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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/26-ND]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 90887-5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Jack Matlock to Baldrige, Reagan, Shultz, re US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission [4951], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #31</i>	6/26/84	P1/F1
2. Memo	Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission [4951], 1p <i>R " " #32</i>	6/21/84	P1/F1
3. Memo	McFarlane to Matlock, re Joint US-Soviet Trade Council [4951], 1p <i>R " " #33</i>	6/20/84	P1/F1
4. PROFS note	McFarlane to Matlock, re Joint US-Soviet Trade Council, 1p <i>R " " #34</i>	6/20/84	P1/F1
5. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re fishing (with notations) [4877], 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #23</i>	6/26/84	P1/F1 P5
6. Memo	Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill, re fishing [4877], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #35</i>	nd	P1/F1
7. Memo	Charles Hill to McFarlane, re fishing [4877], 2p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #36</i>	6/18/84	P1/F1
8. Memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re review of fishing [3447], 2p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #24</i>	5/21/84	P1/F1 P5
9. Memo	Kimmitt to Hill, re review [3447], 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #37</i>	ND	P1/F1
10. Memo	Hill to McFarlane, re review of fishing [3447], 3p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #38</i>	4/28/84	P1/F1
11. List	of participants, 4p (partial)	ND	P6
12. Questionnaire	re NSC picnic, 1p	ND	P6
13. Memo	McFarlane to the President, re conversation with Dobrynin, 1p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #39</i>	ND	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: Matlock Chron June 1984 [6/26-ND]

Date: July 29, 1999

Box 46887 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
14. Talking Points	with Dobrynin on July 1, 1p <i>R 10/17/05 M02-011 #25</i>	nd	P1/F1 P5
15. Memo	Shultz to the President, re Chernenko's June 6 letter and Dobrynin's talking points [90695], 3p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #40</i>	6/14/84	P1/F1
16. Letter	translation of Chernenko to the President [90695], 8p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #41</i>	6/6/84	P1/F1
17. Letter	in Russian, Chernenko to the President, 6 p <i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #42</i>	6/6/84	P1/F1
18. Talking points	Dobrynin's, 4 p <i>R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #43</i>	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 5

FOIA M02-011

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1984 (6/26-ND)

DATE 3/22/2007

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
5 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE FISHING MVH 3/17/08 (#23)	1	6/26/1984	
8 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE FISHING MVH 3/17/08 (#24)	2	5/21/1984	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4951

~~Matlock~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

VIA LDX

Chen

June 26, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
Secretary of the Treasury

THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE
The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Joint U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission ~~(S)~~

As you are aware, we have proposed to the Soviet Union that the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation be extended for another ten-year period.
~~(S)~~

In 1981 the President decided that the Secretary of Commerce would act as the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Commercial Commission for which this agreement provides. Therefore, if the agreement is extended, the Department of Commerce should take the lead in preparing the U.S. position for a joint meeting of experts to prepare for a possible session of the Joint Commercial Commission. Preparations should be cleared through the normal interagency process and policy issues should be reviewed in the Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy as appropriate. ~~(S)~~

Coordinated negotiating positions should be submitted for NSC review before presentation to the Soviets. ~~(S)~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane
Robert C. McFarlane

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2#31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

BY hjt, NARA, DATE 10/25/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission

I have prepared a memorandum for your signature to the Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury and State (Tab I) designating Baldrige as the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Commercial Commission, and instructing them to staff policy issues through the SIG/IEP.

The Soviets have not yet replied to our proposal to renew the Long-Term Agreement, but we expect them to do so next week. My understanding is that renewal would be effected by an exchange of diplomatic notes, so there may be nothing for Mac to sign.

RR
Roger Robinson concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum at TAB I.

Approve / Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed memo for your signature
Tab II Your memorandum of June 20

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NLS F95-074/2#32BY h05, NARA, DATE 10/25/00~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4951

~~SECRET~~

June 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Bud*
SUBJECT: Joint US-Soviet Trade Council

As you know, we have agreed to extend the US-Soviet Economic and Industrial Cooperation Agreement as a consequence of the Sushkov visit. Mac Baldridge called me today to note a possible bureaucratic hitch. When first established in 1974, Commerce chaired it on the US side. Then when George Shultz became Treasury Secretary he took it over. Now Treasury (staff level) is saying that they should remain in the chair. Mac says that he told the Russians that he was the US Chairman back in 1981. As a near term matter, the Soviets are about to sign the agreement (it was initialed when Sushkov was here) and we need someone to sign for the US. Mac also says that back in 1981, Ed Meese approved Commerce's resuming the chair although that was never put in writing. I think Commerce ought to be the US chair and believe we should put that in writing designating Secretary of Commerce as the US Chairman. Mac is willing for the policy issues to be taken up in the SIG-IEP. Please think about this and get together a directive, "In 1981 the President decided that the Secretary of Commerce would chair the US side of the US-Soviet etc etc etc..." Please coordinate with Roger Robinson.

Many thanks.

cc: Admiral Poindexter
Bob Kimmitt
Roger Robinson
Don Fortier

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NLS F95-074/2#33

BY HI, NARA, DATE 10/25/00

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA
To: NSWGH --CPUA

TO: NSGVE --CPUA

06/20/84 17:01:24

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

EXPEDITE

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock

Subject: Joint US-Soviet Trade Council

As you know we have agreed to extend the US-Soviet Economic and Industrial Cooperation agreement as a consequence of the Sushkov visit. Mac Baldrige called me today to note a possible bureaucratic hitch. When first established in 1974, Commerce chaired it on the US side. Then when George Shultz became Treasury Secretary he took it over. Now Treasury (staff level) is saying that they should remain in the chair. Mac says that he told the Russians that he was the US Chairman back in 81. As a near term matter, the Soviet are about to sign the agreement (it was initialed when Sushkov was here) and we need someone to sign for the US. Mac also says that back in 81, Ed Meese approved Commerce's resuming the chair although that was never put in writing. I think Commerce ought to be the US chair and believe we should put that in writing designating Sec Commerce as the US chairman. Mac is willing for the policy issues to be taken up in the SIG-IEP. Please think about this and get together a directive "In 1981 the President decided that the Sec of Commerce would chair the US side of the US-Soviet etc etc etc..." Please coordinate with Roger Robinson

Many thanks

copy to Roger Robinson, Don Fortier

cc: NSJMP --CPUA
NSGVE --CPUA

NSRMK --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

EXPEDITE

NLS F95-074/2 #34
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 10/25/00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 26, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *[initials]*

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship

You will recall that State and Commerce recommended in April that the Soviets be granted a directed fishing allocation in the range of 50,000 tons and that expanded joint ventures be permitted if there are no overriding security problems. State was requested to examine the question of timing in view of the current overall U.S.-Soviet relationship (TAB III).

On the timing question, State now recommends that we proceed at this time since the steps recommended are beneficial to U.S. firms and have strong Congressional support (TAB II).

Since this is a very limited step, is responsive to domestic interests and consistent with our policy of trying to establish a better working relationship with the USSR, I believe the State/Commerce recommendation is justified. It is, however, a close call.

Steve Gersanovich concurs for Don Fortier, Chris Lehman, Richard Levine and John Lenczowski *concur.* *RL* *JK does not concur.*

Recommendation:

That you approve the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at Tab I approving the State/Commerce recommendation.

Approve ☐Disapprove ☐Attachments:

Tab I	Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
Tab II	State's memorandum, June 18, 1984
Tab III	Memorandum on this subject, May 21, 1984

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS MO2-011 #23BY LET, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

but not with State's press guidance which should not be so forward leaning; we should emphasize condition that joint venture be expanded, 2) that restoration of pre-Afghan allocation is only 10%, and 3) we have held back from negotiation, because political conditions prohibit.

This is yet another of the signals of weakness to the Kremlin for which we will have to pay dearly at some point.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship (S)

The recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce in the memorandum from Mr. Hill to Mr. McFarlane of April 28, 1984, have been approved. These steps are:

1. Restoration of a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
2. Permission for further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems. (S)

Any steps taken should be coordinated in normal fashion with the appropriate internal security agencies. (S)

The proposed press release should be submitted to the NSC for approval. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2#35BY LOT, NARA, DATE 10/25/00~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR



CONFIDENTIAL

S/S 8417472 XR 8417471 4877
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Review of US-USSR Fishing Relationship

On May 23, the NSC requested the views of the Department of State on the question of the timing of the President's decision on partial restoration of the bilateral fisheries relationship with the USSR and, if such a step is to be taken now, on how we would explain a favorable decision in light of current strains on the bilateral relationship.

The Department of State recommends that the President decide now on whether to grant the Soviets a directed fishing allocation in the range of 50,000 tons and permit expanded joint ventures, if requested, provided there are no overriding security problems. We do not believe that the President's decision should be delayed by the factors mentioned in your memo of May 23 because:

1) The war in Afghanistan will continue for years and our sanctions have made their point. While our sanctions policy as such remains in place, therefore, we should be willing to make specific exceptions that are in our interest, such as these.

