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**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/7/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1985 (1/4)

**FOIA**

F06-114/2

**Box Number** 9

YARHI-MILO

910

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7425	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV: SHULTZ CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	1	6/1/1985	B1
7426	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN MAY 24TH <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	2	5/25/1985	B1
7427	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN ON MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV (SAME TEXT AS 7375) <b>PAR 1/11/2012 M125/2; PAR UPHELD 10/1/2012 F06-114/2</b>	3	5/29/1985	B1
7428	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE BRIEFING PAPERS ON USSR FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	2	6/3/1985	B1
7429	BRIEFING PAPER	BRIEFING PAPERS ON USSR TENTATIVE OUTLINE <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	1	ND	B1
7430	E-MAIL	E-MAL PROFS MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE US-USSR PAPERS <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b>	1	5/28/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/7/2005

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**FOIA**

F06-114/2

**Box Number** 9

YARHI-MILO

910

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7431	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE RUSSIAN POET VOZNESENSKY <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	1	6/3/1985	B1
7432	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PEARCE AND GREEN AGAIN: REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	1	6/3/1985	B1
7433	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7431 <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	1	6/3/1985	B1
7434	MEMO	RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE BIB/RFE/RL <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	2	6/3/1985	B1
7435	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7432 <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	1	6/3/1985	B1
7436	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE INTERIM RESTRAINT <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b> <del>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233</del>	2	6/4/1985	B1
7437	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7436 <b>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</b> <del>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233</del>	2	6/4/1985	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

System II 906521  
Shuttle-Diagram

PRESERVATION COPY



## MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

SYSTEM II  
90652

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2 #7425

WASHINGTON

June 1, 1985

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07SECRET/SENSITIVEINFORMATION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Gorbachev: Shultz Conversation with Dobrynin

Secretary Shultz has sent you a memorandum reporting on a conversation he had with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on May 24, at which time Shultz said that you agreed with Gorbachev's proposed time frame for a meeting the second half of November, and suggested the week beginning Monday, November 18. As for place, George pointed out the reasons a meeting in the U.S. would be in order, and indicated that you would be prepared to visit Moscow in a follow-on meeting.

The ball is thus back in the Soviet court regarding time and place, and it will be interesting to see whether Gromyko's comment to Shultz in Vienna that a meeting in Washington is "out of the question" continues to be the Soviet position.

You should be aware that evidence is accumulating which indicates that Gromyko's views and Gorbachev's views may not be identical as regards the locale of a summit meeting. I suspect that Gorbachev is more interested in coming to the United States than Gromyko's comments to Shultz would suggest. Therefore, I believe that we should not rush to think about a site in Europe for the meeting if the Soviet reply to George's proposal continues to resist a meeting in the United States. It might be worthwhile, in that case, to attempt to communicate more directly with Gorbachev on the matter, perhaps using an Agency contact who has provided several reports regarding Gorbachev's interest in coming here.

Attachment:

Tab A Shultz-President Memorandum

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F06-114/24-7426

**SECRET**SUPER SENSITIVE  
8515757

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BY WJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

90562

May 25, 1985

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz *gms*

Subject: Conversation with Dobrynin -- May 24th

At a reception last night, I had the opportunity to take Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin aside to discuss the question of a Summit. I told him first that I wanted him to pass on to Gromyko that, should the Foreign Minister come to the UN General Assembly this late September as usual, he would be welcome to come to Washington and meet with you in the Oval Office at that time.

Second, I told Dobrynin that I had passed to you Gorbachev's proposed time frame for a meeting between the two of you, and that you were agreeable, preferring sometime in the week beginning Monday, November 18. I stated that you felt a one-day meeting would probably not be sufficient and that a two-day meeting with three substantive sessions would perhaps be best. Concerning the venue, I reiterated your invitation for Gorbachev to come to Washington, observing that for protocol reasons, Washington would be most appropriate since it was our turn to host such an affair. I added, however, that in any follow-on meeting after such a Washington summit, you would be quite prepared to visit Moscow. I noted to Dobrynin your view that it would be better for the leaders of the world's two most powerful countries to meet in each other's capitals than in some third country.

Dobrynin promised to convey back to Moscow both the invitation for Gromyko to visit Washington in late September and your proposed time frame for a meeting with Gorbachev. On the question of venue, he stated that Gorbachev wanted you to visit Moscow because he thought it would be good for you "to look around" and see the Soviet people and society. I reminded Dobrynin that you would be prepared to visit, but that it was the turn of a Soviet leader to come to the U.S. I noted that in any joint announcement of a Washington meeting, we would be willing to add that the next meeting would be in Moscow.

Dobrynin said that he would report this to Gorbachev, but mused whether our interest in a Washington venue was solely a matter of protocol. I told him it was. We both agreed that if

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DECL: OADR**SECRET**



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# SECRET

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

such a meeting were to take place, it would best if it could accomplish something tangible. Dobrynin added that from his own experience, once agreement on a Summit was reached, the respective bureaucracies "begin to move" to produce progress.

I concluded by reminding Dobrynin of the need for the Soviets to take special care in the weeks and months to come not to take any unfortunate action, deliberate or otherwise, which might have the effect of derailing this process. (I took this moment to pass to Dobrynin a non-paper noting our strong concerns over the plight of Soviet hunger-striker Balovlenkov). I also stated that, while the other NATO Foreign Ministers might not decide until the Lisbon NAC, it was likely I would be going to the Helsinki commemoration in late July where I meet with Gromyko again. I suggested that the two sides should soon begin work on an agenda for that meeting.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

# SECRET

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

May 29, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCEARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jur*

SUBJECT:

Shultz Conversation with Dobrynin on Meeting  
between the President and Gorbachev

Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President reporting a conversation with Dobrynin May 24, when Shultz provided a reply to the suggestion Gromyko made in Vienna regarding the time and locale of a summit meeting. Shultz suggested the week of November 18, and pressed for a meeting here, to be followed by a visit to the USSR by the President.

This puts the ball back into the Soviet court regarding time and place, and it will be appropriate to await an answer before doing anything further. However, I detect a distinct difference in tone between what Gromyko told Shultz in Vienna and what seems to be emanating from Gorbachev more directly. In sum, I believe Gorbachev is in fact interested in coming to the United States, while Gromyko is discouraging it and pushing for a third country. This is speculation on my part, but it is speculation based on a number of clues. Since these clues have a relevance not only to arrangements for a summit meeting, but also for dealing with Gorbachev on substantive issues, I will review some of them.

Evidence of Gromyko-Gorbachev Differences

1. The curious way Gromyko introduced the question in Vienna. According to our interpreter, Gromyko said literally the following: "Please tell the President that in my informal personal opinion the General Secretary is thinking along the lines of November, most likely the second half. As for the place, the General Secretary will not be attending the UNGA and thus the meeting could be held in the Soviet Union. This invitation stands, and if the President wishes, we would be prepared to host him in the Soviet Union. If for some reason that did not suit him, the meeting could be held in some mutually acceptable European country."

The question arises: Why, if Gromyko was passing a message, did he say it was his "informal, personal opinion"? Gromyko is careful with his words, and it seems to me the implication is clear that what he was saying is not necessarily identical with Gorbachev's personal view.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

BY *KW*

NARA DATE 11/11/12

NLR 88-12512#7427



Sec. 3.3 (b)(1)  
E.O. 12958  
135210

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

-2-

2. [REDACTED]

3. Protocollary slights to the Foreign Ministry: Except for Sukhodrev, the interpreter, no Foreign Ministry officials were present for Gorbachev's meeting with Baldrige, and none for his earlier meeting with Andreas. Also, Gorbachev made a point of telling Baldrige that, as regards a summit meeting, Baldrige could say to the press that Gorbachev and the President agree that one would be useful, and that "arrangements will be made between the President and the General Secretary." I was struck by his implication that this is a matter between the two personally, and not necessarily one to be settled through diplomatic channels.

4. Anomalies in Soviet comment on the issue: Somebody authorized Pravda editor Afanasiev to tell foreign correspondents that Gorbachev was thinking of coming to the U.N. in September. That almost had to be Gorbachev or someone close to him, since Pravda is the organ of the Party Central Committee. Gromyko and Dobrynin have denied that this statement was authorized. What this seems to mean is that Gromyko thinks it should not have been authorized.

5. Some evidence of Gromyko-Gorbachev political rivalry: Actually, what we have is more gossip and inference than real evidence, but many Soviet intellectuals and some East European officials are convinced that Gromyko opposed Gorbachev's accession to power, and therefore assume that Gorbachev will move against Gromyko when and if he has sufficient power to do so. Even if this is not the case, it would be natural for the General Secretary to try to assume direct control of foreign policy, which would require, at a minimum, some denigration of Gromyko's predominant role.

#### Conclusions:

1. If the Soviets fail to accept our suggestion regarding a meeting here, we should not rush to think about a site in a third country, but attempt to get a message to Gorbachev directly [REDACTED] in an attempt to arrange the meeting here.

2. We should bear in mind the growing evidence of tension between Gromyko and Gorbachev, and not rely entirely on the Foreign Minister for an accurate portrayal of Gorbachev's positions.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

3. Some means of communicating directly with Gorbachev would be in our interest, not only as regards summit questions, but also on substantive issues.

Recommendation:

That you send the memorandum at TAB I to the President, if he has not already seen Secretary Shultz's report.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I -- Memorandum to the President  
Tab A -- Shultz-President Memorandum



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

June 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Briefing Papers on Soviet Union for President

In response to your profs note, I am attaching at TAB I a suggested list of topics on which briefing papers might usefully be submitted to the President. I believe that this exercise can be most useful in dealing with broad and fundamental factors, and should not be used as a surrogate for specific briefings on issues requiring decisions. I would anticipate papers about 4-6 pages long, which would avoid voluminous data but aim at illuminating the underlying issues and principles. I also believe that the suggested list should not be considered sacrosanct, but rather as a suggestive outline, subject to alteration as we go along. We may find that the President wishes further discussion of some topics, and that some can be combined into a single paper.

In addition to this exercise, I would also suggest that you schedule an occasional discussion (maybe as often as once a month) to give the President a chance to discuss some of these issues. At some point a meeting with some emigres might be useful, and there are also U.S. scholars, and USG specialists who can deal perceptively with some of these topics. In regard to Gorbachev's personal style, having observed him for over two hours with Baldrige, I believe I could "role play" his mannerisms and mode of presentation, if this would be useful at some point.

I will also pursue the idea of having the Agency work on one or more video tapes. They have done one on ideology in Soviet society, but it is very poor and needs considerable work before it would be appropriate to show to the President. There may be one or two additional topics amenable to video presentation.

If and when a date is set for a meeting, the schedule can be adjusted to allow the final 2-3 weeks to concentrate on the specific issues relevant to the meeting.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the outline at TAB I as a general guide for the papers to be produced.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

BY *RW* NARA DATE *11/11/12*

NLR 108-12512-7428

2. That you authorize me to ask Gates and Abramowitz to supply research material relevant to these topics. (I will attempt to do most of the final drafting myself.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I            Suggested Outline  
Tab II           Profs note

cc: Don Fortier





BRIEFING PAPERS ON THE USSR  
Tentative OutlineSOURCES OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR

1. The Soviet Regime: Communist or Russian or Both?
2. Soviet Psychology
3. The Soviet/Russian View of Their Place in the World

THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE INSIDE

1. Leadership Politics and the Role of the Communist Party
2. The Ruling Class: Nomenklatura
3. Managing the Economy
4. Societal Problems
5. Dissidence, Religion and the Intellectuals
6. The Non-Russian Nationalities
7. Role of the Secret Police
8. The Soviet Military: Status, Role and Relationship to Party
9. Gorbachev's Domestic Agenda

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD

1. The Warsaw Pact and the International Communist Movement
2. Western Europe and the Developed Capitalist World
3. The China Factor
4. The Third World

SOVIET VIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Soviet Military Doctrine
2. National Security Decision-Making
3. Contrasts in Soviet and American Strategic Thinking

U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS IN SOVIET EYES

1. The Soviet Image of the U.S.
2. Soviet Aims in Dealing with the U.S.
3. U.S. Means to Influence Soviet Behavior

GORBACHEV

1. Portrait of the Man
2. Gorbachev's "Personal Agenda" for a Meeting



27

From: NSRCM --CPUA  
To: Matlock

Date and time = 05/28/85 14:22:23

13  
- Matlock -

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE  
SUBJECT: US-Soviet Papers

We may be heading for a summit and we may not. Under any circumstances, however, it will be important for the President to develop a much more thorough knowledge of the Soviet union, their history, culture, bureaucratic process, Gorbachev, the man and the survivor as leader, their negotiating style etc. I would like to initiate the practice of sending the President about one paper each week as pure background on the top 25 dimensions which bear on the relationship. Could I ask you to think about this Jack and to rough out an outline of the several topics which it would be useful to treat and in what order. Then let's get busy with the first paper to be submitted no later than next week. Many thanks.

cc: NSJMP --CPUA  
NSWRP --CPUA

NSDRF --CPUA  
NSRMK --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOUO 114/2 # 7430

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07



7431 SFM07  
SF-C  
14~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Russian Poet Voznesensky's Desire to Meet with President

I understand that an appointment has been set for you to meet with Andrei Voznesensky on Friday, June 7. I believe you will find him a very interesting person to talk to. You should also be aware that Voznesensky has expressed an interest in seeing the President.

I have known Voznesensky for about 25 years and have translated some of his poetry. He is an outstanding example of an artist who has retained his integrity while staying within the requirements of the system sufficiently to avoid expulsion or imprisonment. I hosted him at a small dinner May 24, at which time he made several penetrating comments about the system and its impact on creativity. (He is one of the intellectuals who feels that there is political rivalry between Gorbachev and Gromyko. He also spoke at length about techniques for getting non-official messages past the censors. His own poetry has a heavy religious cast; in this respect his attitude is very close to Pasternak's -- and Pasternak was his mentor when he got his start in poetry.)

Since Voznesensky can speak with insight on several of the topics the President is interested in, the President might enjoy a few minutes with him. Voznesensky has met several other world leaders and recently was granted a private audience with the Pope. He told me that if he could see the President, he would appreciate it being done without publicity, since that would only create problems for him at home.

While I would normally be eager to attend any meetings with Andrei, I will be in London Friday at the Chief of Mission conference.

Recommendation:

That you try to arrange for Voznesensky to see the President, if you think the President would be interested and his calendar permits.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2 #7431

BY RW NARA DATE 11/1/12

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Pearce and Green Again: Request for Appointment

Terry Pearce and Tom Green have continued to contact me every few weeks regarding the "progress" of their proposal. (It of course is getting absolutely nowhere, but they seem to have an infinite capacity for interpreting politeness as encouragement.) In any event, I have met with them and have talked to them on the telephone several times over the past couple of months.

Now they are insisting that they really must see you to bring you up to date on their efforts, and are suggesting June 19 or as soon thereafter as possible. I have told them that I can meet with them any time I am in town, but cannot advise them to make the trip to Washington for that purpose since my honest opinion is that circumstances still are not such as to permit an official endorsement of their proposal. Nevertheless, they have persisted in requesting a meeting with you, since they feel it essential to convey directly what they interpret as "positive signals" from their Soviet interlocutors (apparently some of Arbatov's people).

At this point, I don't see how we can get them off our backs; even a brutally frank rejection of their idea would probably just send them to other channels in an attempt to see others in the White House. Therefore, I very reluctantly recommend that you agree to see them sometime after June 19. They have asked for an hour (!), but I believe it would be sufficient for me to meet them in the Sit Room or Wardroom, if you could drop by for 10 minutes or so.

I will spare you the full file of materials the duo has sent, but enclose their latest letter, which reiterates their request for an appointment.

Recommendation:

That you schedule a "drop by" in a meeting with Pearce and Green June 19 or sometime thereafter.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I - Letter from Pearce and Green of May 9.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2# 7432

BY RW NARA DATE 11/12





5/13/85  
n

May 9, 1985

Ambassador Jack Matlock  
Executive Office Building, Room 368  
Washington, DC 20006

Jack,

Of course we have been following the President's remarks closely. We sense some frustration in his use of the public forum, particularly given the reports that the initiatives he is proposing have not engendered favorable responses when brought up privately, or perhaps no response at all. Your patience is incredible.

When Stella mistook us for advocates of a "peace walk", it dawned on us again how many gestures there are, how much support there is for breakthrough. Everyone has an agenda, a project, a list of things to do to help reduce tensions, and we of course are no different. Yet, our strong conviction remains that something contextual needs to be done first-something which at least states the points of agreement-and we are advocating the joint Declaration as such a contextual event.

In the 40th Anniversary remarks to one another, both President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev advocated the "elimination of nuclear weapons", and the same day, Adelman said he was not hopeful about prospects for progress in arms control. It is generally agreed that to achieve meaningful arms reduction, let alone the elimination of nuclear weapons, fear of domination has to be reduced drastically. The commitment we are proposing and the dramatic inclusive way of delivering it will do just that, and will allow the process to accelerate.

Without regard to whether the global Declaration will have the far-reaching effects we suppose, it, at the very least will allow the Soviets, Americans and the rest of the world to see the leaders closely, to dispel some of the misconceptions, to make them human, and will be positive for that alone. It is, at a minimum, an agreement - our government's willingness to make a broad Declaration in exchange for access to the Soviet people by our President. It has to be beneficial.

There are two specifics since we last reported to you:

1. During an informal chat late last month, Dobrynin asked Verity about this initiative. When Verity tried to pursue Dobrynin's interest, the subject shifted.
2. This month in Bellagio, Bialer will be with Arbatov and other Soviets for several days. He will be asking the status of the initiative privately with Arbatov, and urging a Soviet response.

Given the current status, you may wish to ask about the plan or to comment on it informally to your Soviet counterparts in your travels, to test the breadth of knowledge about it, or you may not.




18

Our request is the same: to meet with you and Bud near month-end for one hour to detail the logic in our conviction that this private initiative should be noted officially now. The time seems right. The risks are minimal. This initiative fosters continuous dialogue and supports actions for avoiding accidental war. It puts the onus on the Soviets. It creates the atmosphere necessary for real progress, and it can be done now.

Our thoughts will be with you. We are looking forward to speaking with you on your return.

God bless your journey.

Warmest Regards,



Terry Pearce

(415) 381-1598

2349 Spanish Trail  
Tiburon, CA 94920



Tom Green

(415) 435-9663

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Russian Poet Voznesensky's Desire to Meet with President

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While I would normally be eager to attend any meetings with Andrei, I will be in London Friday at the Chief of Mission conference.

Recommendation:

That you try to arrange for Voznesensky to see the President, if you think the President would be interested and his calendar permits.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD8-125/2 #7433

BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/12



MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

(outside the system)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

June 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. *WR*

SUBJECT: BIB/RFE/RL

With your proxy in hand, I had a good lunch with Jim Buckley on May 29. He had just been told by the White House that all systems were "go" concerning his appointment as Chairman, BIB, subject to the usual clearance process.

We had a frank discussion of personnel, and he appeared to be receptive. He is particularly focussed on the BIB Staff which we in the NSC (Matlock, Raymond, Lenczowski) all believe needs to be changed, starting with the Staff Director. As you know, the staff has, if anything, been retarding the process of modernization.

I also indicated our strong feelings that we would like to be part of the process -- advisory, not command and control -- concerning the selection of the three key posts in Munich: President, RFE/RL, Director of RFE, and Director of RL. He listened. I did suggest two names for the currently vacant or soon-to-be vacant positions: Dick Shifter for President, RFE/RL, and Herb Ellison for Director, RL. You might, if you agree, endorse these to Jim. Herb is widely hailed as an excellent choice and is leaving his position as Director, Kennan Institute. In this regard, Jack Matlock has gotten wind that a chap named John Dunlop (a man described as a Shakespeare-clone) is under consideration for one of the two posts. He, and I agree, does not believe that Dunlop has the stature or the political balance to be a happy choice. My information adds that he has no managerial skill and is very closely tied to "Russian nationalism." An example of the problem is seen in the letter at Tab I from the Russian leaders of the so-called "Democratic Movement" to President Reagan. This sounds too much like a repeat of the George Bailey disaster.

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The main point of this memorandum is that I expect that you will have a chance to talk to Jim Buckley this week, and I would urge you to reinforce two points:

-- Our pleasure over his acceptance of the post.

-- Our concern over the need to consult over the key appointments in RFE/RL.

RECOMMENDATION

That you reinforce our concerns over RFE/RL key personnel assignments and would like a chance to consult.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*JSW*  
Jack Matlock concurs.

Attachments

Tab I Ltr to President, May 28, 85  
Tab II The Rise of Unofficial Thought

~~SECRET~~

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LUDMILLA ALEXEEVA  
293 Benedict Ave.  
Tarrytown, N.Y. 10591

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May 28, 1985

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear President Reagan:

We are recent emigres from the Soviet Union who are appealing to you because of our fears for the future of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe (RL/RFE). As longtime listeners to Radio Liberty, we recognize from our own experience the important role broadcasts from the free world have for people deprived of access to truthful information and alternative ideas. Western broadcasts have played a major role in encouraging the national, religious and intellectual dissent movements which have evolved in the Soviet Union.

We have learned that on June 6 the directors of the Board for International Broadcasting are meeting in order to consider the nomination of Professor John Dunlop to become president of RL/RFE. Professor Dunlop's publications demonstrate that he is not an impartial Sovietologist, but rather a fervent supporter of Russian nationalism, which he considers the sole constructive force in contemporary Soviet society. Professor Dunlop takes a dim view of the past and present state of the democratic movement in the USSR and believes it lacks any potential.

Absorbed by their particular national problems, Professor Dunlop treats the Russians as if they were the only nationality in the USSR. He pays almost no attention to the serious problems caused by the multi-national nature of the Soviet state. All his published works are primarily propaganda for Russian nationalism rather than balanced, impartial studies. Although an American, Professor Dunlop is so caught up in his subject that, without exaggeration, he can be called a Russian nationalist himself.

We believe that his sympathy for Russian nationalism is the principal reason why Professor Dunlop has been nominated to become president of RL/RFE since he lacks experience in administration and in broadcasting. It is a mistake for the management of RL/RFE (and particularly for the president) to be a partisan of any specific dissident trend inside the USSR or, still worse, of a particular emigre group. This contradicts RL/RFE's commitment to pluralism and toleration. This damages RL/RFE's credibility with its audience which includes millions of persons of diverse nationalities, faiths and opinions. The president of RL/RFE should be an impartial arbiter among the various approaches and points of view of staff and audience. He should protect Radio Liberty from becoming the captive of any specific interest group inside or outside the USSR.



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It would seem natural for us to appeal to Frank Shakespeare, the president of the Board for International Broadcasting, rather than to the President of the United States. We did appeal to him on a similar occasion three years ago with respect to the appointment of George Bailey as director of Radio Liberty. Mr. Bailey is closely associated with the same emigre group as Professor Dunlop. Mr. Shakespeare, who evidently sympathizes with their position, did not answer us. Mr. Bailey was appointed director. After the passage of three years, it is evident that this appointment has had sad consequences for Radio Liberty's reputation, and we are now faced with a still more threatening nomination to the post of president of RL/RFE.

Therefore we are appealing directly to you to preserve the credibility of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.

Sincerely Yours,

Ludmilla Alexeeva

Pavel Litvinov  
Andrey Sinyavsky  
Cronid Lubarsky  
Thomas Venclova  
Nina Strokata  
Aishe Seytmuratova

cc: Jack Matlock (NSC)  
Directors (Board for International Broadcasting)







# **The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism**

*John B. Dunlop*



In contrast to the substantial output of Western works on the revival of nationalism among the non-Russians in the USSR, the critical phenomenon of Russian nationalism has been little studied in the West. Here John B. Dunlop measures the strength and political viability of a movement that has been steadily growing since the mid-1960s and that may well eventually become the ruling ideology of the state. Professor Dunlop's comprehensive discussion depicts for the Western reader the gamut of Russian nationalism from Solzhenitsyn to the vehement National Bolsheviks.

