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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/21-6/25]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 4657 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Jack Matlock to John Poindexter, re suggestion (original with notations), 1p	6/21/84	P1/F1
2. Memo	same text as #1 (no notations), 1p	6/21/84	P1/F1
3. Memo	Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission [4951], 1p	6/21/84	P1/F1
4. Memo	McFarlane to Baldrige, Regan, Shultz, re US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission [4951], 1p	nd	P1/F1
5. Memo	McFarlane to Matlock, re Joint US Soviet Trade Council [4951], 1p	6/20/84	P1/F1
6. PROFS note	Matlock to McFarlane, re Joint US Soviet Trade Council, 1p	6/20/84	P1/F1
7. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Weekly report, 1p	6/22/84	P1/F1
8. Memo	Charles Hill to McFarlane, re visit, 2p	6/23/84	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

National Security Council
The White House

System #

EYES

Package #

ONLY

84 JUN 22 P 7: 33

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	1	<i>[initials]</i>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>[initials]</i>	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<i>JP</i>	3	<i>[initials]</i>	<i>N</i>

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Bud,
Either you or I need to get
back to Don Gregg. It seems
to me next step is to mention
it to Shultz. Then have Gregg ask
Rosen to Washington to ask him (over)

Questions.

J

24 APR 55 4:13



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

EYES ONLY

June 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jm*

SUBJECT:

Suggestion regarding Gorbachev-Vice President Meeting

Regarding the indirect message Don Gregg received, my thoughts are:

1) In principle, a meeting would be a good idea from a number of points of view.

2) It would be somewhat delicate for us to take the initiative in promoting one, since it could be seen as an effort to undercut Chernenko and resisted for that reason.

3) If Roemer has received some indication from the Soviets that they would be interested, we should explore what they have in mind with a favorable attitude.

4) If, however, this is just Roemer's bright idea, then that would be another matter. We might not want to turn him off if he has some sort of direct contact with Gorbachev, however.

eg, re
5) I would, therefore, recommend further inquiries to determine whether Roemer is acting on his own or has received a signal from the Soviets. If it is the latter, we should find out precisely how he received it and what it said, in which case we could consider the best way to respond.

6) If it is a Roemer idea and he has not yet talked to the Soviets, I believe that the most we should encourage him to say to the Soviets* (assuming that he has some means of contact) is that he thinks it is a good idea, has the feeling that the VP might be receptive if the Soviets are interested, and would be glad to convey Gorbachev's interest to the VP if it exists.

** Depends on which Soviets are involved. Let's keep that first.*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

EYES ONLY

Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #23

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

EYES ONLY

June 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

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- 3) If Roemer has received some indication from the Soviets that they would be interested, we should explore what they have in mind with a favorable attitude.
- 4) If, however, this is just Roemer's bright idea, then that would be another matter. We might not want to turn him off if he has some sort of direct contact with Gorbachev, however.
- 5) I would, therefore, recommend further inquiries to determine whether Roemer is acting on his own or has received a signal from the Soviets. If it is the latter, we should find out precisely how he received it and what it said, in which case we could consider the best way to respond.
- 6) If it is a Roemer idea and he has not yet talked to the Soviets, I believe that the most we should encourage him to say to the Soviets (assuming that he has some means of contact) is that he thinks it is a good idea, has the feeling that the VP might be receptive if the Soviets are interested, and would be glad to convey Gorbachev's interest to the VP if it exists.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

EYES ONLY

Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

NLS F95-074/2 #24

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:

U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission

I have prepared a memorandum for your signature to the Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury and State (Tab I) designating Baldrige as the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Commercial Commission, and instructing them to staff policy issues through the SIG/IEP.

The Soviets have not yet replied to our proposal to renew the Long-Term Agreement, but we expect them to do so next week. My understanding is that renewal would be effected by an exchange of diplomatic notes, so there may be nothing for Mac to sign.

 Roger Robinson concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum at TAB I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed memo for your signature
Tab II Your memorandum of June 20

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #25BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/24/00~~SECRET~~Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4951

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
Secretary of the Treasury

THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Joint U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission (U)

As you are aware, we have proposed to the Soviet Union that the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation be extended for another ten-year period.

~~(S)~~

In 1981 the President decided that the Secretary of Commerce would act as the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Commercial Commission for which this agreement provides. Therefore, if the agreement is extended, the Department of Commerce should take the lead in preparing the U.S. position for a joint meeting of experts to prepare for a possible session of the Joint Commercial Commission. Preparations should be cleared through the normal interagency process and policy issues should be reviewed in the Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy as appropriate. ~~(S)~~

Coordinated negotiating positions should be submitted for NSC review before presentation to the Soviets. ~~(S)~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane

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NLS F95-074/2 #26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

BY Lo-I, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4951

~~SECRET~~

June 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Joint US-Soviet Trade Council

As you know, we have agreed to extend the US-Soviet Economic and Industrial Cooperation Agreement as a consequence of the Sushkov visit. Mac Baldridge called me today to note a possible bureaucratic hitch. When first established in 1974, Commerce chaired it on the US side. Then when George Shultz became Treasury Secretary he took it over. Now Treasury (staff level) is saying that they should remain in the chair. Mac says that he told the Russians that he was the US Chairman back in 1981. As a near term matter, the Soviets are about to sign the agreement (it was initialed when Sushkov was here) and we need someone to sign for the US. Mac also says that back in 1981, Ed Meese approved Commerce's resuming the chair although that was never put in writing. I think Commerce ought to be the US chair and believe we should put that in writing designating Secretary of Commerce as the US Chairman. Mac is willing for the policy issues to be taken up in the SIG-IEP. Please think about this and get together a directive, "In 1981 the President decided that the Secretary of Commerce would chair the US side of the US-Soviet etc etc etc..." Please coordinate with Roger Robinson.

Many thanks.

cc: Admiral Poindexter
Bob Kimmitt
Roger Robinson
Don Fortier

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #27

BY HOI, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA
To: NSWGH --CPUA

TO: NSGVE --CPUA

06/20/84 17:01:24

~~SECRET~~

EXPEDITE

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock

Subject: Joint US-Soviet Trade Council

As you know we have agreed to extend the US-Soviet Economic and Industrial Cooperation agreement as a consequence of the Sushkov visit. Mac Baldridge called me today to note a possible bureaucratic hitch. When first established in 1974, Commerce chaired it on the US side. Then when George Shultz became Treasury Secretary he took it over. Now Treasury (staff level) is saying that they should remain in the chair. Mac says that he told the Russians that he was the US Chairman back in 81. As a near term matter, the Soviet are about to sign the agreement (it was initialed when Sushkov was here) and we need someone to sign for the US. Mac also says that back in 81, Ed Meese approved Commerce's resuming the chair although that was never put in writing. I think Commerce ought to be the US chair and believe we should put that in writing designating Sec Commerce as the US chairman. Mac is willing for the policy issues to be taken up in the SIG-IEP. Please think about this and get together a directive "In 1981 the President decided that the Sec of Commerce would chair the US side of the US-Soviet etc etc etc..." Please coordinate with Roger Robinson

Many thanks

copy to Roger Robinson, Don Fortier

cc: NSJMP --CPUA
NSGVE --CPUA

NSRMK --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2#28

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

EXPEDITE

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 22, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Weekly Report: Europe and USSR

1. President's Meeting with Participants in Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges: The meeting has been scheduled for 1:00 P.M. Wednesday, June 27, in the Rose Garden. We are working on a short speech which would lay out what we have been doing to reinvigorate the bilateral relationship. It looks like more than 100 persons may be coming, and the meeting should provide an effective platform for the public statement. (S)
2. Space Systems: If the President decides to move toward negotiation of any aspect of ASAT or space systems with the Soviets, I would strongly recommend that we notify the principal allies in advance of any notification to the Soviets or press leaks. Since we face a problem in bringing the Allies on board concerning SDI, it is important to make them feel that we are keeping them au courant with our thinking. (S)
3. Green/Pearce "Initiative": I have had another "hand-holding" session with Tom and Terry. They are pushing as hard as ever on their "initiative," but apparently Dobrynin has given them a pretty cold shoulder. (He told Verity he thought it was a "wierd idea.") Nevertheless, Verity thought Dobrynin might have referred to it indirectly in his speech to the Trade and Economic Council in New York, and was quite excited. I asked for the text and found that Dobrynin was talking about CTB, and not by any stretch of the imagination the Green-Pearce idea. I mention this only in case you hear something from Verity or others. (S)
4. USSTEC: Dwayne O. Andreas (Archer Daniels Midland Co.--grain traders) will replace Verity as chairman of the U.S. side of the Trade and Economic Council on July 1. There was a dispute among the U.S. directors over Verity's recommendation that his assistant, Giffen, be made President, with the upshot that Giffen was made "Acting President," and will probably be removed when Andreas succeeds Verity. (S)
5. Scientific Contacts with Soviets: Alvin Trivelpiece of DOE told me that there has been discussion in the Intelligence Research Development Council of a negative impact of curtailed scientific exchanges with the Soviets. It seems that we are getting much less information that we did a few years back on the direction of Soviet basic research, which could have results 10-15 years from now. (Trivelpiece feels that we have to distinguish carefully between basic research, where we have much to gain, and technology, where we have much to lose.) He said that DeLauer might be calling you on this, and I suggested that he see to it that these considerations are properly reflected in interagency studies of the trade-offs inherent in scientific exchanges. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/2 #29~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/24/00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 22, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK 
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Mr. Ullman of CSIS

Harlan Ullman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has written you a letter (Tab II) detailing a recent conversation he had with General Milstein, who was visiting Washington as part of Arbatov's group.

