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JH-C 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 1, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Thank you Letter to Dobrynin
for the book "The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945"

I have reviewed the proposed draft thank you letter to Ambassador Dobrynin. However, given the thrust of the "history" as presented in this book, I think it would not be appropriate to acknowledge the gift. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Mr. Hilboldt for your signature with above recommendation.

Steve Sestanovich concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I to Mr. Hilboldt.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt-Hilboldt Memorandum

Tab A Proposed Draft Letter and Incoming Correspondence

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN E. HILBOLDT

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Thank you Letter to
Ambassador Dobrynin for the Book "The Great
Patriotic War 1941-1945"

We have reviewed the proposed thank you letter to Ambassador Dobrynin. Given the thrust of the "history" as presented in this book, we think it would not be appropriate to acknowledge the gift.

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed Draft Letter and Incoming Correspondence

4

April 22, 1985

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you very much for the copy of The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 which you gave to Commander Paul Thompson for me during his visit to the Soviet Embassy. I am pleased to share in this newly released history on the struggle of the Soviet people during World War II and your thoughtfulness is indeed appreciated.

Nancy joins me in sending you and Mrs. Dobrynin our best wishes.

Sincerely,
RR

His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Ambassador of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics

Add to envelope:

1125 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

RR:CMF:JEH:AVH

DISPATCH THRU STATE VIA NSC.

JK

312112

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

ID 8500371 A INITIALS CMF

LOGGED 850422 ARRIVAL 850418 PRESENT 850417
ARRIVAL FORM S STAFF OTHER THAN CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON

DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY
NAME ANATOLY F. DOBRYNIN

TITLE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ADDR 1125 16TH STREET, N.W.

CITY WASHINGTON ST DC ZIP 20036
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SALUT DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

INTEND P PRESIDENT
CATEGORY 0498
BOOK - GENERAL HISTORY OF OTHER AREAS

DESCRIP "THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945", BY VASILY CHUIKOV AND VASILY
RYABOV, TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN BY SERGEI ESS; PUBL . BY
PLANETA PUBLISHERS, MOSCOW, 1985.

VALUE 000020
APPR I. BAUM, ASA, DC.

DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT PRESENTED TO CMDR PAUL B. THOMPSON, MIL. ASST. TO MR. MCFARLANE, BY
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AT SOVIET EMBASSY.

TOTVALU 0000020 GIFTS A

6

*With compliments
from the Soviet Ambassador*

Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps

Washington, D. C.

WHITE HOUSE GIFT REGISTER

(For President/First Lady)

Please Complete as Thoroughly as Possible

Send Gift and Register to: White House Gift Unit, Room 494, OEOB (456-7133)

Date: April 17, 1985

Date Gift Received: April 17, 85

Accepted By or Presented to: Paul B. Thompson

Title: Military Assistant to Mr. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for National
Office: Security Affairs

GIFT
INTENDED
FOR

President: ☒

First Lady: ☐

President & First Lady: ☐

Other First Family Member (Name):

DONOR
INFORMATION

Name of Donor: Anatol Dobrynin

Title of Donor: Soviet Ambassador

Address of Donor: Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 16th St NW, Washington, DC 20036 Country USSR

PRESENTED BY:

Donor: Other (Name):

Address:

GIFT
INFORMATION

Circumstances of Presentation: (including date; location, and purpose of event)

Amb Dobrynin presented two books to Cdr Thompson while he was
at Soviet Embassy on business -- one book for the President and
one book for Mr. McFarlane.

Description of Gift: Book entitled The Great Patriotic War published
in Moscow, 1985

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Copy Attached: To be Handled by Gift Unit: Please
for the President's book only
Coordinate acknowledgment with other office: (ie, Hospitality, NSC, State)

REPORT
PREPARED
BY

Name: Dona Proctor

Tel: 2255

Office: Mr. McFarlane's

Room No.: 1st Fl WW

OTHER
COMMENTS

For Gift Unit Use:

Date received:

Through:

8

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 17, 1985

Bob
Dear ~~Robert~~,

It was nice to talk to you again on the
phone this afternoon.

I am sending you a book which has just
come out of print in the Soviet Union.

I am sending an extra copy for the President
in case he would like to look through it
personally.

With best wishes,



The Honorable
Robert McFARLANE
The White House


THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

This book is dedicated to the
heroic deeds of the Soviet people
in the bloody battles against the
Nazi invaders



THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

1941-1945



JMC 11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 1, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Weinberger May 3 Speech to Regional Councils on Foreign Relations

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Colonel Affourtit concurring in Secretary Weinberger's May 3 speech with the changes indicated.

SS Sestonovich, *mf* Fortier, *on* North, *ny* Dohley, *n.a.* Small, *SK* Kraemer, Burghardt, Menges and Dobriansky concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorndum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt-Affourtit Memorandum

Tab A Weinberger May 3 Speech

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL R.J. AFFOURTIT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880, THE PENTAGON

SUBJECT: SecDef Address to the Regional Council on Foreign
Relations, May 3, 1985

The draft text of Secretary Weinberger's May 3 speech has been
approved with the suggested minor changes as indicated.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Tab A Secretary Weinberger's May 3 Speech

REMARKS BY SECRETARY WEINBERGER
TO THE
NASHVILLE, LOUISVILLE, AND BIRMINGHAM COUNCILS ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS

3 MAY 1985

I WISH TO THANK THE COUNCILS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS NOT ONLY
FOR INVITING ME HERE TODAY, BUT ALSO FOR SPONSORING THIS VALUABLE
AND TIMELY SYMPOSIUM ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

AMERICANS, OF COURSE, DIFFER WIDELY IN THEIR PERSPECTIVES
ON THIS SUBJECT. YOU HAVE HEARD SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES
TODAY. BUT IN DEBATING OUR DIFFERENCES WE SHOULD ALWAYS
KEEP IN MIND THAT A FAR WIDER GULF EXISTS BETWEEN AMERICAN, AND
SOVIET, PERSPECTIVES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVES ARE ILLUSTRATED BY A STORY
PRESIDENT REAGAN LOVES TO TELL, ABOUT A MINISTER'S SON WHO WAS
TAKEN OUT CAMPING ONE DAY. HIS COMPANIONS WARNED HIM NOT TO

STRAY TOO FAR FROM THE CAMPFIRE, BECAUSE THE WOODS WERE FULL OF WILD BEASTS. BEING YOUNG, THE BOY OF COURSE IGNORED THIS GOOD ADVICE, AND WANDERED OFF TO EXPLORE. SUDDENLY HE FOUND HIMSELF FACE TO FACE WITH A VERY LARGE AND NOT VERY FRIENDLY LOOKING BEAR.

