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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 3/23/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (1/5)

FOIA

F06-114/1

Box Number 6

YARHI-MILO

611

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6298	MEMO	MEMO TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE KOIVISTO LETTER TO GEORGE BUSH [2] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	ND	B1
6316	LETTER	LETTER TO GEORGE BUSH [5-6] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	10/29/1984	B1
6299	MEMO	SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNIN [12-14] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	3	ND	B1
6300	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE NEXT SHULTZ/DOBRYNIN MEETING [15] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	12/5/1984	B1
6301	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE RE GENEVA [18] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	12/4/1984	B1
6302	MEMO	MEMO FOR GEORGE SHULTZ RE DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN ON GENEVA [19] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	ND	B1
6303	MEMO	SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNIN [21-23] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Box Number 6

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611

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6304	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE NEXT SHULTZ/DOBRYNIN MEETING [24] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	12/5/1984	B1
6305	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE RE GENEVA [30] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	12/4/1984	B1
6306	MEMO	MEMO FOR GEORGE SHULTZ RE DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN ON GENEVA [32] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	ND	B1
6307	MEMO	SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNIN [34-36] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	3	ND	B1
6308	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE NEXT SHULTZ/DOBRYNIN MEETING [37] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	12/4/1984	B1
6309	MEMO	MEMO FOR GEORGE SHULTZ RE DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN ON GENEVA [39] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	ND	B1
6310	MEMO	TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH DOBRYNIN [41] <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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611

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
6311	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE CHANNEL TO USSR [44-49] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	6	12/6/1984	B1
6312	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN RE U.S. STRATEGY ON WORLD WAR 2 ANNIVERSARIES [50] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	1	12/6/1984	B1
6313	MEMO	MEMO FOR SHULTZ RE U.S. STRATEGY ON WORLD WAR 2 ANNIVERSARIES [51-52] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	2	12/6/1984	B1
6314	MEMO	MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM GEORGE SHULTZ [56-58] <i>R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1</i>	3	11/29/1984	B1
6315	MEMO	MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE U.S. STRATEGY ON WORLD WAR 2 ANNIVERSARIES [59] <i>R 3/3/2011 F2006-114/1</i>	1	12/3/1984	B1

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

R. McTavane
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Chron File Dec -84

11

Exo only please

Ant. Jack mat lock
N5C

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

6/10/02
CAS

PRESERVATION COPY

V

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

TO: RCM
FROM: Jack Matlock
SUB: Koivisto Letter to V.P.

NLRR 06-114/1 #
BY GJ NARA 298

7/27/87

- 1) Obviously Koivisto was wrong that the Soviets would not "reopen negotiations" in the absence of a gesture on our part. (He implies, of course, that it would take an IDF deployment moratorium.)
- 2) I am not sure what oral messages may (or may not) have accompanied this correspondence.
Unless there were some which alter the thrust of the letter, the latter is not very helpful.
- 3) Nevertheless, I believe that it would be useful to maintain some sort of private dialogue with Koivisto.
- 4) I have not discussed any of this with anyone else. If you wish, I can follow up with Dan Gregg.

2 p/s
Jack do.

11/13

2A

RCM:

Do you wish to share with staff?

☒ Yes: E.O. to Matlock

☐ No

Wilma

~~SECRET~~

3

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

The information in this document
is classified and as such will be
treated according to OSD Security
Instructions. Writing on this
cover sheet is prohibited.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

6/10/02

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 13, 1984

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FOR BUD McFARLANE

FROM: DON GREGG

DG

I am attaching a copy of
President Koivisto's most recent
letter to the Vice President for
your information.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~SECRET~~

CSS 6/10/02

Dear Mr. Vice President,

I am writing to you, Mr. Vice President, now that we might be approaching a new turning point in international relations. The direction of the future developments in great power relations may be determined by decisions to be made in the coming months.

When I wrote you last spring I expressed the fear that there would be a long period of deadlock ahead of us. Although this deadlock has hardly been opened yet, we have been able to note signs of improvement in great power relations, above all the meeting of President Reagan and Mr. Gromyko. The door may be ajar, but we are still far from the resumption of the negotiations, not to speak about concrete results.

A number of optimistic assessments have been published recently implying that the arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are to be resumed soon after the US elections. To open a dialogue is not so difficult as to attain concrete results. I am convinced that the Soviet Union is not prepared to re-open the negotiations without some degree of certainty in regard to positive results.

In the light of the discussions and contacts we have recently had, I, for my own part, am not so optimistic as

His Excellency
Vice President George Bush
Washington D.C.

DECLASSIFIED/RE(CASE)

NLRR FNo-114/1 #6316

BY CIV NARA DATE 11/25/07

6
many specialists of international politics are. Hence I wish to emphasize the urgent need of building confidence in the relations between the US and the USSR. I would also like to reiterate what I already said in my two previous letters: a freeze on further deployment of INF systems in Europe could, in my mind, considerably contribute to building mutual confidence, even if I recognize the inherent problems of such a step.

I highly appreciate the opportunity to write to you in this way and for my part I am ready to continue to maintain our contacts.

With best personal regards,

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized name, possibly "R. S. Kennedy", written over a horizontal line.

8650
Chrom
multistep
File Referral

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1984

Dear Patricia:

I appreciated your letter of November 23 in which you described your plans for taking Raggedy Ann to Moscow.


This seems a very worthy project and I hope you are able to bring it to fruition.

Thanks for keeping me informed.

Please know let me if I can help
Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane
Robert C. McFarlane

Ms. Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director
ESIPA
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223



81 info

ESIPA

November 23, 1984

NOV 26 1984

Matlock

RCM HAS SEEN

11-26-84

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

As you will recall, we met last spring in Washington at Queen Noor's table during the Arab Women's Cultural and Educational Benefit. Thank you so much for the kind letter you sent regarding our program.