Milstein's comments to Ullman are interesting since they reveal that at least some Soviets understand the long-term significance of legitimizing our policy of dealing from strength. Attached at Tab I is a brief note of acknowledgment for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Mr. Ullman.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed response to Mr. Ullman
Tab II Incoming letter, June 1, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Harlan:

I appreciate your taking the time to keep me posted on your recent conversation with Mikhail Milstein. I found it very interesting and share your feeling that the prospects for improving relations, in time, are not as bleak as Soviet spokesmen like to suggest.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Harlan K. Ullman
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Suite 400
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006



4733

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

JUN 7 1984

June 1, 1984

The Honorable Robert C. MacFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bud:

The recent Washington visit of Arbatov's group representing the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada provided an interesting opportunity to exchange views in a few cases privately and, I thought, often candidly. One private conversation I had with Mikhail Milstein, a retired general and senior strategic analyst at "USA" formed some impressions which may be useful to you. They form the subject of this brief letter.

The topic was the future of U.S. - Soviet relations. Milstein asserted the now-standard Soviet line: improved relations and continued negotiations were a function of the U.S. intent to engage seriously in these matters. Barring some concession on the part of the U.S., the Soviets would make no move to improve relations. Milstein specifically observed that the Soviets would take no action that could be construed as remotely helpful to the President's re-election. After November the Soviets would not take positive steps to improve relations because, in their view, it would prove right the President's approach of forcing the Soviets to negotiate based on the threat of U.S. strength. The Soviets, in Milstein's view, would find that unacceptable.

I responded that this was nonsense. I could not understand that if improved relations were in the Soviet's interest and if the Soviets considered themselves a responsible state, why they would take any action (or inaction) that might prove injurious to themselves.

At this stage, Milstein acknowledged the point and gave me the strong impression, as much through physical as verbal expression that, in about a "year's time" (I read to mean well after the election), provided the U.S. made some "symbolic" act, the Soviets could see it in their interests to improve relations and resume productive negotiations.

Robert C. MacFarlane
June 1, 1984
Page Two

One discussion does not provide even reasonably hard evidence. And, whether Milstein represents any senior view or perhaps disinformation is a crucial question. However, this discussion reinforces my own bias that, despite the tenacity and pessimism evident in current Soviet views over U.S. relations, positive movement is indeed possible. The trick, on course, is inducing movement on mutually acceptable terms. Although I've some ideas along that line, I thought the Milstein exchange, by itself, was important enough to pass on to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Harlan", followed by a horizontal line.

HARLAN K. ULLMAN

HKU:ab

4771

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

June 22, 1984

Dear Mr. Webb:

Thank you for sending the President your account of your visit to the Soviet Union. The President appreciated receiving your report and found it most interesting.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jack F. Matlock". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Jack" being more prominent.

Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to
the President

Mr. Jack M. Webb
602 River Oaks Bank and
Trust Tower
2001 Kirby
Houston, Texas 77019

NSC

JACK M. WEBB & ASSOCIATES
602 RIVER OAKS BANK & TRUST TOWER
2001 KIRBY
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77019
713 • 526-3038

4771

217184

JACK M. WEBB

June 6, 1984

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I sincerely appreciated having the opportunity to visit with you about my trip to the Soviet Union when I was in the Oval Office on May 10, 1984 prior to the annual President's Dinner. Enclosed is a report on the trip which I promised to send to you.

Sincerely yours,

Jack M. Webb

JMW:vmw

Enclosure

A TEXAN TOURS THE SOVIET UNION

By:

Jack M. Webb
602 River Oaks Bank & Trust Tower
Houston, Texas 77019

DAY 1

During the past eighteen months, my wife, Diane, and I have been spending most of our time working for the re-election of President Ronald Reagan and conducting numerous projects designed to promote free enterprise and to protect our democratic system of government. In addition to participating in Texas and U.S. politics, I have traveled to Lebanon, Israel, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Namibia, Angola and South Africa. Consequently, when the opportunity arose to spend ten days in the Soviet Union visiting with Soviet Jews who had been denied their application for immigration, I immediately accepted. Prior to the trip, I received several briefings on the do's and don'ts of travel in the Soviet Union.

On April 1, 1984, Diane and I left Houston with five other Houstonians on a KLM flight. Fifteen hours later, we entered the Soviet Union at Leningrad after touching down at Amsterdam, Stockholm and Helsinki. Upon arrival, Diane and I cleared customs in about thirty minutes and went outside to meet our Intourist guide. In contrast, our five Jewish colleagues (Diane and I are Christians) had all of their luggage thoroughly inspected for about an hour and three of them were taken into a private room for a personal search. At that point in time, we were quite tired. Our fatigue was not helped by the stress one naturally experiences in being subjected to the Soviet system. The dullness of the surroundings and the cold, gray weather didn't help either.

Upon entering our tour bus, I was approached by a man in plain clothes who demanded to see my papers. After inspecting my passport, he left the bus and ran inside the terminal. Shortly, the other six members of my party, our Intourist guide and driver got on the bus. We were then joined by two other individuals who were introduced to us as "guide trainees" and told that they would also be with us during our ten day stay in Russia. By this time exhaustion was becoming overwhelming.

Within minutes we were informed, without any reason whatsoever, that we were to get off the bus, remove our luggage, and return to the terminal for a second customs' inspection. We protested the second search stating that we felt that the first inspection had been adequate. We were then told that our luggage would be removed for inspection whether we liked it or not. I must say that at this time we were becoming quite apprehensive. We then called the U.S. Consulate and were informed that the Russians were perfectly within their rights to make as many searches as they wished. We then went back inside for the beginning of a thorough 3 1/2 hour scrutiny of all of our possessions. During this search, several of our members were photographed with their belongings. The agent went through my wallet and checked all of the contents in my pockets. Agents were brought in who began reading the books which we had with us and asking numerous questions about our possessions. Each of us had items confiscated. In my case, it was simply a newspaper that I was given on the airplane and my Mesa telephone directory. By this time we had drawn the attention of customs agents, militia, passport agents, KGB men in leather coats, and even an army general. Needless to say, we were furious with our treatment and completely exhausted.

Upon announcing that we would like to abandon our planned tour of the Soviet Union and go to a different county, we were informed that we were perfectly free to go anywhere we desired and could leave anytime we liked; however, they informed us that changes in travel arrangements cannot be made quickly in the Soviet Union. Consequently, we were "encouraged" to continue on the tour for the time being.

By that time our frustrations had overcome our apprehensions and we spontaneously burst into a chorus of "God Bless America" followed by the "Eyes of Texas". Needless to say, our hosts were stunned.

Upon reboarding our bus, our guide began her carefully prepared script about the glories of the Soviet Union. Our guide, a young lady in her mid-

thirties, was witty, friendly, highly intelligent and did everything in her power to make us appreciate her country.

Although it was 10:00 p.m., the April skies were still light as our guide described the historical sites to us on our drive to the Hotel Leningrad. However, the snores of my companions drowned out much of her lecture.

In checking into our rooms we became familiar with the "key ladies" (really hall monitors) who hold your keys until you need them and in the meantime keep an eye on who is in each room. They constantly stare as if you were there to steal the Crown Jewels. After barring my door with a chair and finding out how to flush a Russian commode, we collapsed into bed!

DAY 2

I must say breakfast in the Soviet Union was not my favorite meal - (however, come to think of it, neither was lunch nor dinner.) Our first activity of the day was to go the U.S. Consulate, report on our ordeal at the airport and leave a copy of our itinerary.

Following our visit to the Consulate, we visited the travel agent where we were informed that it was not possible for us to leave Leningrad on that day. That afternoon we toured the Hermitage Museum, one of the world's great museums. It was originally the Winter Palace and has 1,047 rooms and 117 staircases. That evening we attended the Kirov Ballet and saw "Don Quixote". Unfortunately, we arrived after the ballet had begun and had to stand in the aisle during the first act. To add to the confusion, our seats were not together. Since we could not read our tickets, converse in Russian or see in the dim theater, we became separated.

During the first act, three of our traveling companions tired of standing and decided to leave and go visit with a Russian Jew who had applied for immigration. After the ballet, we waited a long time trying to find our friends and finally concluded that they had indeed left early. Upon returning to our room about 10:00 p.m., we discovered that our friends

had not returned. As time passed we became concerned and for approximately 3 1/2 hours we played cards and debated our various courses of action. Finally at 1:30 a.m., a car drove up in front of the hotel and the authorities returned our friends. We listened with great interest as they relayed their experiences.

After leaving the apartment of the Russian who they were visiting, several men met them outside the apartment, arrested our three friends as well as their Russian hosts and took all of them to the nearest police station. They were questioned extensively before being returned to the hotel. They never saw their Russian friends after that and were told that we would be informed the next day whether or not we would be expelled.

DAY 3

We were first in line that morning at the travel desk. After a number of phone calls by the Russian travel agent, we were informed that we would be leaving Leningrad that night at midnight via train to Moscow. That morning we visited the State Museum of Russian Art - but my thoughts were really not on art but on the vast differences in our systems of government. That afternoon we drove to Petrodvorets to tour the Summer Palace. The drive took about an hour and allowed us to view the countryside and observe living conditions. The snow was lovely as a background for the gold and blue trim of the Palace.

That evening one of our companions hosted us for an elegant and delicious dinner at the rooftop restaurant in our hotel. Although the restaurant was practically empty, the maitre d' was constantly turning others away. It was probably a good thing because after vodka and wine, some of our group became rather vocal and frequently joined the fabulous Russian folk orchestra in song. Both musicians and hotel employees seemed amused that we were having such a good time eating, singing, dancing and telling jokes. The musicians, (eight strings and a flute who we referred to as the "9 spies orchestra"), supplied the Russian ambiance we had anticipated.

After dinner our mood changed considerably as we were transported to the train station for the train to Moscow (probably too many James Bond movies). The ride took 8 1/2 hours and gave us little opportunity to see the countryside since we traveled at night. Our Intourist guide made the trip with us and in fact rarely left us the entire trip. We did have a radio in our compartment and understood the names of Mondale and Hart on the Russian station.

DAY 4

Upon arriving in Moscow, Intourist assigned us a second guide. After checking into the 1777 room Cosmos Hotel, we drove across Moscow to the airline office and spent quite some time making arrangements to fly to Amsterdam.

On the return to our hotel, we asked to stop and visit a beautiful old convent that we were told was open to the public. Once again, the buildings could only be viewed from the outside for reasons known only to the Russians themselves. Several artists using various mediums offered their representations of these onion-domed buildings for sale. Diane picked one out and agreed to buy it for ten rubles. However, by the time she had secured the necessary rubles from our group, a man in one of those leather coats appeared and the painter quickly announced that his painting was not for sale. The artist then assembled his easel and other paraphernalia and left.

At lunchtime I was delighted to receive a message from the U.S. Embassy inviting me and my wife to dinner that evening. It had been arranged by Mr. Kenn George of the U.S. Department of Commerce in Washington.

That afternoon we went to Red Square and visited the Gum State Universal Department Store and watched the changing of the guard at Lenin's tomb. Afterward we wanted to visit a specific synagogue and were told by our Moscow guide that she did not know where it was. We pointed out the location on a map and asked to be driven there. She said that was not permitted. After receiving permission to take a walk, we went by foot to the synagogue which turned out to be only three blocks away.

Many of the answers to my questions left a lot to be desired - for example, I was told (1) there were relatively few cars on the streets because Russians take the subway to work and only use their cars on the weekends when they go to their country homes, (2) most of the thousands of people riding the subway at two o'clock in the afternoon are tourists and (3) hundreds of Soviet soldiers are dying in Afghanistan in an attempt to stop a war that we Americans had started.

That evening the rest of our group went to the circus while Diane and I went to the U.S. Embassy (our guide insisted on taking us there so we wouldn't have to go by taxi). That evening was wonderful for our host, Dr. Robert Krause, had been in Moscow for two years and kept us entertained all evening with his Russian experiences. He was also hosting a number of American businessmen who were there for an International Trade Show. The businessmen told us horror stories concerning the difficulties that the U.S. industry is facing with international competition.

DAY 5

Up early for our trip to Sheremetyevo International Airport. Diane and I breezed through customs with only an x-ray inspection of our luggage and a cursory glance at our papers while our companions had everything searched. The members of our group who had had possessions confiscated at the Leningrad airport had all of the articles returned to them at that time.

As I waited to assist one of my companions with her luggage, I was approached by two men who informed me that my papers were missing. I was told to return to customs with my carry-on luggage. I was then thoroughly searched and allowed to leave just in time to catch my plane. Once we were in the air, we breathed a sigh of relief - however, we didn't relax completely for our next stop turned out to be Warsaw, Poland. But that is another story.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 25, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *SM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement to Conference on Soviet Exchanges, June 27

Attached at TAB I is my rewrite of State's suggested text for the President's statement to participants in the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, scheduled for 1:00 P.M. June 27.

I have tried to include the following elements:

-- A comprehensive review of the proposals we have made to the Soviets in the bilateral area (drawing on the State text);

-- A frank explanation of the dilemma faced in expanding exchanges when Soviet behavior requires us to protest; and

-- An implicit, but tactful, challenge to the Soviets to move in this area if they are as devoted to peace as they say they are -- worded so as to indicate that we have reasons to doubt their devotion to true peace.

The text has not yet been coordinated with the speechwriters or with State, but if you approve it, we will proceed with the coordination.

Recommendation:

That you approve the text at TAB I for coordination with the speechwriters and State.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Suggested text of President's statement to the Smithsonian Conference
Tab II - State draft

Copies to: John Lenczowski
Walt Raymond
Steve Sestanovich

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *R. V. H.* NARA, Date *6/21/99*

STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE

Thank you for coming over to the White House today. When I heard that you would be meeting at the Smithsonian to discuss U.S.-Soviet exchanges, I was eager to have a chance to meet you and to share with you my thoughts on this most important topic.

First, I want to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for organizing your conference. These institutions are outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. And right now there is no topic more worthy of our attention than ways we can reach out and establish better communication with the people and government of the Soviet Union.

In my January address on U.S.-Soviet relations I suggested that the U.S. and Soviet governments make a major effort to see if we could make progress in three broad problem areas: reducing the threat and use of force in solving international disputes, reducing armaments in the world, and establishing a better working relationship with each other. We have been working hard to secure Soviet cooperation in all these areas.

I've had a lot to say recently about our efforts to establish a dialogue on regional issues and on arms reduction and control. Today I would like to describe to you what we are proposing to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union. If these proposals are accepted, they could open up new avenues for your own efforts.

First, we have informed the Soviet Government that we are prepared to initiate negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, and we have completed our preparations for these negotiations.

Second, we have proposed that we resume preparations to open consulates general in New York and Kiev.

Third, we have taken steps to reinvigorate our agreements for cooperation in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health and agriculture. Activities under these agreements have waned in recent years, since there have been no meetings of their joint committees to plan projects. We have proposed that preparations begin for such meetings in order to increase the number of active projects.

Fourth, we are in the process of renewing several agreements which otherwise would have expired this year.

-- We have proposed extending our fishing agreement for 18 months and are looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under it.

-- We have proposed that our Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation be renewed for another ten years, and that preparations begin for a meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission.

-- A U.S. Navy delegation held talks this month with their Soviet counterparts in accord with our agreement on avoiding incidents at sea, and we have agreed to extend that useful agreement for another three years.

-- We are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement, which has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research, and will give careful thought to renewing it when it expires in December.

Finally, we have made proposals in several other areas in order to solve problems, improve our dialogue and foster cooperation.

-- We have proposed a fair and equitable resolution of our differences on the exact depiction of the maritime boundary off Alaska.

-- We have proposed a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts and cosmonauts would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop techniques to rescue people from malfunctioning space vehicles.

-- We recently concluded another round of talks on consular matters, in which we are trying to improve visa procedures and facilitate travel between our countries.

-- We have suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures to assist citizens of all countries lost at sea.

-- We have made progress in our talks on upgrading the Hotline, and have proposed measures to deal with nuclear terrorist incidents, establishing a Joint Military Communications Line, and upgrading embassy communications in both countries.

-- We have put forward a specific set of steps to improve navigation aids along the North Pacific air routes to ensure that the KAL tragedy never recurs.

-- We have suggested that we establish regular, high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

As you can see, we have been working as hard to improve communication and our working relationship with the Soviets, as

we have to persuade them to join us in finding ways to reduce arms and settle disputes without the use of force. We cannot yet judge the results: some of our proposals have been rejected -- at least for the moment; a few are near agreement; and many others are still under discussion. But one thing is certain. We want to move ahead.

We don't expect that to be easy. Opening up contact and communication with a closed society governed by exceedingly suspicious officials can never be easy. I am as disturbed as you are by recent reports of new steps which have been taken by Soviet authorities to restrict their citizens' contacts with foreigners. And these come on top of intensified repression of many persons who have dared express views contrary to those of their political leaders. The people of the Soviet Union pay the greatest price for such practices, but we are all affected.

When attempts are made to seal off great, proud, accomplished peoples from outside influence, two things happen. First, their own intellectual and cultural life suffers. And second, the rest of the world is deprived of the cultural riches and intellectual stimulation they can offer.

Sometimes, if we get preoccupied with our political and ideological differences, we may not think enough about this. But we all know that Russian writers, composers and scientists are a part of our own heritage. What American does not think of Tchaikowsky as one of his favorite composers? And what would our literature be like without Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and Chekhov? Or chemistry without Mendelejev? I could give many more examples,

but the point is clear: we all have a stake in keeping contacts and communication as broad and deep and unfettered as possible.

While our main problem, for decades, has been the Soviet propensity to seal their people off, or to filter and control the flow of contacts and information, we too have sometimes made decisions that led to a decrease in contacts, though that was never our purpose or goal. For example, some of the cooperative agreements which we would like to revive have been languishing in part because of our refusal, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to hold high-level meetings.

Here, frankly, we face a dilemma. When Soviet actions threaten the peace, or violate solemn agreements, or trample on standards essential to civilized mankind, we cannot be silent or continue to deal with the perpetrators as if nothing had happened. To do so would not only betray our deepest values and violate our conscience; it would also ultimately undermine world stability and our ability to keep the peace. We must have ways short of military threats to make it crystal clear that Soviet actions do matter and that some will inevitably affect the quality of the relationship.

But we have to bear something else in mind. That is, that our quarrel is not with the Russian people, or the Ukrainian people, or any of the other proud nationalities living in that enormous multinational state. (Pause) I can think of another word for it, but don't want to be accused of indulging in rhetoric. We wish the peoples of the Soviet Union well, and want only to live in peace and cooperation with them. And we're sure they want the same with us. So we must be careful, in reacting to

actions by their government, not to take out our indignation on those not responsible.

That is why I feel that we should move to broaden opportunities for Americans and Soviet citizens to get to know each other better. Our proposals are not a "signal" that we have forgotten Afghanistan. We have not, and we will continue to demonstrate our sympathy for the people of that ravished land, and will support their desire to rid themselves of foreign occupiers and reestablish an independence and neutrality which could threaten no one.

Our proposals also do not mean that we ignore violations of the Helsinki Final Act, or the plight in which the Soviet authorities have placed some of their noblest citizens. Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, Anatoly Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov and many others weigh heavily on our hearts, and it would be misleading to imply that their treatment and fate will not have an effect on our ability to increase cooperation with the Soviet Union. It will, and we all know it. Not because I want it that way, or you want it that way, but because our own consciences, and those of the American people, will have it no other way.

I know that these thoughts do not resolve the dilemma I mentioned. If they did, it wouldn't be a dilemma. But it is a dilemma for all of us, and I will value any advice that you, who have so much experience in dealing with the Soviet Union, may have for me.

You know, I don't think there is anything we are encouraging the Soviet leaders to do that is not as much in their interest as it is in ours -- and the whole world's. If they are as committed

to peace as they say they are they should welcome our outstretched hand and join us in a dialogue aimed at solving problems. If they really want to reduce arms, there's no excuse for refusing to talk about ways to do just that. And if they want to deal with us as equals -- which is quite natural, and in fact the only way to treat each other -- then they wouldn't try to avoid a frank discussion of real problems.

Some say that the Soviet leaders are not really interested in peace but only in avoiding war while they use their military power to spread their dominance. A lot of things they are doing certainly seem to support this interpretation. But even if this is the case, it should be clear by now that it's not going to work. Once they realize that, maybe they'll see more clearly that they have as much to gain as everyone else from improving our dialogue, solving some problems and reducing tensions.

So I'm not going to stop trying to get our relations on a better track.

Your efforts will be very important. The best way governments can promote contacts among people is to avoid standing in the way. We in the American government will do all we can in conscience to stay out of the way, and to persuade the Soviet government to do the same. We all know this isn't going happen overnight. But if we are successful, or even partially successful, it's going to be up to you to do the real work of getting a lot more Americans into wider and more meaningful contact with a lot more Soviet citizens.

With all the problems in our relations, it may seem an impossible dream to think there could be a time when Americans

and Soviet citizens of all walks of life could travel freely back and forth, visit each other's homes, look up friends and professional colleagues, work together on all sorts of problems and, if they feel like it, sit up all night talking about the meaning of life and the different ways they look at the world. All these things we take for granted with most countries of the world. We should never accept the idea that it should not be the normal way of interacting with people in the Soviet Union as well. When you think about it, doesn't it give you as clear a picture of true peace as you can imagine?

As distant as it may seem, I don't believe it's an impossible dream. And I hope you don't either. Let's dedicate ourselves to making it a reality.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TO: _____

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Executive Secretary

Executive Secretariat SENSITIVE



Washington, D.C. 20520

4831

June 15, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Presidential Statement for the June 26-27
Smithsonian Meeting on US-Soviet Exchanges

Attached is a draft Presidential message outlining our efforts to improve our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union for use at the June 26-27 meeting at the Smithsonian on US-Soviet exchanges.

For McKinley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *R. Vitt* NARA, Date *6/21/99*

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By R. V. Vitt NARA, Date 6/21/99

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE

Gathered here today is an impressive group of Americans dedicated to the improvement of the range and quality of our contacts with the people of the Soviet Union. The Smithsonian Institution and its Woodrow Wilson Center are themselves outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. As you know, I am generally less impressed by what governments can do in resolving outstanding problems than dedicated individuals giving free range to their energy and imagination. As I said on January 16, people don't make wars; on the contrary, their common interests cross all borders. For this reason, I believe your efforts to improve meaningful people-to-people communication is a matter of the greatest importance indeed.

The people of the Soviet Union have impressive energy, talent, and resources to contribute to the overall betterment of mankind. We all know that Russian writers, poets, and composers have made enormous contributions to the development of Western culture. What American does not think of Tchaikowsky as among his favorite classical composers, and what would our common literary heritage be like without Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, or Chekhov?
~~Pasternak?~~ Our recent commemoration of the Normandy landing reminds us once again of the incredible courage and sacrifice

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DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

R. V. Vitt NARA, Date 6/21/99

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- 2 -

of the Russian people, and the contribution we each made to the other's efforts when confronted with a common enemy. In the years since World War II, the Soviet and American governments have often been on the opposite sides of major issues, but our people still retain fond memories of the past and understand clearly the value of communication for the future.

I want to emphasize to you, and to the people and leaders of the Soviet Union that: Increased communication among the world's peoples is the trend of the future, an essential ingredient for social progress and world peace. Genuine dialogue between the American people and the people of the Soviet Union is necessary for all of us. In an era of increased global interdependence, the trend towards Soviet self-isolation and restriction of contacts can only undermine the future of Soviet science, its economy, and its cultural development. The Kremlin's current approach is not healthy for Soviet society or for mankind as a whole. We hope it will change, and quickly.

All of us here today share a common goal in seeking to reverse this negative trend. You can -- and I trust you will -- make new efforts on the people-to-people side. We, for our part, have been working hard to make progress on a set of issues designed to facilitate communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those of you at this conference are well aware of some elements of our agenda and our effort to improve the overall atmosphere of the US-Soviet relationship.

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-- We have encouraged the Soviets to return to the Geneva nuclear arms talks, put forth a new Chemical Weapons Treaty proposal, and advanced new ideas to break the impasse at the MBFR talks.

-- In Dublin, I noted our willingness to discuss the Soviet proposal on non-use-of-force in the CDE at Stockholm along with our proposals to make conflict in Europe less likely.

-- We have sought to engage the Soviets more deeply in discussions of regional trouble spots, most particularly in recent months, the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and Southern Africa.

-- And, of course, we continue to make representations on human rights issues -- on the Sakharovs, on Shcharanskiy, on Orlov, on other persecuted individuals, on emigration issues, and on divided spouses. In these discussions, we regularly emphasize the importance of movement in the human rights area to an improvement in the overall relationship.

To give a fuller view of our efforts, I would like to take this opportunity today to provide for the first time a detailed accounting of the comprehensive program for cooperation and contacts between our peoples which we have proposed in recent months to the Soviet leadership.

First, we have completed all the necessary technical preparations for negotiations on a new exchanges agreement. This would open the way for official exchanges and encourage increased people-to-people contact. Our proposal contains

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- 4 -

such features as a resumption of the highly popular exhibitions in the USSR and a proposal for reciprocal appearances on national television which would allow the leaders of the two countries to communicate directly with the people of the other.

Second, we are working with the Soviets on moving to open consulates in Kiev and New York. The details may yet take some time, but when completed, a Consulate in Kiev would give us greatly increased contact with the people of the Ukraine, the largest non-Russian nationality in the USSR.

Third, we have taken steps to reinvigorate agreements in force in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health, and agriculture.

-- Specifically, I have directed EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus to assume the position of U.S. Co-chairman of the US-USSR Committee on Environmental Protection. He is talking with his Soviet counterpart to begin arrangements for a Joint Committee meeting which would expand environmental cooperation.

-- Secretary Pierce at HUD has begun preparations for a meeting of the Joint Housing Committee, the first in over six years.

-- We are ready to move ahead with a full meeting of the Joint Agriculture Committee and rejuvenate cooperation in this vital area with, I hope, private sector participation.

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- 5 -

-- In the health area, we have informed the Soviets of our willingness to broaden cooperation under both the health and artificial heart agreements as soon as the issue of Mrs. Bonner's need for medical treatment abroad is resolved.