SEEING NO MEANS OF ESCAPE, THE MINISTER'S SON DID AS HE HAD BEEN TAUGHT. HE KNELT DOWN TO PRAY FOR DELIVERANCE. AND WHEN HE OPENED HIS EYES A FEW MOMENTS LATER, HE WAS DELIGHTED TO DISCOVER THAT THE BEAR, TOO, WAS KNEELING IN PRAYER RIGHT IN FRONT OF HIM.

"OH BEAR," HE SAID, "ISN'T THIS WONDERFUL. HERE WE ARE, WITH SUCH DIFFERENT LIVES AND SUCH DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, BUT WE'RE BOTH PRAYING TO THE SAME LORD."

THE BEAR REPLIED EVENLY, "I DON'T KNOW ABOUT YOU, SON, BUT I'M SAYING GRACE."

IT IS REVEALING OF OUR DIFFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVES THAT AMERICANS, WHEN THEY SPEAK OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, LOVE TO BORROW METAPHORS FROM METEOROLOGY. WE SPEAK OF COLD WAR, HEATED RHETORIC, AND STORMY EXCHANGES. TOO OFTEN OUR FAVORITE INSTRUMENT OF ANALYSIS IS THE THERMOMETER; OUR FAVORITE SUBJECT OF ANALYSIS, THE ATMOSPHERE.

SOVIET RHETORIC OFFERS A STRIKING CONTRAST. FROM LENIN TO GORBACHEV, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTENTION ON WHAT MARXIST-LENINIST DOCTRINE CALLS "OBJECTIVE" FACTORS. THE SOVIETS DO NOT MEASURE THE TEMPERATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THEY MEASURE WHAT THEY CALL THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES:" THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND ABOVE ALL MILITARY POWER. IN LENIN'S FAMOUS PHRASE, THEY ASK "KTO KOVO?" (KAH-TOE', KAH-VOE') -- ROUGHLY, AND POLITELY, TRANSLATED AS WHO IS DOING WHAT, TO WHOM?

TODAY IT IS A COMMONPLACE OBSERVATION AMONG AMERICAN PUNDITS THAT THE "ATMOSPHERE" OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS WORSENERED OVER THE PAST FOUR AND A HALF YEARS. THE BLAME IS PUT SQUARELY ON PRESIDENT REAGAN, OR MORE PRECISELY, ON WHAT IS COMMONLY TERMED HIS "HARSH, ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC."

LEAVING ASIDE THE QUESTION OF WHY THE SOVIETS' CONSISTENTLY HARSH ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC IS NEVER THOUGHT TO POISON THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, I THINK IT A USEFUL EXERCISE TO TRY TO LOOK AT RECENT EAST-WEST RELATIONS FROM THE BEAR'S PERSPECTIVE. WHAT HAS HAPPENED, NOT TO THE ATMOSPHERE, BUT TO THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES?"

TODAY THE CRUCIAL FACT ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS THAT THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES ARE STRONGER, MORE CONFIDENT, AND MORE UNITED THAN THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT HISTORY. SINCE 1980 NO NEW NATIONS HAVE ENTERED THE SOVIET CAMP, AND GRENADA HAS LEFT -- DEALING AS IT WENT A

FATAL BLOW TO THE NOTION THAT THE MARCH OF COMMUNISM COULD GO ONLY FORWARD, NEVER BACKWARD. THE UNITED STATES IS AT LAST MODERNIZING ITS STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES; AND TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES WE HAVE ENDED THE SOVIET MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. ^{In late 1983} ~~JUST THIS PAST YEAR~~ THE SOVIETS TOOK A MAJOR GAMBLE BY WALKING OUT OF THE ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS, AND TRYING TO CONVINCE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IT WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FAULT. THEY LOST.

THE SOVIETS, OF COURSE, ARE NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS. AND THEY HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR DISPLEASURE. DOES THEIR PUBLIC GRUMBLING MEAN, THEN, THAT OUR RENEWED STRENGTH HAS ACTUALLY WEAKENED THE PROSPECTS FOR DETERRING AGGRESSION, OR PERSUADING THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS?

COMMON SENSE AND POSTWAR HISTORY WOULD SURELY ADVISE US THAT THE SOVIETS RESPECT STRENGTH, HOWEVER GRUDGINGLY, AND ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO COME TO TERMS WITH A STRONG THAN A WEAK

AMERICA.— THE DISAPPOINTING EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ALSO SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST DISCOVER CERTAIN COMMON GROUND. MORE SPECIFICALLY, I BELIEVE THAT TO ARRIVE AT A GOOD AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST FIRST ARRIVE AT:

- 1) COMMON FACTS;
- 2) A COMMON PURPOSE; AND
- 3) A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY.

FACTS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASY TO COME BY IN THE SOVIET UNION. NEW YORK TIMES REPORTER DAVID SHIPLER TELLS THE STORY OF A COLLEAGUE WHO WAS WRITING ABOUT THE RUSSIAN NEW YEARS CELEBRATION. HE CALLED THE METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE TO FIND OUT HOW MUCH SNOW HAD FALLEN ON NEW YEARS DAY. HE WAS TOLD THAT THIS WAS CLASSIFIED SECURITY INFORMATION!

ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, HOWEVER, MUST BE BUILT ON A SOLID FOUNDATION OF FACTS: FACTS SUCH AS HOW MANY WEAPONS EACH SIDE HAS, OR HOW NEW WEAPONS WILL BE COUNTED AND DEFINED.

TOO OFTEN WE HAVE GLOSSED OVER A FAILURE TO AGREE ON COMMON FACTS. PERHAPS THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE IS THE DEFINITION OF "HEAVY MISSILES" IN THE SALT I TREATY. THE AGREEMENT FORBODE CONVERSION OF LIGHT ICBMs TO "HEAVY" ICBMs . . . BUT THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO AGREE TO A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "HEAVY." AND LITTLE WONDER. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY THE SOVIETS DEPLOYED THE SS-19, CLEARLY A HEAVY MISSILE BY ANY DEFINITION THE UNITED STATES HAD PROPOSED.

OUR RESPONSE? WE CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A TECHNICAL VIOLATION BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAD NOT, AFTER ALL, AGREED TO OUR DEFINITION OF "HEAVY MISSILE."

YOU PROBABLY HAVE NOT HEARD MUCH ABOUT THEM, BUT IN STOCKHOLM THE UNITED STATES IS NOW PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS DESIGNED PRECISELY TO DEVELOP A COMMON SET OF FACTS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. TOGETHER WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, WE HAVE PROPOSED WHAT ARE CALLED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: MEASURES THAT WILL INCREASE THE OPENNESS AND THE PREDICTABILITY OF PEACETIME MILITARY MANEUVERS AND EXERCISES IN EUROPE. THOUGH SUCH ACTIVITIES USUALLY SERVE LEGITIMATE TRAINING PURPOSES, THEY CAN ALSO BE EMPLOYED FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION -- AS IN POLAND IN _____ -- OR TO CONCEAL PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK -- AS IN THE SINAI IN 1973. UNDER A GOOD AGREEMENT, IF A PARTY CONDUCTED CERTAIN UNANNOUNCED THREATENING OR UNEXPECTED MILITARY ACTIVITIES, IT WOULD VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT AND THEREBY HELP SOUND THE ALARM AGAINST AGGRESSION.