The purpose of this letter is to bring you up to date on a new ESIPA project which you might be interested to learn about. In September I was invited to meet with Deputy Minister of Culture, George Ivanov, in Moscow. We discussed an exchange between our theatre, The Empire State Institute for the Performing Arts-State University of New York, and a theatre from Moscow and or Leningrad. Tentatively they will perform in our theatre in 1985-86 and we will tour to Moscow and Leningrad in 1986-87. It is also possible that the tour plans might reverse and we would tour in 1985-86 and they in 1986-87. I have kept Mr. John Zimmerman, the United States Cultural Officer for the Soviet Union, up to date and he has been most helpful with communications between our Institute and the Ministry of Culture in Moscow through the diplomatic pouch.

To give you a little background, in 1974 I directed a production of The Wizard of Oz which toured to Moscow under the sponsorship of The State University of New York and the Soviet Ministry of Culture, with underwriting from the Chase Manhattan Bank and Finnair. At that time Walter Stoessel was our ambassador to the Soviet Union. Our performances were received most enthusiastically and prior to our departure from Moscow we were invited for a return engagement. During the interim, between 1974 and 1976, our theatre program moved from the State University of New York Albany campus and was instituted as a State mandated professional theatre as part of the State University of New York university-wide programs. Two years ago I was approached

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
by Natalia Sats, the Director of the Moscow Musical Theatre for Children, regarding the possibility of an exchange between her company and our company and was invited to Moscow to discuss the possibility last spring. Unfortunately our schedule at ESIPA was so hectic it was impossible for me to get away until September of this year.

The work that we would take to Moscow would be a new production of Raggedy Ann. The book has been written by William Gibson and the lyrics and score by Joe Raposo. Mr. Raposo has informed me that he has spoken to Mrs. Reagan about this exchange. As you may know, Mr. Raposo has written the music for Mrs. Reagan's Foster Grandparents Program.

We will continue to work through Mr. Zimmerman, but since I had the pleasure of meeting you last spring and since discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States are commencing, I thought I would communicate this information directly to you.

The State University of New York Chancellor, Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., to whom I report, is most supportive about this project and we would all like to see it realized. If you have any suggestions, I would be most pleased to receive them.

Sincerely,



Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JW***SIGNED**

SUBJECT: Letter from Patricia B. Snyder

Patricia Snyder has written you a letter (Tab II) informing you of her plans to propose staging an American play in the Moscow Musical Theater for Children.

Attached is a letter of acknowledgment (Tab I), should you wish to send one.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve ✓Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I Proposed letter of acknowledgment to Patricia Snyder

Tab II Incoming letter from Patricia Snyder

~~Mallock~~ 11
Chron

National Security Council
The White House

System # II

Package # 91239

1464

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
Tom Shull	<u></u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>6</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u>DEC 17 1984</u>	<u>D Tab A</u>
Situation Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u>only to Shultz.</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese, Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Tab IV remains relevant and timely.

Other Tabs are OBE.

Tab IV is very good.

[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
91239

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 1 -

SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNIN

Introductory

→ We are pleased that we have been able to agree to start new negotiations on the whole arms control area and I am looking forward to my meetings with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva.

-- I thought it would be useful for us to touch base regarding some of the arrangements for the meeting, and also to discuss the sort of issues to be covered.

Arrangements

-- I am planning to arrive with my party in Geneva the evening of January 6 and will be available throughout the next two days for as many meetings as are convenient to Mr. Gromyko.

-- Since we have a lot of ground to cover, I would suggest that we schedule morning and afternoon meetings on both days. These could alternate between our missions, or the meetings on one day could be at one and those on the second at the other.

-- I would also suggest that it might be useful to have a dinner for our delegations the evening of January 7, and -- if it does not crowd the schedule too much -- a working lunch with smaller groups on the 8th.

-- Although I will probably have a number of people travelling with me, I would intend to keep the number of people with me in the official meetings very small. I will have Paul Nitze, who is helping me prepare for the meetings, with me, and probably just one or two others. If Mr. Gromyko would like my remarks translated into Russian, I can have an interpreter, but if he feels comfortable with my English we could dispense with him and just depend on Viktor to interpret Mr. Gromyko's comments.

Agenda

-- Since we have arranged the meeting specifically to begin new negotiations on arms control, I think that clearly should be our primary focus.

-- However, arms control is only a part of the relationship, and it might be useful to use the occasion for a review of where we stand on regional and bilateral issues, if we can find the time to do so without detracting from our primary purpose.

-- We could, for example, review some of these issues at the working lunch. Or, if we have exhausted the arms control issues by noon Tuesday, devote the fourth session to them. I suspect,

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NLRR 606-114/1 #6299

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

13

however, that we will need that fourth session to conclude our arms control discussion.

-- Another way to provide for a thorough consultation on these other issues might be for each of us to delegate an Assistant Secretary or Deputy Minister to meet separately Monday to review them, then report to us so that we can take up briefly any issues which seem to require our attention sometime on Tuesday.

Objectives

-- As for our objectives, I believe that, at a minimum, we should seek to fulfill the promise of the agreed statement, that is to reach agreement on a basic agenda for future negotiations and to draw up agreed objectives for them.

-- I think it would also be very useful to have a basic discussion of our longer term objectives, and of the factors which will affect the strategic balance in the future. We will need this to guide our discussion of our immediate tasks.

-- Although we hope that the meeting will result in some broad and very specific agreements for negotiation, we must be realistic regarding what we can expect to achieve in two days. I think it is very likely that a number of questions will remain to be settled when we finish -- if only regarding how to implement what we have agreed upon.

-- As I mentioned, I will have Paul Nitze with me at the meeting. He will be thoroughly familiar with our thinking on the various issues, and will be in a position to follow up -- on a day-to-day basis if necessary -- in working out any remaining problems. If Mr. Gromyko would like to name a counterpart to meet with Mr. Nitze following our sessions in Geneva, I believe that this could move things along more rapidly.

-- I'm not suggesting elaborate, formal meetings of large delegations. Just Nitze and his counterpart, perhaps with an assistant and a notetaker.

-- This is something we can discuss at Geneva, or if Mr. Gromyko feels it is a good idea, we could agree on it in advance.

