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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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**File Folder:** Matlock Chron July 1984 [7/1-7/14]

**Date:** July 29, 1999

*Box 708875*

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                    | DATE    | RESTRICTION                       |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Memo               | Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill, re fishing [4877], 1p<br><i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #44</i>                       | 7/3/84  | <del>P1/F1</del>                  |
| 2. Memo               | "A Reordering...?", 3p<br><i>R 7/1/00 NLSF95-074/2 #45</i>                                                       | nd      | <del>P1/F1</del>                  |
| 3. Memo               | Robert McFarlane to the President, re Jesse Jackson and Sakharov [5190], 2p<br><i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #46</i> | nd      | <del>P1/F1</del>                  |
| 4. Memo               | Walt Raymond to Matlock, re Jackson-Sakharov, 1p                                                                 | 7/5/84  | <del>P5</del>                     |
| 5. Talking points     | draft, re Jackson and Sakharov, 1p                                                                               | nd      | <del>P5</del>                     |
| 6. Memo               | Matlock to McFarlane, re the Soviets, 3p<br><i>R 10/17/05 MO2-011 #26</i>                                        | 7/6/84  | <del>P1/F1</del><br><del>P5</del> |
| 7. Memo               | for Assistant to the President for NSA, re ship visit, 1p<br><i>R 11/5/99 NLSF95-074/2 #47</i>                   | 7/11/84 | <del>P1/F1</del>                  |
| 8. Routing slip       | with comments and notations, re item #9, 1p                                                                      | nd      | <del>P5</del>                     |
| 9. Memo               | Matlock to McFarlane, re establishing contact, 2p<br><i>R 10/17/05 MO2-011 #27</i>                               | 7/13/84 | <del>P1/F1</del><br><del>P5</del> |
| 10. Note              | re Anderson proposal, 1p<br><i>R 10/17/05 MO2-011 #28</i>                                                        | nd      | <del>P1/F1</del><br><del>P5</del> |
| 11. Memo              | Matlock to McFarlane, re status of negotiations [5434], 1p<br><i>R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #48</i>                  | 7/14/84 | <del>P1/F1</del>                  |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer** CAS

**Box Number** 5

**FOIA** M02-011

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1984 (7/1-7/14)

**DATE** 3/22/2007

| ID Doc Type        | Document Description                                          | No of Pages  | Doc Date             | Restrictions |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------|
| <del>6 MEMO</del>  | <del>MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIETS (#26)</del>              | <del>3</del> | <del>7/6/1984</del>  |              |
| <del>9 MEMO</del>  | <del>MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ESTABLISHING CONTACT (#27)</del> | <del>2</del> | <del>7/13/1984</del> |              |
| <del>10 NOTE</del> | <del>RE ANDERSON PROPOSAL (#28)</del>                         | <del>1</del> | <del>ND</del>        |              |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4877

VIA LDX

July 3, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship (C)

The recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce in the memorandum from Mr. Hill to Mr. McFarlane of April 28, 1984, have been approved. These steps are:

1. Restoration of a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
2. Permission for further joint ventures providing there are no overriding security problems. (C)

Any steps taken should be coordinated in normal fashion with the appropriate internal security agencies. (C)

The proposed press release should be submitted to the NSC for approval. (C)

*Robert M. Kimmitt*  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #44

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Press Release on  
US-USSR Fishing Relationship

The President has decided to grant the USSR a directed fishing allocation in the U.S. exclusive economic zone of approximately 50,000 tons and we have so informed the Soviets. This decision is taken in the framework of continuing cooperation between the two countries in the fisheries area, and will directly benefit U.S. fishermen involved in an existing joint fishing venture. It will also provide them with enhanced opportunities to benefit from Soviet technology and expertise in fishing.

This decision is consistent with the President's policy of promoting a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and facilitating non-strategic trade exchanges.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~DECL: OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By R. V. V. V. NARA, Date 6/22/99

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8405041

RECEIVED 03 JUL 84 08

TO

MC FARLANE

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOC DATE 02 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

CM

OGARKOV, MARSHAL N

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF OGARKOV INTERVIEW RE REORDERING OF SOVIET MILITARY  
PRIORITIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 05 JUL 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

KIMMITT

THOMPSON

COMMENTS

Sent to McFarlane earlier - AFM 7/3/84

REF# 8418467

LOG

NSC/FID

( CM )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

NSC/S

C

3 July

NFAR per JM note

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Caspar W. Weinberger ---- 8418465  
Secretary  
Department of Defense

Mr. William J. Casey ----- 8418466  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane ---- 8418467  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities

The attached analysis of Ogarkov's views of current and emergent Soviet military priorities caught my attention. I would be interested in your reactions.

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By *d Vitt* NARA, Date *6/22/99*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: QADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM: A Reordering of Soviet Military Priorities?

On May 9 (Victory Day), the Soviet military newspaper, Red Star, published a lengthy and authoritative interview with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff (relevant section attached). U.S. commentary on this interview has focused on the relative moderation of Ogarkov's anti-American rhetoric. A not unrelated, but much more distinctive and noteworthy feature of the interview is its implicit questioning of some long-established Soviet military priorities.

Unlike most other recent Soviet commentaries on defense matters (including those by other Soviet marshals), the Ogarkov interview does not dwell on the threat posed by the deployment of Pershings and GLCM's and the modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. On the contrary, Ogarkov describes our continuing nuclear buildup as "senseless," since the already existing "overkill" capacity on both sides has made it "impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike." No matter how destructive an initial attack, the victim will "inevitably" retain enough weapons for "a crushing retaliatory strike -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage."

In the absence of corroborating evidence, it would clearly be unwarranted to conclude that Ogarkov has been converted from a proponent of nuclear war-fighting (the long-established Soviet military doctrine) to a proponent of mutual assured destruction. But he has gone out of his way to discount the military significance of the alleged U.S. quest for nuclear superiority. One can infer from his argument that there is no urgent need either to cap the U.S. nuclear buildup through early arms-control agreements or to respond to that buildup through matching nuclear countermeasures. Despite new U.S. programs, a continuing nuclear standoff can be taken for granted so long as the Soviet Union maintains a survivable retaliatory ("second-strike") force and the U.S. lacks reliable strategic defenses. (Notably, Ogarkov says nothing whatever about the SDI.)

Ogarkov's disparagement of a U.S. first-strike threat is accompanied by obvious concern about an adverse shift in the conventional balance. He argues at length that conventional weaponry is on the threshold of a technological revolution that will radically transform current methods of waging war. Furthermore, he clearly implies that the U.S. has built a considerable lead in conventional modernization, thereby threatening to deprive the Soviets of a long-standing and potentially decisive competitive advantage. In Ogarkov's judgment, this is a threat that must be addressed "right now" -- with such urgency and concentration that other established priorities are bound to suffer in the absence of a sizeable increase in military spending.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F95-074/2 #45  
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Although Ogarkov may well be a proponent of such an increase, in this interview he seems to take it as a given that the Soviet military can not afford both a crash program in conventional weaponry and an accelerating buildup of its nuclear capabilities. If this is regrettable, it is nonetheless a fact of life, a reflection of what Ogarkov describes as "an objective law discovered in his time by Frederick Engels" -- to wit, that "nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy." Fortunately, however, the unattainable is unlikely to prove indispensable. While Ogarkov clearly does not view the existence of a stable nuclear balance as a guarantee against the outbreak of a conventional war (the gravamen of his entire argument is precisely the contrary), his case nonetheless rests on an assumption that the current period is a period of relative security.

