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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/22/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1984 (4/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

604

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6151	MEMO	CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO RECEPTION [1] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/23/1984	B1
6152	MEMO	MEMO TO SVEN KRAEMER [2] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/24/1984	B1
6153	MEMO	DECISIONS REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SCC SESSION BEGINNING OCTOBER 2, 1984 [5-7] R 6/23/2010 M125/2	3	9/24/1984	B1
6154	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM CASPAR WEINBERGER RE MEETING WITH GROMYKO [11-12] R 6/23/2010 M125/2	2	9/22/1984	B1
6155	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT REAGAN-GROMYKO MEETING: UNDERSTANDING GROMYKO'S LANGUAGE [14-17] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	4	9/24/1984	B1
6156	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SOVIET AGENDA FOR UNITED NATIONS [18] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/24/1984	B1
6162	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SOVIET UN AGENDA [19-20] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	9/21/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

604

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6157	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE REPLY TO GREEN AND PEARCE [21] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	1	9/24/1984	B1
6158	LETTER	LETTER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE FROM GREEN AND PEARCE [23-24] R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	2	9/14/1984	B1
6159	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV AND FREDKIN [25-26] PAR 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1	2	9/24/1984	B1 B1
6160	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE EVANS AND NOVAK COLUMN RE SEPTEMBER 18 NSC SESSION [32] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/24/1984	B1
6163	LETTER	MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN [40-41] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	ND	B1
6164	LETTER	MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN [42-43] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	ND	B1
6165	LETTER	MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN [44-45] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6166	LETTER	MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN [46-47] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	ND	B1
6167	LETTER	MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN [48-49] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	2	ND	B1
6161	MEMO	MEMO FROM KEN DEGRAFFENREID [50] R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1	1	9/26/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Jan 9/23/84

CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
RECEPTION

-- LOOKING FORWARD OUR MEETING FRIDAY. VIEW IT AS IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO PUT OUR RELATIONS ON MORE CONSTRUCTIVE FOOTING; HOPE YOU DO THE SAME.

-- IMPORTANT BOTH SIDES TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE OTHER'S POINT OF VIEW, SEEK WAYS TO AVOID CONFRONTATION.

-- MOST CRITICAL TASK FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE, AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- GEORGE SHULTZ AND I WILL WANT TO DISCUSS WAYS TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AGAIN AT OUR FORMAL MEETINGS THIS WEEK.

DECLASSIFIED / RE/CASED

NLRR F06-114/1 #6151

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Sven Kraemer

I strongly recommend Option 1 in regard to the "Common Understanding on Concurrent Operations."

If we do not proceed at this point, our further delay will certainly be interpreted by the Soviets as prime evidence that we have no intention of concluding agreements, even if they are negotiated. Therefore, further delay, could undermine our credibility in such negotiation in other areas.

Please make sure this view is reflected in your covering memo -

Jack

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NLRR 106-114/1 #6/52

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07

SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8490999

RECEIVED 24 SEP 84 09

TO MCFARLANE FROM STAPLES, W

DOCDATE 24 SEP 84

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/10/02

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL SCC
USSR

SUBJECT: DECISIONS RE INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCC SESSION BEGINNING 2 OCT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 28 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRAEMER

LINHARD

LEHMAN, R

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

84 SEP 24 09:24

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

September 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. FARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Decisions Regarding Instructions for the SCC
Session Beginning October 2, 1984

Attached is a paper prepared by the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) Backstopping Committee containing issues for decisions regarding instructions for the next session of the SCC beginning on October 2, 1984, (the US Commissioner will depart Washington on September 28, 1984).



William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment
As stated

THIS DOCUMENT UNCLASSIFIED
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ATTACHMENT

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

OAS 6/10/02

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NLRR M08-125/2 #6153

September 24, 1984

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

Decisions Regarding Instructions for the
SCC Session Beginning October 2, 1984

Decisions are needed to complete the instructions for the next session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) beginning on October 2, 1984. Draft instructions are at Attachment 1. Six decisions are needed as follows:

1st - Whether to complete the conforming of the text for, and sign, the Common Understanding on Concurrent Operations or continue to defer action on it.

2nd - Whether to pursue the Rapidly Deployable ABM System issue which was noted at the end of the last SCC session.

3rd - Whether to raise the SS-NX-23 Throw-weight issue.

4th - Whether to raise and how to approach the ABM Rapid Reload issue.

5th - How to approach the Data Denial issue - Telemetry Encryption.

6th - How to approach the SS-X-25 Throw-weight issue.

No decisions are needed on other issues previously raised in the SCC (SS-16 ICBM, Data Denial - Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association, Krasnoyarsk Radar, SS-X-25 deployment at a former SS-7 site). Finally, there is agreement on how the US should respond to the Soviets on issues previously raised by them: ABM Testing Activities, Pave Paws Radars, Strategic Defense Initiative, and Article XII (n.b.: non-circumvention) of the SALT II Treaty.

I. Issues Which Need NSC Decisions

A. Common Understanding on Concurrent Operations

The purpose of the US in seeking the Common Understanding was to preclude activities of Soviet air defense missile systems which could give them the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles.

During the Fall 1982 SCC session, the SCC completed a text of the Common Understanding, ad referendum to Governments. The Soviet Commissioner was authorized to sign the Common Understanding, but the US Commissioner was instructed to take no further action. The agreed text provided that each Party will refrain from launching strategic ballistic missiles into, or ABM interceptor missiles at, a test range during periods when air defense components located at that test range are being operated for any purpose. At Soviet initiative, the text also included the following clause: "... the parties recognize the possibility

of circumstances in which, for the purpose of providing air defense, a necessity for the operation of air defense components, ... may arise unexpectedly" also included was the US proposed text that, should such an event occur, the Party which has such a concurrent operation would be required to provide notification to the other Party as soon as possible but not later than the next session of the SCC.

During the Spring 1983 SCC session, the US sought and obtained explicit agreement that the "circumstances in which ...a necessity for the operation of air defense components ...may arise unexpectedly ...referred to hostile or unidentified aircraft." The Soviet Commissioner was given authority to sign the revised text, but the US proposed that notifications of a concurrent operation be made as soon as possible but within 30 days. In May 1983, the US Commissioner was authorized to sign the Common Understanding with the proposed change and without any further action by Washington; but the Soviet Commissioner did not have authority to sign the Common Understanding containing the revised wording.

