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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (1/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1002

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7483	MEMO	MARTIN TO PLATT RE DRAFT ROWNY ARTICLE ON GORBACHEV'S FIRST ONE HUNDRED DAYS IN POWER R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	7/1/1985	B1
7484	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ROWNY ARTICLE ON GORBACHEV'S FIRST ONE HUNDRED DAYS IN POWER R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	1	7/24/1985	B1
7485	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GROMYKO'S "ELEVATION": FIRST THOUGHTS R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	3	7/2/1985	B1
7486	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO PRESIDENT FROM SERGEI PETROV R 1/11/2012 M125/2	2	7/2/1985	B1
7487	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER FROM SERGEI PETROV R 1/11/2012 M125/2	2	ND	B1
7488	MEMO	RYE/MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S./USSR SPACE COOPERATION R 1/11/2012 M125/2	3	7/3/1985	B1
7489	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7488 R 1/11/2012 M125/2	3	7/3/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7490	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PAPER ON GORBACHEV FIRST HUNDRED DAYS R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2	1	7/6/1985	B1
7491	MEMO	CASEY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE GORBACHEV FIRST HUNDRED DAYS R 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	1	7/27/1985	B1
7492	REPORT	GORBACHEV THE NEW BROOM PAR 5/26/2011 F2006-114/2	13	ND	B1 B3 B6
7493	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PAPER ON GORBACHEV THE NEW BROOM (SAME TEXT AS DOC 7478) R 11/24/2011 F2006-114/2	1	6/28/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Matlock

5244

File
J4C

July 1, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM M. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Travel Request to Participate in an Aspen
Institute Berlin Meeting to be held on December
1-4, 1985

I have been invited by the Aspen Institute Berlin to participate in a meeting to be held from December 1-4, 1985. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss "The Status of German-American Relations" and the role the mass media in the U.S.A. and Europe play.

Transportation costs will be covered by the Institute. The only cost to the NSC will be per diem for November 30 - December 5, 1985.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve

[Signature]

Disapprove

Attachment:

TAB A Incoming Letter

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: July 2, 1985

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To Attend German-American Meeting Sponsored by Aspen Institute Berlin from December 1 - 4, 1985
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington/Berlin/Washington
- DEPARTURE DATE o/a Nov. 30, 1985 RETURN DATE o/a Dec. 5
- TIME TIME
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV RAIL OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM \$420 OTHER 198 TOTAL TRIP COST \$618
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC OTHER Aspen Inst Berlin will cover Transportation costs
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
Transportation costs will be covered by the Aspen Institute Berlin
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO XX
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ -
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
Travel Orders should authorize per diem for 6 days.
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock
13. APPROVALS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4628

SM-C
SF4073

Martin

July 1, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~WITH UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Article on Gorbachev's First One
Hundred Days in Power (U)

We have reviewed the draft article by Ambassador Rowny on
"Gorbachev's First Hundred Days," which was forwarded in your
memorandum of June 21, 1985. (U)

While the article is an interesting exercise in political
speculation which would be appropriate for a scholar who is not a
U.S. Government official, we question the desirability of an
American official speculating in public regarding the internal
political status of a foreign leader. Furthermore, some of the
assertions on page 13 of the draft seem particularly
inappropriate. The reference to the President's recent trip to
Europe could be read as an implicit suggestion that the trip was
a failure and made the President vulnerable to Soviet propaganda.
In addition, the characterization of Gorbachev's attitude toward
a summit meeting is not consistent with the President's own
comments on the subject, and we believe it important that no U.S.
Government official go beyond the President's public comments on
this subject. (C)

For these reasons, we would prefer that the article not be
published. (C)

William F. Martin

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

TAB A Platt-Martin Memorandum with Draft of Rowny
Article

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2# 7483

BY 101 NARA, DATE 11/21/07



June 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC - Mr. William Martin
OSD - COL David Brown
ACDA - Mr. William Staples

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Article

Attached is the long version of the article by Ambassador Rowny on Gorbachev's first one hundred days in power.

Please provide any comments to S/ART - Fred Shaheen on (632-4153) by COB, Tuesday, June 25, 1985.

B. McKinley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

Gorbachev's First Hundred Days

The Soviet Union is truly the god that limps. While its military capabilities elevate it to superpower status, it is a colossus that cannot feed its own people. Economically ailing, its rate of real economic growth has actually declined at a steady rate over the past two decades. It is ruled by a lumbering and ossified bureaucracy. The cronyism institutionalized during the Brezhnev years made upward mobility nonexistent and stifled creativity. Unrest among internal Soviet nationalities makes the Soviet Union a simmering cauldron. Black marketeering is rampant. Alcoholism is openly acknowledged to be a national epidemic.

Soviet recognition that a new and young leadership was needed manifested itself when 73-year-old leader Konstantin Chernenko finally passed from the scene on March 10, 1985. Announcement of his death was so anticlimactic that it was carried on page 2 of Pravda. The front page news was that the mantle of leadership had officially passed to the Politburo's youngest member, 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev.

From one death watch to another, the Soviet Union poured more and more money into weapons causing the Soviet system to slump into further decay. Indeed, there was a time in the early '70s when Sakharov and Amalrik were questioning whether the Soviet Union could survive until 1984. Thus, there was perhaps a deep psychological need in both the Soviet Union and the West to look upon Gorbachev's arrival on the scene as as a breath of fresh air. Both hope to find in Gorbachev a new vitality, and to provide

for the Soviet Union a new direction. Many in the West hope that he can restrain his country's foreign policy appetites and restore sanity to the growth of their nuclear force structures. At home, many Soviets undoubtedly hope he can raise their standard of living and bring their country economically into the twentieth century.

Can these hopes be realized? Do the first hundred days match the picture of the forceful and vigorous reformer who, under the American system, could be expected to turn things around? The answer lies not so much in the man himself -- though he is quite remarkable -- as in the nature of the collective leadership he serves. A new leader in the Soviet system, in contrast to a newly elected US president, does not bring several hundreds of new people along with him. Instead a Soviet leader works with a bureaucracy he inherits, and only gradually makes changes which make it responsive to him.