Ogarkov has been a leading contributor to Soviet efforts to generate a war-scare (something he probably finds useful, among other things, in pressing his overall budgetary claims). But in this interview he argues that it is possible to concentrate resources on the development and testing of necessarily uncertain emergent technologies and weapons systems because there is no clear and present danger of war. Attempts to argue the contrary within military circles are nothing more than poorly disguised expressions of illegitimate inter-service rivalry. More generally, they reflect precisely the sort of "conservatism and inertia" that must be "resolutely overcome" by leaders who appreciate Engels' further "discovery" that innovations in military affairs often have to be imposed "almost forcibly and against the will of the military command."

If this reading of Ogarkov's interview is correct, there are a number of implications that are worth bearing in mind and exploring further:

- The Soviet military is far from monolithic and traditional inter-service rivalries may have been considerably intensified as a result of work on the new Soviet Five Year Plan.
- Soviet economic stringencies are such that the Soviet high command faces -- and is more-or-less resigned to facing -- hard choices among competing weapons systems and mission priorities.
- The Soviet high command does not believe that the risk of war (let alone of a U.S. first strike) is particularly high.

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- The Soviet high command may not be as eager to cap the U.S. strategic buildup through a START agreement as we often suppose.
- Within the Soviet high command support for nuclear arms control may be strongest among conventional force commanders who feel it is more important to increase spending on conventional modernization than to match us nuclear missile for nuclear missile in a continuing cycle of deployments and counterdeployments.
- Pressing ahead with our conventional arms modernization programs may be one of our most effective means for limiting the modernization of Soviet strategic and theatre nuclear forces.
- The Soviets may be on the verge of launching conventional force modernization programs that will tip the conventional balance even further in their favor unless we in fact justify their apprehension and exploit our technological advantages in the field of conventional weaponry.

Attachment:

Relevant Section of Ogarkov Interview

## Ogarkov Interview

PM081625 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 84 First Edition pp 2-3

[Interview with MSU N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister: "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 is being celebrated widely and solemnly in our country today. On the eve of this great and resplendent holiday, the editorial office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA asked Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR first deputy defense minister, to answer a number of questions connected with the defense of socialism's gains.

Question: It is nearly 40 years since the Great Patriotic War. What changes have taken place in military matters in that time, and how are they taken into account in our military building, in the training of troops and fleets?

Answer: In his time, F. Engels discovered an objective law: "Nothing depends on economic conditions as much as the Army and Navy. Armaments, personnel, organization, tactics, and strategy depend, above all, on the level of production achieved at a given moment and on the means of communication," and "successes of technology, the moment they have become usable and have been applied in practice in military matters, have immediately -- almost forcibly, and often against the will of the military command -- caused changes and even revolutions in the methods of waging war."

In present-day conditions, this law is manifested with particular force. In the postwar years, several generations of weapons systems and combat hardware have already succeeded one another.

What do the basic changes in military matters consist of today?

First, the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons, which has continued over several decades, has led to radical qualitative changes in the conditions and potential for the use of these weapons. The stockpiles of nuclear ammunition and various means of delivery that the sides created have reached such a size and quality that they are sufficient to destroy all the important targets on enemy territory many times over in a short space of time.

For instance, in just one salvo (launch) of strategic (not counting battlefield) nuclear forces, the United States could today use about 12,000 nuclear charges with a total yield hundreds of times greater than the yield of all the explosives and ammunition used by all states throughout the 6 years of World War II. With the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe, this potential of U.S. strategic nuclear forces will further increase. You do not have to be a military man or a scientist to realize that a further buildup is becoming senseless. Nonetheless, this buildup is continuing, through the fault of the United States.

As a result, a paradox arises: On the one hand, it would seem, a process of steadily increasing potential for the nuclear powers to destroy the enemy is taking place, while on the other there is an equally steady and, I would say, even steeper reduction in the potential for an aggressor to inflict a so-called "disarming strike" on his main enemy. The point is, with the quantity and diversity of nuclear missiles already achieved, it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike. A crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor, even by the limited quantity of nuclear charges remaining to the defender -- a strike inflicting unacceptable damage -- becomes inevitable in present conditions. The calculation of the strategists across the ocean, based on the possibility of waging a so-called "limited" nuclear war, now has no foundation whatever. It is utopian: Any so-called limited use of nuclear facilities will inevitably lead to the immediate use of the whole of the sides' nuclear arsenal. That is the terrible logic of war. Their arguments about the possibility of a so-called "limited nuclear strike without retaliation" against the enemy's main centers and control points are even more groundless. Such arguments are pure fantasy. Put together, all this substantially changes both the conditions for the outbreak of modern warfare and the potential for waging it.

Second, rapid changes in the development of conventional means of destruction and the emergence in the developed countries of automated reconnaissance-and-strike complexes, long-range high-accuracy terminally guided combat systems, unmanned flying machines, and qualitatively new electronic control systems make many types of weapons global and make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness. The sharply increased range of conventional weapons makes it possible to immediately extend active combat operations not just to the border regions, but to the whole country's territory, which was not possible in past wars. This qualitative leap in the development of conventional means of destruction will inevitably entail a change in the nature of the preparation and conduct of operations, which will in turn predetermine the possibility of conducting military operations using conventional systems in qualitatively new, incomparably more destructive forms than before.

There is a sharp expansion in the zone of possible combat operations, and the role and significance of the initial period of the war and its initial operations become incomparably greater. A new war, should imperialism unleash it, will certainly be strikingly different in nature from the last war.

Third, the rapid development of science and technology in recent years creates real preconditions for the emergence in the very near future of even more destructive and previously unknown types of weapons based on new physical principles.

Work on these new types of weapons is already in progress in a number of countries, for example, in the United States. Their development is a reality of the very near future, and it would be a serious mistake not to consider it right now. This, in turn, cannot fail to change established notions of the methods and forms of armed struggle and even of the military might of the state.

This is a short list of only the basic changes currently taking place in the means of armed struggle. They are inevitably exerting their influence on the nature of war and the role and place of the branches of the Armed Forces in resolving operational and strategic tasks and on the further development and improvement of forms and methods of conducting military operations and military affairs as a whole.

All this must unconditionally be the subject of constant and in-depth analysis and must be generalized and taken into account in the practical building of our Armed Forces.

In consideration of this, the technical equipping, organizational building, and management of our Armed Forces are effected in such a way that they are always ready under any conditions to deal an immediate counterstrike against any aggressor. This capability must be guaranteed in all instances. The main component of the combat might of the Army and Navy and the basic factor in curbing the aggressor are our strategic nuclear forces, which are in a state of constant high combat readiness. All branches of the Armed Forces and categories of troops are developing harmoniously with them and are being equipped with the most modern weapons and combat hardware.

There is also a simultaneous process of honing and improving the system of operational, combat, and political training of troops and fleets; the procedure for mobilizing and provisioning them; troop and weapon control systems, and forms and methods of political-educational and party political work.

The Soviet Armed Forces' might is determined by not only the quantity but also the quality of their weapons and combat hardware. Our main strength is the Soviet people, who have an expert mastery of the awe-inspiring weapons entrusted to them by the motherland. Today, over 93 percent of our servicemen have secondary and higher education. Almost 90 percent of the servicemen are Communists and Komsomol members, who are transforming our Army and Navy into an invincible force.

The resolution of the tasks of military building and training of our Armed Forces is effected on the basis of comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the military-political situation and the development of the means of armed struggle. Therefore, our military cadres do not merely copy past experience, they use it creatively and enrich it. They must constantly improve the training and organizational structure of troops and naval forces and conduct scientific quests to this end, taking into account the continuous changes in military affairs and, if necessary, taking justified risks. It is better to test new forms in peacetime than to seek them in the course of a war. Furthermore, there would now be no time for this. We military men must, as Comrade K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, points out, "resolutely overcome any conservatism and inertia"; for us in the military "the slogan of the day must be: From a correct idea, fully armed with experience, to bold actions!"

