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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 6/5/1985

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1985 (2/4)

**FOIA**

F06-114/2

**Box Number** 9

YARHI-MILO

911

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7438	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH VOZNESENSKY <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	6/5/1985	B1
7439	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE VOZNESENSKY (SAME TEXT AS 7431) <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	1	6/3/1985	B1
7440	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SUMMITRY <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	2	6/18/1985	B1
7441	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7440 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i> DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	2	6/18/1985	B1
7442	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO YOU <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	6/18/1985	B1
7443	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE APPROACH TO U.S.-USSR TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN JUNE 18-19 <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	6/18/1985	B1
7444	REPORT	US-USSR TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN SCOPE PAPER <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	8	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7445	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7442 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	6/18/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 4, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. McFarlane from VISA re Chautauqua  
Conference - June 24-28

Daniel Horodysky, Chairman of VISA has written you suggesting that you stress the importance of family visits in your speech at Chautauqua.

A courtesy reply is attached for your signature at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I Letter to Mr. Horodysky

Tab A Incoming Correspondence



2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 4, 1985

Dear Mr. Horodysky:

Thank you for your letter of May 27, 1985 with suggestions for my speech at the Chautauqua Conference.

I will certainly keep your suggestions in mind as I prepare my remarks.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Daniel Horodysky  
Chairman  
Visits International for  
Soviets and Americans  
P.O. Box 2361  
Berkeley, California 94702



← VISA — Visits International for Soviets and Americans — BN3A →

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po box 2361  
berkeley, california 94702  
usa



May 27, 1985

Robert C. Mc Farlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Mc Farlane:

According to press reports you are to be a participant  
at the June 24-28 Chautauqua conference on US-Soviet relations.

There is one aspect of US-Soviet relations that needs  
to be separated from all others and focused upon. That is  
the inability of American and Soviet relatives to visit  
one another. The enclosed statistics and actual cases tell  
part of the story.

There is a long-standing human tragedy occurring and  
millions of people have become pawns of politics. For what-  
ever reasons the US Government continually emphasizes  
emigration and dissidence. From time to time --- the Madrid  
talks, for example, --- family visits are mentioned but  
that is all --- just mentioned.

If Washington --- and Moscow and the UN are sincere  
in waging peace there must be a foundation. That foundation  
exists in family visits and it is being ignored.

US and Soviet related persons have missed out on  
peaceful coexistence, detente, and now the era of dialogue.

Please bring this story out during the conference, and  
beyond, as a representative of millions of unrepresented  
people. Let the age of family diplomacy start.

We beseech you to bring out the facts and speak out.

Respectfully,

Daniel Horodysky  
Chairman

(415) 549-1791

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usa

Visits Between USA and USSR

	<u>USA to USSR</u> total visits(1)	<u>USSR to USA</u> total visits(1)	<u>USSR to USA</u> private visits- includes family visits(2)
1976	65,864	11,960	1,654
1977	57,798	8,347	1,632
1978	53,191	12,124	1,977
1979	44,166	13,838	2,283
1980	12,922	9,734	1,320
1981	22,342	8,323	1,650
1982	28,232	8,027	1,750
1983	38,256	8,018	1,423
1984	35,058	6,035	1,325

- (1) World Without War Council, Seattle Office - compiled from US and Soviet sources
- (2) Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, US Congressional Staff report

Following are some actual cases:

- One man was prevented from visiting his dying mother. Official permission came about an hour before tour departure thereby making the trip impossible.
- A woman was prevented by the Soviet militia from visiting her 93 yr. old grandfather.
- An hourly bus was rerouted around an American couple and Soviet relatives trying to visit elderly relatives at a nearby village. Taxi drivers turned down the couple out of fear of losing their job if caught carrying Americans.
- Soviet relatives were chased out of Intourist hotels when trying to inquire about relatives on a tour.
- A young Soviet girl who applied for a visitor's visa was told to cease her efforts or be in big trouble.
- An elderly American was given an unusual 2 month's visa. It was received after it became known that he intended to leave a sizeable sum of money to a Soviet relative.
- Soviet authorities refused to send a telegram from an American tourist to Soviet relatives.





← VISA — Visits International for Soviets and Americans — ВИЗА →



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## PURPOSE and GOALS

World peace to a great extent depends on good US-USSR relations. Improvement in those relations can result in greater understanding, and eventual relaxation of tension.

The Governments of the two States must continually reaffirm their commitment to the development of friendly relations and cooperation, thereby resulting in peace.

Fundamental to this commitment is the right and freedom of the many thousands of related persons in the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to establish and maintain personal contact and communication with each other.

VISA --- Visits International for Soviets and Americans --- is an organization based on Article 13(2) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his [her] own, and to return to his [her] own country."

The purpose of VISA is to promote the development of contacts between related persons in the two Countries and to facilitate freer movement of related individuals with the minimum and/or absence of official involvement, determent, and harassment. These contacts will serve as the foundation in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust.

The immediate goal is to create a climate conducive to mutual understanding and respect of people at the most common level, which can only have an eventual positive effect on official attitudes.

The long range goal is genuine long term meaningful World Peace and cooperation among all peoples. The future of the United Nations and Mankind depend on the concept of free contact among peoples.

In the final analysis governments can make treaties but only people can make peace.

## UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

### Article 13.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Following this historic act the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and "to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories."



## ВСЕОБЩАЯ ДЕКЛАРАЦИЯ ПРАВ ЧЕЛОВЕКА

### Статья 13

2. Каждый человек имеет право покидать любую страну, включая свою собственную, и возвращаться в свою страну.

10 ДЕКАБРЯ 1948 ГОДА Генеральная Ассамблея Организации Объединенных Наций утвердила и провозгласила Всеобщую декларацию прав человека.

Приняв это решение исторического значения, Ассамблея обратилась с призывом ко всем государствам-членам Организации обнародовать текст Декларации и сделать все возможное для ее распространения, оглашения и разъяснения, главным образом в школах и других учебных заведениях, без различия, основанного на политическом статусе стран или территорий.

←VISA—Visits International for Soviets and Americans—B13A→

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Family Diplomacy: Peace starts with relatives getting together.

The 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords will soon pass. The Accords were signed by the U.S., U.S.S.R., and 33 other countries. They were quite specific as to the question of human contacts--- family visits.

It has been 36 years since the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 13(2) states, "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." The Declaration was followed by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

It has been over 50 years since Moscow and Washington established diplomatic relations.

A series of Soviet leaders and officials have stated that the Soviet Union wants "normal" relations with the United States. What is more normal than American relatives visiting Soviet relatives, and visa versa?

The fact is that there are millions of related persons in the two countries and it is virtually impossible for them to visit one another. They represent many ethnic groups.

While Moscow may argue that emigration and dissidence are internal matters, the question of family contacts is an international matter. The Helsinki Accords, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent covenants, diplomatic relations, world peace, and common human decency demand this.

Détente overlooked and ignored this basic right.

We are now in the period of "dialogue." Everyone wants to meet their counterpart. Shultz and Gromyko, Karpov and Kampelman, scientist with scientist, physician with physician, peace group with peace group, trade delegation with trade delegation, and so on.

Hopefully soon Reagan will meet Gorbachev. And the problem of family visits will be once again ignored, or perhaps just mentioned.

What kind of peace is Moscow, and Washington, and the UN talking about if related individuals cannot maintain normal human contacts? How long does quiet diplomacy take?

We are asking for nothing more or less than the right enjoyed by Messrs. Reagan and Gorbachev, Gromyko and Shultz, O'Neill and Shcherbitaky, their predecessors, their successors.

What better foundation for peace is there?

We want the problem of family contacts to be given priority consideration on a continuous basis in Washington, at summit meetings, the forthcoming Ottawa talks, and all appropriate US-Soviet meetings. It should not be a bargaining chip or tradeoff!

History shows that governments have been dismal failures at waging peace --- let family diplomacy be the foundation for better US-Soviet relations and world peace!



# Challenge to the Peace Movement

Peace  
&  
Disarmament

Disarmament does not mean peace. Disarmament is a treaty between governments and is merely a piece of paper. Peace means nations resolving conflicts without war. Peace means people meeting and knowing one another.

The key to World Peace rests with US-Soviet relations. There has never been a good foundation in that relationship. The means to achieve that foundation exist: There are millions of related persons in the two countries, and they should be allowed to visit one another.

The challenge to the peace movement is to make this a reality.

\*\*\*

Getting  
Together

JUST AS U.S. and SOVIET SOLDIERS EMBRACED IN TRIUMPH AT THE ELBE RIVER,  
LET U.S. and SOVIET RELATIVES EMBRACE TO WORK FOR WORLD PEACE !

Hanna Vasylivna Malitska's father is a Soviet Army veteran. Vasyl Andreivich Malitsky met the U.S. forces on the Elbe in April 1945.

Hanna, of the Ternopil Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, has applied to visit relatives in the U.S. She was told by the authorities to stop her efforts or be in big trouble.

\*\*\*

Family  
Diplomacy

FAMILY DIPLOMACY: PEACE STARTS WITH RELATIVES GETTING TOGETHER

The number of visas for family visits for Soviet citizens to the United States, even during detente, has averaged about 1000 per year.

Because of Soviet policy, most Americans who wish to see relatives are forced to take a tour. Relatives are fortunate to spend precious few hours with one another --- if that !

Soviet officials have stated that their citizens cannot afford to visit the U.S. The Soviet government should eliminate one missile and use that money to create a fund for family visits. Such a move will bring us two steps closer towards World Peace!

\*\*\*

HERE'S WHAT YOU CAN DO !

Write  
to  
Reagan  
and  
Gorbachev

- Send letters to Secretary General M. Gorbachev, The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR, and to President R. Reagan, The White House, Washington, DC 20500, requesting that family visits be made a priority in US-Soviet meetings as the first step towards normalizing relations.

-ask why Hanna V. Malitska cannot visit the U.S.

\*\*\*

Join  
VISA

JOIN VISA --- Send in your contributions for real peace!  
(for further information send a large self-addressed stamped envelope -SASE)



← VISA — Vaisa International for Soviets and Americans — BMJA →

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berkeley, california 94702  
usa

VISA  
P. O. BOX 2361  
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94702



8

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1985

Loretta,

Pls send attached for staffing.  
Karna Small is handling details  
for RCM address but this is  
something that needs to be  
addressed in substance (Matlock/  
Raymond etc).

Pls send me a copy for  
RCM's folder. Thanks.

RCM scheduled to speak at  
10:30 AM, Fri, June 28.

Wise

MEMORANDUM

4486

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

9  
Matlock

June 4, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JS*

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR LEAVE

After attending the Chiefs of Mission Conference in London (June 6-8) I plan to take three days of leave. Attached at TAB 1 is form SF-71 Application for Leave for the period June 10 - 12, 1985. I will be returning from London on June 13 and will be in the office on June 14.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my leave.

Approve *WLP*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I SF-71 - Application for Leave



CHRON

*Attache*  
✓

4481 10  
JM-C

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1985

Dear Mr. Horodysky:

Thank you for your letter of May 27, 1985 with suggestions for my speech at the Chautauqua Conference.

I will certainly keep your suggestions in mind as I prepare my remarks.

Sincerely yours,

*Robert C. McFarlane*  
Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Daniel Horodysky  
Chairman  
Visits International for  
Soviets and Americans  
P.O. Box 2361  
Berkeley, California 94702

MEMORANDUM

4481

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 4, 1985

ACTION

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Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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Tab I Letter to Mr. Horodysky

Tab A Incoming Correspondence





←VISA—Visits International for Soviets and Americans—BN3A→

visa

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Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
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
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We beseech you to bring out the facts and speak out.

Respectfully,

  
Daniel Horodysky  
Chairman

(415) 549-1791



← **VISA** — Visits International for Soviets and Americans — **BN3A** →

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← VISA — Visits International for Soviets and Americans — ВИЗА →



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## PURPOSE and GOALS

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## ВСЕОБЩАЯ ДЕКЛАРАЦИЯ ПРАВ ЧЕЛОВЕКА

### Статья 13

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Family Diplomacy: Peace starts with relatives getting together.

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FAMILY DIPLOMACY: PEACE STARTS WITH RELATIVES GETTING TOGETHER

The number of visas for family visits for Soviet citizens to the United States, even during detente, has averaged about 1000 per year.

Because of Soviet policy, most Americans who wish to see relatives are forced to take a tour. Relatives are fortunate to spend precious few hours with one another --- if that !

Soviet officials have stated that their citizens cannot afford to visit the U.S. The Soviet government should eliminate one missile and use that money to create a fund for family visits. Such a move will bring us two steps closer towards World Peace!

\*\*\*

Write  
to  
Reagan  
and  
Gorbachev

HERE'S WHAT YOU CAN DO !

- Send letters to Secretary General M. Gorbachev, The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR, and to President R. Reagan, The White House, Washington, DC 20500, requesting that family visits be made a priority in US-Soviet meetings as the first step towards normalizing relations.

-ask why Hanna V. Malitska cannot visit the U.S.

\*\*\*

Join  
VISA

JOIN VISA --- Send in your contributions for real peace!  
(for further information send a large self-addressed stamped envelope -SASE)



← VISA — Visa International for Soviets and Americans — BMJA →

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p o box 2361  
Berkeley, California 94702  
usa

VISA  
P. O. BOX 2361  
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94702





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1985

54-C 17  
4338Matthew

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY OSBORNE

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *John for*SUBJECT: Soviet Emigre Alexander Kaletski's Book Metro

We have reviewed Alexander Kaletski's book Metro, and we see no reason why it should not be shown to the President and First Lady.

Attachment:

Tab A Book titled Metro



ALEXANDER KALETSKI

# METRO

A NOVEL OF

THE MOSCOW UNDERGROUND

ИИ • МПС



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Book to the President Titled Metro

Kathy Osborne forwarded us a book by Soviet emigre and artist Alexander Kaletski titled Metro. I have reviewed the book and see no reason why it should not be shown to the President and the First Lady. I believe that they will find it most interesting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I memorandum to Kathy Osborne.

Approve   /  Disapprove           

## Attachments:

Tab I      Memo to Kathy Osborne

Tab A      Book on the Moscow underground titled Metro

Tab II     Incoming

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 5, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Andrei Voznesensky  
Friday, June 7 at 3:00PM

Voznesensky may have some particular topics on his mind to take up with you, but if so, he did not indicate them to me.

Some questions you may wish to raise would be:

-- Is the situation of artists and writers getting better or worse? How does he see the prospects under Gorbachev?

-- Does he have any thoughts on U.S. policy toward cultural exchanges and information? Are we getting through to the intellectuals? Should we do some things differently?

-- Can the President do more to make sure the Russian people understand his policy of peace and arms reduction? How can he do this most effectively?

As I mentioned before, Voznesensky has maintained his personal and artistic integrity despite periodic regime attacks on him and constant fights with the censors. Although best known as a poet, he has also done work in the graphic arts, has authored the score of a very popular "rock opera," and is working on another theater production.

Before the meeting you might want to glance at a review of his latest book of poetry in English, which came out in 1979, and of a couple of his poems which I translated. One, "Michelangelo's Pieta" illustrates his use of religious themes, and the other, "September," his portrayal of the plight of individuals caught in a system which promises more than it delivers.

I would also appreciate your giving him my regards and conveying my regret that I will not be in town to see him during this visit.

Attachment:

Tab I -- Review and two poems.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FD6-114/2#7438

BY hdt, NARA, DATE 11/24/07

21

National Security Council  
The White House

85 JUN 5 P 4: 03

System # I  
Package # 4434 Addition

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>●</u>		
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>McClach</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>redo</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Please put time on meeting memo, e.g.  
June 7 at \_\_\_\_\_ p.m. (a.m.) P.x.

BL



ily. Knowing he must leave it makes his private world ever more intense, a work of art founded on schizophrenia.

Not all of *Birdy* reaches these heights. The conclusion is a letdown, the magic partially dissipated in explanations. Birdy and Al are not above dime-store philosophizing, attempting to blame their wounds on their cramped pasts. Their recollections, in fact, sound almost idyllic, a Norman Rockwell vision of mischievous childhood with none of the grime and flavor air-brushed out.

These few flaws arise from excess, from an ambitious giving of more than is strictly required. First, Novelist William Wharton (the pseudonym of a Philadelphia-born painter now in his mid-50s and living in Paris) is nothing if not audacious, and his skills and determination make good on promises. Like his afflicted hero, Wharton tries the impossible, and the result, though linked to earth, mysteriously soars.

— Paul Gray

## Periscope of The Buried Dead

NOSTALGIA FOR THE PRESENT\*

by Andrei Voznesensky

Edited by Vera Dunham and

Max Hayward

Doubleday; 268 pages; \$10 hard-cover, \$4.95 paperback

Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations* spans some 5,000 years, from the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* (circa 3500 B.C.) to the verse of Andrei Voznesensky (born 1933). The book ends are astonishingly apposite. The King Tut exhibition demon-

strates that ancient art has modern resonance. *Nostalgia for the Present* proves that Russia's contemporary poet tells ageless parables.

Voznesensky's tenth book reinforces his reputation as a major lyricist and enhances his role as the last of the international troubadours, a public man as recognizable on American campuses as he is on his own soil. Literary and political celebrities throng these pages: Poets Robert Bly, Allen Ginsberg, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Richard Wilbur are among the many translators; Senator Edward Kennedy and Playwright Arthur Miller contribute moving forewords. Several poems recall encounters with Robert Lowell, Robert Kennedy, Boris Pasternak and Marc Chagall. By all customary standards Voznesensky should be thoroughly corrupted by recognition and applause. Instead, his work has retained its pure, almost elemental force.

Nearly every poem glistens with irony: the man who is regularly censured at home is not one to go gentle into that good night. Muffled by Soviet bureaucracy, he seethes:

I'm ...

35th for a place in Vagankovo Cemetery ...

16th at the optician's ...

110th for an abortion

(not pregnant now, but ready when my time comes).

In "Technology" he admits:

With all due respect to samovars,  
in the very middle of this  
provincial hole,

I long for plumbing and freedom  
of thought.

Throughout, Voznesensky's work is transfigured by metaphors. A man clothes himself in a suit, a car, a garage, a nation, a planet, a cosmos—and then realizes that he has forgotten his watch. Timeless, he has lost his place in history. A girl's black bell-bottomed trousers "flare out as shadow would flare out/ If the source of light/ Were centered in her belly." The poet moves in his leather jacket, "a cow's hide stuffed with soul." In "War" he compresses the century's anguish to four barbed-wire lines:

With the open eyes of their dead  
fathers

Toward other worlds they gaze  
ahead—

Children who, wide-eyed, become  
Periscopes of the buried dead.

*Nostalgia* presents a single poetic vision and a choir of translators. They are not of equal worth. Robert Bly makes Voznesensky sound like Robert Bly, all curt stanzas and quick vignettes. Ginsberg jettisons the author's rhymes for some ungainly free verse. The best work is the least obtrusive: working with Voznesensky's supple and difficult lines, Max Hayward, Vera Dunham and William Jay


Smith have given the Russian, both man and language, a new voice.

At its most eloquent, that voice echoes the lurching prophecies of Yeats:

*A man in the dark, drunkenly  
seeking his matchbox,  
cries: "Mary is pregnant again,  
and again the world is not  
ready! ..."*

Or the hellish stanzas of Brecht:

*You and I, George, let us drink  
together,  
in our eyes the wild fires of  
centuries glow.  
Each sister is raped by her own  
brother,  
and nobody knows whose brother  
is who.*



Reciting in a Moscow stadium, 1978

Other lines evoke the imagery and attitudes of Auden and Whitman. But for the most part Voznesensky recalls no one except himself. This courageous and unique writer never retreats into metaphysics, never merchandises the jargon of protest. Though all of his works concern human rights, most are addressed to the human condition; to accidental death and still more accidental love, to the encroachments of the state, to the lives of ordinary citizens of any country who will not succumb to blind authority or cheap despair.

On each page the poet attempts to contemplate his epoch with the emotions of a participant and the eye of a future observer. The task is impossible; one can no more feel authentic nostalgia for the present than get in front of one's nose. In the end, Voznesensky does not emerge with perfection, but with something better: rare and unsuspected truths that are



Voznesensky in New York after U.S. tour

*A journey past the language barrier.*



the great goals of poetry. In the author's indelible metaphor:

*The poet thrusts his body  
like a tolling bell  
against the dome of insults.  
It hurts. But it resounds.*

— Stefan Kanfer

In Russia 14,000 people gathered in a Moscow sports stadium last year to hear Andrei Voznesensky read his verse. As many as 500,000 Soviet citizens have subscribed to buy a volume of his poetry. In the U.S. more modest but still impressive numbers of students jam college auditoriums whenever the poet pays a visit. In New York City after a two-month, 21-campus tour (his fifth in the U.S. since 1966), Voznesensky charted his journey past the language barrier in America.

"At first I was exotic," the 45-year-old poet recalls in fluent, strongly accented English. "People were listening to me more for the sound of my poetry than for the sense. It helped that in those days I was writing in a more musical and aggressive style than I am now. My work was also more constructivist. You could see, and even hear, how my poetry was made: the rhythm, rhymes, associations and metaphors. My poems were easy to catch hold of. When my book, *Antiworlds*, came out in English, translated by W.H. Auden and other marvelous poets, it prepared audiences for the more delicately orchestrated poetry I've been writing lately. It's more surreal, analytical and elusive—quite impossible to catch."

On his current tour, Voznesensky's readings have been more muted than his galvanic performances of the '60s and early '70s. In those days he would scuttle back and forth across the stage in spurts of convulsive energy, flailing the air with one hand while his powerful baritone voice rolled with the rhythms and assonances of such poems as *Goya*, his now famous war dirge. ("I am Goya/ of the bare field, by the enemy's beak gouged/ till the craters of my eyes gape.")

In contrast, at Voznesensky's reading last month in Joseph Papp's Public Theater in New York City, the poet created an atmosphere of almost monastic serenity. A large, white, Russian Orthodox church candle burning on the podium provided virtually the only lighting. "It is more intimate for you, my friends," Voznesensky explained to an audience that included Mstislav Rostropovich, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and C.P. Snow. As Poet William Jay Smith, a favored translator and friend, read English versions from *Nostalgia for the Present*, Voznesensky could be glimpsed in the wings, his slight figure rigid with apprehension, as if braced for combat. Following the English readings, Voznesensky moved forward to recite the Russian originals. Among them was a new poem: "Fighting eternal idiocy,/ born to the greatest deeds there are,/ the literature of Russia/ conducts civil war."

Voznesensky recited for nearly two hours, from memory as he always does. His voice, softened in maturity, was alternately playful, mocking and most often sorrowing. As a spotlight shot harshly into his face, his gaze turned inward in painful concentration. Asked why he appeared so pained, Voznesensky explained: "When I read, I repeat the process of creation. I remember my mood when I was writing a poem, as if I had walked into a forest. It is necessary masochism; it means suffering, but I like it." He even welcomes the intrusion of the spotlight. "It blinds me, and I forget about the faces in front of me. I lose all connection with people. I can say everything then. It is like talking to God, to your life and death. On stage, you are another person. You belong to language."

## Editors' Choice

**FICTION:** Shosha, *Isaac Bashevis Singer* • The Cement Garden, *Ian McEwan* • The Coup, *John Updike* • The Flounder, *Günter Grass* • The Stories of John Cheever, *John Cheever* • The World According to Garp, *John Irving* • War and Remembrance, *Herman Wouk*

**NONFICTION:** A Distant Mirror, *Barbara W. Tuchman* • A Jew Today, *Etie Wiesel* • American Caesar, *William Manchester* • E.M. Forster: A Life, *P.N. Furbank* • In Search of History, *Theodore H. White* • The Annotated Shakespeare, *A.L. Rowse* • The Culture of Narcissism, *Christopher Lasch*

## Best Sellers

### FICTION

1. War and Remembrance, *Wouk* (1 last week)
2. Chesapeake, *Michener* (2)
3. The Stories of John Cheever, *Cheever* (5)
4. Second Generation, *Fast* (3)
5. Fools Die, *Puzo* (4)
6. Evergreen, *Plain* (6)
7. The Far Pavilions, *Kaye* (9)
8. The Coup, *Updike* (10)
9. The Empty Copper Sea, *MacDonald* (7)
10. Eye of the Needle, *Follett*

### NONFICTION

1. Mommie Dearest, *Crawford* (1)
2. A Distant Mirror, *Tuchman* (3)
3. American Caesar, *Manchester* (2)
4. Gnomes, *Huygen & Poortvliet* (5)
5. In Search of History, *White* (4)
6. Faeries, *Froud & Lee* (7)
7. If Life Is a Bowl of Cherries —What Am I Doing in the Pits?, *Bombeck* (6)
8. The Complete Book of Running, *Fixx* (8)
9. Tutankhamun: The Untold Story, *Hoving* (9)
10. Jackie Oh!, *Kelley* (10)

## Milestones

**MARRIED.** Nancy Lopez, 22, champion pro golfer who in her rookie season last year became her sport's top woman money-maker with nearly \$200,000 in earnings; and Timothy Melton, 29, a sportscaster from Harrisburg, Pa.; both for the first time; in Medford Lakes, N.J.

**MARRIED.** Sylvia Field Porter, 65, syndicated financial columnist and author; and James F. Fox, 61, New York City-based public relations executive; she for the third time, he for the first; in Manhattan. Porter, whose daily column appears in over 400 papers worldwide, once earned a compliment from a White House reader. "Why, goddammit," Lyndon Johnson thundered, "can't these economists talk straight like Sylvia?"

**MARRIAGE REVEALED.** Bernardo Bertolucci, 38, Italian film director (*Last Tango in Paris*, 1900); and Clare Peploe, 31, his English assistant and onetime companion of Film Director Michelangelo Antonioni; both for the first time; on Dec. 16, in Rome.

**DIED.** Olga Deterding, 52, Swiss heiress (Royal Dutch/Shell Oil Co.), who frequently forsook affluent society to work for Dr. Albert Schweitzer in West Africa; after choking on a piece of meat at a New Year's Eve party; in London. Deterding first joined Schweitzer's hospital in 1956, while on an African safari. Assigned such chores as floor scrubbing and potato peeling, she stayed for a year, returning at irregular intervals until Schweitzer's death in 1965. "There are times when I like to suffer," said the peripatetic millionaire. "Having so much money makes it necessary to cleanse oneself."

**DIED.** Boleslaw Piasecki, 63, Polish Communist official and chairman of the pro-government Roman Catholic organization called PAX; of a thrombotic ailment, Buerger's disease; in Warsaw. Jailed by the Soviets in 1944, he reportedly bartered for his freedom by agreeing to establish an association of "patriotic" Catholics. Founded in 1945, PAX was scorned by many Polish Catholics (including the present Pope) as a tool of the regime designed to split the church. Its influence began to wane in the early 1960s as Warsaw and Rome started seeking an accommodation. In 1971, Piasecki was appointed a member of the 16-man Council of State.

**DIED.** Conrad N. Hilton, 91, financial wizard who parlayed a small Texas hotel into an international chain of 261 hostleries; of pneumonia; in Santa Monica, Calif. (see ECONOMY & BUSINESS).

**DIED.** Julia Rush Biddle Henry, 92, diminutive *grande dame* of Philadelphia society, whose daily jogs throughout her 80s helped keep her weight at 88 lbs. and her name on the world's best-dressed lists; in Chestnut Hill, Pa.



# ПИЕТА МИКЕЛАНДЖЕЛО

Сколько было тьмы непониманья,  
чтоб ладонь прибитая Христа  
протянула нам для умыванья  
пригоршни, полные стыда?

И опять на непроглядных водах  
стоком оскверненного пруда  
лилия хватается за воздух —  
как ладонь прибитая Христа.

# MICHAELANGELO'S PIETA

What hosts of incomprehension were there  
that Christ's pierced palm  
stretched out to us for cleansing  
cupped hands full of shame?

And again on pitch-dark waters  
draining from a defiled pond  
a lily grasps for air —  
like Christ's pierced palm.

# SEPTEMBER

# СЕНТЯБРЬ

Your black Volga chases distant headlights  
into a grove of golden disillusionment.

The devilish laser of will, early motherhood  
speeds into a golden disillusionment!

They promised you gold -- they gave you brass.  
And the dawn brings home the disillusionment,

above the black plain and above the torn clouds  
weeps the golden disillusionment!

A diamond dust in the grove, like over a waterfall,  
asks you to press the brakes when the trees are shedding leaves

Don't race the car, my dear. Drive with care  
into that golden disillusionment.

Воя «Волга» черная гонит фары дальние  
рощи золоченого разочарования.

Оли лазер чертовый, материнство раннее  
чится в золоченое разочарование!

осулили золото — дали самоварное.  
зарей подчеркнуто разочарование

ад равниной черною и над тучей рваною —  
мачет золоченое разочарование!

роще пыль алмазная — как над водопадом  
росит притормаживать в пору листопада.

е гони, шоферочка! Берегись аварии  
это золоченое разочарование.



7439  
JM-C  
25

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mattlock~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Russian Poet Voznesensky's Desire to Meet with President

I understand that an appointment has been set for you to meet with Andrei Voznesensky on Friday, June 7. I believe you will find him a very interesting person to talk to. You should also be aware that Voznesensky has expressed an interest in seeing the President.

I have known Voznesensky for about 25 years and have translated some of his poetry. He is an outstanding example of an artist who has retained his integrity while staying within the requirements of the system sufficiently to avoid expulsion or imprisonment. I hosted him at a small dinner May 24, at which time he made several penetrating comments about the system and its impact on creativity. (He is one of the intellectuals who feels that there is political rivalry between Gorbachev and Gromyko. He also spoke at length about techniques for getting non-official messages past the censors. His own poetry has a heavy religious cast; in this respect his attitude is very close to Pasternak's -- and Pasternak was his mentor when he got his start in poetry.)

Since Voznesensky can speak with insight on several of the topics the President is interested in, the President might enjoy a few minutes with him. Voznesensky has met several other world leaders and recently was granted a private audience with the Pope. He told me that if he could see the President, he would appreciate it being done without publicity, since that would only create problems for him at home.

While I would normally be eager to attend any meetings with Andrei, I will be in London Friday at the Chief of Mission conference.

Recommendation:

That you try to arrange for Voznesensky to see the President, if you think the President would be interested and his calendar permits.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2#7439

BY *RW* NARA DATE *11/1/12*



R. Metcalfe  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Chron- June 85  
to

~~Secret / Sensitive / Exempt~~

Arch Jack Matlock

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED EYES ORSIC

as 4/17/12

PRESERVATION COPY



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Classified

Summary  
Eyes only

Matlock

Classified

PRESERVATION COPY

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

CNS 6/17/02



JFM07  
J4-6  
28

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

June 18, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Summitry

Mark Palmer mentioned to me last night that he understood that you and Secretary Shultz would be meeting with Dobrynin to deliver a reply on Gorbachev's meeting suggestion, and that he understood that we would be proposing Geneva.

I hope Mark's information is garbled, and that this is not the case. On the possibility that he misunderstood the current state of play, I would like to submit the following thoughts for your consideration:

1. It is undesirable to respond too quickly to Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting in Europe, since that will reinforce the impression that the President wants a meeting more than he does. This is particularly true given the conflicting signals we have received regarding Gorbachev's own desires.
2. The fact of the matter is that a meeting in a third country in Europe is, in most respects, the least attractive of the three alternatives. I say this because it is the variant which puts the least pressure on the Soviets to change some of their policies in order to insure a successful meeting. These pressures are greater if they receive an American President there, and also if they send their leader here. And our historical experience has been that meetings in third countries tend to be either failures or sterile (Kennedy-Khrushchev in Vienna and Carter-Brezhnev, also in Vienna -- the latter sterile in the sense that SALT-II had already been negotiated, and even if that is considered an achievement, it was not an achievement of the meeting). I believe these factors should be carefully considered by the President before he is encouraged to move in the direction of a meeting in a third country.
3. If there is some difference between Gromyko's desires regarding a meeting and Gorbachev's, then a quick acceptance of the proposal in the letter (which bears all the earmarks of having been written in the Foreign Ministry) simply hands Gromyko an easy victory. We should be cautious about doing this until we get a better feel for Gorbachev's real desires.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Feb-11/42 #7440  
BY 10J NARA DATE 11/12/07

4. For this reason, I would strongly recommend that we delay a reply for a couple of weeks, and use the time to have the Agency contact try to find out from Ryzhkov what Gorbachev really wants. I still suspect that he would prefer to come to the U.S., and if this is the only way he can get a meeting, he might well agree.

5. Rather than agreeing precipitously to a third country, we should give careful thought to the advantages and disadvantages of the President going to Moscow. I don't like the idea of his making the trip first any more than the others, but I believe that if we cannot have a meeting here, one there would almost certainly be more productive than one in a third country. Given the Soviet approach to these things, it would put them under pressure, at a minimum, to moderate their propaganda attacks and start making some gestures in the human rights field. It would make it most difficult for them to continue to portray the President as a threat, since the symbolism of his visit would undermine this claim -- certainly among the Russian people and probably also in Western Europe. None of these advantages are gained from a meeting in a third country, which in fact maximizes the liabilities (high public expectations) and minimizes the leverage for Soviet performance.

In sum, unless an irrevocable decision has already been made, I would strongly recommend that we slow down, give some careful thought to these nuances, and play our cards deliberately.

I would appreciate an opportunity to see you briefly as soon as you can make time, in order to obtain your guidance on several ongoing issues.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

June 18, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *km*

SUBJECT: Summitry

*set up a Jack*  
*mtg*

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2-# 7441

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 11/21/07



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

- 2 -

4. For this reason, I would strongly recommend that we delay a reply for a couple of weeks, and use the time to have the Agency contact try to find out from Ryzhkov what Gorbachev really wants. I still suspect that he would prefer to come to the U.S., and if this is the only way he can get a meeting, he might well agree.

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In sum, unless an irrevocable decision has already been made, I would strongly recommend that we slow down, give some careful thought to these nuances, and play our cards deliberately.

I would appreciate an opportunity to see you briefly as soon as you can make time, in order to obtain your guidance on several ongoing issues.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 18, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JEM*

SUBJECT:

Gorbachev's Reference to Remarks Attributed to You

You will recall that I mentioned to you the report from the Italians that Gorbachev had told Craxi that he had just received a cable from Dobrynin which reported that you had "confirmed nonchalantly" that the negotiations in Geneva had no prospect of success and had "insisted on the importance of a summit meeting." Hartman reported this from Moscow and was instructed to inform those allied missions briefed by the Italians that the purported quotations were a total fabrication.

State subsequently raised the matter with Sokolov, pointing out that such misquotations damage Dobrynin's reputation as a reliable reporter. Sokolov said that he would discuss the matter with Dobrynin and attempt to obtain an explanation.

The next day, Sokolov telephoned Simons to say that Dobrynin had sent two cables to Moscow, one reporting conversations at Ken Dam's farewell reception, which included conversations with you and Secretary Shultz, the latter touching on the summit question, and one reporting on his luncheon conversation with Kampelman, which dealt primarily with the Geneva negotiations. Dobrynin speculated that Gorbachev had read both cables and had mixed up the identity of the interlocutors.

Comment: Even if it is true that Gorbachev mixed up a cable reporting a conversation with Kampelman with one reporting on a conversation with you and/or Shultz, it does not explain why Gorbachev received such a distorted view of what was said. Certainly Max was not as negative on the prospects for Geneva as was reported, nor could Shultz's comments on the possibility of a summit be considered "insisting on its importance."

I believe that we should consider this incident as clear warning of the danger of depending largely on Dobrynin to convey our messages to Moscow. It is obvious either that his reporting is inaccurate, or that his commentary puts a twist on the conversation so that his report leaves a distorted impression on his readers. The lesson for us should be clear: if we want to be understood accurately in Moscow, we better make sure that the message is conveyed directly by our own people.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLS Feb-11/4/2# 7442  
BY ADJ NARA DATE 11/21/07



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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SYSTEM II  
90681

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*Matlock*

SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*  
SUBJECT: Approach to U.S.-Soviet Talks on Afghanistan,  
June 18-19

State has finally submitted a scope paper for the talks with the Soviets on Afghanistan today and tomorrow.

These are consistent with the approach worked out in consultation with Don Fortier, Steve Sestanovich and me, but the paper arrived too late for us to give formal approval before the talks.

At this late date I see no point in your taking time to read the paper; a report on the outcome (if any) of the talks should be available shortly.

Steve ~~S~~estanovich and Jock <sup>M.A.</sup>Covey concur.

Recommendation:

That you ask Bill Martin to request State to submit scope papers for important consultations in more timely fashion in the future.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

TAB A U.S.-Soviet Talks on Afghanistan: Scope Paper

cc: Don Fortier

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *2/6/97*



34  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II  
90681

June 17, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Approach to U.S.-Soviet Talks on Afghanistan

Attached for your concurrence is a scope paper outlining the U.S. approach to the U.S.-Soviet Talks on Afghanistan scheduled for June 18-19 in Washington.

*Nicholas Platt*

Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By WS NARA, Date 6/17/02



7444 35

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Talks on Afghanistan: Scope Paper

I. THE SETTING

Our experts' talks with the Soviets on Afghanistan come at a difficult moment in the conflict. Under the new leadership in Moscow, the Soviets are carrying the war to the resistance and the Afghan civilian population with increasing purpose and brutality and are stepping up their diplomatic and military pressure on Pakistan. This forward-leaning approach is tempered by occasional hints of flexibility on Moscow's part. The Pakistan Government has responded firmly to this increased militancy but is anxious for continued long-term support from the U.S. Now that the Pakistanis have begun a process of democratization, sustaining public support for their cooperation with us and for their tough stand on the Afghanistan issue may become a problem.

In these circumstances, we are in a position to advance our interests in several ways. We will want to reiterate to them that Afghanistan is a major obstacle to improvement of relations between us, that our support for Pakistan is unwavering, that we support the elements of a solution to the problem outlined in successive UNGA resolutions and the U.N. negotiations as a means of achieving this outcome, and that, were the Soviets genuinely willing to seek a negotiated solution, we would explore seriously the prospect of giving some form of U.S. guarantee to an overall settlement. As to the issue itself, we will reassert that the inter-relationship of Soviet troop withdrawal and the other elements of a comprehensive settlement is the core of the problem and will try to see if there has been any change in Moscow's position on this point. Finally, our presentation will be designed in such a way that, if, as we expect, there is no give to the Soviet position, we will be in a good position to exploit their intransigence in our public diplomacy.

In sum, although we doubt our talks with the Soviets will produce substantive progress, they should benefit our relationship with Pakistan as well as our public diplomatic posture. We have consulted closely with the Pakistanis, who have stressed the importance they attach to our holding these talks, and to our projecting an impression of seriousness in our presentations. From their comments, we have a precise idea as to how we can further their interests as we serve our own. Ensuring that our ideas are heard by the Soviets, following

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NLRR MD8-125/2 #7444

BY KMI NARA DATE 6/25/10

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through with more U.S.-Pakistani consultations after the talks, and working together when appropriate to exploit likely Soviet intransigence publicly should serve to enhance our relations with Islamabad. If we learn something from the Soviets in the process, and perhaps do something to disabuse them of the notion that we are out to "get" them in Afghanistan, so much the better.

## II. U.S. OBJECTIVES

A. To reiterate that the Afghanistan issue is important to us both as a matter of principle and because it is a major obstacle to the development of constructive relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Our stand requires that we continue to give all appropriate forms of support to the Afghan resistance and to the Pakistan Government.

B. To emphasize that we stand behind the Pakistanis and that Soviet attempts to put pressure on Islamabad risk a widening of the conflict. That we are discussing Afghanistan with the Soviets is to be a reassurance to doubters in Pakistan that we are seriously interested in peace.

C. While we are not and will not be a party to the negotiations on Afghanistan, to confirm our support for a negotiated solution to the conflict which is based on all elements of successive UNGA resolutions and in which the interests of all parties are recognized, for the U.N. negotiator's efforts, and for the peace agreement framework he has devised. We do not seek a strategic position for ourselves in Afghanistan but rather a return to the country's former independent and non-aligned status in which Soviet security interests were met.

D. To explore the substance of the Soviet position with a view to determining whether there has been any shift in the Soviet attitude towards the conflict generally and on the linkage between Soviet troop withdrawals and other elements of a settlement in particular.

E. To position ourselves to exploit in our diplomatic exchanges the intransigent Soviet attitude we expect will emerge from these talks.

## III. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

1. The Soviets will presumably want to project continuity in policy during a time of leadership transition. In particular we believe they will stress that they will not be forced to quit

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- 3 -

Afghanistan by the military pressure of the mujahidin. This is likely to be expressed in their formal statements, which will be tough and unyielding; it may also be reflected in Soviet military action on the ground before the talks. The Soviets might see the latter as a signal to us of their determination to stay the course.

2. Pakistan, and our support for Islamabad, will be a specific Soviet target. After impressing upon us their intention of toughing it out in Afghanistan, the Soviets are likely to point out Pakistan's "complicity" in supplying the "bandits" in Afghanistan and the possible negative consequences for regional security (read increased Soviet military pressures on Islamabad). We will need to make clear that Soviet efforts to bully Pakistan, to whom we have a strong commitment, are futile.

3. We assume that the Soviets will want to avoid any discussion of the DRA regime in Afghanistan and specifically any changes in the composition of the current Karmal government. These issues may, however, come up in conversations on the margin of the talks and may shed some light on whether the hints we have picked up about possible Soviet interest in kicking Karmal upstairs might have some substance. Without explicitly drawing the link to the future of the Karmal regime, we will want to impress on the Soviets that any negotiated settlement will have to address the concerns of the mujahidin.

4. The Soviets have already heard Dick Murphy's presentation on Afghanistan and will be listening carefully to see if we have modified our position on Afghanistan in any way. They will be particularly interested in seeing if this might include a willingness to cut a deal which would sacrifice Afghanistan in return for a Soviet concession somewhere else.

5. Based on the record of Murphy and Crocker's meetings, the Soviets will try to strike a pose of aggrieved reasonableness. They may also seek to use the fact of these talks to deflect criticism of their Afghan policy, by arguing with some interlocutors that they remain flexible and interested in pursuing negotiations, while we remain committed to pursuing the war against the Karmal regime rather than ending it by negotiation.

#### IV. U.S. PRESENTATION

Our opening presentation to the Soviets should contain the following elements:

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A. Nature of the Problem: We see the mujahidin military activity and popular opposition to the Soviet occupation and to the Kabul regime also rising. We see the cost in Soviet men, materiel, and other resources (including Soviet prestige) rising. After five and a half years of fighting, loss of life and destruction of property continue to increase. The bombardment of civilian targets has intensified, forcing more and more Afghans to abandon their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. International condemnation of what is happening in Afghanistan is expressed virtually unanimously at the United Nations and in other international gatherings. Any possible doubt either that the war in Afghanistan is anything other than a national liberation struggle by an entire people against a foreign occupier and an oppressive, foreign-imposed regime or that the Afghan people reject the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan as their representative has long since been dispelled. A symbol of this national resolve is the decision of the major resistance groups to join in a single alliance which will speak for the Afghan people throughout the world.

Our position in support of the Afghan people, and of the Government of Pakistan, is a principled one. It is based on the bedrock of American public opinion, expressed directly and through the elected representatives of the people, that the United States has a moral obligation to stand behind a cause that is just. The expressions of support for this policy from Congress are strong across the board. The unambiguous nature of the Afghanistan situation means that there is no alternative to continuing our present policy towards the conflict and to maintaining our unwavering commitments to the Pakistan Government.

In these circumstances, the Afghanistan issue cannot but remain a major obstacle to the emergence of a more normal and constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. What is happening in Afghanistan inevitably raises questions as to whether measures aimed at reducing tensions should even be attempted and creates a climate of suspicion. As a result, everything else in our relationship is made more difficult while the Soviet Union is waging war in Afghanistan. For us, it is the outstanding example of Soviet willingness to use military force to impose political solutions unacceptable to third countries and parties without regard to the consequences in our bilateral relations. We attach major importance to developing a constructive relationship and therefore welcome the opportunity both to discuss the Afghanistan problem and to seek practical means of resolving it.



B. The U.S. Position: For the United States, Afghan affairs are ordinarily of slight interest. The Soviet Union will always have great influence in Afghanistan. A negotiated solution should be the most attractive of the options the Soviet Union currently faces, but we have not yet seen any sign of a serious Soviet commitment to this course. Other Soviet choices include an escalation of the war or allowing the present standoff to continue indefinitely. Each of these latter alternatives is grim. The first would involve a sharp increase both in the number of Soviet casualties and in the suffering inflicted on the Afghan people. The war would become an even larger issue in the eyes of the world, and the international opprobrium the Soviet Union would face could be expected to grow. Also, given the record of the Afghan resistance up to now, it is questionable whether such tactics would succeed in ending the conflict in the near or middle term. As for continuing the present course, the prospect of more casualties over an indefinite time period, of continued tension in the sub-continent with the attendant risk of a widening of the war, and of growing criticism of Soviet policies by the world community must not be an attractive one from Moscow's point of view.

Serious negotiations offer a possibility of resolving the conflict in a way satisfactory to all concerned. The U.S. position, which has always been consistent with the U.N. resolutions, is that a comprehensive settlement include the following elements: (a) withdrawal of Soviet troops; (b) restoration of Afghanistan's independence and non-alignment within internationally recognized borders; (c) safe and honorable return of the refugees; and (d) the opportunity for the Afghan people to determine their own political future.

The Cordovez talks have produced a framework upon which such a comprehensive settlement could be built. These negotiations could go forward on the basis of the following principles:

1. Inter-Relationship of Troop Withdrawal and Other Elements of a Comprehensive Settlement: The heart of the Afghanistan problem is the relationship between the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the other elements of a comprehensive settlement of the Afghanistan problem. If the principle can be established that troop withdrawals would take place in the same timeframe in which other elements of the settlement were being brought into force and becoming practical realities, and if the timeframe for withdrawals were both specific and short, a great step towards peace will have been taken, and an internationally



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guaranteed settlement could be envisaged. There are, of course, other knotty problems which must be resolved, but this, it seems to us, is the core issue.

2. Respect for the Interests of All Parties: A settlement of the Afghanistan issue involves the restoration of the country's independent and non-aligned status. As President Reagan wrote to Chairman Gorbachev earlier this year, the United States would like to see "a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference." Contrary to charges made from time to time by the Kabul authorities, the United States does not seek the transformation of Afghanistan into a base for future anti-Soviet activities. Over many decades, and with Afghan regimes of all kinds, we have been content to have no role. This was so even though the Soviet Union did have a major role in Afghan affairs. At the same time, as President Reagan wrote to Chairman Gorbachev, we recognize the interest of the Afghan people in living under a government of their own choosing and of the Soviet Union in having a secure southern frontier. We also recognize, as part of an overall settlement, the importance of procedures for the safe and honorable return of the refugees to their homes.

3. Mutual Confidence: Finally, although the United States is not involved in Afghanistan peace negotiations, we believe that a measure of mutual confidence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is important to the success of such discussions. Unfortunately, such confidence is lacking at present. We, for example, believe we have seen a discrepancy between Soviet professions of an interest in peace and the realities on the ground inside the country. At the same time, the Soviets continue to make known their skepticism at our insistence that we have no ulterior motives in seeking a withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan.

#### V. POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS

The foregoing presentation in itself serves the first three of our objectives and at the same time leaves the Soviets openings for further discussion should they choose to pursue them. As indicated above, we expect the Soviets will stake out a tough position in their reply to our presentation, and it is conceivable that their statement will be entirely rhetorical. If this is the case, we will rebut their arguments as necessary and allow the talks to come to an end with most of our objectives fulfilled.

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If, on the other hand, the Soviets make it clear that they are interested in exploring some of our ideas more fully, we will be prepared to set forth a few of our ideas in more detail and to make one specific suggestion to them. At the beginning of this part of our presentation, we will reiterate the point that we are not a party to the conflict in Afghanistan and have neither the wish nor the intention to negotiate with them on the issue. We will then stress that the problem nonetheless causes us major and growing concern and that we have had occasion to think carefully about ways of resolving it.

The role we might play in the endorsement of a comprehensive solution to the problem is a subject which might bear further discussion. How we approach this issue will be governed by the Soviet approach to the overall question of a negotiated solution. We may, for example, get an indication from their presentation that they are seriously considering Cordovez's latest formulation and that, specifically, they recognize the need for an "inter-relationship instrument" in which the link between Soviet troop withdrawal and other aspects of the settlement is recognized. In this situation, we might counter by reiterating our view that some sort of international endorsement or undertaking to guarantee all elements of such a settlement would be appropriate and desirable, while pressing the point that any guarantees should apply to the entire agreement, not just cessation of outside interference. There is a small chance that the Soviets will go farther, perhaps indicating, as academician Evgeni Primakov did in a recent Washington Post interview, that they recognize the linkage between troop withdrawal and cessation of "outside interference" and that they do not intend to force socialism on an unwilling recipient. In this event, we might want to be more specific about our interest in facilitating the withdrawal of their troops and in endorsing an overall agreement that was acceptable to all the parties.

We will also be alert for any sign that the Soviets are interested in exploring formulas that would link the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan to other aspects of a comprehensive settlement. The latest word from the Pakistanis and U.N. negotiator Cordovez is that the Soviets have for the first time agreed to accept the principle that a "mother document" mentioning troop withdrawal could be part of an overall agreement. They have apparently not, however, agreed to giving this document any juridical status. There is not much we can contribute in this domain except to encourage the linkage of

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troop withdrawal with other elements of the settlement and to press for a specific, short timeframe for getting Soviet forces out of the country.

During our consultations, the Pakistanis noted that one question which greatly interested the Soviets was prisoner exchange. We said we had decided not to pursue this issue since the ICRC was being denied access to Kabul's Pul-i-Charkhi jail and therefore could not play its proper role and since, in any case, it was our understanding that the Soviets did not take mujahidin prisoners. The Pakistanis said they understood the Soviets might be willing to make some concessions which would facilitate a genuine exchange of prisoners and subsequently asked that we suggest to the Soviets that they pressure the Kabul authorities to grant the ICRC access to its resistance prisoners. In return, the Pakistanis said they would be willing to use their good offices with the resistance to reactivate the process of having Soviet prisoners sent to Switzerland for a two-year period following which the prisoners could choose to go back to the Soviet Union or to seek asylum elsewhere. The Pakistanis asked that we make their offer of good offices known to the Soviets. If the atmosphere in our talks warrants it, we plan to pass on the Pakistani request and offer.

#### V. LIKELY SOVIET REACTION AND POST-TALKS U.S. POSTURE

As noted above, we are skeptical that the Soviets will be any more forthcoming in this round of talks than they were in any of our previous discussions on the Afghanistan issue, and we doubt that we will get very far into a discussion of the issues described in the previous section. Nevertheless, our intention is to signal Moscow that, while we remain unyielding on major questions of principle, we are prepared to facilitate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan should they prove seriously interested in leaving. At this juncture, it seems particularly important to emphasize the centrality of the relationship between troop withdrawal and the other elements of a general settlement and to stress the need for the timeframe for troop withdrawal to be short. In the 1982 talks we spent much of the time discussing the need for the removal of the Karmal regime in Kabul as a pre-condition for a settlement. As a practical matter this would be necessary as part of a genuine settlement. It is a point, however, which the Soviets are unwilling to consider and whose discussion in 1982 led to a sterile exchange as to whether the conflict were the result of conditions inside Afghanistan or, as the Soviets insist, the situation "around" the country. We should focus this time on the issue which is central to the achievement of a comprehensive settlement.

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## MEMORANDUM

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 18, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JEM*

SUBJECT:

Gorbachev's Reference to Remarks Attributed to You

RCM HAS SEEN

You will recall that I mentioned to you the report from the Italians that Gorbachev had told Craxi that he had just received a cable from Dobrynin which reported that you had "confirmed nonchalantly" that the negotiations in Geneva had no prospect of success and had "insisted on the importance of a summit meeting." Hartman reported this from Moscow and was instructed to inform those allied missions briefed by the Italians that the purported quotations were a total fabrication.

State subsequently raised the matter with Sokolov, pointing out that such misquotations damage Dobrynin's reputation as a reliable reporter. Sokolov said that he would discuss the matter with Dobrynin and attempt to obtain an explanation.

The next day, Sokolov telephoned Simons to say that Dobrynin had sent two cables to Moscow, one reporting conversations at Ken Dam's farewell reception, which included conversations with you and Secretary Shultz, the latter touching on the summit question, and one reporting on his luncheon conversation with Kampelman, which dealt primarily with the Geneva negotiations. Dobrynin speculated that Gorbachev had read both cables and had mixed up the identity of the interlocutors.

Comment: Even if it is true that Gorbachev mixed up a cable reporting a conversation with Kampelman with one reporting on a conversation with you and/or Shultz, it does not explain why Gorbachev received such a distorted view of what was said. Certainly Max was not as negative on the prospects for Geneva as was reported, nor could Shultz's comments on the possibility of a summit be considered "insisting on its importance."

I believe that we should consider this incident as clear warning of the danger of depending largely on Dobrynin to convey our messages to Moscow. It is obvious either that his reporting is inaccurate, or that his commentary puts a twist on the conversation so that his report leaves a distorted impression on his readers. The lesson for us should be clear: if we want to be understood accurately in Moscow, we better make sure that the message is conveyed directly by our own people.

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10J NARA DATE 11/21/07

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 20, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter from Armand Hammer

Armand Hammer wrote you notifying you that he would be seeing Gorbachev June 17 and offering "to render any assistance you may wish."

It of course is not our policy to use Hammer to pass specific messages.

Since I understand that an appointment has been set for Hammer to see the President briefly on June 24, I believe a reply to Hammer's June 6 letter is unnecessary.

*sc* Sestanovich, *na* Robinson and *md* Martin concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you thank Hammer for his letter when you see him June 24.

Approve *m*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab A Letter from Armand Hammer with attachments



*Staff - Matlock*  
*80* *4673*  
*43*  
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-8800

RCM HAS SEEN

ARMAND HAMMER  
CHAIRMAN AND  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

June 6, 1985

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud:

I was informed today that I will be meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in the Kremlin on June 17th. I have written to notify the President and George Shultz and am prepared to render any assistance you may wish. A copy of my letter to the President is attached.

I enjoyed the recent New York Times Sunday piece on you and am very glad that all is going so well with your own career.

With every best wish, I am,

Sincerely,

*Armand*

Attachment

AH:ec

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OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER  
CHAIRMAN AND  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

June 6, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I was informed yesterday while in Bogota, Colombia, where I was meeting with President Betancur, that General Secretary Gorbachev will receive me at the Kremlin on June 17th.

I wanted to officially inform you of this in the event it is of any assistance. I am also notifying Secretary Shultz and Bud McFarlane.

As an American citizen, I am always available to you for any consultation you may desire.

Thank you very much for the kind words about my "youth" which you expressed to Gordon Reece at George Will's dinner Tuesday night. He told me of it and was very thrilled at the honor of meeting and talking with you.

I had an excellent meeting with Jay Keyworth Monday morning, and I believe he will shortly send you a full report on the achievements of your Cancer Panel, which I have the honor to chair.

With every best wishes,

Respectfully,

*Armand Hammer*

AH:ec



*Haff - Notice*  
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-8800

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ROM HAS SEEN

ARMAND HAMMER  
CHAIRMAN AND  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

June 6, 1985

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud:

I was informed today that I will be meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in the Kremlin on June 17th. I have written to notify the President and George Shultz and am prepared to render any assistance you may wish. A copy of my letter to the President is attached.

I enjoyed the recent New York Times Sunday piece on you and am very glad that all is going so well with your own career.

With every best wish, I am,

Sincerely,

*Armand*

Attachment

AH:ec

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*Waltuch*

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

XR-8517085

S/S # 8517430

Date: June 17, 1985

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: The President From: Armand Hammer  
Date: June 6, 1985 Subject: Mr. Hammer's June 17  
Meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev  
WH Referral Dated: June 13, 1985 NSC ID# 305310  
(if any)

\_\_\_\_\_ The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State

Action Taken:

\_\_\_\_\_ A draft reply is attached.  
\_\_\_\_\_ A draft reply will be forwarded.  
\_\_\_\_\_ A translation is attached.  
X \_\_\_\_\_ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
(see REMARKS below)  
\_\_\_\_\_ We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
\_\_\_\_\_ The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other.

Remarks: Mr. Hammer sent similar letter to Secretary Shultz on same  
date; Department believes attached reply from the Secretary  
should suffice as a response to letter to the President.

*James W. Bea*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

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(Classification)



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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1985

Dear Mr. Hammer:

Thank you for your letter of June 6, concerning your upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow.

I understand that Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer recently talked with your associate, Bill McSweeney. I gather that they went over the entire agenda of issues we are now pursuing with the Soviets, and that Mark suggested the kinds of themes we believe it would be useful for you to stress with the Soviets during your upcoming trip.

I think it would be particularly important that you underscore to Mr. Gorbachev and any of his colleagues you meet the President's determination to build a more constructive relationship. We have put forward a number of ideas for consideration in every area of our dialogue. We are frankly somewhat disappointed that they have refused to engage us in a serious discussion of many of these issues.

The President's decision to continue our policy of interim restraint with regard to the SALT II Treaty is a case in point. I am sure you read their negative reaction as published in TASS. I don't need to tell you the significance of that decision and what it says about the President's determination to pursue a new arms control agreement in Geneva. I hope you will emphasize to the Soviet leadership the importance of seizing the current political opportunity to build a better relationship. I hope you will also emphasize the importance which all Americans place on positive Soviet actions on key human rights concerns.

We have let Ambassador Hartman in Moscow know about your trip. I hope you will be able to meet with him after your meetings to share your impressions and your assessment of the way in which the new Soviet leadership is approaching both domestic and international problems.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

  
George P. Shultz

Armand Hammer, Chairman,  
Chief Executive Officer,  
10889 Wilshire Boulevard,  
Los Angeles, California

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OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-2800

ARMAND HAMMER  
CHAIRMAN AND  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

June 6, 1985

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

8517085

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have been informed that I will be received by General Secretary Gorbachev in the Kremlin on June 17th and have written to the President. A copy of my letter is attached.

As you know, I am always prepared to be of whatever service possible to our government and will make myself available for consultation if you so desire.

I admire greatly what you have accomplished as Secretary of State and wish to express every confidence with you at the helm of our foreign policy in the years immediately ahead.

With every best wish, I am,

Sincerely,

*Armand Hammer*

Attachment

AH:ec

JUN 7 REC'D



31  
8517430

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE  
REFERRAL

JUNE 13, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:  
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 305310  
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 6, 1985  
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN  
FROM: MR. ARMAND HAMMER  
PRESIDENT  
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION  
SUITE 1600  
10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD  
LOS ANGELES CA 90024

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING MEETING HE WILL HAVE WITH  
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON JUN 17 85

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED JUN 17 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. ARMAND HAMMER

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING MEETING HE WILL HAVE WITH  
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON JUN 17 85

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE		ORG	85/06/06		C	85/06/10 <sup>2</sup>
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:		85/06/13			
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
	REFERRAL NOTE:					

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_  
MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*\*\*\*

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*CORRESPONDENCE:
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*OF SIGNER
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*CODE = A
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		*OUTGOING
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE		
*X-INTERIM REPLY		

\*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.



305310 63

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10689 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 879-1700 • (213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER  
CHAIRMAN AND  
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

5517430

June 6, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I was informed yesterday while in Bogota, Colombia, where I was meeting with President Betancur, that General Secretary Gorbachev will receive me at the Kremlin on June 17th.

I wanted to officially inform you of this in the event it is of any assistance. I am also notifying Secretary Shultz and Bud McFarlane.

As an American citizen, I am always available to you for any consultation you may desire.

Thank you very much for the kind words about my "youth" which you expressed to Gordon Reece at George Will's dinner Tuesday night. He told me of it and was very thrilled at the honor of meeting and talking with you.

I had an excellent meeting with Jay Keyworth Monday morning, and I believe he will shortly send you a full report on the achievements of your Cancer Panel, which I have the honor to chair.

With every best wishes,

Respectfully,

*Armand Hammer*

AH:ec