OUR PROPOSALS INCLUDE: 1) THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES; 2) ANNUAL

FORECASTS OF MILITARY EXERCISES; 3) ADVANCE NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES; 4) THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO THOSE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND 5) MEANS OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE MEASURES AGREED TO AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

SO FAR THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO CALL FOR HIGH-SOUNDING DECLARATIONS OF PEACEFUL INTENT -- WITHOUT ANY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, VERIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, OR ENFORCEMENT CLAUSES. BUT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOT WILLING TO SUBSTITUTE RHETORIC FOR SOLID AGREEMENT, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK

FOR GENUINE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM, AND CONSIDER REAFFIRMING DECLARATIONS OF INTENT ONLY IN THE NEED FOR A COMMON SET OF FACTS ON WHICH TO BASE AN ^{THE} CONTEXT

AGREEMENT IS RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD. THE NEED FOR A COMMON PURPOSE, HOWEVER, IS SOMETIMES MISUNDERSTOOD.

PUT BLUNTLY, IN THE BROADEST AND MOST IMPORTANT SENSE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DO NOT HAVE A COMMON PURPOSE. DURING THE PAST DECADE WE SOMETIMES EMBRACED THE

OF CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH GIVE REAL MEANING TO SUCH DECLARATIONS.

THEORY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS BECOMING A "STATUS QUO POWER:" A NATION THAT WOULD SHARE WITH US THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY. SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WARNED OTHERWISE. "DETENTE," HE DECLARED, "IN NO WAY RESCINDS, OR CAN RESCIND, THE LAWS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE." AND INDEED THE STRUGGLE WENT ON IN POLAND, AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA . . . BACKED BY SOVIET AND SOVIET-SURROGATE FORCES.

ANOTHER ILLUSION OF THE 1970s WAS THE BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS COULD BE PERSUADED TO ADOPT AMERICA'S STRATEGIC DOCTRINES, IN PARTICULAR WHAT HENRY KISSINGER HAS CALLED "THE HISTORICALLY AMAZING THEORY THAT VULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTED TO PEACE, AND INVULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISKS OF WAR."

DURING THE 1970s THE UNITED STATES UNILATERALLY RESTRICTED ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS, AND DISMANTLED ITS ONLY ABM SYSTEM, HOPING THE SOVIETS WOULD IMITATE THIS RESTRAINT. THEY DID NOT. INSTEAD, THE SOVIETS PURSUED A

MAJOR RESEARCH EFFORT INTO DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES: AN EFFORT THAT CONTINUES EVEN AS THEY CONDEMN THE PRESIDENT'S OWN RESEARCH INITIATIVE AS THE START OF A NEW ARMS RACE. LIKEWISE, THE SOVIETS DEVELOPED AN ICBM FORCE WHOSE NUMBERS, EXPLOSIVE POWER, AND ACCURACY WERE FAR GREATER THAN WOULD BE NEEDED SIMPLY TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE RETALIATION.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST DECADE, THEN, SHOULD MAKE US CAUTIOUS ABOUT ATTRIBUTING A BROAD COMMON PURPOSE, OR A SHARED STRATEGIC CONSENSUS, TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN A NARROWER SENSE, HOWEVER, THE BASIS FOR A COMMON PURPOSE CLEARLY EXISTS. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS SO DEVASTATING THAT WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR AIMS AND DOCTRINES, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST SHARE AN INTEREST IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR.

AND IN FACT THE SOVIETS HAVE COOPERATED WITH US IN CERTAIN AREAS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. WE HAVE AGREED TO

UPGRADE THE HOTLINE. WE ARE IN ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT ON
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. WE BOTH EXERCISE IN MANY IMPORTANT
WAYS GREAT CAUTION ABOUT NUCLEAR ARMS.

TODAY'S CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HAS IT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, IF IT CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD,
WILL SOUND THE DEATH-KNELL FOR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

I CERTAINLY AGREE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD FAR PREFER A WORLD IN
WHICH THEY ALONE WERE DEVELOPING STRATEGIC DEFENSES, WHILE WE
REMAINED WHOLLY VULNERABLE TO ATTACK. I EXPECT THE SOVIETS
WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SUCH A WORLD, AND SEEKING IT VIGOROUSLY.
BUT ONCE THE SOVIETS ARE CONVINCED -- IF THEY ARE CONVINCED

-- THAT WE WILL NOT CONCEDE THEM A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, I
~~WORKING~~ ^{WORKING WITH US IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES,}
BELIEVE OUR TWO NATIONS CAN WORK TOGETHER TO MANAGE THE TRANSITION
TO A NEW DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENT. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, AFTER
ALL, ULTIMATELY OFFERS FAR MORE SAFETY TO BOTH OUR SOCIETIES,
AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.

ONCE WE HAVE PERSUADED THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT COMMON FACTS AND A COMMON PURPOSE, HOWEVER, WE FACE THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGE OF ALL. AND THAT IS THE CHALLENGE OF PERSUADING THE SOVIETS, WHO DO NOT SHARE OUR RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW, TO ACCEPT COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS WORK.

A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WITNESSED THE SPECTACLE OF AN AMERICAN ARMY MAJOR SHOT BY A SOVIET SENTRY AND LEFT TO BLEED AND DIE ON EAST GERMAN SOIL. HIS MURDER INFORMED MILLIONS OF AMERICANS THAT WE HAVE A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO EXCHANGE MILITARY OBSERVERS IN GERMANY: AN AGREEMENT DATING FROM 1947.

I WAS FRANKLY DISMAYED BY MUCH OF THE REACTION TO THIS OUTRAGE. THERMOMETERS POPPED OUT ALL OVER WASHINGTON, AS OUR SO-CALLED OPINION LEADERS SOUGHT TO MEASURE THE EFFECT OF MAJOR NICHOLSON'S MURDER ON THE "ATMOSPHERE" OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

28

DO NOT MISTAKE ME. I STRONGLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS, JUST AS I SUPPORTED THE SAME DECISION AFTER 269 INNOCENT CIVILIANS MET THEIR DEATH ON KAL FLIGHT 007. WHAT DISMAYED ME WAS THE ALMOST TOTAL FAILURE OF THE PRESS, IN THE MIDST OF ALL THEIR TEMPERATURE-TAKING, TO ASK A VERY BASIC QUESTION. WHAT IS THE VALUE OF AGREEING TO EXCHANGE OBSERVERS IF THE OBSERVERS ARE GOING TO BE SHOT? OR, PUT MORE BROADLY, WHAT IS THE VALUE OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS IF THEY WILL NOT SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING THEM?