Accordingly, what we see going on in the Soviet Union is a struggle to change the faces of the Politburo. But it will change its superficial nature slowly, and may never change its fundamental nature. The fact that Gorbachev -- at least to outside observers -- presided over the smoothest succession in Soviet history does not alter the basic objective of the Politburo -- its continuity. Gorbachev was elected because the Politburo recognized that it needed to be rejuvenated; but those who elected him would like to remain members of the team, and, in the end, to survive.

To be sure, the means of succession have changed. Anyone familiar with the political graveyards of the 30s, 40s and early 50s can remember that Trotsky was exiled and ultimately murdered,

that Kirov was assassinated, Zhdanov died under mysterious circumstances, and Kamenev, Zinoviev, Kuznetsov, Vosnesensky and Beria were all shot. The list is endless. Emphasis on the use of terror has been replaced by a reliance on natural attrition. Yet the succession process continues to foster and preserve the same objective -- a small entrenched collective leadership dedicated to continuity. The difference is that in recent years the collective has kept itself alive. It is from this one central fact that all Soviet policies derive.

This notion of ruling through collective leadership has its roots deep in Russian history. In fact, it predates the tsars and was the way early Russian society was ruled at the time of the arrival of the Varangians. From the middle of the eleventh century, decision-making of the principalities was influenced by the veche, a group of leaders roughly paralleling the modern Politburo, which on occasion expelled princes just as the Politburo expelled Khrushchev. The General Secretary, Khrushchev, like his successors, who in many ways has the power in modern-day Soviet leadership comparable to the princes of the Kievian era. Similarly, the power of the early princes rested upon, in an even broader sense, the support of the druzhina, an early analogue of the modern-day nomenclatura, which allocates power and influence throughout the Soviet Union. Be this as it may, the veche, by its actions, preserved the oligarchy just as its modern counterparts.

The modern-day collective leadership, just as the tsars did before it, has had to conjure up external threats to help justify its own legitimacy. The collective leadership of the Soviet Union since

Stalin has made repeated attempts to improve its productive efficiency. But for Gorbachev to attempt a major economic reform would be to break the bubble of Marxist-Leninism, which also serves to legitimize the gerontocracy. As a result, the stagnate and overarmed country cannot leap forward, it can only keep sputtering along.

Following Brezhnev's death in November 1982, Yuriy Andropov was "elected" first among equals by this leadership. Even though Brezhnev's health was precarious for many months and his death anticipated, when he did finally expire, Soviet troops were placed on alert until well after Andropov assumed control. This pattern was repeated on February 9, 1984, when Andropov died. However, when General Secretary Chernenko died on March 10, 1985, the mood within the Soviet Union was not only one of indifference, but almost one of relief. It is now clear that Chernenko's death had been expected for some time and that steps were taken while he was still alive in anticipation of the change. Indeed, in his speech nominating Gorbachev as the new leader, Gromyko stressed repeatedly that Gorbachev had played a key role in running the country before Chernenko died. Gromyko even revealed that Gorbachev had chaired Politburo meetings in Chernenko's absence, adding that he had performed "brilliantly."

In hindsight, we can see that Gorbachev skillfully maneuvered within the power structure so that the passing of the baton to him at Chernenko's death was swift and certain. But Gorbachev was probably also aided by a powerful patron, Yuriy Andropov, who made a deathbed deal with the collective leadership which assured that

Gorbachev would ultimately become the nation's leader. Key Gorbachev supporters were moved into place even before Chernenko's death. Nine key personnel shifts occurred in the last three months of Chernenko's tenure -- all Andropov proteges and all affiliated with Gorbachev. We can only surmise that Gorbachev must have had a guardian angel someplace. Gorbachev had presided over a series of agricultural failures, as one wag put it, unprecedented since the days of Joseph and the Pharaoh. For Gorbachev still to come out on top suggests that there is something remarkable about him, considering the fact that his predecessor in the agriculture job, Kulakov, reputedly committed suicide for more modest crop failures.

Chernenko's long sickness probably meant that Gorbachev was firmly entrenched in the role of interim leader by the time of his visit to the United Kingdom from December 15th to the 21st of 1984. One can posit that Gorbachev's first hundred days can actually be counted as coinciding with Chernenko's last one hundred days. To be sure, Gorbachev was the highest ranking Soviet leader to visit the United Kingdom since Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin went there in 1967. Some watchful Kremlinologist saw this as a sign that Gorbachev would take over. Orwell was right; the year 1984 did foreshadow a change.

In many respects, Chernenko's death finally broke the hold Brezhnev's proteges had on the Politburo. Gorbachev had actually been groomed by Andropov for a number of years. Indeed, their relationship goes back to the time the elder Soviet took his vacations

in Stavropol where Gorbachev was Party boss. Gorbachev's ascension may have also been aided behind the scenes by supreme ideologist Mikhail Suslov.

My guess is that additional members of the Brezhnev clique will continue to be quietly retired with full honors between now and the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. In the meantime, Gorbachev is still in the process of becoming more than first among equals. Gorbachev's quick elevation of Viktor Chebrikov, 61, Yegor Ligachev, 64, and Nikolai Ryzhkov, 54, raises the number of Andropov proteges on the Politburo to seven out of thirteen, the remainder being the Brezhnev hold-overs. It is now being widely speculated that Ligachev may in fact be the number-two in power. Like Gorbachev he seems to have been watched over by both Andropov and Suslov. Chebrikov, as head of the KGB, also had a long affiliation with Andropov. By the time the Party Congress opens, Gorbachev should have consolidated his internal position to such an extent that he will, after the 27th Party Congress, in fact become the unquestioned titular head of State as well as Party leader. Once this takes place, he will have somewhat more latitude in playing an influential role in arms control and foreign policy. This will be construed by many in the West as a personal power play by Gorbachev. However, closer students of the Kremlin will understand that it is merely an evolution in the character of the collective leadership.

