is based on mutual self-interest, not on capitulating to their demands.

Mr. Chairman, I believe there were a number of significant turning points in our relationship with the Soviet Union in the post-war era. Some of these were the result of agreements reached with the Soviet Union to divide Germany, Korea

and, in effect, to permit the Soviet Union to use the threat of force in Eastern Europe to subjugate the peoples of those nations. Many of these current day crises can be traced to the following events: (1) the Berlin blockade and airlift; (2) the takeover of the Suez Canal by Nasser and the subsequent rejection by the United States of British-French efforts to maintain control; (3) the introduction of Marxism into the Western Hemisphere by the Cuban revolution and the subsequent failure of the United States to envoke the Monroe Doctrine effectively when it became obvious that Cuba was a client state of the Soviet Union; (4) the prolonged war in Vietnam which lacked definition of purpose and eventually lost the support of the American people; (5) the recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole representative of all China; (6) thefailure of the United States to support its friend the Shah of Iran which led to the Khomeini regime; and finally (7) the hasty decision to get Israel out of Lebanon without getting Syria and the PLO out of Lebanon, which has contributed to the situation of near-chaos in that war-torn country.

Rather than discuss each of these turning points in detail, I would like to focus on two or three of them. First, Soviet ambitions in the Western Hemisphere: I believe the Soviet Union has two objectives in the Western Hemisphere.

The first is control of the Panama Canal, which is vital to United States security and that of Western Europe. The second is the neutralization and possibly the Marxist "liberation" of Mexico. A word about Panama: Americans tend to underestimate the strategic importance of the Panama Canal.

Few recognize that the Panama Canal has been the sea link between the United States and Western Europe and between the United States and Japan. More than half of the supplies the United States sent to Western Europe in World War II passed through the Canal. Our naval ships regularly use the Canal even from going from San Diego to the Gulf of Mexico. If the Canal is either put out of use by terrorist activity such as blowing up the locks or is taken over by unfriendly forces in Central America, the United States would face a very serious strategic problem. I don't believe the Soviet Union is interested in Nicaragua or El Salvador as an ultimate objective as much as I see their interest in the control of that vital gateway between the oceans.

Second, I see their interest in Mexico with its 80 million people contiguous to the United States. Mexico is a tinderbox, ripe for radical Marxist penetration. It is a one-party state with an incredible amount of poverty and a massive external debt of $80 billion. Mexico's history of revolution should make us cautious about its ability to turn from a free nation, although not pluralistically democratic in our political standards, to a state dominated by radical revolutionary ideology, perhaps of the Marxist variety.

The intervention, invasion or rescue, however you want to designate it, in Grenada by the U.S. and Caribbean nations may have set back the plans of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere. We would be naive if we assumed that these plans were dealt a body blow by the "liberation" of Grenada from the Marxist direction.

Therefore, viewing the continued struggle in Central America, I believe the Congress should support the President in providing assistance to those forces of freedom that are trying to restore the original aims of the Sandinista revolution. I think it is the height of folly to withdraw support from the so-called "Contra" groups in the region, those who are actively opposing Soviet and Cuban surrogates, while voting to spend billions of dollars on missiles that hopefully will never be used. The battle for freedom is not only in maintaining a strategic balance, but it's in supporting those forces of freedom who wish to see true democracy in their own homeland.

Now, let me turn to the Western Pacific. The buildup of Soviet forces on Sakhalin Island, including missile forces as well as air and naval bases, is very dangerous. The Soviet Union has made every effort to intimidate Japan from assuming a legitimate role for defending itself in its own sealanes. Moreover, the Soviet Union, which has pervasive influence over the tyrannical regime in North Korea, must have been aware of the effort by the North Koreans to assassinate the South Korean political leadership. We will not speculate on their motives in shooting down an unarmed Korean civilian airliner.

Communists leaders -- whether in Moscow, Peking, Pyong Yang or Hanoi -- are all quite familiar with the contrast between the stultifying impact of their own closed systems and the dynamic economies of free societies. These leaders are therefore committed to maintaining their insulation against outside forces of any nature and at the same time exploiting the very pluralism

and openness which characterizes the successful systems on our side.

Thus, the security of the Western Pacific has more than a strictly military dimension. Yet, given the circumstances of the region and the Soviet buildup of forces, there will be no substitute for collective security in the Western Pacific. That security should be in the form of a security community united by common perceptions of shared vital interests. Japan in particular must play a far greater strategic role, especially in maritime defense.

The only realistic way for this to be accomplished today, given Japanese domestic politics and the politics of the Pacific, is for Tokyo's role to evolve and be exercised within an informal concert of friendly, non-Communist countries in and near the region.

As with German rearmament in the 1950s, such defense growth must be disciplined by the constraints of a comprehensive, albeit informal, security system in which strategic planning is dedicated to the security of all members. Although today there is no prospect that Japan might again become a rogue elephant in the region, the Japanese people and the world both need assurance that Japan though strategically active is constrained by mutual obligations.

The community of the Western Pacific must include Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Their chief mission and principal challenge would be to protect the tranquility of the Western Pacific and to cope with the spread of Soviet power and

the danger such power poses to the vital maritime lanes in the region. These kinds of security agreements must emerge organically rather than be proclaimed from Washington. The days when U.S. Secretaries of State could make momentous announcements and foreign embassies and ministers would respond are over.

Finally Mr. Chairman, a few words about an area which has dominated U.S. post-war policy: the Atlantic Alliance. Despite the so-called neutralist movement in Western Europe, which we see on the nightly news in the form of demonstrations against the deployment of missiles in Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, the fact is that the elections which have taken place in Western Europe over the past several years have indicated a rejection of unilateral disarmament, peace at any price, and a neutralism of the region.

There's no question that a principal aim of Soviet policy is to split the Western alliance, to divide the United States from Western Europe. What the Soviet leadership must be brought to understand is that their efforts at intimidation will fail. If they are serious about disarmament, there is no greater will than that in this country for a verifiable, balanced reduction, indeed elimination, of strategic weapons in Western Europe. But as long as they continue their deployment of modernized missiles in Western Europe and expect the United States and its allies to refrain from seeking even parity in this strategic area, given the fact that in the conventional area, Western forces are badly outnumbered by Soviet controlled forces, their buildup will certainly continue.