2) The Olympic boycott is largely an example of the Soviet tendency to retreat into self-isolation and our policy purpose is to encourage the Soviets to constructive engagement with us through steps that are mutually advantageous, like these.

3) We are attempting to persuade the Soviets to take action in the Sakharov case through quiet diplomacy and international pressure rather than through bilateral economic sanctions. Implementation of steps to activate four bilateral agreements will be affected by developments in the Sakharov case. But in our view this logic does not extend to the whole agenda of relations such as arms control and economic relations. In particular, it does not extend to economic steps of clear benefit to us, like these.

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NLS F95-074/Z#36
BY WOT, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

In their original recommendation of April 28, State and Commerce noted that this would be a carefully modulated step, which excluded renegotiation of a bilateral fisheries agreement at this time. Our recommendation was based on the fact that the proposed steps would be of direct economic benefit to the currently depressed US fishing industry and were strongly supported by relevant Congressional delegations. This continues to be the case as we recently confirmed with contacts on the Hill. In addition, our recommendation was based on our belief that we should maintain the structure of economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, expanding it those areas in which it is appropriate from a security and economic standpoint to do so.

If the President decides to go forward, we recommend that we inform the Soviets here and in Moscow and do a low key public announcement. We believe that this course would enable us to present this action publicly as an example of the US policy of taking steps to increase exchanges of non-strategic goods as enunciated by the President in his June 4 speech. Our press guidance would underscore the benefits to the US fishing industry, noting US willingness to build upon existing structure in the US-USSR economic relationship where appropriate.

Bonickmley
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MOZ-011#24

3447

MEMORANDUM

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship

The interagency review of measures proposed last year by Congressman Breaux regarding the fisheries relationship with the USSR has been completed. You will recall that Breaux had proposed removing the Afghanistan sanction and restoring our bilateral fisheries relationship with the Soviets. Recently, we agreed with the Soviets to extend the existing fisheries agreement to December 31, 1985, but no allocation of fish was made to the USSR.

Following the interagency review, State and Commerce recommend that two steps be taken:

- restore a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
- permit further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems.

The IG considered a third step -- to seek renegotiation of the bilateral fisheries agreement at this time -- but concluded that this step should not be taken now, but should be kept under review with regard to the future development of political conditions.

Discussion:

The reasons given by the IG for restoring a small fisheries allocation to the Soviets (50,000 metric tons would be one tenth of the allocation they had before Afghanistan) and allowing further joint ventures are based on a judgment that these moves would be of benefit to the American fishing industry, which is currently depressed.

Given the strong Congressional interest (from the Pacific Northwest and Alaska) in restoring the bilateral fisheries relationship and the desirability of maintaining a minimal framework for non-strategic economic interaction with the Soviets, I believe that the IG's recommendations should be approved eventually.

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However, I believe that at the moment the timing is bad. The Soviets are still engaged in a major offensive in Afghanistan, and we face a possible tragedy in the Soviet handling of the Sakharov's hunger strike. I recommend, therefore, that State be requested to review its recommendation in light of the present political situation, and provide its views on whether a decision on this issue should be made now, or should be deferred in light of current additional strains in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

³⁻ Lenczowski, ^{SRS} Levine and Sestanovich concur.

Recommendation:

That you authorize transmittal of the attached Kimmitt-Hill memorandum, which requests State to review its recommendation in respect to timing.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I	Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
Tab II	Hill to McFarlane memorandum, April 28, 1984

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3447

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship (S)

Since your memorandum of April 28, 1984, on this subject was sent, a number of additional strains have developed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. These include the Soviet boycott of the Olympics, the intensification of the war in Afghanistan, and the steps taken against Mrs. Bonner and Academician Sakharov. (S)

In view of the above, the Department's views are requested on the question of timing the President's decision on the fisheries matter. Specifically, should such a step be taken now, and if so, how should we explain a favorable decision on this matter in light of present circumstances? (S)

Upon receipt of the Department's views on the timing question, the matter will be forwarded to the President for decision. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2#317

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 10/25/00

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Washington, D.C. 20520

April 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Review of US - USSR Fishing Relationship

The NSC on March 21, 1983, requested an interagency review of measures proposed by Congressman Breaux regarding the fisheries relationship with the USSR. Breaux's proposals would remove an Afghanistan sanction and restore our bilateral fisheries relationship. They are strongly supported by the fishing industry and other Senators and Congressmen from the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. We and the Soviets just agreed to extend the existing fisheries agreement for eighteen months, through December 31, 1985.

The interagency review, interrupted by the KAL incident, has been completed. The concerned agencies (State and Commerce; NSC unable to attend) considered the following three steps:

--granting the Soviets a directed fish allocation of approximately 50,000 metric tons to permit expansion of the existing joint venture based in Seattle. Prior to the Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets had a 500,000-ton allocation. A directed allocation would permit Soviet vessels to remain on station fishing when weather conditions require the smaller U.S. fishing boats to seek shelter. This would permit an expanded Soviet processing capability to remain in place for longer periods of time, which would benefit the joint venture. At present, Soviet vessels can only process U.S.-caught fish;

--allow further joint ventures in other areas of the U.S. fishing zone as they are proposed, assuming there are no overriding security problems;

--inform the Soviets we are prepared to renegotiate the US-Soviet fisheries agreement, with the possibility of negotiating an agreement to allow US fishermen access to Soviet fisheries. This would almost certainly require a large directed allocation to the Soviets in return.

The IG determined that there are strong economic reasons to restore the fisheries relationship and that the current sanctions are imposing economic hardships on the U.S. fishing industry:

-- The US firm currently involved in the existing joint

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NLS F95-074/2#38

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

venture has stated that it expects to increase the joint venture operations by the amount of the direct allocation given to the USSR. The joint venture currently processes about 160,000 MT of US-caught fish annually, valued at \$30 million, and involving 40 US vessels which otherwise would not be employed. An additional 50,000 MT caught by the joint venture would result in an estimated \$8 million increase in proceeds to participating US fishermen.

-- Establishment of new joint ventures with the Soviets in US waters would increase our leverage with other countries now fishing off the US coast (Japan and Korea) to expand cooperation with the US fishing industry.

-- The US fishing industry is depressed and the impact from the joint ventures is substantial; the multiplier effect on local fish-related industries from each dollar earned by the present joint venture is estimated at four to one.

-- There has been a significant reverse flow of technology and expertise to the US fishing industry from the Soviets as the result of the joint venture and our cooperative fisheries research programs. Restoration of Soviet fishing privileges would enhance our opportunities to take greater advantage of these benefits.

The IG also concluded that forward movement would be consistent with the President's January 16 speech calling for a constructive dialogue with the Soviets. The fishing sanction on Poland has been removed and the restoration of Soviet privileges would underscore our commitment to review sanctions to ensure that US business interests are not unfairly penalized. Finally this action parallels negotiation of the the new LTA.

The Departments of State and Commerce have concluded that we should now take the first two steps: restoring a directed allocation of 50,000 MT, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture commensurately; and, permitting further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems. We would not publicly encourage new joint ventures, however. The allocation would be granted in at least two stages to permit observation of Soviet performance.

It was deemed inappropriate to seek renegotiation of the bilateral fisheries agreement at this time. We will keep this step under review should political conditions permit our moving in that direction in the future.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We now request NSC concurrence with the recommendations of the interagency review and that the matter be forwarded to the President for his review of all the options and decision.

for Charles Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

c

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 26, 1984

Dear Charlie:

Thank you very much for your letter of June 18, and for the copy of your article.


I found it full of insights which are useful indeed. Your observations on the limitations and pitfalls of summitry are pretty well understood around this building. Would that they were understood better on Capitol Hill and among the public at large!

It happens that the President will be delivering a speech on some of the topics you deal with tomorrow. I'll send a text along in case you miss it.

On the point about the utility of having a special assistant to the Secretary on Soviet affairs, I am not totally convinced that this is the best way to proceed. There is always a potential problem when there is no "line" responsibility. But maybe my attitude is unduly influenced by my present position: my work is easier not having to compete with a specialist of comparable rank in State -- and I have no problem getting my views either to the Secretary or the President. If I were in State, the latter contact would inevitably be more indirect.