Even though the Brezhnevites continue to follow Chernenko into oblivion, United States leaders should not, for the short term, expect much new in arms control until the collective

leadership has put Gorbachev's men in key places. In the meantime, because of the Soviets' strong penchant for continuity and because some mileage can still be extracted therefrom, Gorbachev is continuing the public line that was adopted by the Soviets following the NATO dual-track decision of 1979. This decision was that US missiles should be deployed in Europe in response to the Soviet SS-20 threat and to seek arms control negotiations to negate that threat. The Soviets' approach was based on the hypothesis that NATO could be split from the United States over the issue of deployment of missiles in Europe. However, while it was obvious to the West that this policy was no longer working, the Soviets were incapable of shifting gears and did not have another issue to use to try to split NATO. Under the circumstances, a decision was made, probably, by Gorbachev to seek steps leading to the resumption of arms control negotiations in 1985.

In 1984, the Soviets added a new issue to their campaign designed to drive a wedge between the US and the NATO Allies, namely, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Still the Soviets' first attempt to move toward this new policy proved abortive. We will recall that the Soviets made the US an offer in June 1984 to meet in Vienna on September 15 to discuss "space arms." However, our almost immediate reply caught the Soviets off guard and the Soviets fumbled. Apparently, they had not expected a reply so quickly, and every time we repeated our "yes" they attached another precondition. As Britain's Foreign Minister remarked at the time, it seems that the Soviets just couldn't take "yes" for an answer.

It may be that this event gave Gorbachev the opportunity he was looking for. Perhaps he began exerting a dominant influence within the Politburo after he saw how clumsily the Soviets' offer in June was handled. Indeed, we can speculate that he was the one who approved -- if not the one who masterminded -- the Soviets' follow-up offer in mid-November. This second offer resulted in the US reply on November 22 which said that Secretary Shultz would be prepared to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in early January.

In the fall of 1984, Chernenko's health began to fail rapidly. For seven weeks, Chernenko had dropped out of sight, supposedly, accordingly to the Soviet press, on vacation. In perhaps no other way can the stark difference between the closed society of the Soviet Union and the open society of the United States be more apparent. In the United States it is inconceivable that President Reagan could drop out of sight for even seven hours. To do so for seven days would be unthinkable for seven weeks impossible. In January and February of this year, the Soviets twice went through the charade of parading Chernenko in public although on both occasions he appeared to be in frail health. It was clear that his illness was terminal.

During this same time, Gorbachev was seen more prominently in public. In December, of course, he took his highly successful trip to London where he and his attractive wife Raisa captivated their British audience. Following his London trip, there were stories in the press that Gorbachev might visit the United States.

But Chernenko's worsening health undoubtedly prevented Gorbachev from traveling abroad.

We can't, of course, know for certain that Gorbachev was making the key decisions in the Politburo on Soviet foreign policy and arms control matters in January of 1985. My personal guess, as I have suggested, is that he was.

Whatever the competition for the mantle of leadership, the Soviets' desire to put on a solid face by the collective leadership was evident. In his speech nominating Gorbachev, Gromyko alluded to the need to show unity in the face of prying foreign eyes. The fact that Gromyko displayed a confident attitude at this time helped achieve this objective.

As for Gromyko, we can surmise that he had a relatively free hand tactically. It might be that Gromyko was in fact making his own decisions within the limits decided upon by the Politburo, since anything other would amount to a real break with Soviet tradition. The collective approach to Soviet policy is highly ingrained, and even a seasoned diplomat like Gromyko will not act outside the bound of his instructions.

Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that Gorbachev was, during the last weeks before Chernenko died, playing an increasingly influential role in the Soviet Union's arms control decision-making apparatus. Our best piece of evidence comes from Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov who said, on the day after Chernenko died, that the Soviet team's instructions had been given them by Gorbachev the week before the negotiations began.

Although this is the first time Karpov had mentioned names

(he never indulged in such speculation when he and I negotiated throughout 1982 and 1983), it is not the first time Karpov had gone out of his way to impress on Westerners the importance of continuity and collectivity in the Soviet leadership. In November 1982, during SALT II, I had invited the Soviet negotiating team to a cocktail party which had been scheduled to take place the day after Brezhnev died. The day Brezhnev died I called Karpov to express my condolences and told him I was cancelling the scheduled party. Karpov thanked me, but asked that I not cancel the party. "We do a lot of business at these parties," Karpov said, "and we would like to go ahead with it. As a matter of respect for General Secretary Brezhnev," he added, "we will not bring our wives." Our party did, in fact, go ahead on schedule as a stag affair. As one Soviet negotiator put it, their wives were left home to mourn Brezhnev's passing.

Although Gorbachev was no doubt playing the dominant role in the Politburo prior to his formal assumption of power, I do not mean to imply that he decided that serious negotiations would be in the offing. It is painfully obvious in the Geneva negotiations that there apparently were no Soviet policy changes for the "new" negotiations. In fact, in all three areas: START, INF, and Defense and Space, the Soviet approach has been to revert to earlier, harder positions.

At the same time that the "new" negotiations were going on in Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev attempted on several occasions to influence public opinion on arms control. First, he issued his

Easter Day moratorium, a statement that was nothing more than a warmed-over version of offers the Soviets had made in 1982 and 1983. In fact, the same moratorium proposal had been made several weeks earlier in the Geneva negotiations but not disclosed publicly because of the confidentiality agreement entered into between the two Chief Negotiators. That Gorbachev chose to make this public on Easter Day, with all the implications of a "new beginning, a new dawning" in order to assist the various "peace demonstrations," make it clear that Gorbachev was eager to try his hands at influencing Western public opinion. His Easter moratorium proposal laid an egg.

Gorbachev again took to the bully pulpit on April 23, the very day that the first round of the new arms control negotiations came to a close. Gorbachev publicly blamed the US for the lack of progress in the talks. Here, Gorbachev was doing nothing more than turning up the pressure, taking the offensive publicly in order to divert attention from Soviet actions to the contrary. This is a standard Soviet negotiating technique.