While I would have preferred, obviously, as would you, to see the Soviet Union agree to dismantle its SS20s in return for no deployment of American Pershing or Cruise missiles, apparently this is not to be. There is not even the likely prospect that the Soviets would agree to essential parity at lower levels with the allied forces.

Thus, we are in the unhappy situation of having to implement the second track of the so-called two-track policy because the first track did not work. But I don't see any alternative. We should remember in this connection, however, that the two-track policy was not Ronald Reagan's creation, it was none other than Helmut Schmidt's, the leader of the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Republic.

I believe that once the Soviet Union is convinced that the demonstrations have not broken the will of the West, that the leadership of the Western Alliance is as firm as ever and trying to redress the imbalances that resulted from the Soviet buildup in the late '60s and throughout the '70s, it will come to the bargaining table and negotiate the kind of agreement which this committee will approve and recommend to the Senate for its approval.

The Reagan Administration has embarked on a long-term program of rearmament which, in my judgement, is correct, prudent and necessary. It has done so because of the clear determination of the Soviet Union to continue to fund, develop and deploy the most awesome arsenal of modern weapons of mass destruction known to history.

Unchallenged, this relentless buildup will continue to threaten world peace, and will certainly continue to exert pyschological pressure upon our allies, especially those in Europe.

I take it that we are not here to argue the specific merits of the Reagan Administration's long-term defense program, although some will insist that it is this very defense program that represents a "destabilizing force" in the relationship between the two countries, and that if we would only show restraint on our side, the incentive for the Soviet Union to continue investing a disproportionate share of its very scarce resources in weapons would accordingly diminish. I do not share this point of view, since I think that Soviet planners make their resource allocation decisions based on their own perception of Soviet national interest. While they must certainly take into account our own actions, we have, at best, a highly limited capacity to influence these choices.

On the other hand, I believe that we can and do influence, in a direct and measurable way, Soviet policy choices.

The Reagan Administration came to office determined to put our relationship with the Soviet Union on a different footing, one that more accurately reflects the reality with which we must deal in the 1980s. Many consider view of the President and some of his advisors to be unnecessarily harsh, and some have characterized it as simplistic. One observer, himself a member of the preceding Administration, recently opined that "the public rhetoric of Mr. Reagan and his team and their private

conversations all point to a deeply held belief that the world is in a fight between the good guys and the bad guys. They do not seem to see the difference between compromising with an adversary and bargaining with the devil. All adversaries are devils. In their hearts, they simply do not want to make a deal with Communists and radicals, all of whom they believe cannot be trusted to keep a deal. The only way to deal with the devil is to keep your distance. The only recourse with a bad guy is to beat him to the draw."

This caricature of the policy inclinations and the basic beliefs of the President and his advisors offers little in the way of serious analysis, let alone guidance for an understanding of the way in which fundamental policy choices are presently made.

The Administration came to office with a mandate to rebuild our military forces, and with the conviction that to retain the credibility of our deterrent capability we would necessarily have to proceed with the development and deployment of weapons systems that had been deferred or scrapped by previous Administrations. To delay any longer the recovery program for our armed forces, the President reasoned, would be to jeopardize our safety and to cause further erosion of our alliances.

A point of contention in the Reagan program was its rejection of the SALT II Treaty as negotiated by the Carter Administration. During the campaign of 1980, Mr. Reagan had decisively rejected that instrument because he had concluded -- along with the majority of the then Democratic-controlled Senate Armed Services Committee -- that the treaty did not serve the

national security interests of the United States.

He repeatedly pledged to negotiate arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union, but promised to seek agreements that would be balanced, equitable and, most important, verifiable. In the meantime, the Administration agreed to observe the terms of SALT II.

The Administration has done all this, although it has been forced to face a barrage of criticism from the press and from other quarters, much of it alleging that the Administration's negotiating position is unnecessarily lopsided and unrealistic, and does not take into account legitimate Soviet interests.

Still another variant of criticism is the one I heard just a few days ago in Taipei, where former British Prime Minister Edward Heath declared that "It is perfectly obvious that President Reagan does not want an Arms agreement with the Russians."

The fact of the matter is that President Reagan does want an agreement, and believes that he can get one on terms that are both acceptable to the Senate and which will truly serve the security interests of the United States. Such an agreement would necessarily take into consideration the basic security requirements of the Soviet Union, else why would there be an incentive to the Soviets to conclude such an agreement in the first place?

On both the intermediate and strategic fronts, continued negotiations with the Soviet Union are both necessary and

desirable. Effective, safe, verifiable arms reduction agreements are a prerequisite for safety in the nuclear age. Yet, to grasp for an agreement that does not meet the criteria set down by the President would be a profoundly dangerous mistake.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 25, 1983

Dear Professor Pfaltzgraff:

I want you to know that I very much regretted not being able to attend the recent conference in Bonn sponsored by your Institute and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Peter Sommer tells me that it was most stimulating and worthwhile. Unfortunately, it occurred just as I was getting settled in Washington and in my current job, and I was unable to leave Washington at that time.

However, I hope you will keep me in mind for future conferences on similar subjects.

Sincerely,

Jack F. Matlock

Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
IFPA
Central Plaza Building, Tenth Floor
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

NSC/S PROFILE UNCLASSIFIED ID 8307096

RECEIVED 05 OCT 83 09

TO CLARK FROM PFALTZGRAFF, ROBERT DOCDATE 30 SEP 83

KEYWORDS GERMANY F R AC

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SUBJECT LTR TO CLARK FM INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS RE WHITE HOUSE ATTENDANCE RE GERMAN-AMERICAN ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE 11 - 13 NOV 83

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE 10 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

In association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President

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September 30, 1983

The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bill:

I regret that, as you advised me in your letter of August 9, you will not be able to participate in the Sixth German-American Roundtable Conference, to be held at the Bristol Hotel in Bonn between November 11-13.