Prior to the Fall 1983 session, the US Government decided not to initiate discussion of the Common Understanding because of the KAL incident. During this session the Soviets stated that they could accept the US-modified text. Washington instructed the US Commissioner to continue to refrain from signing the Common Understanding and to focus on the resolution of compliance issues on the table before returning to the Common Understanding.

In the Spring 1984 SCC session, the US Government decided to continue to defer completing the Common Understanding in order to focus on the resolution of compliance issues then on the agenda. In April 1984, the US Commissioner requested that his instructions be reconsidered with a view to authorizing the US Component to conform the text and initial the Common Understanding. In May 1984, Washington decided to continue to refrain from further work on the Common Understanding.

The issue for decision is whether the US Commissioner should be authorized to sign the Common Understanding during SCC-XXVII with the text approved by the US Government in May 1983, or continue to refrain from signing the Common Understanding. For additional details on this issue, the SCC Working Group paper on this subject is at Attachment #2.

Options

Option 1: The US Commissioner would be authorized to complete work on a conformed text for, and to sign, the draft

Common Understanding on Concurrent Operations with the text as agreed on April 19, 1983, and modified by the US proposal of May 4, 1983.

Option 2: The US Commissioner would be instructed to continue to refrain from raising the subject of the Common Understanding and, if the Soviets open the subject, to state that, as in the last two sessions, the US wishes to focus on the resolution of the compliance issues before returning to the Common Understanding.

Agency Positions

State, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1.

State, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner believe the Common Understanding, which was negotiated at US insistence, continues to be in our net interest; that we should affirm our willingness to conclude the Common Understanding as now tabled; and that the US Commissioner should be authorized to sign the Common Understanding during SCC-XXVII. Doing so now would demonstrate our commitment to seriously pursuing solutions to compliance issues (e.g., the Krasnoyarsk radar), and would constitute a signal to Moscow of this Administration's interest in constructive arms control.

The JCS support Option 1 if the political circumstances which led to the US decision to defer conclusion of the Common Understanding during previous sessions of the SCC no longer exist. The JCS continue to believe the Common Understanding to be in the net military interest of the US.

OSD supports Option 2.

OSD believes that the US Government should continue to refrain from completing the Common Understanding. Nothing has changed which would justify reopening this issue at this time. In particular, none of the compliance issues, on which the US indicated to the Soviets it wished to focus prior to returning to the Common Understanding, have been resolved. Under these circumstances, signing the Common Understanding would demonstrate a lack of seriousness and resolve in pursuing compliance issues with the Soviets. Furthermore, in addition to the "unidentified aircraft" loophole which was included at Soviet insistence, OSD believes intelligence information available since the drafting of the Common Understanding indicates that the current draft may be inadequate in other respects as well to deal with the concurrent operations question. In particular, the current draft does not

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90998

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: President-Gromyko Meeting: Weinberger Suggestions

Secretary Weinberger has sent a memorandum to the President recommending certain talking points for his meeting with Gromyko.

I believe that the points he proposes are sound and deserve a place in the President's presentation to Gromyko.

Ron
Ron Lehman concurs.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at TAB I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I -- Memorandum to the President

Tab A -- Weinberger-President Memorandum of September 22, 1984

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CJS* NARA, Date *6/10/02*

MEMORANDUM

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9
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Gromyko: Secretary Weinberger's
Suggestions

Secretary Weinberger has sent you a memorandum (Tab A) suggesting certain talking points for you to use with Gromyko. I believe these points are well taken and will see to it that they are worked into the talking points supplied to you.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum of September 22, 1984, from Secretary Weinberger

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By Cfs NARA, Date 6/10/02

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/22

Jack:

Please see me Monday
to discuss format for Gromyko
briefing papers. I have some
guidance from Bud.

Bob

21/9

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE MILITARY ASSISTANT

Bob Kimmitt,

Per CONVERSATION,

Colin



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

6154 11
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September 22, 1984 09
01 SEP 22 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Gromyko

WILL TO SEE
SITUATION ROOM

In the NSPG meeting Tuesday, you said you intend, in your meeting with Gromyko, to deal with arms control in broad terms, not to advance specific proposals. As I mentioned at the meeting, I very much agree with this approach.

You might wish to use the meeting with Gromyko to propose broad discussions on a framework for specific arms control negotiations, so that we can proceed with an agreed road map.

In line with such an approach, you might find the following talking points useful:

- o The time has come for our two countries to agree on a fresh approach to arms control. I trust, we can overcome the present difficulties that are holding up progress.
- o We have made clear our serious desire to reach agreement and have shown a great deal of flexibility, but unfortunately your side has walked out of two negotiations.
- o In the 1970's, the United States placed great hope in the SALT process. But SALT has failed to stop increases in nuclear arms. As you know, we found it necessary to modernize our strategic defenses to respond to the increases and new systems in your nuclear expansion.
- o In addition, as we explained to your side, we have encountered serious problems regarding the compliance with existing agreements and the arrangements for verification. Arms control can prosper only in a climate that permits effective verification. We can agree, I am sure, that excessive, deliberate concealment practices will make progress in arms control impossible.
- o We have to make a new start. We need a broader framework that will give our future negotiations and our specific proposals a sense of direction. We want to move together with you toward a safer peace at much lower levels of armaments. But we cannot take this long journey together unless we are both agreed on where we are going. As the Ancient Greeks said, if you don't know where you are sailing, every wind will take you there.