These are, of course, minor points. Thanks for your thoughtfulness in thinking of me and our very best wishes to you and Gaby for your upcoming trip to Moscow. Give everyone at the Embassy our best regards.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock

The Honorable Charles G. Stefan
8012 S.W. Fifth Avenue
Gainesville, Florida 32607

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting Memo for U.S.-Soviet
Exchanges, June 27, 1984

Attached at Tab I is the Presidential Meeting Memorandum for
the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, June 27, 1984.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

565 { Bob Sims, Karna Small, Ron Sable, Ty Cobb and Steve Steiner
concur. ^{KS} ^{PA} ^{TC}

Attachments

Tab I Presidential Meeting Memo
Tab A List of Participants
Tab B Remarks

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH PARTICIPANTS IN CONFERENCE
ON U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES

DATE: June 27, 1984
LOCATION: East Room
TIME: 1:30 p.m. - 1:45 p.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To demonstrate our efforts to improve the U.S.-Soviet working relationship and to expand contacts with the peoples of the USSR.

II. BACKGROUND

A conference of representatives of private foundations and universities involved in U.S.-Soviet exchanges is being held at the Smithsonian, June 26-27. This is an excellent forum for a statement describing your efforts to improve the bilateral working relationship with the USSR and to expand exchanges. This is the third broad policy area laid out in your January speech on U.S.-Soviet relations and follows your recent statements on the first two areas, namely arms control and regional issues.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab A.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open press coverage.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

At 1:20 p.m. you go to Green Room to welcome leaders of the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, Professor Billington, Dr. Hamburg, Dr. Ellison and Mr. Brad Johnson. Senator Dick Lugar, who has been a key player in this area, may also be with this group. You proceed with them to East Room at 1:30 p.m. and address approximately 100 Conference attendees, as well as selected Members of Congress and senior Administration officials.

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

Attachment

Tab A	List of Participants
Tab B	Remarks

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Secretary of State George Shultz

Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
National Security Council

Professor James Billington
Director, Wilson Center

Dr. David Hamburg
President
Carnegie Corporation of New York

Dr. Herbert Ellison
Secretary of Kennan Institute

Mr. Brad Johnson
Research Associate
Kennan Institute

and approximately 100 members of
the Conference, and selected
members of Congress and senior
Administration officials

REMARKS ARE BEING COORDINATED

BY AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AND SPEECHWRITERS

CJM

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Wednesday, June 27, 1984

for The President of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

See attached list.

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House Requested by Francesca Lapinski
Room No. East Room Room No. 368 Telephone x5646
Time of Meeting 1:00 p.m. Date of request June 26, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Dan Amstutz		11/8/32
Michael H. Armacost		4/15/37
Diana Arsenian		10/31/58
Jeremy Azrael		3/23/35
Harley Balzer	REDACTED	3/25/48
William Barlow		6/5/21
William J. Barody, Jr.		11/5/37
Irving Becker		5/1/27
James Billington	ACTED	6/1/29
Michael Brainerd		4/15/43
Stephanie Bursenos		7/15/37
John A. Busterud		3/7/21
Maura Cantrill		9/18/64
Alan Campbell		10/19/39
Jerome M. Clubb	REDACTED	12/7/28
Tyrus Cobb		
Walter Connor	ACTED	4/20/42
Paul Cook		5/14/25
Harriet Crosby		8/30/45
Karla Cruise		10/30/63
Barbara Dash		12/21/52
Dan E. Davidson		9/18/44
George Demko	REDACTED	4/10/33
Mark Dillon		7/11/51
Douglas Doan		1/21/57
Paula Dobriansky		
	ACTED	
Alla Dombrowsky		10/7/41
Honorable Thomas Downey, U.S. House of Representatives		
Herbert J. Ellison		10/3/29
Cynthia Ely		6/28/31
Erick Erickson		12/28/48
Amy Evans		8/19/56
Ralph T. Fisher, Jr.	REDACTED	4/5/20
Wesley A. Fisher		10/23/44
Michael Flack		9/12/20
John Geraghty		7/1/43
Robert H. Getz	ACTED	3/30/62
Christine Glenday		6/6/51
Nancy Graham		5/10/26
Damon Gray		

Bernard Gwertzman, The New York Times

Jeffrey Hahn		5/22/44
David Hamburg	REDACT	10/1/25
Alan Hart		6/16/44
Stephen Hayes		5/27/47

Alan Hecht		7/23/44
Ruth Hegyeli		8/14/31
Kurt F. J. Heinrich		5/31/21
Peter Henry		5/10/43

Michael Hurley		4/20/50
Micnela Iovine		6/29/48
William James	REDACT	10/5/45
Brad Johnson		10/13/55
Robert Junghans		7/16/25

Madeleine Kalb		11/4/36
Allen Kassof	D	12/17/30
Edward Keenan		5/13/35
John Kiser, Kiser Research, Inc.		
Genevieve Knezo		8/8/42

Helen Kodman		12/13/48
Christopher Lehman		
John Lenczowski		
Alice LeMaistre	REDA	7/3/45

Robert Litwak		4/5/53
Edward Luck		10/17/48
Julian MacDonald	ED	5/17/26

Gifford Malone, Acting Director, Office of Programs, USIA		
Suzanne Massie		1/8/31
Ambassador Jack Matlock		
Rebecca B. Matlock		12/7/28
David Maxwell		12/2/44

Honorable James McNulty, U.S. House of Representatives		
Jacquie McNulty	REDACT	8/18/29
John Mercer		7/25/59
John Metzler		9/19/47
Laurence Mitchell		6/25/23
William Moody	DACTED	2/4/39

~~REDACT~~

Frederick A. Mosher	ED	12/20/32
Lewis Murray		
Sherry Mueller Norton		8/17/43
Michael Oja		11/20/59
Ned Ostenso		6/22/30
R. Mark Palmer		7/14/41
B. Lynn Pascoe	RED	7/7/43
Honorable Claiborne Pell, U.S. Senate	ED	
Grant Pendill		12/3/28
Pierre Perrolle		4/29/44
Honorable Thomas Petri, U.S. House of Representatives		
Vladimir Petrov		11/15/15
Michael Pillsbury, National Security Advisor, Senate Steering Committee, U.S. Senate		
Louise Platt		4/15/40
Alexander Rabinowitch		8/30/34
Victor Rabinowitch	ED	8/30/34
Bernard Ramundo		6/12/25
Susan Rasky, <u>The New York Times</u>		
Peter Reddaway, British Passport:		9/18/39
Marlin Remick		4/2/27
Robert Robertson		3/5/29
Erik Ronhovde		5/13/37
Sophie Sa		11/16/43
William Salmon	REL	9/3/35
Jack Schmidt		7/23/26
Laurie Schultz		1/30/57
Alex M. Shane		7/16/33
Secretary of State George F. Shultz	RED	
Thomas W. Simons		9/4/38
John Skillman		10/8/27
Damon Smith		11/26/34
Parker Snowe	ED	8/20/57
Jed Snyder		3/24/55
Edward Snyder		3/24/55
Linwood Starbird		5/16/47
Steven Steiner		
Phillip Stewart		1/16/38
John Stremlau	REL	1/25/44
Peter R. Summer		
Meredith Taylor		3/30/62
John Thomas		3/6/28
	ED	

Vladimir Toumanoff
Catherine Torgerson
Donald Treadgold
Ronald Trowbridge

Charles Trumbull
Janice Tuten
Leon Twarog
Paul Von Ward
Gary Waxmonsky

James Wertsch

Charles E. Wick, Director, U.S. Information Agency
Honorable Timothy Wirth, U.S. House of Representatives
John Zimmerman

10/1

4/11/23
4/26/61
11/24/22
12/4/37

-RED.

5/17/43
5/29/56
5/20/19
9/11/39 or 34
9/28/50

CTED

5/16/47

-RE

10/12/47

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8404907

RECEIVED 23 JUN 84 10

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM RYAN, F

DOCDATE 22 JUN 84

RYAN, F

26 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

Done already
*JS*SUBJECT TALKERS FOR CONFERENCE ON US SOVIET EXCHANGES WITH PRES ON 27 JUN
1984

ACTION: PREPARE TALKERS

DUE: 24 JUN 84 STATUS IP FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

MARTIN

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(V)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Matlock	-	6/26 Rec'd Ryan Revised Memo		Wm
NSC/S	C	27 June NFAR per JM		

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

84 JUN 26 P 6: 14

6/26/84

4997 add-on

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE/WILLIAM HENKEL

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: The meeting with participants in Conference on
US-Soviet Exchanges is now scheduled for 1:30 pm
on June 27 rather than 1:00 pm as previously
DATE: notified.

TIME: The location will now be the East Room rather
than Rose Garden with Indian Treaty Room as backup.

