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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

Archivist: smf

File Folder: Matlock Chron April 1984 (2)

Date: 5/30/97

Box 4

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US-Soviet Relations: Current State and Next Steps (3 pp.)	4/20/84	P1/P5
2. memo (3239)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR Agreement (2 pp.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #32</i>	4/19/84	P1
3. memo (3239)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US-USSR Agreement (1 p.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #33</i>	n.d.	P1
4. memo (3239)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR Agreement (2 pp.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #34</i>	4/18/84	P1
5. memo (8410602)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Draft Presidential Message to Plenary Session of US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, 5/22-24, New York (1 p.)	4/18/84	P1
6. memo (3141)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Soviet Agreement to Extend Agreement (1 p.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #35</i>	4/19/84	P1
7. memo (3141)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Soviet Agreement to Extend Fisheries Agreement (1 p.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #37</i>	4/16/84	P1
8. memo (90499)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Sakharov Plans for Hunger Strike (1 p.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #38</i>	4/19/84	P1
9. memo (90499)	George Shultz to the President re Sakharov Plans to Go on Hunger Strike (1 p.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #39</i>	4/18/84	P1
10. letter (1 p.)	draft letter President Reagan to Chairman Chernenko <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #40</i>	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- P-7 Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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11. memo (90497)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Proposed Presidential Message to Mitterrand on US-Soviet Relations (1 p.)	4/18/84	P1/P5
12. talking points	Talking Points for Mitterrand (2 pp.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #41</i>	n.d.	P1
13. memo (90307)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Agreement with the USSR (2 pp.)	4/17/84	P1/P5
14. memo (90307)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Agreement with the USSR (2 pp.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #42</i>	n.d.	P1
15. memo (90307)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Agreement with the USSR (1 p.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #43</i>	3/23/84	P1
16. paper	re Agreement with the USSR (4 pp.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #44</i>	n.d.	P1
17. paper	draft Agreement between US and USSR (35 pp.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #45</i>	n.d.	P1
18. memo (90307)	John Lenczowski to Robert McFarlane re US-Soviet Agreement (7 pp.)	4/4/84	P1/P5
19. memo (90307)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Agreement with the USSR (1 p.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #46</i>	n.d.	P1
20. paper	re NSC changes (4 pp.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #47</i>	n.d.	P1
21. memo (90307)	Diane Dornan to Robert McFarlane re Talks and Agreements (2 pp.) <i>R 1/7/11 MD2-D10 #28</i>	4/13/84	P1/P5

RESTRICTION CODES

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22. memo (90307)	Edward O'Malley to Ken deGraffenreid re Agreement with USSR (2 pp.)	4/12/84	P1
23. memo (90307)	to Dianne Dornan re Review of Proposed Agreements (2 pp.)	4/12/84	P1
<p><i>P 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #48</i></p> <p><i>D 10/17/05 MOZ-010 #29</i></p> <p><i>D 7/10/01 F95-074 #49</i></p> <p><i>PART. 10/17/05 MOZ-010 #30</i></p>			

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National Security Council
The White House

System #

EYES

Package #

ONLY

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	1	J	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	2	M	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
JP	3	J	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

JOINTENET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CLASSIFIED

Chron
April 84

4/21

JACK MATROCK
EYES ONLY

(HOLD FOR HIS RETURN
FROM LEAVE)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture

Acting on a request by Secretary Block, State has requested a review of our sanction against high-level contacts with the Soviets to implement cooperative agreements, with respect to the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture (Tab II). Lifting of this particular sanction (imposed by the Carter Administration) would permit a meeting of the Joint Committee under the Agreement, which is at the Under Secretary level.

Discussion

Inasmuch as the President approved Secretary Block's travel to Moscow last year to sign the Long-Term Grain Agreement, it seems appropriate to resume high-level meetings to agree on projects under this agreement. The agreement has operated in the past to provide activities which have bolstered Agriculture's marketing efforts in the Soviet Union, as well as travel to keep tabs on crop conditions there. The Soviets are of course interested in it because it gives them better access to U.S. agricultural technology, but that interest has not been sufficient for them to pursue most activities in the absence of a Joint Committee meeting.

In general I oppose dropping Afghanistan sanctions unless they operate to the disadvantage of the U.S. In this instance, I believe our interests and Soviet interests are in rough balance, so long as it is our policy to sell as many agricultural products as we can. And since it seems inconsistent to allow contacts at the Cabinet level and refuse them at the sub-Cabinet level, I recommend that the position taken by Agriculture and State be approved.

oot
 Roger Robinson, Doug McMinn, John Lenczowski and Steve Sestanovich* concur. (*See page 2.) *JL does not concur*

Raised question of SSB-FEP blessing as it involves exception to a sanction - not with concur

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #32BY Onf NARA, DATE 11/16/99

Recommendation

1. That you authorize transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at TAB I, approving the resumption of senior-level meetings under the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

2. *Steve Sestanovich concurs with recommendation that quoted paragraph below be added to the Kimmitt/Hill memorandum:

"USDA participation in the Joint Committee should respect these guidelines: no public statements casting doubt on past sanctions policies, no attempts to inflate this meeting as a signal in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union."

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of April 18, 1984
Tab III - Block-Shultz letter of April 3, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Reactivation of the U.S.-USSR Agreement on
Cooperation in Agriculture *(c)*

Your memorandum of April 18, 1984, to Mr. McFarlane conveyed Secretary Block's proposal that activities under the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture be reactivated, and that an exception be granted to the post-Afghanistan sanction on high-level contacts with the Soviets in order to permit resumption of Joint Committee meetings pursuant to that Agreement. *(c)*

Please inform the Department of Agriculture that its recommendations have been approved, and that Joint Committee meetings can be resumed under the Agreement as an exception to the policy of avoiding high-level meetings with Soviet officials. *(c)*

Any activities under this agreement should be subject to normal interagency review as regards technology transfer considerations, visa issuance and travel procedures, and coordinated through the mechanism established for monitoring activities under U.S.-Soviet agreements. *(c)*

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #33

BY smf NARA, DATE 11/16/99



Washington, D.C. 20520

April 18, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Reactivation of the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Agriculture

Secretary of Agriculture John Block has written to Secretary Shultz requesting reactivation of the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture. Over the past few years, the Agriculture Agreement has become increasingly inactive as a result of the January 1980 decision by President Carter to impose a government-wide sanction against high-level US-Soviet contacts in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets have used this ban as an excuse to curtail almost all activities under the Agreement stating that without such contacts between senior-level officials they could not properly plan their programs. An agreement which once supported projects with scientific and commercial potential is now reduced to little more than a means for exchange of routine data and germplasm samples.

Reactivation of the Agreement, including a Joint Committee Meeting, would support the renewal of cooperative scientific and commercial activities of mutual interest. Furthermore, reactivation would allow for full resumption of trade development activities by U.S. commodity interests and would give impetus to expanded U.S. exports of agricultural commodities, equipment and inputs. In addition, the Soviets have used the curtailment of cooperative programs as a reason to restrict the travel of American agricultural officials in the USSR and limit the availability of statistical information on agricultural production; this situation should be improved by a rejuvenation of the Agreement.

The Agreement was signed in Washington on June 19, 1973 by Secretary Butz and Foreign Minister Gromyko and renewed for a third five-year period in 1983. When active, the Agreement provided a forum for regular discussion of agricultural issues; exchange of specialists engaged in scientific projects and agricultural and market development activities; reciprocal visits of crop survey teams; and, regular exchange of agricultural statistics. Unlike some of the other US-Soviet cooperative scientific and technical agreements, concerns for possible illegal technology transfer were minimized by the nature of the research projects. Encouraging increased activity under the agreement can provide a useful supplement to what we are currently trying to do in certain other areas.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #34

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL. CARD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Reactivation of the Agreement should elicit considerable public support and be seen as consistent with the signing last year of the long-term grain agreement and our support for non-strategic trade with the USSR.

The Department considers that in this case continued application of the Afghanistan sanction against high-level contacts runs counter to U.S. interest and recommends NSC approval of Secretary Block's proposal as an exception to that policy.

Block
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

8419011

April 3 1984

Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would like to meet with you in the near future to discuss renewal of activities under the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture. Activities under the Agreement have been curtailed since January 1980. U.S. sanctions prohibit high-level meetings while the Soviets insist on a meeting of the Joint Committee (chaired by the Under Secretary) as a prerequisite for any activity.

Reactivation of the Agreement would support the expansion of cooperative activities in areas of mutual interest. In addition, it would allow for full resumption of trade development activities by U.S. commodity interests, would give impetus to expanded U.S. exports of agricultural commodities, equipment and inputs, and would alleviate the present lack of information on Soviet agricultural production.

The Soviets have used the suspension of activities under the Agreement as a reason for restricting travel of U.S. agricultural officials in the Soviet Union and for limiting availability of statistical information regarding Soviet agricultural production. These Soviet policies have drastically limited our ability to assess Soviet agricultural performance in a timely and confident manner.

The Agreement has been in existence since 1973, having been automatically renewed in 1983 for a third five-year term. The Agreement when functioning provided:

- a forum for regular discussion of agricultural issues;
- exchange visits of specialists engaged in agricultural and market development activities;
- exchange visits of agricultural scientists and technicians;
- exchange visits of crop survey teams, and
- exchange on a regular basis of statistical information on the agricultural situation.

I hope that you will work with us to reactivate the U.S.-USSR Agricultural Agreement. I look forward to discussing the matter with you.

Sincerely,


Jack R. Block
Secretary

APR 3 REC'D

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Kupperman Visit to Soviet Union

Bob Kupperman has sent you a report of his visit to Moscow, Leningrad and Helsinki, March 30-April 9, and I met with him today for an oral debrief.

Kupperman said that his host in the USSR was Yevgeni Velikhov, a Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Velikhov arranged for him to give a lecture on the technical aspects of crisis management at the Soviet Academy, and his talk was very well received.

Subsequently, Velikhov proposed that the Soviet Academy and CSIS co-sponsor a cooperative venture to explore crisis management issues analytically, with about ten specialists coming from the Soviet Union. Topics would include such items as the mathematical theory of compromise, joint games, and compromise simulation. Kupperman was cautious about making a commitment, but agreed to talk to Velikhov further about the idea when the latter is in Washington in May.