Soviet Views

-- I know you'll have to check these matters out with your boss, but I'd be very interested in your own reaction and in any thoughts you have for us as we prepare for Geneva.

-- Art Hartman will be coming back on consultation in a few days, and if the Foreign Minister has any suggestions that he can bring back to us, he of course will be pleased to receive them.

Conclusion

-- We are approaching these talks hopefully, and will do our part to see that they are successful. We know the issues are very difficult, and will be looking for innovative and creative ways to bridge some of the distance between our positions. We hope your folks will do the same and that we can find a way to achieve a real breakthrough. In any event, if Mr. Gromyko can approach our talks in the same positive spirit I will bring, I am confident that the meeting will mark a turning point in our relations.

SECRET

6300

15

System II
91239

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION

5 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: *RM* RON LEHMAN/JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Next Shultz/Dobrynin Meeting

Attached for your consideration is a short memorandum from you to Secretary Shultz (Tab IV) suggesting talking points (Tab A) for a meeting late this week with Ambassador Dobrynin. We had agreed at last night's meeting to give him our thoughts on this subject. The focus of the suggested talking points are certain format, logistics and protocol preliminaries and then some substantive points designed mainly to draw out the Soviet Union on what they have in mind.

Key items include setting the focus on arms control, explaining how we might deal with regional and other issues, giving the Soviets some advance knowledge of Nitze, explaining our thinking on a delegations, and put down some substantive markers and questions.

At Tab I is recommended language for use today as a White House statement. It differs from the language in your profs note ((Tab III) in that it takes into account the photo opportunity and uses speakers to elaborate on the delegation by mentioning the SACG. It also deletes the modifiers on Nitze's advisory status to give us maximum flexibility and also protect us if the statement is used before Shultz talks to Gromyko. Likewise, a modification is made on the delegation statement to provide flexibility.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of State sending him your suggestions for talking points.

Approve *RCM* Disapprove _____

That you approve the White House statement at Tab I.

Approve *OBE* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I - President's Statement
- Tab II - Speakers Material
- Tab III - Profs Note
- Tab IV - Memorandum to Secretary Shultz
- Tab A - Talking Points

SECRET-SENSITIVE
Declassify by OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *U* NARA, Date *7/26/99*

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, I have today asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as advisor to the Secretary for the Geneva talks. Ambassador Nitze has a long history of distinguished service to his country and I am very pleased that he has accepted.

A handwritten signature, likely of the President, is located below the typed text. It consists of stylized, cursive letters.

17

SPEAKERS' Q & A

Q. Ambassador Paul Nitze has a new office in the seventh floor of the State Department. Has he been named the arms control "Czar" or a "special envoy."

A. At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President today has asked Ambassador Nitze to serve as the personal advisor to the Secretary for the Geneva talks. The balance of the interagency delegation will be drawn largely from the White House Senior Arms Control Group. The President has met with Ambassador Nitze today and is currently meeting with key arms control officials to discuss our preparations for the Geneva talks.

h

6301 18

LOOK AT THE NOTE

E01

From: NSRCM --CPUA
To: NSJMP --CPUA

Date and time 12/04/84 17:22:52

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

Subject: Reply to Note 12/04/84 13:52 Delegation for Geneva

I have talked to Shultz about it. I have urged him toward a small group for the actual sessions with Gromyko. My idea is three people--Shultz, Paul and a notetaker. He could take more people on the plane--indeed he is willing to take reps drawn from the SACG from each interested agency. And he is willing--even eager--to take Richard Perle. I asked him today to put together a draft announcement which we could put out tomorrow. They were working on something to say today from State but I think the announcement of Paul ought to have a Presidential association and should wait until after the Lusinchi visit so as not to step on that story. I urged him to express it along the lines "At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President has today asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as an advisor to the Secretary in preparations for the Geneva talks and beyond. The balance of the US delegation will include representatives from each of the interested agencies and will be drawn from the Senior Arms Control Group." Ron is also working on a draft and

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CA NARA, Date 7/26/07

6302 19
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Discussion with Dobrynin on Geneva

I believe that a preliminary discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin would be very helpful in our preparations for the meeting in Geneva on January 7th and 8th. Attached you will find a number of talking points which are designed to address certain preliminary arrangements and reduce the number of misunderstandings in Geneva. Although we clearly do not want to get into substantive issues now, we do need to express our views on a number of items. Furthermore, more information on Soviet views of Geneva would prove useful.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CA NARA, Date 7/26/09

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~
Declassify by: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jack - please call
Ron Lehman

8:30 am

Dec 6

Chron file -
Dec.

20

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 1 -

SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNIN

Introductory

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-- Since we have a lot of ground to cover, I would suggest that we schedule morning and afternoon meetings on both days. These could alternate between our missions, or the meetings on one day could be at one and those on the second at the other.

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however, that we will need that fourth session to conclude our arms control discussion.

-- Another way to provide for a thorough consultation on these other issues might be for each of us to delegate an Assistant Secretary or Deputy Minister to meet separately Monday to review them, then report to us so that we can take up briefly any issues which seem to require our attention sometime on Tuesday.

Objectives

-- As for our objectives, I believe that, at a minimum, we should seek to fulfill the promise of the agreed statement, that is to reach agreement on a basic agenda for future negotiations and to draw up agreed objectives for them.

-- I think it would also be very useful to have a basic discussion of our longer term objectives, and of the factors which will affect the strategic balance in the future. We will need this to guide our discussion of our immediate tasks.

-- Although we hope that the meeting will result in some broad and very specific agreements for negotiation, we must be realistic regarding what we can expect to achieve in two days. I think it is very likely that a number of questions will remain to be settled when we finish -- if only regarding how to implement what we have agreed upon.

-- As I mentioned, I will have Paul Nitze with me at the meeting. He will be thoroughly familiar with our thinking on the various issues, and will be in a position to follow up -- on a day-to-day basis if necessary -- in working out any remaining problems. If Mr. Gromyko would like to name a counterpart to meet with Mr. Nitze following our sessions in Geneva, I believe that this could move things along more rapidly.