I am writing to you at this time in the hope that you might be able to help us to ensure appropriate participation from the White House, since I have been informed that Chancellor Kohl will be present for part of the Conference and that the Minister of Defense, Manfred Woerner, will deliver an address on one of the evenings of the Conference. We have begun to assemble an impressive American delegation. Among the Americans who have accepted our invitation to participate are General Rogers, Richard Burt, and Kenneth Adelman.

Nevertheless, I believe that the Conference should include as high level participation from the White House as possible. In addition to one or more senior members of the National Security Council Staff, to whom we have extended invitations, we had hoped to have someone in attendance from the White House of the stature of you or Ed Meese. We had also invited Ed Meese, only to learn that he will accompany the President on his Asian tour. The Conference offers an opportunity for the Administration to make a statement of major importance on INF and other NATO modernization issues. I believe that it is important that the American delegation include appropriate official representation from the White House in light of the West German group that is being assembled for the meeting. I would welcome any help that you might be able to give us for this purpose.

I realize the many demands on your time. I write to you at this time only because of the importance of the issues that will be discussed at the Conference and the opportunity that will be available in the meeting for those of us, in the Administration and outside, who strongly support the NATO modernization decision, to maintain the momentum of our efforts for the planned INF deployment and to present our perspectives on other vitally important security issues in the transatlantic relationship.

I enclose a list of American invitees for your information, as well as a copy of the agenda, and my original letter of invitation to you and the published report from the Fifth German-American Roundtable Conference.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

RLP:md
Enclosures

SIXTH GERMAN-AMERICAN ROUNDTABLE
November 11-13, 1983
Bristol Hotel
Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany

AMERICAN INVITEES
(But no response as of
September 30)

The Honorable Thomas E. Coleman
House of Representatives

Dr. Jeffrey Cooper
Jeffrey Cooper Associates

Mr. Robert Dean
Deputy Director
Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Donald Fortier
Senior Director, Political-
Military Affairs
National Security Council

Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe
Director, Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs
U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Robert Kasten
U.S. Senate

The Honorable John F. Lehman, Jr.
Secretary of the Navy

Mr. Ronald F. Lehman
Senior Director, Defense
Programs and Arms Control
National Security Council

Dr. Leslie Lenkowsky
Deputy Director Designate
U.S. Information Agency

Mr. Jack F. Matlock
Senior Director, European
and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council

Dr. John Mansfield
Assistant Deputy Director
Science and Technology
(for Theoretical Research)
Defense Nuclear Agency

The Honorable Paul H. Nitze
Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the
Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces Negotiations
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Mr. Richard Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security
Policy

The Honorable Dan Quayle
U. S. Senate

Dr. James R. Schlesinger
Center for Strategic and
International Studies

General Brent Scowcroft
Washington, DC

The Honorable John Tower
U. S. Senate

Dr. Robert W. Tucker
Director
Center for Foreign Policy Research
John Hopkins University

Mr. James Woolsey
Shea and Gardner
Washington, DC

ACCEPTANCES:

The Honorable Kenneth Adelman
Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(Tentative)

The Honorable W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Washington, DC

Mr. Richard R. Burt
Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
Director
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

Dr. Laurence Legere
Defense Advisor
U.S. Permanent Representatives
on the North Atlantic Council

Mr. Joseph Lehman
Public Affairs Office
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

General Bernard W. Rogers
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
U.S. Mission to NATO

General Richard G. Stilwell
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Tentative)

SIXTH GERMAN AMERICAN ROUNDTABLE

Proposed Agenda

November 11-13, 1983

SESSION I — INF Modernization, Arms Control and European Security

- INF Deployment and Deterrence
- Arms Control Initiatives
- British and French Nuclear Forces
- Theater Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence

SESSION II — Strengthening Conventional Deterrence

- Revitalizing Flexible Response
- Military Viability of Concept of Forward Defense
- Deep Strike/Second Echelon Targetting
- European and U.S. Force Levels
- East-West Technology Balance: A Plus or Minus?

SESSION III — European Defense Collaboration and the Transatlantic Relationship

- German-French Defense Dialogue
- Transatlantic Tensions & European Collaboration
- A "European nuclear force"

SESSION IV — Defense Burden-Sharing & U.S. Resources

- Persian Gulf & U.S. Resources
- French External Assistance Forces
- U.S. Domestic Constraints and Defense Burden-Sharing
- Alliance Action versus Multilateral Efforts-- U.S., German, British and French -- out of Area

Rev. June 15, 1983

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
In association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President

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Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
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TELEX/TWX: 710-328-1128

July 18, 1983

The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bill:

On November 11-13, 1983, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis of Cambridge, Massachusetts and Washington, D.C., and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung of St. Augustin, Federal Republic of Germany, will co-sponsor at the Bristol Hotel in Bonn, a conference entitled "NATO Modernization and Arms Control: U.S. and West German Perspectives."

This meeting represents the sixth in a series of German-American Roundtable meetings begun in 1977 under the joint auspices of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Like the earlier Roundtable meetings, this conference will bring together a select group of distinguished West German and American policy analysts, government officials and other participants for an informal discussion of issues of current importance to the Atlantic Alliance. The Sixth German-American Roundtable will provide a timely forum for the frank exchange of views among distinguished German and American policy-makers and defense analysts on NATO conventional and nuclear force modernization, arms control, and European and American perspectives on current political issues of common importance. I am enclosing a copy of the agenda setting forth the principal topics to be considered at the Sixth German American Roundtable Conference, as well as the Conference Report from the Fifth German-American Roundtable Conference held in Washington in March 1982.

It is anticipated that participants from the Federal Republic of Germany will include Manfred Woerner, Minister of Defense, Dr. Alois Mertes, State Minister of the Foreign Office, and Lothar Ruehl, State Secretary for Defense. We hope to have comparable representation from the United States, and, especially, from the Administration.

Please regard this letter as an invitation to participate in this meeting and to present remarks on a topic of your choice related to the principal themes of the Conference.