Some of these topics seem very close to some of the crisis management areas which the Soviets have so far refused to discuss with us officially, so it is interesting that they are soliciting a meeting on them with non-governmental specialists. Their doing so, of course, is consistent with their current posture of downplaying official negotiations in some areas while dealing with private groups on the same subjects.

Kupperman's report is at TAB II, and a letter of acknowledgment at Tab I.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Bob Kupperman at TAB I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Mr. Kupperman
Tab II Kupperman's Trip Report

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bob:

Thanks for sending over the report on your trip to Moscow, Leningrad and Helsinki, and for briefing Jack Matlock.

Academician Velikhov's proposal for a joint meeting on the technical aspects of crisis management is most interesting, and I hope you'll keep me informed if plans along these lines develop.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dr. Robert Kupperman
CSIS, Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006



APR 17 1984

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

*Staff of High Level
ack*

April 17, 1984

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud:

The trip to the Soviet Union was quite useful. I think true progress was made. Though I know that you are up to your neck at the moment, I believe it would be a good idea for us to get together as soon as possible.


For your review, I am attaching a copy of my trip report that I prepared for CSIS.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. Kupperman".

Robert H. Kupperman
Senior Associate

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

FROM: Robert H. Kupperman 
DATE: April 13, 1984
SUBJECT: Trip report of Robert H. Kupperman to the Soviet Union and to Helsinki, Finland (March 30 - April 9, 1984)

At the invitation of the USSR Academy of Sciences I was asked to address members of the Academy and other scientific groups on the mathematics of arms control and the technical aspects of crisis management. My wife and I traveled to the Soviet Union on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In addition to our trip to the Soviet Union, Finland extended an invitation to us to discuss the possibility of my conducting an international congress on the subject of arms control and crisis management under the aegis of Georgetown University, the Institut de la Vie, and the Government of Finland.

At the outset I wish to make it clear that despite obvious strain between the United States and Soviet governments, my wife and I were treated cordially and the discussions held with the scientists in the USSR and Finland were largely substantive. There is no question that the Soviets are very worried over the lack of progress in arms control. They are especially concerned about our Star Wars initiatives. It is also clear that they agree that the future of meaningful arms control measures lies beyond the traditional impasses so painfully evident in the INF and START talks.

My first meeting was with Academician Moiseev, a member of the Academy and Director of the Computer Center of the Academy. Academician Moiseev led a large seminar (perhaps 50 or 60 people) on the mathematical models of conflict and compromise. In my view, he had given a lot of thought to their design. Following Professor Moiseev's presentation I was invited to lecture on the policy and mathematical implications of strategic force structure, deterrence and stabilization at times of stress. I lectured on the relevant technical and policy issues for some two hours. Afterwards, I answered questions as forthrightly as I could. From comments made afterwards, I believe my talk was well received.

Following the seminar, Academician Moiseev said that he and other Soviet technical and international relations experts would like to enter into a cooperative venture with the Center for Strategic and International Studies to explore the crisis management issues analytically. He agreed that the subject was of incalculable importance and that there was a chance to make great headway. (For one, unlike INF and START, no hardened political positions have been taken by either side about the crisis issues.)

That afternoon we were received by Academician E.P. Velikhov (my host and Vice President of the Academy). Velikhov and I conversed for nearly an hour. He said that the key to working together was to gather top-notch Soviet scientists who really wished to commit their efforts. Velikhov then stated his wish to enter into an agreement with the Center and establish a working relationship between the Academy and CSIS. I told him that we

look forward to a close relationship, but would have to explore carefully the terms of any formal arrangement. Finally, Velikhov said that he planned to be in the United States in May and would enter into a bilateral relationship with our National Academy of Sciences and would pursue some relationship with the Federation of American Scientists! (It was clear that the relationship with the Federation had all sorts of propaganda implications, such as "nuclear winter".)

At Velikhov's request, I visited Dr. A. Jakovlev, who was Director of the Institute of World Economy. That meeting, while largely cordial, reflected Soviet intransigence. No matter what I said about the crisis management issue, Jakovlev replied with a statement about the evil intent of the Reagan administration. Finally, I asked him if he preferred the risk of nuclear carnage to that of cooperative ventures which might prevent it. He was left somewhat speechless.

Jakovlev's deputy, whose name I do not recall, said that the U.S. does not understand the "psychology" of the Soviet people but that the Soviet Union understands the American psychology all too well. (He accused us of being a violent people, noting that 20,000 murders per year are committed on U.S. television.) He made a most incredible statement -- if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to play a war game, the Soviet Union could do a better job in playing the U.S. role than could the United States. I responded that I was not certain that the Soviet Union fully understood us as well as they thought.

My next meeting was with Vitaly Zhurkin, Deputy Director, Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Zhurkin expressed the party line about the strained relationship between the U.S. and USSR but said he was prepared to work with the Center. (At lunch with Moiseev the prior day, he said that Zhurkin would be working with him. Moiseev also joined the Jakoolev meeting unexpectedly. A few minutes after he sat down at the Jakoolev meeting, the tone of the meeting became more productive.) Zhurkin asked if the Center's study would also include issues about the first-use of nuclear weapons, and I stated that we would consider all of the relevant issues including his concerns.

A curious thing about the meeting was that Georgi Arbatov refused to step in and say hello. (I had the feeling that Arbatov resented Velikhov having taken the lead in the crisis management matter.)

The next meeting was at their space and research institute. Their computer simulations of the Heley's Comet mission were demonstrated. The real reason for that institute having wished to see me was their admission they have been given the job of analyzing U.S. efforts in Star Wars. Obviously, I could discuss nothing with them.

When I first came to the Soviet Union, and shortly before I left, I visited with Mr. Warren Zimmermann, the Deputy Chief of Mission to our embassy. I told Zimmermann about everything that had transpired. It turns out that he leads our delegation on

the crisis management negotiations with the Soviets. He said that the Soviet Union has been quite uncooperative with him and have only sent low level technicians to discuss hot line matters. He also complained that few of Ambassador Hartman's or his calls are returned by the Soviets.

At each meeting with the Soviets, I made it clear that neither the Center nor I represented the U.S. government. Moreover, I told my hosts that it was imperative that they maintain the arms control dialogue with the United States government.

On Friday evening we took the night train to Leningrad and Saturday morning we were met at the train and were taken to meet with Dr. V. V. Ivanischev who is Chief of the System Analysis Lab in Leningrad. (He works for Moiseev.) The only thing I was able to learn from Dr. Ivanischev was that the USSR planned to go beyond the nuclear winter propaganda efforts by building models of the ecological effects of nuclear warfare.

On Sunday, April 8, we left Leningrad via Aeroflot to Helsinki. (The Aeroflot trip, though one-half hour long, was in itself a memorable experience.) The following morning we attended a luncheon in our honor given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The senior official was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. It was clear that they were in touch with the Soviets. In addition to the Soviet Union's interest in a bilateral relationship with CSIS, Finland wanted to pursue the multi-lateral aspects of crisis management. In particular, they proposed I lead an international congress on crisis management. In addition to the

Ministry officials, there were quite a number of others present including the head of Finland's National Academy of Science and several other leading academicians.

A joint organizing meeting was broached, with the hope of holding an international congress about a year later.

cc: Robert C. McFarlane
Amos Jordan
William Taylor

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Plenary Session of
U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, May 22-24,
New York

As you recall, Bill Verity wrote you asking for a number of actions in connection with the meeting of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council in New York May 22-24. In your reply you indicated that you would support sending a message from the President to the meeting. Attached at Tab A is a draft message which has been prepared by State and reviewed by the Speechwriters.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve sending the memorandum from Kimmitt to Livingston (Tab I) for appropriate transmission of the Presidential message.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Kimmitt/Livingston Memo
Tab A	Proposed Presidential Message

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR DODIE LIVINGSTON

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Plenary Session of
U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, May 22-24,
New York

Attached for appropriate transmission is a proposed Presidential message to the Plenary Session of U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, May 22-24 in New York. The message was drafted by the Department of State and reviewed by the Speechwriters.

Attachment

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PLENARY SESSION,
US-USSR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL,
NEW YORK, MAY 22-24

I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the Soviet ~~attendees~~ ^{participants in} of the plenary session of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council to the United States. It is ~~well~~ ^{encouraging} that leading representatives of American industry and their Soviet counterparts can meet to discuss trade and economic issues of mutual interest at a time when US-Soviet relations are not what we might wish. The U.S. government supports mutually beneficial, non-strategic trade between our two countries. Your meetings and the activities of the Council, including the Agribusiness '83 trade show in Moscow last October, demonstrate that a key element of the structure for trade between our two countries remains in place to build upon if an improvement in international conditions permits. I look forward to hearing the results of your meetings.

Ronald Reagan

REFERRAL

DATE: 09 APR 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPT OF STATE

8410602

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

TO. MCFARLANE

SOURCE: VERITY, C WILLIAM

DATE. 27 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

SUSHKOV, VLASIMIR

INTL TRADE

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
BAIBAKOV, NICHOLAI

SUBJ: LTR TO MCFARLANE FM ARMCO REQUESTING PRES MSG RE US - USSR TRADE COUNC

REQUIRED ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS & DRAFT MSG

DUE DATE: 16 APR 84

COMMENTS


FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Message to Plenary Session of
US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, May 22-24, New York

In response to your request (Tab A), we have prepared a draft Presidential message to the Trade and Economic Council meeting (Tab B) which U.S. Co-Chairman C. William Verity had requested in his letter to you of March 27. We understand that your staff has already replied to that letter.

Verity also wrote to Secretaries Shultz, Baldrige and Block, inviting them to speak at the meeting. After coordinating with Commerce and Agriculture, we have determined that the USG speakers should be at the sub-Cabinet level. Tentative plans call for Deputy Secretary Lyng to represent Agriculture, Deputy Secretary Brown to speak on behalf of Commerce, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer to represent State.

We will keep you informed of any additional requests on behalf of the Trade and Economic Council which would involve senior-level USG officials.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments: Tab A - NSC Tasker and letter from C. William
Verity to Robert C. McFarlane
Tab B - Draft Presidential Message

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

NARA, Date 11/20/98~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL. OADR



ARMCO CORPORATE OFFICES

C. WILLIAM VERITY, JR.
Chairman, Executive Committee
Board of Directors

8410604
MAR 28 1984

March 27, 1984

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Advisor to the President
The White House
Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20050

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

I thoroughly enjoyed our visit last Thursday and appreciate so much you taking the time to visit with me and to bring me up-to-date on our present positions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.


I talked to Tom Green and Terry Pearce over the weekend and we are making arrangements to see Ambassador Dobrynin during the first week of April. We shall keep you advised of the results of that meeting.

I am also happy that I had a chance to share with you some of the high points of my meeting in Moscow with Prime Minister Tikhonov, as well as meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Baibakov and Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. There is no question in my mind that the Soviets are anxious to move forward in the normalization of relationships, but they want President Reagan to provide some signals that he is desirous of moving forward and that he does understand the Soviets' reluctance to make the first move.

I do believe that the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council meeting in New York on May 22-24 might provide a good vehicle for communication with the Soviets.

As I explained to you, the Trade Council is considered by high Soviet officials to be a very important organization. At the meeting in May, we will have not only a meeting of members but, also, the Directors and the Executive Committee, which is composed of Soviet Ministers, including Alkhimov, Chairman of Gosbank.

As agreed, I will check with you early this week on specific questions I asked of you -- namely, would the President send a message of support for the work of the Council and a message for our May meeting which would indicate that he hopes progress is made in ways to facilitate trade between our two countries?



The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Page 2
March 27, 1984

Also, would the President receive Vladimir Sushkov, Chairman of the Soviet side of the Council? Mr. Sushkov and I are Co-Chairmen -- one from the American side and one from the Soviet side. Mr. Sushkov would be available on May 21, 22, 23 or 24.

Is it possible for us to invite Nicholai Baibakov, Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and Chairman of Gosplan, to the United States? We would make all the necessary arrangements for his visit, but it would not be appropriate to invite him unless we knew that he would be received at the White House.

Nicholai Baibakov is one of the most revered men in the Soviet Union because of the important position he has held for many years as Chairman of Gosplan.

And, lastly, if it is possible to reestablish the Aeroflot flights between New York and Moscow by May 22, this would be most helpful in making a significant signal to the Soviet Union.

If you were to let me know that this might be possible, I would communicate with Vladimir Sushkov and tell him that this is being done because of his request and, as a means of facilitating attendance by the Soviets at the meeting May 22-24. I can assure you this would be a most significant signal to the Soviets.

I am most anxious to be of help to you and to the President in any matter regarding our relationships with the Soviet Union. I do believe our Council might be helpful in creating a dialogue.

Also, I am hopeful that I will have a chance to spend about ten minutes with the President at which time I could give him my feelings about the current situation with the Soviet Union, and some other suggestions on possible signals to them.

Sincerely,

CWV:cee

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 19, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *smf*

SUBJECT:

Soviet Agreement to Extend Fisheries Agreement

State has notified us that the Soviet Embassy has given us formal notification of their agreement to extend the current bilateral agreement on fisheries for 18 months -- that is, until December 31, 1985.

An interagency review of the U.S.-Soviet fisheries relationship is under way and its recommendations have been promised by the end of April.

Attachment:

Tab I - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of April 16, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F95-074 #36BY smf NARA, DATE 11/16/89



8410878

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 16, 1984

3141

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Agreement to Extend Fisheries Agreement

The Soviets informed us April 13 of their agreement to our proposal for an 18 month extension (through December 31, 1985) of our current fisheries bilateral agreement. The renewal action must now lie before the Congress for 60 days. In an accompanying statement read on instructions, Minister-Counselor Sokolov said the USSR expects full implementation of all provisions of the agreement and, particularly, "restoration of the fishing allocations to the Soviet fishermen in the 200 mile zone of the U.S."

The interagency review of the US-Soviet fisheries relationship, requested by the NSC last spring but suspended in the wake of the KAL incident, has now resumed. We expect to forward to the NSC by the end of April the recommendations of the participating agencies (State and Commerce).

for Pomckmley
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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NLS F95-074 #37BY amf NARA, DATE 11/14/99~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Decl. OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Sakharov Plans for Hunger Strike

George Shultz has sent a memorandum to the President (TAB I) describing a request Embassy Moscow has received from Sakharov's wife, Elena Bonner, for refuge in the Embassy while Sakharov goes on a hunger strike in an effort to force the Soviet authorities to allow Mrs. Bonner to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment. Secretary Shultz recommends that the President send a letter to Chernenko urging him to allow Mrs. Bonner to leave, in order to avoid the damage to our relations which a hunger strike by Sakharov -- which could lead to his death, given his tenuous health -- would inflict.

I concur in this recommendation. The fact is that it will be most difficult to refuse Mrs. Bonner refuge without considerable adverse publicity, yet her taking refuge in the Embassy would make it much more difficult for the Soviet authorities to grant her exit permission. She and Sakharov might be dissuaded from this course if she could be told that the President had sent a personal message on her behalf. And it cannot be excluded that the Soviets would in fact see the wisdom in letting her go before the whole issue becomes even more of a cause célèbre.

Recommendation:

That you forward Secretary Shultz's memorandum to the President with the recommendation that he sign the letter.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Shultz-President Memorandum of April 18, 1984

Tab A - Letter to Chernenko for President's Signature

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074 #38
BY smf NARA, DATE 11/16/99

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

April 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz
Subject: Sakharov Plans to Go on Hunger Strike

Elena Bonner, Sakharov's wife, has left with our Embassy in Moscow several documents "to hold until her return". They indicate that Sakharov had planned to begin a hunger strike April 13 and to request our Embassy to offer Mrs. Bonner temporary refuge during the hunger strike. His goal was to obtain a positive response to Mrs. Bonner's longstanding request for permission to go abroad for medical treatment. A medical problem--phlebitis--apparently caused him to postpone the hunger strike. Mrs. Bonner is due back May 7 from Gorkiy, Sakharov's city of exile, and there is a strong possibility that he will begin the hunger strike shortly thereafter.

A Sakharov hunger strike would receive enormous world attention. We would come under great pressure to grant Mrs. Bonner the refuge Sakharov requests, which would further complicate matters. It would be very difficult for the Soviets to give her exit permission while she was staying in our Embassy. Moreover, once having taken refuge in our Embassy, Mrs. Bonner would be unable to play a decisive role in seeking to end Sakharov's hunger strike, and the life-threatening consequences would be even more acute. The major diplomatic confrontation that would ensue would very likely bring the rest of our dialogue to a standstill which, depending on the outcome, could endure for some time.

I think that the best chance for heading this off is for you to make a personal appeal to Chernenko to grant exit permission to Mrs. Bonner. She has been abroad twice before for medical treatment and there appears to be no problem such as state security which would keep her from going again. If we were able to tell Mrs. Bonner that such a private request had been made, we would have a good chance at persuading the Sakharovs not to undertake public steps, such as the hunger strike and request for refuge, which would undercut your efforts. A draft letter is attached for your consideration.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #39

BY smj NARA, DATE 11/16/99

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I mentioned to you in my letters of March 6 and April 16 the need for some positive steps in the area of human rights, a matter of great concern to the Western public. We may be facing developments involving Andrei Sakharov which could greatly complicate our efforts to develop a more constructive dialogue. It appears that Sakharov is seriously considering beginning a hunger strike in the near future in an attempt to obtain permission for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment. A drastic step such as that would, of course, receive world-wide attention. I must tell you frankly that no one in this country would understand a decision to allow him to endanger his health, or to subject him to force-feeding.

Mrs. Bonner has been permitted to travel abroad twice before for medical reasons. I urge you to intervene personally to ensure that her present request receives a favorable response. Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that in making this personal request I am thinking only of the welfare of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner and of my desire to see an improvement in the relations between our two countries. The United States government will not publicize this letter and would not seek to take any political advantage of Mrs. Bonner's presence in the West.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

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NLS F95-074 #40

BY smf NARA, DATE 10/16/99

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 11- LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Talking Points for Mitterrand

-- President Reagan very much values his discussions with you about the Soviet Union.

-- He would like to continue to benefit from your thinking as you each develop an independent dialogue with Chernenko in the coming months.

-- With Chernenko's selection as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, he has acquired in three months all of the key positions which it took Andropov six months and Brezhnev years to obtain, (General Secretary of the Party, Chairman of the Defense Council, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet). While there is a collective leadership, Chernenko presumably has a personal interest in some foreign policy achievements.

-- Therefore, as you know, we have established an active dialogue directly with Chernenko, and through Gromyko and Dobrynin. We are seeking to convey our concerns and our willingness to turn U.S.-Soviet relations in a more constructive direction.

-- We assume that in preparation for your trip to Moscow, your own dialogue with the Soviets is active.

-- The fact that Chernenko has invited you to Moscow this year demonstrates the value they place on relations with France. We believe they will listen to you carefully on a broad range of issues.

-- Knowing that you had talked with President Reagan at some length recently, we believe the Soviets would pay particular attention to any comments you might want to make now on the President's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.

-- Clearly it is not appropriate for us to indicate what if any impressions you might want to share with the Soviets. The central message President Reagan is trying to convey to Chernenko is that we are serious about a more constructive relationship, we have suggested a large number of areas where we are prepared to go beyond words to deeds, and the time has come for the Soviets to respond.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #41

BY Amf NARA, DATE 11/16/97

-- On arms control, working closely with France, we have introduced a new chemical weapons treaty in Geneva. The French and American delegations will be exploring ways to make concrete progress at the CDE in Stockholm. The Soviets know we will shortly have some new ideas on MBFR in Vienna. And they know that we have new ideas on START and INF to discuss with them whenever they are ready.

-- On our bilateral relations, we have proposed a number of steps: for example, a strengthened dialogue on regions of crisis, opening of consulates in Kiev and New York, a new agreement on cultural exchanges.

-- But to date they have been extremely cautious on most issues, and totally negative on START and INF where they even refuse quiet discussions much less a return to Geneva.

-- Obviously the United States will manage even in the absence of meaningful dialogue with the Soviet Union. We can protect our interests. But it is clear that East-West relations will function better if the Soviets will agree to engage in the serious discussions France and the United States are offering.

-- Again, let me stress how much the President values your advice in this field.

-- Thank you for your time, Mr. President

MESSAGE TO JACQUES ATTALI

"President Reagan would appreciate it if you could arrange for Assistant Secretary Burt to present an oral message to President Mitterrand on relations with the Soviet Union. Mr. Burt can be in Paris on April 26 if that is convenient for your President. The meeting need take no more than 15 minutes. Robert C. McFarlane

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 13-23 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and
Cooperation (S)

The strategy paper for negotiations with the USSR on an agreement on contacts, exchanges and cooperation, transmitted by Mr. Hill's memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 23, has been approved, subject to the reservations and guidelines for implementation noted below. (S)

1. Before submission to the Soviets for negotiation, the draft agreement should be expanded to provide for some features which would be desirable from the U.S. point of view even though they are unlikely to be accepted by the Soviets. This could include a proposal for the establishment of cultural centers in both capitals, and other measures which, in the opinion of the Department and USIA, would be useful to provide increased negotiating room for the U.S. negotiators.

2. In negotiating the agreement, and in implementing any agreement reached, U.S. objectives should include the following:

a. Maximizing people-to-people contact and minimizing Soviet manipulation of the exchanges to reward loyalists and exclude independent-minded Soviet citizens.

b. Maximizing the opportunity for participation of groups which hitherto have not been importantly involved in the exchange program, such as young people, workers, farmers, and members of unofficial groups.

c. Insuring that all exchanges which have the potential for unauthorized technology transfer be reviewed by the appropriate agencies or interagency committees before they are implemented.

d. Making every effort to reach younger scholars in the academic exchanges, and minimizing any disproportion in the balance of scientific and non-scientific topics studied.

e. Insuring the maximum feasible degree of reciprocity in all aspects of the various exchange programs. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F95-047442

BY Amf NARA, DATE 11/16/99

3. If an agreement is concluded, the Department and USIA should establish a program for briefing U.S. participants and hosts in advance of actual exchanges, and for debriefing them following their exchange experience. Such briefings and debriefings should be considered mandatory for all participants and hosts in exchanges financed in whole or in part by the U.S. Government.

(c)

When the suggested changes noted in numbered paragraph 1 above have been introduced into the draft agreement, it may be presented to the Soviets with a proposal that negotiations begin in Moscow at a mutually acceptable date. The Department's suggestions regarding composition of the U.S. negotiating team are approved. (c)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

March 23, 1984

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and
Cooperation

Pursuant to the National Security Council memorandum of March 12, 1984, attached herewith for review by the President is a strategy paper for negotiations and proposed texts for a new US-USSR General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation, and for the more specific 3-year Program of Cooperation and Exchanges.

RMCKinley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

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NLS F95-074 #43BY smf NARA, DATE 11/16/99

~~SECRET~~

Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

BACKGROUND

From 1958 through 1979 the United States and the Soviet Union were parties to a series of General Agreements on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation which served as the general document for cultural, educational, scientific, technical, and other types of exchanges with the USSR. Negotiations to renew the last Agreement broke down in late 1979 and were terminated following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Secretary Shultz, with the authorization of the President in June 1983, proposed to Ambassador Dobrynin that negotiations leading toward conclusion of a new bilateral Agreement be renewed. The Soviet Government responded positively to the Secretary's proposal on July 15, 1983, but we suspended further movement toward negotiations following the shootdown of the KAL airliner. Pursuant to the NSC memorandum of March 12, 1984, the Department and USIA have prepared language for a U.S. proposal for a new General Agreement (attached at Tab A) and for a specific 3-year Program of Cooperation and Exchanges (attached at Tab B) for interagency coordination if this general approach is approved.

NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

Our strategy for the negotiations is to seek full reciprocity from the Soviets within the framework of an official Exchanges Agreement. This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets may make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying us reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. To ensure that U.S.-Soviet exchanges are properly monitored to protect U.S. security and intelligence interests, the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in the Department of State will be tasked to serve as the central clearinghouse, in close liaison with USIA, for exchanges conducted under the General Agreement and the Program of Cooperation and Exchanges. Moreover, the Department intends to pursue the objective of rescinding or modifying the McGovern Amendment in order to strengthen its control over authorization or denial of visas to Soviet groups and individuals.

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BY smf NARA, DATE 11/14/99

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-4-

7. Congressional and Other Governmental Exchanges Article X of the Agreement allows for the exchange of members of Congress, officials of the national governments, and representatives of municipal, local and state governments of the two countries, which has proven an especially effective means of gaining access to Soviet political leaders.

8. Sports Exchanges and Tourism Articles XII and XIV of the Agreement provides a framework for continuing these types of activities which have been supported by the private sector in the U.S. and are useful in providing low-key access to "non-political" sectors of Soviet society.

MAJOR OBJECTIVES

The major problems in negotiating a new Exchanges Agreement with the Soviets will involve our highest priority objectives -- reinstituting USIA thematic exhibits and assuring access to Soviet television by our representatives, including the President. Unless we achieve those objectives in the negotiations, the overall value for the U.S. of an Exchanges Agreement will be in doubt. In any event, we should be prepared to refuse to conclude an agreement if we judge the balance of benefits inadequate in relation to our objectives.

VENUE OF NEGOTIATIONS

The exchanges negotiations should be held in Moscow. This would balance the negotiations on the establishment of additional consulates to be held in Washington at about the same time. More important, it should accelerate the decisionmaking process for the Soviets by providing them with ready access to senior levels of their regime. Ambassador Hartman would be protocolary head of the delegation, with the Embassy Counselor for Press and Cultural Affairs, an officer with extensive experience in Soviet exchanges, conducting the day-to-day talks for the American side.

RECOMMENDATION

That this strategy paper and the attached drafts of a General Agreement and Program of Cooperation and Exchanges be forwarded to the President for his review and approval.

Attachments:

- A. Proposal for a New General Agreement
- B. 3-Year Program of Cooperation and Exchanges

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-3-

the New York City Ballet, the Alvin Ailey Dancers, Duke Ellington and his Orchestra, and the American Conservatory Theater of San Francisco had tremendous impact in the Soviet Union.

4. Educational/Academic Exchanges Despite the absence of an official exchanges agreement since 1979, both countries have continued the higher educational/academic exchanges, although in reduced numbers. These exchanges are organized and administered by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) in close coordination with USIA and our Embassy in Moscow. They will continue to be implemented on the basis of reciprocity in numbers under any new agreement. We are, moreover, seeking in the draft Program agreement that not more than half of the participants on either side will be in the natural and physical sciences, which is where the Soviets seek to concentrate their exchangees. The U.S. currently has numerous private academic programs which are in our favor, for which the Soviets have not raised questions of reciprocity. Hundreds of Americans go to the Soviet Union annually under such programs primarily to study Russian for academic credit. The Soviets have avoided such programs in the U.S. for that age group, but we have inserted language in the draft Program to encourage them to send Soviet youngsters to the U.S.

5. America Illustrated and Soviet Life Magazine Exchange Our Russian-language America Illustrated magazine is extremely popular in the Soviet Union. Its sales in the USSR are permitted only through the Soviet government's distributing organization, which can control the number of copies sold out of the total number of copies of each issue delivered to it each month. Supposedly "unsold" returns of America Illustrated have been a problem through most of the history of the exchanges program, and currently average about 10,000 copies per issue. The provision in the draft Program that both sides may distribute unsold copies of the magazines free of charge to visitors to mutually arranged exhibits is a crucial factor in implementing the contingent provision that the distribution level of the magazines might possibly be increased once the currently agreed distribution level of 62,000 copies per issue has been achieved.

6. U.S. Film Weeks and Film Premieres in the USSR Although we have not been active under this provision in our previous exchanges agreements, we intend to use every opportunity aggressively to implement it under any new agreement, in reciprocity for Soviet film weeks and premieres organized in the U.S.

~~SECRET~~

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-2-

Following are brief notes on the major types of exchanges proposed in cultural, educational and informational fields [the science and technology fields are covered by separate agreements; Article II of the General Agreement (Tab A) lists the seven agreements which are still operative.]

1. Travelling thematic exhibits These highly effective exhibits, viewed by millions of Soviet citizens throughout the USSR, have great impact among the Soviet populace. We propose at least two such thematic exhibits to circulate in the Soviet Union during the 3-year period of the Program of Cooperation and Exchanges and a total of at least four during the 6-year validity of the General Agreement. Each would be shown in six cities of the Soviet Union, with one month's actual showing time in each city.

2. Television Appearances We are introducing this as part of a new Agreement in order to reach the Soviet population with statements of U.S. policy. The draft Agreement provides for an annual exchange of at least six television appearances by representatives of each country, including at least one exchange by the Chiefs of State. We believe that we can obtain the cooperation of the U.S. TV networks on this exchange when we explain to them that we are not trying to place any limits on their access to Soviets, but simply concerned that we obtain improved TV access to the Soviet people.

3. Performing Arts Groups and Individual Performers In spite of the absence of an Exchanges Agreement, the Soviets have continued to show interest in sending performing arts groups (PAGs) and individual performers to the U.S., and there are signs of a resurgence of interest by American impresarios. The draft Program provides for tours of at least 10 major PAGs and at least 20 individual performing artists from each side during the 3-year period of the Program. We have inserted language of reciprocity in the draft Program providing that, should one side send more than the numbers indicated above, the other side would be accorded the opportunity, if it wished, to send like numbers of additional PAGs or individual performing artists. With these provisions in an official agreement, we will be able to send our performers on tour in the USSR and to have control over the quality and type of American PAGs and individual performing artists touring the Soviet Union. In turn, we will have better control over the Soviet PAGs and individual performers coming to the United States. American PAGs such as

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SYSTEM II
90307

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Exchanges Agreement with the USSR (S)

The strategy paper for negotiations with the USSR on exchanges with accompanying draft agreements transmitted by your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 23 has not been approved. (S)

Attached at Tab A is a list of NSC changes to the negotiating strategy, the draft agreements and our overall exchanges policy. These changes should be incorporated into a new strategy paper and new draft agreements and then these should be submitted for full interagency review to the U.S.-Soviet Public Diplomacy Subcommittee of the International Political Committee, the TTIC/Committee on Exchanges, and the IG for Counterintelligence.

(S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #46

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

BY dmf, NARA, DATE 11/16/99

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #45

BY AM/ NARA, DATE 11/14/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples
of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve
the general state of relations between the two countries;

Believing that the further expansion of strictly reciprocal
and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will
facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through
previous agreements on exchanges in the scientific, technical,
educational, cultural and other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The Parties will encourage and develop contacts, ex-
changes and cooperation in the fields of education and culture,
the humanities and social sciences, the natural sciences,
technology, and in other fields of mutual interest on the basis
of strict and full reciprocity, equality and mutual benefit.

2. Such contacts, exchanges and cooperation shall be subject
to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the
respective countries. Within this framework, the Parties will
make every effort to promote favorable conditions for the ful-
fillment of these contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

ARTICLE II

1. The Parties take note of the following specialized agreement on cooperation in various fields and reaffirm their commitments to achieve the fulfillment of them:

a. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environment Protection between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972 and extended until May 23, 1987, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

b. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health, signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972, and extended until May 23, 1987, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

c. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture, signed at Washington on June 19, 1973, and extended until June 19, 1988, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

d. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in Studies of the World Ocean, signed at Washington on June 19, 1973, and extended until December 15, 1984, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

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e. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development, signed at Moscow on June 28, 1974, and extended until June 28, 1987, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

f. The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, signed at Washington on June 21, 1973, and extended until June 20, 1986, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes;

g. The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field of Housing and Other Construction, signed at Moscow on June 28, 1974, and extended until June 28, 1989, by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes.

2. When it is considered mutually beneficial on the basis of strict and full reciprocity, the Parties will encourage within the framework of this Agreement, conclusion of specialized agreements, including mutually agreed upon amendments, between:

a. The National Academy of Science of the United States of America and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and

b. The American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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3. On the basis of strict and full reciprocity the Parties will encourage the conclusion of additional agreements in other specific fields within the framework of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

1. The Parties will encourage and facilitate on the basis of strict and full reciprocity contacts, exchanges and cooperation between organizations of the two countries in various fields of education, the humanities and social sciences, natural sciences, technology and in other related fields of mutual interest which are not being carried out under specialized agreements concluded between the Parties. These activities may include:

a. The exchange of students, researchers and faculty members for study and research; professors and teachers to lecture, offer instruction, and conduct research; as well as specialists and delegations in various fields of education; and the organization of lectures, seminars and symposia for such specialists;

b. The participation of specialists in professional congresses, conferences and similar meetings being held in the two countries, and the conducting of specialized exhibits and of joint research work;

c. The facilitation of the exchange, by appropriate organizations, of educational and teaching materials on methodology, samples of teaching instruments and visual aids; and,

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d. The facilitation of other forms of contacts, exchanges and cooperation which may be mutually agreed upon on the basis of strict and full reciprocity.

2. The Parties will also encourage the study of each other's languages through the development of the exchanges and cooperation listed above and through mutually agreed upon, and other, measures.

ARTICLE IV

In order to promote mutual acquaintance with the cultural achievements of each country, the Parties will facilitate on the basis of strict and full reciprocity:

1. Exchanges of theatrical, musical and choreographic ensembles, orchestras, other artistic and entertainment groups, and individual performers;

2. The development of contacts and exchanges in the fields of the performing arts, thus to increase in the host country:

a. The production of the sending country's works, and

b. Performances by the sending country's artists including on the premises of the sending side's Embassy or Ambassador's or Consul General's Residences.

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ARTICLE V

1. The Parties will encourage the organizations of the film industries of both countries, as appropriate, to consider means of further expanding the purchase and distribution of a commercial basis of films produced in each country.

2. Film weeks and the holding of film premieres in each country will be organized on the basis of strict and full reciprocity for the other country.

3. The Parties will facilitate the exchange of delegations of creative and technical specialists in various aspects of film making.

4. The Parties further agree that, when requested to do so by organizations and individuals of their respective countries, they will consider proposals for joint production of feature films and short and full-length educational and scientific films and proposals for filming or production of films in the other country.

ARTICLE VI

1. The two Parties agree that the views of their governments on issues of interest to the world and important to their bilateral relationship should be communicated directly to the publics of the host country through that country's television and radio programs. This will be accomplished by, among other means, an exchange of television appearances by official representatives of each country on the other's nation-wide television on the basis of strict and full reciprocity.

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2. The Parties agree also that, when requested to do so by organizations and individuals of their respective countries, they will consider proposals for joint production of television films and proposals for filming of television specials or programs and production of radio programs in the other country. The Parties further agree that each side will facilitate access by representatives of the other's television and radio organizations to the sources of information they consider necessary to the success of such proposals.

3. The Parties will, on the basis of reciprocity, facilitate contacts and encourage exchanges between organizations of the two countries in the fields of radio and television, including the exchange of radio programs and television films, both for purposes of study and for transmission to local audiences, and exchanges of delegations of creative and technical specialists in various aspects of radio and television production.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties will encourage:

a. The exchange of books, magazines, newspapers and other publications devoted to scientific, technical, cultural, and general educational subjects between libraries, universities and other organizations of each country, as well as the reciprocal distribution of the magazines Amerika and Soviet Life; and

b. Exchanges and visits, on a strictly reciprocal basis, of journalists, editors and publishers, translators of literary works, as well as their participation in appropriate professional meetings and conferences.

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ARTICLE VIII

1. The Parties will encourage and facilitate:

a. The exchange of exhibitions on various topics of mutual interest, with showings in a total of 20 cities in every five-year period of 3 to 4 different exhibits, each to show in up to 6 different cities. The exhibits will be concerned with various topics of mutual interest. The organization and themes of these exhibits will be subject to additional agreements, contracts, and protocols between the sending organization and the receiving organization.

b. Appropriate participation by one Party in exhibitions which may take place in the other's country.

2. The Parties will also render assistance for the exchange of exhibitions between the museums of the two countries.

ARTICLE IX

On the basis of strict and full reciprocity the Parties will provide for exchanges and visits of architects, art historians, artists, composers, musicologists, museum specialists, playwrights, theater directors, writers, specialists in various fields of law and those in other cultural and professional fields, to familiarize themselves with matters of interest to them in their respective fields and to participate in meetings, conferences and symposia.

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ARTICLE X

1. The Parties will render assistance to members of the Congress of the United States of America and Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as to officials of the national government of both countries, making visits to the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. Arrangements for such assistance will be agreed upon in advance through diplomatic channels.

2. The Parties will encourage exchanges of representatives of municipal, local and state governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to study various functions of government at these levels.

ARTICLE XI

The Parties will encourage, on the basis of strict and full reciprocity, exchanges between appropriate organizations active in civic and social life, including youth and women's organizations. (See 79 agreement)

ARTICLE XII

The Parties will encourage exchanges of athletes and athletic teams as well as visits of specialists in the fields of physical education and sports under arrangements made between the appropriate sports organizations of the two countries.

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ARTICLE XIII

The Parties note that commemorative activities may take place in their countries in connection with the celebration of anniversaries recognized by major international bodies.

ARTICLE XIV

The Parties will encourage the expansion of tourist travel between the two countries and the adoption of measures to satisfy the requests of tourists to acquaint themselves with the life, work and culture of the people of each country.

ARTICLE XV

The Parties agree to hold a meeting each year of their representatives for a general review of the implementation of contacts, exchanges and cooperation in various fields and to consider exchanges which are not being carried out under specialized agreements concluded between the Parties.

ARTICLE XVI

1. In implementation of various provisions of this Agreement, the Parties have established a Program of Exchanges for 1985-89, which is annexed to and constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. The terms of this Program shall be in force from . . . to December 31, 1989, and thereafter, unless

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and until amended by agreement of the Parties, will provide the basic guidelines for the Program of Exchanges in 1991-1994.

2. The Parties agree that their representatives will meet prior to the end of 1989 and will develop the Program of Exchanges for the succeeding three years.

ARTICLE XVII

The Parties agree that:

a. The programs and itineraries, lengths of stay, dates of arrival, size of delegations, financial and transportation arrangements and other details of exchanges and visits, except as otherwise determined, shall be agreed upon, as a rule, not less than thirty days in advance, through diplomatic channels or between appropriate organizations requested by the Parties to carry out these exchanges;

b. Applications for visas for visitors participating in exchanges and cooperative activities shall be submitted, as a rule, at least fourteen days before the estimated time of departure;

c. Guest-of-the-Ambassador or Guest-of-the-Consul General visas to accommodate visitors participating in exchanges, cooperative activities, exhibits, performances by groups or individuals or involved in any way in organizing or carrying out these activities shall be handled expeditiously and with priority attention within this fourteen-day period.

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d. Unless otherwise provided for in specialized agreements between the Parties, and except where other specific arrangements have been agreed upon, participants in exchanges and cooperative activities will pay their own expenses, including international travel, internal travel and costs of maintenance in the receiving country.

ARTICLE XVIII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on signature and shall remain in force until December 31, 1989. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prejudice other agreements concluded between the two Parties.

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DONE AT _____, this _____
day of _____, in duplicate, in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

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PROGRAM OF EXCHANGES FOR 1984-1986

In implementation of various provisions of the General Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation signed at _____ on _____, the Parties have agreed on the following Program of Exchanges for the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 1986.

SECTION I

HIGHER EDUCATION

1. The Parties will exchange annually from each side:

a. For long-term advanced research: At least 40 researchers, instructors, and professors for study and scholarly research in the humanities and the social, natural and physical sciences for periods of stay from one semester to one academic year. In nomination for this exchange the Parties will give due consideration to young scholars preparing dissertations, as well as young instructors, and they will take into account the desirability of appropriate representation of the humanities and social sciences.

b. For short-term advanced research: At least ten professors, instructors, and researchers to conduct scholarly research in the humanities and the social, natural and physical sciences for periods of stay between two and five months, the total not to exceed 50 person-months for each side.

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c. At least 30 language teachers and two leaders from universities and other institutions of higher learning to participate in summer courses of eight weeks to improve their competence in the language of the receiving side.

d. For the exchanges specified under paragraph 1.a and b, above, the Parties agreed that not more than half of the participants on each side shall be in the natural and physical sciences.

e. In the practical implementation of these programs, the Parties will strive to maintain the levels of exchange already achieved, where the existing levels exceed the minimum levels given above.

2. The Parties will exchange annually at least three graduate-level students or young specialists in culture and the arts, including, among others, dance, music, theater, and fine arts, architecture and historic preservation and restoration, for the purpose of study, research and training for periods of one semester to one academic year in universities and other appropriate cultural institutions.

3. a. In accordance with the desires of the sending and receiving sides, the Parties will exchange annually from each side at least 15 professors or specialists from universities and other institutions of higher learning. At least four will be lecturers on the languages and literatures of the sending side at courses for teachers and students. The exchanges will be for periods of one to 10 months, normally corresponding to the receiving side's academic calendar, to lecture and, as time permits, to conduct research at universities and other institutions of higher learning.

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b. The Parties agree that not more than half of the lecturers exchanged over the period of this Agreement shall be in the natural and physical sciences.

4. The Parties will exchange during the period of this Program at least two delegations of specialists in higher education consisting of up to five persons from side for periods of two to three weeks each, including two to three days of seminars with specialists of the other country. The subjects of the seminars and itineraries of the visits will be agreed upon subsequently.

5. The Parties will encourage the conclusion of arrangements for direct exchanges between universities and other institutions of higher learning of the two countries for the purpose of study, research and lecturing. These exchanges would take place over and above the exchange quotas mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, but on the basis of strict and full reciprocity for both sides.

6. The Parties agreed to continue to exchange information and to conduct appropriate consultations regarding the equivalency of diplomas and scholarly degrees. The Parties expect that the UNESCO Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees Concerning Higher Education in the States Belonging to the Europe Region, in the elaboration of which the United States and the Soviet Union have taken part, will lead to closer cooperation in this field.

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SECTION II

Primary and Secondary Education and the Pedagogical Sciences

1. The Parties will exchange annually from each side at least five professors or specialists in primary and secondary education from universities and other educational institutions in the United States, and from pedagogical institutes and other institutions of higher learning in the Soviet Union, in accordance with the desires of the sending and receiving sides, for periods normally corresponding to the receiving side's academic calendar.

2. The Parties will exchange annually from each side, beginning in 1984, at least 15 language teachers from secondary schools in the United States, and from secondary schools or pedagogical institutes in the Soviet Union, to participate in summer courses of six weeks duration, including two weeks of travel, to improve their competence in the teaching of the Russian and English languages and their knowledge of the Soviet Union and the United States. Each group of language teachers may be accompanied by a leader.

3. The Parties will exchange one delegation annually of specialists in primary and secondary education of up to five persons from each side for a period of two to three weeks each, including two to three days of seminars with specialists of the other country. The subjects of the seminars and itineraries of the visits will be agreed upon subsequently.

4. The Parties will encourage the exchange of textbooks and other teaching materials, and, as is deemed appropriate, the conducting of joint studies on textbooks, between appropriate organizations in the United States and the Soviet Union.

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5. The Parties will encourage the annual exchange of six teachers for periods of three months to conduct practical instruction classes in the English and Russian languages at secondary schools, colleges, universities, and pedagogical training institutions of the United States and the Soviet Union.

SECTION III

Arts and Culture

1. The Parties will facilitate the tours of at least 10 major performing arts groups from each side during the period of this Program on the basis of strict and full reciprocity in numbers of groups. If tours of more than 10 major performing arts groups are feasible, additional groups may be accommodated, but only on the basis of equal numbers of groups exchanged between the two countries. The detailed arrangements for tours of these groups will be provided for in contracts to be concluded between the following entities: for American groups, between the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow or authorized representatives of the groups themselves, and concert organizations of the Soviet Union; for Soviet groups, between appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States and concert organizations of the Soviet Union. The receiving side, taking into consideration realistic possibilities, will seek to satisfy the wishes of the sending side concerning the selection of groups and timing, with the duration of the tours in-country and the number of cities to be visited to be based on a principle of rough equivalence between countries for similar type performing arts groups. The receiving side will make a decision on each proposal by the sending side as soon as possible.

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2. The Parties will facilitate an equal number of tours by individual performers from each side. The detailed arrangements for these tours will be provided for in contracts to be concluded between the following entities: for tours of American performers, between the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow or authorized representatives of the performers themselves, and concert organizations of the Soviet Union; for Soviet performers, between appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States and concert organizations of the Soviet Union.

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2, above, the Parties will do all within their legal powers to ensure maximum favorable conditions for those performances and tours.

4. The Parties will render assistance for the exchange of art exhibitions of equal quality or other exhibitions between museums of the two countries, on the basis of reciprocity where possible, and will encourage the establishment and development of direct contacts between these museums with the aim of exchanging informative materials, albums, art monographs and other publications of mutual interest. In the case of art exhibitions, their content and the conditions for conducting them, including questions of governmental financial responsibility in the event of loss or damage, will be subject to negotiation and special agreement in each case between the relevant museums or interested organizations of the United States and the Ministry of Culture of the Soviet Union.

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5. The Parties will encourage exchanges of delegations and individual specialists in various fields of art and culture, including, among others, such fields as libraries, museums, music, theater, architecture and historic preservation and restoration.

6. The Parties will encourage and facilitate exchanges of theater directors, composers, choreographers, stage designers, performers, musicians and other creative artists for productions and participation in performances. The conditions for these exchanges will be agreed upon in each case on the basis of strict and full reciprocity.

7. The Parties will do all within their legal powers to facilitate such performances by groups or individuals as the sending side may wish to organize on the premises of its Embassy or of the Ambassador's or Consul General's Residences, these to be above and beyond the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2, above.

SECTION IV

Publications

The Parties will render practical assistance for the distribution of the magazines Amerika in the Soviet Union and Soviet Life in the United States, on a reciprocal basis, and agree to consult, as necessary, in order to find ways to increase the distribution these magazines. The Parties will distribute free of charge unsold copies of the magazines among visitors to mutually arranged exhibitions. Upon reaching full distribution of the 62,000 copies of each magazine as currently provided for, the Parties will expand to 82,000 their reciprocal

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distribution, this to be accomplished by various means, including sales at kiosks and by subscription.

SECTION V

Exhibitions

1. The Parties agree to accord each other the opportunity for two circulating exhibitions during the three-year period of this Program. The subjects of the exhibitions will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Parties will discuss in a preliminary fashion the nature and general content of each exhibition and will acquaint each other with the exhibitions before their official opening, in particular through the exchange of catalogues, prospectuses and other information pertinent to the exhibitions. Other conditions for conducting the exhibitions (dates, size and character of premises, number of personnel, financial terms, etc.) shall be subject to agreement by the Parties. Arrangements for conducting the exhibitions will be concluded no later than five months before their opening.

2. The Parties will agree through diplomatic channels on arrangements for other exhibitions and on participation in national exhibitions which may take place in either country.

SECTION VI

Other Exchanges

1. The Parties agree to implement the exchange of television appearances as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article VI of the General Agreement by an annual exchange of six television appearances by official representatives of each

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country or by the other country's nation-wide television, including at least once annually a television address by the Chief of State of each country. Any arrangements for additional appearances on the other country's television will be made on a strictly reciprocal appearance basis. The level of official representation, the time span, and the relative degree of nation-wide television coverage for each such exchange of television appearances will be determined and agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Parties agree that those official representatives of each side who can speak the language of the host country may use that language in his/her telecast. The Parties further agree that each of the television appearances will be duly announced publicly in the host country's major newspapers and television.

2. The Parties agree that film weeks and the holding of film premieres in each country will be organized on the basis of strict and full reciprocity for the other country. Reciprocity will involve not only the holding of such events reciprocally in each country, but also rough equivalence in the number and population-size of the cities in which the events are held.

3. The Parties will encourage cooperation and exchanges in the fields of film, television and radio: in joint productions, in exchanges of programs, delegations of creative and technical specialists, and in facilitative assistance to organizations and individuals in films, television radio under conditions as provided in paragraph 4 of Article V and paragraphs 2 and 3 of the General Agreement.

4. The Parties will encourage invitations to journalists for familiarization with the print and broadcast media in the receiving country. To this end the Parties will facilitate the

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exchange of at least three journalists annually from each side on the basis of strict and full reciprocity.

5. The Parties will encourage exchanges and contacts in the field of book publishing.

6. The Parties recognize the value of the visits by other specialists in addition to those noted elsewhere in this Agreement, for lectures and participation in seminars, meetings and discussions which contribute to better understanding between the peoples of the two countries.

7. The Parties will encourage the further development of contacts and cooperation between archival institutions of the two countries.

SECTION VI

General

1. The Parties will hold periodic meetings of their representatives for a general review of the implementation of this Agreement. The times and places of such meetings will be further agreed upon.

2. Each of the Parties shall have the right to include in delegations interpreters and/or members of its Embassy who shall be considered as within the agreed total membership of such delegations.

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CONDITIONS

HIGHER EDUCATION (Section I)

A. Long-Term Advanced Research (Section I, paragraph 1a), Short-Term Advanced Research (Section I, paragraph 1b), and Language Teachers and Leaders (Section I, paragraph 1c):

1. These exchanges will be conducted between the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) of the United States and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the Soviet Union (Ministry).

2. The receiving side will provide for participants in these programs:

a. necessary fees for study and research in universities and other institutions of higher learning;

b. appropriate research conditions necessary for conducting their scholarly research programs;

c. suitable living quarters;

d. a monthly stipend;

e. medical costs, including dental care for the emergency alleviation of pain and for dental work necessitated by injury, as well as hospital expenses as agreed between the two sides in cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a participant in the receiving country;

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f. language instruction during the course of the academic year as indicated by initial testing.

3. The sending side will bear all costs for travel of its participants.

4. The receiving side will assist in providing suitable accommodations for spouses and minor children accompanying or following to join participants within the receiving country, with the exception of participants in the Summer Exchange of Language teachers. In cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a spouse or minor child in the receiving country, the receiving side will bear medical costs, including hospital expenses, as agreed between the two sides. The sending side will bear all other costs, including travel, for spouses and minor children accompanying or following to join the participants. The receiving side will assist participants in enrolling dependent children in schools during the participants' programs.

B. Long-Term Advanced Research (Section I, paragraph 1a):

1. IREX and the Ministry will exchange lists of nominees and the necessary information about each nominee and his or her program of study before January 15 for study to commence the following academic year. The information provided for each nominee will include full biographic data, previous and current study and professional experience, publications, details of the proposed research program, places, institutions and archives to be visited, and the names of specialists whom the nominee wishes to consult.

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2. Representatives of IREX and the Ministry will meet in alternate years in New York and Moscow no later than April 1 to inform the sending side of their decisions concerning the acceptance of each nominee, the names of universities or other institutions where each nominee will be placed, the names of advisors and the archives and other institutions named in the application, to which each nominee will have access. Costs for up to two persons for up to one week related to these meetings within each country will be borne by the receiving side. Each side may also make additional visits to the other country at its own expense to review these exchanges and to visit educational institutions.

3. The placements of candidates accepted by each side will be considered complete and final on July 1. Any placement still pending by the date will be considered rejections. The two sides retain the right to make appropriate adjustments at that time in order to achieve a balanced exchange. After July 1 there will be no substitutions for any withdrawals made by the sending side.

4. Participants who are to start their work at the beginning of the academic year will arrive in the receiving country in August as agreed between IREX and the Ministry. Participants accepted for the second semester will arrive during the period January 2-10. If a participant cannot arrive on the agreed date, the sending side will inform the receiving side as far in advance as possible, and a new date for the arrival will be agreed upon.

5. The period of study will normally be nine months. Applications for extension of agreed periods of study will be considered by the receiving side.

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6. Both sides will facilitate travel by participants to other appropriate locations in the receiving country for study trips directly related to their research projects. The receiving side will arrange and pay for accommodations during such trips. Costs of travel for these study trips will be paid by the sending side.

7. Both sides, with the agreement of the host institutions, will facilitate travel by participants for cultural or leisure purposes during their stay in the receiving country, at the going rates for the native citizens of that country. Costs of such travel and accommodations will be paid by the sending side.

8. Both sides agreed to provide favorable conditions essential to carry out research programs agreed upon, including the use of academic and scholarly materials and, in those cases where it is appropriate and possible, work in laboratories, archives and institutions which are not a part of the system of higher educational establishments. Academic programs drawn up at the beginning of the year can, with the approval of the academic advisors, be corrected and supplemented in the course of the academic year.

9. The receiving side will provide participants with the following monthly stipends for a period of nine months the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States () dollars
In the Soviet Union () rubles

C. Short-Term Advanced Research (Section I, paragraph 1b):

Provisions of Section B above will apply except that:

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1. Participants will arrive in the receiving country as agreed between IREX and the Ministry.

2. The receiving side will provide participants with the following monthly stipends, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States () dollars a month

In the Soviet Union () rubles a month

D. Exchange of Language Teachers (Section I, paragraph 1c):

1. IREX and the Ministry will agree on the dates for the course, will provide a daily course plan and will exchange biographic data on the participants by April 20 of each year.

2. The receiving side will provide participants and leaders the following monthly stipends, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States () dollars a month

In the Soviet Union () rubles a month

3. The receiving side, at its expense, will arrange excursions to at least two of its cities, for a total duration of up to one week, to be included within the agreed duration (eight weeks) of the exchange.

E. Graduate Students and Young Specialists in Culture and the Arts (Section I, paragraph 2):

Conditions for these exchanges will be the same as those for Young Researchers and Instructors, Section A above, except that nominations will be exchanged between the American Embassy in

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Moscow on one side and the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR on the other side. The Soviet side will fill this quota with graduate students from institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture and of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. The number of students and young specialists will be over and above the quota under Article I, paragraph 1a. Nominations will be submitted by January 15 and notifications of acceptance and placements by April 1 for each following academic year.

F. Lecturers (Section I, paragraph 3):

1. The Parties by March 15 (18 months prior to the start of the academic year in which the exchange will take place) will exchange priority requests and information on the disciplines in which they wish to receive lecturers.

2. The Parties by November 15 will exchange nominations including full biographic data, previous and current study and professional experience, publications and program proposals in response to the priority requests exchanged by March 15 (paragraph 1, above), as well as similar data for at-large nominations.

3. Representatives of the Parties will meet in alternate years in Washington and Moscow no later than April 1 of the following year to inform each other of their final decisions on acceptance of the nominations exchanged by November 15 (paragraph 2 above). Costs related to these meetings will be borne by the sending side. Each side may also make additional visits to the other country at its own expense to review these exchanges and to visit educational institutions. The receiving side will

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facilitate appointments at institutions of higher learning outside Washington, D.C., and Moscow in accordance with the desires of the sending side for these additional visits.

4. The normal lecturer terms will be for periods of three months (academic quarter), four months (academic semester) to 10 months (academic year). However, cases of exceptional distinction (as defined by criteria of the sending side) may be considered for periods of one to three months for up to four lecturers exchanged on each side.

5. Agreement on acceptance of a lecturer will include the exact dates and duration of the lecturer's stay in the receiving country, the name of the host institution, faculty host and details of the academic program including specific information regarding the syllabus and lecturing hours.

6. Approximately half of the lecturers exchanged shall be scholars specifically requested by the receiving side or equally qualified scholars in the same disciplines (priority requests); the remainder will be selected from those nominated by the sending side (at-large nominations).

7. The sending side will provide international round-trip travel to the host institution in the receiving country (via Washington, D.C., in the United States).

8. The receiving side will provide for the lecturers it receives:

a. appropriate housing for the lecturers and, where possible, for spouses and minor children;

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b. medical costs, including dental care for the emergency alleviation of pain for dental work necessitated by injury, as well as hospital expenses as agreed between the two sides in cases of illness of, or accident resulting in injury to, a participant in the receiving country;

c. at least two scholarly trips to universities when the universities requested in the applications express their interest in receiving the lecturers; the itineraries of the lecturers will be agreed upon before their arrival in the receiving country; the receiving side will arrange and pay for accommodations during such trips; costs of travel for these scholarly trips will be paid by the sending side;

d. a monthly allowance, the first payment to be made on arrival in the receiving country:

In the United States 600 dollars

In the Soviet Union 420 rubles;

e. an allowance of 200 dollars in the United States and 100 rubles in the Soviet Union for the purchase of books, scholarly materials, and payment for duplicating services.

G. Seminars (Section I, paragraph 4):

1. The Parties will consult in advance through diplomatic channels on the subjects, procedures, locations, dates and numbers of participants in seminars in higher education.

2. The receiving side will organize the seminars and prepare the programs for visiting delegations, taking into consideration the requests of the sending side.

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3. The receiving side will cover the costs of seminars in its own country, including the costs of maintenance and internal travel for the visiting participants. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with rates currently in effect in each country.

H. Exchanges Between Universities (Section I, paragraph 5):

Conditions for direct exchanges between universities and other institutions of higher learning will be determined by the participating institutions.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
AND THE PEDAGOGICAL SCIENCES (Section II)

A. Lecturers (Section II, paragraph 1):

1. The normal lecturer terms will be for periods of three months (academic quarter) or four months (academic semester). However, cases of exceptional distinction (as defined by criteria of the sending side) may be considered for periods of one to three months, as agreed to by the receiving side, for up to two participants exchanged on each side.

2. Half of the participants exchanged over the period of the Agreement will be scholars specifically requested by the receiving side or equally qualified scholars in the same disciplines (priority requests); the remainder will be selected from those nominated by the sending side (at-large nominations).

3. All other conditions for exchanges of lecturers will be the same as those for lecturers under Higher Education, Section F, above.

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B. Language Teachers (Section II, paragraph 2):

1. The Parties will agree on the dates and location for the courses by January 15, will exchange lists of nominations by March 15, and will inform each other of their acceptance of the nominations by May 15.

2. A leader may accompany each group of participants.

3. The receiving side will provide for the costs of instruction, maintenance and the two weeks of internal travel for the participants and the leader. The monthly stipends for the period of instruction, to be paid on arrival in the receiving country, will be:

In the United States () dollars

In the Soviet Union () rubles

C. Seminars (Section II, paragraph 3):

Conditions for these exchanges will be the same as those for seminars under Higher Education, Section G, above.

ARTS AND CULTURE (Section III)

A. Exchanges of Performing Artists (Section III, para 2 and 3)

With reference to the conditions governing performances in the Soviet Union by United States performing arts groups and individual artists, payment by Soviet concert organizations for such performance will be made in an agreed combination of U.S. dollars and rubles. The ruble amount shall not exceed the

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estimated costs of food for the performing artists during their stays in the Soviet Union.

B. Exchanges of Exhibitions Between Museums (Section III, paragraph 4):

Conditions for these exchanges will be agreed upon between the participating museums of interested organizations of the United States and the Ministry of Culture of the Soviet Union.

C. Exchanges of Delegations and Specialists (Section III, paragraphs 5 and 6)

The receiving side will provide for the costs of maintenance, accommodations and internal travel for delegations and specialists exchanged between the Parties under the Agreement. Conditions for such exchanges will be agreed upon in each specific case. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with current rates in each country.

EXHIBITIONS (Section V)

All costs for escort officers assigned by the receiving side to accompany exhibitions received under these exchanges will be paid by the receiving side.

OTHER EXCHANGES (Section VI)

Specialists in Radio or Television (paragraph 3), Journalists (paragraph 4), and Film Specialists (paragraph 3):

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The receiving side will provide for the costs of maintenance, accommodations and internal travel for delegations and specialists exchanged between the Parties under the Agreement. Conditions for such exchanges will be agreed upon in each specific case. Maintenance will be paid in accordance with current rates in each country.

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SYSTEM II
90307 - Tab A

NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

What follows is a list of changes that should be made in our general negotiating strategy, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges and our overall exchanges policy. (S)

1. Both the General Agreement and the Program of Exchanges should be amended to take into account the exchanges policy as determined by the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations, approved by the NSC on December 5, 1983. Specifically the agreements should be reconstructed so as to maximize contact with non-official Soviet groups and individuals. The principle here is to avoid equating genuine Congressmen, journalists, etc., with ersatz Soviet parliamentarians, "journalists," etc., and thus to ensure that exchanges will be on a genuine people-to-people basis as opposed to a people-to-government basis. (S)
2. Exchanges should be conducted only with non-official groups and individuals except in fields where they do not exist. These include: human rights groups, independent peace groups (such as the Group for the Promotion of Trust between the U.S. and USSR), the Group for the Defense of the Rights of Disabled People, the independent Veterans' rights group, The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of the Monuments of History and Culture, samizdat writers and publishers, etc. (S)
3. To facilitate exchanges with independent groups and individuals, the principle by which exchangees should be nominated should be changed from exclusively "sending-side nominates" to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and "receiving-side invites." (S)
4. The agreements should be modified so as to minimize the degree to which the U.S. aids the Soviet regime in its attempts to enforce political conformity. This means we should minimize exchanges with individuals whose political conformity the regime can reward with exchange trips to the United States. Instead, we should seek out individuals who refuse to participate in such regime-orchestrated efforts as revocation of refuseniks' academic credentials, public letters attacking Sakharov, and the like. (S)
5. We should set up an independent agency entitled the Board of International Exchanges (BIE) (analogous to the Board for International Broadcasting), whose responsibilities would include: identifying independent, non-official Soviet groups and individuals, establishing criteria to measure their independence, putting such independent groups in contact with their U.S. counterparts, and reviewing Soviet