III. 9 May 84

R 21

USSR NATIONAL AFFAIRS  
POLITICAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

I would like to emphasize that the defense of the socialist motherland is the concern of every Soviet person, a concern of the entire people. In this connection, work to educate the Soviet people in accordance with revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions and train reliable and skillful defenders of the motherland, and the active participation in this work of our party, labor, war, and Army veterans, are of great importance.

The main source of the Soviet Armed Forces' strength and invincibility and an important condition of their further strengthening and development has always been and remains the leadership of the Communist Party and the unbreakable unity between the Army and the people. The CPSU, its Leninist Central Committee, and our government are doing everything necessary to ensure that the Soviet state's defense potential and its Armed Forces' combat might are abreast of present-day demands and that no eventuality can take us by surprise.

The grim years of the Great Patriotic War are receding further and further into the depths of history. A great deal has changed in the world in the almost 40 years since then. However, time cannot wipe out from the memory of grateful mankind the unparalleled feat of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces who, in an unprecedentedly fierce confrontation with a perfidious enemy, not only defended the socialist fatherland, but also saved the peoples of many countries from fascist enslavement. The memory of the millions of people who gave their lives for the great victory makes it imperative today to rally the forces of the world's peoples in the struggle against the perfidious designs of the forces of imperialism and reaction, against the instigators of a new war. The imperialist pretenders to world domination should not forget that history savagely punishes those who ignore its lessons.

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 3, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Ms. Cathy Marshall

I have reviewed and have no objection to the proposed response prepared by the Department of State to Ms. Cathy Marshall (Tab A). Ms. Marshall wrote the President on behalf of Mrs. Bernice Gajauskas regarding the plight of Mrs. Gajauskas' nephew, Balys Gajauskas -- a Lithuanian who has been in Soviet prisons most of his life.

Walt Raymond concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Sally Kelley.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt to Kelly memorandum

Tab A Incoming correspondence

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Ms. Cathy Marshall

We have reviewed and have no objection to the attached proposed response prepared by the Department of State to Ms. Cathy Marshall regarding the plight of an imprisoned Lithuanian in the Soviet Union -- Balys Gajauskas.

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

5/36

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8416580

Date June 30, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Ms. Cathy Marshall

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Subject: WRITES ON BEHALF OF MRS. BERNICE  
GAJAUSKAS, AUNT OF LITHUANIAN BALYS GAJAUSKAS, WHO HAS BEEN IN  
SOVIET PRISONS FOR MOST OF HIS LIFE

WH Referral Dated: June 7, 1984 NSC ID# 230338  
(if any)

\_\_\_\_\_ The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- \_\_\_\_\_ xx A draft reply is attached.
- \_\_\_\_\_ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- \_\_\_\_\_ A translation is attached.
- \_\_\_\_\_ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- \_\_\_\_\_ We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Other.

Remarks:

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

Dear Mrs. Gajauskas:

Ms. Cathy Marshall has written to the White House on your behalf concerning the tragic situation of your imprisoned nephew, Balys Gajauskas.

We have read the report on the "Case of Balys Gajauskas Human Rights Advocate and Prisoner of Conscience" and have been deeply moved by the sad plight of this brave man. I have informed the Department of State of our interest in this case and am certain that they will continue to give their full support to all the efforts to secure freedom for Mr. Gajauskas.

I wish that it would be possible to offer some concrete assurances that the Soviets will be responsive to the appeals on your nephew's behalf, but so far they have not taken any positive actions in this regard. Nevertheless, we will continue to seek ways to keep this case before the Soviet authorities.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Bernice Gajauskas  
942 10th Street,  
Santa Monica, California.

Dear Chuck:

I promised Mrs. Bernice Gajauskas, the aunt of Lithuanian, Baly's Gajauskas, who has been in Soviet prisons for most of his life, that I would see that a copy of the enclosed reached our friend in the White House.

I hope you don't mind. This woman, probably in her seventies by now, stormed capitol hill for many years on her nephew's behalf, and I worked with her when in Dornan's office. She now has parkinsons disease, but continues to call me about this case, and I just wish that there were something I could do for her.

If you have any ideas, it would be wonderful, but I realize dealing with the Russians is next to impossible. However, perhaps you could send a note to her?

Thanks Chuck

*Cathy M.*

Cathy Marshall  
6151 Occoquan Forest Dr.  
Manassas, VA 22111

Mrs. Bernice Gajauskas  
942 10th St.  
Santa Monica, CA 90403

CASE OF  
BALYS GAJAUSKAS  
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATE  
AND  
SOVIET PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE

Project Direction: James Platler Group, Santa Monica, CA  
3010 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 290  
Santa Monica, CA 90404  
213-393-1040

C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 3, 1984

Kay,

Here is the list:

*(left to right)*

Secretary Shultz

Dr. Herbert J. Ellison  
Secretary, The Kennan Institute

Mr. David Hamburg  
President, The Carnegie Corporation  
of New York

President

Dr. James<sup>H.</sup> Billington  
Director, The Wilson Center


Mr. Bradford Johnson  
Research Associate, The Kennan Institute

Mr. William J. Baroody  
Chairman of the Board, The Wilson Center

Amb. Matlock said he would be glad to forward  
the photos to Dr. Billington. However, if  
you want to do it the address is:

Dr. James H. Billington  
Director  
Woodrow Wilson International  
Center for Scholars  
1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20560

*Trav*



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 5, 1984

*Dissidents*ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Jesse Jackson and Sakharov

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President on this subject, with suggested talking points at TAB A.

I have discussed the matter with Mark Palmer at State and he agrees that this would be an appropriate course to take.

*W2* Walt Raymond, *vs* Karna Small and *unavailable.* Bob Sims concur.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Suggested Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *R. Valt* NARA, Date *6/22/99*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

5190

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

ACTION

NLS F95-074/2 #46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 11/6/00

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
SUBJECT: Jesse Jackson and Sakharov

Issue

Should you clarify your comments in the interview released yesterday regarding Jesse Jackson's proposal to seek the release of Sakharov?

Facts

The press has interpreted your remarks as suggesting that Jackson may be violating the law if he seeks the release of Sakharov. Members of the Sakharov family have publicly encouraged his efforts and are likely to demand that you assume the responsibility for securing his release if you appear to discourage efforts by private individuals.

Discussion

Since we are unable to make public our private efforts on behalf of Sakharov, and have no assurance that they will be successful, it is important to keep the onus for Sakharov's condition on the Soviet authorities and not allow public attention to be distracted by a debate on who does what. The Soviets have given no indication that there is any "give" in their position, and they would likely deny Jackson a visa to go to Moscow to discuss Sakharov. Therefore, any efforts Jackson would make are most unlikely to be successful.

We cannot totally exclude the possibility (though it seems remote) that the Soviets would in fact release Sakharov in an effort to embarrass you. In the unlikely event this should occur, however, we believe the fall-out would be manageable. And it would remove a major irritant in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

In any case, the situation will be more difficult to manage if Jackson can claim that he is prevented from attempting to secure Sakharov's release by your disapproval of his efforts. This could be interpreted as your assumption of responsibility for securing Sakharov's release, and if you failed some could reproach you.

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2

For these reasons, it seems desirable to clarify your position by indicating that you have no objection to Jackson making efforts to free Sakharov, so long as he does not involve himself in negotiation of matters which are the responsibility of the government.

Recommendation

OK    No

—      —      That you respond along the lines of the attached talking points when asked again by the press regarding your attitude toward Jackson and Sakharov.

Attachment:

TAB A    -- Suggested talking points

Prepared by:  
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Q. Why do you oppose Jesse Jackson's idea of approaching the Soviets regarding the release of Andrei Sakharov?

A. I do not oppose any efforts he, or any other private individuals, may make to persuade the Soviet authorities to resolve this tragic situation in a humane way.