With the Soviet Union in the midst of significant political change, the identification of internal dissident groups and their effect on the course of that change is a major issue of American foreign policy and scholarship. This work suggests the appeal of Russian nationalists to various elite and mass constituencies in the Soviet Union and suggests a direction for American policy toward emerging Russian nationalism.

John B. Dunlop is Associate Director and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author of *The New Russian Revolutionaries* (Nordland) and coeditor of *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Critical Essays and Documentary Materials* (Nordland).

*Sponsored by the Hoover Institution on  
War, Revolution and Peace*



men, like Solzhenitsyn, opt for the word "renaissance" (*vozrozhdenie*) to describe the recent religious and national upsurge.<sup>9</sup> Shafarevich's statement, "I do not belong to any group . . . But I think that many hold views close to mine,"<sup>10</sup> appears to be typical of the perception many nationalists have of their ties to like-minded Soviet citizens. At times, however, Russian nationalist sympathizers are brought together in quasi-organizational fashion, the *Molodaia gvardiia* and *Veche* episodes being cases in point. Perhaps "a renaissance in process of becoming a movement" or "in search of a movement" is the most appropriate way of describing the present condition of Russian nationalism.

#### COUNTERPRODUCTIVE APPROACHES IN THE WEST

What should be the policy of the United States, and of the West in general, toward the critically important and little-understood phenomenon that has been the subject of this study? Obviously, the answer depends to a large extent on one's analysis and assessment—both political and moral—of the phenomenon. Recently several approaches to the question of Russian nationalism—*counterproductive* approaches in my opinion—have received considerable attention and publicity in the United States.

In his books *Détente after Brezhnev* and *The Russian New Right*, recent émigré Aleksandr Ianov has urged the West to exert all of its powers, on the scale of a new Marshall Plan, to ensure that the nationalists, whom he sees as ineluctably evolving in a neo-Nazi direction, fail in their bid for power.<sup>11</sup> If adopted even in part (and I am told that Ianov has his admirers in the U.S. State Department), Ianov's recommendations would send an unmistakable signal to Russian nationalists in the USSR. Solzhenitsyn, who may be regarded as a

<sup>9</sup> See chapter 9, note 3.

<sup>10</sup> "Interview korrespondentu gazety *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*," *Vestnik*, no. 126 (1976), 224-225.

<sup>11</sup> Alexander Yanov, *Détente after Brezhnev*, Berkeley, 1977, and *The Russian New Right*, Berkeley, 1978.



kind of roving nationalist ambassador, recently complained in a BBC interview which was beamed back to his countrymen:

He [Ianov] has already published two books analyzing the USSR and is extremely hostile to everything Russian . . . In his books, for instance, you will find no hint that the Russian people might have some sort of religion or that this might have some significance in its history and aspirations. . . . Yet intellectual America lionises [such thinkers] because people here expect and want it to be like that: they want to make friends with communism and believe that Russia is bad. One after the other, American professors repeat: "At last, erudite scholars have come and explained to us what we must fear—not communism at all, but the national existence of the Russian people."<sup>12</sup>

Another nationalist spokesman in the emigration, Boris Paramonov, until recently a member of the Department of Philosophy of Leningrad State University, has published a lengthy rebuttal to Ianov's views in the émigré journal *Kontinent*. After demonstrating that Ianov's ideas are not original but stem primarily from Miliukov's well-known essay "The Decomposition of Slavophilism" and Vladimir Solov'ev's antinationalist polemics, Paramonov proceeds to contest Ianov's assertion that "the law of Russian nationalism is evolution in the direction of ideological justification of the worst forms of tyranny."<sup>13</sup> Ianov, Paramonov notes, "ironically admits his lack of competence" in judging the religious and moral problems underlying Russian history, but this lack of competence is no laughing matter.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, Ianov, who sees Russia's present difficulties as entirely endemic to her historical de-

<sup>12</sup> *The Listener*, 22 February 1979, p. 271. Solzhenitsyn's statement also appeared in Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *East and West*, New York, 1980, pp. 169-170. For Ianov's reply to Solzhenitsyn's charges, see *The Listener*, 24 May 1979, p. 713. Solzhenitsyn elaborated on his views in his essay, "Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America," *Foreign Affairs*, 58 (Spring 1980), pp. 797-834.

<sup>13</sup> Boris Paramonov, "Paradoksy i komplekсы Aleksandra Ianova," *Kontinent*, no. 20 (1979), 234. Ianov replied to Paramonov and other critics in *Sintaksis*, no. 8 (1980), 110-115.

<sup>14</sup> Paramonov, "Paradoksy," p. 239.

velopment, does not see Marxism, nor the Bolsheviks, as the cause of the evils of evil which the Soviet Union has created. . . .<sup>15</sup> The Soviet Union has a positive which had been lost for a thousand years. Paramonov also criticizes Brezhnev and his policy: "Brezhnev or a new Russian nationalism, but not nationalism, which is a degeneration."

An example of this downward is provided by the *Myths of Holy Russia* Magazine.<sup>16</sup> (In the introduction to Ianov's *The Russian Revolution*, printed by Solzhenitsyn in his works, Carl Solzhenitsyn, on several occasions, and the religious Her essay in the factual error Vladimir Orlov, "Solzhenitsyn, a Communist," while Solzhenitsyn's Orthodox Church should be a statement of moral use of the economic system is, in

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>18</sup> Olga G. Solzhenitsyn, *azinc*, 16.



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velopment, does not, as it were, "notice the date 1917, nor Marxism, nor the Bolshevik dictatorship, nor those Himalayas of evil which the followers of Marx raised up in Russia . . ." <sup>15</sup> The Soviet Marxists attempted to destroy everything positive which had sprouted from Russian soil over a period of a thousand years, "from Orthodox churches to wheat." <sup>16</sup> Paramonov also criticizes Ianov's favorable attitude toward Brezhnev and his belief that the only real choice is between "Brezhnev or a new Stalin." <sup>17</sup> The West's enemy is not Russian nationalism but Marxist ideology; it is Marxism, not nationalism, which demands the suppression of Western civilization.

An example of what happens when Ianov's ideas percolate downward is provided by Olga Carlisle's diatribe, "Reviving Myths of Holy Russia," which appeared in the *New York Times Magazine*. <sup>18</sup> (In her article, Carlisle admits an indebtedness to Ianov's *The Russian New Right*.) Since being rebuked in print by Solzhenitsyn for her role in the publication of two of his works, Carlisle, the daughter of a Russian émigré, has on several occasions made use of the press to attack the novelist and the religious and national tendency which he represents. Her essay in the *Times* is poorly researched and replete with factual errors and uninformed assertions. In her opinion, Vladimir Osipov is an "extremist" and a "Great Russian chauvinist," while Il'ia Glazunov is "an execrable painter." As for Solzhenitsyn, he is said to propose a "restoration of the Orthodox Church" (although in fact he believes that the Church should be separate from the state) and "a voluntary abandonment of modern technology" (when actually he advocates the use of the most advanced modern technology in a context of economic decentralization). Carlisle's view of Russian nationalism is, in short, a caricatured one, in which its most "lib-

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 245.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 246.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 264.

<sup>18</sup> Olga Carlisle, "Reviving Myths of Holy Russia," *New York Times Magazine*, 16 September 1979.



eral" representatives, such as Solzhenitsyn and Osipov, are depicted as virtual Nazis.

An equally dismal, though far more scholarly, opinion of contemporary Russian nationalism is provided in the writings of Harvard historian Richard Pipes. In his important, albeit one-sided, study, *Russia under the Old Regime*,<sup>19</sup> and in subsequent essays, Pipes expresses the belief that the continuities between Old Russia and the Soviet Union far outweigh any discontinuities and that, consequently, the discarding of Marxist-Leninist ideology would be likely to have little practical effect on the political or social life of the country. No matter what her political form of government, Russia will continue her oppressive and repressive way. In an essay on Solzhenitsyn, Pipes points to "the remarkable continuity of Russian intellectual history, especially its conservative strain . . . Each generation of Russians seems to discover afresh the same answers, partly because the problems which they confront, decade after decade, remain so strikingly similar."<sup>20</sup> Whatever the justness of Pipes' historical interpretations—and they have been criticized on some points by such specialists as Donald Treadgold, Nicholas Riasanovsky, and Dorothy Atkinson<sup>21</sup>—the wisdom of their applicability to the West's dealings with the Soviet Union is another matter.

In a talk given to the Hoover Institution in 1976, Solzhenitsyn fulminated against Western historical studies of Russia which distort the nation's past and proclaim "a persistent and tendentious generalization about 'the perennial Russian slave mentality,' seen almost as an inherited characteristic . . ."<sup>22</sup> Singling out Pipes' *Russia under the Old Regime* for harsh and at times unfair criticism (whatever else it is, Pipes' study is surely not "pseudoacademic"), Solzhenitsyn warned of the

<sup>19</sup> Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, New York, 1974.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Pipes, "Solzhenitsyn and the Russian Intellectual Tradition," *Encounter*, June 1979, p. 53.

<sup>21</sup> Treadgold's review of *Russia under the Old Regime* appeared in *Slavic Review*, 34, no. 4 (1975), 812-814; Riasanovsky's in *Russian Review*, 35, no. 1 (1976), 103-104; and Atkinson's in *American Historical Review*, 81, no. 2 (1976), 423-424.

<sup>22</sup> Solzhenitsyn, "Remarks at the Hoover Institution," p. 187.

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dangers of overstressing the continuities between Old Russia and the Soviet Union and of thereby downplaying the ruinous significance of Marxist ideology.

In an essay published two years later, Solzhenitsyn's former associate, Irina Ilovaiskaia, currently editor of the prestigious émigré weekly *Russkaia mysl'*, elaborates upon the novelist's criticism of Pipes' book.<sup>23</sup> Ilovaiskaia sharply contests Pipes' thesis concerning Russia's "mystically determined striving toward a police regime" and accuses her opponent of failing to see that communism is a "pan-human disease" and "a terrible suppression and distortion of Russian history . . ."<sup>24</sup> Pipes' book and similar modern studies of Russia, she says, betray a striking, if unintentional, form of racism: Russians are seen as inherent and immutable barbarians. Moreover, Ilovaiskaia continues, Pipes' chapter on religion shows his helplessness in dealing with spiritual phenomena:

Richard Pipes completely ignores the whole rich flower of Russian spirituality, naturally ignoring its deep influence on popular life as well. He needs only the testimony of Belinskii to enlist the whole Russian people in a heap as atheists. He does not vouchsafe one word concerning the innumerable Russian saints and ascetics; even St. Sergii of Radonezh is simply not mentioned in the book. . . . And concerning the role of the Church in the Time of Troubles there is not one word.<sup>25</sup>

Pipes' interpretation of Russian history, Ilovaiskaia concludes, is "extraordinarily dangerous for the whole world," since it serves to conceal the international essence of communism.<sup>26</sup>

Wladislaw Krasnow, a Soviet defector who has been living in the United States since the early sixties, has also criticized Pipes' views. Krasnow is particularly exercised by Pipes' bleak opinion of the Russian peasantry: "Apparently sharing Marx's

<sup>23</sup> Irina Ilovaiskaia, "Rossiia v otritsatel'no-misticheskom osveshchenii," *Vestnik*, no. 126 (1978), 193-206.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 194, 195.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206.



bias against the 'idiocy of rural life,' Pipes also seems to share his low opinion of the Russian nation as a whole. Since the majority of Russians have descended from peasants . . . all Russians except [the] intelligentsia, Pipes argues, cannot be trusted because they are bound to be guided by no higher moral standard than Social Darwinism of the 'pike-and-carps' syndrome."<sup>27</sup> Pipes' *Russia Under the Old Regime*, Krasnow believes, is especially dangerous for the effect that it could have on United States foreign policy—i.e., it could foster a conviction that "the Soviet leaders are expressing nothing but the collective psychology and historic aspirations of the Russian people."<sup>28</sup>

It seems abundantly clear that the view of Russian history held by Pipes at least until early 1980,<sup>29</sup> a view which in its essential contours is shared by many American scholars and at least some diplomats, serves strongly to exacerbate anti-Western sentiment among even the most moderate Russian nationalists. Professor Pipes and his colleagues are, of course, entitled to express their beliefs concerning Russian historical development and to make predictions about the country's future evolution. If, however, their interpretations were to become the view of the United States government, or were to be perceived as such, then we should not be surprised at a marked growth of hostility on the part of Russian nationalists. My own view on the issue in dispute between Pipes and the nationalists is that, while there are indeed important continuities between Old Russia and the Soviet Union, there are even more significant discontinuities—the most crucial being the USSR's adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Not only

<sup>27</sup> Wladislaw G. Krasnow, "Richard Pipes's Foreign Strategy: Anti-Soviet or Anti-Russian?," *Russian Review*, 38, no. 2 (1979), 188. See also Richard Pipes, "Response to Wladislaw G. Krasnow," *Russian Review*, 38, no. 2 (1979), 192-197.

<sup>28</sup> Krasnow, "Richard Pipes's Foreign Strategy," p. 189.

<sup>29</sup> In an article entitled "Soviet Global Strategy," which appeared in *Commentary* (April 1980, pp. 31-39) shortly before he entered the government, Pipes effected an unexpected *volte-face*, placing the emphasis on Marxist-Leninist ideology rather than on Russian historical continuities as a key to understanding Soviet expansionist behavior. If Pipes has indeed changed his mind, he has offered no explanation.

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Solzhenitsyn, but major contemporary thinkers who could not by any stretch of the imagination be termed Russian nationalists—for example, Nadezhda Mandelstam and Aleksandr Zinov'ev<sup>30</sup>—have shown the importance of Marxist-Leninist doctrine for correctly understanding the Soviet Union. Were the USSR to rid itself of Marxist ideology, the consequences, as Alain Besançon has said, would amount to a revolution, and major changes would necessarily ensue.<sup>31</sup> Like Ianov, a thinker with whom he is in disagreement on a number of points, Pipes fails to see the significance of Marxist ideology in today's Soviet Union or the dangers which a perpetuation of Marxist-Leninist legitimacy in the USSR portend, for example in the Middle East, Southern Africa, or Central America.

There are, to be sure, unattractive and potentially threatening currents within the ranks of contemporary Russian nationalists. Could it be otherwise in a country which has suffered numbing losses of life in the past sixty years—both Solzhenitsyn and the late Andrei Amal'rik have contended that some 60 million Soviet citizens perished during the various phases of the terror<sup>32</sup>—as well as nearly unprecedented social, demographic, and moral dislocation and perhaps the most intense persecution of a Christian religion in 2,000 years?<sup>33</sup> But there exist positive and even edifying currents within the same movement. It is my belief that the West should encourage and support, in word and in action, that influential and perhaps dominant tendency which, following Solzhenitsyn, I have called the "Russian national and religious renaiss-

<sup>30</sup> Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope against Hope*, New York, 1970, and *Hope Abandoned*, New York, 1974; and Alexander Zinoviev, *The Yawning Heights*, New York, 1979.

<sup>31</sup> "La Technique du Pouvoir," p. 92.

<sup>32</sup> Solzhenitsyn, *Letter*, p. 30, and Andrei Amal'rik, "Victims of Yalta," *Harper's*, May 1979, p. 91.

<sup>33</sup> Alain Besançon writes: "Except during World War II and during the moral NEP . . . the Orthodox Church [in the Soviet Union] has been subjected to the longest and most intense persecution in recorded history, exclusive of the persecution of the Catholic Church in Japan during the seventeenth century. Unlike Japan, Russia had been Christian for a thousand years." (*The Soviet Syndrome*, New York, 1978, p. 26.)



sance," and that it should seek to strengthen this tendency's hand against rival, less promising strands, such as National Bolshevism. The religious proclivities of the *vozrozhdentsy* should strike a responsive chord in the United States, which has traditionally harbored fugitives from religious oppression, while their ecological and preservationist concerns, as well as their desire to come to mutual understanding with the minority nationalities of the USSR, should elicit sympathy rather than opprobrium. Moreover, the tendency's isolationist leanings should be of interest to even the most parochial of American policy makers. Among other results, an inward-looking, nonmilitaristic Russia could save American taxpayers millions of dollars in armament outlays. National Bolshevism, on the other hand, like the Brezhnev synthesis of communism, militarism, and patriotism, could constitute an expansionist threat and place considerable strain on Western military and economic resources.

#### POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The first concrete recommendation to grow out of this study is a semantic one. It is long past time for Western governments, diplomats, and media representatives to cease using interchangeably the words "Russia" and "USSR," "Russians" and "Soviets." This practice understandably irritates many Russian nationalists, who consider it akin to blasphemy to identify Russia and the Soviet Union, and it demoralizes minority nationalists, who prefer not to be called "Russians" at all. If the U.S. government and media were to begin employing these terms properly—as they generally do, for example, with the terms "British" and "English"—this problem, which, it should be stressed, is a major one, would soon disappear.

A second recommendation concerns the list of "captive nations" which, since 1959, Congress has commemorated each year in the third week of July. The present list includes such nations as Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, and Estonia, but, strangely, does not men-

tion Russia herself.<sup>34</sup> As Co recently noted, this is an an gated peoples who make up in this list, but not the Gre communism imposed by fo being so many captive nation sian people are not the per of its chief victims."<sup>35</sup> If Rus tive nations," it would not c would also, one suspects, s foreign radio—to ethnic Rus the United States deems its ideology and not Russia her

A third recommendation itself to understand "Slavo present. Such understandi in America where there are equivalents (the Tory tender analogue, but even there t aggerated). Though a consi ture exists on Russian Slav nineteenth and early twent literature is generally limite itself is, in certain cases, bia should be obvious, a knowl sential for comprehending t temporary Russian nationa Theofanis Stavrou write in of essays devoted to the Ru preceding the revolution, is in its infancy . . ."<sup>36</sup> Ind

<sup>34</sup> Public Law 86-90. *Laws of th*. The "captive nations" mentioned Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, mainland China, Arme bania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossacki

<sup>35</sup> *Congressional Record—Hou*

<sup>36</sup> Robert L. Nichols and Theo doxy *Under the Old Regime*, Mi



tion Russia herself.<sup>34</sup> As Congressman McClorey of Illinois recently noted, this is an anomaly: "... many of the subjugated peoples who make up the Soviet empire are included in this list, but not the Great Russians themselves. . . . it is communism imposed by force which is the cause of there being so many captive nations in the Soviet orbit. The Russian people are not the perpetrators of this tyranny, but one of its chief victims."<sup>35</sup> If Russia were added to the list of "captive nations," it would not only correct an obvious error but would also, one suspects, send a helpful message—via the foreign radio—to ethnic Russians in the USSR: namely, that the United States deems its antagonist to be Marxist-Leninist ideology and not Russia herself.

A third recommendation is that the West begin to exert itself to understand "Slavophile" currents of the past and present. Such understanding will not come easily, especially in America where there are no readily identifiable political equivalents (the Tory tendency in Britain might be a Western analogue, but even there the similarities should not be exaggerated). Though a considerable Western academic literature exists on Russian Slavophiles and conservatives of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, knowledge of this literature is generally limited to specialists, and the literature itself is, in certain cases, biased against its subject matter. As should be obvious, a knowledge of Russian Orthodoxy is essential for comprehending the thought of a major wing of contemporary Russian nationalism, yet, as Robert Nichols and Theofanis Stavrou write in their introduction to a collection of essays devoted to the Russian Church in the two centuries preceding the revolution, "American scholarship in this area is in its infancy . . ."<sup>36</sup> Indeed, one could compile an embar-

<sup>34</sup> Public Law 86-90, *Laws of the 86th Congress-First Session*, 17 July 1959. The "captive nations" mentioned are: Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, "and others."

<sup>35</sup> *Congressional Record—House*, 15 July 1961, p. H4397.

<sup>36</sup> Robert L. Nichols and Theofanis George Stavrou, eds., *Russian Orthodoxy Under the Old Regime*, Minneapolis, 1978, p. vii.



passing list of noted American universities and colleges in which not one course in Russian Orthodoxy is taught or has ever been taught.

Another goal of Western scholarship must be to disentangle the various strands of contemporary Russian nationalism. The tendency among at least some scholars is, as has been seen, to see the movement as an extremist monolith. Those who would tar all Russian nationalists with the brush of anti-Semitism would do well to heed the voice of Leonard Schapiro of the London School of Economics, chairman of the editorial board of *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, who has written:

... it is not correct to identify [Russian] nationalism with antisemitism. Russian thought has traditionally been characterized by a combination of nationalist and Russian Orthodox attitudes in which suspicion of parliamentary democracy and respect for individual liberty are combined. Antisemitism forms no part of this tradition. The accusation of antisemitism occasionally made against Solzhenitsyn is false ... The church in general is also free from antisemitism ... The violent Black Hundred type of antisemitism which appears in *samizdat* literature is found among those who reject the church as part of the Judaic corruption of Russia. It may be presumed that this is the *samizdat* element which lies closest to the heart of the KGB ...<sup>37</sup>

If one wished to send a favorable signal to the moderate nationalists, how would one go about doing it? The most obvious answer would be to make more astute use of foreign radio broadcasting, i.e., in the case of the United States, the Voice of America and Radio Liberty. As specialists are aware, an extraordinary situation presently obtains in the Soviet Union in which virtually everyone, from neo-Stalinist to *demokrat*, listens to the foreign radio, many of them regularly. That the regime is keenly aware of this is evident from a flow of books and articles decrying Western attempts at "ideological subversion" through broadcasting. None of this, however, ap-

<sup>37</sup> Leonard Schapiro, "Communist Antisemitism," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, 1 (1979), 51-52.

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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

pears to work, and the control in this area.

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Another fruitful are exchanges. Invitations leaders of the Society Cultural Monuments West, while Western encouraged to send exhibitions could be ern cultural figures, are held in high regard

Lastly, Western nationalist currents and on translated into Russian study on the Slavop begin.<sup>38</sup> Theoretical cism, democracy, and

<sup>38</sup> Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, no. 9 (1976), 210-223, and no. 12 (1977), 268-271.

<sup>39</sup> Albert Gratioux, A. Paris, 1939.



37

pears to work, and the regime seems effectively to have lost control in this area.

Both Solzhenitsyn and Viktor Sokolov, a former editor of *Molodaia gvardiia* now in the emigration, believe that not enough is being done by the foreign radio in the critical spheres of "the Russian theme" and Russian Orthodoxy.<sup>36</sup> Specifically, they point out that Russian-language broadcasts are not generally aimed at ethnic Russians, whereas broadcasts in the languages of the minority peoples usually address the concerns of those peoples. In addition to being the administrative language of the Soviet Union, Russian happens to be the native tongue of over 137 million ethnic Russians. Indeed, through the foreign radio, the West has an excellent opportunity to influence the Russian national movement in a direction compatible with its own self-interest. Lending support to moderate and Christian elements in the movement might, furthermore, help to retard the emergence of a malignant and militarily expansionist right.

Another fruitful area deserving attention would be that of exchanges. Invitations could be extended, for example, to leaders of the Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments or to *derevenshchik* writers to visit the West, while Western preservationist organizations could be encouraged to send members to the Soviet Union. Similarly, exhibitions could be held in the USSR on the work of Western cultural figures, such as novelist William Faulkner, who are held in high regard by the nationalists.

Lastly, Western books and monographs on Russian nationalist currents and on Russian history should be systematically translated into Russian. Albert Gratieux's classic two-volume study on the Slavophiles might be an appropriate place to begin.<sup>37</sup> Theoretical studies on nationalism, monarchism, fascism, democracy, and law would all be useful. Once trans-

<sup>36</sup> Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "O rabote russkoi sekti 'Bi-Bi-Si,'" *Kontinent*, no. 9 (1976), 210-223, and Viktor Sokolov, "Zapiski radioslushatelia," *Kontinent*, no. 12 (1977), 268-286.

<sup>37</sup> Albert Gratieux, *A. S. Khomiakov et le Mouvement Slavophile*. 2 vols., Paris, 1939.



lated and published, such works would eventually find their way into the Soviet Union, where they would be circulated in *samizdat*.

In advocating the adoption of such measures, I am not, it should be underlined, urging that the interests of minority nationalities in the USSR be passed over—to the contrary. But for the West to continue to ignore the concerns of ethnic Russians and the not-so-few Eastern Slavs who identify with them strikes one as folly.

To conclude, I would suggest that the problems facing contemporary Russian nationalists are truly immense and deserving of a response other than contempt. Near-catastrophic social and demographic dislocations, enormous population losses, the threat of a military conflict with China—a tendency that is wrestling with difficulties of such magnitude deserves sympathy rather than reflex condemnation. It is time for us to end our parochialism and begin to acquire the wisdom, will, and courage to see the Soviet Union for what it is and what it could shortly become.

## Postscript

The following recent developments were not covered in the text of this lecture.

During 1981-1982, there was a significant change in the "Nash sovremennost" journal, which was in political significance the late sixties. Early in 1982, the journal of the Party Central Committee on Vladimir Soloukhin for his "gryvanie s bochenkom" and his "timents" contained in the journal appeared in an article entitled "Nash" in an issue of Nash sovremennost. A lengthy article appeared in the monthly Nauka i religii in the defense of Orthodox Christianity as the principal prize for 1982.

Soviet journalists and the views of Komarov and the editors of Nash sovremennost. In 1982, the journal published the Palm. Komarov and his flex their muscles. In the fore various organizations. In 1982, the chief editor of

<sup>1</sup> In the discussion of the accounts: "Nash" by M. M. Nazarov, "Dostignutye" 12 (1982), 50-55. It was immediately after the fact that, at least in the last years of Russian nationalism, reports that the 1982 and "personal support" of the Notsia gazeta, 11-12. The frequent visitor to the same information.



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Pearce and Green Again: Request for Appointment

Terry Pearce and Tom Green have continued to contact me every few weeks regarding the "progress" of their proposal. (It of course is getting absolutely nowhere, but they seem to have an infinite capacity for interpreting politeness as encouragement.) In any event, I have met with them and have talked to them on the telephone several times over the past couple of months.

Now they are insisting that they really must see you to bring you up to date on their efforts, and are suggesting June 19 or as soon thereafter as possible. I have told them that I can meet with them any time I am in town, but cannot advise them to make the trip to Washington for that purpose since my honest opinion is that circumstances still are not such as to permit an official endorsement of their proposal. Nevertheless, they have persisted in requesting a meeting with you, since they feel it essential to convey directly what they interpret as "positive signals" from their Soviet interlocutors (apparently some of Arbatov's people).

At this point, I don't see how we can get them off our backs; even a brutally frank rejection of their idea would probably just send them to other channels in an attempt to see others in the White House. Therefore, I very reluctantly recommend that you agree to see them sometime after June 19. They have asked for an hour (!), but I believe it would be sufficient for me to meet them in the Sit Room or Wardroom, if you could drop by for 10 minutes or so.

I will spare you the full file of materials the duo has sent, but enclose their latest letter, which reiterates their request for an appointment.

Recommendation:

That you schedule a "drop by" in a meeting with Pearce and Green June 19 or sometime thereafter.

Approve ☐Disapprove ☒ *RC*

Attachment:

Tab I - Letter from Pearce and Green of May 9.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/1/127435 *Matlock*  
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*Called Tom Green  
6/18 & passed  
message. He said he  
understood "what I  
was saying" & would  
consult  
Terry -  
again*

*Suggest they  
stand down, given  
Soviet information re-  
occupation until  
late this year.*



May 9, 1985

Ambassador Jack Matlock  
Executive Office Building, Room 368  
Washington, DC 20006

Jack,

Of course we have been following the President's remarks closely. We sense some frustration in his use of the public forum, particularly given the reports that the initiatives he is proposing have not engendered favorable responses when brought up privately, or perhaps no response at all. Your patience is incredible.

When Stella mistook us for advocates of a "peace walk", it dawned on us again how many gestures there are, how much support there is for breakthrough. Everyone has an agenda, a project, a list of things to do to help reduce tensions, and we of course are no different. Yet, our strong conviction remains that something contextual needs to be done first-something which at least states the points of agreement-and we are advocating the joint Declaration as such a contextual event.

In the 40th Anniversary remarks to one another, both President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev advocated the "elimination of nuclear weapons", and the same day, Adelman said he was not hopeful about prospects for progress in arms control. It is generally agreed that to achieve meaningful arms reduction, let alone the elimination of nuclear weapons, fear of domination has to be reduced drastically. The commitment we are proposing and the dramatic inclusive way of delivering it will do just that, and will allow the process to accelerate.

Without regard to whether the global Declaration will have the far-reaching effects we suppose, it, at the very least will allow the Soviets, Americans and the rest of the world to see the leaders closely, to dispel some of the misconceptions, to make them human, and will be positive for that alone. It is, at a minimum, an agreement - our government's willingness to make a broad Declaration in exchange for access to the Soviet people by our President. It has to be beneficial.

There are two specifics since we last reported to you:

1. During an informal chat late last month, Dobrynin asked Verity about this initiative. When Verity tried to pursue Dobrynin's interest, the subject shifted.
2. This month in Bellagio, Bialer will be with Arbatov and other Soviets for several days. He will be asking the status of the initiative privately with Arbatov, and urging a Soviet response.

Given the current status, you may wish to ask about the plan or to comment on it informally to your Soviet counterparts in your travels, to test the breadth of knowledge about it, or you may not.




Our request is the same: to meet with you and Bud near month-end for one hour to detail the logic in our conviction that this private initiative should be noted officially now. The time seems right. The risks are minimal. This initiative fosters continuous dialogue and supports actions for avoiding accidental war. It puts the onus on the Soviets. It creates the atmosphere necessary for real progress, and it can be done now.

Our thoughts will be with you. We are looking forward to speaking with you on your return.

God bless your journey.

Warmest Regards,

  
Terry Pearce

(415) 381-1598

2349 Spanish Trail  
Tiburon, CA 94920



Tom Green

(415) 435-9663



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→ JACK MATLOCK

~~Admiral Poudexter~~

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


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National Security Council  
The White House

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Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	<u>[Signature]</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>JP</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<div>I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action</div>			

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

June 4, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *km*  
SUBJECT: Interim Restraint

I know that you have already heard much more than you want to on this topic, but I would like to make a few observations before you give your final advice to the President. I have given long thought to the impact of the decision on the Alliance, on the Soviet reaction, and on our own public posture here. With these factors in mind, I strongly favor Option B, while feeling that Option C is second best and Options D and E would cause major problems both in the Alliance and eventually with our own public.

I believe the basic fact that we must bear in mind for the future is that the Soviets have far more capacity to break out of the numerical limits than we do. To argue that they have no military need to do so and therefore will not represents a total misreading of Soviet psychology: they will in fact be determined to do so just to make a political point, if they can blame the break-out on us. And I believe both European publics and eventually our own will blame us for discarding these restraints if we adopt Options D or E. This could cause serious disruption in the Alliance and much greater pressure on SDI. (Take a look at the chart in this week's U.S. News & World Report -- Tab I -- to get an idea of how the press, even some friendly to us, is likely to portray the issue.)

I understand the argument that there is not much we can put into a supplemental or a beefed up FY87 defense budget. But this argument defies logic: either the cuts forced on us in the 86 budget are meaningless, or else there is something more that can usefully be done. What that is need not be defined right now.

My problem with Option C is that it will be undermining a very precise agreed procedure which, since it is easily verifiable, is in our interest. We should have no illusion that the Soviets will accommodate us to send persons to look down the tubes, or that they will refrain from fudging on other dismantlement procedures, using this as a justification, if it suits them. And the option is likely to have this effect without the advantage of a clear military justification, in the sense that what is gained seems to be marginal at best in military terms, and could

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actually divert funds from more effective uses. Nevertheless, this option is clearly more easy to manage politically than D and E.

Finally, regarding communicating the decision to the Soviets, I would recommend a letter from the President to Gorbachev if Option A or B is chosen, making the point that it was a difficult decision in view of Soviet performance, but was made in order to encourage progress in arms reduction negotiations and in the hope that it would facilitate resolution of compliance issues. If any other option is chosen, I would recommend communicating it to the Soviets by diplomatic note, and thus avoid personalizing the issue.

Attachment:

Tab I      U.S. News World Report Chart



47





MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 4, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION

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
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Attachment:

Tab I U.S. News World Report Chart





Kremlin's military power on parade in Moscow's Red Square.

# New Soviet Arms Buildup: How Big a Threat

**From stem to stern, Moscow is modernizing its nuclear forces. The drive confronts Reagan with hard choices.**

As Congress battles over the scale and pace of President Reagan's rearmament plan, the Soviet Union is embarked on a major new nuclear-arms buildup.

Across the board, Moscow is now producing more-sophisticated and more-powerful strategic nuclear weapons—mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, a new multiwarhead submarine-launched missile, huge missile-launching submarines and new bombers as well as advanced cruise missiles.

In the best case, these will replace existing weapons to modernize Soviet strategic forces. The result would be a limited growth in the size of Moscow's nuclear arsenal but a significant increase in its capability to mount a devastating attack against the U.S. with a larger number of more-accurate warheads.

At worst, the new weaponry will be added to the existing Soviet arsenal to achieve an expansion of the strategic forces in raw numbers as well as in destructive power. One congressional report warns

that Moscow's atomic-warhead stockpile could leap from about 10,000 to nearly 30,000 by the 1990s if there are no arms-treaty restrictions. Another report by private arms analysts asserts that warheads carried by the most dangerous Soviet weapons—land-based missiles—could grow from roughly 6,000 today to more than 22,000 in 1995.

Which course Moscow pursues in the end, modernization or expansion, will depend, according to many defense analysts, in large part on the fate of existing strategic-arms-limitation agreements and the prospect of a new and more comprehensive accord.

As long as the SALT II treaty is observed, these experts assert, the Soviet buildup will be constrained. Without an effective arms pact, Moscow will be in a strong position to expand its nuclear arsenal without inhibitions.

Why are American officials worried about Moscow's program when the Reagan administration itself is modernizing all three legs of America's strategic nuclear triad—land based, submarine based and airborne?

The answer from administration officials comes down to this: Kremlin leaders can be confident of carrying through any arms program they undertake without the hazards of dealing with an independent legislature and free public opinion.

By contrast, Reagan already faces an uphill struggle with Congress to implement a rearmament plan designed to maintain nuclear parity with Moscow. Currently, for example, there is a move to limit production of MX missiles to 50, compared with the President's plan for 100.

Some administration officials are pessimistic about the prospect of securing new funds, over the long haul, to match an accelerated Soviet buildup. "I don't see us funding large new nuclear programs," says one ranking official. "I don't see us funding thousands of missiles."

The potential magnitude and significance of the second big nuclear drive in the U.S.S.R. are pointed up by this assessment area by area:

**Land-based missiles.** What especially concerns Washington decision makers is Moscow's drive to produce a new generation of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. The fear is that these would reinforce the existing





threat of a knockout attack against America's land-based launchers.

Scheduled for deployment early next year is the SS-X-24, a large missile armed with up to 10 highly accurate and powerful warheads. It is designed to be carried on railway cars to make it less vulnerable to U.S. targeting.

A second launcher, the truck-mounted SS-X-25, is close to deployment. It is accurate, with a large single warhead capable of knocking out hardened U.S. military targets.

U.S. arms-control officials allege that Moscow is violating a SALT II restriction that allows the development of only one new ICBM.

Some analysts point out that the U.S. also is designing a single-warhead mobile missile—Midgetman—that would be more difficult for the Soviets to target. Administration officials say that the SS-X-24 differs from Midgetman in that the Soviet weapon's multiple warheads increase its first-strike threat.

Reagan charges that the Soviet Union "has chosen to build nuclear forces clearly designed to strike first and thus disarm an adversary." The President asserts that Moscow is moving toward deployment of new mobile, multiple-warhead missiles with the potential to avoid detection, monitoring or arms-control verification.


In addition to the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25, intelligence experts say, activity at missile ranges shows that Moscow is developing two other ICBM's, one to replace the monster SS-18 and another that is presumably a bigger version of the SS-X-24. Both are expected to be flight tested in the next several years.

Whether or not the Kremlin is intent on a big, quick expansion of its existing force of 1,398 ICBM's, experts in and out of the government emphasize that the Soviet Union rapidly is building a base for large-scale production of new missiles should it choose this course.

They note that Moscow already has the capacity to build 200 missiles annually. "When you see that they can crank out 200 ICBM's a year," says John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists, "then you see that they could double their land-based force without even breathing hard."

**Submarine-launched missiles.** Soviet ICBM modernization is being paralleled by a buildup of submarine-missile forces as Moscow, not content with its substantial advantage over the U.S. in ICBM strike power, moves to challenge America's lead in warheads carried by submarine-based missiles.

The Soviet Navy today operates 62 missile-launching submarines capable of firing a total of roughly 2,900 atomic warheads. Now, a batch of huge new



New mobile Soviet SS-X-24 multiple-warhead missile will be transported by rail.

submarines is being constructed with powerful and accurate multiple-warhead missiles that will expand that total.

These include the world's biggest submarine, the 25,000-ton Typhoon class, which is armed with 20 launchers, each carrying six independently targetable warheads. Three already are on patrol, a fourth is nearing completion and four more are under construction. The total run could go as high as 12.

At the same time, construction is being stepped up on the new Delta IV-class submarines, which will carry the Soviets' most advanced sea-based missile, the SS-NX-23. The missile, now being flight tested, is expected to be more accurate than any other in the Soviet Navy's nuclear arsenal and will carry at least six warheads.

**Bombers.** The most dramatic results of Moscow's latest nuclear effort may show up in Soviet long-range nuclear-strike aircraft, an area where the Kremlin traditionally has demonstrated little interest.

A big new intercontinental bomber, called Blackjack by Western officials, is being tested, with initial deployment expected by 1988. The supersonic, swing-wing aircraft, which exceeds America's B-1 in size and payload, could pose a serious threat in view of the lack of an extensive U.S. air-defense system. U.S. experts say Moscow could build more than 200 by the late 1990s.

The Kremlin also has reopened the production line for the venerable Bear bomber, with the aim of providing the maximum possible number of platforms for small airborne cruise missiles now coming off the production lines. These missiles, which will enable the Soviet aircraft to attack targets from a distance, have a range of more than 1,860 miles with high accuracy. Several thousand of them are expected to be deployed in the next decade.

From the viewpoint of American military planners, the Soviet strategic buildup poses two potential challenges.

One involves an increased threat of a first-strike attack to knock out U.S. nuclear forces. As the evolution of the Soviet submarine force leads to more-accurate and more-numerous multiple-warhead missiles, Washington analysts say, Moscow will be able to launch strikes on U.S. bomber bases, missile silos and command centers simultaneously with only 15 minutes' warning.

The other challenge is political. Planners maintain that Washington will come under new pressure to keep rough parity with Moscow in strategic forces to prevent the perception among friends and allies—and Kremlin leaders themselves—that the Soviets have a clear-cut strategic superiority. The current buildup, some analysts believe, creates that prospect in the decade ahead.

The Reagan administration is divided as to how to respond to these potential challenges. Some experts, primarily in the State Department, argue that the need to keep Soviet programs in check lends new urgency to arms-control negotiations and a continued observance of the unratified SALT II treaty, which puts constraints on new forces.

Other administration officials, particularly in the Pentagon, contend that, in view of alleged Soviet violations of SALT II, the U.S. cannot rely on the arms-control process to bolster U.S. security. Instead, they maintain, Washington should concentrate most of its attention on developing a space-based strategic defense aimed at neutralizing or reducing the Soviet nuclear threat.

With the SALT II accord due to expire at the end of the year, Reagan faces critical decisions as he weighs his response to Moscow's nuclear buildup. □

By ROBERT S. DUDNEY