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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

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File Folder: Matlock Chron April 1984 (3) *Box 90887 4*

Date: 5/30/97

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (90449)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin (1 p.) <i>R 11/19/99 NLSF95-074 #50</i>	4/11/84	P1
2. memo (90449)	Robert McFarlane re Secretary Shultz's April 2 Meeting with Dobrynin (1 p.)	n.d.	P1/P5
3. memo (90449)	George Shultz to the President re Meeting with Dobrynin (4 pp.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #51</i>	4/6/84	P1
4. paper	US Soviet Dialogue: Follow-up Steps (3 pp.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #52</i>	4/5/84	P1
5. memo (90307)	Jack Matlock to Admiral Poindexter re Cultural Exchange Agreement (2 pp.)	4/9/84	P1/P5
6. memo (1831)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Visit of Soviet TV Commentator Pozner (1 p.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #53</i>	4/6/84	P1
7. memo (1831)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Visit of Soviet TV Commentator (1 p.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #54</i>	3/19/84	P1
8. memo (1831)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Visit of Soviet TV Commentator Pozner (2 pp.)	3/12/84	P1/P5
9. memo (1831)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Visit of Soviet TV Commentator (1 p.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #55</i>	3/3/84	P1
10. memo (1831)	draft Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Visit of Soviet Commentator (1 p.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #56</i>	n.d.	P1
11. memo (91379)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Soviet Nationalities (1 p.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #57</i>	4/6/84	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
12. memo (91379)	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Soviet Nationalities (1 p.) <i>A 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #58</i>	n.d.	P1
13. memo (91379)	John Lenczowski to Robert McFarlane re Soviet Nationalities (1 p.) <i>R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #59</i>	12/9/83	P1
14. NSDD	draft NSDD (4 pp.) <i>A 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #60</i>	n.d.	P1
15. memo (90437)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Social Contact with Soviet Citizens: Current Attitudes (2 pp.) <i>P 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 #61</i>	4/3/83	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 11, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Visit of European Democratic Student Group (EDS)

On our recommendation a Presidential meeting for the EDS group was turned down (Tab II). Public Liaison is requesting, in lieu of a meeting with the President, that the delegation meet with you anytime between April 11 and 14 for 15-20 minutes.

This is a very influential group that has given us solid support in the past. Although I know your schedule is tight, I think you and I should meet with them. If not, Peter, Ty, Steve and I can see them.

^{SES}
Steve Steiner concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to meet with the EDS delegation for 15-20 minutes between April 11 and 14.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo from Public Liaison
Tab II NSC Memorandum


THE WHITE HOUSE

2962

WASHINGTON

April 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT KIMMITT
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Frank Donatelli 
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

SUBJECT: EDS delegation

As you know, the President will not be meeting with the EDS delegation when they visit Washington, despite the efforts of both our offices.

In lieu of a meeting with the President, the delegation has requested a meeting with Bud McFarlane. They would be available for a meeting any time from April 11 through April 14.

I would recommend a 15-20 minute meeting with McFarlane, to be followed by a longer meeting with one or more of your professionals from your European and Soviet Affairs office.

Please let me know as soon as possible if you think this is a possibility.

9

2547

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 30, 1984

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: STEVEN E. STEINER *Steve*
SUBJECT: Visit of European Democratic Student Group

Walt and I feel strongly that this group does not merit a Presidential meeting:

-- This is a group of only 5-6 persons, and they are already "with us." A far higher priority for youth contacts would be for the President to meet with the 200 U.S. representatives of the International Youth Year Commission. This would be helpful both domestically and internationally. This was turned down, but we are appealing -- with your support.

-- It is far from clear in any event that the convention in Europe will "commend" the President. If they do, others here can express appreciation, and we can take some steps in other ways to get publicity for the commendation.

At Tab I is a proposed reply to Frank Donatelli (any relation to the famous umpire??) suggesting that he decline the request but offer one of our patented NSC briefings -- which I would be happy to arrange.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Donatelli at Tab I.

W Approve 1C Disapprove _____
Ty Cobb and Peter *PRS* Sommer concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Donatelli
Tab II Ltr fr Donatelli, w/atch

MEMORANDUM

Steiner:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 31, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK J. DONATELLI

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT ^{Bob}

SUBJECT: Visit of European Democratic Student Group

Thanks for your note concerning the coming visit of 5-6 European Democratic Student representatives.

We are very interested in their visit and would like to set up a meeting (or meetings) for them to be briefed and have discussions with some of our senior staff. We do not feel, however, that a Presidential meeting is warranted in this case, particularly in view of the very small size of the visiting group.

Steve Steiner, our Director for International Communications and Information, would be happy to arrange the NSC program for these visitors. He can be reached at 395-5697. Also, please keep us posted as to whether the group's convention in Europe does indeed give a "commendation" to the President, as we will wish both to express our appreciation and to give this some publicity.

Frank -- Our staff looked closely at this one and, to my surprise, recommended against it, feeling we could get more mileage out of larger groups.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


March 26, 1984

Dear Bob:

As a follow-up to our conversation of last Friday, I am enclosing a copy of the letter I received from James B. Taylor.

I would be happy to support this event if you are interested.

Sincerely,



Frank J. Donatelli
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Public Liaison

Mr. Robert Kimmitt
Special Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs
Room 372 Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500

Enclosure

YOUNG AMERICA'S

FOUNDATION

SUITE 812, 11800 SUNRISE VALLEY DRIVE
RESTON, VIRGINIA 22091 • (703) 620-5270

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DR. WILLIAM L. SCOTT
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DR. SAM SLOM
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DR. FLOYD SPENCE
U.S. Representative
DR. STEVE SYMMS
United States Senate
DR. WAYNE J. THORBURN
Austin, Texas
EDERICK WILHELMSSEN
University of Dallas
(For Identification Only)

15 March 1984

Mr. Frank Donatelli
Office of Public Liaison
Old Executive Office Building
Room 423
Washington, D.C.

Dear Frank:

I would like to suggest a White House event that would be helpful to the President as well as Young America's Foundation.

During the first two weeks in April the Foundation will be hosting a tour of five or six young Europeans. They will range in age from 23 to 29. They are all very pro-American and pro-Reagan and most of them are members of the European Democratic Students. The EDS is the largest pro-democratic youth organization in Europe and includes many thousands of members from the NATO alliance.

Ten days prior to the visit to the U.S., the EDS will hold its annual convention in Stockholm, Sweden. They are interested in voting a special commendation or award to President Reagan as a "defender of freedom". This award will be in honor of the President's standing firm against the Soviet attempt to establish hegemony over Europe. The commendation may also mention the fact that European young people are grateful for the emplacement of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles. This commendation is not a foregone conclusion, but the leaders are reasonably certain they can have it approved.


My suggestion is that the White House invite this delegation to a meeting with President Reagan on April 11th, 12th or 13th. Since most of these Europeans have met the President on previous occasions and have also hobnobbed with the leaders of their own countries, this should not be seen as a cheap attempt to rub elbows with the President. Rather it is our idea to enable the President to be commended by people who are young and European,

Mr. Frank Donatelli
Page Two
15 March 1984

two groups that the public does not identify as being friendly to Reagan. Moreover, this commendation would have the weight of thousands of young Europeans from all over the continent.

Please let me know what you think and whether anything can be done on this. I will need to know by Wednesday, March 21st in order for the commendation to be introduced and approved.

Sincerely,



James B. Taylor
Executive Director

JBT/vmk

ITEM RETURNED

TO NSC

SECRETARIAT

IN APRIL 1987

Log # 507

NOT Logged / 11 Apr 84

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 11, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm*
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin

Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President reporting on his meeting with Dobrynin April 2, and attaching a status report on the various issues in the U.S.-Soviet Dialogue (TAB A).

The report and status report on follow-up steps are self-explanatory. I would note only that Dobrynin is giving a more positive tone to the Soviet response to our initiatives than we have been getting in Moscow. This may be in part because Dobrynin wishes to cultivate his image as an interlocutor, but also could be the result of a policy debate in Moscow.

Ron Lehman and I are working on the text of the letter and will send our suggestions on that shortly. However, I believe you will wish to provide Shultz's memorandum to the President without delay, and have prepared a transmittal memorandum.

Ron - Wanted to discuss important aspect of this memo from Shultz
Ron Lehman concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum at TAB I, transmitting Secretary Shultz's report to the President.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President for signature
Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of April 6, 1984

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #50

BY Amf NARA, DATE 11/12/99

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONSYSTEM II
90449~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin

I called in Dobrynin Monday afternoon to discuss the state of play of the relationship following your exchange of letters with Chernenko. He held to the rigid Soviet positions on START and INF, but showed interest in other arms control issues. We agreed to go ahead on several bilateral items. We also agreed on discussions on regional issues, including the Middle East, and confidential preliminary discussions on outer space.

To start off, I professed to be puzzled about where things now stand, noting that we have been hearing things from Moscow that seem different from the confidential exchanges we have been having and your correspondence with Chernenko. I noted we were ready to move forward, questioned if Moscow was, and asked for his personal assessment of the last Chernenko letter, the "oral remarks", and the recent Moscow line.

Dobrynin claimed the letters and "oral remarks" were self-explanatory. He said our dialogue covered three areas -- nuclear arms control/security, regional, and bilateral issues -- and proceeded to give his views. On nuclear issues, they had "invited" us to remove obstacles to negotiations, i.e., to reverse our INF deployments. They had also proposed concrete actions on other issues such as non-militarization of space (including ASAT), the nuclear freeze, test ban negotiations, and the "nuclear norms" -- some vague declaratory measures including no-first-use. Dobrynin asserted the Soviets were very serious about this list which, he added, could be discussed in diplomatic channels or through special envoys.

