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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1984 (5/5)

**FOIA**

F06-114/1

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605

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6168	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SCC--- COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON CONCURRENT OPERATIONS [4-6] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	3	9/26/1984	B1
6171	MEMO	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS [3]	1	9/27/1984	B6
6172	LETTER	LETTER TO MICHAEL DEEVER FROM SIDNEY PLOSS [11-14]	4	5/12/1984	B6
6173	LETTER	LETTER TO CAROLYN DEEVER FROM KAYA PLOSS [15-16]	2	5/14/1984	B6
6174	MEMO	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS [20]	1	9/28/1984	B6
6169	MEMO	MEMO OF CONVERSATION RE PRESIDENT REAGAN MEETING WITH GROMYKO [21-31] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	11	9/28/1984	B1
6170	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE REPLY TO GREEN AND PEARCE [35] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	9/24/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 26, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*SUBJECT: "Prebrief" Meeting Memorandum  
(Thursday, September 27, 1984 -- 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.)

Attached at Tab I is a very simple prebrief memorandum for the meeting tomorrow.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I Meeting Memorandum

cc: Bill Martin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

By *CRS* NARA, Date *6/16/01*  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PREBRIEF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

DATE: Thursday, September 27, 1984  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.  
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To review the scenario and topics of discussion for your meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on Friday, September 28, 1984.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting will provide an opportunity to review the important issues to be placed on the agenda for your Friday meeting and lunch with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Shultz  
Secretary of Defense Weinberger  
Robert C. McFarlane  
~~Deputy Secretary of Defense William Taft~~  
Admiral John M. Poindexter  
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman  
Under Secretary Michael Armacost  
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt  
Jack Matlock, NSC  
Messrs. Meese, Baker and Deaver, at their discretion

IV. PHOTO OPPORTUNITY

White House Photographer

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Introduction of various topics under consideration, to be followed by general discussion.

Prepared by:  
Jack Matlock

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CLS NARA, Date 6/10/02



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

September 26, 1984

4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER/RONALD LEHMAN/JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: SCC -- Common Understanding on Concurrent Operations

The following is provided in response to your request for a brief history and for an assessment of the above subject. As you know, the Department of State's draft Talking Points for upcoming meetings with Gromyko proposed immediate movement on this subject. At the same time, it is also part of a larger interagency decision package we are forwarding as a separate memorandum (System II 90999) to provide guidance for the next session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which begins on October 2, 1984.

Attached for your review are two documents that provide essential information: Tab A -- the full text on this issue as discussed in the current interagency SCC Decision Paper; and Tab B -- the complete text of the proposed Understanding.

BACKGROUND

As the chronology in the discussion paper at Tab A indicates, this Understanding was first presented ad referendum by the US and Soviet SCC Commissioners to their governments in late 1982; was modified during the Spring of 1983 (when the US Commissioner was authorized to sign, but when the USSR Commissioner lacked such authority); was deferred by the US following the KAL shootdown in the Fall of 1983; and was further deferred by the US during the Spring of 1984.

Two fundamental issues have affected USG decisions on this issue. The first has been the issue of the diplomatic context. The second has been the issue of a substantive loophole in the Understanding's text and the possible impact and precedent of such a loophole for military and arms control policy.

THE DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT

Concerning the diplomatic context, all agencies agreed following the KAL shootdown that the Understanding should be deferred for the Fall, 1983, session, but as that event has receded agencies other

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CODEWORD ATTACHMENTS~~

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than OSD, which had strong substantive objections to the Understanding, have moved to the recommendation that the agreement be concluded. Because of disagreement on the substantive merits of the Understanding, some agencies see the Understanding as demonstrating our concerns about compliance and effective arms control, while others believe it demonstrates quite the opposite.

#### THE LOOPHOLE PROBLEM

Concerning the loophole problem identified by OSD, it has been barely, if at all, engaged by other agencies. This issue turns on US acceptance in the Understanding of a Soviet proposal that concurrent operation of air defense components may be permitted in "unexpected circumstances" involving "hostile or unidentified aircraft." OSD's position is that this exemption provides a critically important loophole, which, especially given Soviet deception practices, the KAL shootdown, and poor Soviet responses to the serious compliance concerns we have raised in the SCC, would be both militarily and diplomatically intolerable and would set a bad precedent as an ambiguous and unverifiable agreement.

In a further recent development on this matter, as indicated in the interagency paper (and as verified by NSC staff with Doug George), the Intelligence Community has confirmed that "intelligence information available since the drafting of the Common Understanding indicates that the current draft may be inadequate in other respects as well as to deal with the concurrent operations questions." On the latter point, State, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner have essentially chosen not to address the loophole issue; instead, continuing their focus on a diplomatic context which assumes there are no substantive problems with the Understanding. Informal NSC staff discussion with Dean Sackett indicates that the JCS, while deferring on the diplomatic context issue, believe the substance of the agreement to be in the net military interest of the United States, not so much because of ease about Soviet exploitation of the loophole but in part because they believe the loophole may protect US concurrent activity contingencies.

#### NSC STAFF VIEWS

There are clearly some serious issues and tradeoffs involved in this issue that require careful consideration. SCC Commissioner Ellis (who favors signing the Understanding) has now strongly urged that no USG decision be made until after the Gromyko meetings, as he believes we will be in a better position to assess the above tradeoffs after gauging Gromyko's overall responsiveness and tone.

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Some NSC staff (Matlock) believe we should seek a positive decision affirming the Understanding for the Gromyko meeting. Some other NSC staff (Lehman and Kraemer), in view of substantive policy concerns along the lines of OSD and Intelligence Community views and because of a desire to see how Gromyko acts, agree that it would be wrong to make a decision, particularly a positive decision prior to the Gromyko meeting. Still other NSC staff believe that, depending on positive results in the Gromyko meeting, we could conclude this Understanding if we step up to the concurrent testing issues which remain unresolved (R. Lehman).

Don Fortier and Bob Linhard concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That a decision be made now to endorse the signing of the Understanding as is, prior to the Gromyko meeting, and that Gromyko be so informed. (Matlock recommends.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove RCM

That a decision on this issue be deferred until after the Gromyko visit, but that when a decision is made, it be to continue to defer the signing of the Understanding, meanwhile tasking agencies to address the loophole issue and to come up with alternative approaches in the next few weeks. (Kraemer recommends.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove RCM

Alternatively, that the decision be postponed until after the Gromyko visit, and that, contingent upon positive results for that visit, we agree to the signing of the Understanding as is, to be presented early in the next SCC session, but accompanied by a US statement that: (1) we believe that movement on this issue and other issues might be helpful; (2) we recognize that circumstances or new development could require additional discussion, clarification, and/or understanding; and (3) we would view any use of the exception as highly unusual and would expect it to be accompanied immediately by a full explanation of the circumstances. If Gromyko meeting were negative, we would, under this option, then indicate a desire to reopen the Understanding issue with a revised text taking account of our concern on the above. Regardless of whichever way the Gromyko meeting goes, the IG would be tasked to develop the appropriate package for addressing remaining concurrent testing concerns. (R. Lehman recommends.)

Approve RCM

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments as Noted

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~~CODEWORD ATTACHMENTS~~

Please forward over all SCC right away.

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C

September 26, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK SUBJECT: Proposed Response for Signature by Michael Deaver  
to Letter from Ploss Seeking NSC Position

Sydney Ploss, a Soviet affairs analyst at the State Department, sent a letter to Michael Deaver requesting a position as a Soviet analyst at NSC. Attached is a proposed response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Michael Deaver, forwarding the letter at Tab A to Mr. Ploss.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I      Memorandum to Michael Deaver  
Tab A      Letter to Mr. Ploss  
Tab B      Incoming, with background papers.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Letter from Ploss Seeking NSC  
Position

Sydney Ploss, a Soviet affairs analyst at the State Department, sent a letter to you requesting a position as a Soviet analyst at NSC. Attached is a proposed response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A to Mr. Floss.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab A Letter to Mr. Ploss

Tab B Incoming, with background papers.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Ploss:

Thank you for your letter regarding a position with the National Security Council Staff.

The National Security Council Staff is relatively small and at the present time there are no positions for a Soviet Affairs Analyst. The National Security Council will, however, keep your letter on file in case such an opening should occur.

Sincerely,

Michael K. Deaver  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
and Assistant to the President

Mr. Sidney Ploss  
3807 48th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20016



ID #

254943

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# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence  
received (YY/MM/DD)

8/109/106

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT:

Sidney  
Ploss☒ DC Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: wants position for her husband Sidney  
Ploss on WSC staff; Soviet affairs specialist

## ROUTE TO:

## ACTION

## DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
DCS:IT	ORIGINATOR	8/109/106		C	8/109/106
✓ Bob Kimmitt	D	8/109/106		S	8/109/1
	Referral Note:	Bob - would you please draft a response to the attached on behalf of MKR. Thanks / /			
	Referral Note:				
	Referral Note:				

## ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action  
C - Comment/Recommendation  
D - Draft Response  
F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary  
R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
S - For Signature  
X - Interim Reply

## DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered  
B - Non-Special Referral  
C - Completed  
S - Suspended

## FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
Code = "A"  
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

## COMMENTS:



✓ 17

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSW*

SUBJECT: Briefing, Meeting and Luncheon Memorandum: The President's Meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko  
(Friday, September 28, 1984)

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum combining the briefing meeting, the President's official meeting and lunch with the Foreign Minister, beginning at 9:00 a.m., 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., respectively, on Friday, September 28.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Meeting Memorandum

Tab A List of Participants

cc: William Martin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997  
By *CW* NARA, Date *6/10/02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING, OFFICIAL MEETING AND LUNCH  
WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO

DATE: Friday, September 28, 1984  
LOCATION: Oval Office and State Dining Room  
TIME: 9:00 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To review major international issues with a special focus on U.S.-Soviet affairs.

II. BACKGROUND

These fora will provide opportunities to review the issues (see memoranda submitted separately).

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is attached at Tab A.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunities at the beginning of the official meeting in the Oval Office at 10:00 a.m. and at the beginning of lunch, at 12:00 noon.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

9:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. Briefing in the Oval Office  
10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Official Meeting in the Oval Office  
12:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. Lunch in the State Dining Room

Prepared by:  
Jack Matlock

Attachments:

Tab A List of Participants

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CV NARA, Date 6/10/02

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING, OFFICIAL MEETING AND LUNCH  
WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO

Friday, September 28, 1984

9:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. -- Briefing -- Oval Office

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Shultz  
Secretary of Defense Weinberger (will attend briefing only)  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman  
Jack F. Matlock, NSC  
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. -- Official Meeting -- Oval Office

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Shultz  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman  
Jack F. Matlock, NSC  
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Gromyko  
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko  
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin  
Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

12:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. -- Lunch -- State Dining Room, White House

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan  
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger  
Edwin Meese III  
James A. Baker, III  
Michael K. Deaver  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter  
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman  
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt  
Jack F. Matlock, NSC  
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko  
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy M. Korniyenko  
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
Ambassador Vasiliy Makarov, Chief Aide to Mr. Gromyko  
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, USSR Embassy  
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov, USSR Embassy  
Ambassador Albert S. Chernyshov, Mr. Gromyko's Staff  
Vladimir B. Lomeyko, Press Spokesman for Mr. Gromyko



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WASHINGTON

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NLRR F06-114/1 #6169

BY OW NARA DATE 11/27/07

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister  
Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet UnionPARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador  
to the Soviet Union  
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt  
Jack Matlock, NSC  
Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter  
  
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko  
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko  
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, InterpreterDATE, TIME Friday, September 28, 1984,  
AND PLACE: 10:00-12:00 a.m., Oval Office

After several minutes wait, as journalists came through for photographs, the President opened the meeting at 10:20 a.m. He said that he was pleased that Foreign Minister Gromyko had been able to come to Washington to meet with him and he hoped that he could demonstrate to Gromyko that he was not the sort of person to eat his own grandchildren.

The President pointed out that our political systems are very different and that we will be competitive in the world. But we live in one world and we must handle our competition in peace. He emphasized that the United States will never start a war with the Soviet Union. He added that they did not have to take his word for that but only look at history. For example, after World War II when the United States was the predominant military power in the world, we did not use that power to force ourselves on others. Instead we set out to help -- allies and one-time enemies alike -- to restore their economies and to build a peaceful world. We have been trying to reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and today have only two-thirds as many as we had in 1967.

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Of course, we are now rebuilding our military strength, but we are doing this because of the massive Soviet buildup. We feel this is a threat to us. Soviet leaders have proclaimed their dedication to revolution and to our destruction. And we have experience with Soviet aggression: the Cuban missile crisis, the attempts to extend Soviet influence in Africa, their efforts elsewhere. Throughout, the Soviet Union seems to consider us the enemy to be overcome.

The President said he mentioned this only to explain why we feel threatened -- not to debate the matter -- but he wanted to make it clear that while we do not intend to be vulnerable to attack or to an ultimatum that would require us to choose between capitulation and annihilation, we have no aggressive intent toward anyone. He added that we are willing to accept Soviet concerns for their own security. We understand the loss of life in World War II, and we understand their feelings based on a number of invasions of their country over the years. But the problem is that we are mutually suspicious; both sides are fearful. The time has come to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms.

As the two superpowers, we must take the lead in reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. If the two of us take the lead, the rest of the world would have to follow. And this applies not only to nuclear weapons, but also to such weapons as biological and chemical as well.

The President mentioned that the Soviet Union had proposed negotiations on weapons in space. He said that we are ready for this. But we also feel that offensive weapons must be a subject of concern and a subject of negotiation. And he wondered if we could not consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and also agreement on a process of reducing nuclear arms.

The President also suggested that we need to have representatives of senior levels meet to discuss the whole situation and to try to find ways to negotiate these problems. A private channel would be useful. For example, someone here and a counterpart there could take up contacts privately in order to consult confidentially and give direction to negotiations. The President stressed that we both have confidence in our Ambassadors and should use them more, but there may also be a need for confidential contacts without the formality of more official channels.

The President then referred to the American commitment to human rights. He said that he understands the Soviet feeling that these questions impinge upon their sovereignty, but they must understand that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that many ethnic groups in the United States maintain an interest



responsive to these concerns. The fact is that it would be much easier for the United States to make agreements with the Soviet Union if there is improvement in this area. As an example, he cited the resolution of the case of the Pentecostalists who took refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow, and said that we treated their permission to leave the Soviet Union as a generous act on the part of the Soviet Government. We never attempted to portray it as an arrangement between our two governments, but did attempt to respond and ease relations by, for example, concluding the long-term grain agreement. The President added that although the Foreign Minister knows the United States fairly well, some of his colleagues may not, and the Soviet leadership should understand that the President cannot simply dictate to the Congress or to the public. The atmosphere must be right if the President is to be capable of carrying out and implementing agreements with the Soviet Union.

The President stressed that peace is our greatest desire and we are prepared to move in a peaceful direction and to discuss how we can reduce arms and set a goal of ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Foreign Minister Gromyko responded that the President had touched on many problems and he thought it was necessary to set out their policy. He realized that the President had heard and read many authoritative statements from the Soviet leadership, including Chernenko's letters and public statements. He observed that it cannot be questioned that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are of tremendous importance for the entire world. Indeed, this is axiomatic and no one in the world would deny it. The conclusion he would draw from this is that the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union must see to it that both bilateral issues and international questions that concern us are conducted in full accord with the responsibilities which the leadership of both countries carry.

Gromyko said that he did not know how the President got the idea that the Soviet Union set for itself the goal of demolishing the American system, or that the Soviets think about that at all. The Soviet Government has no such goal, and the U.S. has no basis for making the accusation.

Gromyko stated that in accord with the philosophy held by the Soviet leaders, the course of historical development is unavoidable, and just as they believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, they also believe that the capitalist system will be followed by a socialist system which in turn will be followed by a communist system. But that is not a goal. And, indeed, "voluntarism" -- attempts to force historical developments -- is alien to their philosophy. It is, he said, "anti-scientific." Therefore, there is no goal of undermining the social and political system in the United States. He felt that if some of the President's statements have been motivated by such a misunderstanding, the President would do well to correct his



comments. He would not use the word "insult" to characterize these accusations because it is too mild. The fact is, the Soviets have a philosophy of historical processes, but not a goal of changing or replacing the political and economic systems in other countries.

Gromyko continued that it was not the first time that they had heard that the United States had acted generously after World War II and that the U.S. had possessed nuclear weapons, but had not used them. He observed that it is true that the United States acted wisely in not using nuclear weapons, saying in passing that the U.S. had only a negligible number, of course, but he wouldn't emphasize that. He continued by saying that at the end of the war, if the Soviet leaders had waved their armies to the West, no force could have stopped them. It would have been like a tidal wave. Yet, they did not do it; they were loyal to their agreements with the Allies, to their agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom. France, of course, later joined as an ally, but principally with the United States and the United Kingdom. The USSR was true to its word and did not move beyond the boundaries specified in the post-War agreements. The President would recall that President Truman signed the Potsdam Accord along with Churchill and Stalin. The Soviet Union had lived up to this agreement.

Gromyko continued that in the President's observations, he detected the thought that the Soviet Union is a threat to the West. The fact is, Gromyko said, that after the war when the guns fell silent, all the military bases which had been set up by the United States throughout the world were retained. They were kept and even increased; new ones were built. Arms were increased as well. He asked, rhetorically, if the Soviet Union should have taken this into account, and answered "of course," and said that these events were still fresh in their memories.

Gromyko went on to charge that the United States had built a wall -- a barrier -- against all attempts to reduce arms. He said he would remind the President that after the war ended in 1945 -- and he digressed to say that the Soviet Union had entered the war against Japan precisely in accord with its commitments -- and nuclear weapons appeared on the scene, it had been no miracle for the Soviet Union to acquire them. All nuclear weapons require is a certain technological potential and funding decisions. But Gromyko claimed that at that time the Soviet Union had proposed a permanent ban on nuclear weapons, and a commitment to use nuclear power solely for peaceful purposes.

He recalled that he himself had introduced in the United Nations in New York a draft convention for the permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons. The United States Administration (Truman was then President) rejected this idea. So what was the Soviet Union to do? They had to reconsider their position. They had to draw conclusions from the path the world was taking.



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Gromyko then stated that the West always raises questions of verification. It does this as if the Soviet Union doesn't do all it should do in carrying out its commitments. But the Soviet proposal was a very comprehensive one. It was for both nuclear and conventional disarmament, and as for verification at that time, they had proposed "a general and complete verification." And what was President Truman's response? He refused. He refused because the United States simply wanted more and more and more arms.

Gromyko then observed that we now have at our disposal mountains of arms. It's not a very pretty picture. We're sitting on mountains of nuclear weapons. We must ask how far we want to go in this direction.

He then recalled that when President Nixon came to Moscow in 1972 and entered Brezhnev's office, he observed that we both have enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other nine times over. And Brezhnev replied, "You are right. We have made the same calculation." So both came to the conclusion that it would be senseless to continue piling up these arms, and the result was the SALT II Agreements -- the ABM Treaty, and the interim agreement on offensive weapons. These are historic agreements and they are still alive.

Gromyko continued by saying that the question now is which direction we will go: toward a further accumulation of nuclear weapons or toward their reduction and elimination? This is indeed the "problem of problems." It is a question of life and death; it is a problem which must be overcome.

He suggested that a helpful step to start us on the right direction would be to freeze nuclear weapons where they are. He added that he wanted to say directly to the President that the Soviet Union is not threatening the social system of the United States. Indeed, the Soviets have great admiration for the talent of the American people, for its technology, for its science, for its vitality. They want to live in peace and friendship. And, he believes Americans want the same. Everyone wants trade, and trade can be mutually beneficial. The USSR needs the more advanced American technology and Americans can make a profit from it to the benefit of its own society. In short, Gromyko said, "we are offering peace as we have always offered peace. We will extend our hand if you extend yours."

Gromyko continued by observing that the President could say that the Soviet Union has more arms than the United States. That is not true, he said, the USSR does not have more. The United States and its allies have more, but an approximate equality exists. The Soviets say an "approximate equality" because it is not exact and the advantage is actually on the Western side. But, they are willing to say equality in order to move things forward.



In Europe, for example, NATO has fifty percent more weapons than the Warsaw Pact yet the Soviets have declared that this is approximately equal. In counting, of course, they take into account tactical and theater weapons, British and French systems and aircraft, including carrier aircraft.

So this is the situation as the Soviets see it. They do not wish to follow the course the United States has set of adding to the weapons in Europe. Of course, they are determined not to stay behind if the U.S. moves ahead.

Gromyko observed that one thread that ran through some of the argumentation he had heard was the contention that the Soviet Union cannot keep up in an arms race, and it is true that an arms race would cost the Soviets much in the way of material, intellectual and financial means. But they would do it. They were able to develop nuclear weapons even after their economy had suffered the colossal losses in World War II, and they will be able to keep up in the future regardless of the sacrifice required.

Gromyko added that he had heard some good words in the President's statement. He agreed that the United States and the Soviet Union must deal as equals and he wanted the President to know that the Soviet Union is seeking peaceful relations. The United States has advanced technology and can profit from trade with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union felt that it is better to trade than to compete in nuclear arms. Trade could be to the mutual benefit of both countries.

As far as outer space is concerned, the problem, according to Gromyko, is that we already have arms competition on the ground, under the water, on the water, in the air, but not yet in space, and we should prevent its spread to space. The Soviet Union, he said, is against the American plan to extend the arms race into space. They condemn it and if the effort continues it will be irreversible. Tremendous resources will be spent, and yet there will be no advantage gained in this field. Look at it coolly, he said. We are fed up with the competition in nuclear arms. Why involve space as well? Think it over calmly and coolly, he repeated.

He noted that the United States had taken a negative attitude toward the Soviet proposal for negotiations in Vienna. It would have been better, he said, if the United States had not proposed its formula at all. It is clear the United States wants the militarization of space, which the Soviet Union opposes.

Gromyko continued that a freeze of weapons is not a reduction and they would like to reduce nuclear weapons, but that a freeze would improve the atmosphere for reduction and might make it possible. He believed that no nuclear power would be hurt by a freeze. He went on to say that the average person in the United



States knows very little about the Soviet Union but does know that he wants peace.

Gromyko continued by saying that the President's speech at the United Nations spoke of contacts and consultation. These are not contrary to Soviet desires; they are not bad. The Soviets do not reject the President's proposal at all. What disturbs the Soviets is that everything seems to be reduced to the question of contacts, and they wonder if this is something just to make people think that something is happening. If nothing, in fact, happens, then that would be an incorrect impression.

Gromyko stressed that we need a constructive goal for these meetings. We need to decide what they will lead to. One cannot combine arms reduction with the current American policy of increasing military budgets and increasing the arms buildup. So long as American arms keep growing this is inconsistent with reductions or a mutual goal that can be set. He added that this may be unpleasant to hear but he felt he must explain it.

Gromyko concluded his initial presentation by saying that the entire leadership of the Soviet Union and the General Secretary personally wanted to find a common language with the United States. We must find a way to put our relations in motion. It must be understood that they are not trying to undermine the American social system. The U.S. must seriously and coolly analyze the current situation. The Soviets will defend their interests, but want peace and cooperation. The choice is up to the United States, but it should be understood that the Soviet Union wants good relations with the United States.

The President stated that he could not agree with many of the things which Gromyko had said. First, the idea that Soviet policy is not directed against our system is inconsistent with many statements made by Soviet leaders over the decades. The President quoted from Lenin and from others to make his point, but then said that there was no point in continuing citations and that what is important about all of this is that it is evidence of the high level of suspicion that exists between us.

As for American behavior at the end of the war, he recalled that one of the few things that Stalin said that he agreed with was that the Soviets would not have been able to win the war without American help. Gromyko had said that we had retained our bases at the end of the war. This is simply untrue. The United States had demobilized its forces. The Soviet Union did not.

As for arms control Gromyko had spoken of "a wall constructed against arms and troop reductions," and of the Soviet proposal for a nuclear weapons ban. He had not mentioned, however, the U.S. proposal for international control of all nuclear weapons and activity -- the Baruch Plan -- which the Soviet Union turned down.



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Gromyko had also mentioned the U.S. concern for verification, and the President commented that yes, this is a U.S. concern and should be the concern of the Soviet Union and of other countries. He recalled that President Eisenhower had made his "open skies" proposal, which would have allowed each country to inspect everything that went on in the other, and the Soviets had rejected that. In addition, the United States had made at least nineteen proposals regarding nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union had been unresponsive.

The President then turned to Gromyko and said, "You say you want to eliminate your weapons. Fine. We'll sign an agreement on that right now." He pointed out that the U.S. has already made proposals in that direction. For example, in the INF negotiations, the U.S. proposed that all INF systems be eliminated from Europe. When the Soviets did not accept that the U.S. proposed the lowest possible levels, and the Soviet Union still did not accept. As far as the START negotiations are concerned, the United States at first concentrated on ICBM's because they are the most frightening and the most destructive of the weapons. But the United States is prepared to include also submarines, aircraft, and other strategic systems.

The President noted that Gromyko had mentioned President Nixon and the SALT I Agreement and pointed out that the Soviet Union has deployed 7,000 warheads since the SALT I Agreement, and since the SALT II Agreement, has deployed 800 ballistic missiles. So far as INF is concerned, he showed Gromyko a chart depicting SS-20 deployments and noting the statements of various Soviet leaders that there was a balance, while each year the Soviet total mounted and the U.S. was making no deployments in Europe.

The President added that the United States had taken many tactical weapons out of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union had not, but has been adding to them. He said that so far as our armies are concerned, the United States has seventeen divisions and the Soviet Union 260 divisions.

The President then pointed out that the Soviets are saying they want peace and we are saying the same, but we need deeds. He agreed that there is a mountain of weapons, and made clear that the United States will keep pace with the Soviet buildup. But he asked what the purpose of a continued buildup can have, and suggested that we start reducing. He observed that reducing equally and verifiably would produce just as effective a defense for both countries as they have now.

The President pointed out that the United States does not have more warheads than the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union had developed several entire families of nuclear weapons, while the U.S. was developing only one. He noted that Gromyko had mentioned the cost of the competition, but referred to the U.S. experience when the previous administration had cancelled



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systems, but the Soviet Union did not reciprocate and slow its buildup.

In regard to anti-satellite systems, the President pointed out that the Soviets had a tested system and the U.S. did not, and therefore calls for a moratorium before the U.S. has tested a system and is on an equal basis were one-sided and self-serving. He added that his criticism of SALT II was that it simply legitimized the buildup of arms.

The President stressed, however, that we want peace and that we are willing to believe that the Soviets want peace. But the fact is that the United States did not walk away from the negotiating table. He agreed that we need deeds and specifically to resume negotiations on nuclear weapons.

Gromyko referred to the President's opening remark and said he wanted to assure the President that they did not believe he ate his own grandchildren or anyone else's.

Then Gromyko referred to the table the President had shown him of the buildup in Soviet nuclear weapons. He said that one should remember the way our respective nuclear weapons systems developed. At first the United States had a superior Air Force and the Soviets began to develop missiles. The United States then developed submarines and so the two systems developed in parallel, but resulted in structures that are quite different.

The President pointed out that the Soviets had gone on to outbuild the United States in submarines, to build more modern aircraft while the United States was still flying B-52s which are older than the pilots that fly them, and in addition, had developed several new missiles. The President added that in the START negotiations we did propose to concentrate initially on ICBM's, but that this was not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal and was simply based on the consideration that the land-based missiles are the most threatening. But we have agreed to talk about all the systems and to take them into account.

What we want, the President pointed out, is reductions. He recalled a statement by President Eisenhower that modern weapons are such that nations possessing nuclear weapons can no longer think of war in terms of victory or defeat, but only of destruction of both sides. We bear that in mind and want to reduce as much as possible. The President then asked why, if we both are of this mind, we cannot proceed to agree on the reduction of weapons.

Gromyko said that he wished to recall a few facts. At Vladivostok, the question of Soviet heavy missiles had been raised along with the question of the U.S. forward-based systems, and at that time, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger had agreed that if the Soviet Union dropped its insistence on including forward-based systems, the United States would drop its



insistence on restricting Soviet heavy missiles. If now the United States insists upon raising the question of restraints on heavy missiles, the question of forward-based systems immediately arises.

Gromyko then turned to the British and French systems and asked how the Soviet Union could leave them out of account inasmuch as Britain and France were allies of the United States. He added that President Carter had a different opinion from President Reagan and recalled that once when he was at lunch at the White House, President Carter had said that in principle these systems should be included.

With regard to nuclear weapons, Gromyko said that he could give an answer as follows: "as soon as the United States corrects its position." He then asked rhetorically whether the U.S. considers the Soviets to be such frivolous people as not to know of American aircraft carriers and what they mean to the Soviet Union. According to Gromyko, each carrier has 40 planes which can carry nuclear weapons. Six times 40 equals 240 nuclear launchers which the U.S. is not willing to count at all.

The President interjected that the U.S. is willing to put this on the table in negotiations, but he pointed out that Gromyko seemed to forget that their SS-20s were targeted on our allies and even if NATO carried through all of its planned deployments, they would amount to only a fraction of the Soviet missiles targeted at Europe.

Gromyko then asked if we were willing to include tactical and theatre weapons, and whether the British and French systems were included.

The President stated that, no, we would not be willing to count British and French systems. In fact, he pointed out, there had been a net decline of nuclear weapons in Europe available to NATO.

Gromyko asked if the U.S. would include carrier-based aircraft, and the President, referring to the U.S. START position, reiterated that we had started by concentrating on ICBM's but that we were willing to consider aircraft and other systems in the overall negotiations.

Gromyko stated that there is no question of excluding carrier-based aircraft from the negotiations.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the Soviet Union has a greater number of nuclear-capable aircraft than the United States, that so far as British and French systems are concerned, we had made it clear that when strategic levels were reduced substantially, there would be a time to consider British and French systems in the negotiations. The main point, however, is that the U.S. fully recognizes the differences in the structures of the nuclear



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forces of our two countries. We have been trying to generate a discussion which recognizes these as asymmetries. To search for a framework is a necessary ingredient in this process.

Gromyko asked if we were saying that the Soviet Union is concealing its aircraft.

Shultz said no, not concealing aircraft, but simply that they have more nuclear capable aircraft than the United States.

Gromyko retorted that that was incorrect, that we seemed to be counting cargo planes and other aircraft which do not carry nuclear weapons and observed that this was not serious reasoning.

Gromyko continued by saying that the U.S. position is that we should simply sit down, but the Soviet Union has experience with that. So far no one had mentioned the improper use of the language of ultimatums in these negotiations. Gromyko claimed that the U.S., in effect, said, "This is our plan, accept it. If not, there is a deadline that has to be met and we will deploy." In fact, that is what happened.

So, the U.S. must liquidate the results of that decision. The Soviet Union does not see any point in continuing negotiations otherwise.

The President asked how it would have been possible for NATO not to deploy under the circumstances of the SS-20 threat and the Soviet rejection of our zero proposal and also U.S. proposals to negotiate lowest possible equal levels.

Gromyko claimed that NATO now has 50 percent more nuclear weapons.

The President said that the proper procedure is to count each other's systems.

Gromyko then asked specifically about British and French systems and carrier-based aircraft. He asserted that if we count all of these systems and then compare, we will find that NATO is ahead.

The President disputed this, but noted that the time for lunch had come and invited Gromyko to stay a few minutes for a private conversation.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1984

Referral 32  
~~Matthew~~ 7039  
Chow

Dear Tom and Terry:

I appreciated your letter of September 14 and your calls to Wilma to report on your activities on behalf of your project. I am sure you noted the President's stress, in his speech to the United Nations, on the need for better consultation with the Soviet Union in regard to regional disputes.

As for your questions regarding the President's meetings with Gromyko, I'm sure you will understand the necessity of our keeping the precise subject matter private. However, as I have explained previously, in the current atmosphere we feel that it would not be helpful for us to advance a proposal such as yours officially.

We appreciate your strong support for our efforts to engage the Soviets in a more meaningful dialogue and hope you will continue to keep us informed of what you learn.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

  
Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Tom Green  
Mr. Terry Pearce  
2349 Spanish Trail  
Tiburon, California 94920

*The meetings  
went very well.  
The passage of  
important minutes.*



Matlock  
For reply

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September 14, 1984

NOT HAS SEEN

Robert McFarlane  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Bud,

It is a pleasure seeing your quiet influence in the increasing inclusivity in the President's public position - clearly not softening - but a quality reflecting a deep appreciation of the reality of our mutual existence and of the necessity for operating in an atmosphere of mutual interest. Thank you for being there.

Like much of the world, our prayers are for the upcoming visit by Gromyko to be an important step toward clearer understanding. This note is to bring you up to date on the contacts planned for next week regarding the private initiative, and to express full support for all actions intended to evoke the world wide atmosphere of support necessary for progress on specifics. We were particularly moved by the President's comment, "...I think maybe the time has come that anything that can perhaps get a better understanding between our two governments maybe should precede any resumption of dealings on specifics..." We are confident the idea contained in the private initiative would do just that - create a sustained global atmosphere as the context for dealings on specifics - and again, we also are totally supportive of any other actions which would accomplish that end.

During the week of 9-17, we will be in the east to offer the following questions through both private channels to the Soviets and through Dobrynin:

- Does the Soviet leadership wish to respond to this initiative through private channels and to have the responses exchanged before Gromyko arrives?
- Is Mr. Gromyko prepared to respond should the President, Secretary Schultz, or someone else bring up the initiative?
- Will he (Gromyko) bring the idea up?
- Does he wish his responses to any of these questions conveyed?

To keep all alternatives active, we believe the responses to the last three questions from the President, or another representative, would greatly serve:

- Is he (are we) prepared to respond to the initiative if Gromyko brings it up?
- Will he/we bring the idea up to Gromyko?
- Does he (Do we) wish the responses to these questions conveyed through private channels before Gromyko's visit?

We are also meeting with the Chinese Minister-Counsellor on 9-21, and have asked if it would be in China's best interest to have their written response shared with the Soviet Union and the United States prior to Gromyko's visit.

As always, Bud, we are continuing to move, respectful of your counsel, and would welcome your thoughts as well as your response to the questions. We will call Wilma Tuesday, 9-13-84 to obtain a time to call back. We can be reached Monday night at the Shelburne in New York City (212)629-5200.

Warm regards,



Terry Pearce  
400 San Rafael Ave.  
Belvedere, CA. 94920  
(415)-435-0510



Tom Green  
2349 Spanish Trail  
Tiburon, CA. 94920  
(415)435-9663

cc. C. William Verity



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 24, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *[Signature]*

SIGNED

SUBJECT:

Reply to Green and Pearce

Tom Green and Terry Pearce have written you again to report on their vigorous pursuit of their "plan" and to ask some specific questions about its relevance to the meetings with Gromyko this week.

I have drafted a reply for you at Tab I.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Green and Pearce.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I - Letter to Tom Green and Terry Pearce

Tab II - Letter of September 14 from Green and Pearce

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11