What speculation can we indulge in concerning Gorbachev's approach to arms control during his "official first 100 days?"

First, Gorbachev was too preoccupied with consolidating his power base to pay much attention to arms control. It is true that Gorbachev has quickly placed two of his allies, Ligachev and Ryzhkov, the two most junior members of the Secretariat, into the Politburo as full members. Additional clues as to Gorbachev's priorities and which way he will mold the Soviet leadership will come from the pattern of his future appointments. But the way the

appointments are running right now, it appears that he will focus on domestic issues before he embarks on any major foreign initiatives. Further, the luxury of having the experienced Foreign Minister, Gromyko, managing arms control may be allowing Gorbachev to focus on issues at home. He can take his time about taking charge in foreign affairs, in general, and arms control in particular. Gromyko, despite rumors to the contrary, apparently was never a serious competitor for Gorbachev's job and did not threaten the latter's position. If anything, Gorbachev may find it difficult to tell Gromyko, who is at the pinnacle of his career and enjoys enormous prestige, precisely what to do. Accordingly, Gorbachev may well be taking his time about moving into the thorny briar patch of arms control. In the meantime, Gorbachev may be doing what comes most naturally to Soviet leaders: simply continuing past policies and thereby exercising continuity.

Second, it may be that the Soviets have made an assessment of the "correlation of forces" and decided that they are ahead in all areas of strategic power: long-range and intermediate offensive weapons and defenses against them as well. As a consequence, the Soviet leaders may have decided that they do not need to press ahead on arms control. Instead, they may have decided that they have nothing to lose by engaging in the arms control process, so long as they are careful not to enter into agreements that are unfavorable to the Soviet Union.

Finally, Gorbachev may have decided that now is the time to test the will and patience of the United States. Soviet leaders are certainly aware that President Reagan has had a difficult

time getting his defense proposals through the Congress. Further, the Soviets may try to further exploit what they see as a loss in Reagan's popularity as a result of his last trip to Europe. Gorbachev may be convinced that he needs to do nothing at this stage, that things are going his way without any effort on the Soviets' part.

As is usually the case with Soviet leaders, Gorbachev's approach is probably a combination of all three of the above. Or, he may be playing a fourth hidden wild card that we know nothing about. Gorbachev's "go-slow" attitude concerning a meeting with President Reagan may mean that he is playing the role of the reluctant partner, hoping thereby to get more for having finally given in. My guess is that he wants a meeting this fall to take place. It would enhance his image at home and abroad as well as help him consolidate his internal position. On the other hand, he may have decided that he has more to gain by watching Reagan's conduct and the flow of public sentiment during the next several months than by meeting with Mr. Reagan at an early date. Nevertheless, we can be certain Gorbachev is making calculations on how he can gain most from his not inconsiderable skills at influencing public opinion in the West.

What should we conclude from all of the above?

First, Gorbachev, more vigorous and public than his predecessors, has been able to achieve the smoothest transition to power to date in the Soviet Union.

Second, the Soviets place great faith in consistency and patience. They have learned from past experience to anticipate that sooner or later that the West, if the Soviets do nothing, will move toward the Soviet view.

Third, for the short run, the Soviets may believe they have nothing to gain from allowing progress to be made in arms control.

Fourth, while the Soviets firmly believe in collective leadership, Gorbachev's rapid emergence as first amongst equals could set him apart. He appears to have started, and might be able to achieve much desired domestic reforms in Soviet economy. But as for major changes in the Soviets' approach to arms control, he will have to wait until after the Party Congress next year.

Fifth, Gorbachev may well be planning to test his public relations skills to see if he can achieve, by influencing Western publics, have to accomplish through negotiations.

Based on the track record of Gorbachev's first 100 days, what can we be led to expect from him in the future?

The honest answer is that we shall simply have to wait and see. We certainly have no evidence yet to support the view that Gorbachev is a foreign policy reformer anxious for change. We should not expect a new, enlightened and conciliatory approach to arms control.

As to what we should do in the meantime, we in the West must learn to be realistic, objective and patient. We should not undertake further US initiatives unless they would clearly serve our interests by making them now. We should continue to explain that adopting our existing proposals would serve the mutual current

-15-

interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. We should, above all, act prudently.

Meanwhile, we can hope that the Soviet leaders will sooner or later see that it is in their own interest to enter into arms control agreements which significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war. One would hope that the Soviet Union would come to this realization sooner rather than later. They would benefit, we would benefit, and the entire world would benefit.

In the final analysis, the Soviet Union remains the Soviet Union. And, in a sense, Stalin and all of his heirs were reformers who ended up nearly destroying the system or being destroyed by it themselves. Whether Mikhail Gorbachev succeeds where all the others have failed remains a great unanswered question.

7484

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4628

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jim*

SUBJECT:

Rowny Article on Gorbachev's First Hundred Days

Ed Rowny has written an article commenting on Gorbachev's start as Party leader, for possible placement as an op/ed article.

Many parts of Rowny's analysis are highly speculative regarding Gorbachev's position in the Soviet hierarchy and the reasons for some of his actions. The article would be unexceptionable if it were written by an academic. However, I do not believe it desirable for an Administration official to speculate in print in this manner regarding Soviet internal politics. Furthermore, I do not consider some of the speculation well founded. In particular, I believe it undesirable for an official to make the sort of the comments Rowny makes on page 13. They include remarks about Soviet exploitation of the President's trip to Europe, with the implication that it made him vulnerable, and about Gorbachev's attitude toward a summit meeting, a subject on which Rowny is not fully informed, and should not pretend to be.