-- I'm not suggesting elaborate, formal meetings of large delegations. Just Nitze and his counterpart, perhaps with an assistant and a notetaker.

-- This is something we can discuss at Geneva, or if Mr. Gromyko feels it is a good idea, we could agree on it in advance.

Soviet Views

-- I know you'll have to check these matters out with your boss, but I'd be very interested in your own reaction and in any thoughts you have for us as we prepare for Geneva.

-- Art Hartman will be coming back on consultation in a few days, and if the Foreign Minister has any suggestions that he can bring back to us, we of course will be pleased to receive them.

25

Conclusion

-- We are approaching these talks hopefully, and will do our part to see that they are successful. We know the issues are very difficult, and will be looking for innovative and creative ways to bridge some of the distance between our positions. We hope your folks will do the same and that we can find a way to achieve a real breakthrough. In any event, if Mr. Gromyko can approach our talks in the same positive spirit I will bring, I am confident that the meeting will mark a turning point in our relations.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

5 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: RON LEHMAN/JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Next Shultz/Dobrynin Meeting

Attached for your consideration is a short memorandum from you to Secretary Shultz (Tab IV) suggesting talking points (Tab A) for a meeting late this week with Ambassador Dobrynin. We had agreed at last night's meeting to give him our thoughts on this subject. The focus of the suggested talking points are certain format, logistics and protocol preliminaries and then some substantive points designed mainly to draw out the Soviet Union on what they have in mind.

Key items include setting the focus on arms control, explaining how we might deal with regional and other issues, giving the Soviets some advance knowledge of Nitze, explaining our thinking on a delegations, and put down some substantive markers and questions.

At Tab I is recommended language for use today as a White House statement. It differs from the language in your profs note ((Tab III) in that it takes into account the photo opportunity and uses speakers to elaborate on the delegation by mentioning the SACG. It also deletes the modifiers on Nitze's advisory status to give us maximum flexibility and also protect us if the statement is used before Shultz talks to Gromyko. Likewise, a modification is made on the delegation statement to provide flexibility.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of State sending him your suggestions for talking points.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you approve the White House statement at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - President's Statement
Tab II - Speakers Material
Tab III - Profs Note
Tab IV - Memorandum to Secretary Shultz
Tab A - Talking Points

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Declassify by OADR

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 9/26/03

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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, I have today asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as advisor to the Secretary for the Geneva talks. Ambassador Nitze has a long history of distinguished service to his country and I am very pleased that he has accepted.

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SPEAKERS' Q & A

Q. Ambassador Paul Nitze has a new office in the seventh floor of the State Department. Has he been named the arms control "Czar" or a "special envoy."

A. At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President today has asked Ambassador Nitze to serve as the personal advisor to the Secretary for the Geneva talks. The balance of the interagency delegation will be drawn largely from the White House Senior Arms Control Group. The President has met with Ambassador Nitze today and is currently meeting with key arms control officials to discuss our preparations for the Geneva talks.

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III

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LOOK AT THE NOTE

E01

From: NSRCM --CPUA
To: NSJMP --CPUA

Date and time 12/04/84 17:22:52

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~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

Subject: Reply to Note 12/04/84 13:52 Delegation for Geneva

I have talked to Shultz about it. I have urged him toward a small group for the actual sessions with Gromyko. My idea is three people--Shultz, Paul and a notetaker. He could take more people on the plane--indeed he is willing to take reps drawn from the SACG from each interested agency. And he is willing--even eager--to take Richard Perle. I asked him today to put together a draft announcement which we could put out tomorrow. They were working on something to say today from State but I think the announcement of Paul ought to have a Presidential association and should wait until after the Lusinchi visit so as not to step on that story. I urged him to express it along the lines "At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President has today asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as an advisor to the Secretary in preparations for the Geneva talks and beyond. The balance of the US delegation will include representatives from each of the interested agencies and will be drawn from the Senior Arms Control Group." Ron is also working on a draft and

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By CR NARA, Date 7/26/97

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Discussion with Dobrynin on Geneva

I believe that a preliminary discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin would be very helpful in our preparations for the meeting in Geneva on January 7th and 8th. Attached you will find a number of talking points which are designed to address certain preliminary arrangements and reduce the number of misunderstandings in Geneva. Although we clearly do not want to get into substantive issues now, we do need to express our views on a number of items. Furthermore, more information on Soviet views of Geneva would prove useful.

Attachment

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Declassify by: OADR

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
by CH NARA, Date 2/2/05

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SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNINIntroductory

-- We are pleased that we have been able to agree to start new negotiations on the whole arms control area and I am looking forward to my meetings with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva.

-- I thought it would be useful for us to touch base regarding some of the arrangements for the meeting, and also to discuss the sort of issues to be covered.

Arrangements

-- I am planning to arrive with my party in Geneva the evening of January 6 and will be available throughout the next two days for as many meetings as are convenient to Mr. Gromyko.

-- Since we have a lot of ground to cover, I would suggest that we schedule morning and afternoon meetings on both days. These could alternate between our missions, or the meetings on one day could be at one and those on the second at the other.

-- I would also suggest that it might be useful to have a dinner for our delegations the evening of January 7, and -- if it does not crowd the schedule too much -- a working lunch with smaller groups on the 8th.

-- Although I will probably have a number of people travelling with me, I would intend to keep the number of people with me in the official meetings very small. I will have Paul Nitze, who is helping me prepare for the meetings, with me, and probably just one or two others. If Mr. Gromyko would like my remarks translated into Russian, I can have an interpreter, but if he feels comfortable with my English we could dispense with him and just depend on Viktor to interpret Mr. Gromyko's comments.

Agenda

-- Since we have arranged the meeting specifically to begin new negotiations on arms control, I think that clearly should be our primary focus.

-- However, arms control is only a part of the relationship, and it might be useful to use the occasion for a review of where we stand on regional and bilateral issues, if we can find the time to do so without detracting from our primary purpose.

-- We could, for example, review some of these issues at the working lunch. Or, if we have exhausted the arms control issues by noon Tuesday, devote the fourth session to them. I suspect,

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By CS NARA, Date 7/26/89

however, that we will need that fourth session to conclude our arms control discussion.

-- Another way to provide for a thorough consultation on these other issues might be for each of us to delegate an Assistant Secretary or Deputy Minister to meet separately Monday to review them, then report to us so that we can take up briefly any issues which seem to require our attention sometime on Tuesday.

Objectives

-- As for our objectives, I believe that, at a minimum, we should seek to fulfill the promise of the agreed statement, that is to reach agreement on a basic agenda for future negotiations and to draw up agreed objectives for them.

-- I think it would also be very useful to have a basic discussion of our longer term objectives, and of the factors which will affect the strategic balance in the future. We will need this to guide our discussion of our immediate tasks.

-- Although we hope that the meeting will result in some broad and very specific agreements for negotiation, we must be realistic regarding what we can expect to achieve in two days. I think it is very likely that a number of questions will remain to be settled when we finish -- if only regarding how to implement what we have agreed upon.

-- As I mentioned, I will have Paul Nitze with me at the meeting. He will be thoroughly familiar with our thinking on the various issues, and will be in a position to follow up -- on a day-to-day basis if necessary -- in working out any remaining problems. If Mr. Gromyko would like to name a counterpart to meet with Mr. Nitze following our sessions in Geneva, I believe that this could move things along more rapidly.

-- I'm not suggesting elaborate, formal meetings of large delegations. Just Nitze and his counterpart, perhaps with an assistant and a notetaker.

-- This is something we can discuss at Geneva, or if Mr. Gromyko feels it is a good idea, we could agree on it in advance.

Soviet Views

-- I know you'll have to check these matters out with your boss, but I'd be very interested in your own reaction and in any thoughts you have for us as we prepare for Geneva.

-- Art Hartman will be coming back on consultation in a few days, and if the Foreign Minister has any suggestions that he can bring back to us, he of course will be pleased to receive them.

Conclusion

-- We are approaching these talks hopefully, and will do our part to see that they are successful. We know the issues are very difficult, and will be looking for innovative and creative ways to bridge some of the distance between our positions. We hope your folks will do the same and that we can find a way to achieve a real breakthrough. In any event, if Mr. Gromyko can approach our talks in the same positive spirit I will bring, I am confident that the meeting will mark a turning point in our relations.

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Chron~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ACTION

4 December 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: RON LEHMAN/JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Next Shultz/Dobrynin Meeting

Attached for your consideration is a short memorandum from you to Secretary Shultz (Tab I) suggesting talking points for a meeting late this week with Ambassador Dobrynin. We had agreed at last night's meeting to give him our thoughts on this subject. The focus of the suggested talking points are certain format, logistics and protocol preliminaries and then some substantive points designed mainly to draw out the Soviet Union on what they have in mind.

Key items include setting the focus on arms control, explaining how we might deal with regional and other issues, giving the Soviets some advance knowledge of Nitze, explaining our thinking on a delegations, and put down some substantive markers and questions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of State sending him your suggestions for talking points.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to Secretary Shultz
Tab A - Your Talking Points

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By CW NARA, Date 7/2/89

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Discussion with Dobrynin on Geneva

I believe that a preliminary discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin would be very helpful in our preparations for the meeting in Geneva on January 7th and 8th. Attached you will find a number of talking points which are designed to address certain preliminary arrangements and reduce the number of misunderstandings in Geneva. Although we clearly do not want to get into substantive issues now, we do need to express our views on a number of items. Furthermore, more information on Soviet views of Geneva would prove useful.

Attachment

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By US NARA, Date 7/26/09

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TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH DOBRYNIN

- oo We have not met since our two governments agreed to begin new negotiations in Geneva this January. We are looking forward to those sessions. I thought it might be useful if we could discuss some items which might make preparation easier and the meetings more successful.
- oo With respect to format, I would like to offer the following:
 - We intend to arrive on the evening of the 6th of January and would propose that we meet in the morning of the 7th.
 - We believe that plenary sessions focused on arms control should be scheduled for both days. Morning and afternoon sessions on each day would be appropriate. That would give us four sessions. We might leave the agenda for the fourth session open, reserving the option to continue on arms control or turn to other issues of concern.
 - Except for the possibility of the fourth session, regional and other issues should be handled on the margin. However, we would be prepared to schedule parallel meetings on such bilateral issues to be conducted by Assistant Secretary Burt, or a comparable figure.
 - The number of people on both sides during the actual arms control plenaries should be small, perhaps 3 to 5 people plus an interpreter. On the US side, I intend to have Paul Nitze accompany me and to be with me during the plenary session.
 - It might be useful for each side to host a lunch or dinner so as to provide the best climate and opportunities for informal exchanges on arms control and other issues. I would suggest a dinner on Monday night and a working lunch on Tuesday.
 - We have agreed to begin new negotiations. At a minimum, we should seek to fulfill the promise of the agreed statement; namely completion of a basic agenda and objectives for the new negotiations.
 - We believe it would be essential also to have a basic discussion of our longer term objectives which guide the more immediate discussions.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By ON NARA, Date 7/22/01

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-- We are approaching these talks hopefully, but we recognize that the issues involved are difficult. We hope that both sides can enter these discussions in a positive spirit. We are prepared to discuss these issues at a number of levels of specificity, but we realize that in two days, there are limits to what we can cover. What is your thinking in this regard?

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Chron- 12/6/84

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

December 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Private Channel to Soviets

Following on our discussion with Secretary Shultz Monday, I have revised my general paper on the use of special channels and attach it at Tab I in case you wish to show it to the Secretary. It does not deal specifically with my earlier contacts with Zagladin and Menshikov or with the possibility of reviving that channel.