CLASSIFIED BY SECDEF
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NLRR M08-125/2 #6154

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RY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

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- 2 -

17

- o Thus, we need to map out a common approach to arms control. What can our two countries do together to reduce the risk of crises and accidents? What can we do together to reduce the danger of nuclear war and begin to eliminate nuclear weapons as we look ahead to the next century? Your side has expressed concern about our research program on ballistic missile defenses. But we are prepared to discuss the role of offensive and defensive nuclear forces and how they will fit into a program leading to reductions and to greater stability. We are concerned, as you know, about your chemical weapons programs and the danger of biological weapons, and have found that this is an area where concealment and secrecy exacerbates the danger. And how should we both cope with the risks of nuclear proliferation that may well increase over the next twenty years?
- o With these questions in mind, I want to propose that we agree to undertake a fundamental discussion between our two sides, to develop a larger consensus on arms reduction and to chart a course for our negotiators that will permit them constructively to work out specific measures that will reduce arms on both sides to achieve parity at much lower levels, and that will be fully verifiable. We should develop objectives that we want to reach, and a framework for specific issues on which we must follow-up.
- o But the United States cannot accept negotiations with pre-conditions set by your side, any more than you would accept pre-conditions established by us. What we must do is to work together to create agreed objectives and procedures that will make success possible.

Sap.

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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13
ID 8490998

RECEIVED 22 SEP 84 14

TO

PRESIDENT

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 22 SEP 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CRS NARA, Date 6/10/82

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

AP

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR PRES MTG W/ GROMYKO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 24 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

COMMENTS

URGENT

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 24, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *EW*

SUBJECT:

President-Gromyko Meeting: Understanding
Gromyko's Language

Understanding Gromyko involves more than having his words translated into English. Therefore, drawing on my observations of him in 30 to 40 meetings over the last twelve years, I have put together a brief guide which may help bridge the gap between the sort of meaning we would normally attach to his words and the meaning he attaches to them.

If you think he would be interested, you might wish to pass the paper to the President.

Recommendation:

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Guide to "Gromykospeak"

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/1#6155

RV 212) NARA DATE 3/3/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Understanding Gromyko's Language

In anticipation of your upcoming meeting with Gromyko, our staff has prepared a short "Guide to Gromykospeak," which tries to illustrate how one should understand various types of statements he may make. The "quotations" in it are, for the most part, not literal, but paraphrases of the sort of language he habitually uses in a variety of contexts.

You may find it amusing.

Attachment:

Tab A - "Guide to Gromykospeak"

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

14

GROMYKOSPEAK

A Guide to Interpreting Gromyko's Language

Gromyko is a master of his own variant of Orwell's "Newspeak" -- the distortion of the ordinary meaning of words to hide their real meaning. The following examples, paraphrased from things Gromyko has actually said in the past, illustrate his use of language in responding to negotiating initiatives and in explaining Soviet policy and actions. (Translations provided are, of course, conjectural.)

Response to Negotiating Initiatives

- "There are many positive elements in your proposal. Of course, we'll have to think it over, since it does not really meet all of our concerns. But I believe my colleagues will agree that this moves matters forward and brings us closer to solving the problem."

Translation: "I see you've caved. We must follow up to nail this down and see how much more we can get. Looks like it might be quite a bit."

- Your proposal is interesting. My immediate reaction is that it doesn't go far enough on x and y, and doesn't really address our fundamental concerns regarding z. But we'll think about it and get back to you.

Translation: "This looks pretty good. We probably ought to pocket it and make another try to get some more, but if push comes to shove, we could buy it."

- Your proposal really does not address the problem properly. For example...(lists various complaints). However, it is not totally devoid of positive elements and we'll think it over. I'll try to get an official answer in due course, but I'm not optimistic.

Translation: "There's enough here to require some movement on our part if we are to get anywhere."

- I'll report your proposal, but I don't see how you could believe that any of it is constructive (enumerates objections).

Translation: "Not much here, but I better have the door cracked in case we want to pick up something from it."

- Rants with apparent (but probably feigned) emotion about the total unacceptability of our proposal and our bad faith, says it shows why they can't do business with us, etc.

Translation: "No way. They'll have to try again. Thank God that idiot Brezhnev is not still around, or he might want us to make another try."

Explaining Soviet Policies and Actions

- "We'll remove our forces from Afghanistan as soon as outside intervention is ended."

Translation: "If you guys would just stop supporting the mujahedin, we might actually win this one in a few more years."

- "We have no plans to install offensive missiles in Cuba."
(An actual quote from September, 1962.)

Translation: "They're on the way, but we hope you won't find out until it's too late."

- "We do not believe in the export of revolution."

Translation: "Some people still buy this line. Amazing, isn't it?"

- "I can state officially that no microwave transmissions are directed at the American Embassy in Moscow." (Said to Ambassador Stoessel in 1976, after we had provided the Soviets with irrefutable evidence that such transmissions were being made.)

Translation: "You know as well as I do that we're lying, but how can you be so naive to think we would ever admit that we're doing this?"

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Soviet Agenda for United Nations

The attached memorandum from State lists some of the Soviet proposals likely to be floated at the current UNGA. It is based primarily on an article in Pravda September 18, which suggests that the Soviets will restate a number of their past proposals and that their overall emphasis will be on creating an impression of Soviet interest in arms control and disarmament topics.

The article's appeal for "the start of negotiations on a program of phased nuclear disarmament" is possibly interesting, but I agree with State that this does not necessarily herald a greater Soviet willingness to return to START or INF. If advanced officially, however, it is a phrase which we could assert is consistent with our own proposal for a comprehensive dialogue on the entire range of arms control issues.

Attachment:

Tab I - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of September 21, 1984

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/1 #656

BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

**SECRET**

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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34 SEP 21 PM 1:09

September 21, 1984

SECRET

SITE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: The Soviet United Nations Agenda

An authoritative article in the September 18 Pravda gives a preview of the Soviet approach to the upcoming United Nations General Assembly session. The article calls, among other items, for "the start of negotiations on a program of phased nuclear disarmament." This appears unlinked, however, to the Geneva negotiations. The text indicates that Foreign Minister Gromyko can be expected to give first priority in his UN presentation -- and possibly in his subsequent meetings with Secretary Shultz and the President -- to familiar Soviet propaganda initiatives on nuclear arms, including:

- o a nuclear freeze;
- o a code of conduct for nuclear states;
- o nuclear weapons-free zones;
- o an agreement prohibiting first use of nuclear weapons; and
- o a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

We do not believe, however, that this nuclear emphasis heralds a greater Soviet willingness to return to START or INF. The article also notes that the Soviet Union and its allies will be coming to the UN with "large-scale proposals on preventing nuclear war and creating an atmosphere of trust between states." This may mark the opening of a diplomatic offensive aimed at defusing the perception among nonaligned and Western publics that the USSR has been intransigent on nuclear arms control.