I short, I recommend strongly that Ed be asked not to publish an article on this subject, and in particular that clearance be withheld from the remarks on page 13.

na Fortier, *H* Sestanovich, *SK* Kraemer and *KS* Small concur.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Bill Martin to send the memorandum to Platt at Tab I.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

Attachments:

TAB I - Martin-Platt Memorandum

TAB A - Platt-Martin Memorandum with Rowny Article

NLRR F06-114/2 #7484

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 2, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Gromyko's "Elevation": First Thoughts

Some of my initial thoughts on the personnel changes announced today are as follows:

Gorbachev Takes Charge: The most obvious is that Gorbachev has pulled off a brilliant tactical move which puts him in direct charge of foreign policy. He did this by passing on to Gromyko the trappings of high office, while seizing the real power lever. It is an excellent example of his instinct for political maneuver in the Soviet context. A weak leader like Chernenko needed the chief-of-state title to project a public image of authority which was in fact lacking. Gorbachev has the strength and shrewdness to settle for the power itself. The trappings can come in time, when potential rivals, or powerful barons (boyars in Russian terminology), are eliminated or severed from their power base.

Shevardnadze: Originally a tough policeman (he was for several years Minister of Interior in Soviet Georgia), he subsequently made a reputation as a no-nonsense executive, an enemy of corruption (for which Soviet Georgia is notorious), and a mild "reformer" of administrative practices, particularly in agriculture. He handled some explosive issues involving Georgian nationalism deftly, giving way just enough to take off the steam when faced with demonstrations over such issues as forcing more use of the Russian language in Georgia. (On this particular point, the Georgian nationalists actually won; as a Georgian, Shevardnadze may well have been sympathetic, and if so, demonstrated consummate skill in staying in Moscow's good graces while giving way to Georgian national feelings.)

Like Gorbachev, he seems to have a flair for PR, and may be adept at projecting an attractive image to foreign audiences, in sharp contrast to the dour Gromyko. He was a favorite of Andropov and may have collaborated with the latter in his campaign to undermine Brezhnev's authority. (Shevardnadze's predecessor as Georgian Party chieftan, Mzhavanadze, was personally close to Brezhnev, and the charges of corruption against him foreshadowed the later campaign Andropov organized against Brezhnev's family.) So, like Gorbachev, he is a wily operator, but as Foreign Minister he owes his position entirely to Gorbachev, who is also

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well placed to control his future, so we can assume he will work as a faithful executor of Gorbachev's wishes.

Possible Purge of Foreign Ministry: To gain total mastery of foreign affairs, Gorbachev must do one of two things -- or a little bit of both: (1) Bring the Foreign Ministry staff under his own control, though Shevardnadze, and/or (2) Beef up the status and operational clout of his own CC Secretariat staff dealing with foreign affairs. Regarding the former, it will be interesting to see whether Shevardnadze keeps Gromyko's "U.S. affairs team" in place (people like Dobrynin, Korniyenko, Komplektov and Bessmertnykh) or replaces them. My guess is that some will be replaced, though some may be fast enough on their feet to convince the new boss of their indispensability. As for the Central Committee Secretariat staff, Gorbachev has already removed Zamyatin from head of the International Information Department. Rumors are flying in Moscow regarding other possible changes; with changes might come increased authority if Gorbachev wishes to build up an institutional counterweight to the entrenched MFA bureaucracy.

Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations: I expect to see no major changes in the Soviet policy toward the U.S. in the immediate future. However, I suspect that both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze may be more inclined to step up attention to U.S. Allies, China and the Third World, rather than making U.S.-Soviet relations the linchpin of Soviet foreign policy as Gromyko tended to do. Coming from a region bordering on Turkey and Iran, Shevardnadze may well have a greater interest in Third World issues than Gromyko had (despite his rhetoric to the contrary). Furthermore, we have already seen signs of greater activity towards China, and I believe we will see much more in Western Europe, with perhaps more than one trip by Gorbachev there in the fall. (France seems certain in October, and Geneva plus perhaps something else in November.) We can expect some very attractive-looking blandishments waved in the faces of our Allies and their publics in coming months, whatever else happens.

Nevertheless, when all is said and done, relations with the United States will continue to preoccupy the Soviet leadership. The forays into other areas will be seen primarily as attempts to weaken U.S. influence and to put pressure on our positions. In the final analysis, though, they must deal with us, and they know it.

Implications for the Summit: Certainly, from now on, Gorbachev will take personal charge of the "preparations." The Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Helsinki (which I presume will go forward as planned) may provide few signals; it may be little more than Shevardnadze's warm-up for his presumed trip to the U.N. in September and the meetings he can expect here then. While he is getting his team in place, or establishing his authority over the existing team, I doubt that he will be inclined toward policy innovation. As we near November, however,

minds will be increasingly concentrated on how Gorbachev can come out of the Summit looking a winner.

I suspect that we will see something of a "double track" approach. On the one hand, we will see a schedule of activities in Europe, and very likely some "initiatives," which will make Gorbachev look good at home whatever happens at the Summit, coupled with steady pressure on us to give way on SDI -- which the Soviets have set up as the symbolic issue in the relationship. On the other hand, we will probably experience a growing number of probes to determine where there may be some "give" in our current positions. The best summit result for Gorbachev would be to carry back something he could tout as a trophy, on the background of a triumphal tour of several West European capitals.

We have our work cut out for us.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 2, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT:

Letter to President from Sergei Petrov

I just received this morning the letter you mentioned in your profs note yesterday.

The letter is from Sergei Petrov, a Soviet citizen married to Virginia Johnson of Winston Salem. They were married in February, 1981, and the Soviets have repeatedly refused Petrov's applications to emigrate from the Soviet Union to join his wife. Petrov filed his most recent application in May of this year, and so far as State is aware, has not yet received an official reply to his latest application.

Petrov is one of twenty-two divided spouses on behalf of whose emigration Embassy Moscow and the State Department have made numerous representations. Speaker O'Neill also rasied his case with Soviet authorities during his March trip.

The Soviets have never given an official reason for denying him exit permission (they rarely if ever do), but the impression at Embassy Moscow is that he is considered at one time earlier in his life to have had access to sensitive information.

We clearly should continue doing all we can, not only for Petrov but for the other divided spouses, some of whom have actually been waiting longer than he has, and one of whom (Yuri Balovlenkov) has been on a hunger strike carried to the point that his life was in danger.