-- What is important is that such private efforts be conducted in such a way that they do not confuse humanitarian issues such as this one with matters which are properly subject to negotiation between governments.

-- That is what I had in mind when I mentioned the Logan Act. Of course, I am as interested as anyone else in seeing this particular problem solved, and if it can be done without involving other matters, no one would be happier than I.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 5, 1984

TO: JACK MATLOCK  
FROM: WALT RAYMOND  
SUBJ: Jackson-Sakarov

I concur but believe that if you restrict your proposed Q&A to include the introductory statement and the 1st and 3rd ticks that that would be sufficient. In other words, I would delete ticks 2 and 4.

Ed Kline called. He indicated that one of the "downsides" of the President's statement, if taken literally, will lead other countries or parties to stand down. He indicated that the Yankelevichs report from France that there seems to be a sense in France the United States was working on the problem and that they (the French) would not have to take the lead. He is hopeful that there are diplomatic efforts underway but feared that the press today indicated that there was more activity than there really is.

## SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Q. Why do you oppose Jesse Jackson's idea of approaching the Soviets regarding the release of Andrei Sakharov?

A. I do not oppose any efforts he, or any other private individuals, may make to persuade the Soviet authorities to resolve this tragic situation in a humane way.

-- What is important is that such private efforts be conducted in such a way that they do not confuse humanitarian issues such as this one with matters which are properly subject to negotiation between governments.

-- I don't believe any of us should allow foreign governments to exploit our deep interest in finding humanitarian solutions to problems such as this by interfering in our election process or involving other, unrelated issues.

That is what I had in mind when I mentioned the Logan Act. Of course, I am as interested as anyone else in seeing this particular problem solved, and if it can be done without involving other matters, no one would be happier than I.

-- So I was just pointing out some pitfalls. I didn't mean that I would disapprove of an effort done the right way.

July 6, 1984

Q: What is going on now in terms of arms control talks in September? Will you send a delegation even if the Soviets say they will ONLY discuss ASAT?

A: We have accepted the proposal for a conference without preconditions. We are continuing discussions in diplomatic channels as to how to organize it.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 6, 1984

TO: KARNA SMALL  
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm*  
SUBJECT: Qs&As for Regional  
Editors and Broadcast-  
ers Presidential  
Luncheon

Attached.

July 6, 1984

Q: How do you assess the current mood in the Soviet Union? On the one hand they talk about possible talks, but on the other hand they detain our diplomats, won't discuss Sakharov, keep our Ambassador off the air, refuse to let NBC satellite its news reports -- what's going on?

A: They certainly are not being cooperative in creating an atmosphere for talks. But we have experienced this sort of thing before, and it illustrates the sort of problems we have in dealing with them. But we will be patient.

July 6, 1984

Q: What's wrong with Jesse Jackson going to the Soviet Union to try and free Andrei Sakharov or anyone else? If you can't do it, why don't you let somebody else try?

A: I have no problem with Reverend Jackson or any other American citizen making appeals on humanitarian causes. I think it is important, however, not to let these efforts involve areas in which it is the government's responsibility to negotiate. But if the effort avoids these pitfalls, I'm all for it.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

July 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: KARNA SMALI   
SUBJECT: Presidential Luncheon with Regional  
Editors and Broadcasters

The President will host a luncheon for regional editors and broadcasters on Monday, July 9. Some 20 camera crews are expected. While it is difficult to predict question areas, following are a few to which I would appreciate your providing answers. If you can think of any other questions that might come up, please include them. Since Bud will be briefing this same group prior to the President's luncheon, this material will also be given to him.

In order to be considered by the President, please submit your material to me no later than 10:00 a.m., tomorrow morning, Friday, July 6.

Many thanks.

① Q: What is going on now in terms of arms control talks in September? Will you send a delegation even if the Soviets say they will ONLY discuss ASAT?

② Q: How do you assess the current mood in the Soviet Union? On the one hand they talk about possible talks, but on the other hand they detain our diplomats, won't discuss Sakharov, keep our Ambassador off the air, refuse to let NBC satellite its news reports -- what's going on?

③ Q: What's wrong with Jesse Jackson going to the Soviet Union to try and free Andrei Sakharov or anyone else? If you can't do it, why don't you let somebody else try?

FOUNDER  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~Robert McFarlane  
GFL/WW  
HAND DELIVER~~

JACK MATLOCK  
EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED

5/84

National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_



|                  | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN           | DISPOSITION |
|------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| Dep. Exec. Sec'y | _____       | _____              | _____       |
| Bob Kimmitt      | _____       | _____              | _____       |
| John Poindexter  | <u>1</u>    | <u>[Signature]</u> | _____       |
| Tom Shull        | _____       | _____              | _____       |
| Wilma Hall       | _____       | _____              | _____       |
| Bud McFarlane    | <u>2</u>    | <u>M</u>           | <u>I</u>    |
| Bob Kimmitt      | _____       | _____              | _____       |
| NSC Secretariat  | _____       | _____              | _____       |
| Situation Room   | _____       | _____              | _____       |
| <u>JP</u>        | <u>3</u>    | <u>[Signature]</u> | _____       |

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Bud,  
Jack has some very thoughtful  
points here. The three of us  
should discuss. [Signature]*

July 6, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Adm. Poindexter

John -

A very preliminary draft with some thoughts we might discuss with Dad when he comes back next week.

I am also putting together some more detailed thoughts on how to organize for the Sept. conference, which we could discuss when you have time -

Jack

MEMORANDUM

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 6, 1984

EYES ONLY McFARLANE AND POINDEXTERINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: The Soviets: Where We Stand

I have the following miscellaneous (but interconnected) thoughts on the current state of play in our Soviet relations and how we might handle some of the issues tactically.

The September Meeting

The June 29 Soviet proposal and our quick response has put us in a very strong tactical position, both publicly and privately. We must move carefully to exploit our current advantages.

The Soviet response shows clearly that Gromyko has no intention of allowing a meeting to materialize in September unless we buy the Soviet position in full. However, he is coming on increasingly defensive, and may not be able to hew to this rigid position as the time approaches. Evidence is accumulating that his critics in Moscow may be becoming more assertive. If we play our cards right we may be able to achieve a breakthrough, and if not, undermine the Soviet position even further, with useful implications for 1985.

Publically, we should stick right where we are: we are placing no preconditions on the meeting, therefore assume it will take place, and are pursuing arrangements in diplomatic channels. This forces the Soviets to growl and concentrate on their preconditions, which are looking less and less tenable. Meanwhile, this relieves us of the immediate pressure to define our ASAT position, which is desirable tactically, since we need to squeeze the Soviets as much as we can in advance. Since they have proposed a conference, there is no rational argument in favor of our communicating in advance what our position is. To do so would only give Gromyko the ammunition to say it is inadequate and to shift attention from their intransigence to the alleged shortcomings of our substantive position.

This thought should also lie at the basis of our private communications with the Soviets. We should make our proposals general enough and ambiguous enough to provide no logical grounds for complaint (the diplomatic equivalent of a stealth design). One way to do this would be to propose an agenda whereby the first item would be the Soviet exposition of their proposals, and the second item the U.S. commentary and proposals, followed by a

*I agree with you especially in re Gromyko's need to find another way to measure the situation. We have to be careful.*

*Right on.*

Soviet commentary, etc. If we do not define the subjects precisely, it will be exceedingly difficult for the Soviets to argue that there are any preconditions, or that we are refusing to discuss their agenda.

As for the timing, if the conference begins September 18, we need to handle it so as to minimize the opportunity for the Soviets to break it off before November claiming U.S. intransigence. Therefore, there is an advantage in letting them go first, and instructing our delegation to ask frequent questions in order to maximize the amount of time necessary to get their position on the table. We could then take our time in commenting in detail and putting forth our thoughts. This process, if handled adroitly, could easily carry us into November without giving the Soviets ammunition to cry foul and break off. Such tactics would also drive home the point implicitly that they should expect little in the ASAT area until they start talking turkey on nuclear arms.

#### Gromyko's Role

The above is predicated on the assumption that Gromyko will retain his stranglehold on Soviet policy throughout this period, and that therefore our object should be to demonstrate the weakness of that policy while not damaging our own public image.

With every move on the U.S.-Soviet chessboard, my conviction deepens that Gromyko is in fact our principal problem, and that we are likely to make no significant progress until sufficient pressure is brought to bear on him from within the system to modify his approach.

Two recent straws in the wind support this interpretation. First, Strobe Talbot informed me that during his recent visit to Moscow, his interlocutors (mainly from the Institutes) put the finger on Gromyko quite explicitly. This came up in a discussion of the treatment given Scowcroft; all the Soviets said privately that the problem was the effort to secure a private audience with Chernenko, which caused Gromyko to "hit the ceiling." So far, nothing new, but what was surprising was that the Institute types added (when they were out of the office and walking in the park), that our analysis was quite correct; it is necessary to bypass Gromyko, and the only thing wrong with our effort was the way it was done, since it gave Gromyko the opportunity to block it. A quieter effort at a lower level might have worked, they observed.

Second, Robert Anderson informed me today that Velikhov had telephoned his assistant Hirsch twice since their visit to inquire about the fate of "point three" of Anderson's "Bering Straits" proposal. You will recall that Anderson had given them an off-the-cuff idea for a declaration regarding the Bering Straits, which included a proposal for a high-level binational commission to discuss this and other matters (TAB). The idea has many potential problems and probably is not worth pursuing on its merits, but I am struck by Velikhov's obvious and uncharacteristic interest. Could it be that a "commission" of some sort would provide a structure for those outside the MFA to interact with us on behalf of the Party and/or KGB? No other explanation comes readily to mind.

In sum, while it will be necessary for us to continue to play out the game with Gromyko, I am convinced that we are unlikely to find any real opening for a breakthrough, this year or next, unless we can get something going, very quietly, with other elements in the Soviet hierarchy. It should be obvious by now that we cannot do this with officials in the State Department, because Gromyko will always have the perfectly sound bureaucratic argument that it is his responsibility to deal with them. He is on much weaker ground in fending off counterpart-to-counterpart meetings, even if he should know about them in advance (which he will), and gets reports on what transpires.

The fact is that every senior official puts more credence in what his own staff produces than in what comes from others. Therefore, it makes a real difference bureaucratically whose staff does the initial work. So long as the Central Committee apparat, for example, has no direct contact with us, they have little means of reaching conclusions other than those Gromyko is pushing. With direct contacts, they are better able to activate their boss to their own ultimate advantage, provided political conditions permit.

The argument that we should continue to try to communicate with various elements in the Soviet hierarchy is not based on a "good guy, bad guy" presumption. There are no "good guys," and we should never act as if there were. But we should not pass up any feasible opportunity to utilize normal and natural bureaucratic rivalries in the Soviet system to our own advantage.

#### The Danger of Leaks

Few things can be more damaging to our ability to maximize our current tactical advantage than a further succession of leaked stories about the progress of our interagency consideration, possible positions on specific issues and the like. We need either to achieve much greater discipline than we have managed in the past, or else simply keep the bureaucracy (including the SACPG) ignorant of the President's decisions until we have had time to act upon them and can time our public disclosures.

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 9, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY  
JACK MATLOCKSUBJECT: Conference: "Grenada, Lessons and Impact on  
Soviet/Cuban Strategy"

We have been invited to attend a conference, "Grenada, Lessons and Impact on Soviet/Cuban Strategy," co-sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Kennan Institute, August 15 - 18 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California (Tab I). Specifically, we have been asked to be discussants in the panels -- "Grenada and the WTO: Lessons and Impact" and "Impact Upon the Soviet Alliance System." Our comments would be on the record and would be published in a monograph to be edited by the Wilson Center. As these topics are primarily of an historical nature and do not directly impinge on U.S. policies toward Eastern Europe and the USSR, we foresee no problems with making our comments on the record. Moreover, we will clear our five-to-seven page draft remarks prior to the conference. There will be no expense to NSC.

RECOMMENDATION

That our participation in this conference to be held in Monterey, California be approved.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Conference Schedule

cc: Pat Blauth  
Administration Office

c-JM

5268

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 9, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

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Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Conference Schedule

cc: Pat Blauth  
Administration Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: July 9, 1984

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Jack F. Matlock
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): Discussant in Conference in Monterey, California, August 15-18.
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):  
Travel will be from Knoxville, Tn. to Monterey, California,  
and return to Washington, D.C.
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

DEPARTURE DATE 8/16/84

RETURN DATE 8/20/84

TIME p.m.

TIME p.m.

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:

GOV AIR \_\_\_\_\_ COMMERCIAL AIR xx POV \_\_\_\_\_ RAIL \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:

TRANSPORTATION \_\_\_\_\_ PER DIEM \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ TOTAL TRIP COST \_\_\_\_\_

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER xx

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:  
Office of the Secretary of Defense & the Kennan Institute (Wilson Ctr)
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO xx

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$xx

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: JB Matlock

13. APPROVALS: \_\_\_\_\_

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATIONDATE: July 9, 1984

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Paula Dobriansky
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): Discussant in Conference in Monterey, California August 15-18.  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):  
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\_\_\_\_\_  
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- DEPARTURE DATE 8/14/84 RETURN DATE 8/19/84  
TIME p.m. TIME p.m.
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:  
GOV AIR \_\_\_\_\_ COMMERCIAL AIR xx POV \_\_\_\_\_ RAIL \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:  
TRANSPORTATION \_\_\_\_\_ PER DIEM \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ TOTAL TRIP COST \_\_\_\_\_
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER xx
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:  
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Kennan Institute  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO xx
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ xx
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Paula Dobriansky
13. APPROVALS: \_\_\_\_\_

Soviet/Cuban Strategy In The Third World After Grenada

Naval Postgraduate  
School  
Monterey, California

15-18 August 1984

General Chairman  
Dr. Jiri Valenta

Cosponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense

and

The Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center

Washington, D.C.

Chairman  
Dr. Herbert Ellison

Coordinator  
LT Fred Shaheen, USN

SCHEDULE FOR THE CONFERENCE ON  
"SOVIET/CUBAN STRATEGY IN THE THIRD WORLD AFTER GRENADA"  
August 15-18, 1984

WEDNESDAY, 15 AUGUST:

|                   |                                                                                                                                      |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5:00 pm - 6:00 pm | Reception and Cocktails,<br>La Novia Terrace, Herrmann Hall.                                                                         |
| 6:00 pm - 7:30 pm | Dinner, La Novia Room, Herrmann Hall.                                                                                                |
| 7:30 pm - 8:00 pm | Opening Session: Chairman, Jiri Valenta.<br>Introductory Remarks: Dr. Sherman Blandin<br>Opening Remarks: Commodore Robert Shumaker. |

THURSDAY, 16 AUGUST:

|                    |                                                                                                                                                           |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 8:30 am - 11:30 am | PANEL 1—"Grenada: Linkages and Impact on<br>Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa."<br>Chairman: Dr. Susan Purcell, Council on<br>Foreign Relations. |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Papers

Dr. Howard Wiarda, American  
Enterprise Institute, "Grenada:  
Linkages and Impact on Central  
America."

Dr. Anthony Maingot, Florida  
International University, "Grenada:  
Linkages and Impact on the  
Caribbean Basin."

Mr. Colin Legum, Observer,  
(London), "Grenada: Linkages  
and Impact on Africa."

Discussants

Dr. Richard Millet, Southern  
Illinois University.

Ambassador Sally Shelton,  
International-Business  
Government Counsellors.

Dr. Michael Clough, Naval  
Postgraduate School.

|                   |                                                                                                                           |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 12:00 m - 1:30 pm | Mr. Winston Lord, President of the<br>Council on Foreign Relations, Luncheon<br>Speaker, La Novia Room, Herrmann Hall.    |
| 2:00 pm - 5:00 pm | PANEL 2—"Grenada and the Soviet Allies:<br>Cuba and the WTO Members." Chairman,<br>Dr. Herbert Ellison, Kennan Institute. |

Papers

Commentators

Dr. Mark Falcoff, American Enterprise Institute, "Grenada and Cuba: Lessons and Impact".

Dr. Jorge Dominguez, Harvard University.

Dr. Melvin Croan, University of Wisconsin, "Grenada and the WTO: Lessons and Impact".

Dr. Paula Dobriansky, National Security Council.

5:30 pm - 6:00 pm

Cocktails, La Novia Terrace, Herrmann Hall.

6:00 pm - 7:00 pm

Dinner, La Novia Room, Herrmann Hall.

FRIDAY, 17 AUGUST:

9:00 am - 1:00 pm

PANEL 3—"Grenada and East-West Relations", Chairman, Jiri Valenta, Naval Postgraduate School.

Papers

Commentators

Dr. Edward Luttwak, Consultant "Impact on Superpower Relations".

TBA

Professor George Liska, Johns Hopkins University, "Impact on Superpower Relations".

Mr. W. Bruce Weinrod, The Heritage Foundation.

1:30 pm - 2:30 pm

Buffet Lunch, Ballroom, Herrmann Hall.

3:00 pm - 6:00 pm

PANEL 4—"Lessons and Impact of Grenada on Soviet Alliance System." Chairman, Dr. Herbert Ellison, Kennan Institute.

Papers

Commentators

Jiri and Virginia Valenta, Naval Postgraduate School, "USSR and Grenada: Lessons".

Dr. Richard Pipes, Harvard University.

Professor Vernon Aspaturian, Pennsylvania State University and Naval Postgraduate School, "Impact upon the Soviet Alliance System."

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, National Security Council.

SATURDAY, 18 AUGUST:

8:30 am - 9:30 am

Breakfast, El Rancho Room, Herrmann Hall.

10:00 am - 12:00 m

Wrap up discussion.

Paper

Commentator

Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes, United States Senate, "Recommendations and Options for the Region".

Dr. Charles H. Fairbanks, Department of State.

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

84 JUL 13 P 4: 53

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| Paul Thompson   | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bob Kimmitt     | 1           | K        | _____       |
| John Poindexter | 2           | _____    | I           |
| Tom Shull       | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Wilma Hall      | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bud McFarlane   | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| Bob Kimmitt     | _____       | _____    | _____       |
| NSC Secretariat | 3           | B        | Pass to     |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____    | Matlock     |
| MATLOCK         | 4           | _____    | I           |

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|-----------------|------------|------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| I = Information | A = Action | R = Retain | D = Dispatch | N = No further Action |
|-----------------|------------|------------|--------------|-----------------------|

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**


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(Date/Time)

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # \_\_\_\_\_

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| Paul Thompson   | _____       | _____                                                                                | _____       |
| Bob Kimmitt     | 1           | K                                                                                    | _____       |
| John Poindexter | 2           |    | _____       |
| Tom Shull       | _____       | _____                                                                                | _____       |
| Wilma Hall      | 3           | _____                                                                                | _____       |
| Bud McFarlane   | 4           |  | Advice      |
| Bob Kimmitt     | 5           | K                                                                                    | _____       |
| NSC Secretariat | _____       | _____                                                                                | _____       |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____                                                                                | _____       |

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|-----------------|------------|------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| I = Information | A = Action | R = Retain | D = Dispatch | N = No further Action |
|-----------------|------------|------------|--------------|-----------------------|

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COPY

84 JUL 12 P 2: 47

11 JUL 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Reciprocal Ship Visit Proposal (C)

(C) As you know, at the May 28 - June 2 US-Soviet annual review in Moscow of the Incidents at Sea Agreement, Soviet Admiral Navoytsev spoke favorably of an exchange of ship visits by the United States and the USSR similar to that which occurred in 1975. The US Navy envisions that the exchange could occur at Vladivostok and San Francisco. I think there is merit in this proposal. If arranged properly, such an exchange could yield both diplomatic and intelligence benefits to the United States.

(S) I understand that John Poindexter informed Fred Ikle that you are supporting the idea of such a ship visit, as is State, and want us to explore it. If we don't hear from you to the contrary, I will ask the Navy to contact the Soviet side very informally, to see whether they want to make the proposal to us for an exchange visit. DoD ISP will work with the Navy to follow up.

cc: Secretary of the Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations

CLASSIFIED BY: SEC DEF  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074/2 #47

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 7/18/00

SEC DEF CONTR No. X31363

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 11, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JGM*

SUBJECT: Response to Dr. and Mrs. George J. Meyer

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed response prepared by the Department of State to Dr. and Mrs. George J. Meyer's letter to the President regarding his remarks on nuclear weapons.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I with its attachments to Sally Kelley.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Proposed response and attachments.

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Dr. and Mrs. George J. Meyer

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed response prepared by the Department of State to a letter from Dr. and Mrs. Meyer regarding the President's remarks concerning nuclear weapons.

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8418714

Date July 9, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Dr. George J. Meyer

Date: June 23, 1984 Subject: President's Statement - "They  
are not demonstrating in the nation that has the most nuclear weapons".

WH Referral Dated: June 29, 1984 NSC ID# 238964  
(if any)

         The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- X   A draft reply is attached.  
         A draft reply will be forwarded.  
         A translation is attached.  
         An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
         We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
         The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
         Other.

Remarks:

*for Charles Hill*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

Department of State

Draft Reply

Dear Dr. and Mrs. Meyer:

I have received your letter of June 23 responding to mine of June 19. I regret that my first letter did not answer all of your questions, and hope that this letter will succeed.

The President was referring to the Soviet Union when he stated that, "No one is demonstrating...in the nation that has the most nuclear weapons of all." Although the Soviet Union often makes much ado about arms control demonstrations in Western countries, inside the USSR demonstrators are severely harassed and arrested. No Soviet citizen has the possibility of publicly objecting to Soviet military or arms control policy. Efforts to found an "unofficial" peace group have been quickly repressed. The members of the "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the US" have been arrested, exiled, or harassed into silence.

Regarding numbers of nuclear weapons, the Soviets now lead the United States in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, both land-based and sea-based, as well as in ballistic missile warheads (about 7700 to 7300). This is in addition to the USSR's enormous advantage over the United States and its NATO allies in intermediate range nuclear weapons, including more than 1100 warheads on its SS-20's alone. I hope that this answers your questions. I have enclosed two pamphlets on this Administration's arms control policy and on Soviet military power that you might find interesting.

With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

White House Staff

Enclosures:

Soviet Military Power, 1984

Arms Control

8418714

T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E

REFERRAL

JUNE 29, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 238964

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 23, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: DR. GEORGE J. MEYER  
THE WITTINGTON, APARTMENT 10F  
1390 SOUTH OCEAN BOULEVARD  
POMPANO BEACH FL 33062

SUBJECT: WANTS TO KNOW WHO THE PRESIDENT WAS  
REFERRING TO WHEN HE SAID "THEY ARE NOT  
DEMONSTRATING IN THE NATION THAT HAS THE  
MOST NUCLEAR WEAPONS"

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:

AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*Received in 457  
6/29/84-1200 AB*

Dr. & Mrs. George J. Meyer  
The Wittington, Apt. 10F  
1390 South Ocean Blvd.  
Pompano Beach, FL 33062

238964

8418714

1104m

23 June 1984

Ronald Reagan, President  
Attn: Anne Higgins  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Anne Higgins:

Thank you for responding so promptly to our letter of 11 June.

We are disappointed that you did not answer our questions.

So that you can properly answer our questions, we are enclosing a copy of the original letter, a copy of the article in the Ft. Lauderdale News, and a copy of your letter of June 19.

We send our best wishes to you and the President.

PEACE,

Geoff Meyer MD  
Viggo R. Meyer

Dr. & Mrs. George J. Meyer  
The Wittington, Apt. 10F  
1390 South Ocean Blvd.  
Pompano Beach, FL 33062

11 June 1984

Ronald Reagan, President  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Will you please explain to us which "nation" you are referring to in the final paragraph of the enclosed news clipping (q.v.).

The United States "has the most nuclear weapons of all," and there have been many anti-nuclear demonstrations in this country. For example, nearly a million of our fellow citizens demonstrated in New York City in June, 1982. And smaller demonstrations occur often.

What do you mean? Please clarify.

PEACE,

# Reagan belittles effect of protests

The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — President Reagan says the anti-nuclear demonstrators who dogged his 10-day trip in Europe do not speak for a majority and are advocating policies that could lead to "the peace of the grave."

The president was back at the White House on Sunday, with a relaxed schedule today, after the 8,000-mile journey to his ancestral home in Ireland, the D-Day beaches of Normandy and a seven-nation economic summit.

In a post-summit news conference on the lawn of Winfield House, the residence of the U.S. ambassador in London, the president was asked why he believed the anti-nuclear dissidents who rallied and marched in Ireland and London disagreed with his policies.

"They seem to think they have a simple answer to warfare, that if we just lay down our weapons and stand back empty-handed, somehow peace will come to the world," he replied. "They haven't stopped to figure that it might be the peace of the grave."

The state of U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly Moscow's refusal to resume nuclear arms reduction talks, was a topic that arose repeatedly on the president's trip, often by Reagan himself.

A senior American official said Reagan was pressed at the economic summit by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to adopt a new approach toward the Soviets.



AP photo

President Reagan is embraced by his daughter, Maureen, on his return to Washington Sunday as the First Lady looks on.

"He (Trudeau) felt the United States was wrong, (that) we should be more forthcoming," the official said Sunday.

When Reagan heard that, the official said, he "took his glasses off and said, 'Damn it, Pierre ... I have said everything. What the hell more can I do to get those guys back to the table? You are telling me we haven't done it?'"

U.S. officials said other summit participants — the leaders of Britain, Germany, Italy, France, and Japan — supported the administration's refusal to offer any concessions to get the Soviets back to the table.

The summit leaders issued a joint statement Saturday calling for the speedy resumption of nuclear arms talks, which the Soviets broke off last December in the wake of NATO's decision to deploy 572 Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in West-

ern Europe.

The demonstrators in Ireland and in London, where an estimated 50,000 turned out Saturday, also were protesting the deployment decision.

Reagan said he didn't believe all demonstrators on Saturday were against him alone. "I don't think yesterday picked out any single individual," he said. "...Demonstrations have become a fact of life," he added. "Somehow people have felt that that's the way to express their ideas in a democracy in spite of all the legitimate channels that are open to them."

"...But I don't think they're speaking for a majority," he continued. "And I think sometimes they are unreasoning in that as yesterday, have any of them ever stopped to think that no one is demonstrating and they are not demonstrating in the nation that has the most nuclear weapons of all?"

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1984

Dear Dr. and Mrs. Meyer:


President Reagan has asked me to thank you for your message expressing concern about nuclear arms. I can assure you that the President understands and shares your desire for the achievement of a true and lasting peace.

The President has expressed his deep regret that the Soviet Union has chosen to discontinue the present round of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces negotiations in Geneva. We are hopeful that the Soviet Union will recognize that a resumption of these negotiations is in its own best interest. We are also hopeful that the Soviets will agree to resumption of the separate Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. We believe that it is of paramount interest to the entire world that these talks continue.

As President Reagan remarked in a major address on U.S.-Soviet relations on January 16, 1984, "Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table . . . we will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway." In light of your concern, I am enclosing for you a copy of this address which I know you will find of interest.

With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,



Anne Higgins  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Director of Correspondence

Dr. and Mrs. George J. Meyer  
Apartment 10F  
1390 South Ocean Boulevard  
Pompano Beach, FL 33062

Enclosure: 1/16/84 Address by the President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL RESPONSE

July 10, 1984

TO: JACK MATLOCK

FROM: KARNA SMALL

Attached is a copy of a questionnaire from Runner's World magazine for Presidential response. I would appreciate if you would take a cut at questions 2, 3, 8 & 9. Due to a tight publication deadline, I would be grateful for your answers by Thursday 12:00 pm.  
Thanks.

are familiar with who share  
have you ever worked with

ason the Soviets boycotted

undermine the intent of the

role of politics in inter-  
e kept separate? CAN THEY

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d in and made a bid for the  
E the countries around the  
associated with the LA Games.  
g wrong with industry picking

lympic Games in Seoul will  
ea be able to properly  
real and Moscow -- excuse the

e that the Los Angeles Games  
Games become both financially

political standpoint was the  
tive? And if so, on whom

\*9. Although hindsight is almost always 20/20, how would you have handled the Afghanistan situation of 1980?

QUESTIONNAIRE FROM RUNNER'S WORLD FOR PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE

1. Are there any other world leaders you're familiar with who share your burning interest in fitness? If so, have you ever worked with them?
- \* 2. What is your interpretation of the reason the Soviets boycotted the 1984 Games?
- \* 3. Do you feel their actions served to undermine the intent of the Games?
4. What are your feelings as far as the role of politics in international sports? Should the two arenas be kept separate? CAN THEY BE KEPT SEPARATE?
5. Many people feel that the Olympic Games would have died had not the Los Angeles Olympic Committee stepped in and made a bid for the Games as a private enterprise, yet many of the countries around the world have criticized the commercialism associated with the LA Games. What are your feelings? Is there anything wrong with industry picking up the bill for international sports?
6. How successful do you feel the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul will be? Will a country the size of South Korea be able to properly finance an enterprise that still has Montreal and Moscow -- excuse the pun -- in the red?
7. From your observations, is it possible that the Los Angeles Games will be the last Olympic Games? Have the Games become both financially and politically impossible?
- \* 8. It's well after the fact, but from a political standpoint was the Soviet boycott of this year's Games effective? And if so, on whom did it have its most profound effect?
- \* 9. Although hindsight is almost always 20/20, how would you have handled the Afghanistan situation of 1980?

C

July 12, 1984

Q: What is your interpretation of the reason the Soviets boycotted the 1984 Games?

A: The only thing we can be sure of is that it was not for the reason they gave. We had gone to great lengths to meet all their requests and make clear that their athletes, officials and spectators would be welcome and protected. I can only speculate on their real reasons. they may have thought that having their athletes in Los Angeles in July would undermine their propaganda claims that our defense modernization is a threat to them. They may have worried that some of their people would defect. And revenge for 1980 could have played a role.

July 12, 1984

Q: Do you feel their actions served to undermine the intent of the Games?

A: Certainly it hurts the Olympic movement when one country refuses to participate without good reason -- and not only refuses but requires countries under its control to do the same.

July 12, 1984

Q: It's well after the fact, but from a political standpoint was the Soviet boycott of this year's Games effective? And if so, on whom did it have its most profound effect?

A: I don't believe the Soviet boycott was very effective, because the Los Angeles Games had more participants than ever in history. Those most hurt were the Soviet athletes and the athletes from the other countries forced to join in the boycott.

July 12, 1984

Q: Although hindsight is almost always 20/20, how would you have handled the Afghanistan situation of 1980?