Our Embassy in Moscow notes that Chernenko is personally identified with the proposed code of conduct for nuclear states. It has been a major Soviet propaganda initiative since he first suggested it in a March 2, 1984 speech, and in his correspondence with President Reagan. Given Chernenko's personal association, we can expect it to occupy a prominent place in future Soviet public statements and private exchanges. Recent comments in Tokyo by a senior Soviet Central Committee official also noted the priority which the USSR is giving to nuclear issues. That official underscored Soviet interest in "preventing the militarization of space," a topic which received only perfunctory mention in the article.

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DECL: OADR**SECRET**

NLRR 606 114/1 - 46162

BY CU NARA DATE 11/27/17

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- 2 -

The Pravda article also touches on a variety of regional political issues in predictable fashion, supporting the most recent version of their Middle East proposal (which they are sure to push during the session); endorsing the Contadora process in Central America; and calling for an end to "interference" in Afghanistan (without explicit endorsement of the UN Secretary General's mediation efforts). Non-nuclear arms control issues receive brief mention, including a call for talks on naval arms limitations. The focus of the piece, however, and presumably the focus of the Soviet UN agenda, is squarely on nuclear issues.


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 24, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Reply to Green and Pearce

Tom Green and Terry Pearce have written you again to report on their vigorous pursuit of their "plan" and to ask some specific questions about its relevance to the meetings with Gromyko this week.

I have drafted a reply for you at Tab I.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Green and Pearce.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Letter to Tom Green and Terry Pearce
- Tab II - Letter of September 14 from Green and Pearce

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-1141 #6157

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Tom and Terry:

I appreciated your letter of September 14 and your calls to Wilma to report on your activities on behalf of your project. I am sure you noted the President's stress, in his speech to the United Nations, on the need for better consultation with the Soviet Union in regard to regional disputes.

As for your questions regarding the President's meetings with Gromyko, I'm sure you will understand the necessity of our keeping the precise subject matter private. However, as I have explained previously, in the current atmosphere we feel that it would not be helpful for us to advance a proposal such as yours officially.

We appreciate your strong support for our efforts to engage the Soviets in a more meaningful dialogue and hope you will continue to keep us informed of what you learn.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Tom Green
Mr. Terry Pearce
2349 Spanish Trail
Tiburon, California 94920

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9.14.84 6152 23
SEP 17 1984
September 14, 1984
RCM HAS SENT

Robert McFarlane
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20006

Bud,

It is a pleasure seeing your quiet influence in the increasing inclusivity in the President's public position - clearly not softening - but a quality reflecting a deep appreciation of the reality of our mutual existence and of the necessity for operating in an atmosphere of mutual interest. Thank you for being there.

Like much of the world, our prayers are for the upcoming visit by Gromyko to be an important step toward clearer understanding. This note is to bring you up to date on the contacts planned for next week regarding the private initiative, and to express full support for all actions intended to evoke the world wide atmosphere of support necessary for progress on specifics. We were particularly moved by the President's comment, "...I think maybe the time has come that anything that can perhaps get a better understanding between our two governments maybe should precede any resumption of dealings on specifics..." We are confident the idea contained in the private initiative would do just that - create a sustained global atmosphere as the context for dealings on specifics - and again, we also are totally supportive of any other actions which would accomplish that end.

During the week of 9-17, we will be in the east to offer the following questions through both private channels to the Soviets and through Dobrynin:

- Does the Soviet leadership wish to respond to this initiative through private channels and to have the responses exchanged before Gromyko arrives?
- Is Mr. Gromyko prepared to respond should the President, Secretary Schultz, or someone else bring up the initiative?
- Will he (Gromyko) bring the idea up?
- Does he wish his responses to any of these questions conveyed?

To keep all alternatives active, we believe the responses to the last three questions from the President, or another representative, would greatly serve:

- Is he (are we) prepared to respond to the initiative if Gromyko brings it up?
- Will he/we bring the idea up to Gromyko?
- Does he (Do we) wish the responses to these questions conveyed through private channels before Gromyko's visit?

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/1 #6158

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

We are also meeting with the Chinese Minister-Counsellor on 9-21, and have asked if it would be in China's best interest to have their written response shared with the Soviet Union and the United States prior to Gromyko's visit.

As always, Bud, we are continuing to move, respectful of your counsel, and would welcome your thoughts as well as your response to the questions. We will call Wilma Tuesday, 9-13-84 to obtain a time to call back. We can be reached Monday night at the Shelburne in New York City (212)629-5200.

Warm regards,



Terry Pearce
400 San Rafael Ave.
Belvedere, CA. 94920
(415)-435-0510



Tom Green
2349 Spanish Trail
Tiburon, CA. 94920
(415)435-9663

cc. C. William Verity

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cf
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SYSTEM II
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 24, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSW*
SUBJECT: Sakharov and Fredkin

Following his message to me about his desire to arrange for the sale of 100 IBM-XT personal computers to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Edward Fredkin sent me a message through Embassy Moscow with a proposal for an attempt to resolve the Sakharov problem. He left Moscow before it could be answered, and then came to see me on September 17 to explain what he had in mind.

Fredkin explained that, while he was in Moscow, he noted that the Soviets were making a lot in the press over the Peltier case here. Although he recognizes that this is not a matter of genuine interest to them but only one of propaganda, he felt it provided a possible cover for an optically reciprocal resolution of the Sakharov problem. Accordingly, he left with his Soviet contacts (Arbatov and Velikhov) a "personal proposal" for steps to resolve the issue. The text is at TAB I, and Fredkin apologized for the rhetoric in the first two pages, which he said was designed to stimulate Soviet interest in the idea.

Essentially, Fredkin's proposal is that a person or persons trusted by both sides visit both Sakharov and Peltier, take pictures of them and interview them, and then certify to their condition. Following this both governments would issue statements that they were satisfied that the conditions of the two individuals were as found by the observers. The next step would be confidential talks by US and Soviet officials in an effort to find a way to resolve the situation, consistent with the sovereignty of both countries.