OF COURSE, IN MANY CIRCLES IT IS CONSIDERED BAD MANNERS TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF TREATY COMPLIANCE. WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN SUBMITTED A LIST OF VIOLATIONS TO THE SENATE HE WAS ROUNDLY CONDEMNED IN THE PRESS FOR ENDANGERING THE ARMS REDUCTION "PROCESS." COMPLIANCE HAS INDEED BECOME A KIND OF LITMUS TEST FOR INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED WITH NATIONAL SECURITY. IF

THEY EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT COMPLIANCE, THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY LABELLED AS UNREGENERATE OPPONENTS OF ARMS REDUCTION, WHO BELIEVE IN BRUTE MILITARY STRENGTH, CONFRONTATION, AND THE FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

IN FACT, IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THIS ADMINISTRATION DOES BELIEVE IN THE PROMISE OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS -- ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN AMERICA HAS RECOVERED HER STRENGTH AND STRENGTH OF PURPOSE -- THAT WE ARE TAKING COMPLIANCE SO SERIOUSLY. TO ARGUE THAT BREAKING TREATIES IS UNIMPORTANT IS TO ARGUE THAT THE TREATIES THEMSELVES ARE FRIVOLOUS. SURELY WE CAN DEMAND MORE OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS THAN THAT.

DURING THE DECADE OF THE 1970s WE IN EFFECT OFFERED THE SOVIETS TWO CHOICES. -- THEY COULD AGREE TO GENUINE, MUTUAL, VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS -- NOT JUST AGREEMENTS

THAT CODIFIED A MILITARY BUILDUP. OR, WITH THE FULL
SANCTION OF SO-CALLED ARMS "CONTROL" AGREEMENTS, THEY COULD
SIMPLY CONTINUE EXPANDING THEIR MILITARY POWER . . . SECURE
IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE WERE UNWILLING TO PAY THE PRICE FOR
RESTORING THE MILITARY BALANCE.

THE CHOICE WAS EASY.

THE CHOICES OF THE 1980s ARE PROVING HARDER FOR THE SOVIETS.
THE CHOICE OF GENUINE, MUTUAL, VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS
REMAINS OPEN. AND, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DEMONSTRATED, WE
ARE WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT HOW THESE REDUCTIONS CAN BEST
AND MOST FAIRLY BE ACHIEVED. BUT FOR NOW AT LEAST THAT SECOND
CHOICE -- UNILATERAL AMERICAN RESTRAINT -- HAS BEEN REPLACED BY
A DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE THE MILITARY BALANCE.

THE SOVIETS ARE OF COURSE HOPING THAT WE WILL LOSE
PATIENCE WITH OUR PROGRAM TO RESTORE AMERICA'S MILITARY STRENGTH.

AND THEY HAVE SOME CAUSE FOR HOPE. BUT IF WE CAN MAINTAIN A STEADY COURSE AND A STRONG SENSE OF PURPOSE, I BELIEVE THIS DECADE COULD AT LAST WITNESS THE ARMS REDUCTION BREAKTHROUGH WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING, WITHOUT SUCCESS, SINCE THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR AGE.

ABOVE ALL, WE AS A NATION NEED TO KEEP OUR ULTIMATE GOALS IN SIGHT. STRONG DEFENSES ARE NOT A GOAL. AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT A GOAL. THEY ARE MEANS TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS: PRESERVING PEACE, PROTECTING FREEDOM, AND PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AND THEY SHOULD BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO HOW WELL THEY SUCCEED IN THAT PURPOSE.

NOW LET ME TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 1, 1985

Matthew C. 30
2429
SB - refer
JM-C

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED RYAN

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *Bud*
SUBJECT: Oval Office Meeting with Harold Willens

We have received your Presidential Activity package for an approved Oval Office meeting with Harold Willens. This meeting is to take place May 15 at 1:15 p.m. Upon some investigation, my staff has learned that Willens is an active supporter and funder of the nuclear freeze, and other similar "peace" movements, in California.

This already-scheduled meeting was approved by Mike Deaver. Unless there is some overriding reason why the President should see Willens (e.g., he's a personal friend), I recommend that this meeting be canceled.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Oval Office Meeting with Mr. Harold Willens

Mike Deaver approved scheduling a 15-minute Oval Office meeting with Harold Willens. I have learned that Willens is a big supporter and funder of the nuclear freeze movement in California, and he is active in other causes contrary to the Administration's policies. The purpose of this meeting is to lobby the President to agree to a summit meeting in Hiroshima. A Hiroshima summit meeting is something we should not seriously consider.

Unless Willens is the President's personal friend, I recommend that the President not see Willens a second time.

SK
Sven Kraemer, *SRS* Steve Sestanovich, *JL* John Lenczowski, and Bill Martin concur.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo to Fred Ryan (Tab I) outlining the reasons why the meeting should be canceled.

Approve *m*

Disapprove _____

OR

2. That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab II and the Talking Points at Tab A, *if it is decided to hold the meeting anyway.*

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Ryan
Tab II Meeting Memorandum
Tab A Talking Points
Tab III Clearance List
Tab IV Background papers

MEETING WITH MR. HAROLD WILLENS

DATE: May 15, 1985
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss Mr. Willens's suggestions on holding a potential summit meeting at Hiroshima.

II. BACKGROUND:

Will provide opportunity to hear his views on why he suggests your having a summit meeting with Soviet Leader Gorbachev at Hiroshima. This is at least your second meeting with Willens; you have corresponded with him once earlier this year, in which you replied that you would give his suggestion "careful thought." (The idea is not a good one and should not be encouraged.)

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Greet Willens and initiate discussion of his suggestion.

Prepared by:
Nicholas S. Klissas

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points

TALKING POINTS

Meeting with Harold Willens
May 15, 1985

- Welcome to Washington. How is the weather back in California?
- Your suggestion is a very interesting one. How did this idea come about?
- I'd like to meet with Gorbachev, under the right conditions. But, you know, it's the Soviet turn to come here. A summit meeting at Hiroshima could look like an artificial event for the media, and this is certainly not what we want.
- I'm also not sure how the Japanese would feel about it, whether they would want a Soviet leader to come given the lack of a peace treaty and the problem of the Northern Islands.

FOR END OF MEETING

- Appreciate your ideas on this subject. It still is too early to tell under what conditions a meeting may take place, but we will keep your suggestion in mind.