A: First of all, I think we should have done more in advance to dissuade the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We shouldn't have let it take us by surprise. And we should have planned our reaction more carefully and made sure we had solid international support for the steps we took. But, if the Soviets invaded anyway, we did have to react and if I had been in office then I certainly would have. But, I'm not certain I would have insisted on a boycott of the Olympics unless most of our Allies supported us.

Metlock  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

for 6/22/99  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

Shannon  
July 89

~~Secret / Sensitive~~

ADM. POWDERTEER  
MR. McFARLANE

EYES ONLY

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System #

*EYES*

Package #

*ONLY*



|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN          | DISPOSITION |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|
| Paul Thompson   | _____       | _____             | _____       |
| Bob Kimmitt     | _____       | _____             | _____       |
| John Poindexter | <i>1</i>    | <i>[initials]</i> | _____       |
| Tom Shull       | _____       | _____             | _____       |
| Wilma Hall      | _____       | _____             | _____       |
| Bud McFarlane   | <i>2</i>    | _____             | _____       |
| Bob Kimmitt     | _____       | _____             | _____       |
| NSC Secretariat | _____       | _____             | _____       |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____             | _____       |
| <i>MATLOCK</i>  | <i>3</i>    | _____             | _____       |

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

*Bud,*  
*I opt for Jack trying*  
*meet with Z agladin*  
*by [unclear] 2.*  
*clear our*  
*interest.*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS MD2-011#27BY WJ NARA, DATE 10/17/05

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

July 13, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *SM*

SUBJECT:

Establishing Contact outside Gromyko's Staff

You asked for my thoughts on how we might go about establishing a contact outside Gromyko's staff. Several possibilities come to mind, which are not mutually exclusive. Tactically, I believe we should not show too much eagerness, but simply let it be known that we would have something to say if they wish to listen.

Our principal target, in my opinion, should be the CC CPSU Secretariat staff. These are the people who work directly for Chernenko and presumably Gorbachev, since the latter seems to be acting as Chernenko's number two in running the Secretariat. He may actually be the more active of the two; if he aims for the top spot -- as he doubtless does -- he is probably eager to get his finger in the foreign affairs field, where he has little prior experience. The most valuable interlocutor here is probably Zagladin. He runs the International Department (although Ponomarev is the titular head), is a Central Committee member in his own right, and clearly has a vested interest in building up his organization's influence, as compared with Gromyko's MFA.

In the past, however, this channel has not been used (except for my two meetings this year, the second with Stanislav Menshikov, Zagladin's "desk officer" for the U.S.). In the past, private channels have either been through Dobrynin (who seems to have had a direct line to Brezhnev's office, but this may not exist any more), or through KGB contacts who acted merely as message bearers. There are dangers in using Dobrynin, since we don't know how direct his own lines of communication are, and since we should not subject our messages to whatever spin he chooses to put on them. The use of KGB contacts would be feasible -- and should be done if that is the Soviet preference -- but has the disadvantage of dealing with a person who is only a message bearer and who plays no personal role in the policy making process. For some types of subjects, this is preferable -- for example in arranging a prisoner exchange, or some other limited, concrete deal which the Soviets want off the record. It has its limitations, however, if our objective is a broader discussion of how disparate issues might be put together to form a package.

The following specific possibilities come to mind:

1. We could have Hartman pass a message to Zagladin that another meeting might be useful to review informally what might be possible for the balance of this year and next year. If he agrees, we could offer to meet quietly in Washington, Moscow or a third country, as he suggests. If we decide to follow this course, the best way to get the message to Hartman would be to call him on the secure line. Nothing should be done in telegraphic traffic, because it is too difficult to control distribution.

2. Ty Cobb has an outstanding invitation from the USA Institute to visit Moscow in connection with a research project initiated before he came on the NSC staff. It has been renewed verbally since he became a staff member, but he of course has done nothing about it. We could have him pick up the invitation (if the Soviets are still willing). When he was there in 1981 he was given excellent access to a variety of senior officials, including Zagladin. Ty would not have to go with any particular message (and probably should not), but his Soviet interlocutors would know that they could get messages back to us by him if they desired.

3. Robert O. Anderson's suggestion (TAB I) could provide an avenue to Academician Velikhov (who has gone out of his way to express an interest in it). I am not sure just how influential Velikhov is (aside from his prominent role in Soviet space, SDI, and ASAT programs), or on whose behalf he may be speaking. He is not himself a member of the Central Committee, which would indicate that his personal status in the Party is not very high. On the other hand, he may be a channel to someone else, and the matter might be worth exploring.

There are several ways this might be done:

(1) Hartman or his Deputy might ask for an appointment with Velikhov, in the course of which inquiries could be made about the Soviet view of Anderson's proposal.

(2) A USG official from Washington could do the same, and perhaps with greater success than the Embassy can. For example, Alvin Trivelpiece of DOE has an invitation from Velikhov which he is willing to accept if we want him to. He could be briefed to raise the Anderson proposal and attempt to smoke out just what the Soviets find appealing about it.

(3) Finally, we could ask a reliable private citizen with ties to Velikhov to raise the matter. Anderson and his assistant Hirsch, for example, could be encouraged to follow up on our behalf. There are dangers here, however, because, as I mentioned before, I don't find the idea attractive as it stands, and its main utility would be as a vehicle for smoking out possible Soviet interest in establishing a special channel. Therefore, I believe it would be better to use a USG official to inquire, if we decide to do so.

Attachment:

Tab I - Anderson "proposal"



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

This is the proposal Anderson gave Velikhov during his trip in late May/early June.

It was the third point that Velikhov asked about specifically in two subsequent telephone calls to Hirsch, Anderson's assistant.

As I mentioned in my earlier oral briefing, I don't think we need a private commission meeting with Soviet officials. But we might think about a "commission" from within the USG (and perhaps with a few reliable "outsiders") as a vehicle to maintain contact with Soviet officials outside MFA.

It is the latter aspect which may explain Velikhov's interest -

Jack

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS MOZ-011 #28

BY WOT, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

MEMO RE: BERING STRAITS

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. hereby agree to the following concepts as being in the long term interests of the two countries and the world community:

- 1) Both nations agree that the Bering Straits shall be open to peaceful navigation for all nations of the world in the belief that the concept of open sea lanes are a major need for world commerce.
- 2) Both nations agree to set up a joint organization to explore long range problems that are of mutual concern. Environmental problems, meteorological phenomena, mineral development in the Bering Sea, and others shall constitute the initial agenda for discussion.
- 3) A joint commission shall be constituted to put the foregoing into effect and to pursue any and all other matters of any nature whatsoever that may be of importance to the long term interests of both countries. The commission shall consist of 14 members, equally divided between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
  - (a) It shall meet not less than three times per year at a site to be designated by the Co-Chairmen.
  - (b) It shall be chaired by co-chairmen consisting of a U.S. and a Soviet member of the committee to be so designated.
  - (c) The Chairman and the committee shall report directly to their respective Chiefs of State. The U. S. membership shall be bi-partisan and advisory in nature.
- 4) The first meeting of commission shall be within 90 days of this agreement, dated \_\_\_\_\_.

*Churn*

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 14, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Status of Negotiation of Cultural Exchange  
Agreement with Soviets

Art Hartman presented our draft agreement to Gromyko when they met July 5. Subsequently, the Soviets notified us of their negotiator (one Churlin, a decent type as Soviets go, who has worked on cultural affairs for MFA -- and on the UN Secretariat staff -- for many years). They have indicated that they will be prepared to begin negotiations shortly, but have not yet set a date.

At present, our PAO in Moscow, Ray Benson, is on leave. He will be Hartman's principal deputy for the negotiations, and will do the day-to-day stuff. Benson is prepared to return to Moscow immediately, however, to accomodate any date the Soviets suggest.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F95-074/2 #48BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/6/00~~CONFIDENTIAL~~