Earlier, Ken deGraffenreid requested file checks at the FBI and CIA on Fredkin (we really know little about him) and has reported that both reported that he had been uncooperative with U.S. officials in the past. For example, he once excluded a State Department escort from a meeting he was having with a Chinese delegation, [REDACTED] There is no evidence, however, of illegal or disloyal activity -- mainly eccentricity and an uncooperative attitude.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-11411 #6159

BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

FOIA(b)(1)

Perhaps recognizing that some of this would be on the record, Fredkin went out of his way during our meeting -- and during earlier telephone calls -- to describe what he had observed of computer developments in the Soviet Union, and offered to talk with government specialists if there is an interest. (I am doing a separate memorandum of these comments, and believe it would in fact be useful to have someone talk to him.)

Nevertheless, Fredkin's background is not one which would commend him to us as an intermediary if we had a real choice in the matter. However, inasmuch as we contacted him (as a result of Tanya Semyonov's call to the Vice President) to encourage him (without commitment) to take up the Sakharov problem, we may be to some degree on the hook, since it would be damaging to our relations with the Sakharov family if we tried to turn him off at this point.

Actually, Fredkin does not seem to be seeking hard-and-fast commitments at this point. Essentially, what he is asking is whether we would be prepared to respond favorably if the Soviets pick him up on his proposals. I doubt that they will, although conceivably his scenario could provide a face-saving way to solve the problem if the Soviets decide at some point they want it solved.

Therefore, I recommend that we tell Fredkin that his plan is an ingenious one, and that if the Soviets show an interest, we will do what we can to make it work on our side. I would caution him, however, that we cannot make advance commitments regarding concrete actions until there is a clear sign of Soviet interest, and a more precise indication of what precisely they want us to do and what they themselves are prepared to do.

Recommendation:

That you approve my replying to Fredkin along the lines described above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I - Fredkin "Appeal" of September 13, 1984, as submitted to his Soviet contacts.

27

A Concerned Citizen
Planet Earth

13 September, 1984

To whom it may concern
USSR, Moscow

To whom it may concern
Washington, USA

The world is rapidly plunging towards a terrible fate, which may involve the destruction of a majority of mankind, and the fruits of thousands of years of civilization. Why? That is a question that deserves an answer.

Every creature that lives on this planet has a will to survive. Yet, no creature survives beyond its normal life span because all creatures are mortal. While we may want to live forever, it is certain that we will all die someday. Under the best and most peaceful of circumstances, we can expect that every one now alive on this planet will be dead by the year 2150.

Every species of creature on this planet has survived for thousands of years and also has the ability to survive for thousands of years into the future. Yet no species has the will to survive, because a species cannot have a will of its own. If mankind manages to continue surviving on this planet, it will not be a matter of the will of our species, but because of the will of the individuals who wish to have mankind survive. I and others like me, who want to survive, to have others survive, to have our species survive must express our will against all forces that threaten that survival. We need not care if one man so wants to win that he puts winning ahead of his own survival. We all must care when some want to win, to have their nation win, and they put that goal ahead of the survival of all mankind.

The fear of annihilation knows no national boundaries. The will to survive knows no national boundaries. Those who wish to go on living, whoever and wherever they may be, must express their will in terms of actions that are effective. Throughout history, governments have proven themselves unable to avoid war. Such wars are usually preceded by an increase in tensions and an increase in hostility. In fact, situations similar to those developing today, between the USSR and the USA are very much like those that have led to war in the past. The difference is that today, everyone in the world is threatened by this USA-USSR confrontation. It is those who are threatened who must work to save themselves and their descendants by finding ways to reduce the chance of war. Since everyone is threatened, we all must work on this problem. There is no aspect that is too small to be worthy of careful and considerate effort. It is not a time for us to be patient, rather it is a time for us to be purposeful and persistent.

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The most important step is to move away from positions of conflict and hostility, and towards positions of cooperation and rapprochement. As hostility increases, tensions increase, communication decreases, suspicions increase and in general, the world moves towards war. War has happened in the past, and many have suffered. We must understand that there have been no new discoveries that now make war less likely; the new discoveries only make war more terrible.

A case in point are situations like those that surround Leonard Peltier and Andrei Sakharov. In the USSR and USA, the situation of these individuals, and the reaction on the other side, has as a consequence the fact that there is an increase in hostility and suspicion. There are steps, however, that can be taken in concert between the USA and the USSR that will serve to reduce the confrontational nature of these situations, while respecting each country's right to solely determine its own internal affairs.

We must all realize, that if the US and the USSR go to war, they will have determined the internal affairs of all sovereign countries. Surely killing most if not all of the population of a country, without consulting with its government for permission to do so could be considered an infringement on its internal affairs! A war between the USA and the USSR could have such a result for most countries. In today's world, the USSR and the USA both have military establishments that have plans in place that will result in infringing upon the sovereign rights of every country on the planet. It should be possible to consider small requests that one country might make about the affairs inside another, if that request is honestly made as part of a series of concrete actions that can lead to a reduction in tensions.

Consider the Peltier and the Sakharov situations. Everyone in the world might benefit if ways could be found to stop the destructive effects of these situations. What are the destructive effects? Within each country, public opinion is being influenced in the direction of hostility and confrontation. The USA claims that the USSR is bad, because of its treatment of Sakharov, and the USSR claims that the USA is bad because of its treatment of Peltier.

Those who believe that having a way to turn public opinion against the "enemy" is a step towards winning, revel in and enjoy such confrontational situations. What they do not realize is that they do not win when the other side loses. This is a situation where most events lead to consequences where mankind wins, or mankind loses. It doesn't matter if all Russians die three minutes before all Americans die, and thus enjoy three minutes as the "winner".

To truly understand what makes sense, every issue must be first examined in terms of its consequences for all mankind, secondly in terms of its consequences for one's own country. Otherwise we are led to results that seem better for one country

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than for another, but where everyone is dead or dying. Why not try to answer questions first in mankind's interests, and secondly in national interests? True, it goes against simple human nature, but the same logic that causes patriots to place the concerns of their country ahead of their own personal concerns, can lead countries to put the concerns of the world ahead of their own national concerns.

In this light, there must be solutions to the Peltier and Sakharov situations that, by putting the needs of the world first, benefit all mankind. Of course, in finding such solutions, there is no reason not to proceed fairly, evenly, respectfully, with compassion not just for the two men, but compassion for everyone.

I, as an inhabitant of the world, do hereby make the following private proposal to the Governments of the USA and the USSR. I suggest that a representative of the USSR and of the USA get together to hold private discussions to arrive at a series of steps along the following lines.

1. The US and the USSR establish private communications, one person from each side.
2. Washington, (certainly government press releases and VOA) becomes noticeably quiet on the Sakharov situation.
3. Moscow, (certainly government press releases and Radio Moscow) becomes noticeably quiet on the Peltier situation.
4. X, a person described below, will meet with a Soviet official who answers questions X will ask about Sakharov's situation. They promise that all such discussions will be completely private.
5. Y, a person described below, will meet with an American official who answers questions Y will ask about Peltier's situation. They promise that all such discussions will be completely private.
6. X and Y will work out with a Soviet and an American official the contents of two projected press conferences, including press releases and general responses to questions.
7. X and Y will then communicate with, respectively, the American and Soviet official and then if, in their judgement conditions are suitable, they will proceed with the following steps. If conditions are not suitable, all matters discussed will be kept confidential, and we will not proceed with the following steps.
8. X will meet with Sakharov. X will speak to him to verify to his complete satisfaction that the information X received in step 4 above is accurate. X will take photos of Sakharov with a Polaroid camera.

9. Y will meet with Peltier. Y will speak to him to verify to his complete satisfaction that the information Y received in step 5 above is accurate. Y will take photos of Peltier with a Polaroid camera.

10. In Moscow, X will hold a press conference, giving a simple and neutral statement of the pertinent facts that X personally observed. X will give the photos to the press. X will not, however, grant any subsequent press interviews as X will be unwilling to become a public personality.

10. In Washington, Y will hold a press conference, giving a simple and neutral statement of the pertinent facts that Y personally observed. Y will give the photos to the press. Y will not, however, grant any subsequent press interviews as Y will be unwilling to become a public personality.

11. The US State Department's first response will be to issue a press release that they are now satisfied with Moscow's official position on the state of Sakharov's condition.

12. The USSR Foreign Ministry's first response will be to issue a press release that they are now satisfied with Washington's official position on the state of Peltier's condition.

13. Washington and Moscow will then remain "noticeably" quieter about the Sakharov and Peltier situations, awaiting further private discussions. A request will be made to the Sakharov family and private groups in the USA and USSR to do the same, so long as progress is made in private talks. This facts about this US-USSR understanding, however, will remain private.

14. Private discussions will then take place that respect the mutual sovereignty of the USSR and the US, but which are aimed at finding innovative ways to solve this dilemma. Each side will take into consideration the fact that by making fair and contemporaneous concessions to the perceived needs of the other side, that they will not lose, rather it is all mankind that will win.

15. So long as such discussions make progress, the US and USSR will continue to show restraint in their public statements about these issues.

16. X and Y must be persons capable of complete neutrality with regard to these issues. Each must be a person that understands both sides of each issue. They must each be a person trusted by both sides.

This proposal attempts to take into account certain Soviet and American realities about this situation, but gaining approval will require a spirit of goodwill, where the interests of all of mankind can be put above national interests.

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One can ask "Why tackle such small issues with such an elaborate procedure? Why not solve questions about arms in space or strategic weapons in Europe?" The answer is that these small issues loom large in the minds of many and they contribute in a disproportionate way to world tensions, hostility and distrust. We can and must make progress on such issues.

I am willing to be X or Y or both. There are others who can fill such roles. Our problem is to solve this problem, for the sake of mankind, and not to quibble over details. Nevertheless this little problem is worthy of great attention. Its solution needs the thought of our best thinkers, later they can pay attention to harder problems.

I would be pleased if, having modified this proposal to take into account the reactions of the appropriate persons in the US and USSR, if it could be considered at an early date. Perhaps it could be a matter of discussion in New York, when Gromyko may meet with Reagan.

Respectfully submitted,

Edward Fredkin
Moscow, USSR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Chrom 7144 32
Matlock

CONFIDENTIAL

September 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Evans and Novak Column Regarding September 18
NSC Session

In case you missed it, I'd like to call your attention to the Evans and Novak column, September 21 Washington Post, which contained a misleading account of the September 18, 1984 NSPG session.

If my understanding of the meeting is correct, the column is quite literally disinformation. Its content seems deliberately meant by the source to give the wrong impression of events at the NSPG. Whatever the source's motives, this "revelation" may create serious problems in our dealings with the Soviets.

Undoubtedly, the Soviets read the reports of "Washington insiders" with care. This one tends to reinforce suspicions they already have: 1) that the column is correct and the President is following a duplicitous policy, i.e., that the positive statements by the President are a cover for more devious things; or 2) that however well-intentioned the President may be, he is not willing or capable of controlling his Administration. (That is, if the President could control his staff, nothing like this would ever happen.)

This is not the first time that Evans and Novak have published misleading reports about what the President's "real policy" is. I am not sure what, if anything, can be done about it. I only want to point out that we need to be concerned not only with leaks of classified information, but also with distorted and misleading information fed to the press by officials with a personal ax to grind.

Attachments:

Tab I Washington Post clipping, Friday,
September 21, 1984.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/1 #6160
BY CN DATE 11/27/07

Washington Post, Friday, September 21, 1984,

op-ed page.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Will Gromyko Get a Lecture?

Presiding over an enlarged National Security Council session Tuesday, President Reagan laid down tough guidelines for next week's talk with Andrei Gromyko focusing not on arms control but on unacceptable Soviet conduct in all its manifestations, a decision certain to alarm the arms control bloc.

Reagan's guidelines move the United States away from the obsessive preoccupation with arms control that has motivated previous administrations. Arms control, the president made clear to his top policy aides, is not the centerpiece of American-Soviet relations. The United States, he said, must be more concerned about general Soviet misconduct—particularly intervention in Afghanistan and Central America—than about the troubled course of arms control.

Contributing to these Reagan guidelines on how to deal with Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit are new intelligence reports that have alarmed Reagan and his top advisers.

The lesson in the correct U.S. policy toward the Soviets that Reagan recited behind closed doors suggests a cool presidential approach to the Gromyko meeting not encumbered with the election-year peace imagery urged by some of his advisers.

For months, the president has been buffeted by conflicts between his own convictions and the pleadings of a few aides, notably deputy

chief of staff Michael Deaver. They want Reagan to enhance his peace image with offers to Moscow that would lead to quick resumption of arms control talks.

But Reagan was on a different tack in the 90-minute White House session last Tuesday. As described by one insider, he took a "simple and uncluttered" view of the disrupted talks: The Soviets walked out, not the United States; therefore it is up to the Soviets to return, not for the United States to beg for their return.

That seemed to doom proposals of State Department officials that the United States offer concessions to induce Moscow to return to arms control negotiations, possibly before the election. One proposal: that the United States agree to delay the crucial late-fall test of a new anti-satellite weapon. Although Secretary of State George Shultz did not formally broach that idea Tuesday, Reagan was prepared for it. "He would have said no," a key aide told us, not only on principle but because intelligence reports now moving onto his desk are asking hard questions about hostile Soviet acts at home and around the globe.

The most ominous of these reports from the CIA raises suspicion of an imminent Soviet move from Afghanistan into the northern tip of Pakistan. Moscow has repeatedly warned that it will not tolerate continued Pakistani aid for Afghan

freedom fighters in their struggle against the Soviet invasion. Reagan has been informed that a new buildup of Soviet arms and men in northern Afghanistan points to a spillover of the war into Pakistan itself. If that occurred before Nov. 6, Reagan's course would be excruciatingly difficult.

Another Soviet move now alarming the White House is the most intensive effort ever recorded to conceal tests of its new missiles. This deception and concealment have made it utterly impossible for the United States any longer to monitor Soviet weapons testing—a violation of the SALT II Treaty that Reagan first charged Moscow with almost a year ago.

Reagan may decide to let Shultz bring up encryption and other SALT violations during the secretary's Sept. 26 meeting with Gromyko. That was a detail he did not discuss with his top advisers on Tuesday. Indeed, Reagan discussed no details at all about how he plans to handle his meeting with Gromyko.

The disclosure that his first-ever session with a Soviet leader will center on the real world of America's problems with its adversary, not the narrow and often overdramatized issue of arms control, was comfort enough for his supporters. If he follows through as outlined on Tuesday, the Soviets will now have no trouble knowing exactly where they stand with Ronald Reagan.

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RECEIVED 26 SEP 84 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 25 SEP 84

HILL, C

25 SEP 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/10/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

GROMYKO, ANDREI

SUBJECT: SOVIET PARTICIPANTS AT SEP 28 MTG & LUNCHEON W/ PRES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR KIMMITT DUE: 26 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

MARTIN

LEHMAN, R

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COMMENTS

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

7223

September 25, 1984

84 SEP 26 A 5: 29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMMEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Participants at September 28 Meeting with the President

In addition to Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko, the following Soviet officials will attend the 10:00 a.m. Oval Office meeting with President Reagan on September 28:

Georgiy M. Korniyenko - First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin - Ambassador to the United States

Aleksey A. Obukhov - Deputy Chief USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (notetaker)

Viktor M. Sukhodrev - Deputy Chief, Second European Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)

We have advised the Soviets that this group may be expanded by three for the 12:00 luncheon in the White House family dining room and asked them to provide as soon as possible the names of those planning to attend.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

NADA Date 10/10/02



S/S:8426518

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 25, 1984

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7223

84 SEP 26

A 5 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Guests at White House Lunch

The following three Soviets will be joining the Gromyko party for lunch at the White House on September 28:

Ambassador Vasiliy Makarov - Gromyko's chief aide
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov - USSR Embassy in Washington
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov - USSR Embassy in Washington

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CHS NARA, Date 6/10/82

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83 G - 381-529 (312) Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP

(Date/Time)

We have direct links with all but Craxi.
We could send ~~him~~ his via privacy
channel to Max Labb. These have been
discussed with, but not cleared by, State.
You may want to touch base with Shultz
or Oam -- though the text is general enough
I would not see a real problem in moving on our own.
Time is of the essence.

~~SECRET~~

7182

38

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~
ACTION

September 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK/PETER R. SOMMER *PRS*

SUBJECT: Presidential Messages Re Meeting with Gromyko

Attached are the Presidential messages you requested to Nakasone, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Kohl and Craxi.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Tab I memo forwarding the messages for Presidential approval.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

PRS
Gaston Sigur concurs.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to President
Tab A	Message to Nakasone
Tab B	Message to Thatcher
Tab C	Message to Mitterrand
Tab D	Message to Kohl
Tab E	Message to Craxi

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/10/02*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7182

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Messages Regarding Your Meeting with Gromyko

Attached are suggested messages to Nakasone, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Kohl and Craxi outlining your general objectives in Friday's meeting with Gromyko. The messages, which are similar for all the leaders but with personalized openings, also solicit their thoughts and suggestions.

Recommendation:

OK

No

That you approve the attached messages for dispatch via the privacy channels.

*per RR telco,
9/25/930*

Attachments:

Tab A Message to Nakasone
Tab B Message to Thatcher
Tab C Message to Mitterrand
Tab D Message to Kohl
Tab E Message to Craxi

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 25, 1997
By *as* NARA, Date *6/10/02*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED/RE(0452)

NLRR 106-114/1 176/63

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE

BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

Dear Yasu,

On a number of occasions you and I have discussed the need to improve East-West relations, especially U.S.-Soviet relations. From our talks, I know how deeply you feel and I wanted to share my thoughts with you on the eve of my Friday meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

My aim will be to impress upon the Soviet Government my strong, personal desire to put our relations on a more positive track and, in particular, my commitment to negotiate agreements to reduce arms levels in a fair, balanced and verifiable manner. I will make clear that our arms control proposals are flexible and that in negotiations, I am fully prepared to take legitimate Soviet security concerns into account. I do not, however, believe that it would be prudent to make preemptive concessions and will not do so.

I do feel strongly that we need a better mechanism for consulting with the Soviet Government on both arms control and regional issues, and will be making some concrete suggestions for regular high level meetings. My objective would be to engage the Soviets in a comprehensive dialogue, which would focus on the interrelation of offensive and defensive systems and would aim at finding ways to reduce armament levels substantially and restrain destabilizing technological developments. On regional issues, my aim is to reduce the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations.

I shall, of course, keep you fully informed of the results of my meeting and will stay in touch as we plan any subsequent consultations which may ensue from it.

Should you have any comments on the approach I intend to take with Gromyko, or specific suggestions for the meeting, I would value them greatly.

Sincerely,

Ron

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASD)

NLRR F06-114/1 #6164

BY CW NARA DATE 1/27/07

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

Dear Margaret,

From our frequent talks, I know how deeply you feel about the need to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and I am hopeful that the approach I outline below will strike a responsive chord. In particular, I hope you will be pleased that we have taken up your suggestion in proposing to expand and increase high level contacts.

In my meeting Friday with Foreign Minister Gromyko, my primary aim will be to impress upon the Soviet Government my strong, personal desire to put our relations on a more positive track and, in particular, my commitment to negotiate agreements to reduce arms levels in a fair, balanced and verifiable manner. I will make clear that our arms control proposals are flexible and that in negotiations, I am fully prepared to take legitimate Soviet security concerns into account. I do not, however, believe that it would prudent to make preemptive concessions and will not do so.

I share your view that we need a better mechanism for consulting with the Soviet Government on both arms control and regional issues, and will be making some concrete suggestions for regular high level meetings. My objective would be to engage the Soviets in a comprehensive dialogue, which would focus on the interrelation of offensive and defensive systems and would aim at finding ways to reduce armament levels substantially and restrain destabilizing technological developments. On regional issues, my aim is to reduce the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations.

I shall keep you fully informed of the results of my meeting and will stay in touch as we plan any subsequent consultations which may ensue from it.

Should you have any comments on the approach I intend to take with Gromyko, or specific suggestions for the meeting, they, of course, would be welcome.

Warm regards,

Ron

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MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

Dear Francois,

From our frequent discussions, I am well aware of your special interest in East-West relations. I also remember your efforts to keep me informed about your trip to Moscow and I would like to bring you up to date on our thinking on the eve of my meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

In my meeting on Friday, my aim will be to impress upon the Soviet Government my sincere desire to put our relations on a more positive track and, in particular, my commitment to negotiate agreements to reduce arms levels in a fair, balanced and verifiable manner. I will make clear that our arms control proposals are flexible and that in negotiations, I am fully prepared to take legitimate Soviet security concerns into account. I do not, however, believe that it would be prudent to make preemptive concessions and will not do so.

I do feel strongly that we need a better mechanism for consulting with the Soviet Government on both arms control and regional issues, and will be making some concrete suggestions for regular high level meetings. My objective would be to engage the Soviets in a comprehensive dialogue, which would focus on the interrelation of offensive and defensive systems and would aim at finding ways to reduce armament levels substantially and restrain destabilizing technological developments. On regional issues, my aim is to reduce the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRRF06-114/1 #6/65

BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

I shall, of course, keep you fully informed of the results of my meeting and will stay in touch as we plan any subsequent consultations which may ensue from it.

Should you have any comments on the approach I intend to take with Gromyko, or specific suggestions for the meeting, I would value them greatly.

Sincerely,

Ron

44

MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

Dear Helmut,

I know you share my strong desire to build a constructive, realistic long term relationship with the Soviet Union and I wanted to write you personally on the eve of my meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

In my meeting Friday, my aim will be to impress upon the Soviet Government my sincere desire to put our relations on a more positive track and, in particular, my commitment to negotiate agreements to reduce arms levels in a fair, balanced and verifiable manner. I will make clear that our arms control proposals are flexible and that in negotiations, I am fully prepared to take legitimate Soviet security concerns into account. I do not, however, believe that it would be prudent to make preemptive concessions and will not do so.

I do feel strongly that we need a better mechanism for consulting with the Soviet Government on both arms control and regional issues, and will be making some concrete suggestions for regular high level meetings. My objective would be to engage the Soviets in a comprehensive dialogue, which would focus on the interrelation of offensive and defensive systems and would aim at finding ways to reduce armament levels substantially and restrain destabilizing technological developments. On regional issues, my aim is to reduce the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations.

DECLASSIFIED/RE/EXC(2)

NLRR F06-114/1 #6166

BY CV NARADATE 11/27/07

I shall, of course, keep you fully informed of the results of my meeting and will stay in touch as we plan any subsequent consultations which may ensue from it.

Should you have any comments on the approach I intend to take with Gromyko, or specific suggestions for the meeting, I would value them greatly.

Sincerely,

Ron

MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER CRAXI

Dear Bettino,

From our conversations, I am well aware of your strong desire to improve East-West relation and I wanted to share my thoughts with you on the eve of my meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

In my meeting on Friday, my aim will be to impress upon the Soviet Government my sincere desire to put our relations on a more positive track and, in particular, my commitment to negotiate agreements to reduce arms levels in a fair, balanced and verifiable manner. I will make clear that our arms control proposals are flexible and that in negotiations, I am fully preapred to take legitimate Soviet security concerns into account. I do not, however, believe that it would be prudent to make preemptive concessions and will not do so.

I do feel strongly that we need a better mechanism for consulting with the Soviet Government on both arms control and regional issues, and will be making some concrete suggestions for regular high level meetings. My objective would be to engage the Soviets in a comprehensive dialogue, which would focus on the interrelation of offensive and defensive systems and would aim at finding ways to reduce armament levels substantially and restrain destabilizing technological developments. On regional issues, my aim is to reduce the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontations.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR FOB-114/1 # 6167

BY CU DATE 11/07/07

I shall, of course, keep you fully informed of the results of my meeting and will stay in touch as we plan any subsequent consultations which may ensue from it.

Should you have any comments on the approach I intend to take with Gromyko, or specific suggestions for the meeting, I would value them greatly.

Sincerely,

Ron

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Sepember 26, 1984

TO:
Ken
deGraffenreid

TO: JACK MATLOCK

FROM: KEN deGRAFFENREID

Jack,

Do you by any chance remember when the
attic fire occurred at Embassy Moscow?

Ken

Yes - it is seared in my
memory. August 26, 1977.
(If not the 26th, then
within a day or two.) Jack

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED / DELETED

NLRR 106-114/1 #6161

BY CW NARA DATE 11/27/07