DURATION:

LOCATION:

REMARKS REQUIRED:

MEDIA COVERAGE:

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION:

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: R. Darman	J. Rosebush	R. Kimmitt
R. Deprospero	R. Scouten	J. Matlock
B. Elliott	B. Shaddix	
D. Fischer	W. Sittmann	
C. Fuller	L. Speakes	
W. Henkel	WHCA Audio/Visual	
E. Hickey	WHCA Operations	
G. Hodges	A. Wrobleski	
C. McCain	Nell Yates	
B. Oglesby		

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Dan Amstutz, Under Secretary, USDA
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary Political Affairs, State
Diana Arsenian, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
Harley Balzer, Department of History, Georgetown University
William Barlow, East-West Trade Development

Irving Becker, The William and Mary Greve Foundation
Diana Bieliauskas, Office of International Affairs, National
Academy of Science
James Billington, Director, The Wilson Center
Michael Brainerd, Director, Citizen Exchange Council
Stephanie Bursenos, Fogarty International Center, National
Institutes of Health

John A. Busterud, Attorney at Law, Palo Alto
Maura Cantrill, The Kennan Institute
Alan Campbell, The Wilson Center
Jerome M. Clubb, Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research, Ann Arbor
Tyrus Cobb, National Security Council

Walter Connor, Foreign Service Institute
Paul Cook, Department of State
Harriet Crosby, President, Institute for Soviet-American Relations
Karla Cruise, The Kennan Institute
Barbara Dash, The Kennan Institute

Dan E. Davidson, Executive Director, American Council of Teachers
of Russian
George Demko, Office of Research, U.S. Department of State
Mark Dillon, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency
Douglas Doan, NSC
Paula Dobriansky, NSC

Alla Dombrowsky, U.S. Information Agency
Honorable Thomas Downey, U.S. House of Representatives
Herbert J. Ellison, Secretary, The Kennan Institute
Cynthia Ely, The Wilson Center
Erick Erickson, U.S. Department of Agriculture

Amy Evans, Environmental Protection Agency
Ralph T. Fisher, Jr., Russian and East European Center,
University of Illinois
Wesley A. Fisher, International Research and Exchanges Board
Michael Flack, Washington, D.C.
John Geraghty, International Affairs, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development

Robert H. Getz, The Kennan Institute
Prosser Gifford, Deputy Director, The Wilson Center
Christine Glenday, National Academy of Sciences
Nancy Graham, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Soviet-
American Relations
Damon Gray, Washington, D.C.

Bernard Gwertzman, The New York Times
Jeffrey Hahn, Short-Term Visiting Grantee, Kennan Institute
David Hamburg, President, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
Alan Hart, Journalist, Smithsonian Institution
Stephen Hayes, Director, AFS International/Intercultural
Programs, Inc.

Allen Hecht, Director, National Climate Program Office, National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
Ruth Hegyeli, National Institutes of Health
Kurt F. J. Heinrich, Office of International Relations, National
Bureau of Standards
Peter Henry, Office of International Health, U.S. House of
Representatives
John Holmfield, Science Policy Staff, U.S. House of Representatives

Michael Hurley, Visitor Program Service
Micnela Iozine, National Academy of Sciences
William James, Jackson School of International Studies,
University of Washington
Brad Johnson, Research Associate, The Kennan Institute
Robert Junghaus, Chief, International Activities Group, National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

Madeleine Kalb
Allen Kassof, Executive Director, International Research and
Exchanges Board
Edward Keenan, Russian Research Center, Harvard University
John Kiser, Kiser Research, Inc.
Genevieve Knezo, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service

Helen Kodman, National Institutes of Health
Chris Kojm, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S.
House of Representatives
Christopher Lehman, NSC
John Lenczowski, NSC
Alice LeMaistre, Office of European Affairs, U.S. Information Agency

Tod Leventhal, Voice of America
Robert Litwak, The Wilson Center
Edward Luck, UN Association
Julian MacDonald, The Council for International Exchange of Scholars
Gifford Malone, Acting Director, Office of Programs, U.S.
Information Agency

Suzanne Massie, Irvington, New York
Ambassador Jack Matlock, National Security Council
Rebecca B. Matlock, Washington, D.C.
David Maxwell, Dean, Undergraduate Studies, Tufts University
Honorable James McNulty, U.S. House of Representatives

Jacquie McNulty, Washington, D.C.
John Mercer, International Policy Studies
John Metzler, U.S. Department of Energy
Laurence Mitchell, National Academy of Sciences
William Moody, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Frederick P. Mosher, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
International Education
Lewis Murray, Bureau of Legislative/Intergovernmental Affairs, State
Sherry Mueller Norton, Institute for Intergovernmental Education
Michael Oja, Washington, D.C.
Ned Ostenso, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

R. Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs,
U.S. Department of State
B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Affairs, State
Honorable Claiborne Pell, U.S. Senate
Grant Pendill, American Committee on East-West Accord
Jan Perkowski, Chair, CIEE Russian Language Program Consortium

Pierre Perrolle, National Science Foundation
Honorable Thomas Petri, U.S. House of Representatives
Vladimir Petrov, George Washington University
Michael Pillsbury, National Security Advisor, Senate Steering
Committee, U.S. Senate
Louise Platt, The Wilson Center

Cassandra A. Pyle, Director, The Council for International
Exchange of Scholars
Alexander Rabinowitch, Executive Director, Russian and East
European Institute, Indiana University
Victor Rabinowitch, National Academy of Sciences
Bernard Ramundo, U.S. Department of Transportation
Susan Rasky, The New York Times

Peter Reddaway, Kennan Institute; British Passport: 660933C
Marlin Remick, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, USIA
Yale Richmond, National Endowment for Democracy
Robert Robertson, Occidental International
Erik Ronho de, Institute of International Education

Sophie Sa, Social Science Research Council
William Salmon, Senior Advisor for Science and Technology, U.S.
Department of State
Jack Schmidt, Fogarty International Center, National Institutes
of Health
Laurie Schultz, Office of Representative James Jeffords
Alex M. Shane, Director of International Programs, State
University of New York, Albany

Gerson Sher, National Science Foundation
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Thomas W. Simons, Deputy Asst Secretary European/Soviet Affairs, State
John Skillman, Deputy Director, Council on International
Education Exchange
Damon Smith, Washington, D.C.

Parker Snowe, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Jed Snyder, Research Associate, The Wilson Center
Edward Snyder, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Linwood Starbird, Department of State
Steven Steiner, National Security Council

Phillip Stewart, Associate, The Kettering Foundation
John Stremlau, Associate Director, International Relations, The
Rockefeller Foundation
Peter R. Summer, NSC
Meredith Taylor, The Kennan Institute
John Thomas, U.S. Department of State

Richard Thompson, Deputy Director, Center for International
Education, Department of Education
Vladimir Toumanoff, Executive Director, National Council for
Soviet and East European Research
Catherine Torgerson, NSC
Donald Treadgold, Russian and East European Studies, University
of Washington
Ronald Trowbridge, USIA

Charles Trumbull, Science Applications, Inc.
Janice Tuten, The Wilson Center
Leon Twarog, Director, Center for Slavic and East European
Studies, Ohio State University
Paul Von Ward, President, Delphi Research Associates, Inc.
Gary Waxmonsky, Environmental Protection Agency

James Wertsch, Northwestern University
Charles E. Wick, Director, U.S. Information Agency
Honorable Timothy Wirth, U.S. House of Representatives
John Zimmerman, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, State

SUGGESTED INVITEES TO ROSE GARDEN CEREMONY
Wednesday, June 27, 1984 -- 1:00 P.M.

HOUSE

- ✓ Wirth, Timothy E. (D-Colo)
- ✓ Downey, Thomas J. (D-NY)
- ✓ Petri, Thomas E. (R-Wis)
- ✓ McNaulty, James E., Jr. (D-Ariz)
- ✓ Hamilton, Lee (D-Ind)
- Bereuter, Doug (R-Nebr)
- Glickman, Dan (D-Kan)
- ✓ Foley, Thomas S. (D-Wash)
- ✓ Leach, Jim (R-Iowa)
- ✓ Fascell, Dante (D-Fla)
- ✓ Simon, Paul (D-Ill)

SENATE

- ✓ Pell, Claiborne (D-RI)
- ✓ Hatfield, Mark O. (R-Ore)
- Evans, Daniel J. (R-Wash)
- ✓ Biden, Joseph R., Jr. (D-Del)
- ✓ Mathias, Charles McC., (R-Md)
- ✓ Leahy, Patrick J. (D-Vt)
- ✓ Lugar, Richard G. (R-Ind)
- Percy, Charles H. (R-Ill)
- Cohen, William S. (R-Maine)
- Dole, Robert (R-Kansas)

Optional

- Smith, Neal (D-Iowa)
- O'Brien, George M. (R-Ill)
- Schroeder, Patricia (D-Colo)
- Kemp, Jack (R-NY)
- Oakar, Mary Rose (D-Ohio)

Optional

- Laxalt, Paul (R-Nev)
- DeConcini, Dennis (D-Ariz)
- Inouye, Daniel K. (D-Haw)
- Bradley, Bill (D-NJ)
- Glenn, John (D-Ohio)
- Levin, Carl (D-Mich)
- ✓ Hatch, Orin (R-Utah)
- Tower, John (R-Tex)
- Goldwater, Barry (R-Ariz)

State Invitees

- Secretary of State George Shultz
- Michael H. Armacost, UnderSec/Political Affairs
- Richard R. Burt, Asst.Sec/European & Canadian Affairs
- W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. Asst.Sec/Bur. of Legis. & Intergovernmental Affairs
- ✓ Mark Palmer, Dep.Asst.Sec/European & Canadian Affairs
- ✓ Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Dir./Office of Soviet Union Affairs
- ✓ B. Lynn Pascoe, Dep.Dir./Office of Soviet Union Affairs
- ✓ John Zimmerman, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
- Lewis Murray, Bureau of Legislative & Intergovernmental Affairs

Technical Agency Invitees

- Ambassador Theodore Britton, Dir., Office-International Affairs, HUD
- Undersecretary Dan Amstutz, USDA
- Fitzhugh Green, Dep. Adminis., EPA, or his Designate
- C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General, DHHS
- Alvin Trivelpiece, Asst. Secretary, DOE

— not invited
✓ invited = not accepted
X invited = accepted

MEMORANDUM


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:

Letter to Mr. Giffen of U.S.-USSR Trade and
Economic Council

Attached at Tab I is a letter of acknowledgement to James Giffen, who wrote to thank you for meeting with Bill Verity and Vladimir Sushkov last month.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Proposed response
Tab II	Incoming letter, June 15, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Giffen:

Thank you for your letter of June 15. I am pleased that the recent meeting of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council went so well.

I am also pleased that the long-term agreement will be renewed and that preparations will begin to reactivate the Joint Commercial Commission.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. James H. Giffen
U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic
Council, Inc.
805 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Jack M
Chotack ph
M

**US-USSR
Trade and Economic Council, Inc.**

June 15, 1984

Dear Mr. McFarlane,

Before any further time passes I want to express to you my profound appreciation for taking the time out of your busy schedule to meet with Mr. Vladimir N. Sushkov and C. William Verity, Jr. the Soviet and American Co-Chairmen of the US-USSR Trade & Economic Council when they were in Washington last month.

You will recall that Mr. Sushkov headed a delegation who were in the U.S. in connection with the Annual Meetings of the Council in New York. He found the opportunity to meet with you very worthwhile and enlightening and expressed the hope that we could continue to maintain open communications with people such as yourself.

You may be interested in knowing that the meetings in New York were considered by the membership to be extremely successful. Over 140 American member firms were represented and there were over 300 participants from both the American and Soviet sides.

Again, my sincere thanks and if I may be of any help, please let me know.

Sincerely,



James H. Giffen

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

805 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 212/644-4550
3 Shevchenko Embankment, Moscow 121248, USSR

c-JM

June 29, 1984

Q: Is there much chance for a summit meeting with the Soviet Union?

A: I'm sure that when our dialogue reaches the point that a meeting will be useful, one will be arranged. But we haven't reached that point yet, and I can't predict when it will happen. As far as I'm concerned, I'm ready and willing.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM:

KARNA SMALL *KS*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Interviews

On Monday, the President is scheduled to be interviewed by local TV stations in Florida and Texas. They have submitted a few questions in advance. May I have your answers to these questions no later than opening of business, tomorrow morning, Friday, June 29.

I appreciate your help on this.

Q: Is there much chance for a summit meeting with the Soviet Union?

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dobrynin at Barbeque Today

You will presumably have the opportunity to speak to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at the barbeque this evening for the diplomatic corps. (Since he is Dean of the Corps, it will be normal for you to exchange some words with him.)

I would recommend that you take the opportunity to encourage a favorable Soviet response to our proposal for talks in Vienna this September. We cannot be sure that the Soviets will respond positively. If they are determined to deal only on their own terms, they will reject our reply and claim that it does not respond to their proposal for negotiations on space weapons. In fact, however, it offers them a face-saving way out of the box they have put themselves in regarding START and INF.

The best approach, I believe, would be to treat the matter in an up-beat fashion, assuming that we have been totally responsive. This would also provide an opportunity to reiterate your desire to get the dialogue into a problem-solving mode.

The attached talking points may be useful.

Attachment:

TAB A - Suggested Talking Points with Dobrynin

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #39

BY hdt, NARA, DATE 10/25/00

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Ambassador Dobrynin at Barbeque for Diplomatic Corps
July 1, 6:30 P.M.

-- I understand you are going back to Moscow Tuesday and want you to carry a personal message from me to Mr. Chernenko.

-- I recognize that the proposal you gave us Friday was an important move on your part. Our response is serious and positive.

-- We accept your invitation to meet in Vienna September 18. We will be ready at that time to talk about both anti-satellite weapons and nuclear arms reductions -- and of course other arms control concerns if you wish.

-- In particular, tell Mr. Chernenko that I am eager to make some real progress. Your proposal and our favorable response can provide a valuable opportunity that we must take advantage of. I am confident that if we both take a problem-solving approach, we can work out together arms control arrangements that meet both our countries' needs and concerns.

-- I will be telling George Shultz and Art Hartman to get moving with your people in working out the necessary preparations so that these talks can be successful.

-- And tell Chairman Chernenko that I will reply to his last letter soon. Frankly, I was discouraged when I got it, because the correspondence didn't seem to be getting anywhere. I hope these latest developments will change that.

If Dobrynin says that our reply was not responsive to their proposal, you might want to express surprise and say that when they spoke of all weapons using space, you naturally assumed that they included ballistic missiles.

If Dobrynin should complain about our rapid release of our statement, you could remind him that we were merely following their example. Of course, it will be easier in the future to discuss matters confidentially before we go public, but both sides have to follow this practice if it is to work.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS MD2-011 #25

BY WJS, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

SYSTEM II PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ID 8490695

RECEIVED 14 JUN 84 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOC DATE 13 JUN 84

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

06 JUN 84

SHULTZ, G

14 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

SUBJECT. CHERNENKO LTR REPLYING TO PRES LTR RE STATE OF US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION. NFAR / NOTED BY PRES

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

No further action required.
Return to Secretariat
for file -

COMMENTS

REF#

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

MATLOCK S JUN 13 1984 prepare memo for Pres
NSC/S C 19 July 84 NFAR pers. from Matlock

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

84 JUN 14 P 2: 34

June 14, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Chernenko's June 6 Letter and Dobrynin's
Talking Points: Analysis

I would like to share with you my analysis of Chernenko's reply to your last letter and to the points Dobrynin handed over in my meeting last Tuesday.

These communications basically contain nothing new, and confirm my impression that the Soviets are currently uncertain about how to handle us. Since the letter was signed June 6, it does not respond to your Dublin speech. But your last letter already contained your offer to negotiate on non-use of force if they would negotiate on confidence-building measures at Stockholm. Meanwhile, we have put down two other new arms control negotiating proposals, on chemical weapons and in MBFR. The Soviet reaction has been to pull out of the Olympics and to ratchet up their propaganda campaign, while claiming privately that they are willing to move forward (and agreeing to another round of talks on minor consular issues). In this letter and these points, Chernenko repeats the general argument that they want to move forward and we do not, but offers practically nothing to back it up.

Chernenko's language is correct and non-polemical. In response to your effort to explain why we see a threat in many Soviet actions, he goes on at length with a familiar rendition of Soviet complaints about us (encirclement with bases, INF missiles at their doorstep, etc.). The core theme is that we refuse to treat the USSR as an "equal."

On the security side, Chernenko basically reiterates the same tired agenda of one-sided arms control proposals as the solution to the problems in the relationship. On regional issues, he calls for restraint and says Dobrynin will present some "specific considerations" on our proposals for talks, but all Dobrynin had to say was that they are willing to listen to our views on southern Africa and the Middle East/Persian Gulf before deciding whether they will sit down for actual exchanges of views.

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As in previous letters, Chernenko leaves bilateral issues to others, i.e. Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, but even here Dobrynin had mainly complaints that we are not moving on the things they care about, like fishing allocations and Aeroflot flights to the U.S. However, he also promised to get back to us soon on our proposals for new rounds of talks on hotline upgrade and the Pacific maritime boundary and for talks on search and rescue operations in the northern Pacific.

Finally, Chernenko closes with a complaint that you keep injecting Soviet internal affairs -- meaning human rights -- into your letters.

On the arms control side, there are a few items of detail worth pointing out:

-- In terms of the emphasis given to various arms control items, the "Chernenko agenda" as it now stands is: negotiations on outer space arms control; renouncing construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems; limitations on naval activities and naval armaments (a recent Gromyko "initiative"); non-use of force; and nuclear testing.

-- On non-use of force, Chernenko is careful: he touts their proposal for a Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty on non-use of force, which they propose to discuss separately from the Stockholm conference; he next talks about chemical weapons and MBFR, and only then turns to Stockholm, where he expresses the hope that "the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions." Dobrynin's points do not mention non-use of force at all. This suggests there may be some unresolved differences between Chernenko and Gromyko on how to handle your offer to discuss non-use of force together with our confidence-building measures in Stockholm. (Their negotiator in Stockholm is being almost totally non-committal at this point.)

-- Finally, both communications promise to negotiate on chemical weapons in Geneva and MBFR in Vienna, even though they are very skeptical of our offers, but Dobrynin's points turn down our offer of private discussions here on either issue "in view of the character of the latest American proposals." In other words, they accept bilateral discussions, but only at the negotiating sites.

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In sum, then, the Soviets have given us a mixed but, on balance, a poor showing. The tone is defensive, and so is the content. This is not surprising: they are on the defensive because we have the initiative in most aspects of our relationship. I found it interesting that Dobrynin -- in his remarks -- insisted so strongly that they "are not afraid to be seen negotiating with this Administration," and that they can do business even this year. But there may be some daylight between him and Moscow, where they continue to appear unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the substantial agenda you have put forward. So, despite Dobrynin's complaint about accusations that they are "hibernating," I think that remains a fairly accurate description of what they are doing.

To sustain our initiative, I think you should respond fairly quickly to Chernenko's message, and I will be sending you a draft in the next week or so. Overall, our response should be to keep pressing them both privately and publicly, as you did so successfully in your Dublin speech.

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His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
The President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

In connection with your letter I would like to express some thoughts in continuation of our exchange of views with you.

I, of course, took note of the pledge of commitment to the lessening of tensions between our countries made by you in the handwritten addition to your letter. In turn, I can affirm once again what I wrote in my first letter to you -- namely, that it has been and continues to be our wish that there be a turn toward steady, good relations between the USSR and the USA. As a matter of fact, the numerous specific proposals submitted by our side, including those proposals put forward in my letters to you, have been aimed at reaching that very objective.

As regards interpreting a certain period in the history of our relations, about which you had already written once before, here our views differ. We have presented our point of view in this regard, so I will not repeat myself. I will note, however, that one side's having military superiority or seeking such superiority cannot be perceived by the other side as an indication of good intentions. There can be only one indication -- a willingness to conduct affairs as equals, a willingness reflected in practical policies. The position of the Soviet Union in this regard is clear and precise: we are not seeking superiority, but we will not allow superiority over us. I do not see anything here that should be unacceptable to the United States, if one wants stability and a lessening of tensions. It is from a position of equality that it is possible to agree on really mutually-acceptable solutions, when neither side can have reason to believe that it is making unilateral concessions.

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I thought it necessary to point this out, having in mind the way in which the intentions of the Soviet Union are interpreted in your letter. I cannot agree with this. This has already been stated on our side in the past. But since you return again to the question of intentions and how they can be perceived, I will express a few opinions, illustrating them with specific examples.

If one is to sum up what on many occasions has been publicly stated by you and other representatives of the Administration, one concludes that the only situation that would be acceptable to the United States would be one in which it was militarily ahead of the USSR. The fact of the matter, however, is that such a situation has not been and is not acceptable to us. In this respect we have experience -- bitter experience. The history of our relations, especially in the postwar period, has seen quite a few complications too. Quite a few attempts have been made to exert political, economic, and even military pressure on us.

Let us take the current situation. There is, it seems, an American idiom "to turn the table." Try to look at the realities of the international situation from our end. And at once one will see distinctly that the Soviet Union is encircled by a chain of American military bases. These bases are full of nuclear weapons. Their mission is well known -- they are targeted on us. Nothing like it can be found around your country.

And what about the fact that entire regions of the globe have been proclaimed spheres of American vital interests? And not only proclaimed, but made the object of a U.S. military presence. And this is done, among other places, at our very doorstep. And again we, for our part, are not doing anything

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like it. What conclusions should we draw from this as to the intentions of the U.S.? I believe the conclusions readily present themselves. Such an approach is nothing other than a hypertrophied idea of one's interests in which the legitimate interests of others are completely ignored, an effort to gain, to put it mildly, positions of privilege at the expense of the other side. This approach is not compatible with the objective of ensuring stability. On the contrary, such an approach as a matter of policy objectively helps to create and sustain tensions.

Or let us take strategic arms. Here, too, no claims can be directed toward the Soviet Union. The fact that there is rough parity between the USSR and the USA and, in a wider sense, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, can be disputed by no expert familiar with the situation. The SALT-2 Treaty was a reflection of this fact. It was not the end of the road, and we did not consider it as such. But the merit of the treaty was, among other things, that it established, I would say, with mathematical precision the strategic balance that has evolved.

Your military experts can tell you that the Soviet Union has done nothing to upset this balance. At the same time we see what kind of attitude is displayed toward the Treaty by the other side. Is it not the criterion by which to judge its intentions?

The same applies as well to medium-range nuclear forces in Europe. I will recall only that it was we who offered to reduce their number to the minimum on the side of the USSR and NATO. In response, "Persings" and cruise missiles are appearing near our borders. How would you regard it, Mr. President, had something similar happened with respect to the U.S.? I believe

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that your assesment of the intentions of the other side under the circumstances could only be one -- as regards both the other side's approach to negotiations and the essence of its intentions.

But even under these circumstances we have displayed and continue to display utmost restraint. The response we were forced to take, in terms of its scope and character, has not gone beyond the limits necessary to neutralize the threat posed to us and our allies. Moreover, we propose to return to the initial situation and, instead of further unleashing an arms race, to address ourselves in a decisive fashion to curbing the arms race, and to radically limiting and reducing nuclear arms. This is far from imposing conditions. As a matter of fact, what is unfair about the two sides cancelling those measures whose effect was to heighten the level of nuclear confrontation and, conversely, to lessen global security? There can be nothing unfair or damaging for either side in this. A return to the previous situation in the present circumstances would constitute forward movement by both sides toward stabilizing the situation, toward the practical renewal of the entire process of limiting nuclear weapons that is of decisive importance for the future of international relations and for peace as such.

So far, however, we see no indication that the American side proceeds from such an assumption. Regrettably, nothing new on this major issue of the day can be found in your letter either. I say this not for the sake of polemics, but rather in the hope that you will still find it possible to appreciate the way out of the extremely grave situation that we are suggesting.

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From my correspondence with you, Mr. President, as well as from previous correspondence, one can conclude that, in general terms there seems to be an understanding on your part that there are a number of important questions concerning the problem of security which require solutions and where joint efforts by our two countries are necessary.

For my part, in my last message I specifically mentioned several of these questions. Let me remind you that these included renouncing the construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems, entering into negotiations on preventing the militarization of outer space and on banning anti-sattelite weapons, a freeze on nuclear weapons, resuming talks on a complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, and some other measures. In other words, we are not for dialogue in a general sense between our two countries, but propose to fill it with concrete, weighty substance. We are convinced that practical movement in these and other directions and mutual determination to achieve practical results would fundamentally ease the situation in our relations and throughout the world in general. The degree of trust would increase significantly.

But we have not received a response to these proposals that would enable us to say that the United States is prepared for such concrete actions. I will not make a judgment as to what is the problem here, but I am convinced that, seriously speaking, there is no good reason and, moreover, no justification for avoiding the solution of problems that can play a decisive role in determining the road the world will take in the near future. Awareness of this is growing on the part of the public and the leaders of many states. Graphic evidence of this is the recent appeal by the leaders of six countries from four continents to the governments of the nuclear powers. Mr. President, this

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appeal is a very serious reminder, to our countries as well, of the enormous responsibility they bear for the destinies of the world and mankind. Our common duty is to respond to this appeal honestly, without delay, and through concrete actions. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared for it.

In addition to those of our proposals already mentioned, I would also like to draw your attention to additional areas of possible cooperation in the interests of strengthening peace. One of these is the limitation of naval activity and naval armaments. This problem is very urgent; it is no coincidence that the United Nations has attached such importance to it as well. We have specific ideas on what could be done to reduce the growing tensions on the high seas, to ensure freedom of navigation and the safety of international sea communications. We have spoken in favor of discussing this problem within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament or in separate multilateral negotiations. Taking into account the role of our countries, we also propose to discuss this set of questions on a bilateral basis. We would like to know your opinion on this score.

Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact countries recently made a proposal to NATO countries to begin multilateral consultations on the subject of concluding a Treaty on mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. The essence and the importance of the idea of such a Treaty are well known. Attention to this proposal has been growing from the moment of its introduction. And here our two countries could also play an important part. We are ready to study any ideas the American side might have on this question.

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The Soviet Union will, furthermore, do everything in its power to promote agreements on the problem of banning chemical weapons and on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Our delegations in Geneva and Vienna will be prepared to cooperate with American representatives. It goes without saying that, within the framework of these fora, we shall also express in detail our views on recent positions advanced by the American side. However, I have to note that the overall impression -- and not only ours -- is that these positions do not constitute a constructive contribution to the work already done in these fora.