Funds are available to underwrite the cost of round-trip air travel (on a U.S. air carrier) to the Federal Republic of Germany together with other expenses directly related to participation in the Sixth German-American Roundtable Conference.

I hope that you will find it possible to participate in what promises to be a useful and timely examination of security issues of importance to the Atlantic Alliance and the United States.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

RLP:md
Enclosures

A Conference Report

Fifth German-American Roundtable on NATO: The Changing Context of the European Security Debate

Summary of a Transatlantic Dialogue

Co-sponsored by
THE KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG
and
THE INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, INC.

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Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President

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September 27, 1983

Mr. Jack F. Matlock
Senior Director, European
and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Matlock:

On November 11-13, 1983, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung of St. Augustin, Federal Republic of Germany, will co-sponsor at the Bristol Hotel in Bonn, a conference entitled "NATO Modernization and Arms Control: U.S. and West German Perspectives."

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Please regard this letter as an invitation to participate in this meeting. Hotel accommodations in Bonn will be underwritten by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

I hope that you will find it possible to participate in what promises to be a useful and timely examination of security issues of importance to the Atlantic Alliance and the United States.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

RLP:md
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SIXTH GERMAN AMERICAN ROUNDTABLE

Proposed Agenda

November 11-13, 1983

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Fifth German-American Roundtable on NATO: The Changing Context of the European Security Debate

Summary of a Transatlantic Dialogue

Held at the Madison Hotel
Washington, D.C.
March 15-16, 1982

Co-sponsored by
THE KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG
and
THE INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, INC.

Copies of this Conference Report and previous ones in this series (see inside back cover) may be ordered from the Circulation Manager, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Central Plaza Building, 10th Floor, 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Mass. 02139. (Telephone: 617-492-2116) Single copies, one dollar. For orders of 10 or more copies, 20 percent discount.

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Contents

Foreword

This Report synthesizes the proceedings of the Fifth German-American Roundtable Conference on NATO, co-sponsored annually by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C. The German-American Roundtable meetings provide a forum for a continuing dialogue among participants, representing a broad spectrum of informed thought, from both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, on security issues of common importance. These meetings were initiated in 1977 in the belief that it is essential to build and to sustain a consensus in both countries based on an adequate understanding of transatlantic security problems. The German-American Roundtable series has provided an opportunity for a candid examination of security issues and perspectives such as is achieved rarely, if ever, within the more formal processes and forums of the Atlantic Alliance.

The emphasis in the Roundtable meetings has been upon informal and informed discussions by participants drawn from the German and American "policy communities," representing the official as well as the private sectors of their respective countries. There are no formal presentations—other than luncheon and dinner speakers. All of the sessions have been conducted on an off-the-record basis, although each conference has produced a report summarizing the major themes under discussion.

The Roundtable meetings in 1977 and 1978 addressed the triad of NATO forces, with special emphasis on trends in the theater nuclear balance and general purpose forces in Europe. Discussions at the 1979 Roundtable were devoted to the ongoing negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe. The Fourth German-American Roundtable in 1980 provided a forum for an assessment of political trends in the United States and in Western Europe, as well as in Eastern Europe, together with broader strategic military issues affecting transatlantic relations emanating from beyond the North Atlantic area. Issues discussed included German-American security perspectives in the early 1980s in light of events in the Persian Gulf; existing and prospective U.S. defense modernization programs; trends in West European defense policy; and the NATO decision of December 12, 1979, to deploy in Europe new generation theater nuclear systems and to modernize general purpose forces.

The Fifth German-American Roundtable Conference, upon which this report is based, has as its principal focus the transatlantic political tensions facing the Alliance as a result of differing security perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to East-West trade and technology transfer, these include the priority to be attached to NATO nuclear mod-

ernization, proposals for the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces, burden sharing in NATO, and issues outside the North Atlantic area which are of importance to Alliance members. This Roundtable conference had among its participants a large number of representatives of the present, and past, Administrations in Washington, as well as a distinguished group from the Federal Republic of Germany. Because of the importance of the perspectives on the issues discussed at the Fifth German-American Roundtable Conference, it is appropriate that they be made available in this Report to a wider transatlantic audience.

The themes and viewpoints reflected in this summary should not be associated with the official positions of the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, nor specifically with any participant(s) in the Roundtable.

Summary of Discussions

The Fifth German-American Roundtable had as its focus the transatlantic security debate that has been intensified in the months since the Fourth German-American Roundtable Conference in Bonn in December 1980. The Conference provided a timely occasion for the consideration of a broad range of security problems with military, political and economic dimensions that affect German-American relations. Specific emphasis was placed upon the discord that presently exists in the Federal Republic of Germany on the installation of new generation intermediate nuclear forces in keeping with the decision taken by the NATO Ministerial Council on December 12, 1979. Other discussions in this Roundtable meeting addressed the pipeline project in which eventually the Federal Republic of Germany will obtain at least 30 percent of its natural gas from the Soviet Union. Attention was devoted to transatlantic differences related to security issues outside the geographic perimeter of the Alliance. The Conference furnished an opportunity for an examination of arms control issues, and especially those related to the growth in Soviet systems, particularly the counterforce-capable SS-20, now targeted against the Federal Republic and other West European NATO members. Much of the discussion that took place during the Fifth German-American Roundtable was set within the framework of transatlantic burden sharing in light of contrasting trends in defense appropriations on both sides of the Atlantic.

Burden Sharing in the Defense of Europe

Thus, a pervasive theme of the meeting was the role of NATO allies in the forward defense of Europe, in light of the assumption by the United States of security obligations in other parts of the world, particularly in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf, where allied interests were said to be at least as great as those of the United States. The economies of Western Europe and Japan are even more heavily dependent than that of the United States upon imports of energy and nonfuel minerals. Under such circumstances, it was asked by more than one American participant, should European NATO members undertake a greater effort on behalf of security *within* the geographic perimeter of the Alliance, if the United States is to build a security capability for power projection into more distant regions of importance both to West European and American interests?