I understand that Secretary Shultz will raise the question of the divided spouses at his next meeting with Dobrynin, urging him to mount a special effort to start resolving these cases before the meeting in Helsinki to mark the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. We also should continue pressing for resolution of all of them before the President's meeting with Gorbachev in November.

My suggestions would be the following:

1. That Secretary Shultz raise the problem of divided spouses in his meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow, making the point that family reunification is a cardinal obligation of the Helsinki Final Act,

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/11/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

and that prompt resolution of these cases would contribute to a successful meeting with Shevardnadze in Helsinki on the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. (I have already made this recommendation to State, and the point is in the Secretary's talking points.)

2. Beyond this, we should press consistently in diplomatic channels and in any private communications we may establish to have all these cases resolved before the Geneva meeting.

3. Finally, I believe it would help if the President signed a personal letter to Petrov, referring to Ron's meeting with him (if in fact they met), and expressing his personal interest in the case. If such a letter were sent to him through the international mails (either directly from here or by Petrov's wife), it would doubtless be intercepted by the Soviet authorities and could have a salutary effect.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you either explain the facts of the case to the President or send him the memorandum at Tab I, with the recommendation that he sign the letter at Tab A. (Once the letter is signed, it might be well to consult with Petrov's wife about the best way to have it delivered.)

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Letter to Petrov
Tab B	Incoming Letter from Petrov

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter from Sergei Petrov

You will recall that your son Ron gave you a letter given to him during his trip to Moscow. It is from Sergei Petrov, a Soviet citizen married to an American citizen, who is attempting to emigrate from the Soviet Union to join his wife in the United States.

Petrov married Virginia Johnson, who lives in Winston Salem, in 1981. Since that time he has been refused permission repeatedly to leave the Soviet Union. He most recently applied for exit permission in May of this year, and so far as the State Department is aware, has not yet received a reply to this latest application.

Petrov is one of twenty-two divided spouses on behalf of whose emigration Embassy Moscow and the State Department have made numerous representations. Speaker O'Neill also raised his case with Soviet authorities during his March trip.

The Soviets have never given an official reason for denying him exit permission (they rarely if ever do), but the impression at Embassy Moscow is that he is considered at one time earlier in his life to have had access to sensitive information.

We clearly should continue doing all we can, not only for Petrov but for the other divided spouses, some of whom have actually been waiting longer than he has, and one of whom (Yuri Balovlenkov) has been on a hunger strike carried to the point that his life was in danger.

I understand that George Shultz will raise the question of the divided spouses at his next meeting with Dobrynin, urging him to mount a special effort to start resolving these cases before the meeting in Helsinki to mark the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. We also should continue pressing for resolution of all of them before your meeting with Gorbachev in November.

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

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27

As for your own involvement in this process, I believe it might be helpful if you signed a personal letter to Petrov, in response to the letter Ron brought. If this letter were sent to him through the Soviet mail system, it would be seen by Soviet officials. The personal interest in his case which this would indicate could be helpful in encouraging the Soviets to shape up and do the right thing.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

OK

No

—

—

Attachments:

Tab A Letter to Petrov

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Petrov:

Your letter of May 4 concerning the difficulty you have encountered in obtaining permission to join your wife in the United States moved me deeply. Surely all governments have an obligation to avoid practices which artificially separate spouses. I am aware that all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to this principle, and know that if this commitment were honored, you and your wife would have no difficulty living together in whichever country you choose.

I can assure you that your efforts to join your wife have my personal support. I know that our government officials and diplomatic representatives have made many appeals on your behalf. You can be confident that we will continue to do so, in the hope that we can persuade all governments to act in accord with the commitments they have assumed.

With my best wishes and hope that that you and your wife can soon be reunited.

Sincerely,

Mr. Sergei Petrov
125445 Moscow
Belomorskaya 5,
Block 3, Apt. 385
Moscow

79

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

5753

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	
William Martin			
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	2		Staff
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Action: Maxlock

Red tag on
advance to
Maxlock done

30
The President of the United States
The White House,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

4 May, 1985

Dear Mr. President

My name is Sergei Petrov. I am a Russian, married to an American citizen Virginia Hurt Johnson. Since our wedding in February 1981, which took place in Moscow, my wife and I have been separated from each other. For four years the Soviet authorities refuse to let me join my wife in the United States.

We do not know why instead of helping us -- as they should according to Helsinki agreement -- the Soviet authorities continue to create obstacles which keep us apart. My wife is a law student; I am a free lance photographer, and we refuse to believe that our reunification is a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

All our attempts to find out the real reason for denying me exit permission to go to the United States have produced no results. The Soviet authorities either refuse to explain or limit their answer to one word: "undesireable".

In our desperate situation, my wife and I ask for your help and support. There is little hope that our problem will find a solution all by itself.

There are less than twenty divided families who are not being allowed to join their spouses in the United States. Their situation is not essentially different from ours. The number is too small to expect the Soviet authorities to be concerned with this problem. Our suffering means nothing to them. Historically, this country views its citizens as its property. The concept that people have inalienable rights is still foreign to the Russians.

For me, four years of struggle for my right to be with my wife in the United States, the country of our mutual choice, has been a deeply instructive, even valuable, experience. Being unable to accept certain positions of the Soviet government, I proved to be a bad Russian. That gives me hope that I may become good American.

Sincerely,

Sergei Petrov

Sergei Petrov

USSR
125445 Moscow,
Belomorskaya 5,
block 3, apt.385
tel. 458-31-71

my wife's address:
Ms. Virginia Hurt Johnson
9095 Reynolda Station
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
tel. (919) 724-5735

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: GILBERT D. RYE 9:1
JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.