Recently the Soviet Union introduced at the Stockholm conference a concrete and carefully balanced document directed at attaining a really significant agreement, which would fundamentally strengthen security on the European continent. In preparing this document, we took into account the opinions expressed at the first round of the conference as well as in the course of bilateral consultations, including those with American representatives. We would like to expect that in Stockholm the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions.

As it has already been pointed out on our part in correspondence with you, we favor a bilateral exchange of opinions on regional matters. Our Ambassador is instructed to present to the Secretary of State more specific considerations on these and some other matters. Here I find it necessary to stress the main point: the need for restraint, for refraining from actions -- no matter what their motives -- which could only intensify dangerous tensions in various regions and make difficult the achievement of a just political settlement. The world has proven more than once that it is a hundred times more difficult to extinguish a fire than to prevent it. To remember this is in everyone's interests.

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I do not want to conclude this letter on a negative note, but in view of some of the remarks in your letter, I must point out that introduction into relations between states of questions concerning solely domestic affairs of our country or yours does not serve the task of improving these relations -- if this is our goal. I wish questions of such a nature did not burden our correspondence, which both of us, as I understand it, value.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

Moscow
June 6, 1984

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Его Превосходительству
Рональду У. Рейгану,
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
Вашингтон

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NLS F95-074/2 #42

BY h05, NARA, DATE 10/25/00

Уважаемый господин Президент,

В связи с Вашим письмом хотел бы высказать некоторые соображения в продолжение нашего с Вами обмена мнениями.

Я, конечно, обратил внимание на заверение в приверженности делу снижения напряженности между нашими странами, о чем говорится в сделанном Вами рукописном добавлении к тексту письма. В свою очередь могу вновь подтвердить то, о чем я писал еще в первом письме Вам, а именно — поворот к равным, добрым отношениям между СССР и США был и остается нашим желанием. Собственно, эту цель и преследуют те многочисленные конкретные предложения, которые выдвигались с нашей стороны, в том числе в моих письмах Вам.

Что же касается интерпретации определенного этапа в истории наших отношений, о чем Вы однажды уже писали, то здесь наши оценки расходятся. Мы излагали свою точку зрения на этот счет и повторяться не стану. Отмечу, однако, что наличие военного преимущества у одной стороны или стремление к таковому не может восприниматься другой стороной как показатель наличия добрых намерений. Здесь может быть лишь один показатель — готовность вести дела на равных, готовность, выраженная в практической политике. Такова ясная и четкая позиция Советского Союза: мы не стремимся к преимуществу, но и не допустим его над собой. Не вижу, что здесь может быть неприемлемым для Соединенных Штатов, если желать стабильности, снижения напряженности. С позиций равенства можно договариваться о действительно взаимоприемлемых решениях, когда ни у одной из сторон не может быть причин считать, что она идет на односторонние уступки.

Я счел необходимым отметить это, имея в виду и то, как в Вашем письме интерпретируются намерения Советского Союза. Я не

могу с этим согласиться. В прошлом с нашей стороны об этом уже говорилось. Но коль скоро Вы опять возвращаетесь к вопросу о намерениях и как они могут представляться, выскажу некоторые суждения, проиллюстрировав их конкретными примерами.

Если обобщить то, что не раз публично заявлялось Вами, другими представителями администрации, то получается, что США устраивало только такое положение, когда в военном отношении они были впереди СССР. Но дело в том, что нас-то такое положение не устраивало и не устраивает. На этот счет у нас есть опыт и опыт тяжелый. Немало было осложнений и в истории отношений наших стран, особенно в послевоенный период. Немало было попыток оказать на нас политическое, экономическое, да и военное давление.

А возьмите нынешнее положение. Есть, кажется, такое американское выражение "развернуть стол". Постарайтесь взглянуть на реальности международной обстановки с нашего конца. И сразу станет отчетливо видно, что Советский Союз окружен цепью американских военных баз. На этих базах полно ядерного оружия. Предназначение его известно — оно нацелено против нас. Ничего подобного вокруг Вашей страны нет.

А то, что целые районы земного шара объявляются сферой американских жизненных интересов? И не просто объявляются, а становятся объектом военного присутствия США. И это происходит в том числе у самого нашего порога. Опять-таки мы со своей стороны ничего подобного не делаем. Какие из этого выводы должны мы делать относительно намерений США? Полагаю, они напрашиваются сами собой. Такая линия есть не что иное, как гипертрофированное представление о своих интересах, когда полностью игнорируются законные интересы других, как стремление получить, мягко выражаясь, привилегированные позиции за счет другой стороны. Не совмещается это с целями достижения стабильности. Напротив, такая линия в политике объективно ведет к созданию и поддержанию напряженности.

Или взять стратегические вооружения. И здесь не может быть никаких претензий к Советскому Союзу. То, что между СССР и США, а в широком смысле между странами Варшавского Договора и НАТО есть примерный паритет, не станет оспаривать ни один знающий

положение дел специалист. Отражением этого явился договор ОСВ-2. Да, это был не конец пути. И мы так не считали. Но его достоинство, помимо прочего, в том, что в нем было, я бы сказал, с математической точностью зафиксировано сложившееся стратегическое равновесие.

Ваши военные эксперты могут сказать, что Советский Союз не сделал ничего, чтобы нарушить равновесие. В то же время мы видим, какое отношение проявляется к этому договору с другой стороны. Разве это не критерий, чтобы судить о ее намерениях?

То же самое относится и к ядерным средствам средней дальности в Европе. Напомню лишь, что именно мы предлагали сократить их до минимума на стороне СССР и НАТО. В ответ вблизи наших границ появляются "Першинги" и крылатые ракеты. Как бы Вы, господин Президент, отнеслись, случись подобное применительно к США? Думаю Ваша оценка намерений другой стороны в этом случае была бы однозначной — как в отношении ее подхода к переговорам, так и в том, что касается ее намерений по существу.

Но даже в этих условиях мы проявили и проявляем максимум выдержки. Наша вынужденная ответная реакция по своему объему и характеру не выходит за рамки нейтрализации создаваемой нам и нашим союзникам угрозы. Более того, мы предлагаем вернуться к изначальному положению и вместо развертывания гонки вооружений решительно заняться ее свертыванием, радикальным ограничением и сокращением ядерных вооружений. Это отнюдь не выдвижение каких-то условий. Собственно говоря, что несправедливого в том, что обе стороны отменили бы свои мероприятия, в результате которых уровень ядерного противостояния повысился, а степень всеобщей безопасности напротив, понизилась? Ничего несправедливого или ущербного ни для одной стороны в этом быть не может. Возврат к прежнему положению в данном случае был бы движением обеих сторон вперед в направлении стабилизации положения, к практическому возобновлению всего процесса ограничения ядерных вооружений, имеющего решающее значение для будущего международных отношений, для мира как такового.

Пока, однако, мы не видим признаков того, что американская сторона исходит из такой предпосылки. К сожалению, в этом главное

сейчас вопросе не обнаруживается нового и в Вашем письме. Говорю об этом не ради полемики, а в надежде, что Вы все же сможете оценить предлагаемый нами выход из крайне серьезного положения.

Из нашей с Вами, господин Президент, да и предыдущей переписки можно сделать вывод, что с Вашей стороны в общем плане вроде бы есть понимание, что имеется целый ряд крупных вопросов, относящихся к проблеме безопасности, которые требуют решения и где необходимы совместные усилия наших двух стран.

Со своей стороны в предыдущем послании я конкретно назвал несколько таких вопросов. Напомню, речь шла об отказе от создания широкомасштабных систем противоракетной обороны, о вступлении в переговоры относительно недопущения милитаризации космоса и запрещении противоспутникового оружия, о замораживании ядерного оружия, возобновлении переговоров о всеобщем и полном запрещении испытаний ядерного оружия и о некоторых других мерах. Иными словами, мы не вообще за диалог между нашими странами, а предлагаем наполнить его конкретным весомым содержанием. Мы убеждены, что практическое продвижение по этим и другим направлениям, взаимная нацеленность на практические результаты коренным образом разрядили бы обстановку и в наших отношениях, и в международном плане в целом. Значительно повысилась бы и степень доверия.

Но мы не получили на эти наши предложения отклика, который позволял бы говорить, что Соединенные Штаты готовы к таким конкретным действиям. Не стану судить, в чем здесь дело, но убежден, что по большому счету ничем нельзя обосновать и тем более оправдать уход от решения проблем, которые могут сыграть определяющую роль в том, по какому пути пойдет мир уже в ближайшем будущем. Осознание этого все глубже внедряется в умах общественности и руководителей многих государств. Наглядное подтверждение тому — недавний призыв к правительствам ядерных держав руководителей шести государств, представляющих четыре континента. Господин президент, этот призыв — очень серьезное напоминание, в том числе нашим странам, о той огромной ответственности, которая лежит на них за судьбы мира, человечества. Наша общая обязанность —

откликнуться на этот призыв честно, незамедлительно, конкретными действиями. Со своей стороны Советский Союз к этому готов.