However, I am increasingly convinced of several things:

-- Zagladin and the people in his office certainly seem to want a contact. They have informed us that Gromyko approved the contact, and probably interpret our failure to follow up on my meeting with Menshikov in New York either as lack of interest on our part, or as the result of bureaucratic problems here. (This was implicit in Menshikov's comment to Giffen last week that, although they desired direct contact with the White House, they did not wish to create misunderstanding here by making a proposal which could be misunderstood. What Menshikov knew, and Giffen did not, was that he had informed us that the contact with Zagladin had been approved and we did not follow up.)

-- Probably the most useful informal contact we can have is precisely with Zagladin and his staff, since it is the most senior level which deals with overall foreign policy under the Politburo and staffs Politburo decisions.

-- A contact before the Geneva meeting could possibly -- though not certainly -- be of assistance to us in formulating our position for Geneva, since it would give the Soviets the opportunity, if they chose, of getting comments to us privately.

-- From our standpoint, I would not suggest that such a meeting be used to telegraph our negotiating position at Geneva -- even if we were sure what it would be. Rather, it should be part philosophical discussion and part probe of Soviet intentions and bureaucratic considerations. Conceivably, some insights into the succession struggle might also emerge.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11

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Steps Necessary to Activate

If Secretary Shultz decides that he wishes to explore whether the Soviets are still willing to allow a continuation of my contact with Zagladin, we can initiate the matter as follows:

-- Request Ambassador Hartman, by secure telephone, to pass a message to Zagladin that we do not fully understand some of the comments passed by his staff recently to us, and if he agrees, we feel a meeting might be useful.

-- If the Soviets want to pursue the contact, he will respond favorably and set a date; if he does not we will know that the time is not ripe from their point of view.

-- If Zagladin accepts, arrangements could be made to travel to Moscow for consultation with the Embassy (perhaps as part of a trip with other stops). If he prefers to meet somewhere in Western Europe, that also could be arranged -- and might be preferable.

-- After setting a date, the talking points could be developed, discussed, and cleared in detail.

Practically speaking, if we are to do this before Geneva, the decision must be made by this weekend. (With Shultz out of town next week and Christmas and New Year's coming up, time to make the arrangements has almost run out as it is.) It will also take some advance preparation if we are to arrange the contact discreetly, since a sudden visit by me to Embassy Moscow for consultation could well attract attention at the Embassy and in EUR unless we have some time to develop a plausible reason for my travel. (If Zagladin is going to be in Western Europe and proposes a meeting there, it would be easier.)

Recommendation:

That you discuss with Secretary Shultz the desirability of reestablishing the Zagladin contact before Shultz leaves for New York and Europe Sunday.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachment:

Tab I - "Private Channels to the Soviet Leadership: Some Basic Considerations"

PRIVATE CHANNELS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
Some Basic Considerations

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Experience has shown that, in working out agreements with the Soviets, private means of unofficial communication can play a very helpful role. The Secretary may therefore wish to consider whether it would be useful to him to employ one or more private channels in support of his effort to bring the Soviets into a more constructive negotiating posture. I have summarized below some of the considerations which I believe are relevant to such a decision.

Reasons for Channel:

- Need for mechanism to consult privately, informally, and off the official record. Given Soviet psychological inhibitions to be seen in public compromising "basic principles," they need very private consultation to arrange for compromises outside the public eye.
- Need for a better feel for the factors entering into Soviet decision-making. We have very little insight into which precise arguments are being made within the Soviet leadership. Private contacts with important elements in the staffing process can provide additional insights.
- Need for conveying our views to the Soviet leadership without the Foreign Ministry filter. The fact that the staff of the Party Secretariat processes and comments on recommendations from the various ministries before they are considered by the Politburo suggests that senior officials in the Secretariat apparatus should be a prime target in this respect.
- Need for total confidentiality, the best insurance for which is that the public and the bureaucracy be unaware that the channel exists.

Possible Modes:

There are many possible modes for private communication, none of which are mutually exclusive. The utility of each (and their disadvantages) depends on the specific purpose of the communication. Some possibilities are the following:

- Use of Ambassadors in both capitals.

While this is probably the best arrangement in theory, it is not immediately available to us because of Soviet bureaucratic hang-ups. We should not accept an arrangement whereby the Soviet Ambassador is used exclusively.

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-- Use of someone thoroughly familiar with the President's and Secretary's thinking and the decision-making process in Washington, but outside the normal structure for diplomatic contact.

The first qualification is necessary to ensure the reliability of the messages we send, and the accuracy of feed-back; the second to get around Soviet "turf" considerations. The latter are minimized when the contact appears to be "counterpart to counterpart."

-- Use of "private sessions" between heads of delegation engaged in specific negotiations.

Essential to progress in the negotiations, but subject matter normally limited to issues in the specific negotiation.

-- Use of intermediaries for specific messages.

Useful in arranging specific deals which are delicate for one or the other side (e.g., a prisoner exchange through Vogel), but of limited utility for a broader discussion since it does not provide direct contact with persons active in the decision-making process.

-- Use of indirect messages through private citizens.

Probably the most unsatisfactory of the various options, since it is difficult for both sides to judge the reliability of the messages, and the risk of leaks is always present. Nevertheless, it is the method the Soviets resort to when other channels do not exist (we are receiving frequent alleged indirect messages these days, and these are often difficult to evaluate).

Soviet Attitudes

-- They understand the need for confidential and informal consultation and will desire it if and when they are serious about solving problems.

-- They would probably prefer to establish Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor on broad issues, since this would serve their interest by giving them access to our decision-making process but denying the same to us.

-- Since we have made it clear that an exclusive role for Dobrynin is not acceptable, there are indications that the Soviets desire informal contacts in another form.

-- "Knowledgeable" officials have been suggesting such since the beginning of the Reagan Administration (several approaches, beginning in 1981).

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- Central Committee officials have periodically sent "messages" via third parties, implicit invitations to initiate a dialogue.
- We were informed earlier this year that White House/Central Committee contacts had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko.
- The Soviets doubtless feel "burned" by some of the earlier efforts to communicate unofficially by other means.
- The contact with Kampelman regarding Shcharansky backfired for reasons which are unclear, but our selective briefing of Allies may have played a role, since knowledge of the contact was spread very widely among NATO delegations at Madrid, their home capitals and even their Embassies in Washington.
- Publicity given the "walk in the woods" and the subsequent informal conversations between Nitze and Kvitsinsky is likely to make the Soviets hypercautious for some time to come in dealing with U.S. negotiators on the private level.
- The facts that the abortive Scowcroft mission became public knowledge and that private comments by Soviet diplomats in Washington to senior U.S. officials reach the press rapidly also act to reinforce Soviet doubts of our ability or willingness to keep any contact completely private.
- Before the election, we had to consider the possibility that the Soviets would suspect that we were seeking contacts for their own sake (i.e., just to claim that we are negotiating for a public impact). Such suspicions should now be attenuated. If we judge that a private channel would be useful to us, it would be a good time to try again.

Basic Operating Principles

- A private channel should not be used as a substitute for any other mode of communication, but rather as a supplement which may help both sides to make formal channels as productive as possible.
- Both sides must insure that everything discussed in the channel, and knowledge of its very existence, is kept scrupulously confidential.

On our side this will require direct knowledge of the channel to be limited to a very small number of the most senior officials, probably designated by name, and with a strict injunction against mentioning it to anyone not on the list, including personal aides and secretaries. Illustratively, such a list might include, in addition to

the President and the Secretary of State, the Vice President, the National Security Adviser and his deputy, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and our Ambassador in Moscow.

-- It should be used for conditioning Soviet policy makers to the broad factors that underly our thinking and to tactical policy guidance, not for concrete negotiations or precise commitments. At most, commitments should be in contingent form (e.g., "if you do x, we will respond with y"). Any general understandings reached would be subject to confirmation and detailed negotiation in formal channels.

-- All positions taken in the "channel" -- including general guidelines for "personal remarks" -- should be cleared in advance by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security, and as regards the more important issues, by the President personally.

-- A clear understanding should be reached with the Soviet interlocutor on these matters (except those relating to internal USG procedures) at the outset, and it should be made clear that establishing a special "channel" does not imply an effort to bypass any principal policymaker in either country.

-- It should be kept in mind throughout that such informal consultation as the "channel" would provide is no substitute for formal negotiation, but only a means of supplementary private communication to assist the Secretary of State in his negotiations and to assist him and the President in better understanding Soviet motives and bureaucratic factors which are relevant to our policy making.

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The President has seen _____ 50

Received

THE WHITE HOUSE

1984 DEC -6 PM 1:09

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

December 6, 1984

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Matlock

Chron

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *rcm*

SUBJECT: U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries

Secretary Shultz has sent you a memo (Tab A) outlining the various policy considerations that we must address in managing the series of anniversaries that will commemorate the 40th Anniversary of the end of World War II. You will remember the German sensitivities that Chancellor Kohl expressed so eloquently last Friday, as well as his invitation for you to extend your stay in Germany for two days, beyond the Bonn Summit.

We have an approach in mind which would avoid embarrassing the Germans and would keep us from being in a defensive position should the Soviets invite us to their ceremonies. Subject to British, French and German agreement, we could invite the Soviets and East Germans to a joint commemoration ceremony celebrating the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazism -- perhaps in Berlin (in both East and West). Our central theme would be reconciliation. The Soviets would likely reject such an invitation, but we would be better positioned to turn down a Soviet invitation designed to exclude the West Germans, and call attention to alleged German revanchism.

George will be seeing his colleagues at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels next week, and I am asking him to consult with the British, French and Germans about their plans and their views on Soviet participation. Based on these consultations, I will ask George to make specific recommendations concerning your participation, Allied and Soviet participation, and the possible extension of your stay in Germany.

Attachment

Tab A - Secretary Shultz's Memo

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BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07~~SECRET~~

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cc Vice President

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries (U)

Chancellor Kohl's invitation for the President to extend his stay in Germany for two days beyond the Bonn Economic Summit, i.e. May 5 and 6, 1985, to participate in ceremonies commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the end of World II offers us an opportunity to develop a coordinated Allied approach. Your recent memo aptly outlined the various policy considerations. We now need to develop some specific suggestions. (S)

We believe we should consider approaches which could preempt a Soviet invitation aimed at embarrassing our German Allies. One idea which you may wish to consider is for the Western Allies and West Germans to invite the Soviets and East Germans to a joint commemoration ceremony celebrating the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazism -- perhaps in Berlin (in both East and West). Our central theme would be reconciliation. Although the Soviets would likely reject such an invitation, its extension would preempt Soviet efforts to secure high-level Western participation in ceremonies directed at German "militarism" and "revanchism." (S)

Your trip to Brussels offers an opportunity to begin consultations. Indeed, you may wish to inform the British and French in advance so they would be in a position to respond. If you consider the idea outlined above sound, you may inform the British and French that the President has asked if it would not be best to seize the high ground by inviting the Soviets and East Germans to participate in a joint ceremony. You could also inform the British and French of Kohl's invitation for the President to extend his stay in Germany, and that the President is inclined to accept, schedule permitting. Following your discussion with the British and the French, we ask that you seek German views on proposals that might be made to the East. (S)

We are concerned that the Soviets could put us in a defensive position by extending invitations to the Western Allies before we have developed a coordinated Allied approach. Therefore, we

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BY CN NARA DATE 11/27/07

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would greatly appreciate a memo, shortly after your return, making specific recommendations concerning the President's participation in anniversary ceremonies, Allied and Soviet participation, and the extension of the President's stay in Germany. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Robert C. McFarlane

cc: Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 8691 **53**

Date **DEC 06 1984**

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By **CAS** NARA, Date **6/10/02**

Subject: **WW II ANNIVERSARIES**

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By CAS NARA, Date 6/10/02

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R. E. Burt

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *WBS*

Subject: U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries

Background

1985 will mark the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the many wartime and postwar events associated with it. These anniversaries will also highlight the several steps taken by the United States and other victorious powers to establish a postwar order. 1985 also happens to be the thirtieth anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, West German entry into NATO and establishment of the Warsaw Pact, and the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act -- all major milestones in the political settlement which emerged from the war.

These anniversaries are already drawing considerable worldwide attention. The world's media will focus on US-Soviet relations and on our ties to the democratic states of Europe and Asia. In Europe, especially in the FRG, there will be debates over the historic decisions which divided Germany and created two military alliances. The West Germans are already nervous about being isolated from their Western allies in the anniversary festivities and the Japanese will probably be anxious as well. In the US, Congressional interest will be high, and various private veterans, Jewish or peace groups will wish to participate in these occasions to further their own causes.

The focal point of the anniversaries in Europe will be V-E Day -- May 8. You and the leaders of all the major participants in the war except the Soviets and the Chinese will be in Bonn May 2-4 for the 1985 Economic Summit. Chancellor Kohl undoubtedly scheduled the Summit on these dates in order to draw a connection to the V-E Day anniversary. We will need to consult closely with our allies to ensure that an appropriate commemoration is arranged.

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If well handled, events connected with these anniversaries can serve important American interests. We can use the public attention focussed on the commemorations to stress the unity of democratic nations which emerged from the war, while at the same time stressing our desire for reconciliation among all nations, East and West. However, without a well thought-out, positive and forward-looking approach we could find ourselves at odds with important allies and at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Soviet efforts to use the commemorations for their own purposes. The Soviets have already launched a major program at home and abroad, stressing their role and downplaying the contribution of the US and other Western allies. The Soviets are arguing that the postwar order is unchangeable and are attacking us for trying to alter it.

Policy Implications

Our policy concerning the anniversaries will take account of several basic questions, including;

-- How to deal with the Soviet Union. Ideally, these anniversaries could provide an impulse to improved ties with the USSR, but the Soviets must be willing to cooperate. If they concentrate their commemoration on anti-American or anti-German themes, we must reply. There is also likely to be considerable pressure for a US-Soviet summit in connection with these anniversaries. I am considering how best to approach the issue with the Soviets. My January meeting with Gromyko might provide an opportunity to broach this issue.

-- The best means to organize a Western commemoration. The Bonn economic summit is the most likely focus for a Western commemoration. Chancellor Kohl may wish to add a commemorative ceremony to summit activities. We should discuss this aspect in detail with the Germans and other allies. Kohl's visit this week could provide a chance for a first exchange.

-- Whether to add more events to your German trip. We can expect a German request that you visit Berlin again in May. Visiting Berlin would provide an excellent opportunity to stress our view of the meaning of V-E day. If we desire, it could also provide an opportunity for a joint commemoration with the Soviets, but managing the symbolism of such an event -- the victorious Allies meeting in the still-divided German capital -- would be difficult.

-- How best to include Japan. We will of course work with the Japanese on the special V-J day aspects, but we should also seek to include Japan in the "Western" observance. Again, the economic summit provides an excellent vehicle. Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's January visit could provide a chance for an initial exchange of views.

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- 3 -

-- Which themes to stress. The best way to turn the anniversaries into opportunities with our allies and with the USSR is to offer a positive message. A strong and attractive approach would be:

- o We and our allies used the defeat of fascism and militarism to build a new world on the basis of democracy, reconciliation, freedom, prosperity and peace, while the Soviets did not;

- o We have built further on these achievements at Helsinki and elsewhere to ease the tensions and hardships caused by Soviet rejection of a democratic course.

- o While we are not seeking to revise the post-1945 territorial settlement in Europe, our goals remain to overcome the division of Europe and erase the danger of war between East and West. We intend to pursue this approach and invite the Soviets to join us to seeking mutual arrangements permitting reduction of tensions and peaceful change in Europe, to the betterment of all our peoples.

Our message to the Soviets should stress our desire for peace. To our allies, we should underline the important contribution our democratic experience has made in realizing our common goals. We should also underline our common conviction that peace and democracy must go together. Peace cannot be assured if human aspirations are not set free. We should not hide our cooperation with the Soviets during World War II, but we should stress the kind of world we had hoped to build and which we are still striving for. This is the positive lesson to be learned from World War II.

I have directed the Department's European and East Asian and Pacific Bureaus to take the lead in coordinating our official participation in these World War II commemorations, consistent with the general policy considerations outlined in this memorandum. We intend to commence discussions with major allies, especially the West Germans and the Japanese, as soon as possible. I will provide more detail to Bud McFarlane and our discussions progress and will keep you informed of policy issues as they arise.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 3, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK/PETER R. SOMMER

SIGNED

SUBJECT: U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a memo addressing how to manage and mark the 40th Anniversary of the end of World War II. The Secretary's memo aptly outlines the various policy considerations, but is woefully short on specifics.

We have a suggested approach which could only be done with the full agreement of the British, French and Germans. With their agreement, we could propose to the Soviets and the East Germans a joint ceremony commemorating the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazism -- perhaps in Berlin (both parts) or Potsdam. The message would be reconciliation, and we would need to take special steps so as not to embarrass our West German Allies. The Soviets would likely reject such an invitation, but its extension would preempt the Soviets, and make it easier for us to turn down a Soviet invitation.

Chancellor Kohl's invitation for the President to extend his stay in Germany for two days beyond the Bonn Summit, i.e., May 5 and 6 offers us the opportunity to develop a coordinated position with our Allies. But we need to move out smartly; Secretary Shultz's trip to NATO next week offers an opportunity to begin intense consultations.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the Tab I memo to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's memo, and noting that you intend to ask the Secretary to consult with his British, French and German colleagues at the upcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting and to report back to the President with a specific V-E Day plan.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

2. That you sign the Tab II memo to Shultz, asking him to consult with our Allies and make specific recommendations.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Rm
Ron Lehman concurs

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
	Tab A - Shultz Memo
Tab II	Memo to Secretary Shultz

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BY RW NARA DATE 2/2/11