34

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Wednesday, May 15, 19 85
for THE PRESIDENT of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

PARTICIPANTS

Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock
Harold Willens

MEETING LOCATION

Building WHITE HOUSE

Requested by JACK F. MATLOCK

Room No. OVAL OFFICE

Room No. 368 Telephone X5112

Time of Meeting 1:15 PM

Date of request April 30, 1985

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

35

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3/29/85

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with Harold Willens

DATE: May 15, 1985

TIME: 1:15 pm

DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc:	K. Barun	A. Kingon	R. Kimmitt
	P. Buchanan	C. McCain	
	D. Chew	B. Oglesby	
	T. Dawson	E. Rollins	
	R. Deprospero	J. Rosebush	
	B. Elliott	R. Scouten	
	D. Fischer	B. Shaddix	
	M. Friedersdorf	W. Sittmann	
	C. Fuller	L. Speakes	
	W. Henkel	WHCA Audio/Visual	
	E. Hickey	WHCA Operations	
	J. Hirshberg	Nell Yates	
	G. Hodges		

34
HAROLD WILLENS

PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN (RETIRED) FACTORY EQUIPMENT CORPORATION AND WILSHOP CONCO

*Bill
Set-up with RR
15 minutes*

March 18, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House

Dear Mr. President,

I am grateful for your January 23rd letter and especially appreciate your willingness to give "careful thought" to the idea of a Hiroshima Summit.

In this particular year, that would be an unprecedented event bound to capture the attention, imagination and respect of all the world.

In that connection, I would like to share with you a further suggestion which I believe would interest you.

I am scheduled to be in Washington the week of May 13th and wonder whether you would be willing to meet with me for 15 or 20 minutes so that I can explain it in a way that would do justice to something which I believe would benefit your Administration, our country and the world.

Sincerely,

Harold Willens

Harold Willens

HW:kk

5-15-85
1:15
15 min
5/28/85

TO: PROJECT OFFICERS
 FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
 SUBJECT: Checklist for Presidential Events

General Responsibilities

- _____ The Presidential Advance Office has responsibility for all logistical arrangements for any event involving press coverage. Please coordinate with them from the time your event is approved in order to avoid the need for last-minute modification.
- _____ Notify and clear all participants. (Full name, social security number, date of birth).
- _____ Prepare and submit briefing paper to David Chew's Office by 3:00 p.m. of the preceding day. (14 copies)
- _____ Coordinate with James Kuhn (x2168) on Presidential involvement.
- _____ Coordinate with the Press Office (x2100) regarding Press Coverage. Indicate hometowns of participants.
- _____ If remarks are required, coordinate with the Speechwriters Office (x6266) well in advance.
- _____ For Rose Garden events, clear and reserve a backup location in case of inclement weather.
- _____ If participant brings a gift, contact the White House Gift Unit (x7133) for handling.
- _____ If any foreign visitor or dignitary is to be involved, please coordinate with Robert Kimmitt of the NSC (x2224).
- _____ If any Department of Defense or Military personnel are to be involved, please coordinate in advance with the White House Military Office (x2150).
- _____ If press coverage is expected, please provide all pertinent information concerning this event (guests, scenario, backdrop, etc.,) to the Presidential Advance Office at least 72 hours prior to the event.
- _____ Submit a complete, confirmed list of staff and attendees, identified by title, as well as the actual starting and completion times, to the President's Diarist, Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling (x7560) within five (5) days after the event.
- _____ If tent name cards are needed, send a list of names to Social Secretary's office (x7064) at least 48 hours in advance.
- _____ For West Wing Meetings all room arrangements (chairs, notepads, pencils, etc.) should be made through Carl Jones (x2275) or Nell Yates (x2605).

Residence Events

- _____ Coordinate with the Social Secretary's office (x7064) for all arrangements.
- _____ Send guest list to Social Secretary's office, preferably three weeks prior to the event.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

38
CHRON FILE

January 23, 1985

Dear Mr. Willens:

Thank you for your letter of January 7 with the suggestion that I consider the possibility of a summit meeting in Hiroshima.

I am determined to do all I can to try to negotiate fair and equitable agreements with the Soviet Union to bring down the high levels of nuclear weapons and to set the world on a course toward their complete elimination.

In that connection, I want you to know that I will bear in mind your very interesting suggestion and will give it careful thought.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mr. Harold Willens
President and Chairman
Factory Equipment Corporation
and Wilshop Corporation
1122 Maple Avenue,
Los Angeles, California 90015

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Harold Willens

A suggested reply to the letter from Harold Willens -- which you handed me earlier this week -- is at Tab A.

Recommendation

OK

No

RCM

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Mr. Harold Willens

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
cc: Vice President

MEMORANDUM

0390

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 16, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Harold Willens

A suggested reply to Mr. Willen's letter is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letter for President's Signature
Tab B Mr. H. Willens Letter to the President

41
0390

January 7, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House

Dear Mr. President,

Perhaps you will recall that when we met in the Oval Office, you indicated willingness to consider the idea of a Summit Meeting ("at some appropriate time") which would be made unique by the fact of its being held in Hiroshima. And perhaps you will recall our reasons for believing that such a meeting would justifiably yield not only worldwide respect and attention, but also a place of distinction in the annals of history.

There are a number of reasons -- beyond those which are obvious -- for which August 6 of this year might be particularly "appropriate" for this unprecedented event -- reasons which would benefit your Administration as well as our country and the world. I hope that you will grant me the privilege of bringing these reasons to your personal attention in a brief discussion sometime soon.

As a person trained by many years of business experience, I am keenly aware of the demands upon your time, Mr. President. But I am also aware of your deep desire to make the world a safer place while keeping our country strong. It is this knowledge that encourages me to make the request which Patti has generously offered to bring to your personal attention.

Sincerely,



Harold Willens

HW:kk

Matlock

JM-C
42

3529

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 2, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL R.J. AFFOURTIT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ROOM 3E880, THE PENTAGON

SUBJECT: SecDef Address to the Regional Council on Foreign
Relations, May 3, 1985

The draft text of Secretary Weinberger's May 3 speech has been
approved with the suggested minor changes as indicated.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Tab A Secretary Weinberger's May 3 Speech

McCONNELL
29APR85
3:00PM

43

REMARKS BY SECRETARY WEINBERGER
TO THE
NASHVILLE, LOUISVILLE, AND BIRMINGHAM COUNCILS ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS

3 MAY 1985

I WISH TO THANK THE COUNCILS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS NOT ONLY
FOR INVITING ME HERE TODAY, BUT ALSO FOR SPONSORING THIS VALUABLE
AND TIMELY SYMPOSIUM ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

AMERICANS, OF COURSE, DIFFER WIDELY IN THEIR PERSPECTIVES
ON THIS SUBJECT. YOU HAVE HEARD SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES
TODAY. BUT IN DEBATING OUR DIFFERENCES WE SHOULD ALWAYS
KEEP IN MIND THAT A FAR WIDER GULF EXISTS BETWEEN AMERICAN, AND
SOVIET, PERSPECTIVES ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVES ARE ILLUSTRATED BY A STORY
PRESIDENT REAGAN LOVES TO TELL, ABOUT A MINISTER'S SON WHO WAS
TAKEN OUT CAMPING ONE DAY. HIS COMPANIONS WARNED HIM NOT TO

STRAY TOO FAR FROM THE CAMPFIRE, BECAUSE THE WOODS WERE FULL OF WILD BEASTS. BEING YOUNG, THE BOY OF COURSE IGNORED THIS GOOD ADVICE, AND WANDERED OFF TO EXPLORE. SUDDENLY HE FOUND HIMSELF FACE TO FACE WITH A VERY LARGE AND NOT VERY FRIENDLY LOOKING BEAR.