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exchange candidates requested by U.S. private groups. The last of these functions is important because private U.S. parties may have motivations for receiving Soviet visitors that are irrelevant or contrary to the purposes of the exchanges, such as career advancement, justification of monetary claims on universities for return visits to the USSR, etc. (S)

6. Full reciprocity in access to people, mass media, libraries, archives, research facilities, copying machines, and geographic areas should be ensured in the texts. Soviet exchangeees should be subject to the same travel restrictions as Soviet diplomats, or American exchangeees must be permitted access to those closed areas of the USSR that reciprocate U.S. restricted areas. All publications of articles and other literature, and media appearances by Soviet exchangeees must be reported to the BIE, which, in turn, will ensure that analogous media in the USSR will offer reciprocal opportunities for publication and media appearances. The agreements should be modified to contain such a media-access provision. (S)
7. All private exchanges must be subsumed under the framework of these agreements. (S)
8. All Soviet exchanges must be subjected to prior review by the interagency group on Counter-Intelligence and the Interagency Committee on Exchanges. (S)
9. No scientific or technical exchanges will be part of these agreements. (S)
10. All references to joint cooperation in film projects, TV, textbooks and the like should be eliminated from these agreements. (S)
11. The provisions on exchanged TV appearances should incorporate the following points: a) U.S. speakers will have the right to use a U.S. interpreter over Soviet TV and vice versa; b) U.S. representatives must be permitted to monitor the TV signal (while the U.S. speaker is on the air) in locations throughout the USSR and vice versa; c) if the signal is not sufficiently widespread, subsequent TV appearances by the opposite side will be reduced accordingly; d) there will be no prior review or censorship of televised remarks; and e) 50 percent of TV speakers must have no professional affiliation with party or state. The choice of American non-governmental spokesmen will be made by the National Endowment for Democracy. (S)
12. The U.S. will unequivocally reject any Soviet attempt in negotiations to secure the return of defectors. (S)

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Tab A

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13. Before negotiations proceed, the U.S. will change the existing visa-granting process to permit foreign policy controls. This must be done either: a) by final passage of new legislation eliminating the McGovern Amendment; or b) invoking the Baker Amendment until such time as it may be necessary to change existing law. This will immediately enhance our negotiating position and establish immediate control over private exchanges. ~~(S)~~
14. All "Congressional" and federal (or All-Union) government exchanges should be eliminated from these agreements. If governmental exchanges are to take place, it should be in the category of tourism. ~~(S)~~
15. No exchanges between journalists or trade union officials should take place unless it can be determined that the Soviet participants are not representatives of the Soviet government. ~~(S)~~
16. The distribution of publications should be made fully reciprocal. The two sides should be able to distribute copies of America Illustrated and Soviet Life to any citizen of the other country free of charge, not just at exhibits but through kiosks or other vending devices. Diplomatic personnel should be permitted to share these publications with any citizen of the host country. ~~(S)~~
17. The provisions on exhibits should not include any references to prior diplomatic approval of the exhibits' contents. Instead the agreement will represent the good faith of both parties to conduct exhibit exchanges in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. Access to exhibits must be free and unrestricted. Security both inside and outside the exhibit halls will be provided by the exhibiting country so as to ensure free access. The U.S. will propose as part of the agreement (and will make public the proposal when it is put forward) that both sides should establish permanent exhibits in each other's capitals where the public can have free access to books, films, television programs, and other exhibits. ~~(S)~~
18. The U.S. shall make proposals for exchanges of workers, farmers, churchmen, seminarians and other non-official, independent groups. Youth exchanges should also be included, however with the definition of "youth" specified as including persons 13-to-25 years old. Our youth strategy -- especially for high schoolers -- should include large numbers of exchangees, include unstructured itineraries (so the youth can engage in independent explorations) and should encompass long periods of time (several months). ~~(S)~~
19. The treaty language should not contain any politically-oriented homonyms which can be subject to different, ideologically-based interpretations. As an example, the

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Tab A

word "cooperation" should be eliminated from the agreement's title. The purpose here is not only to avoid differing interpretations but to avoid gratuitous legitimation of illegitimate Soviet institutions and concepts. ~~(S)~~

20. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet TV should be changed to "country-wide" so as to avoid legitimizing Soviet "nationhood." ~~(S)~~
21. A training program, composed mostly of written briefing materials, must be initiated for all U.S. exchangees and hosts as a mandatory requirement for participation. Materials must explain: the basic nature of the Soviet system, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how the Soviets are trained in propaganda, disinformation, and technology theft techniques. This is to help the process of understanding the USSR. ~~(S)~~
22. All references to the Russian language as the official Soviet language should be eliminated from the agreements. These only serve to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification. Instead all references to language exchanges must include the possibility of the choice of language so that U.S. exchangees might study Ukrainian, Armenian, etc. ~~(S)~~
23. The U.S. should establish a debriefing program for all U.S. exchangees travelling to the USSR. This should be done in cooperation with the intelligence community as well as with those agencies working on public diplomacy. ~~(S)~~
24. All sports exchanges should take place in a single locality to be recommended by the counterintelligence community so as to avoid giving Soviet Spetsnaz personnel the opportunity for reconnaissance operations. ~~(S)~~
25. U.S. negotiators are instructed not to yield on any question of reciprocal access. ~~(S)~~

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J. MATLOCK

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 13, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DIANE DORNAN *DD*SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Implications of Proposals
for (a) Consular Review Talks, (b) Cultural
Exchange Agreement and (c) Review of Agreement *see p 2*
on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation

In accordance with John Poindexter's instructions, IG(CI) members were asked Tuesday to comment on the CI implications of proposed negotiating terms for the above agreements by COB Thursday. They and the COMEX Staff were given previous State and FBI comments for reference, and some of them later received a State summary (Tab I) of the complete terms of reference for the Consular Review Talks (CRT). Due to the shortage of time, agencies responded individually and mostly by telephone. As instructed, DIA also submitted a written assessment of potential collection opportunities under the CRT.

My summary of previous views regarding the merits and liabilities of the CRT and the official State and FBI papers presenting their respective positions, and Jack Matlock's evaluation are at Tab II. Most agencies agreed with the FBI assessment of CI concerns regarding the CRT and highlighted the need for a net assessment of collection benefits vs probable CI difficulties. They focused on the entry/exit issue, endorsing all FBI views previously expressed, including the expectation that this would further strain CI resources. NSA elaborated on the problems which might be caused if this agreement effectively undercut our ability to deny entry at San Francisco and Baltimore to either ships or planes of Soviet or Soviet Bloc nationality. These could be fitted with ELINT collection gear and planes could also carry PHOTINT equipment. The problem would be particularly acute in Baltimore, where a ship would have a very extensive radio horizon and a perfect spot to intercept high-volume intergovernmental and defense contractor communications. Should Bloc ships be allowed to dock there, it would be necessary to establish a protected communications zone between the current two encompassing New York and Washington, an extremely expensive and complicated undertaking. The exception was OFM, which foresaw no significant CI problems with the proposed terms.

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Agencies responsible for collection, on the other hand, disputed the belief that the expansion of entry/exit points would provide the US with a net benefit because of its advantages for intelligence collection. The DIA analysis at Tab III discusses in detail why it would be doubtful that essential data would be collected -- partly because the Soviets would continue to minimize collection opportunities and partly because we already have normal access to the nonessential information we might secure. CIA also said regularization of access to Brest and Nakhodka would not affect its collection program.

Regarding the Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation (Cultural Exchanges), FBI has submitted a memorandum (Tab IV) advocating that technology transfer losses be minimized by requiring that the ratio of exchange personnel and groups in scientific/technical programs be the same for both countries and that there be direct reciprocity in number of groups and participants, types of groups and relative geographical access. DIA (Tab V) has suggested that "young" scholars, and visitors be defined in the treaty as those under 28 years of age, in order to limit access to those who are prime intelligence collectors. Two agencies also insisted that the agreement must drop one sentence (p. 27, para. 8) allowing Soviet scholars to change their course of study after the beginning of the year (when their programs normally are reviewed for technology transfer concerns), since this provides an effective loophole which they may exploit to target programs most desirable from a collection standpoint. CIA indicated that such exchange agreements have not been useful to the US from an intelligence collection standpoint.

Most agencies had no comment on the desirability of renewing Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. They were largely unfamiliar with its terms and past operation (lack of familiarity was also a problem on the Cultural Exchanges issue, especially given time constraints), but most said they did not see obvious and major CI problems. DIA (Tab III, p. 2) objected, as has DOD generally, that the agreement as written offers opportunities for technology acquisition in the US; CIA said it does not affect our collection program in the USSR. DOD's general position is that it should be allowed to lapse but that if eventually revived it should be rewritten more carefully and specifically that it should give priority to Export Administration Act controls. FBI did not comment on this issue.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ATTENTION: DIANNE DORNAN

SUBJECT: Review of Proposed Agreements ~~(U)~~

1. ~~(C)~~ Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation.

- Attached to this agreement is a Program of Exchanges for 1984-1986, section I, paragraph (a) dealing with long-term advanced research indicating "that due consideration should be given to young scholars preparing dissertations, as well as, young instructors for purposes of nominations for this exchange. The term young is also used in other portions of the Program of Exchanges. As "young" is an undefined term it might be appropriate to define it to be those under a certain age (e.g. 28). Our experience in the past is that 70 to 90 percent of the Soviet exchange students hold the Soviet equivalent of a doctor's degree and have eight years experience in their research specialty, and are on the average 34.5 years of age. This kind of experience makes these individuals excellent intelligence collectors in highly technical areas. Any effort to reduce the average age of the Soviet students (however, unverifiable) would likewise reduce their capacity for collection. Such a restriction would not materially damage the U.S. side of the exchange program, from a collection point of view, because there is extremely poor instrumentation available in Soviet laboratories where U.S. exchange students would be assigned. This has had a tendency to dissuade American scientists/scholars from participating in the exchange program.

2. ~~(S)~~ US-Soviet Consular Review Talks Entry/Exit Points Issue.

- We agree with the suggestion made by Mr. E. J. O'Malley, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, FBI to the National Security Council dated April 3, 1984 that no concessions to the Soviets in the areas of visas and entry/exit points should be made until a study has been made of the collection opportunities in the USSR that might be made available versus the counterintelligence losses that would accrue to the U.S. through an increased number of entry/exist points.

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
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3. ~~(S)~~ Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation.



William G. Leyden Jr.
WILLIAM G. LEYDEN, JR.
IG/CI Member

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(c)