SUBJECT: U.S./Soviet Space Cooperation

There has been a considerable activity in recent months providing some impetus toward improved U.S./Soviet space cooperation:

- In October 1984, the President signed a Joint Congressional Resolution indicating a willingness to work with the Soviets on mutually beneficial space projects.
- The President has proposed a joint space rescue mission which the Soviets have twice rejected.
- Representatives from the U.S. and the Soviet Union have visited each other on an informal basis in an attempt to initiate cooperative endeavors on a myriad of individual projects. U.S. Government involvement has been minimal.
- The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) and the Planetary Society are sponsoring a symposium on July 16 and 17 which will include commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Apollo/Soyuz project. Dobrynin and two Soviet cosmonauts will attend. Jim Beggs will give a speech.
- Congressman Don Fuqua (D-FL) has invited Dobrynin and the two cosmonauts to attend the next Shuttle launch at Cape Canaveral on July 12 as his guests. (This visit was not formally coordinated with the Executive Branch -- I have asked Congressman Fuqua's office if they would, as a courtesy at least, advise us of this invitation.)
- Congressman Bill Nelson (D-FL), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, will conduct hearings on U.S./Soviet space cooperation on July 30-31 and August 1. (Congressman Nelson is on your calendar for July 10, but in my discussions with his staff, I don't believe he plans to raise this subject with you.)

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-- Congressman Nelson and other members of his Subcommittee plan to visit the Soviet Union in early August.

The main point is that there are numerous actions underway in this area without any overarching U.S. Government policy. If we want to increase U.S./Soviet space cooperation, we should seize the initiative rather than abrogating leadership to the Legislative Branch or the private sector.

Especially disturbing is the fact that individuals from both the Soviet Union and the U.S. (primarily from academia) are discussing mutual scientific endeavors. It appears that at a minimum we need some coordinating process to insure that any cooperative activities are consistent with U.S. national interests. Perhaps the most important issue is whether or not we desire to formally propose renewal of the U.S./Soviet Space Agreement which expired in 1982. If this agreement was renewed or a new agreement formulated, it would obviously provide the basic umbrella for more specific cooperative endeavors and provide a mechanism for coordination.

The Soviets may reject a highly visible overture for renewal of the space agreement. As you know, they have twice rejected our proposal for a space rescue mission on the grounds that their first priority is to avoid the "militarization of outer space." Therefore, they might be inclined to reject any public initiative on the "peaceful uses of outer space" on the grounds that it might indicate weakness on their part.

However, we continue to believe that, if carefully structured and carefully articulated, U.S./Soviet cooperation in space can be used as a highly visible instrument for improving U.S./Soviet relations. Such cooperation could provide a more conducive environment for progress in other areas, especially arms control. As a means of demonstrating our sincerity, the first step could be to suggest discussions which could lead toward renewal of the space agreement through diplomatic channels. If the Soviets agree to this proposal we would either publicly announce formation of joint group to formulate such an agreement or we could conduct the group's activities in secret and await the results before going public.

If the Soviets do not support renewing the space agreement but have no objection to informal cooperation on individual projects, we must, at a minimum, establish an appropriate intergovernmental mechanism to coordinate these activities to assure consistency with U.S. policy.

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~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you agree to an initiative leading toward improved U.S./Soviet space cooperation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you agree to drafting a proposal for U.S./Soviet discussions on a broad-based space agreement to be submitted through diplomatic channels.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you agree to establishment of a mechanism for coordinating U.S./Soviet space projects.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GILBERT D. RYE 9.2/85
JACK F. MATLOCK, JR. 8/1/85

SUBJECT: U.S./Soviet Space Cooperation

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- Representatives from the U.S. and the Soviet Union have visited each other on an informal basis in an attempt to initiate cooperative endeavors on a myriad of individual projects. U.S. Government involvement has been minimal.
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- Congressman Nelson and other members of his Subcommittee plan to visit the Soviet Union in early August.

The main point is that there are numerous actions underway in this area without any overarching U.S. Government policy. If we want to increase U.S./Soviet space cooperation, we should seize the initiative rather than abrogating leadership to the Legislative Branch or the private sector.

Especially disturbing is the fact that individuals from both the Soviet Union and the U.S. (primarily from academia) are discussing mutual scientific endeavors. It appears that at a minimum we need some coordinating process to insure that any cooperative activities are consistent with U.S. national interests. Perhaps the most important issue is whether or not we desire to formally propose renewal of the U.S./Soviet Space Agreement which expired in 1982. If this agreement was renewed or a new agreement formulated, it would obviously provide the basic umbrella for more specific cooperative endeavors and provide a mechanism for coordination.

The Soviets may reject a highly visible overture for renewal of the space agreement. As you know, they have twice rejected our proposal for a space rescue mission on the grounds that their first priority is to avoid the "militarization of outer space." Therefore, they might be inclined to reject any public initiative on the "peaceful uses of outer space" on the grounds that it might indicate weakness on their part.

However, we continue to believe that, if carefully structured and carefully articulated, U.S./Soviet cooperation in space can be used as a highly visible instrument for improving U.S./Soviet relations. Such cooperation could provide a more conducive environment for progress in other areas, especially arms control. As a means of demonstrating our sincerity, the first step could be to suggest discussions which could lead toward renewal of the space agreement through diplomatic channels. If the Soviets agree to this proposal we would either publicly announce formation of joint group to formulate such an agreement or we could conduct the group's activities in secret and await the results before going public.

If the Soviets do not support renewing the space agreement but have no objection to informal cooperation on individual projects, we must, at a minimum, establish an appropriate intergovernmental mechanism to coordinate these activities to assure consistency with U.S. policy.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you agree to an initiative leading toward improved U.S./Soviet space cooperation.

Approve PCM Disapprove _____

That you agree to drafting a proposal for U.S./Soviet discussions on a broad-based space agreement to be submitted through diplomatic channels.

Approve PCM Disapprove _____

That you agree to establishment of a mechanism for coordinating U.S./Soviet space projects.

Approve PCM Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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37

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Andrei Gromyko

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a letter of congratulations (as amended) to Andrei Gromyko on his election as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Andrei Gromyko

38

5293

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter to Chairman Andrei Gromyko

Issue

Letter of congratulations to Chairman Andrei Gromyko
(Tab A).

Facts

Mr. Gromyko was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on July 2, 1985.

Discussion

Your letter expresses your congratulations and hope of cooperation in reducing world tensions.