An effort was made to assuage American concern by suggestions that the question of transatlantic burden sharing is complex. Although the United States remains principally responsible for the nuclear component

of the deterrent posture of the Alliance, the largest conventional contributions are provided by European members. The Federal Republic of Germany maintains an authorized military establishment totaling just under 500,000, all of which is committed to the defense of NATO. The United States presently has stationed in Europe a total of 337,000 active-duty forces, contrasted with 55,000 for Britain. Most of the active units available for NATO defense, together with air units committed to the Alliance, are those of West European members.

The United States, it was asserted by at least one American participant, is by tradition a maritime nation whose capabilities have been designed to project military power into regions in association with friendly local forces and populations. The principal security threat to the United States, in sharp contrast to Western Europe, lies not in a land invasion but rather in the strategic nuclear capabilities possessed by the Soviet Union. The strategic nuclear forces of the United States account for no more than 15 percent of the American defense budget. The maintenance of large general-purpose forces, particularly ground units committed to NATO forward defense, constitutes a substantial expenditure of defense resources. The question that will face the United States in the years ahead is that of reconciling its commitment to NATO forward defense with the manifest need to evolve a strategic framework that provides for deterrence based upon strategic nuclear forces *and* the projection of conventional military power, including maritime forces, into regions in many parts of the world.

As one German participant pointed out, the U.S. military posture reflects a sharing of burdens based upon large-scale nuclear capabilities, together with a conventional military establishment that, as a percentage of the U.S. labor force, exceeds the comparable percentage of the Federal Republic of Germany, even though the United States has an all-volunteer army, in contrast to the Federal Republic, which maintains conscription,[1] as the basis for military recruitment. The possibility of greater defense allocations by the Federal Republic of Germany has been diminished by an increasing budgetary deficit and by numerous domestic economic problems. One German participant suggested, however, that the ability of the Bonn Government to cope successfully with present economic problems, including high interest rates, low economic growth, balance

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[1]Reference was made to data published in *NATO Review*, February 1980, p. 33. These data are as follows: In 1981, 2.5 percent of the total work force of the Federal Republic was in its military establishment; the comparable figure for the United States was 2.9 percent. In this respect, the Federal Republic of Germany is exceeded by Belgium (2.8 percent), The Netherlands (2.7 percent), and Norway (2.6 percent). Both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are surpassed by France (3.0 percent), Greece (6.2 percent), and Turkey (4.4 percent). The *NATO Review* is published bimonthly under the authority of the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

of payments deficits, and unemployment, would make possible a real annual increase of as much as 4 percent in defense appropriations.

Under such circumstances, the German conventional force contribution to NATO might be strengthened in the form of improvements in reserve forces, and in transportation and logistical infrastructures. The Bundeswehr is limited by law to 500,000; a substantial increase in its size would evoke, at best, mixed reactions in Western Europe. One German participant asserted that other European NATO members have appeared to favor a West German force large enough to deter the Soviet Union but small enough not to menace Luxembourg.

The problem in maintaining adequate force levels—and of even sustaining existing military capabilities—is heightened by impending demographic trends in the Federal Republic of Germany. Within the present defense framework, by 1987 the Federal Republic will face a shortfall of 104,000 below the 495,000 total of today. Such a deficiency could be remedied by allowing women to join the military in noncombat duties and by calling up foreign workers who have been officially resident in the Federal Republic for at least ten years. Another option was said to lie in extending the term of conscription from 15 to 18 months, and in tightening existing legislation regarding the status of conscientious objectors.

NATO's Intermediate Nuclear Force Modernization Program

Much of the conference had as its focal point the question of intermediate nuclear force modernization set within the broader context of NATO force levels, the growth of Soviet military capabilities, and the defense decisions taken by the Reagan Administration during its first year in office. American policy on the modernization of NATO nuclear capabilities has been consistent in its response to the initiative taken by Chancellor Schmidt when, in 1977, he cited the need for the Alliance to modernize its long-range nuclear capabilities in light of the deployment by the Soviet Union of the SS-20 capability targeted against Western Europe. It was pointed out that the SS-20 had not been addressed in the SALT II Treaty and that the Soviet Union was in the process of gaining a preponderant position in long-range theater nuclear systems targeted against Western Europe. For much of its history, the Alliance had compensated for conventional force deficiencies by superiority at the nuclear level as the basis for deterrence. The Soviet advantage in long-range theater nuclear systems, together with the reluctance of some NATO members to modernize the nuclear capabilities of the Alliance, taken in context of adverse trends in the balance of conventional forces, has the cumulative effect of widening the gap between NATO and Soviet-Warsaw Pact force levels and conceivably even undermining the concept of

deterrence upon which the Alliance's strategy of flexible response has been based. Because of a large number of constraints, NATO members are not prepared to deploy increased conventional force levels as an alternative to deterrence based upon nuclear capabilities.

Turning the discussion to the issue of Alliance strategy, one German participant alleged that successive governments in the Federal Republic have failed to promote adequate public awareness of NATO defense needs in light of the threat posed by Soviet-Warsaw Pact military doctrine and force levels. The result has been widespread lack of understanding of the purposes of the Atlantic Alliance, which in turn has provided fertile ground for anti-nuclear hysteria not necessarily created, but nevertheless exploited, by the opponents of NATO, including the Soviet Union. In turn, such sentiment was strengthened by the suggestion that the United States, in the event of a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack, might view such a hypothetical conflict as being "limited" to Western Europe. This idea accords with the view, manifest among certain of the opponents of long-range theater nuclear modernization, that the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee has been decoupled from the deterrence of conflict in Western Europe. Such a perspective, it was pointed out by more than one participant, constitutes a distortion of American strategic military policy, which remains committed to the deterrence of war.

What is at issue are the defense requirements for that purpose—both with respect to levels and types of capabilities. As a result of the growth of Soviet capabilities, the military requirements for maintaining deterrence, it was suggested, have been altered. At least several German and American participants suggested that the defense program of the Reagan Administration is designed to take account of such changed needs. At least one member of the American group expressed the view that, in light of the momentum of Soviet efforts during the last decade, the United States would not be able to satisfy all of its expressed defense needs even with the planned increases in military forces. Another American participant characterized as unfair such a criticism, inasmuch as there will always exist a difference between available capabilities and strategic goals and that the achievement of a greater balance between means and ends could not be achieved under the best of circumstances in a short period of time.

Consideration of anti-nuclear sentiment in the Federal Republic evoked comments to the effect that such opposition created concern in the United States about the community of purpose upon which the Alliance had been founded. According to this view, the fundamental question to be asked on both sides of the Atlantic is the extent to which the consensus on the multilateral approach to security that was embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty remains a valid basis for the transatlantic security relationship.

The Alliance was created upon the premise that the collective defense of the West against the threat posed by the Soviet Union could be met only by a security guarantee among states on both sides of the Atlantic. An adequate level of defense capabilities, shared by Alliance members, was deemed to be the indispensable prerequisite first for the containment of the Soviet Union and then for the management of relations with Moscow.

Hostility to the deployment of long-range theater nuclear weapons in Western Europe, together with sharply contrasting policies between the United States and certain of its allies on other issues, had contributed to a questioning of the continuity in common purpose on security issues. It had spawned in the United States in recent months a debate between the proponents of a residual Atlanticism, or multilateralism, as the conceptual basis for American foreign policy and a contending perspective based upon what is termed a new nationalism, or unilateralism. In the absence of an ability to reconcile transatlantic perspectives to take account of its perceived interests, the United States might pay less deference to Atlanticism in favor of unilateral approaches to national security. Specifically, the unwillingness of West European electorates and their governments to permit deployment of long-range theater nuclear weapons would fuel sentiment in the United States in support of the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces. Why should the United States, it would be asked, continue to deploy in Western Europe ground forces which, because of West European opposition, could not be equipped with nuclear capabilities deemed necessary to the deterrence of conflict on the NATO Central Front?

The discussion turned to an examination of the question of basing mode options for new generation NATO long-range nuclear forces. Prominent in the discussion was the deployment of sea-based systems as a possible alternative to the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile. It was suggested that the Alliance should have available such an option in the event that it became politically impossible to deploy new generation long-range nuclear systems on land in Western Europe. It was pointed out that the United States, in the strategic force modernization program announced by the Reagan Administration on October 2, 1981, has decided to procure sea-based cruise missiles that might be launched from submarines. Support for such a sea-based option was not widespread among conference participants. The most important obstacle to such an alternative was said to lie in the psychological decoupling of deterrence on the European battlefield from the nuclear forces of the Alliance that would be symbolized by sea-based forces as an alternative to nuclear capabilities deployed on land as a tangible part of a NATO forward defense posture.

Herein the discussion at the Roundtable Conference confronted a par-

adox that was evident elsewhere as well in the deliberations. West European opponents allege that the deployment of such systems on land signifies the willingness of the United States to launch from West European territory nuclear systems targeted against the Soviet Union, while the United States supposedly would not be prepared to strike the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons from U.S. territory. It was in this sense that, according to some of the opponents in the anti-nuclear lobbies in the Federal Republic and elsewhere in Western Europe, the U.S. strategic nuclear force has been decoupled from the deterrence of conflict in Western Europe. However, the deployment of sea-based systems, according to those who support the basing of long-range nuclear forces on land in Western Europe, would symbolize a decoupling of nuclear forces from European security.

According to the proponents of the NATO modernization decision, amply represented both among the German and American participants, the only satisfactory resolution of this paradox lay in the deployment of long-range theater nuclear systems as agreed in December 1979 by the NATO Ministerial Council. It was suggested, furthermore, that no evidence existed that the Soviet Union, in the event of a war in Europe, would distinguish between a U.S. nuclear system launched from Western Europe or from the United States against Soviet territory. The Soviet Union was likely to view such a use of nuclear weapons by the United States without regard for point of origin of the system employed. The deterrence of conflict could be enhanced by deployment of new generation sea-based systems as a supplement, rather than as an alternative, to land-based capabilities. Such a diversified force would be inherently more survivable than one based on only one type of (land or sea) capability. In part, the need for such NATO nuclear modernization results from the counterforce level accuracy of the Soviet SS-20 launchers.

The military rationale for long-range theater nuclear modernization, it was suggested, results also from the need to deploy systems capable of enhancing deterrence by possessing the means to strike so-called second and third echelon targets, such as staging areas, supply depots, and force concentrations, that would be indispensable to the success of a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack. If the survival of such vitally important capabilities could be placed in doubt, the deployment of long-range theater nuclear systems by NATO would have reinforced battlefield deterrence and helped to maintain a perceived coupling with the strategic nuclear capability of the United States. In this respect, the deployment of new generation long-range theater nuclear capabilities under NATO auspices should be viewed, it was suggested, within the broader perspective of Alliance force modernization and the steps being taken by the Reagan Administration to strengthen U.S. defense capabilities.

Especially among some American participants, there were expressions of skepticism about the prospects for an arms control agreement that would satisfy the security needs of the West in the absence of a manifest willingness of NATO to engage in necessary programs of nuclear modernization. Although the United States, in accordance with the NATO "two track" decision, has entered negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit long-range theater nuclear systems, the West now has little with which to negotiate, since the first detachment of new generation long-range nuclear forces will not be deployed in Europe before December 1983. In contrast, it was pointed out, both by German and American participants, that the Soviet Union has already deployed some 300 SS-20 launchers thought to have as many as 900 warheads (three per missile), with each launcher capable of as many as three reloads of missiles. In addition, the Soviet Union has built more than 140 supersonic Backfire launchers capable of missions against targets in Western Europe, as well as in the adjacent seas. These substantial improvements in the Soviet nuclear posture against Western Europe are supplemented by new generation shorter-range battlefield, nuclear-capable systems (the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23, which constitute, respectively, the FROG, SCUD and SCALEBOARD follow-on systems). Under such circumstances, if arms control negotiations are allowed to supercede NATO modernization programs, European security would become hostage to the goodwill of the Soviet Union, which would gain increasing influence in West European defense decisionmaking. In fact, the nondeployment of NATO long-range theater nuclear systems, at a time when the Soviet Union has been deploying its own new generation capabilities, would provide evidence of Moscow's political leverage over NATO defense policies. As a result, only the Soviet Union would have retained the right to modernize its nuclear forces in Europe.

Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals

There was substantial discussion of President Reagan's zero-option proposal of November 18, 1981, together with the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear systems. The U.S. proposal calls for the dismantling of Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 launchers in return for a NATO commitment not to deploy Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missile systems in Western Europe. There was agreement among conference participants that the U.S. initiative had helped, at least for the moment, to mute opposition to the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. The proposal was viewed as an effort by the United States to reconcile the need to diminish the Soviet advantage in land-based, long-range

theater nuclear systems and the commitment of a broad segment of West European opinion to arms control negotiations. The zero option was said to accord with the approach of the Reagan Administration to the achievement of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union based on substantial force reductions. The danger of the "zero option," however, was considered to lie in the possibility that it would not provide a mutually acceptable agreement. In the absence of evidence that arms control negotiations were enhancing the prospects for agreement, the opposition to the deployment of new generation NATO nuclear systems would increase in Western Europe, while anti-nuclear sentiment in the United States itself would grow.

The Soviet proposal for a moratorium on TNF deployments, set forth in Brezhnev's Tashkent speech of March 15, was rejected by Roundtable Conference participants because it would serve only to codify the existing imbalance in long-range, land-based nuclear forces in Europe. Even if the Soviet Union were to agree to dismantle a substantial number of its SS-20 force targeted against Western Europe, a major gap would remain in favor of Moscow. The only land-based, strategic ballistic missile systems located in Western Europe are the 18 launchers deployed as part of the French national force. Although the Soviet Union has sought to include French and British nuclear forces in intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations, the United States and its allies have maintained that such capabilities have characteristics and missions that differ fundamentally from those of theater nuclear forces—that is to say, the French and British forces are configured principally to deter attacks on their respective homelands rather than as an integral part of a NATO forward defense to contribute directly to battlefield deterrence. Any agreement short of the zero option, it was conceded, would leave the Soviet Union in a position of preponderance. The Soviet position, set forth in Brezhnev's proposal of March 15 for a "freeze" in NATO nuclear deployments at levels of Soviet preponderance in land-based forces, would eliminate any incentive for Moscow to negotiate *reductions* in such systems.

Issues Beyond the North Atlantic Region

The divergence between the United States and certain of its NATO allies relates not only to the management of East-West relations, but also to problems outside the North Atlantic area and, in particular, in Central America. In fact, the Alliance has failed by and large in its efforts to achieve a concerted approach to security issues confronting its members, individually or collectively, beyond the geographic perimeter of NATO. The failure to resolve such discord confronts the Alliance with a set of problems that have a cumulative effect upon the transatlantic

relationship. The lack of West European sympathy and support for what the United States regards as vital interests in the Third World, and particularly in Central America, a region adjacent to the United States but distant from Western Europe, is seen as evidence of a divergence in interests calling for independent American policies and possibly for a reassessment of the role to be accorded Western Europe in the overall list of U.S. priorities.

In response, one German participant suggested that the divergence between the United States and certain West European allies, especially the Federal Republic of Germany and France, on some North-South issues arose from contrasting perceptions of how best to cope with Third World problems, including the development of more stable political systems and the minimization of the potential for Soviet and Cuban-proxy support for regimes of the far left, rather than from fundamental differences with respect to overall objectives. There was said to exist a West European perception that the United States places excessive emphasis upon the military dimension of what may be largely socio-economic and political issues. In response, at least one American participant asserted that halting the influx of Soviet arms into the region was a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for political stabilization. In the United States there was held to be understanding of the fact that states in Central America have lacked the political infrastructure upon which representative political institutions could be built. The United States seeks to strengthen moderate, centrist forces in Central America as an alternative to the extremes of the far left or far right in the political spectrum. The view was expressed that the acceleration in violence in Central America would necessarily force a greater focus of U.S. attention in the region, perhaps to the detriment of American commitments and capabilities elsewhere. Hence, the West European Alliance members were said to share with the United States a need to find solutions that would enhance the security needs of states in Central America and eliminate the propensity of the Soviet Union and other forces sponsored by Moscow to intervene directly or indirectly in the region.

The Natural Gas Pipeline Agreement

A portion of the Roundtable discussion was devoted to the question of East-West technology transfer and the natural gas pipeline to be built between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. One German participant expressed the view that the pipeline had been the object of discussions begun during the Carter Administration. At that time the United States had not voiced official disagreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and other West European partners in the project. Furthermore,

The Honorable John F. Lehman, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (on right)



William Hyland, William Schneider, Jr., Congressman Sam Stratton, H. Clayton Cook, Jr., Edmund A. Gullion (left to right)

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Manfred Woerner, Jochen Trebesch, Uwe Nerlich (left to right)

Eugene V. Rostow

Wolfgang Pordzik, Jonathan Dean, Josef Joffe (left to right)

Senator William S. Cohen

Andrew W. Marshall and Harry A. Griffith (on right)

Volker Rühe, Jacquelyn K. Davis, Edward Conrad, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (partly hidden), Jeffrey Record, Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, Wolfgang Pordzik, John G. Keliher, Helmut Sonnenfeldt (left to right, at table)

Richard Pipes, Franz-Joseph Schulze, James M. Rentschler (left to right)

American technologies were to be made available in the pipeline construction. For the United States to express disapproval of the project at this time, when negotiations have been largely completed, would represent a lack of consistency in American policy as well as an attempt to exert undue influence on the policies of allies.