SEEING NO MEANS OF ESCAPE, THE MINISTER'S SON DID AS HE HAD BEEN TAUGHT. HE KNELT DOWN TO PRAY FOR DELIVERANCE. AND WHEN HE OPENED HIS EYES A FEW MOMENTS LATER, HE WAS DELIGHTED TO DISCOVER THAT THE BEAR, TOO, WAS KNEELING IN PRAYER RIGHT IN FRONT OF HIM.

"OH BEAR," HE SAID, "ISN'T THIS WONDERFUL. HERE WE ARE, WITH SUCH DIFFERENT LIVES AND SUCH DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, BUT WE'RE BOTH PRAYING TO THE SAME LORD."

THE BEAR REPLIED EVENLY, "I DON'T KNOW ABOUT YOU, SON, BUT I'M SAYING GRACE."

IT IS REVEALING OF OUR DIFFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVES THAT AMERICANS, WHEN THEY SPEAK OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, LOVE TO BORROW METAPHORS FROM METEOROLOGY. WE SPEAK OF COLD WAR, HEATED RHETORIC, AND STORMY EXCHANGES. TOO OFTEN OUR FAVORITE INSTRUMENT OF ANALYSIS IS THE THERMOMETER; OUR FAVORITE SUBJECT OF ANALYSIS, THE ATMOSPHERE.

SOVIET RHETORIC OFFERS A STRIKING CONTRAST. FROM LENIN TO GORBACHEV, SOVIET LEADERS HAVE FOCUSED THEIR ATTENTION ON WHAT MARXIST-LENINIST DOCTRINE CALLS "OBJECTIVE" FACTORS. THE SOVIETS DO NOT MEASURE THE TEMPERATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THEY MEASURE WHAT THEY CALL THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES:" THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND ABOVE ALL MILITARY POWER. IN LENIN'S FAMOUS PHRASE, THEY ASK "KTO KOVO?" (KAH-TOE', KAH-VOE') -- ROUGHLY, AND POLITELY, TRANSLATED AS WHO IS DOING WHAT, TO WHOM?

TODAY IT IS A COMMONPLACE OBSERVATION AMONG AMERICAN PUNDITS THAT THE "ATMOSPHERE" OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS WORSENERED OVER THE PAST FOUR AND A HALF YEARS. THE BLAME IS PUT SQUARELY ON PRESIDENT REAGAN, OR MORE PRECISELY, ON WHAT IS COMMONLY TERMED HIS "HARSH, ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC."

LEAVING ASIDE THE QUESTION OF WHY THE SOVIETS' CONSISTENTLY HARSH ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC IS NEVER THOUGHT TO POISON THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, I THINK IT A USEFUL EXERCISE TO TRY TO LOOK AT RECENT EAST-WEST RELATIONS FROM THE BEAR'S PERSPECTIVE. WHAT HAS HAPPENED, NOT TO THE ATMOSPHERE, BUT TO THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES?"

TODAY THE CRUCIAL FACT ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS THAT THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES ARE STRONGER, MORE CONFIDENT, AND MORE UNITED THAN THEY HAVE BEEN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT HISTORY. SINCE 1980 NO NEW NATIONS HAVE ENTERED THE SOVIET CAMP, AND GRENADA HAS LEFT -- DEALING AS IT WENT A

FATAL BLOW TO THE NOTION THAT THE MARCH OF COMMUNISM COULD GO ONLY FORWARD, NEVER BACKWARD. THE UNITED STATES IS AT LAST MODERNIZING ITS STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES; AND TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES WE HAVE ENDED THE SOVIET MONOPOLY OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. ^{In late 1983} ~~JUST THIS PAST YEAR~~ THE SOVIETS TOOK A MAJOR GAMBLE BY WALKING OUT OF THE ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS, AND TRYING TO CONVINCE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IT WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FAULT. THEY LOST.

THE SOVIETS, OF COURSE, ARE NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS. AND THEY HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR DISPLEASURE. DOES THEIR PUBLIC GRUMBLING MEAN, THEN, THAT OUR RENEWED STRENGTH HAS ACTUALLY WEAKENED THE PROSPECTS FOR DETERRING AGGRESSION, OR PERSUADING THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS?

COMMON SENSE AND POSTWAR HISTORY WOULD SURELY ADVISE US THAT THE SOVIETS RESPECT STRENGTH, HOWEVER GRUDGINGLY, AND ARE FAR MORE LIKELY TO COME TO TERMS WITH A STRONG THAN A WEAK

AMERICA.— ~~THE~~ DISAPPOINTING EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ALSO SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCEED THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST DISCOVER CERTAIN COMMON GROUND. MORE SPECIFICALLY, I BELIEVE THAT TO ARRIVE AT A GOOD AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST FIRST ARRIVE AT:

- 1) COMMON FACTS;
- 2) A COMMON PURPOSE; AND
- 3) A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY.

FACTS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASY TO COME BY IN THE SOVIET UNION. NEW YORK TIMES REPORTER DAVID SHIPLER TELLS THE STORY OF A COLLEAGUE WHO WAS WRITING ABOUT THE RUSSIAN NEW YEARS CELEBRATION. HE CALLED THE METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE TO FIND OUT HOW MUCH SNOW HAD FALLEN ON NEW YEARS DAY. HE WAS TOLD THAT THIS WAS CLASSIFIED SECURITY INFORMATION!

ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS, HOWEVER, MUST BE BUILT ON A SOLID FOUNDATION OF FACTS: FACTS SUCH AS HOW MANY WEAPONS EACH SIDE HAS, OR HOW NEW WEAPONS WILL BE COUNTED AND DEFINED.

TOO OFTEN WE HAVE GLOSSED OVER A FAILURE TO AGREE ON COMMON FACTS. PERHAPS THE CLASSIC EXAMPLE IS THE DEFINITION OF "HEAVY MISSILES" IN THE SALT I TREATY. THE AGREEMENT FORBADE CONVERSION OF LIGHT ICBMs TO "HEAVY" ICBMs . . . BUT THE SOVIETS REFUSED TO AGREE TO A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "HEAVY." AND LITTLE WONDER. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY THE SOVIETS DEPLOYED THE SS-19, CLEARLY A HEAVY MISSILE BY ANY DEFINITION THE UNITED STATES HAD PROPOSED.