Fourth, we are in the process of renewing several US-Soviet agreements that expire this year.

-- We have proposed that our bilateral fishing agreement be extended for eighteen months, rather than one year, and are looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under it.

-- Secretary Baldrige has formally proposed to Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev that we extend our Long-term Economic Cooperation Agreement for ten more years, hold a experts working group in the near future, and, if that meeting is successful, then convene a Cabinet-level Joint Commercial Commission to examine trade and economic issues.

-- A U.S. Naval delegation went to Moscow earlier this month to renew the Incidents at Sea agreement for another three years. This has been a highly successful agreement that demonstrates clearly the ability of our armed forces to ensure unnecessary frictions are not introduced into our military-to-military relationship.

-- And we are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement that

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- 6 -

has been quite useful in ocean-going joint research. The agreement is due for renewal in December and we anticipate no problems continuing our cooperation in this area.

Finally, I should note that we are negotiating on or have proposed steps in several other areas that will improve our government-to-government dialogue with considerable benefits for the people of our two countries.

-- We recently concluded another round of Consular Review Talks in Moscow aimed at improving visa procedures and facilitating travel between our two countries.

-- We suggested a compromise formula to settle the exact depiction of the maritime boundary between us in the Bering Sea.

-- We proposed to the Soviets a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts of the two countries would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop ways to rescue astronauts from malfunctioning space vehicles.

-- We suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures that could be of major value to citizens of both countries lost at sea.

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-- We have made progress in the talks on upgrading the Hotline, and we have made proposals dealing with nuclear terrorist incidents, establishing a Joint Military Communications Link, and upgrading embassy communications in both countries.

-- We have also put forward a specific set of steps the Soviets and we could take along the Pacific air routes to ensure that the KAL incident never recurs.

-- Finally, I want to mention that I suggested to General Secretary Chernenko that in addition to our other channels of communication, we institute regular, high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

I have enumerated the steps above because I wanted you to know the scope of the efforts that we are making to improve the quality of our dialogue with the government and people of the Soviet Union. We are sufficiently realistic not to expect immediate results in all our endeavors and, given the current mood in the Kremlin, even small steps can be difficult. We are, however, looking to the long-term in our approach. If we cannot settle all of these issues today, we want nevertheless to lay the groundwork to convince this and future Soviet leaders of the need and value of better and more fruitful communications in the future.

All of us know that broadening genuine communication with a country as closed and suspicious as the Soviet Union is no easy

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- 8 -

task. There is a natural conflict between the deeply ingrained American desire for free-wheeling discussions at all levels and the Soviet penchant for restricting contacts to a few hand-picked individuals on their side. At the present time, the atmosphere for contacts is at low ebb. Perhaps because of their own uncertainties, the Soviet leadership has recently boycotted the Olympics, reduced emigration abroad to a trickle, increased controls over mail allowed in, stepped up harassment of tourists, and even keep Soviets from our ambassador's cultural performances at his residence in Moscow.

One cloud over all our efforts to improve communications is the Soviet leadership's treatment of Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. As part of their generally defensive mood, they have gone to extraordinary lengths to cut them off from the outside world. The actions against the Sakharovs have earned the deserved condemnation of much of the world scientific community and forced the National Academy of Sciences to postpone its trip to the USSR. This is preeminently a people-to-people issue and it will inevitably affect what cooperation between our two peoples is possible. I call on the Soviet leadership to relax their pressures on the Sakharovs, allow them to communicate with the outside world, and provide them with their basic rights to seek medical care within or outside the country as necessary.

All of us here today understand only too well the difficulties before us. However, we cannot only dwell on the

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- 9 -

problems before us. We must must strive to reach the goal we are seeking and I am confident that those here at this meeting share my desire for improved communications with the peoples of the Soviet Union. I want to wish you well as you seek to formulate imaginative, but realistic, people-to-people programs that can increase the level of genuine and meaningful dialogue between our two peoples. Our task is hard, but I am sure that working together we can succeed.

Thank you.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE

Thank you for coming over to the White House today. When I heard that you would be meeting at the Smithsonian to discuss U.S.-Soviet exchanges, I was eager to have a chance to meet you and to share with you my thoughts on this most important topic.

First, I want to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for organizing your conference. These institutions are outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. And right now there is no topic more worthy of our attention than ways we can reach out and establish better communication with the people and government of the Soviet Union.

In my January address on U.S.-Soviet relations I suggested that the U.S. and Soviet governments make a major effort to see if we could make ~~major~~ progress in three broad problem areas: reducing the threat and use of force in solving international disputes, reducing armaments in the world, and establishing a better working relationship with each other. We have been working hard to secure Soviet cooperation in all these areas.

I've had a lot to say recently about our efforts to establish a dialogue on regional issues and on arms reduction and control. Today I would like to describe to you what we ~~in the government~~ are proposing to establish a better working relationship ^{with the Soviet Union,} If these proposals ^{are accepted,} ~~can bear fruit,~~ they ^c should ^{open up} ~~provide~~ new avenues for your own efforts.

First, we have informed the Soviet Government that we are prepared to ^{initiate} ~~resume~~ negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, and we have completed our preparations for these negotiations.

Second, we have proposed that we resume preparations to open consulates general in New York and Kiev.

Third, we have taken steps to reinvigorate our agreements for cooperation in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health and agriculture. Activities under these agreements have waned in recent years, since there have been no meetings of their joint committees to plan projects. We have proposed that preparations begin for such meetings in order to increase the number of active projects.

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-- We are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement, which has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research, and ~~I am~~ ^{will give careful thought} ~~sure we will wish~~ ^{ing} to renew it when it expires in December.

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-- We have put forward a specific set of steps to improve navigation aids along the North Pacific air routes to ensure that the KAL tragedy never recurs.

-- We have suggested that we establish regular, high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

As you can see, we have been working as hard to improve communication and our working relationship with the Soviets, as

we have to persuade them to join us in finding ways to reduce arms and settle disputes without the use of force. We cannot yet judge the results: some of our proposals have been rejected -- at least for the moment; a few are near agreement; and many others are still under discussion. But one thing is certain. We want to move ahead.

We don't expect that to be easy. Opening up contact and communication with a closed society governed by exceedingly suspicious officials can never be easy. I am as disturbed as you are by recent reports of new steps which have been taken by Soviet authorities to restrict their citizens' contacts with foreigners. And these come on top of intensified repression of many persons who have dared express views contrary to those of their political leaders. The people of the Soviet Union pay the greatest price for such practices, but we are all affected.

When attempts are made to seal off great, proud, accomplished peoples from outside influence, two things happen. First, their own intellectual and cultural life suffers. And second, the rest of the world is deprived of the ~~riches~~ ^{cultural riches and intellectual stimulation} they can offer.

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point is clear: ²we all have a stake in keeping contacts and communication as broad and deep and unfettered as possible.

~~As we think through this problem, we also have to be frank.~~

¹ While our main problem, for decades, has been the Soviet propensity to seal their people off, or to filter and control the flow of contacts and information, we too have sometimes made decisions that led to a decrease in contacts, though that was never our purpose or goal. For example, some of the cooperative agreements which we would like to revive have been languishing in part because of our refusal, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to hold high-level meetings.

Here, frankly, we face a dilemma. When Soviet actions threaten the peace, or violate solemn agreements, or trample on standards essential to civilized mankind, we cannot be silent or continue to deal with the perpetrators as if nothing had happened. To do so would not only betray our deepest values and violate our conscience; it would also ultimately undermine world stability and our ability to keep the peace. We must ^{have} ~~find~~ ways to make it crystal clear that Soviet actions do matter and ^{that} some will inevitably affect the quality of the relationship.

^{short of military threats absolutely} But we have to bear something else in mind. That is, that our quarrel ~~is~~ is not with the Russian people, or the Ukrainian people, or any of the other proud nationalities living in that enormous multinational state. (Pause) I can think of another word for it, but don't want to be accused of indulging in rhetoric. We wish the peoples of the Soviet Union well, and want only to live in peace and cooperation with them. And we're sure they want the same with us. So we must be careful, in reacting to

actions by their government, not to take out our indignation on those not responsible.

That is why I feel that we should move to ~~reestablish and~~ broaden opportunities for Americans and Soviet citizens to get to know each other better. Our proposals are not a "signal" that we have forgotten Afghanistan. We have not, and we will continue to demonstrate our sympathy for the people of that ravished land, and will support their desire to rid themselves of foreign occupiers and reestablish an independence and neutrality which could threaten no one.

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I know that these thoughts do not resolve the dilemma I mentioned. If they did, it wouldn't be a dilemma. But it is a dilemma for all of us, and I will value any advice that you, who have so much experience in dealing with the Soviet Union, may have for me.

You know, I don't think there is anything we are encouraging the Soviet leaders to do that is not as much in their interest as it is in ours -- and the whole world's. If they are as committed ^{to}

peace as they say they are they should welcome our outstretched hand ^{and join us in} ~~for~~ a dialogue aimed at solving problems. If they really want to reduce arms, there's no excuse for refusing to talk about ways to do just that. And if they want to deal with us as equals -- which is quite natural, and in fact the only way to treat each other -- then they wouldn't try to avoid a frank discussion of real problems.