He also noted that the Chernenko letter proposed discussion of regional issues, particularly the Middle East, and bilateral issues, including such things as the consulates, agreements that would soon expire, fisheries, and artificial heart research. Dobrynin said they were ready to sit down with a calendar and discuss these issues concretely.

In response, I made the following points: 1) We want reductions in nuclear arms, not a freeze which would be as complicated to negotiate as START. I pointed out that even they had come out for reductions from SALT-II in their START proposal. 2) We want

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DECL:OADR

NLS F95-074 #51

BY *smf* NARA, DATE 11/12/99

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

to talk about INF but have no intention of withdrawing our missiles as a precondition. I again told him we have ideas on both INF and START and are ready to negotiate on these issues. 3) We were disappointed that Brent Scowcroft was not received by the Soviets at a proper level. There was no attempt to bypass anyone and we had used diplomatic channels to ask for a meeting. Summing up, I reiterated that we consider the nuclear issues to be of central importance for our two countries.

Dobrynin said he came to the conclusion from my comments that there is no way to make progress on nuclear issues. I told him I disagreed; we believe progress can be made.

Dobrynin returned again to outer space. I told him we were working on this issue and gave him a copy of our unclassified report to Congress. We are interested in achieving something in this area, I said, but do not now see a way to do so because of verification problems. I noted we had proposed discussions on space and strategic defense at START but they had not been interested. I said we continued to be willing to discuss this issue but it had to be recognized that there are real problems with verification.

Dobrynin said we need to discuss this issue now, adding that this question could become the most dangerously destabilizing factor in our relationship. I asked if he were willing to discuss this in private diplomatic channels, rather than begin negotiations in publicly acknowledged talks. Dobrynin said that they were willing. We both agreed to think about how to organize these exchanges and who should participate, and then discuss this subject again.

I turned aside his questions about the possibilities to discuss a nuclear freeze and the CTB, noting again that the former is simply not a good idea and that the latter has profound verification problems. When he pressed on the CTB issue, I told him I would inform you of any new ideas that the Soviets might have on the subject.

I then said we plan to table our CW draft in Geneva later this month and hope to have a new proposal in MBFR by the end of the round on April 16 in Vienna. In this regard, I told him that if the Soviet side reacted positively to our steps in MBFR, there could be some further motion in the Western position. On CDE, I said we were glad to see the substantive discussions between Ambassadors Goodby and Grinevskiy, noting Goodby's invitation for Grinevskiy to come to Washington. Dobrynin said Moscow would decide on whether Grinevskiy should come.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

On the Hotline talks, I noted we had recently conveyed technical information to them and looked forward to meeting at the end of April. (Dobrynin and his deputy seemed surprised we had not been informed by Moscow of a starting date.) I also told him we were working on a draft agreement that we hoped to pass to them before that meeting. Dobrynin said that sounded fine.

Dobrynin then again moved to the Middle East, saying we needed an exchange of views on steps to greater stability in the region and to work for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. He noted these discussions could be "very secret." I said we were ready for discussions on regional problems, but that we would need to set an agenda of the issues to be discussed and decide who would participate. I told Dobrynin we were interested both in sharing information and working on damage limitation to avoid potential crises between us, noting that the Iran-Iraq war was a good subject for discussions. We need to start modestly, I said, to see if progress can be made, indicating I had in mind something along the lines of Chet Crocker's talks with them earlier on Africa.

Dobrynin and I agreed we would give them our ideas on an agenda for regional discussions and the level of the talks. I stressed that even if we have our experts conduct some of these talks, it would be important that Gromyko and I keep close control of these discussions through our respective ambassadors.

On bilateral affairs, I said that we would talk with them this month on our ideas for revitalizing some of the bilateral agreements (on agriculture, health, housing, and the environment) currently in effect. To Dobrynin's questions about expiring agreements and fishing quotas, I said we would have to study them on a case-by-case basis. When I raised the Consulates issue, Dobrynin said they also wanted to talk about Aeroflot. I told him we would discuss that only as a separate issue. I also said that the shootdown of the KAL plane was still an emotional issue in the United States and they should take some positive steps on our suggestions in Montreal for improving the Pacific air routes.

When I asked about the building for our Kiev Consulate, Dobrynin noted that Art Hartman is planning a trip there soon and would be able to get an answer on the building question. I noted we would propose the text of an exchanges agreement in the next two weeks and suggested that the Consular Review Talks resume in Moscow in May. Dobrynin agreed. When I also mentioned we would propose a new time for the Coast Guard search and rescue talks, Dobrynin seemed unfamiliar with them but agreed to raise this with Moscow.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

I noted his positive remarks to Art on the Maritime talks. Dobrynin said yes, he thought that progress could be made.

I then said that Dobrynin had suggested only three areas on the agenda, we had a fourth -- human rights. I noted the positive reaction here to the emigration of the Pentecostals, suggested it would be useful for them to take further steps on human rights, noting the case of Shcharanskiy. Dobrynin said his position on this was well-known. When I again suggested something in the human rights area would be helpful to the overall relationship, he said he had been telling American Jewish groups that an improvement in US-Soviet relations would help on the emigration issue.

Finally, Dobrynin asked if you would be responding soon to Chernenko's letter. I said a letter would be forthcoming, but we wanted to hear what Dobrynin had to say and what Gromyko had to say to Art Hartman in Moscow the following day before discussing a reply. I then once again urged that the Soviet side reconsider its position on the START and INF talks, emphasizing the central importance of this issue.

When Art met with Gromyko on Tuesday, Gromyko seemed most interested in southern Africa and outer space. He read Art an oral statement on southern Africa, emphasized the value of past discussions of this subject, and seemed interested in having Chet Crocker talk with them further. He restated Dobrynin's points on ASAT, suggesting we had no interest in discussing space issues. Art repeated my points that we do not want negotiations, but that we were willing to have confidential discussions. It was clear Gromyko was not completely informed of Dobrynin's discussions with me of this issue.

I have attached a separate memorandum laying out next steps to be pursued in our dialogue with the Soviets.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 5, 1984

US-SOVIET DIALOGUE: FOLLOW-UP STEPSI. Arms Control/Security

A. START/INF: Pursuant to NSDD-137, we will complete SACPG studies on START trade-offs and possible INF initiatives, in preparation for exploratory discussions with Soviets whenever they are ready.

B. Outer Space/SDI: Dobrynin agreed Monday to private talks, but Gromyko claimed to Art Hartman Tuesday that we are refusing to talk; we have raised the discrepancy with the Soviets here. If Dobrynin's agreement is confirmed, we will prepare for confidential private discussions. The Outer Space IG is now focusing on ASAT arms control measures short of a complete ban, and a consensus is emerging on space CBMs and "prohibited acts," but there is still work to be done on more substantive possibilities such as a high-altitude ASAT ban. The first private discussions with Soviets should be at Assistant Secretary level with Dobrynin's deputy. We would: brief on your Strategic Defense Initiative; reiterate our last year's offer of experts' discussions in START/SCC; describe some of the limited ASAT arms control measures under review; and press Soviets to explain how they propose to verify their more sweeping ASAT proposals.

C. Chemical Weapons: The Vice President will present U.S. draft Treaty in Geneva April 18, and we will engage in the private bilateral consultations with the Soviets you have approved, paralleling discussions in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. I suggest you propose these bilateral discussions in your letter to Chernenko.

D. MBFR: Once new Western proposals are on the table in Vienna, I will reaffirm interest in further bilateral consultations there between our two delegation chiefs.

E. CDE: I am suggesting language in your reply to Chernenko's March 19 letter that gets his attention and sends him a clear signal of our non-threatening intentions. We would indicate readiness to explore a trade-off between the concrete confidence-building measures we have proposed in Stockholm and the kind of non-use of force undertaking the Soviets are promoting. The next step would then be up to the Soviets.

F. Hotline: We will provide Soviets an advance text of a proposed Hotline agreement by April 11. The Soviets have agreed on our general timeframe for Moscow talks, but owe us a response on the specific dates we proposed (April 24-26).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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NLS F95-074 #52BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/17/99

II. Regional

A. Southern Africa: We will reply to Gromyko's interesting April 3 démarche to Hartman by proposing in the coming weeks another round of consultations between Assistant Secretary Crocker and a Soviet counterpart at a neutral site (the last Crocker session was in Geneva in December 1982).

B. Mideast/Persian Gulf: Dobrynin and I agreed to engage in talks, but we should proceed cautiously, and I will propose to him that he and I meet accompanied by experts (Assistant Secretaries Murphy and Burt on our side, a Middle East man from Moscow on his). I will keep discussion focused on Iran/Iraq as well as Arab/Israeli issues.

III. Bilateral

Burt and Dobrynin's senior deputy Sokolov will hold weekly meetings to keep book on various bilateral issues, and will report to Dobrynin and me.

A. Exchanges Agreement: I told Dobrynin we hope to table a draft agreement in Moscow by end of next week, and we should do so. We are awaiting final clearance of the draft agreement from the NSC.

B. Activities under existing agreements: Administrator Ruckelshaus has proposed that he assume the Co-Chairmanship of our Joint Commission on the environment with the Soviets and renew activities under our agreement; I agree, and he will be announcing this to his Soviet counterpart. Meanwhile, the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Housing and Urban Development, as well as EPA, are actively examining ways to expand activities under our bilateral agreements on agriculture, health, artificial heart, and housing, and we will be making proposals to the Soviets as they come forward.

C. Agreements nearing expiration: We are awaiting an NSC decision on extension of the Long-Term Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement, which expires June 30. The SIG/IEP has recommended a 10-year extension, with only DoD dissenting. Assuming that we decide in favor, we will inform the Soviets and propose convening a useful sub-group on information exchange. We will need to examine the World Oceans Agreement that comes up for renewal in December; it is important to NOAA and was extended without controversy in December 1981. (These are the only agreements coming up for renewal this year.)

D. Maritime Boundary: We have told the Soviets we are ready for another round of talks, and we will soon propose a specific date for later this spring.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

E. Fisheries: The Soviets owe us a response to our proposal to renew our bilateral fisheries agreement for eighteen months instead of the usual twelve. Meanwhile, I will be taking a decision soon on whether to recommend to you some step to restore elements of our fisheries relationship (small direct allocation to Soviets, new joint ventures, or negotiation of new agreement to include allocations for U.S. in Soviet waters).

F. Civil Aviation Technical Measures: The Soviets have told us not to expect any reply until after the April-May special ICAO Assembly to consider amendments to the Chicago Convention, but we will keep pressing them for more rapid action.

G. Consulates: We are waiting for final approval of the negotiating strategy now at the NSC. We will then propose negotiations on opening the new consulates in Kiev and New York. It should be possible to put advance parties in place in a matter of months, if the Soviets agree.

H. Consular Review Talks: We are waiting for final approval from the NSC. Then we can pin down a starting date for a new round of useful talks on minor consular matters, i.e. a new exit/entry point for us at Nakhodka in the Soviet Far East, in return for a new exit/entry point at Baltimore for the Soviets.

IV. Human Rights:

I am suggesting language in your next letter to Chernenko regretting his lack of response to your previous appeal for humanitarian gestures; and we will keep pressing the Soviets for steps on Mrs. Bonner, Sakharov, Shcharanskiy, Jewish emigration and cultural freedom, etc.

0501M

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Letter to Mrs. Reagan from Congressional
Wives for Soviet Jewry

I recommend that you forward the attached memorandum to
Mr. Rosebush in the First Lady's Office for action.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to Mr. Rosebush
Tab II	Incoming Correspondence

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES S. ROSEBUSH

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to Mrs. Reagan from Congressional
Wives for Soviet Jewry

The Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry have written to Mrs. Reagan requesting an appointment with her to discuss the plight of Soviet Jews. We recommend that -- if Mrs. Reagan's schedule permits -- she receive the group of Congressional wives.

Attachment



CONGRESSIONAL WIVES FOR SOVIET JEWRY

April 3, 1984.

FOUNDING CO-CHAIRWOMAN
Helen Jackson

CO-CHAIRWOMEN
Joanne Kemp
Teresa Heinz
Dolores Beilenson
Shirley Metzenbaum

Executive Committee

(in formation)
Gail Bartlett
Lana Bethune
Jill Biden
Carolyn Bonker
Molly Boren
Ellen Boschwitz
Phyllis Coelho
Diane Cohen
Evie Dannemeyer
Cindy Daub
Lucille de la Garza
Jody Dixon
Elizabeth Dole
Penny Durenberger
Valerie Frost
Annie Glenn
Rhoda Glickman
Sally Gorton
Andrea Gray
Elaine Hatch
Elsie Hawkins
Rita Hollings
Olivia Jones
Barbara Levin
Vicky Levin
Jan Levine
Doris Matsui
Carolyn Mattingly
Elizabeth McEwen
Corinne Michel
Valery Moorhead
Elizabeth Moynihan
Catherine Mrazek
Nancy Murkowski
Nuala Pell
Harriet Pressler
Cheryl Sensenbrenner
Marie Smith
Sheila Smith
Joan Specter
Martha Sundquist
Janet Waxman
Wren Wirth
Addie Yates
Cece Zorinsky

Mrs. Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Reagan:

We are pleased to have had the opportunity to meet today with the President's National Security Advisor.

The information shared with us and with our guests, Parliamentary spouses from abroad, all of whom share our vital concern for the plight of Soviet Jews, has been signally important. Our campaign to secure fundamental human rights for those seeking to rejoin their families, and to abide by their religious beliefs, has been reinvigorated by this briefing today, and by other sessions during this three day conference.

We have taken the liberty of enclosing with this letter, a declaration from a group of gallant Leningrad activists. It is the first such statement to have emerged from the Soviet Union in quite some time -- and demonstrates that their resolve is firm. There is also a personal appeal from one woman, Helen Seidel, addressed to our gathering but which speaks for all individuals.

We believe that these declarations reflect the urgency of the plight of those Soviet Jews who have dared to voice their aspirations -- to live free and as Jews.

It would be especially important for these persecuted souls if we could expect a meeting with you in the future. Such a meeting would serve to affirm our continued support for beleaguered Soviet Jewry and to reflect the high level of concern exhibited by the American people in the face of flagrant human rights abuses by the Soviets.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Helen Jackson

Helen Jackson

Teresa Heinz

Teresa Heinz

Joanne Kemp

Joanne Kemp

Shirley Metzenbaum

Shirley Metzenbaum

Dolores Beilenson

Dolores Beilenson

A COALITION WITH THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

2027 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

202/265-8114

MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW

HELEN SEIDEL MAI

APRIL 3, 1984

Dear Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry and all dear participants of the International Conference of Parliamentary Spouses:

The mere name of your high assembly sounds to me, another wife and mother in a different part of this planet, as the best of ever created by the human soul, music. I, who live with a constant requiem in my heart, hear in it the beautiful symphony of life itself. In our age of permanent wars, growing horrible terrorism, totalitarianism, neglect, and violation of human rights, such forums as yours create a strong hope that the love of mankind, philanthropy, will prevail upon the cruelty and brutality. And, for me, as a Jewish wife and mother, it gives an additional hope and a certain guarantee that the world will not tolerate another holocaust for my own people.

You are absolutely right, dear and highly respected Helen Jackson, saying that the people here appreciate your interest and concern greatly. I am convinced that your activity has historical, biblical, eternal meaning and importance. As it is said, save one life and you save the whole humanity. That means, whatever you do is a God-willing effort, and if you are not going to give up after a time then we are safe and not broken completely.

As you dear Joanne have truly remarked, hello Joanne, I hope you do remember our meeting here when I told you and Jack that I am a Zionist because for me Zionism means only to be an Israeli patriot. I do think that patriotism is a highly noble feeling, and I do respect Russian patriots devoted to their country and people. But why is my life to my Jewish people and to my Jewish country considered here as a political and ideological crime? Why, to be an American, Canadian, Russian, English patriot is a laudable feeling and act, and to be an Israeli patriot is a mean one? I think it is not only unfair, it is a kind of discrimination.

That is why, dear Dolores, my personal concern is not that my only child, my daughter Naomi, cannot fulfill her intellectual and professional potential here because she is the daughter of ten-year old refuseniks, but only because she cannot realize her dream to live among her own people, to share her faith of her own Jewish countrymen. She first felt this urgent want to live in Israel being a child of eight, and she still strongly

cherishes this dream of her twenty-first year of her sad life.

We have tried every possible way and form of struggle for our right to live in Israel, but all in vain. I will not steal your time now to tell our grievous story of ten years of struggle. I want only to illustrate the absurdity and tragedy of the general situation with refuseniks here, especially those who wait so long as we do, and even longer. When all means of struggle to emigrate were fully exhausted we came to an awful and cruel decision to ask for exit visas only for my daughter and me, and my husband volunteered to stay alone, to save at least our daughter's life.

And, as a participant in the Jewish women's movement, I, among others, managed to be received by two deputies of the Minister of Interior, which in itself is almost a miracle, as such practice does not exist for Soviet citizens. Eighty Jewish women struggled for that privilege a whole year for such a reception. Both top level officials told me that they did not see any obstacle for Naomi's and my leaving, for I am a specialist on European and American literature and, thus, having nothing to do with any state secrets. Both promised me the positive solution to my problem within a month's time. It was as long as four or five years ago, and I am still here.

At the same time. Naomi applied alone, to take care of her old grandmother, just after her graduation from high school, when she was not yet seventeen. She was immediately refused because of her father's former secret job. Now it is twelve years since Arkady has left his so-called firm where his job consisted of gathering information of data processing in computerization from foreign literature. So, even when desperate parents are forced by the ugly and inhuman circumstances to make a decision to part forever with their only child, they achieve nothing, as it is beyond their ability to change this ugly situation.

And, finally, two weeks ago, we have got a fresh refusal. Why? Arkady is a pensioner many years; he is sixty; an invalid suffering severely with bronchial asthma. I do not work for twelve years. My mother is eighty-two; waiting for us in Israel seven years now. A whole year she has been in the hospital, severely ill. I applied for a guest visa to see her before she passed and was refused without any motivation.

Now, dear Teresa, you must be fully aware how enormously important is your intention to make people in the West understand in more practical terms what it means to go through such losses and adjustments. Yes, my dear sister by misfortune who understands my anger, fear, desolation, and sense of loss, you are endlessly right. Americans, as well as all other people of this planet, you can no longer have the luxury of being insular or naive unless they are not ready to lose their own freedom and put an end to any democracy in the world.

Thank you for the privilege to participate in your Conference. Thank you for patiently listening to me and I will always bow in gratitude to all the participants of this Conference for their interest, concern and efforts. No one can survive alone without support and help of his or her human fellows.

Devotedly yours,

Helen Sidel Mai

A Declaration

We Jews who have signed this declaration are united by one thing: our desire to live in the State of Israel. We consider emigration to Israel to be a matter of repatriation, a matter of returning home after two thousand years of homelessness and persecution. Both our conscience and our age-old tradition lead us to this point of views.

It is foolishness to accuse us of nationalism; we are no more nationalistic than any other people having its own sovereign state. It is also foolishness to say that we are not a nation or a people.

Our national life and mental make-up are realities whose existence cannot be denied any more than you can our ancient name. For 3,500 years of our national existence we have had to hear too often from foreigners who we are and how and where we may live. Today more than ever we have the right to decide these questions for ourselves.

The State of Israel is young. It arose from the ashes of the Jewish communities destroyed in old Europe. Former inmates of Auschwitz are now able to make their lives there. It is experiencing the difficulties of growth and suffers from many social ills but these are our ills, our business, and no one else's.

Our right to be repatriated in Israel is a natural and indisputable right. Apart from common sense, it is confirmed by such an impressive number of well-known international and national declarations, acts, pacts, and proclamations that detailed reference to them would be superfluous. This right has been guaranteed to us by the Soviet Law and it has been violated in regard to each one of us. There is nothing to justify the forced detention in the USSR of thousands of persons -- an act which serves no state interests whatsoever. Our desire to leave the USSR is not simply a matter of becoming united with our families -- it is an expression of our need for a home.

We harbor no hostility toward the Soviet Union. But the anti-Semitism, the new wave of recent dismissals from employment, and the actions taken to prevent our access to Jewish culture -- all of these make our position unbearable and force us to submit our petition in a new form to express our desire to emigrate without degrading ambiguities and without reticence.

We demand the free repatriation of Jews in Israel.

February 7, 1984/Leningrad

1. Lu L. Kolker L-D 191187, UI Voinova D.7, KV 20
2. S.L. Borovinsky L-D 193130 Grecheskii PR.D. 15 KV 19
3. M.S. Vinaver L-D 197110 UI Kolpinskaia D. 1.7. KV 69
4. E.B. Lein L-D 194356 PR Engel SA D, 135 KV 21
5. S.P. Frumkin L-D 195267 Granzhdanskii PR. D126 Korp 1 KV 70
6. M.E. Elman L-D 190121 NAB. R Rontanka D. 119 KV 30
7. L.M. Furman L-D 191028 UI, Ellia D. 13/15 KV 16
8. E.L. Utevskaia L D197047 Morskoi PR D. 43 KV 94
9. A.I. Ludoborovsky L-D 191025 Nevskii PR 65 KV 5
10. LA. I. Gorodetsky L-D 197136 UI Podrezova D. 17 KV 8
11. I. B. Radomyslsky L-D 196128 Kubinskaia UI D 10 KV 61
12. M.N. Makushkin L-D 197136 Barmaleeva D.4 KV 61
13. V.P. Oizerman L-D 197136 Bolshoi PR D, 74 KV 61
14. M.L. Tsivin L-D 192282 Budapeshtskaia UI D 15 Korp 3 KV 112
15. B. M. Fridman L-D 191025 Dmitrovskii D. 12 KV 33
16. M.F. Salman L-D 190031 Moskovskii PR. D 4 KV 15
17. M.S. Beizer L-D 195276 PR Kultury D. 27 Korp 1 KV 89
18. A.A. Slobodov L-D Pushkin 188620 Priamoi PER D KV 30
19. LU V Karolin L-D 199178 V.O. 12 Linnaiia D. 29/25 KV 20

Received by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry,
10 East 40th Street, New York City 10010

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 6, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *GM*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator Pozner

You will recall that State sent us a memo March 3 regarding issuance of a visa to Vladimir Pozner, who had offered an exchange of TV appearances with Jim Dabakis of Salt Lake City.

State was instructed, by Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum of March 19, not to issue the visa since the exchange did not provide an adequate measure of reciprocity. However, State had already authorized the visa before receiving the memorandum.

In subsequent discussion with State on the matter I learned that, before action could be taken to withdraw the visa authorization, the Soviets stepped in and instructed Pozner not to come. It appears that they decided that they did not want to offer Dabakis access to Soviet TV, as Pozner had promised.

The bottom line of this mix-up on our side is that the visit will not in fact take place and the Soviets will be blamed by Dabakis and Senator Hatch, who was interested.

I wish all of our crossed wires could end so happily.

Attachment:

Tab I - Copies of previous memos on the subject.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F95-074 #53BY smf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Matlock

1831

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX

March 19, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator (U)

Inasmuch as the proposed exchange of TV appearances by Vladimir Pozner in the U.S. and Mr. Dubakis and a university professor in the USSR does not meet the test of real reciprocity, we cannot concur that a visa should be issued. *ter*

If either of the following conditions can be met in arranging for the exchange, we could reconsider our position: *ter*

(1) An exchange which meets the criteria established in any future exchange agreement concluded with the Soviet Union, or

(2) An exchange whereby Mr. Dabakis would appear on Soviet television with a well-informed USG official (selected by the Department of State), after which Mr. Pozner would be granted comparable treatment in the U.S. *ter*

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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NLS F95-074 # 54

BY smf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

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S/S 8406608

1831

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 3, 1984

A7-27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator

Jim Dabakis, an ABC talk-show announcer from Salt Lake City, has invited Vladimir Pozner, a Moscow TV commentator who is frequently seen on American network TV news programs, to visit the US starting March 29. He has arranged for Pozner to appear on at least seven national TV programs, as well as local media, and to speak to various groups. Dabakis has been promised that in return he and a Brigham Young University professor will be able to appear on four major Soviet national TV programs and tour all 15 Soviet republics in August and September of this year.

While this visit raises questions of allowing a recognized Soviet propagandist to appear live on American TV with reciprocity only in the form of appearances on Soviet media by a relatively unknown pair of Americans, we have concluded that it is less costly to allow the visit to proceed. We cannot prevent appearance by Soviets, including Pozner, on American TV by direct satellite feed from Moscow. Refusing him entry would arouse criticism from US media (and in Pozner's case from Senator Orrin Hatch, who strongly supports Dabakis' project) on press freedoms grounds and Helsinki Final Act considerations and would give Pozner an issue he could use effectively in his propaganda. Refusal would have to be based on a finding on foreign policy grounds that his presence here would endanger national security. This would come at a particularly sensitive time in view of the recent filing of four lawsuits against the Department challenging the legality and constitutionality of several visa refusals on the same grounds in 1983.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

BY smf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator (U)

Although we are disturbed by the lack of real reciprocity in the arrangements Mr. Dabakis has negotiated in his exchange of television appearances with Mr. Pozner, we concur that denial of the visa would be subject to misinterpretation by elements of the American public, and therefore concur with the State Department recommendation that, in this instance, a visa be authorized for Mr. Pozner. ~~ter~~

The State Department should ensure, however, that Mr. Dabakis and his companion are fully briefed on USG policies before they travel to the USSR -- and, if possible, before Pozner's visit to the U.S. The Department also should monitor closely the treatment accorded Mr. Dabakis and his companion and furnish a report assessing the balance of benefits resulting from this exchange of television appearances. ~~ter~~

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLS F95-074-56

BY amf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy

John Lenczowski sent you a memorandum on December 9, 1983, recommending approval of a draft NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy (TAB II).

If you consider it untimely or inappropriate to have the draft NSDD approved, I believe it would be useful in any event to have State go ahead and take one of the steps in the draft. That is, to organize an Interagency Career Management Committee for Soviet Nationality Specialists, which would examine ways to overcome the critical shortage of USG analysts and linguists qualified in Russian and Soviet nationality languages.

We are sorely hampered in our understanding of what is happening in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union by a lack of specialists, and development of a cadre will be a lengthy process. Therefore, I believe we should move ahead promptly in this area, even if we decide to delay formal implementation of some of the other recommendations.

With this in mind, I have drafted a Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum instructing State to proceed with this step.

out of town
John Lenczowski concurs.

Recommendation:

That you authorize transmittal of the memorandum at Tab I, if you consider it unlikely that the draft NSDD on Soviet Nationalities will be approved in the near future.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Draft Kimmitt-Hill
Tab II - Lenczowski-McFarlane Memorandum of December 9, 1983

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS *F95-074 #57*
BY *smf* NARA, DATE *11/17/99*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
91379
Add-on

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy

The draft NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy, submitted earlier by the Department, has not yet been approved. However, while it remains under consideration, the Department is requested to proceed to organize an Interagency Career Management Committee for Soviet Nationality Specialists, which would examine ways to overcome the critical shortage of USG analysts and linguists qualified in Russian and Soviet nationality languages.

The name and existence of the committee should be classified and a report containing its recommendations for further action should be submitted in 90 days.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F95-074 #58

BY amf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

NSDD

SYSTEM II
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/20

~~SECRET~~

December 9, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy

Attached at Tab A is a draft NSDD on Soviet Nationalities Policy which was produced by the SIG on the subject. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding the NSDD for his signature and summarizing its main points.

Jack Matlock, Paula Dobriansky and Walt Raymond concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Proposed NSDD for signature
- Tab II State's memorandum and draft NSDD

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F95-074 #59

BY Amf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

**National Security Council
The White House**

11020 P4: 06

System # II
Package # 91379
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Levezawski</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

① Typo page 3 of NSDD ✓
② Any word from OMB?
per John Deaver -
no objection
x 6190 P/21

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dec 20, 1948

Bob -

I called Al Keel about
this and sent him a copy for
his information.

- John L.

II
91379

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/14/48

Al -

Please note Point points 1 and 2
contain references to funding. In
the case of the reference to radio
broadcasting, there is nothing different
or new here that has not been
covered in NSDD 45 on Radio
modernization.

Thanks for your help.

- John Lenczewski

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #60

National Security Decision
Directive

BY amf NARA, DATE 11/17/99

UNITED STATES POLICY ON SOVIET ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS

As set forth in NSDD-75, U.S. policy toward the USSR is to aim at: containing and over time reversing Soviet expansionism; encouraging change within the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic system; and reaching agreements with the Soviet Union that protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the principles of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. As part of that policy, and in addition to steps we will be taking with regard to other elements of Soviet society, the United States Government shall pursue a rejuvenated effort to understand and to encourage ethnic and national freedoms within the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

United States Government objectives are:

1. To encourage changes within the Soviet Union that foster diversity, pluralism, decentralization and democracy. ~~(S)~~
2. To promote a more accurate understanding of the nature and actions of the Soviet Union by drawing attention to its colonial and expansionist characteristics, and by undermining the notion that the expansion of communist rule is an irreversible phenomenon. ~~(S)~~
3. To create an institutional structure to strengthen and sustain our capabilities for understanding and influencing Soviet ethnic and national developments. ~~(S)~~

The USG objectives set forth above can be served by increasing our presence and activities in the USSR. Such an increase, however, could entail a detrimental increase in Soviet presence and activities in the U.S. Consistent with NSDD-75 and our overall foreign policy, we should work to increase our presence and activities in the USSR if it is determined that the benefits are not exceeded by the drawbacks. To realize the above objectives, the USG should develop an action program. This program will be based on the reaffirmation of our commitment to the rights and legitimate interests of the various ethnic and national groups under the administration of the Soviet Union, including their rights to practice their religions, to provide traditional education to their children, to emigrate and, as appropriate, to enjoy national independence. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

The USG shall, inter alia:

1. Increase its capabilities for understanding and ameliorating developments within the Soviet Union adversely affecting ethnic and national groups. As part of this effort, a permanent Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group chaired by the State Department shall be established. That group shall have responsibility for encouraging the allocation of adequate financial and institutional resources to Soviet ethnic and national group developments. This shall include the establishment of an Interagency Career Management Committee for Soviet Nationality Specialists, whose purpose shall be to examine ways to overcome the critical shortage of USG analysts and linguists qualified in Russian and Soviet nationality languages. The Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall also study ways to increase USG funding to enhance international awareness of Soviet ethnic and national issues, and shall participate as appropriate in other USG programs and decisionmaking affecting U.S. policy on Soviet ethnic and national groups. The Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall also continue to study the advisability of creating a Center for the Study of Soviet Nationalities which shall be privately run, but funded by the USG. Finally, the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group will also examine the possibility of cooperating with private groups which are conducting research and activities in the Soviet Nationalities field. (S)
2. Increase its ability to broadcast radio programs to Soviet ethnic and national groups. Within the context of the decision to modernize and upgrade VOA, RFE and the RL facilities, and in addition to other actions, the USG shall assign high priority to increasing the number of Soviet languages in which the radios broadcast. In accordance with the priorities that from time to time will be established by the Special Planning Group for Public Diplomacy with the assistance of the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group, efforts shall be made to reduce the shortages in qualified linguists and other staff, in conjunction with the Interagency Career Management Committee. Renewed consideration shall be given to funding new broadcast sites, strengthening existing transmitter sites and expanding all technical means. Budgetary allocations to existing operating agencies shall reflect their high priority as national security interests. It is noted that high priority is now being given to obtaining additional radio relay facilities and funding for them. (S)
3. Otherwise increase the flow of information into the USSR. The U.S. shall facilitate the flow of information into the USSR by employing additional available means such as networks for the distribution of newspapers, books, and cassette tapes. (S)

4. Continue to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. We will sustain efforts to cooperate with the diplomatic representatives and supporters of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and draw attention to their cause. (S)
5. Increase UN activities. The USG shall take appropriate steps in the UN, including the UN Human Rights Commission and UN Decolonization Committee, to highlight the contradictions between Soviet propaganda and practices. These steps may include raising the issue of Soviet nationalities in statements and debate, especially in the context of Soviet professions of support for self-determination and decolonization. (S)
6. Work with the appropriate public bodies, such as the CSCE Commission, Amnesty International, and other interested religious and political organizations to ensure that adequate attention is paid to Soviet ethnic and national groups at the various human rights meetings that these groups regularly attend. (S)
7. Review costs and benefits of establishing a larger U.S. official presence in the USSR. As a means of increasing our capabilities regarding developments in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, and consistent with NSDD-75, a Consulate in Kiev could make an important contribution. The USG will also give active consideration to the desirability of opening a Consulate in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union. In considering any such steps, we should seek to avoid worsening the existing disparity between the Soviet official representation in the U.S. and the U.S. official representation in the Soviet Union. (S)
8. Examine new Cultural, Informational, and Educational Exchanges. As part of our efforts under NSDD-75 to expand U.S.-Soviet exchanges, the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall devote particular attention to those exchanges involving non-Russian areas of the USSR. (S)
9. Increase public statements on Soviet abuse of ethnic and national groups. The Soviet Government's mistreatment of various ethnic and national groups shall, as appropriate become a more frequent theme of USG public statements. Such statements dealing with official speeches, or written proclamations, shall be case in terms of universally accepted norms, especially those norms incorporated in international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party and those recognized in the Soviet Constitution. Such public statements may include references to: (S)

- the plight of the many Soviet human rights activists whose persecution by the Soviet authorities is directly attributable to the efforts of these persons to assert their national traditions;
- the colonial aspects of Soviet rule over non-Russian peoples; and
- the problems of religion in the Soviet Union. 487

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 6, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Internal Problems: Health

Many of us feel that the Soviet regime is facing mounting problems at home, and this provides some incentive for them to moderate an aggressive foreign policy. Usually we concentrate our attention on sagging economic growth, consumer dissatisfaction, mismanagement, oppressive controls and low morale.

All these are indeed real -- and up to now intractable -- problems. Western researchers are just beginning to discover yet another very serious problem: a clear trend in recent years toward more disease and poorer health standards. This is all the more striking, since it follows a few decades of fairly steady improvement in this area. It also runs counter to the experience of virtually every other industrialized country in the world.

A recent report by Murray Feshbach of Georgetown, who is famous among Soviet specialists for winnowing statistical evidence from a wide variety of Soviet publications to demonstrate trends the Soviet authorities would prefer to conceal, provides a host of shocking statistics. Such as the following:

-- Mortality per 100,000 population has doubled in the last two decades;

-- The incidence levels and death rates due to pulmonary disease quintupled in the same two decades;

-- Whooping cough, scarlet fever, diphtheria, measles and mumps are all on the increase--and the incidence of the latter is nearly one hundred times that in the U.S.

-- The rate of hospitalizations has grown twice as fast as the population since 1960, and is nearly double the rate in the U.S.

-- There is evidence that Soviet military units are experiencing epidemics of diseases such as infectious hepatitis, dysentery and typhoid, and in January "Extraordinary Antiepidemic Commissions" were established in every military and naval unit.

A copy of Feshbach's report is at TAB I in case you are interested in additional such examples. In any event, all this does put our problems with Medicare and rising health care costs in a bit of perspective. And it helps explain why most Soviet citizens seem to believe that their life is getting worse, not better, even though the statisticians tell us that the availability of consumer goods continues to improve modestly.

Attachment:

Tab I - "Recent Research on Soviet Health," by Murray Feshbach

RECENT RESEARCH ON SOVIET HEALTH

By Murray Feshbach
Georgetown University

The Soviet health scene is much improved over the period when they first took power in 1917. At that time there were only about 25,000 doctors for the entire population of about 160 million (using present boundaries), whereas now there are not quite 1 million doctors for a population of not quite 275 million persons. From this viewpoint they have made enormous progress in providing access to medical services, as they have in the number of hospital beds, and in a number of other measures, especially that of mortality and of morbidity. For example, no longer does one out of every four children die in their first year of life; instead about 3 out of every 100 live-born die before reaching their first birthday at the present time. The overall crude death rate has declined from about 30 deaths per 1000 population to about 10 at the present time. While the track of these declines has not always been in a straight-line declension, the basic trend over the entire period is as described. Confusion in the vectors of medical progress occurs essentially in the recent period, which particularly applies to the data on morbidity, sickness rates if you wish. Thus, the focus of this discussion on my recent research will concentrate primarily but not exclusively on the morbidity side and not on mortality issues as in past presentations here at the Wilson Center for the Kennan Institute or in publications.

Paralleling the trend in mortality rates, morbidity incidence and rates are much different than those of the early phase of the Soviet regime. But again, the recent period brings into question the trend line of success, if you wish, and opens up issues of its impact on the population, the economy, the military, and on resource allocation policies.

Returning to the early Soviet period, between 1917 and 1923, some 3 million persons lost their lives to cholera, typhus, typhoid and dysentery during this period of upheaval. Perhaps some 20-25 million persons were sick with typhus by 1920. This situation had ~~become~~ become so pervasive and so dangerous to the new Soviet regime, that¹ early in December of 1919, Lenin felt it incumbent to refer to the health situation in the strongest of terms: "Either the lice will defeat socialism, or socialism will defeat the lice." unquote. Since that point in time, and with a great deal of assistance by the American Relief aid program for medications and medical services, in addition to food supplies, the epidemics of the time were abated. Nonetheless, as recently as 1934, there were some 9 and one-half million cases of malaria throughout the Soviet Union. This no longer occurs.

Thus, the structure of disease patterns changes with further medical intervention, and of course with changes in the age structure of a population, usually shifting to chronic diseases

of the older ages and away from those of the typical childhood prevalence. In the Soviet Union, the ~~share of~~ ~~expectation among~~

older persons has obviously taken place ~~given the drop in fertility~~ among the Slavs and Balts. ~~but because of continued~~ ^{This factor as well as such related}

^{factors as} increases in stress, pollution, ^{and} smoking and alcohol consumption, ^{have led} to ~~the diseases had continued~~ ^{dramatic} increase ^{in heart disease} ~~leading to~~

a doubling in mortality (per 100,000 population) in the two decades of 1960's and 1970's. Cancer deaths also increased until recently. Unfortunately we do not have any age and sex data for the period since 1971/72 and our evaluation has to be limited to crude overall population measures. Undoubtedly these deaths played a large part in driving the overall crude death rate up by about 50 percent between 1964 and 1980. In addition, accidents, poisonings and injuries had been increasing because of more private vehicles on the streets of the Soviet Union, leading to accidents and deaths, half of which may have been due to inebriated drivers.

There is evidence, however, that the latter grouping has been displaced as the third ranked cause of death in the Soviet Union. During a visit last year to the Soviet national institute of pulmonary diseases in Leningrad, Rosemarie Crisostomo and her group were informed that deaths due to pulmonary diseases were now the third cause of death throughout the country. Incidence ^{levels} and death ^{rates} due to pulmonary disease had quintupled per 100,000 population between 1960 and 1979.

This evidence may underlie the reports in medical journals about incredible rates of influenza, upper respiratory diseases and especially pneumonia occurring among the very young, and even the not so young in the USSR. One recent survey by the national institute on influenza studied 5 presumably random ^{ly chosen} child-care institutions throughout the Soviet Union. This survey found that among children of 0 to 3 years of age in these institutions, their average annual rate of illness from pneumonia was 72 per 100 and from influenza 636 per 100 children during the period 1968 to 1975. Alternative statements relating to the frequency of respiratory illness among children in Belorussia (up to 10 and more times per year) blocked the proper administration of vaccines to prevent childhood illnesses and caused an increase in the number of unvaccinated children. The national pediatrics journal of September of 1980 notes that "influenza and acute respiratory infections" are "virtually uncontrollable." Earlier in the year, ⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾ the authors of an article on the health of Soviet children noted that flu and acute respiratory illnesses remained at 900 out of every 1000 children "practically without change" in its level. When the trade union newspaper, Trud, reported that there were 30 million cases sick with influenza each year (29 October 1981, p. 4), this was twice as much as that found for 1975 (of 15.8 million) in a besplatno health statistics publication, and must underlie the Academy of Medical Sciences' report in their journal for November of 1981 that "the significance of a number of infectious diseases is growing, primarily viral diseases, including influenza and influenzal pneumonia, infectious hepatitis, and adenoviral infections."

remains the first cause of infant deaths given in an April 1982 (ZRF, no. 4, p. 6.) detailed listing of the basic reasons for mortality of children in their first year of life.

Following our attention to patterns of illness among the younger population, the remarkable record of the period since 1980 must be addressed at this point. Thus, after continuous decline, albeit at levels much above that of the United States--only in terms of roughly comparable sizes of total population, being only 15 percent higher in the Soviet Union--275 to 235--something has gone awry almost across the board. As we can see from the table on index numbers related to incidence and to incidence per 100,000 population of the Soviet Union, the recent period has witnessed an increase of over 250 percent in diphtheria in the last three years for which we have officially reported data (actually if we go back one more year, to 1979, the increase is ^{more than 4.5} ~~about 5~~ times, from 200 cases in 1979 to 920 in 1982).

Similar dramatic increases take place in the numbers and rates of pertussis, that is, whooping cough, almost doubling in the recent period. Scarlet fever (scarlatina) which had declined between 1980 and 1981, again increased by 40 percent relative to 1980, and lastly, measles increased by 30 percent. Absolute numbers also give us some perspective on the dimensions of this turnaround--assuming that it will take a period--hopefully short--to rectify and improve the health of the individual Soviet citizen. Thus, diphtheria in the USSR ^(as noted earlier) increased to 920 cases in 1982, the United States had 5 cases reported in 1983, and did not

figure for 1978 to 1982 in the United States amounted to 3,819, and showed a further decline to 2,258 in 1983. The Soviet ~~average~~ ^{average} of 21,880 not only is 6 to 7 times higher than in the United States (or very slightly less if adjusted for the population size differential) but includes a doubling in the last 3 years, going from 13,900 to 27,500 in 1980 and 1982, respectively. *The average incidence of typhoid fever in the USSR over the period 1978-1982 is 34 times the level in the United States.*

Measles displays an increase also of remarkable dimension. Again, in the U.S. case, we probably would have succeeded in reducing measles to zero by October of 1982 as expected by the Centers for Disease Control several years ago, but the people without prior medical care arriving from Haiti and Cambodia, among others, has kept the number at about 1,400 cases (1436) in 1983, down from the ~~average~~ ^{average} figure of 13,385 in the five years prior. Simultaneously, in the Soviet Union, after almost doubling between 1977 and 1978 (from 315,000 to 545,000 cases, respectively), the numbers declined until 1981, when it reached just below 343,000 (342,800), not quite as low as in 1977, however. Nonetheless, in the next year, the incidence of measles increased to over 466,000 reported cases, or an increase of over 35 percent. Measles is not a simple illness, as also applies to whooping cough, let alone to diphtheria, referred to earlier, and both measles and pertussis may have serious complications. Thus measles is linked to pneumonia and encephalitis, and pertussis is especially hazardous among children under 2 years of age, frequently leading to bronchopneumonia among the young as well as the elderly. Moreover, measles mortality if over 4 percent is a standard measure of the presence of malnutrition.

At this point it is necessary to speculate about the production quality of Soviet vaccines, and the maintenance and administration of the same domestic as well as foreign medicines imported into the country. Regretfully, it appears to me that they are either less effective or improperly stored or administered with unsterile needles or while counterindicated by the illness of the recipient. For example, in Belorussia, DPT is not administered to the "many children under 1 year of age who have acute respiratory illnesses up to 10 or more times each year." (Zdr.Belo., 9/80, p. 38.) , The lead article of Pediatriya, in September of 1980, reports that "At the present time we have established the inadequate effectiveness of the pertussis component of the DPT vaccine, in excess reactions, incomplete immunization especially among children under 5 months of age who are not vaccinated and who have serious (tyazhelo) cases of illness." (p.3) Later, the article notes that measles vaccines had been utilized for 10 years, but "measles remains a widespread infectious disease" against which a successful "anti-toxin has not been developed. The effect of vaccinations was greater in the first years of application than at the present time. The reduction in the effectiveness of the vaccine is explained by the non-standard quality of the vaccine and defects in the vaccination [process]." More can be recounted of the "inactivization of the serum during transportation, maintenance and administration" from Soviet medical sources (e.g., Sov. meditsina, no.9, Sept. 81, p. 44; Pediatriya, no. 11, Nov. 81, p. 12; and Zdrav. Belor., no. 9, Sept. 1980, 38.) Refrigeration, which is necessary for many medications also is noted as being

immunogenic activeness. (Tr.Inst.Past., 1982--thanks to CDC,Gary Noble,MD,Asst Dir for Science)

It has been indicated to me that it is possible that perhaps in their desire to fulfill the plan, to cover serum shortages, etc., the domestic producers may dilute the vaccine in order to achieve the required production quantum of so many liters, kilograms, etc. Hard to believe, but also hard to exclude from consideration.

Lastly, coverage of the child population in 1975 which should have been administered DPT shots, varied from 88.2 percent in Estonia, to 90.5 percent in the Ukraine, to a high (among the 5 republics listed in the source) of 97.1 percent in Uzbekistan. (Detsk. infekts., vyp 8, 1978, p. 38.) On one hand, it is surprisingly low in the western republics and on the other, surprisingly high in the eastern republic of Uzbekistan. A worst case scenario might indicate that the shortfall in the first instance exposed more to risk of the diseases and that in the second instance, probably the unsanitary conditions or use of non-disposable needles may have led to nonimmunological responses and therefore also left these children open to risk of diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. But this may be too perjorative, nonetheless I suspect not too much so.

I have not yet indicated anything about remarkable increases in various illnesses which are contrary to expectations of a successful public health and medical system. One of the growing

newborn, growing from 0.9 percent of the newborns in the 1960's to 4.7 percent in the early part of the 1970's. (Citing a 1975 source, Terap. arkhiv, 10/1981). Bacterial infections of the newborns may have ensued from poor hygienic care by the mother during the prenatal period. Another illness related to sanitation, salmonellosis, has increased dramatically in the last two decades in the Soviet Union, increasing by 3.4 times between 1961 and 1972, and a further 4 times of the higher base derived for 1972, for a total increase of 12 times between 1961 and 1977. (Ped., 6/78) (In the United States, there was an increase of 50 percent between 1971 and 1980, from 21,928 cases to 33,715 cases.)

Meningococcal infections commonly found in meningitis and septicemia apparently were at a low point in the USSR between 1962 and 1968, increasing markedly after 1968 to the present time. For example, even in Moscow between 1964 and 1970, there was recorded a remarkable increase of "50 - 60 times." And according to a 1982 source, the decade of the 1970's reportedly witnessed even further increases. For Tashkent alone, with 1971 equal to 100, then in 1972 to 1978, it was 300, 600, 900, 700, 900, 400 and 400, respectively. Some 75 to 80 percent of the national increase reportedly also affected children under 15 years of age. (By date of publication--Zdr. Tad, no.5/Sep-Oct,1979, p. 52; Ped., no.9,Sept.1980,p.3 and 5; Zdr. Belor., no.2, Feb.1982, p. 56; and Zdr. Tadzh., no. 5, Sep-Oct. 1982, p. 74.) This lengthy ^{of time} period of ^{increase in} ~~expansion~~ of meningococcal infections is contrary to the classic volume on Control of Communicable

irregular intervals, lasting 3 to 5 years, ^{and} not the decade and a half noted here for the Soviet Union.

And lastly, mumps, in addition to its well-known potential impact on adult males, also can lead occasionally to encephalitis and similar complications. Thus, when in the United States, in 1980 there were 8,576 cases, or a rate of 3.7 per 100,000 population, the Soviet rate per 100,000 population of their country was almost 100 times as high--that is, 343; which in turn yields a figure of 911,000 cases of mumps in that year. (By 1983, the US figure had declined to 3,285 cases.) The vaccine used in the United States was licensed over 15 years ago (in 1967), one should reasonably hope that they could have learned to master its production, or import sufficient quantities (plus proper maintenance) to reduce this enormous number to some reasonably low level.

In the limited time I have for this presentation, I had also hoped to cover issues of patient visit data versus data derived from large-scale medical surveys. The latter reveals the level of sickness incidence and rates to be about twice as high as patient visit based materials, and in some cases even higher rates are revealed. For 1970, the last survey for which we do have such data, the ratio yielded a figure twice as high. As a consequence, the materials discussed earlier here may be seriously incomplete, in some instances dramatically so.

But now I prefer to turn to issues of nutrition, not in terms of fast food or in terms of personal diet--in my case, all too obvious--but in terms of shortages of basic vitamins and other nutrients such as folic acid, which in turn facilitate or predispose an individual to becoming ill. This issue is arguably also linked to issues of the ability of Soviet women to lactate postpartum and the quality of Soviet artificial milk used as a substitute for natural milk and immunities imparted to the infant therefrom.

In the no. 1 issue for January-February 1984 of Voprosy pitaniya, it was revealed that the Institute of Nutrition of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences had been conducting a 10-year longitudinal study of some 64,000 persons located throughout the country. (pp.3-7) *(Although all nutritional surveys are difficult to interpret, the results of the survey reveal a shortage of vitamins A, B1, B2, B6, C and niacin among the foods consumed by part of the population under examination. This is the same survey cited by the department head of the RSFSR Gosplan institute which also cited these nutrient shortages, underlining the shortages during the winter-spring period (EKO, no. 6, June 1982, p. 68.) and by the Scientific Secretary (N.V. Blazheyevich, of the Problem Commission "Problems in Vitaminology" of the AMN, in the no. 4 (July-August) issue of Voprosy pitaniya. (pp. 76-77) Both Institute of Nutrition articles stress the adverse impact of a deficient vitamin supply because of a lack of animal products, vegetables and fruits and local, nationality-related and climato-geographic reasons for deviations from recommended patterns of nutrition on an adult's*

from illness, and for pregnant and breast-feeding women, can be the "reason for hypotrophy, premature births, and infringes upon the physical and mental development of the child." (Vopr. pit., no. 1, Jan-Feb. 1984, pp. 3-4.)

Compounding this problem, and specifically related to the inability of women to lactate or to do so for only a short period of time, the substitution of artificial milk for breast milk has led to other problems. In those instances where Malysch, the most widely available infant formula artificial milk, is utilized, the child is more frequently ill with hypotrophy (low body mass), rickets, alimentary anemia, and pneumonia in comparison with those who are breast-fed and those fed with the newer products--Baldyrgan and Balbolek, as well as the traditional kefir. (Zdr. Kaz, 2/83, pp. 57-60) One of the tasks assigned to the Problem Commission on "Problems in Vitaminology" is determination of the appropriate levels of folic acid and vitamins D and E, in addition to the usual assortment of vitamins A, B1, B2, and niacin. (Vopr. pit., no.4, Jul-Aug 82, pp76-77.). One survey, in Novokuznetsk, found that one-quarter of the children in ages 1 to 14 years of age suffered from latent iron deficiencies, with the peak rate manifested among 2 to 3 year olds. (242.0 +/- 9.6 per 1000 children and 380/1000 among 2-3 year olds.....source.....). I do not know the representativeness of this survey for all Soviet children but the dimension of the rate is so high that it must be worrisome to Soviet medical analysts.

At this late point in today's presentation, I would like to address issues of medical practice --as recently unearthed in Soviet medical sources. Skipping issues of supply or usage of very modern, very expensive medical technology, of which a profound shortage exists in the Soviet Union, including kidney dialysis machines of recent moment, selected types of practice available for the general public are confusing to say the least.

Thus, in a case where numbers have deeper meaning than just ratios or cases, the report on the share of tubercular patients who undergo surgery stands in particular note. In the early 1970's, apparently some 17.4 to 20.6 percent of all those with active tuberculosis of the lungs and 10.0 to 19.1 percent of those with "destructive" tuberculosis of the lungs underwent surgery. (Zdr. (Kishinev), no.5, Sept-Oct.78, p. 21.) In the United States, surgery is avoided if at all possible and does not exceed 1 percent, in part because medications are very successful in treatment of this illness and when performing invasive surgery of the lungs, it is my understanding that the possibility of the spread of the infection is very high probability. In addition, they administer drugs for only 2 to 3 months before making a decision as to surgical intervention, and in the United States (without asserting that our procedures are perfect), this is just the initial point for further application of additional drugs which are used in relatively successful combination.

In December of 1982, an article written as advice to new, young surgeons in Uzbekistan gives clear admonition to the individual

surgeon should not go out as a guest or receive guests, drink alcoholic beverages, or perform physical work. It is desirable (zhelatel'no) that on the day before (sic) surgery the surgeon take a good shower and change his [or her] gown." (Med. zh. Uzb., 12/Dec.82, p. 9.)

In May of 1983, the national popular health journal, Zdorov'ye, published a two-column article "That Everyone Must Know How to Do." (p. 31) In addition to the use of mustard plasters (which I remember from my childhood), it also shows an illustration and gives instructions on how to use banki (cupping). Used to reduce inflammations and pain, it has not been part of American medical practice since the 1930's.

In July of 1983, the national Health Ministry, Ministry of Medical Industry and Medical Trade Union newspaper, Meditsinskaya gazeta, found it appropriate to publish an article written by its "own correspondent" about needles. Presumably this article is broadly representative of a situation which is beyond reasonable shortfalls in supply, to put it mildly. Thus, the supply of needles for injections for a 950-bed, 13 department neuropsychological hospital and two dispensaries with a "large out-patient admission and treatment" facilities, was 200 needles for the entire year. Reportedly this is one-tenth their requirements. And one-tenth seems to be their equitable share as the correspondent notes that the total demand for needles in Krasnodarsk Kray (with about 5 million population) was determined at 2,277,650 for 1982 and 2,346,100 in 1983. In 1982, they received 230,940, or slightly more than one-tenth the level of

of the year--again about one-tenth. (Med.gaz., 22 July 1983, p. 2) However, someone or some organization was stirred by this item, and by 14 December 1983, two years into the "catastrophic" situation, the "artificial" deficit and the "acute shortage of needles for injections" was met by one-half, when they supplied the kray's medical agency with a special supplement of 1.1 million needles. For over a year and a half, however, before the emergency supplement arrived, hospitals and clinics were forced to take the old needles and "sharpen, straighten and remove the rust" from them (tochim, vypryamlyayem, chistim zarzhavevshiye) in order to offset the shortfall. What about sterilizing them?

Many reports are available about the lack of sanitation and hygiene in medical institutions of the Soviet Union. But that the same national medical newspaper would publish in December of 1983, the letter written by a newspaper staff member (of Tashkentskaya Pravda) about his recent experience may indicate that this particular situation also was more generalized than its location. Thus, the staff member wrote that when he complained about the dirty sheet used for his bed, he was told it was the same one used by 10's of patients before him, and that he should not complain. While this may be truly exceptional, it may yet be useful to illustrate basic attitudes among many hospital staff personnel, and the Med. gaz. publication of the article served also to reaffirm the need for attention to sanitary and hygienic rules. Whether it will be successful is moot, however.

Lastly, why was the very unusual step taken by the Soviet armed forces this January to form "Extraordinary Antiepidemic Commissions" in every military unit on land and on sea. The Radio Liberty research report of 25 January of 1984 by Peter Kruzhin makes the logical point that these commissions undoubtedly were formed after "epidemics" (not further defined) had occurred. (RL 41/84) Previous information about outbreaks of infectious hepatitis among whole military formations may have been the harbinger of additional outbreaks of dysentary, typhoid and other intestinal diseases.

In sum, the entire Soviet population seems to be undergoing a difficult health period if this interpretation can be generalized from the materials given here and additional information which it was not possible to include in the limited time I have. Let me add just one more piece of evidence. And that relates to the number of persons hospitalized throughout the Soviet Union. In absolute terms it has increased from 41.5 million to 64.9 million persons admitted to hospitals in 1960 and 1982, respectively. In relative terms, this is an increase of over 56 percent or more than twice as much as the increase in the Soviet population (25.4 percent, 216.3 and 271.2 millions, respectively, at the end of 1960 and 1982). Alternatively measured, in 1960, 17.6 percent of the Soviet population in 1960 and 24.1 percent in 1982 were reportedly admitted to all medical institutions as patients. (N.B. Numbers do not jibe; should be 19.1 and 23.9 percents of the total population, in 1960 and 1982, if total population and total admissions are correct) Or about one out of every 4 Soviet


one of every 7 or 8 persons; about half the Soviet rate. Possibly better roads to the farms enable the rural population to enroll in urban facilities rather than their own usually inadequately staffed, supplied and equipped rural medical points. The Soviet urban hospital administrators may have become more relaxed about place of residence for admission. The rules have changed for hospitalization of specific illness, disease, age group, etc. Thus, ^{why} the new ruling in Belorussia for obligatory admission of all young children under 3 years of age who complain of any, I repeat, any type of stomach ache? Why is the reaction so drastic? But in-hospital acquired infections could be serious, and this policy certainly would lead to overcrowding and the possible spread of such infections. The policy of full dispensarization, i.e., attachment to dispensaries for the entire Soviet population to commence with July of this year may be insufficient to fully correct many of the emerging disease patterns noted here, but if properly exercised might reduce the difference between reported and real illness rates revealed by Romenskiy's group, the real rates being about twice as high as the reported rates on the average and therefore the health status of the Soviet population may be more negative than that depicted today.

MEMORANDUM


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 
SUBJECT: Letter to Kojelis From Baltic American Freedom
League

I recommend that you forward the attached memorandum to Sally Kelley.

Steve Steiner concurs. 

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Sally Kelley
Tab II Incoming correspondence

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to Kojelis From Baltic American Freedom
League

We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's draft response to Mr. Valdis V. Pavlovskis, President of the Baltic American Freedom League.

Attachment

2762

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8409402

Date April 3, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: Linus Kojelis From: Valdis V. Pavlovskis

Date: March 7, 1984 Subject: Requests that the President
designate June 14 84 as Baltic Freedom Day

WH Referral Dated: March 29, 1984 NSC ID# 219226
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- X A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

Dear Mr. Pavlovskis:

Thank you for the recent letter requesting that the President again designate June 14 as Baltic Freedom Day.

President Reagan knows how much this annual commemoration means to the many Baltic-Americans in the United States, and I am certain that he would be delighted to once again designate, through an official proclamation, June 14 as Baltic Freedom Day. I know also that our friends and colleagues in the Congress, at the Department of State and throughout the Administration strongly support this yearly effort to recall the struggle for liberty of the Baltic peoples.

In view of the congressional interest in this memorial day, I would like to suggest that you and your colleagues in the Baltic-American community nevertheless also seek action on the Hill. The cause of Baltic freedom has many advocates in the House and Senate, and I am sure that they want to stand and be counted during this election year.

With very best regards,

Sincerely,

Mr. Valdis V. Pavlovskis
President,
P.O. Box 29657,
Los Angeles, California.

2762

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Remarks:


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

8409402

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MARCH 29, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 219226

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 7, 1984

TO: LINUS KOJELIS

FROM: MR. VALDIS V. PAVLOVSKIS
PRESIDENT
BALTIC AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE
POST OFFICE BOX 29657
LOS ANGELES CA 90029

SUBJECT: REQUESTS THAT THE PRESIDENT DESIGNATE
JUN 14 84 AS BALTIC FREEDOM DAY

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*rec'd S/S-I
3/28/84 2325
AKS*

219226

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No

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☐ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 / 1 / 1Name of Correspondent: Valdis V. Pavlovskis☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Requests that the President designate
June 14, 1984 as Baltic Freedom Day.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	PLKOSE	ORIGINATOR	83103126			1 / 1
	99 DOS	Referral Note:	83103129			1 / 1
		Referral Note:				1 / 1
		Referral Note:				1 / 1
		Referral Note:				1 / 1
		Referral Note:				1 / 1

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
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BALTIC AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE

P.O. Box 29657, Los Angeles, California 90029

March 7, 1984

8409402

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Mr. Linus Kojelis
Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Kojelis:

During the past two sessions of the Congress, the Baltic American Freedom League has been instrumental in initiating the passage of a Joint Congressional Resolution reaffirming United State policy of Non-recognition of the illegal annexation of the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union and requesting the President to designate June 14th as Baltic Freedom Day.

While this legislation and Presidential Proclamation is extremely important to the Baltic people, we have come to realize, it is rather costly process to the American taxpayer. Furthermore, we feel that since the Non-recognition policy was reaffirmed by a public law, it is not necessarily to adopt the legislation every year. However, we would like to see a Presidential Proclamation again designating June 14th as a Baltic Freedom Day.

It is our understanding that such a proclamation of commemoration may be issued without a Congressional action.

We are respectfully requesting that the President of the United States designate June 14, 1984 as Baltic Freedom Day. The request has the full support of the Baltic American community in the United States.

The reasons for and the significance of the Baltic Freedom is well documented in the previous Congressional Resolutions and the two Presidential Proclamations; therefore, I will not discuss them in this letter.

Please advise us what our next step should be and whether you anticipate any problems or difficulties.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Valdis V. Pavlovskis
President

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 3, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Social Contact with Soviet Citizens: Current Attitudes

I had an interesting and lengthy conversation with two Soviet "Americanologists," during dinner the evening of April 2. The two Soviets [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are not at the policy-making level by a long shot, but are members of the politically aware and relatively well-informed upper intellectual class.

My wife and I invited them to dinner because we had gotten to know them well in Moscow, and they had been socially accessible and occasionally helpful [REDACTED]

They seemed mainly interested in hearing my views on U.S. perceptions of U.S.-Soviet relations at present -- not so much on our concrete positions, as on our motivations. But in the course of our long conversation, they expressed several views of possible interest. Those that struck me in particular were the following:

-- Soviet specialists on the U.S. believe that the President will probably be reelected, and are convinced that the Soviets can do nothing to damage his reelection chances. They believe, however, that if they cooperate -- particularly in resuming negotiations on INF and START -- this will help him. They are unwilling to do this, and will probably wait until November.

-- Chernenko's leadership is relatively weak in security areas, and it is more difficult to get decisions now than it was before Andropov fell seriously ill. Chernenko is, however, "not a crazy," and won't do anything dangerous.

-- Soviet decision making is plagued by a number of "really primitive people" in key positions. They don't understand the West or the U.S., are convinced we are out to get them in every way we can, and are capable of reacting in truly stupid ways.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-074 #61

By *smf* NARA, Date 11/17/99

-- Even relatively well informed Soviet citizens are confused about the facts. [REDACTED] questioned me closely about whether we really had evidence that the Soviets had used chemical weapons in Afghanistan, and when I assured him we had, the distress was evident on his face. He observed, in what can only be described as personal agony, "I didn't know that. I really didn't. But I know you are an honest man and wouldn't lie." He then turned to [REDACTED] and said, "How could those idiots of ours do a thing like that."

-- Access to Soviet media -- even if greatly circumscribed -- can have a deep effect if used wisely. [REDACTED] recounted how he had attended many meetings of Soviet citizens to discuss relations with the U.S. (Though he did not say so, these were obviously organized by the regime to whip up anti-American sentiment.) The theme of the meetings usually centered on describing various U.S. "iniquities," but [REDACTED] said that he was struck by how often someone could comment on my July 4 TV speech of 1981, saying something like, "Well, it sounds pretty bad, but I remember a couple of years ago the American 'Ambassador' was on TV, and he said ..." The citizen would go on to paraphrase a couple of lines and observe, "Now he seemed an honest man, and a serious man, and he wanted peace. So maybe it's not as bad as you say. We shouldn't forget that side of America." The point [REDACTED] was trying to make was that we need more communication with the Soviets which is not perceived as threatening or demeaning. Implicitly -- and doubtless inadvertently -- his observation also explained why the Soviet regime resists our access to their media -- it does, in fact, undermine their propaganda when it runs counter to the stereotypes they are purveying.

As they were leaving, [REDACTED] remarked that they had not reported to the Soviet Embassy that they would be seeing me. If they had done so, they said, the Embassy might have ordered them not to, and at the very least they would have been subjected to lengthy briefings regarding what they should say, and required to submit detailed reports later. (They presumably pointed this out to ensure that I should not mention our dinner to anyone in the Soviet Embassy.)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 3, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry -- April 3, 4:00 P.M., Roosevelt Room

Attached is a paper with some background information and talking points to use in your meeting today with the Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry and their guests from the International Conference of Parliamentary Spouses.

When you finish your presentation, I will stay to deal with questions for the rest of the meeting.

Attachments:

Tab I - Background and Talking Points
Tab II - List of participants

JEWISH EMIGRATION/REPRESSION

BACKGROUND

Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union is at its lowest level since the 1960s, with no upturn in prospect. Only 1315 Jews were permitted to leave the Soviet Union in 1983, a 51% drop from 1982's already low total of 2688, and a 98% drop from the peak year total of 51,320 in 1979. Jews who apply for exit permission to join their relatives in Israel or the U.S. face procedural pretexts to delay or deny permission, and are commonly dismissed from their jobs and forced to work at temporary or menial employment. Certain refuseniks have been singled out for harassment or imprisonment by the authorities as a result of their activities in support of Jewish culture. Increased manifestations of officially-sanctioned anti-Semitism, coupled to repeated Soviet allegations that all Jews who wish to leave the USSR have already departed, and that Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has therefore ceased, are particularly disturbing aspects of this bleak situation. The situation for political prisoners and dissidents in the Soviet Union, already grim, deteriorated further in 1983. Two waves of political trials, in October and December, respectively, resulted in the conviction of at least nine political prisoners, including such well-known dissidents as refusenik Iosif Begun. In October Soviet authorities promulgated broader, harsher rules concerning the resentencing of prisoners.

POINTS TO BE MADE

- The question of human rights in the Soviet Union, including the sharp decline in emigration and the problem of political prisoners and dissidents, remains a matter of great concern to the U.S. Government and people.
- In high level meetings with Soviet authorities, these issues are always prominent on our agenda. Soviet policy on these issues, especially in the face of clear, broadly-based concern on the part of the American public and Government, is a serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations.
- We are particularly dismayed by the human rights abuses, such as the decline in the rate of Jewish emigration since its peak in 1979, and the wave of political trials and promulgation of harsh laws on resentencing which have taken place since the conclusion of the Madrid CSCE conference.
- We also regret the recent manifestations of officially-sanctioned anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, such as the "Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet Citizens", and do not accept the claim by some spokesman of the Committee that all Jews who wish to leave the USSR have already done so.

-- It is going to be a long and difficult job convincing the Soviet leadership to ease its repressive internal practices and to permit freer emigration. We are always looking for suggestions about how we might act more effectively in our efforts to influence the Soviets in this area.

-- One of the suggestions made last year was to work more closely with other governments to address these issues. We have taken some steps in this regard, including high-level consultations, and would like to encourage more conferences such as the one which brought you together.



National Conference on Soviet Jewry

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY SPOUSES

APRIL 3, 1984 - 4:00 P.M.

AMB. ROBERT MCFARLANE

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ENGLAND

Myra Janner

Susan Dykes

Caroline Latham

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Gloria Lawrence

ISRAEL

Tamar Bar-Lev

Nitza Ben-Elisar

TOTAL - 31

NETHERLANDS

Inge Nypels

Maryke Van Den Bergh