OUR RESPONSE? WE CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A TECHNICAL VIOLATION BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAD NOT, AFTER ALL, AGREED TO OUR DEFINITION OF "HEAVY MISSILE."

YOU PROBABLY HAVE NOT HEARD MUCH ABOUT THEM, BUT IN STOCKHOLM THE UNITED STATES IS NOW PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS DESIGNED PRECISELY TO DEVELOP A COMMON SET OF FACTS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. TOGETHER WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, WE HAVE PROPOSED WHAT ARE CALLED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: MEASURES THAT WILL INCREASE THE OPENNESS AND THE PREDICTABILITY OF PEACETIME MILITARY MANEUVERS AND EXERCISES IN EUROPE. THOUGH SUCH ACTIVITIES USUALLY SERVE LEGITIMATE TRAINING PURPOSES, THEY CAN ALSO BE EMPLOYED FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION -- AS IN POLAND IN _____ -- OR TO CONCEAL PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK -- AS IN THE SINAI IN 1973. UNDER A GOOD AGREEMENT, IF A PARTY CONDUCTED CERTAIN UNANNOUNCED THREATENING OR UNEXPECTED MILITARY ACTIVITIES, IT WOULD VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT AND THEREBY HELP SOUND THE ALARM AGAINST AGGRESSION.

OUR PROPOSALS INCLUDE: 1) THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES; 2) ANNUAL

51
FORECASTS OF MILITARY EXERCISES; 3) ADVANCE NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES; 4) THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS TO THOSE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND 5) MEANS OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE MEASURES AGREED TO AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

SO FAR THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO CALL FOR HIGH-SOUNDING DECLARATIONS OF PEACEFUL INTENT -- WITHOUT ANY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, VERIFICATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, OR ENFORCEMENT CLAUSES. BUT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS NOT WILLING TO SUBSTITUTE RHETORIC FOR SOLID AGREEMENT, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK

FOR GENUINE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN STOCKHOLM, AND CONSIDER REAFFIRMING DECLARATIONS OF INTENT ONLY IN THE NEED FOR A COMMON SET OF FACTS ON WHICH TO BASE AN ^{THE} _{CONTEXT}

AGREEMENT IS RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD. THE NEED FOR A COMMON PURPOSE, HOWEVER, IS SOMETIMES MISUNDERSTOOD.

PUT BLUNTLY, IN THE BROADEST AND MOST IMPORTANT SENSE THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DO NOT HAVE A COMMON PURPOSE. DURING THE PAST DECADE WE SOMETIMES EMBRACED THE

OF CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH GIVE REAL MEANING TO SUCH DECLARATIONS.

52

THEORY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS BECOMING A "STATUS QUO POWER:"
A NATION THAT WOULD SHARE WITH US THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING
WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY. SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WARNED
OTHERWISE. "DETENTE," HE DECLARED, "IN NO WAY RESCINDS, OR
CAN RESCIND, THE LAWS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE." AND INDEED THE
STRUGGLE WENT ON IN POLAND, AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, NICARAGUA,
ANGOLA . . . BACKED BY SOVIET AND SOVIET-SURROGATE FORCES.

ANOTHER ILLUSION OF THE 1970s WAS THE BELIEF THAT THE
SOVIETS COULD BE PERSUADED TO ADOPT AMERICA'S STRATEGIC DOCTRINES,
IN PARTICULAR WHAT HENRY KISSINGER HAS CALLED "THE HISTORICALLY
AMAZING THEORY THAT VULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTED TO PEACE, AND
INVULNERABILITY CONTRIBUTED TO THE RISKS OF WAR."

DURING THE 1970s THE UNITED STATES UNILATERALLY
RESTRICTED ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS, AND DISMANTLED
ITS ONLY ABM SYSTEM, HOPING THE SOVIETS WOULD IMITATE THIS
RESTRAINT. THEY DID NOT. INSTEAD, THE SOVIETS PURSUED A

53

MAJOR RESEARCH EFFORT INTO DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES: AN EFFORT THAT CONTINUES EVEN AS THEY CONDEMN THE PRESIDENT'S OWN RESEARCH INITIATIVE AS THE START OF A NEW ARMS RACE. LIKEWISE, THE SOVIETS DEVELOPED AN ICBM FORCE WHOSE NUMBERS, EXPLOSIVE POWER, AND ACCURACY WERE FAR GREATER THAN WOULD BE NEEDED SIMPLY TO ASSURE EFFECTIVE RETALIATION.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST DECADE, THEN, SHOULD MAKE US CAUTIOUS ABOUT ATTRIBUTING A BROAD COMMON PURPOSE, OR A SHARED STRATEGIC CONSENSUS, TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN A NARROWER SENSE, HOWEVER, THE BASIS FOR A COMMON PURPOSE CLEARLY EXISTS. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS SO DEVASTATING THAT WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR AIMS AND DOCTRINES, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MUST SHARE AN INTEREST IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR.

AND IN FACT THE SOVIETS HAVE COOPERATED WITH US IN CERTAIN AREAS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. WE HAVE AGREED TO

54

UPGRADE THE HOTLINE. WE ARE IN ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT ON
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. WE BOTH EXERCISE IN MANY IMPORTANT
WAYS GREAT CAUTION ABOUT NUCLEAR ARMS.

TODAY'S CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HAS IT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, IF IT CONTINUES TO MOVE FORWARD,
WILL SOUND THE DEATH-KNELL FOR ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.

I CERTAINLY AGREE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD FAR PREFER A WORLD IN
WHICH THEY ALONE WERE DEVELOPING STRATEGIC DEFENSES, WHILE WE
REMAINED WHOLLY VULNERABLE TO ATTACK. I EXPECT THE SOVIETS
WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SUCH A WORLD, AND SEEKING IT VIGOROUSLY.
BUT ONCE THE SOVIETS ARE CONVINCED -- IF THEY ARE CONVINCED

-- THAT WE WILL NOT CONCEDE THEM A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, I
~~WORKING~~ WITH US IN CLOSE CONSULTATION, WITH OUR ALLIES,
BELIEVE OUR TWO NATIONS CAN WORK TOGETHER TO MANAGE THE TRANSITION
TO A NEW DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENT. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, AFTER
ALL, ULTIMATELY OFFERS FAR MORE SAFETY TO BOTH OUR SOCIETIES,
AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.