Some say that the Soviet leaders are not really interested in peace but only in avoiding war while they use their military power to spread their dominance. A lot of things they are doing certainly seem to support this interpretation. But even if this is the case, it should be clear by now that it's not going to work. Once they realize that, maybe they'll see more clearly that they have as much to gain as everyone else from improving our dialogue, solving some problems and reducing tensions.

So I'm not going to ~~throw in the towel and~~ stop trying to get our relations on a better track.

Your efforts will be very important. The best way governments can promote contacts ^{among} ~~between~~ people is to avoid standing in the way. We in the American government will do all we can in conscience to ^{stay} ~~get~~ out of the way, and to persuade the Soviet government to do the same. We all know this isn't going to ~~be easy, or~~ happen overnight. But if we are successful, or even partially successful, it's going to be up to you to do the real work of getting a lot more Americans into wider and more meaningful contact with a lot more Soviet citizens.

With all the problems in our relations, it may seem an impossible dream to think there could be a time when Americans

and Soviet citizens of all walks of life could travel freely back and forth, visit each other's homes, look up ^{friends and} professional colleagues, work together on all sorts of problems and ^{if they feel like it,} sit up all night ^{and ~~discuss~~ ^{talk about}} the meaning of life and the different ways ~~we~~ ^{they}

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When you think about it, doesn't it give you

As distant as it may seem, I don't believe it's an impossible dream. And I hope you don't either. Let's dedicate ourselves to making it a reality.

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STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE

Thank you for coming over to the White House today. When I heard that you would be meeting at the Smithsonian to discuss U.S.-Soviet exchanges, I was eager to have a chance to meet you and to share with you my thoughts on this most important topic.

First, I want to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for organizing your conference. These institutions are outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. And right now there is no topic more worthy of our attention than ways we can reach out and establish better communication with the people and government of the Soviet Union.

In my January address on U.S.-Soviet relations I suggested that the U.S. and Soviet governments make a major effort to see if we could make major progress in three broad problem areas: reducing the threat and use of force in solving international disputes, reducing armaments in the world, and establishing a better working relationship with each other. We have been working hard to secure Soviet cooperation in all these areas.

I've had a lot to say recently about our efforts to establish a dialogue on regional issues and on arms reduction and control. Today I would like to describe to you what we in the government are proposing to establish a better working relationship. If these proposals can bear fruit, they should provide new avenues for your own efforts.

First, we have informed the Soviet Government that we are prepared to resume negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, and we have completed our preparations for these negotiations.

Second, we have proposed that we resume preparations to open consulates general in New York and Kiev.

Third, we have taken steps to reinvigorate our agreements for cooperation in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health and agriculture. Activities under these agreements have waned in recent years, since there have been no meetings of their joint committees to plan projects. We have proposed that preparations begin for such meetings in order to increase the number of active projects.

Fourth, we are in the process of renewing several agreements which otherwise would have expired this year.

-- We have proposed extending our fishing agreement for 18 months and are looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under it.

-- We have proposed that our Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation be renewed for another ten years, and that preparations begin for a meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission.

-- A U.S. Navy delegation held talks this month with their Soviet counterparts in accord with our agreement on avoiding incidents at sea, and we have agreed to extend that useful agreement for another three years.

-- We are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement, which has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research, and I am sure we will wish to renew it when it expires in December.

Finally, we have made proposals in several other areas in order to solve problems, improve our dialogue and foster cooperation.

-- We have proposed a fair and equitable resolution of our differences on the exact depiction of the maritime boundary off Alaska.

-- We have proposed a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts and cosmonauts would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop techniques to rescue people from malfunctioning space vehicles.

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-- We have suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures to assist citizens of all countries lost at sea.

-- We have made progress in our talks on upgrading the Hotline, and have proposed measures to deal with nuclear terrorist incidents, establishing a Joint Military Communications Line, and upgrading embassy communications in both countries.

-- We have put forward a specific set of steps to improve navigation aids along the North Pacific air routes to ensure that the KAL tragedy never recurs.

-- We have suggested that we establish regular, high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

As you can see, we have been working as hard to improve communication and our working relationship with the Soviets, as

we have to persuade them to join us in finding ways to reduce arms and settle disputes without the use of force. We cannot yet judge the results: some of our proposals have been rejected -- at least for the moment; a few are near agreement; and many others are still under discussion. But one thing is certain. We want to move ahead.

We don't expect that to be easy. Opening up contact and communication with a closed society governed by exceedingly suspicious officials can never be easy. I am as disturbed as you are by recent reports of new steps which have been taken by Soviet authorities to restrict their citizens' contacts with foreigners. And these come on top of intensified repression of many persons who have dared express views contrary to those of their political leaders. The people of the Soviet Union pay the greatest price for such practices, but we are all affected.

When attempts are made to seal off great, proud, accomplished peoples from outside influence, two things happen. First, their own intellectual and cultural life suffers. And second, the rest of the world is deprived of the riches they can offer.

Sometimes, if we get preoccupied with our political and ideological differences, we may not think enough about this. But we all know that Russian writers, composers and scientists are a part of our own heritage. What American does not think of Tchaikowsky as one of his favorite composers? And what would our literature be like without Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and Chekhov? Or chemistry without Mendeleev? I could go on and on, but the

point is clear: we all have a stake in keeping contacts and communication as broad and deep and unfettered as possible.

As we think through this problem, we also have to be frank. While our main problem, for decades, has been the Soviet propensity to seal their people off, or to filter and control the flow of contacts and information, we too have sometimes made decisions that led to a decrease in contacts, though that was never our purpose or goal. For example, some of the cooperative agreements which we would like to revive have been languishing in part because of our refusal, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to hold high-level meetings.

Here, frankly, we face a dilemma. When Soviet actions threaten the peace, or violate solemn agreements, or trample on standards essential to civilized mankind, we cannot be silent or continue to deal with the perpetrators as if nothing had happened. To do so would not only betray our deepest values and violate our conscience; it would also ultimately undermine world stability and our ability to keep the peace. We must find ways to make it crystal clear that Soviet actions do matter and some will inevitably affect the quality of the relationship.

But we have to bear something else in mind. That is, that our quarrel is not with the Russian people, or the Ukrainian people, or any of the other proud nationalities living in that enormous multinational state. (Pause) I can think of another word for it, but don't want to be accused of indulging in rhetoric. We wish the peoples of the Soviet Union well, and want only to live in peace and cooperation with them. And we're sure they want the same with us. So we must be careful, in reacting to

actions by their government, not to take out our indignation on those not responsible.

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As distant as it may seem, I don't believe it's an impossible dream. And I hope you don't either. Let's dedicate ourselves to making it a reality.

File ~~Plot~~ ^{Plot} ~~Chen~~ 4831

Matlock

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 25, 1984

Text.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *SM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement to Conference on Soviet Exchanges, June 27

Attached at TAB I is my rewrite of State's suggested text for the President's statement to participants in the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, scheduled for 1:00 P.M. June 27.

I have tried to include the following elements:

-- A comprehensive review of the proposals we have made to the Soviets in the bilateral area (drawing on the State text);

-- A frank explanation of the dilemma faced in expanding exchanges when Soviet behavior requires us to protest; and

-- An implicit, but tactful, challenge to the Soviets to move in this area if they are as devoted to peace as they say they are -- worded so as to indicate that we have reasons to doubt their devotion to true peace.

The text has not yet been coordinated with the speechwriters or with State, but if you approve it, we will proceed with the coordination.

Recommendation:

That you approve the text at TAB I for coordination with the speechwriters and State.

Approve *RM* Disapprove ____
95 mg

Attachments:

- Tab I - Suggested text of President's statement to the Smithsonian Conference
- Tab II - State draft

Copies to: John Lenczowski
Walt Raymond
Steve Sestanovich

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *R. Val* NARA, Date *6/21/99*

STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE

Thank you for coming over to the White House today. When I heard that you would be meeting at the Smithsonian to discuss U.S.-Soviet exchanges, I was eager to have a chance to meet you and to share with you my thoughts on this most important topic.

First, I want to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Carnegie ^{Endowment (?)} ~~Corporation~~ [?] of New York for organizing your conference. These institutions are outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. And right now there is no topic more worthy of our attention than ways we can reach out and establish better communication with the people and government of the Soviet Union.

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I've had a lot to say recently about our efforts to establish a dialogue on regional issues and on arms reduction and control. Today I would like to describe to you what we are proposing to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union. If these proposals are accepted, they could open up new avenues for your own efforts.

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we have to persuade them to join us in finding ways to reduce arms and settle disputes without the use of force. We cannot yet judge the results: *All of our proposals are rejected* some of ~~our proposals~~ have been rejected -- at least for the moment; a few are near agreement; and many others are still under discussion. But one thing is certain. We want to move ahead.