Помимо уже излагавшихся нами предложений, хотел бы обратить Ваше внимание и на дополнительные области возможного взаимодействия в интересах укрепления мира. Одна из них — ограничение военно-морской деятельности и морских вооружений. Проблема эта весьма актуальна, не случайно ей придала такое значение и Организация Объединенных Наций. У нас есть конкретные идеи, что можно было бы сделать для снижения растущей напряженности на морях, для надежного обеспечения свободы мореплавания, безопасности международных морских коммуникаций. Мы высказались за возможность обсуждения указанной проблемы в рамках женевской конференции по разоружению или на отдельных многосторонних переговорах. С учетом роли наших стран мы предлагаем обсудить комплекс этих вопросов и в двустороннем плане. Хотелось бы узнать Ваше мнение на этот счет.

Далее. Недавно страны Варшавского Договора предложили странам НАТО приступить к многосторонним консультациям на предмет заключения договора о взаимном неприменении военной силы и поддержании тишины мира. Существо и значение идеи такого договора известны. С момента выдвижения этого предложения внимание к нему растет. И здесь наши две страны также могли бы сыграть большую роль. Мы готовы изучить соображения, которые могут быть у американской стороны по данному вопросу.

Советский Союз будет и дальше делать все от него зависящее для продвижения к договоренностям по проблеме запрещения химического оружия, а также относительно сокращения вооруженных сил и вооружений в Центральной Европе. Наши делегации в Женеве и Вене будут готовы сотрудничать с американскими представителями. Разумеется, в рамках этих форумов мы детально выскажемся и по недавним позициям, изложенным с американской стороны. Должен, однако, отметить, что общее впечатление — и не только наше — таково, что эти позиции не представляют собой конструктивного вклада в уже проделанную на указанных форумах работу.

Советский Союз недавно выступил на стокгольмской конференции с конкретным и тщательно сбалансированным документом, направленным

на достижение действительно значимой договоренности, которая ко-
ренным образом укрепила бы безопасность на европейском континенте.
При подготовке этого документа мы учитывали мнения, высказывавшие-
ся на первом раунде конференции, а также в ходе двусторонних кон-
сультаций, в том числе с американскими представителями. Мы хотели
бы рассчитывать, что Соединенные Штаты займут в Стокгольме позицию
которая позволит договориться о взаимоприемлемых решениях.

Как уже указывалось с нашей стороны в переписке с Вами, мы за
двусторонний обмен мнениями по региональным проблемам. Нашему пос-
лу поручается изложить госсекретарю более конкретные соображения
по этим и некоторым другим вопросам. Здесь же я считаю необходи-
мым подчеркнуть главное — необходимость сдержанности и недопущения
действий, какими бы мотивами они ни диктовались, которые могли бы
лишь усиливать опасную напряженность в тех или иных районах, за-
трудняя достижение справедливого политического урегулирования.
Мир не раз убеждался, что гасить вспыхнувший пожар во сто крат
труднее, чем предотвратить его. Помнить об этом — в интересах все-

У меня нет желания заканчивать это послание на негативной
ноте, но с учетом некоторых высказываний, содержащихся в Вашем
письме, вынужден заметить, что привнесение в межгосударственные
отношения вопросов, касающихся сугубо внутренних дел нашей или
вашей страны, не отвечает задаче выправления этих отношений, если
такова наша цель. Хотелось бы, чтобы вопросы такого рода не отяго-
щали и нашу с Вами переписку, которую мы оба, как я понимаю, цени-

С уважением,

К. ЧЕРНЕНКО

Москва

6 июня 1984 года

talking points

First. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the solution of major questions, including new ones, set forth in the message of K.U.Chernenko would be of principal importance from the point of view of improving the Soviet-American relations and the international situation in general. Thus we again confirm in the practical way the line toward conducting a businesslike exchange of views with the Government of the United States with the aim of achieving constructive agreements on a wide range of issues in the Soviet-American relations. It concerns both the questions of strengthening security and ending the arms race as well as the area of bilateral relations.

Up till now, however, the American side acts in such a way that we do not see its readiness to go forward in practice to improving our relations, though quite a few words about such readiness have been said recently. The repeated promises to do something positive are not followed by anything tangible as yet.

At the same time it is often said that the American side allegedly introduces some concrete proposals, but the Soviet side reacts to them negatively. It is stated even as if we consciously counteract to some constructive efforts by the Administration and do not want progress in our relations. It is obvious for us that the situation is just the opposite. It is not clear, however, why a deliberately false impression is created, if, indeed, there is a desire to find a common language.

It is known, by whose initiative the Soviet-American relations were brought to such a mediocre shape. If an unbiased approach is used, there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless, not once we proposed to revive our relations and to fill them with concrete contents. These questions have been discussed with the Secretary of State many times.

If businesslike views in this regard were expressed by the American side,--and promises of such nature were given many times,--then, by all means, we would consider them with due attention.

We wish only that it could be something specific and not simply symbolics presented as something positive in the way of formal extension of some agreements which are in fact not

working. For example, we are told for some time already that a question of allocating fishing quotas for us is being considered. But at the same time, as we find out, measures of the opposite nature are being taken. Is it not the decision on limiting the activity of the joint Soviet-American fishing company on the Pacific coast that speaks about it?

There are attempts to attribute to us the desire to curtail the contacts and ties, including the area of scientific and cultural exchanges. However, the situation here as well rests on the position and acts of the American side. It rests on its unreadiness to solve the question of providing security for Soviet participants in such exchanges and normal conditions for their presence in the US. It is a question of principle and it cannot be avoided. It is again proven by recent hostile acts against Soviet people in the US. The American side also avoids the solution of the question concerning the practical side of such exchanges, connected with the resumption of the flights by the Aeroflot to the United States.

Now the American side keeps some kind of rosters of questions, replies to which should be given by this or that side. But even if to approach the situation with this formal point of view, it still turns out that we constructively develop our position and introduce concrete proposals, while the American side limits itself to promises to think about something and to consider something.

On the Soviet side there is no lack of desire and efforts to really improve the situation in our relations. It is up to the American side.

Second. Questions of security.

The Soviet position on the question of preventing the militarization of outer space has been already presented quite clearly to the Secretary of State. We proceed from the idea that formal negotiations on this matter should start between especially appointed delegations. The organizational side of such

negotiations should be discussed through the diplomatic channels. In other words now the question is this: is the American side prepared to solve this urgent problem, which long ago has already gone because of its importance beyond the framework of the Soviet-American relations only?

A proposal has been introduced by the Soviet side that both sides should reject the very idea of developing and deploying large-scale antiballistic missile defense systems. We would be ready to discuss the means of realization of this proposal - for example to discuss the substance and the form of appropriate statements, the order of making them public, etc.

Our position with regard to the question of the treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions is also clear. The treaties were carefully worked out including the part concerning control. They were signed and should be put in force. There is no necessity in any additional interpretation of any provisions of the treaties. The questions, should the sides have them in the future as the treaties are in force, could be considered and solved in accordance with relevant provisions of those treaties themselves. The issue now is only whether the American side is or is not willing to ratify these treaties. We favor doing this and as far as possible without further delay.

The Soviet side attributes great significance to the banning of chemical weapons, to the reduction of the armed forces and the armaments in Central Europe. These questions must be solved. Our specific considerations in connection with the latest proposals of the United States concerning these questions will be stated by the Soviet representatives at the appropriate forums.

However, it may be said even now that the American position, unfortunately, does not give hope. We would like to think that the American side will properly take into account those observations and remarks which we and not only we shall express in Geneva and Vienna. There the Soviet delegations will be ready to maintain contact with the American side as before.

As for discussing these questions in some other manner, now there is no basis for that in view of the character of the latest American proposals.

Third. Regional problems. We repeatedly expressed our readiness to discuss with the American side regional problems named by it and other ones.

In this connection we are prepared to listen to the possible considerations of the American side in response to what has already been said by us on the South of Africa, and also on the situation in the Middle East and on the conflict between Iran and Iraq. In the future, depending on the progress made, we could agree to hold certain special meetings of our representatives as well. We do not exclude this.

As we have already pointed out, it is especially important that restraint be shown, no actions which could exacerbate the situation be taken. This concerns the above mentioned as well as other regions.

Fourth. The Soviet side intends in the nearest future to propose the date of the next round of negotiations on the convention line in the Bering sea. We expect that the American side has analyzed the results of the previous round and could take the position which would enable us to come to a just and mutually acceptable solution of this question.

We also intend to convey in the near future our views concerning the negotiations on cooperation in the search and rescue operations in the Northern part of the Pacific ocean.