Within this German perspective, however, there was agreement with the view, expressed by more than one American participant, that the effect of the pipeline project would be to make available to the Soviet Union large amounts of hard currency and perhaps otherwise to diminish the pressures upon Moscow resulting from the failure of the Polish economy and serious economic problems facing the Soviet Union itself. Western Europe, and specifically the Federal Republic, would increase its level of dependence upon Soviet natural gas. Although such dependence would represent a diversification of energy supply, it was suggested by one American participant, the increased dependence of West European allies upon Soviet sources would coincide with a period of heightened political instability in other energy producing regions, notably the Persian Gulf, at a time when Soviet power projection capabilities were growing—as manifested in the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa since the middle of the last decade.

Elements of a Grand Strategy for NATO

The problem confronting the United States and its allies, it was asserted by one American participant, is to fashion a grand strategy based upon the containment of the Soviet Union at a time when Moscow possesses unprecedented levels of military power relative to the Atlantic Alliance. An indispensable ingredient in such a strategy lies in the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship, together with links with other allies and friendly states elsewhere in the Eurasian rimland and land mass, to thwart the further expansion of Soviet political influence. For this purpose, a strategic relationship between the United States and China is indispensable, just as another goal of American foreign policy lies in the preservation of security and other links with Japan and, if possible, the building of a security framework encompassing states in the Middle East-Persian Gulf. It was suggested that the ability of the Soviet Union to divert forces and other resources positioned against NATO to the Sino-Soviet frontier, or to move them from the East Asian front to the West, would have adverse implications for friendly states and for U.S. efforts to prevent the Soviet Union from positioning additional capabilities for use in regions, especially the Third World, where the United States and its allies are vulnerable to Soviet exploitation of indigenous local and regional conflicts. Such a strategy, based upon a broadly based consensus among friends

and allies of the United States, was considered to be vital to lessening the conflict potential emanating from instability that may threaten the supply of vitally important resources and raw materials to the United States and its allies, and bring to power governments that are both repressive in their domestic policies and either aligned with the Soviet Union or deeply hostile to the interests and values of the West, or both.

Among conference participants there was a consensus that a close relationship between the United States and its European allies remains indispensable to the formation of a global strategy and, in particular, to the management of diplomacy by the Alliance and its individual members with the Soviet Union. However, there was less agreement about the security burdens to be borne, respectively, by the United States and its allies in the years ahead. It was acknowledged that the Soviet Union, in light of past and present trends both in military doctrine and in force planning, would continue to place heavy reliance on nuclear weapons as integral to its capabilities arrayed against Western Europe. This condition would render inadequate a NATO force posture that relied principally upon conventional forces as an alternative to nuclear weapons. Moreover, Soviet/Warsaw Pact conventional forces outnumber those of NATO, and possess equipment that appears to be qualitatively equal, and in some cases superior, to that of Alliance forces. Although it did not receive detailed discussion, there was acknowledgment of the growth in recent years in Soviet capabilities for the conduct of chemical warfare as part of its military posture against NATO, together with mounting evidence that such weapons have already been used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and in Southeast Asia in violation of international conventions of which Moscow is a signatory—with attendant implications, it may be inferred, for assuring Soviet compliance with future arms control agreements.

It was widely conceded that an increase in NATO's conventional forces is unlikely for reasons that were discussed at several points during the Fifth Roundtable—socio-economic constraints, as well as demographic trends and political considerations on both sides of the Atlantic. Under such circumstances, it was asked, what is the prospect for the development of an effective grand strategy to counter Soviet pressures in regions of vital importance and against allies and friends of the United States? In the early 1980s, it was conceded, NATO faces the dilemma that, unless present trends are reversed, it may have neither an adequate nuclear capability nor a sufficient conventional force posture. The result of such a deficiency might be the neutralization of Western Europe, a contingency that none of the participants, German or American, was prepared to accept. Thus, the Conference ended with a consensus to the effect that, in each of the categories of divisive issues confronting the Alliance, an

effort must be made to resolve differences and build mutually acceptable frameworks and approaches encompassing as many of the members of NATO as possible. First and foremost, this includes the management of relations with the Soviet Union and building domestic support and understanding for the formidable security problems that now confront, or are likely to face, the Alliance in the years ahead.

In the context of force levels on the NATO Central Front, and the need to sustain Western interests outside the North Atlantic area, the American military presence in Europe stems from a desire not to repeat the experience of the past, in which the United States intervened *after* the outbreak of the two World Wars in order to help restore a power balance within which free institutions and independent states could flourish. If the United States were to withdraw its ground force presence from Western Europe, it is unlikely that American military power, in the absence of local European capabilities, could return again to liberate Western Europe if all of the Continent had been occupied. It was emphasized that the Alliance must develop concepts for defense that will sustain the U.S. commitment and, at the same time, generate greater public support for the Alliance.

Thus, the fundamental issue for the future of the U.S.-European relationship is how a broad transatlantic security consensus can be generated and sustained. To what extent is Article V of the NATO Treaty, which stipulates that an attack against one NATO ally is an attack against all Alliance members, relevant to the security needs of this decade? Can the Flexible Response strategy be linked to the capabilities needed for the future deterrence of conflict in Western Europe? Roundtable participants agreed that these questions must be addressed and solutions found if the security of the Atlantic Alliance and its members is to be maintained in the years ahead.

AGENDA

Monday, March 15,1982

Session I: 9:30 a.m.-12:00 noon
Chairman: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

The United States, the Federal Republic and European Security: Political and Economic Issues

Luncheon: 12:00 noon-2:00 p.m.

Address by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

"American Foreign Policy and the Transatlantic Relationship"

Session II: 2:00-4:30 p.m.
Chairman: Wolfgang Pordzik

The United States, the Federal Republic and European Security: Defense Issues

Reception and Dinner: 6:30 p.m.
Chairman: Manfred Woerner

Address by The Honorable William Cohen, United States Senate

"Defense Burden Sharing and the Alliance: Issues for the 1980s"

Tuesday, March 16, 1982

Session III: 9:30 a.m.-12:00 noon
Chairman: Jeffrey Record

Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Arms Control Debate: A New NATO Consensus?

Luncheon: 12:00 noon-2:00 p.m.

Address by Dr. Eugene V. Rostow, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

"U.S. Arms Control Policy and NATO Defense Modernization"

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