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Here, frankly, we face a dilemma. When Soviet actions threaten the peace, or violate solemn agreements, or trample on standards essential to civilized mankind, we cannot be silent or continue to deal with the perpetrators as if nothing had happened. To do so would not only betray our deepest values and violate our conscience; it would also ultimately undermine world stability and our ability to keep the peace. We must have ways short of military threats to make it crystal clear that Soviet actions do matter and that some will inevitably affect the quality of the relationship.

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As distant as it may seem, I don't believe it's an impossible dream. And I hope you don't either. Let's dedicate ourselves to making it a reality.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TO: _____

Executive Secretariat SENSITIVE

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Executive Secretary

Executive Secretariat SENSITIVE



Washington, D.C. 20520

4831

June 15, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Presidential Statement for the June 26-27
Smithsonian Meeting on US-Soviet Exchanges

Attached is a draft Presidential message outlining our efforts to improve our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union for use at the June 26-27 meeting at the Smithsonian on US-Soviet exchanges.

For McKinley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By R. Vitt NARA, Date 6/21/99

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL:OADR

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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT TO SMITHSONIAN CONFERENCE

Gathered here today is an impressive group of Americans dedicated to the improvement of the range and quality of our contacts with the people of the Soviet Union. The Smithsonian Institution and its Woodrow Wilson Center are themselves outstanding examples of the American search for knowledge and communication with the world at large. As you know, I am generally less impressed by what governments can do in resolving outstanding problems than dedicated individuals giving free range to their energy and imagination. As I said on January 16, people don't make wars; on the contrary, their common interests cross all borders. For this reason, I believe your efforts to improve meaningful people-to-people communication is a matter of the greatest importance indeed.

The people of the Soviet Union have impressive energy, talent, and resources to contribute to the overall betterment of mankind. We all know that Russian writers, poets, and composers have made enormous contributions to the development of Western culture. What American does not think of Tchaikowsky as among his favorite classical composers, and what would our common literary heritage be like without Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, or ~~Pasternak?~~ ^{Chekhov?} Our recent commemoration of the Normandy landing reminds us once again of the incredible courage and sacrifice

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- 2 -

of the Russian people, and the contribution we each made to the other's efforts when confronted with a common enemy. In the years since World War II, the Soviet and American governments have often been on the opposite sides of major issues, but our people still retain fond memories of the past and understand clearly the value of communication for the future.

I want to emphasize to you, and to the people and leaders of the Soviet Union that: Increased communication among the world's peoples is the trend of the future, an essential ingredient for social progress and world peace. Genuine dialogue between the American people and the people of the Soviet Union is necessary for all of us. In an era of increased global interdependence, the trend towards Soviet self-isolation and restriction of contacts can only undermine the future of Soviet science, its economy, and its cultural development. The Kremlin's current approach is not healthy for Soviet society or for mankind as a whole. We hope it will change, and quickly.

All of us here today share a common goal in seeking to reverse this negative trend. You can -- and I trust you will -- make new efforts on the people-to-people side. We, for our part, have been working hard to make progress on a set of issues designed to facilitate communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those of you at this conference are well aware of some elements of our agenda and our effort to improve the overall atmosphere of the US-Soviet relationship.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-- We have encouraged the Soviets to return to the Geneva nuclear arms talks, put forth a new Chemical Weapons Treaty proposal, and advanced new ideas to break the impasse at the MBFR talks.

-- In Dublin, I noted our willingness to discuss the Soviet proposal on non-use-of-force in the CDE at Stockholm along with our proposals to make conflict in Europe less likely.

-- We have sought to engage the Soviets more deeply in discussions of regional trouble spots, most particularly in recent months, the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and Southern Africa.

-- And, of course, we continue to make representations on human rights issues -- on the Sakharovs, on Shcharanskiy, on Orlov, on other persecuted individuals, on emigration issues, and on divided spouses. In these discussions, we regularly emphasize the importance of movement in the human rights area to an improvement in the overall relationship.

To give a fuller view of our efforts, I would like to take this opportunity today to provide for the first time a detailed accounting of the comprehensive program for cooperation and contacts between our peoples which we have proposed in recent months to the Soviet leadership.

First, we have completed all the necessary technical preparations for negotiations on a new exchanges agreement. This would open the way for official exchanges and encourage increased people-to-people contact. Our proposal contains

such features as a resumption of the highly popular exhibitions in the USSR and a proposal for reciprocal appearances on national television which would allow the leaders of the two countries to communicate directly with the people of the other.

Second, we are working with the Soviets on moving to open consulates in Kiev and New York. The details may yet take some time, but when completed, a Consulate in Kiev would give us greatly increased contact with the people of the Ukraine, the largest non-Russian nationality in the USSR.

Third, we have taken steps to reinvigorate agreements in force in the fields of environmental protection, housing, health, and agriculture.

-- Specifically, I have directed EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus to assume the position of U.S. Co-chairman of the US-USSR Committee on Environmental Protection. He is talking with his Soviet counterpart to begin arrangements for a Joint Committee meeting which would expand environmental cooperation.

-- Secretary Pierce at HUD has begun preparations for a meeting of the Joint Housing Committee, the first in over six years.

-- We are ready to move ahead with a full meeting of the Joint Agriculture Committee and rejuvenate cooperation in this vital area with, I hope, private sector participation.

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- 5 -

-- In the health area, we have informed the Soviets of our willingness to broaden cooperation under both the health and artificial heart agreements as soon as the issue of Mrs. Bonner's need for medical treatment abroad is resolved.

Fourth, we are in the process of renewing several US-Soviet agreements that expire this year.

-- We have proposed that our bilateral fishing agreement be extended for eighteen months, rather than one year, and are looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under it.

-- Secretary Baldrige has formally proposed to Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev that we extend our Long-term Economic Cooperation Agreement for ten more years, hold a experts working group in the near future, and, if that meeting is successful, then convene a Cabinet-level Joint Commercial Commission to examine trade and economic issues.

-- A U.S. Naval delegation went to Moscow earlier this month to renew the Incidents at Sea agreement for another three years. This has been a highly successful agreement that demonstrates clearly the ability of our armed forces to ensure unnecessary frictions are not introduced into our military-to-military relationship.

-- And we are reviewing the World Oceans Agreement that

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 6 -

has been quite useful in ocean-going joint research. The agreement is due for renewal in December and we anticipate no problems continuing our cooperation in this area.

Finally, I should note that we are negotiating on or have proposed steps in several other areas that will improve our government-to-government dialogue with considerable benefits for the people of our two countries.

-- We recently concluded another round of Consular Review Talks in Moscow aimed at improving visa procedures and facilitating travel between our two countries.

-- We suggested a compromise formula to settle the exact depiction of the maritime boundary between us in the Bering Sea.

-- We proposed to the Soviets a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts of the two countries would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop ways to rescue astronauts from malfunctioning space vehicles.

-- We suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures that could be of major value to citizens of both countries lost at sea.

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- 7 -

-- We have made progress in the talks on upgrading the Hotline, and we have made proposals dealing with nuclear terrorist incidents, establishing a Joint Military Communications Link, and upgrading embassy communications in both countries.

-- We have also put forward a specific set of steps the Soviets and we could take along the Pacific air routes to ensure that the KAL incident never recurs.

-- Finally, I want to mention that I suggested to General Secretary Chernenko that in addition to our other channels of communication, we institute regular, high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

I have enumerated the steps above because I wanted you to know the scope of the efforts that we are making to improve the quality of our dialogue with the government and people of the Soviet Union. We are sufficiently realistic not to expect immediate results in all our endeavors and, given the current mood in the Kremlin, even small steps can be difficult. We are, however, looking to the long-term in our approach. If we cannot settle all of these issues today, we want nevertheless to lay the groundwork to convince this and future Soviet leaders of the need and value of better and more fruitful communications in the future.

All of us know that broadening genuine communication with a country as closed and suspicious as the Soviet Union is no easy

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- 8 -

task. There is a natural conflict between the deeply ingrained American desire for free-wheeling discussions at all levels and the Soviet penchant for restricting contacts to a few hand-picked individuals on their side. At the present time, the atmosphere for contacts is at low ebb. Perhaps because of their own uncertainties, the Soviet leadership has recently boycotted the Olympics, reduced emigration abroad to a trickle, increased controls over mail allowed in, stepped up harassment of tourists, and even keep Soviets from our ambassador's cultural performances at his residence in Moscow.

One cloud over all our efforts to improve communications is the Soviet leadership's treatment of Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. As part of their generally defensive mood, they have gone to extraordinary lengths to cut them off from the outside world. The actions against the Sakharovs have earned the deserved condemnation of much of the world scientific community and forced the National Academy of Sciences to postpone its trip to the USSR. This is preeminently a people-to-people issue and it will inevitably affect what cooperation between our two peoples is possible. I call on the Soviet leadership to relax their pressures on the Sakharovs, allow them to communicate with the outside world, and provide them with their basic rights to seek medical care within or outside the country as necessary.

All of us here today understand only too well the difficulties before us. However, we cannot only dwell on the

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 9 -

problems before us. We must must strive to reach the goal we are seeking and I am confident that those here at this meeting share my desire for improved communications with the peoples of the Soviet Union. I want to wish you well as you seek to formulate imaginative, but realistic, people-to-people programs that can increase the level of genuine and meaningful dialogue between our two peoples. Our task is hard, but I am sure that working together we can succeed.

Thank you.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 25, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:

Richard Pipes' Book "Survival is Not Enough:

I suggest that the following sentence be added to your letter to Mr. Robert Asahina of Simon and Schuster, regarding Richard Pipes' book, Survival is Not Enough:

"I believe Dr. Pipes' book provides a trenchant analysis of the connection between Soviet domestic and foreign policy -- a subject often ignored by Americans. The insights he provides are of crucial importance to anyone who wishes to understand the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship."

A revised letter for your signature is attached at Tab I (with the page proofs to be returned). Your original letter is at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Proposed revised letter (with page proofs)
Tab II	Your original letter

cc: Brenda Reger

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Asahina:

I have received your letter of June 11, 1984, asking that I review the page proofs for Richard Pipes' new book, SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH. I believe Dr. Pipes' book provides a trenchant analysis of the connection between Soviet domestic and foreign policy -- a subject often ignored by Americans. The insights he provides are of crucial importance to anyone who wishes to understand the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Given the subject matter of the book, however, and Mr. Pipes' responsibilities while he was a member of the National Security Council staff, I recommend that the page proofs be sent to Brenda Reger, Director of Information Policy/Security Review, with the National Security Council for a pre-publication review to ensure that no classified information is being published.

I appreciate your sending me the page proofs and hope that the book will receive the wide attention it deserves.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment:

Page Proofs, SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH

Mr. Robert Asahina
Senior Editor
Simon & Schuster, Inc.
1230 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

Simon & Schuster

JUN 12 1984

Robert Asahina
Senior Editor

June 11, 1984

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane,

Richard Pipes suggested that I send you page proofs of his new book, SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH, which Simon and Schuster will be publishing in October. It is a significant and timely analysis of Soviet totalitarianism and American foreign policy, and I hope you will agree that it merits the widest possible readership.

I know there are many demands on your time, but if you have a chance to read it, any comments you might offer would be very helpful in getting the book the attention it deserves. I would be most grateful, as would Richard Pipes, if we could hear from you at your earliest possible convenience.

Sincerely,



Robert Asahina

RA:rel

Enclosure



Simon & Schuster, Inc.
Simon & Schuster Building
1230 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020

212 245 6400

BKB/11/84

Laia #

SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH

Richard Pipes

SIMON AND SCHUSTER
NEW YORK

(3) Title

BKB/AB/SL

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Cartoon by Steiger from *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (May 22, 1981).

ISBN: 0-671-49535-6

(H)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1984

FOR: AMB JACK MATLOCK
FROM: Wilma Hall *WH*

Mr. McFarlane requested that I send the attached to you asking for a summary comment he could make in response to the Simon & Schuster request.

Thanks for your help.

cc: Brenda Reger

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1984

FOR: BRENDA REGER
FROM: Wilma Hall *WH*

Before I give attached to Mr. McFarlane for signature, could I have your clearance that my drafted reply is okay.

Thanks.

BR ☒ APPROVE ☐ DISAPPRC

☐ Okay, as amended

*Wil - Rls to
Send this to
Jack Matlock
asking
a summary for
comment
could make.
Bret*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1984

Dear Mr. Asahina:

I have received your letter of June 11, 1984 asking that I review the page proofs for Richard Pipes' new book, SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH. While I am pleased that you would seek my personal comments on the book, my schedule and responsibilities here are such that I am simply unable to devote the time that would be required to do justice to his work.

Given the subject matter of the book, however, and Mr. Pipes' responsibilities while he was a member of the National Security Council staff, I recommend that the page proofs be sent to Brenda Reger, Director of Information Policy/Security Review, with the National Security Council for a pre-publication review to insure that no classified information is being published.

Again, I do appreciate your seeking my personal comments, but I really cannot and I hope you will understand.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Robert Asahina
Senior Editor
Simon & Schuster, Inc.
1230 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

Attachment

Page Proofs, SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 25, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *ASW*

SUBJECT:

Visit of U.S. Religious Leaders to the USSR

Attached is a report from State on the recent visit of U.S. church leaders to the Soviet Union (Tab I).

State's report speaks for itself. The visit provides an excellent example of how such visits should not be conducted. This is a point we will not fail to make at the Smithsonian Conference this week.

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum, June 23, 1984

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 5010

84 JUN 23 P 1:47

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>WAT B</u>	<u>D/CDX</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Matlock

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

NSC/S
I dispatched +
CDX

Pls create
+ cc matlock



S/S 8418219
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit of US Religious Leaders to the USSR

266 American church leaders concluded a two-week trip through the USSR on June 20. The US group was invited by Soviet religious figures, and traveled under the auspices of the National Council of Churches. The visit concluded with a Moscow press conference at which the group's leaders downplayed problems of religious believers in the USSR and expressed optimism that "improvements in the conditions of Soviet churches will continue."

It appears from our very few pre-visit contacts with American participants that they were naively hoping to establish direct, people-to-people contacts with members of Soviet religious groups that could be later pursued. Predictably, however, the visit was tightly orchestrated by Soviet authorities, and little opportunity was afforded for direct contact with Soviet believers. Disaffected delegation members complained to US Embassy Moscow of an excessive amount of scheduled sightseeing, along with a suspicious shortage of Soviet translators for delegation members who sought contact with the Soviet populace. Some delegates are also reported to have complained that group leaders discouraged any actions or comment by the group on human rights which would discomfit the USSR.

In a June 18 service in the Moscow Baptist Church, however, a small group of Soviet demonstrators unfurled English-language banners decrying Soviet suppression of religion, before being ejected. American churchmen later stated that they appreciated the problems which the believers were trying to dramatize, although one spokesman expressed his annoyance at having the prayer service interrupted.

Soviet press coverage of the visit is reportedly extensive and upbeat, attributing statements to the visitors supporting world peace and praising Soviet freedom of religion.

The Soviet government has encouraged visits of American religious figures to the USSR as a means of countering Western charges of religious persecution. Concern expressed by Western church visitors about nuclear questions has also been exploited

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/2 #30

BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/18/00

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-2-

by the Soviets for endorsement of Soviet foreign policy themes, most notably in the World Peace Council's 1982 "World Conference of Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe," which was attended by Billy Graham. Some American participants in such exchanges, e.g. the Lutherans, seek to parlay their participation into more contacts with and better conditions for their co-religionists inside the USSR, and claim to have seen modest progress (for instance, more imported Bibles) in this effort. Nevertheless, the trade-off remains overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of the Soviets.

This encouragement of religious delegation visits contrasts with an increasing pattern of harassment of American tourists and diplomats who attempt to make contact with Jewish refuseniks and members of unofficial Christian denominations, and is part of heightened Soviet efforts to control all outside contacts with Soviet citizens.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill

Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


5010
Via LDX

June 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Information on American Church Delegation

It is requested that the Department provide by Monday, June 25, an assessment of the American Church Delegation visit to the Soviet Union.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

DEPARTMENT 6
84 JUN 23 P 15

MESSAGE NO. 235 CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS PAGES 1
FROM Robert Kinnitt
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Charles Hill</u>		

REMARKS

NSC#
5010


JM
chron

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 25, 1984

TO: CONSTANTINE MENGES ✓
ROGER ROBINSON

I just received the attached letter from
Kempton Jenkins, who had considerable
experience in U.S.-Soviet relations
when he was an FSO. What do you think?
Any suggestions for a reply?



Jack Matlock



ARMCO CORPORATE OFFICES

KEMPTON B. JENKINS
Corporate Vice President
International & Government Affairs

6/25
June 20, 1984

The Honorable Jack F. Matlock
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Jack:

I am increasingly concerned that we are looking at the Argentine banking crisis strictly as a financial problem, not an international political crisis with Soviet potential. Our (Armco) people in Argentina report that Alfonsine is losing control of the process. This is hardly news, (it is reflected in the Washington Post today).

They speak of a scenario that seems realistic to me: The Peronistas and the radicals collapse in the chaos; various Argentine military elements re-emerge (also in disarray); meantime our banks, Treasury and the IMF have decided that we'll draw the line in the Argentine case in order to protect the credibility of our debt posture with the other Latin American countries. In this situation there is one potential winner, Moscow. The Soviets could well step in with a long-term grain purchasing agreement; plunk a big pot of cash down together with a military sales and training program and emerge from the entire crisis with the prime position they have sought since you and I were in Moscow in 1961. This might have been ridiculous prior to Brzezinski's grain embargo, but Moscow has had a real economic beach-head in Argentina ever since. I don't know where this leads, but I am concerned that the State Department's involvement in this crisis is being handled by E.B. (Dick McCormick) with very little attention being paid to the political ramifications of the crisis.

I wish I had a solution. All I have is the problem which you probably already have defined on your own. But I am concerned that we don't seem to have the right players in position to cope with it and no one has his eye on Moscow.

Warmest regards

KBJ:ja

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jack".