ONCE WE HAVE PERSUADED THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT COMMON FACTS AND A COMMON PURPOSE, HOWEVER, WE FACE THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGE OF ALL. AND THAT IS THE CHALLENGE OF PERSUADING THE SOVIETS, WHO DO NOT SHARE OUR RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW, TO ACCEPT COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS WORK.

A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WITNESSED THE SPECTACLE OF AN AMERICAN ARMY MAJOR SHOT BY A SOVIET SENTRY AND LEFT TO BLEED AND DIE ON EAST GERMAN SOIL. HIS MURDER INFORMED MILLIONS OF AMERICANS THAT WE HAVE A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO EXCHANGE MILITARY OBSERVERS IN GERMANY: AN AGREEMENT DATING FROM 1947.

I WAS FRANKLY DISMAYED BY MUCH OF THE REACTION TO THIS OUTRAGE. THERMOMETERS POPPED OUT ALL OVER WASHINGTON, AS OUR SO-CALLED OPINION LEADERS SOUGHT TO MEASURE THE EFFECT OF MAJOR NICHOLSON'S MURDER ON THE "ATMOSPHERE" OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

54

DO NOT MISTAKE ME. I STRONGLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS, JUST AS I SUPPORTED THE SAME DECISION AFTER 269 INNOCENT CIVILIANS MET THEIR DEATH ON KAL FLIGHT 007. WHAT DISMAYED ME WAS THE ALMOST TOTAL FAILURE OF THE PRESS, IN THE MIDST OF ALL THEIR TEMPERATURE-TAKING, TO ASK A VERY BASIC QUESTION. WHAT IS THE VALUE OF AGREEING TO EXCHANGE OBSERVERS IF THE OBSERVERS ARE GOING TO BE SHOT? OR, PUT MORE BROADLY, WHAT IS THE VALUE OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS IF THEY WILL NOT SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING THEM?

OF COURSE, IN MANY CIRCLES IT IS CONSIDERED BAD MANNERS TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF TREATY COMPLIANCE. WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN SUBMITTED A LIST OF VIOLATIONS TO THE SENATE HE WAS ROUNDLY CONDEMNED IN THE PRESS FOR ENDANGERING THE ARMS REDUCTION "PROCESS." COMPLIANCE HAS INDEED BECOME A KIND OF LITMUS TEST FOR INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED WITH NATIONAL SECURITY. IF

THEY EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT COMPLIANCE, THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY LABELLED AS UNREGENERATE OPPONENTS OF ARMS REDUCTION, WHO BELIEVE IN BRUTE MILITARY STRENGTH, CONFRONTATION, AND THE FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

IN FACT, IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THIS ADMINISTRATION DOES BELIEVE IN THE PROMISE OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS -- ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN AMERICA HAS RECOVERED HER STRENGTH AND STRENGTH OF PURPOSE -- THAT WE ARE TAKING COMPLIANCE SO SERIOUSLY. TO ARGUE THAT BREAKING TREATIES IS UNIMPORTANT IS TO ARGUE THAT THE TREATIES THEMSELVES ARE FRIVOLOUS. SURELY WE CAN DEMAND MORE OF ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS THAN THAT.

DURING THE DECADE OF THE 1970s WE IN EFFECT OFFERED THE SOVIETS TWO CHOICES. THEY COULD AGREE TO GENUINE, MUTUAL, VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS -- NOT JUST AGREEMENTS

58

THAT CODIFIED A MILITARY BUILDUP. OR, WITH THE FULL
SANCTION OF SO-CALLED ARMS "CONTROL" AGREEMENTS, THEY COULD
SIMPLY CONTINUE EXPANDING THEIR MILITARY POWER . . . SECURE
IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE WERE UNWILLING TO PAY THE PRICE FOR
RESTORING THE MILITARY BALANCE.

THE CHOICE WAS EASY.

THE CHOICES OF THE 1980s ARE PROVING HARDER FOR THE SOVIETS.
THE CHOICE OF GENUINE, MUTUAL, VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS
REMAINS OPEN. AND, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS DEMONSTRATED, WE
ARE WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT HOW THESE REDUCTIONS CAN BEST
AND MOST FAIRLY BE ACHIEVED. BUT FOR NOW AT LEAST THAT SECOND
CHOICE -- UNILATERAL AMERICAN RESTRAINT -- HAS BEEN REPLACED BY
A DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE THE MILITARY BALANCE.

THE SOVIETS ARE OF COURSE HOPING THAT WE WILL LOSE
PATIENCE WITH OUR PROGRAM TO RESTORE AMERICA'S MILITARY STRENGTH.

51

AND THEY HAVE SOME CAUSE FOR HOPE. BUT IF WE CAN MAINTAIN A STEADY COURSE AND A STRONG SENSE OF PURPOSE, I BELIEVE THIS DECADE COULD AT LAST WITNESS THE ARMS REDUCTION BREAKTHROUGH WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING, WITHOUT SUCCESS, SINCE THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR AGE.

ABOVE ALL, WE AS A NATION NEED TO KEEP OUR ULTIMATE GOALS IN SIGHT. STRONG DEFENSES ARE NOT A GOAL. AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE NOT A GOAL. THEY ARE MEANS TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS: PRESERVING PEACE, PROTECTING FREEDOM, AND PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AND THEY SHOULD BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO HOW WELL THEY SUCCEED IN THAT PURPOSE.

NOW LET ME TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

60

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 1, 1985

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Weinberger May 3 Speech to Regional Councils on Foreign Relations

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Colonel Affourtit concurring in Secretary Weinberger's May 3 speech with the changes indicated.

SS Sestanovich, *for* Fortier, *on* North, *n.a.* Dohley, *SK* Small, Kraemer, Burghardt, *on* Menges and Dobriansky concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve IL Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt-Affourtit Memorandum

Tab A Weinberger May 3 Speech

61
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

29 April 1985

MEMO FOR MR. ROBERT KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ROOM 372, OEOB

SUBJECT: SecDef Remarks for Review
and Comment

The attached draft remarks were
prepared for Secretary Weinberger's
address to the Regional Council on
Foreign Relations, 3 May 1985.

Request that you review these draft
remarks and provide comments/concurrence
to Mary McConnell (697-8191) by NLT
1500 hours, Wednesday 1 May.

If we have not heard from you by
then, we will assume your concurrence
in these draft remarks as written.

R. J. Affourtit
Colonel, USA
Executive Secretary

Attachment



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DATE & TIME TRANSMITTED

DATE & TIME RECEIVED

TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTOR

FROM SPEECHWRITER OFFICE/DESK Mary McConnell PHONE NBR 697-3191
 SUBJECT SECDEF REMARKS FOR REVIEW AND COMMENT

PAGES 18

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

- ☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS
☒ IMMEDIATELY

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER
 FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
NEL	MR ROBERT KIMMITT	EXEC SEC	RM 372	456-2224
	Executive Secretary			

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED