

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Letter case (8409434)			
1. memo	from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re; Soviet New Year's greetings (1p)	1/4/84	P-1
2. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: New Year's greetings (1p)	n.d.	P-1
Letter case (8400071)			
3. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Soviet demarche on US naval actions off Lebanon (1p)	1/5/84	P-1
4. statement	(1p)	n.d.	P-1
5. memo	from Charles Hill to McFarlane re: Soviet demarche (1p)	1/4/84	P-1
6. cable	re: Shultz meeting with French Ambassador (5pp)	1/10/84	P-1
7. memo (8400014)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: President's Soviet speech (1p) <i>R 5/8/80 NLSM 97-003 #14</i>	1/11/84	P-1
Letter case (8400349)			
8. memo	from Matlock to Robert Kimmitt re: State cable to Moscow (1p)	1/13/84	P-1 P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron January 1984 [1 of 3] <del>GA 90887</del> 3			10/17/95

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
9. cable	re: preliminary discussion (4pp)	1/12/84	P-1
10. memo (8400179)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: President's soviet speech (1p)	1/13/84	P-1
11. memo (8400288)	from Matlock to McFarlane re: Suzanne Massie's call on the President (1p)	1/13/84	P-1
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Matlock Chron January 1984 [1 of 3] OA 90887			10/17/95

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- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 3, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presentation at National War College by Ty Cobb

I certainly have no objection to Ty Cobb's presentation of a lecture at the National War College on January 10. Attached at Tab I is a brief note to the Commandant, Major General Perry Smith, indicating your approval. General Smith's incoming letter is at Tab II.

Ty is available to give the lecture, and assuming you have no objection, I am providing him with a copy of the incoming correspondence; he will make the necessary arrangements indicated.

*RH*  
Ron Lehman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the note at Tab I to Major General Perry M. Smith, Commandant, National Defense University.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I	Proposed note to Major General Smith
Tab II	Incoming correspondence

cc: Ty Cobb



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Perry:

I heartily endorse Dr. Tyrus Cobb's participation at the National War College on January 10. I have taken the liberty of forwarding him a copy of your letter of December 15, and I am sure you will be hearing from him directly.

It was good to hear from you.

Sincerely,

Robert F. McFarlane

Major General Perry M. Smith  
Commandant  
National War College  
National Defense University  
Washington, D.C. 20319



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

15 December 1983

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane: *Brook*

I am writing to request that a member of your staff, Dr. Tyrus Cobb, be made available for a lecture to the students and faculty of The National War College at 8:30 a.m., on Tuesday, January 10, 1984, on the subject, "The Role of Military Power in Soviet National Strategy." To assist Dr. Cobb in his presentation, syllabus pages describing his topic are enclosed. A presentation of about forty-five minutes, followed by a question and answer period of approximately thirty minutes is customary.

The National War College has a well-established policy of holding all remarks in presentations such as this in strictest confidence. This, we believe, permits the speaker to discuss his subject freely and with complete candor.

We frequently receive requests from officials of government agencies, occasionally from the senior members of Executive and Legislative Branch offices, to attend selected lectures at the College. We admit visitors only when the speaker does not object to their presence and after the visitor's clearance and need-to-know have been validated. If Dr. Cobb has any objection to visitor attendance, please have him advise us on the attached form and we will adhere to his guidance. If he concurs in their attendance, we will give him a list of the visitors upon his arrival.

The enclosed requisite form will provide the needed information for the administrative support of his visit. Dr. Cobb should indicate his decisions and return it at his convenience. We would appreciate it if he would send us a copy of his current biography in order to acquaint the student audience with his experience and background.

If Dr. Cobb has any further questions regarding this presentation, he should not hesitate to call Colonel Robert E. Berls, Jr., USAF, at 693-8491.

We look forward to welcoming Dr. Cobb to The National War College on January 10th.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Perry M. Smith  
Major General, USAF  
Commandant

Encl

Bud -

I enjoyed meeting with you the other night at the College. My faculty will be working with your staff to find the right time to have your lecture here to the NWC and IAF folks.





TOPIC 6

(T-6)

THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER IN SOVIET NATIONAL STRATEGY

*Tuesday*  
*Monday*  
109 January 1984  
0830  
(LD)

In assessing the Soviet Union as a superpower, one inevitably comes to the conclusion that the USSR owes its superpower status in great part, if not exclusively, to its military power. Certainly the USSR cannot be looked upon as an economic or social model which most of the world's emerging nations seek to emulate. Rather it is the military might of the Soviet Union which has brought it prestige, influence and deference, if not respect, throughout the world. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Soviets invest a large share of their resources -- economic, human, and political -- into military power and use this power to protect and advance their interests on the world scene. The Soviet use of military power has varied from direct military expansion of the borders of the USSR (in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II), to foreign military intervention (Afghanistan), to power projection, arms transfers, and military aid and assistance.

The growth of Soviet military power can be expected to continue since it brings immeasurable benefits to the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, continued expansion of Soviet military power raises the risk of possible confrontation with the U.S., a factor of which the Soviet leaders are aware, and to which they must give careful consideration as they pursue their use of military power as a tool of Soviet national strategy.

Questions for consideration are:

1. How do the Soviets perceive the threat to the USSR?
2. Why does military power play such an important role in Soviet national strategy?
3. Is it not true that, when viewed from the Soviets' perspective, the Soviet buildup of military power and the use of this power as a tool of national strategy are basically defensive in nature and are clearly directed to counter a very serious and real threat to the security of the USSR?
4. How does U.S defense efforts affect Soviet calculations



of their own use of military power?

5. What role does arms control play in the Soviet view of military power?

6. How should one assess Soviet power projection capabilities and what might they portend for the future?

7. What are the prospects for the direct use of force by the Soviet Union beyond its national frontiers (in addition to Afghanistan)?

#### Required Reading

Edward L. Warner III, "The Defense Policy of the Soviet Union," in Douglas J. Murray & Paul R. Viotti (eds.), The Defense Policy of Nations: A Comparative Study, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 81-111 (issued).

Colt D. Blacker, "Military Power and Prospects," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 55-65, reprinted in Current News, Special Edition, No. 1013 (14 June 1983), pp. 30-40.

#### Recommended Reading

Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981, pp. 641-686 (issued).

8 December 1983

(Date)

SUBJECT: Requisite for Forthcoming Presentation by Dr. Tyrus Cobb

at 0830, Mon., Jan. 9, 1984  
(Time, Day, Date)

on The Role of Military Power in Soviet National Strategy  
(Title or Topic)

Dean of Students and Administration  
The National War College  
Washington, D. C. 20319

1. I (do) (do not) desire NWC to make a hotel reservation for me. N/A

a. If reservation is desired, please state dates and hotel preference, if any \_\_\_\_\_

b. If reservation is not desired, please state where you can be contacted in the Washington area. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Address and Phone Number)

c. My expected time of arrival in the Washington area will be:  
\_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ via \_\_\_\_\_  
(Hour) (Date) (Airline and Flight Number, or other means)

2. It is recommended that you arrive at NWC twenty minutes prior to presentation.

3. I (do) (do not) plan to stay for Discussion Group Meeting.

4. I (will) (will not) use visual aids in my presentation. If affirmative, please indicate what type.

5. The classification of my lecture will be: UNCLASSIFIED \_\_\_\_\_  
CONFIDENTIAL \_\_\_\_\_ SECRET \_\_\_\_\_ TOP SECRET \_\_\_\_\_.

6. I (do) (do not) object to properly cleared visitors at my presentation.

7. Reimbursement and honorarium: The sum of \$ N/A is proposed as reimbursement for your valued assistance to the College. This amount includes governmental limits for transportation costs, a modest honorarium of \$100. and billeting expenses (if appropriate). (For U.S. Federal employees, only travel and billeting costs can be reimbursed.)

(If this arrangement is acceptable, PLEASE INITIAL \_\_\_\_\_.)

NOTE: It is customary not to record lectures given at NWC unless requested by the speaker, since recordings of lectures may be subject to public disclosure under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signed)

PLEASE UNDERLINE OR FILL IN NECESSARY INFORMATION AND RETURN IN THE ENCLOSED FRANKED ENVELOPE AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 3, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Response to Mailgram from Ukrainian American Youth  
Association of New York

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed response prepared by the Department of State to a message from the Ukrainian American Youth Association of New York regarding the situation of Yuriy Shukhevych, imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

Attachments


9332

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 3, 1984

TO: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

Please sign and forward the  
attached memorandum to Sally  
Kelley.

  
Jack F. Matlock

Attachments



9332  
UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8336871

Date DEC 22 1983

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: The President From: The Ukrainian American Youth

Date: 10/28/83 Subject: Situation of Yuriy

Shukhevych who is imprisoned in the Soviet Union

WH Referral Dated: 12/1/83 NSC ID# 189396  
(if any)

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

XX A draft reply is attached.

       A draft reply will be forwarded.

       A translation is attached.

       An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.

       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.

       Other.

Remarks:

*for Kristie A. Keeney*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of October 28 to the President concerning the situation of Yuriy Shukhevych, who is imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

We are attempting to follow as closely as possible the situation of Mr. Shukhevych and others like him who are imprisoned for their dissident activities by Soviet authorities. According to reports, Mr. Shukhevych has spent over thirty of his fifty years in prison and, since 1948, Yuriy Shukhevych has been free for only 3 1/2 years. From 1948 until 1968, Mr. Shukhevych was kept in prison by Soviet authorities primarily because he was the son of General Roman Shukhevych (commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, killed by the MVD in 1950). However, his most recent period of imprisonment stems primarily from his human rights activities. In March 1972 Mr. Shukhevych was arrested in Nal'chik, Kabardin-Balkar ASSR, and charged under Article 62 of the Ukrainian SSR criminal code (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda). This is a well-known "catch-all" charge which the Soviets habitually employ when they cannot detain human rights activists for more specific "criminal" offenses. On September 9, 1972, Mr. Shukhevych was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, to be followed by five years' internal exile.

The Ukrainian American Youth  
Association of New York,  
Chapter Marika Harhaj,  
136 Second Avenue,  
New York, N.Y.

In 1979, while still in prison, Mr. Shukhevych joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group. Mr. Shukhevych's prison term was scheduled to come to an end in March 1982, and he was transferred to his place of exile. Mr. Shukhevych reportedly suffers from a number of severe medical ailments, including chronic ulcer, heart, vision and dental problems, and concerns have been expressed on many sides that he is receiving inadequate medical attention. Mr. Shukhevych may now be blind as the result of unsuccessful eye operations performed in a Leningrad hospital.

We remain committed to do all that we can to alleviate the situations of persons who suffer in the Soviet Union for their defense of individual human rights. We have voiced our special concern for those who have been deprived of their liberty for expressing their cultural rights or asserting their national heritage, and have drawn special attention to the case of Mr. Shukhevych at CSCE and other international meetings. U.S. officials will continue to impress upon the Soviets, in both public debate and private diplomatic exchanges, that such cases of unjust imprisonment are a major obstacle to improved Soviet-American relations.

The plight of Ukrainians who are imprisoned for practicing their culture or expressing their beliefs will remain a matter of serious concern. We will continue to take every appropriate opportunity to help them.

Sincerely,



136 2 AVE  
NEW YGRK  
NY 10003 NY 10003 28AM

MI

pro: 10/27

Western  
Union Mailgram



1-052369S301 10/28/83 ICS IPMMTZZ CSP WHSA  
2124733467 MGM TDMT NEW YORK NY 244 10-28 0442P EST

8336871

189396

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN  
WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC 20500

MR PRESIDENT THE UKRAINIAN AMERICAN YOUTH ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK  
COMMENDS THE STRONG COMMITMENT OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION TO SUPPORT THE  
FORCES OF FREEDOM AND LIBERTY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. WE AGREE WITH  
YOUR STATEMENT THURSDAY EVENING THAT THIS COMMITMENT HAS BEEN PUT TO  
THE TEST IN LEBANON AND GRENADA. OUR ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS YOUR COURSE  
OF ACTION AS IT HAS MET THE CHALLENGE POSED BY SOVIET RUSSIA AND ITS  
SUROGATES IN THESE TWO COUNTRIES. OUR ASSOCIATION ALSO COMMENDS YOUR  
PRINCIPLED STAND DURING THE CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK COMMEMORATION AT THE  
WHITE HOUSE, WHEN YOU REITERATED AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO THE  
COUNTRIES COLONIZED BY SOVIET RUSSIA AND THEIR STRUGGLE TO REGAIN  
THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCES. IN THIS REGARD, THE UKRAINIAN  
CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA THROUGH ITS UKRAINIAN NATIONAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE IN WASHINGTON DC HAS PREVIOUSLY BROUGHT TO THE  
ATTENTION OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION THE DEEP CONCERN OF ALL UKRAINIAN  
AMERICANS FOR THE PLIGHT OF YURI SHUKHEVYCH, WHO, SINCE THE AGE OF 15  
HAS SERVED 30 YEARS IN RUSSIAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND IS STILL  
BEHIND BARS TODAY. YURI SHUKHEVYCH HAS BEEN BRUTALLY TORTURED BY THE  
KGB IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE WAS RENDERED BLIND AND IS NOW  
GREIVOUSLY ILL. WE APPEAL TO YOU MR PRESIDENT TO SPEAK OUT ON HIS  
BEHALF BECAUSE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WITHOUT YOUR INTERVENTION HE  
WILL DIE.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UKRAINIAN AMERICAN YOUTH ASSOCIATION NEW YORK  
CHAPTER MARIKA HARHAJ  
136 2 AVE  
NEW YORK NY 10003

16:42 EST

MGMCOMP

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 3, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Presidential Speech: U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached at Tab I, for your signature, is a briefing memorandum for the President's meeting Thursday, January 5, to discuss the draft of a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations. The President is scheduled to make a speech on January 12 at the National Press Club.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Briefing Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
BY *RD*, NARA, Date *10/15/95*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING ON SOVIET SPEECH

DATE: Thursday, January 5, 1984  
LOCATION: Cabinet Room  
TIME: 4:00 P.M.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss draft of speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations.

II. BACKGROUND:

You are scheduled to make a speech on January 12 at the National Press Club.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
Edwin Meese III  
James A. Baker, III  
Michael K. Deaver  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Richard G. Darman  
David R. Gergen  
Jack F. Matlock  
Ben Elliott

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Comment on speech draft as you desire and solicit comments of others.

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
BY PR, NARA, Date 10/10/95

## RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 182 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Tab A - Informal Translation

Envelope Address

His Excellency

The President of the United States of America  
and Mrs. Reagan

The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Card Greeting

Happy New Year!

Card Interior

Yuriy Vladimirovich  
and Tat'yana Filippovna  
Andropov send you  
their very best wishes  
for the New Year

Tab B - Informal Translation

Envelope Address

His Excellency

The President of the United States of America  
and Mrs. Reagan

The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Card Greeting

Happy New Year!

Card Interior

Nikolay Aleksandrovich Tikhonov  
sends you his very best  
wishes for the New Year



Tab C - Informal Translation

Envelope Address

His Excellency

The President of the United States of America  
and Mrs. Reagan

The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Card Greeting

Happy New Year!

Card Interior

Andrey Andreyevich and Lidiya Dmitriyevna  
Gromyko send you their very best  
wishes for the New Year

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 30, 1983



*3/22/2019*  
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet New Year's Greetings to President and Mrs. Reagan

Attached are New Year's greeting cards and informal translations for the President and Mrs. Reagan from General Secretary and Mrs. Andropov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolay Tikhonov, Foreign Minister and Mrs. Gromyko and Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin.

The New Year's greetings are of some minor biographical interest. The appearance of Mrs. Andropov's name is additional confirmation that she is still alive (until recently, there was some doubt on this score). Also, Nikolay Tikhonov's wife, Praskovaya, reportedly died in 1980, and his solitary greeting would indicate that he has not remarried since then.

*Charles Hill*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Greeting from General Secretary and Mrs. Andropov.
2. Tab B - Greeting from Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolay Tikhonov.
3. Tab C - Greeting from Foreign Minister and Mrs. Gromyko.
4. Tab D - Greeting from Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 4, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK SUBJECT: Request to Travel with Secretary Shultz,  
January 14-19, 1984

State has requested that I travel with Secretary Shultz for his meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm January 18. He plans to leave Washington January 14 and to stop in London on the way to Stockholm, returning to Washington on January 19.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel with Secretary Shultz's party January 14-19.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

cc: Patricia Blauth, Administration

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE  
THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO STOCKHOLM

Saturday, January 14, 1984

p.m.                      Depart Andrews on Secretary's plane

Sunday, January 15, 1984

a.m.                      Arrive London

Monday, January 16, 1984

a.m.                      Depart London

a.m.                      Arrive Stockholm

Wednesday, January 18, 1984

p.m.                      Depart Stockholm

p.m.                      Arrive Oslo

Thursday, January 19, 1984

p.m.                      Depart Oslo

p.m.                      Arrive Washington



NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: January 4, 1984

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Jack F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To accompany the Secretary of State  
to London for consultations, to Stockholm for meeting with  
USSR FM Gromyko, and to Oslo for consultations: Jan 14-19, 1984  
(Stockholm for the Conference on Disarmament Europe)
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):  
Tentative Schedule attached

DEPARTURE DATE 1/14/84

RETURN DATE 1/19/84

TIME p.m.

TIME p.m.

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:

GOV AIR xx COMMERCIAL AIR     POV     RAIL     OTHER    

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES: London 2 @ 136 = 272; Stockholm 2 @ 141 = 282;  
Secy's plane Oslo 1 @ 154 = 154  
TRANSPORTATION / PER DIEM / OTHER     TOTAL TRIP COST 708.00

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC xx OTHER

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES     NO xx

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ xx

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock

13. APPROVALS:

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

January 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM:

TY COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT:

Brzezinski on Soviet-American Relations

I attended a lecture this morning at NDU on "Soviet-American Relations" given by Zbig Brzezinski. Much of the talk was predictable, but he did make some interesting observations on the nature of the US-USSR relationship today, and on a policy toward the USSR that he feels we should adopt.

In contrast to the tendency of some (Time Magazine in its year-end review; Averill Harriman's op-ed piece last week in the Times) to describe our relationship with the USSR as highly dangerous and volatile, Zbig feels that:

-- There is nothing abnormal about the current relationship. Superpower competitiveness is not a recent nor a passing condition, but a realistic state of affairs.

-- In the past the public mood has shifted radically with apparent deterioration or improvement in relations; from "excessive anxiety" in period of tensions to overly-optimistic expectations (fed by over-promotion of the fruits of detente) in periods of surface harmony. Today the public is much more realistic in its expectations and does not share the apocalyptic views of Harriman, et. al. This is the beginning of wisdom.

-- In fact, there is probably less danger of confrontation today than at any time in the past. This is attributable to an admirable degree of prudence exhibited by both superpowers. We have nothing comparable to the Cuban missile crisis, Berlin or Afghanistan to exacerbate tensions. Zbig is impressed with the cautious actions and restraint both sides have demonstrated, despite occasional flashes of harsh rhetoric (which he thinks both nations should tone down).

With respect to the future Brzezinski laid out a 10-point program to guide the further development of an American policy toward the USSR:

(1) Military Buildup should continue (on right track; policy shift began in last half of Carter Administration. Only bad decision was failure to pursue MX deployment in MPS as Carter had planned). Emphasis on RDF must be retained. Strengthening conventional defense must be emphasized, particularly promising developments in our capability to strike deep.

*Chron - Jan 84*  
*[Signature]*



(2) Arms Control: Look for flexibility. Feels that it is possible today to reach an agreement even more promising than the Carter 1977 proposal the Soviets rejected. However, our START position is just too unrealistic in that it requires substantial changes in the Soviet force posture and would only bring us marginal gains. Feels strongly that the Soviet counter-response should be accepted -- except that he would advocate a 7,500 warhead ceiling instead of the 11,500 proposed by the Soviets. Doing so would provide an important cap, get movement going in arms control and, importantly, would assist us greatly in our dealings with the West Europeans.

(3) INF: At some point in time French and British systems will have to be taken into consideration. By 1990 they will be capable of hitting over 1500 Soviet targets and the USSR simply can't ignore this.

(4) Summits: There is no need, either for domestic political relations or to improve international relations, to have a full-fledged summit (defined as one where major expectations for important agreements are created). However, there is a need for regularized, informal (annually he thinks would be best) sessions between the leaders of our two countries.

(5) Poland: We should move on Walesa's recommendation to lift sanctions; would be different if suggestion came from Jaruzelski.

(6) Afghanistan: We should significantly upgrade our assistance to the Afghan rebels. Provide them more than outmoded Soviet weapons.

(7) China: Stabilize relations. Expand economic ties. We are currently on the right track.

(8) Mid-East: Affirmative American diplomacy needed (no real substance on this point; I had the feeling he felt compelled to throw it in).

(9) Central America: We must scale down our concern over Soviet activity here. Soviet moves in CA do not represent an immediate threat to the U.S., but are essentially a strategic diversion designed to get us bogged down over superfluous issues and shift our resources and attention away from really critical areas.

(10) Broadcasting: We should focus more on our broadcasting to the USSR and on psychological "warfare" in general. This holds out the best hope, albeit a slim one, of achieving some transformation of the present system.



In sum Brzezinski's remarks were quite supportive of the Administration and he does offer a few excellent insights. I suspect he is in contact with higher levels of this Administration, but I'm not sure. If not we should make every effort to bring him in for a briefing/pep talk, particularly prior to the delivery of the major speech on Soviet-American relations.

cc: Peter Sommer

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 10, 1984  
7:00 p.m.

TO: ADMIRAL POINDEXTER  
FROM: JACK MATLOCK  
SUBJECT: Shultz Meeting with  
French Ambassador,  
January 6

Attached is the State report  
on Ambassador Vernier-Palliez's  
call on Secretary Shultz Friday.  
I just received it.

Attachment

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'84 JAN 10 P5:01

*al*

**B**

OS/S #

84 JAN 10 P5:07

SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 661 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 5  
FROM: S-RAYSEITZ S 24001  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Secretary's Meeting with French Ambassador

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

NSC

Jack

USO/S

395-5112

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

S/S Officer: *[Signature]*

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'84 JAN 10 P5:01

*al*

**B**

OS/S #

RECEIVED

*Kemp  
Sommer*

84 JAN 10 P5:07

WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 661 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 5  
FROM: S. Ray Seitz S 24001  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)  
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Secretary's Meeting with French Ambassador

TO: (Agency)

NSC

DELIVER TO:

Jack Matlock

JUSO/S

Extension

395-5112

Room No.

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S/S Officer:

*[Signature]*

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PASSPORT OFFICE  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Request for Amendment to Passports

This is to advise you that Jack F. Matlock, former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, is now on detail to the National Security Council as a Special Assistant to the President. We request that his passport and that of his wife be amended to reflect this change.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 11, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: President's Soviet Speech

Attached at TAB I is a marked-up text of the speechwriters' latest version of the speech. It incorporates suggestions received informally from State, plus some suggested language on the compliance issue.

You should give close attention to the compliance language (insert for page 6, at end of package at TAB I). I believe it incorporates the tone the President wishes to convey publicly.

I am working on some more fundamental revisions in accord with Don Fortier's suggestions and should have these ready late today. Meanwhile, I recommend that you convey these suggested changes to the speechwriters.

Recommendation:

That you convey the marked-up text and suggested addition (TAB I) to the speech writing staff.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I      Marked-up Text and Suggested Addition of Speech

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M 97-003 #14

RV

Smt NARA, DATE 5/8/00

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)  
January 10, 1984  
1:00 p.m.

NSC

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS  
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB  
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

~~In just a few days,~~ Tomorrow, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its



role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have *tried to* dominate the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild ~~war-ravaged economies of East and West~~ *in Europe and the Far East,* including those <sup>of</sup> nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends and fellow *democracies.*

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.



But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3-years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals. It



was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

(INSERT A) I have cited

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist



aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear <sup>conflict</sup> ~~confrontation~~ could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the <sup>United States</sup> ~~U.S.~~ and Soviet Union



exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires <sup>both of</sup> us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as

any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harassment of <sup>so many</sup> courageous people, ~~like Andrei Sakharov.~~

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, ~~and~~ peaceful competition <sup>and constructive cooperation</sup> that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva



and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people<sup>S</sup> of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating <sup>these risks</sup> ~~those~~ is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we ~~have~~ fought alongside one another in <sup>World War II.</sup> ~~two world wars~~. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease  and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments?



Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

INSERT A (for page 6)

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms control process.

I will soon submit to the Congress the report on these Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see to it that our modernization program takes them into account so that we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities which undermine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove impediments to arms control, which offers us the means to improve the security of both our countries and to create a safer world.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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84 JAN 12 P 8: 12

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S/S #

MESSAGE NO 773 CLASSIFICATION Secret No. Pages 4

FROM C. Hill S/S 22540 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Cable to Moscow re Preliminary Discussion  
of Southern Africa

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO	Extension	Room No.
NSC	R. Kimmitt	395-3044	
NSC	F. Wettering		
NSC	Mr. Matlock		
NSC	Mr. Bill Martine		

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SUZANNE MASSIE  
60 WEST CLINTON AVENUE  
IRVINGTON, NEW YORK 10533

17 annex for  
recommendation  
I don't mind  
5 min at a 9:30  
January 8, 1984.  
spoke if you  
should get worth-  
while.

Dear Mr. MacFarlane,

I regret, but fully understand that the pressure of your schedule did not permit us to meet when I was in Washington on Friday. I hope that a meeting with you will be possible at some future date before my departure.

M  
1-10-84

I am aware that Jack Matlock has fully informed you of our conversations and of my feeling that it is extremely important for me to see the President even if only for a short time before I leave on this mission. Nevertheless, I wish to explain to you directly my reasons for feeling so strongly about this.

It is my considered assessment, knowing the Russians as I do, that it is vital to the potential success of this initiative for me to be able to say that I have seen the President and that he has personally assured me of his interest in the resumption of dialogue between our two countries on the subject of cultural exchange. For Russians, personal contact is far more important than it is for us, a psychology that we often do not completely understand or share. For them, everything is decided at the top, and only at the top. If I say that I have spoken with the President's highest advisors but am forced to admit that I have not seen him personally, the results will not be the same. Not only will it diminish my credibility, but far more importantly I fear, it will reflect on his. As you are aware, an important part of the problem for them now is not only the question of issues and substance, but the matter of style and personality. They simply do not understand our President and do not trust him. Because of this they are deeply suspicious of his motives and all of his initiatives, however reasonable.




Mr. MacFarlane 2.

Given the state of communication between our countries at this time, this will not be an easy perception to dispel. My task of persuasion will be made much more difficult if I have to say that I have never actually met him. I know them. Their reaction may very well be, " We trust you, but if you have never met him, why do you trust him? How do you know this is a genuine gesture?" It will make it much easier for them to dismiss this initiative as " just another American ploy", rather than the sincere and genuine action I know it to be.

I hope you will give me the fullest support as I believe you understand that I would not presume on the President's time if I did not think a face to face meeting to be a necessary and perhaps vital ingredient in the success of this mission.

Thank you for your trust in me. I shall do my best to serve the interests of our nation and of peace.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Suzanne Massie', with a large, sweeping initial 'S'.

Suzanne Massie