Recommendation

OK

No

_____ That you sign your letter to Chairman
_____ Andrei Gromyko.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Chairman Andrei Gromyko.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

31

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please accept my congratulations upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Even though the differences between our nations are many and complex, as I made clear when we met last year, we can and must resolve these differences without threat or use of force, through discussion, patient effort and determination.

I wish you well in the high responsibilities you have now assumed, and I hope that we can cooperate to reduce tensions between our countries.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

By Crs NARA, Date 6/18/02

Matlock

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40

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1985

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please accept my congratulations upon your election as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Even though the differences between our nations are many and complex, as I made clear when we met last year, we can and must resolve these differences without threat or use of force, through discussion, patient effort and determination.

I wish you well in the high responsibilities you have now assumed, and I hope that we can cooperate to reduce tensions between our countries.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED

1/17/01

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CJS NARA, Date 6/18/02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Letter to Chairman Andrei Gromyko

Issue

Letter of congratulations to Chairman Andrei Gromyko
(Tab A).

Facts

Mr. Gromyko was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on July 2, 1985.

Discussion

Your letter expresses your congratulations and hope of cooperation in reducing world tensions.

RecommendationOKNo

That you sign your letter to Chairman Andrei Gromyko.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Chairman Andrei Gromyko.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc Vice President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNEDFROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Andrei Gromyko

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a letter of congratulations (as amended) to Andrei Gromyko on his election as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum.

Approve *m*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Andrei Gromyko

*Attachments
given to RR
7/5 m*

REFERRAL

DATE: 05 JUL 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: NICHOLAS PLATT

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GROMYKO, ANDREI

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 05 JUL 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS


GROMYKO, ANDREI

SUBJ: CONGRATULATIONS RE ELECTION AS CHAIRMAN OF PRESIDUM

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS.


FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

44

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES ONE

FROM WILLIAM MARTIN 456-2224 _____
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES CONGRATS LTR TO GROMYKO

LOG #: 5293

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>NICK PLATT</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS FOR APPROPRIATE HANDLING; ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/18/02

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5343

~~Matlock~~
34
45

July 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: ROBERT M MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Travel Request to Participate in the CSCE Tenth Anniversary Commemoration July 30-August 1 in Helsinki

I have been invited to accompany Secretary of State George P. Shultz to participate in the CSCE Tenth Anniversary Commemoration in Helsinki on July 30 - August 1.

Request that per diem/subsistence costs be covered by NSC.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel request.

Approve

WLP

Disapprove

Attachment:

cc: Administrative Office

DATE: 7/5/85

44

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To accompany Sec George P. Shultz to CSCE Mtg in Helsinki, July 30-August 1, 1985
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Washington/Helsinki/Washington

DEPARTURE DATE July 29, 1985 RETURN DATE August 1, 1985
 TIME 13:00 TIME 14:40

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
 GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR _____ POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
 TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM \$279 OTHER \$109 TOTAL TRIP COST \$388
 PER DIEM ONLY _____
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC XX OTHER _____
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
Will be flying on Secretary Schult's plane at no cost to the NSC.
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO X
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): _____
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ _____
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock

13. APPROVALS:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSYSTEM II 7490 ✓
90725 JMC
47
Matlock~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 6, 1985 RR

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rcm*
SUBJECT: CIA Paper on Gorbachev's First Hundred Days

Bill Casey has sent over the attached study of Gorbachev's activities during his first hundred days in power. I think you will find it interesting reading.

Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from DCI Casey with paper entitled,
"Gorbachev, the New Broom"

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 #7490

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

7491
The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

SYSTEM II 48
90725

27 June 1985


Dear Mr. President,

You may find this good airplane reading.

It is a good picture of Gorbachev's style, objectives and operating methods as shown in the first 100 days of his leadership.

You will sympathize with his targetting the massive bureaucratic apparatus, which, he complains, implements Central Committee decisions so that after they are finished "nothing is left."

Respectfully yours,


William J. Casey

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

"FOR THE PRESIDENT'S AIRPLANE READING"

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 #7491

BY RW NARA DATE 5/26/11

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

JUNE 1985

Gorbachev, the New Broom

Summary


Gorbachev has demonstrated in his first 100 days that he is the most aggressive and activist Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He is willing to take controversial and even unpopular decisions--like the antialcohol campaign--and to break with recent precedent by criticizing the actions of his colleagues on the Politburo. [redacted]

He has thrown down the gauntlet on issues as controversial as the allocation of investment, broadgauged management reform, and purging the system of incompetent and corrupt officials. The very insistence of his rhetoric allows little room for compromise or retreat. [redacted]

Gorbachev is gambling that an attack on corruption and inefficiency, not radical reform, will turn the domestic situation around. While a risky course, his prospects for success should not be underestimated. Although his approach is controversial, his near term prospects look good. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he has already managed to firm up his base of support in the Politburo and Secretariat. He can also count on some support from middle level officials of the bureaucracy who were frustrated by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era. The public as well has responded favorably to his style, judging by initial reaction

This paper was prepared by [redacted] of the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Comments and questions may be directed to the Chief, [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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NLRR F06-114/2# 7492
BY RW NARA DATE 5/26/11

filtering back through Western sources. His aggressiveness has placed the opposition on the defensive. His opponents are probably biding their time hoping he makes a major misstep. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev's Style

Gorbachev has moved to draw a sharp contrast in style to his recent predecessors, who treated the bureaucracy gingerly and approached change cautiously. Brezhnev and Chernenko voiced concern about the deepening economic and morale problems in the country, but they were not prepared to confront the bureaucracies standing in the way of solutions. Brezhnev's solicitous attitude toward the bureaucracy limited the power of his office as officials came to believe they had lifetime tenure. Andropov moved to break this mold, but he was handicapped by his poor health and the lingering presence of Brezhnevites, including Chernenko and Premier Tikhonov. Learning from Andropov's experience, Gorbachev has consciously created an environment of urgency and made clear he intends to confront problems. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev's populist style has not been seen since Khrushchev's frequent forays among the public and bare knuckles approach to dealing with the bureaucracy:

- He has visited factories in Moscow and Leningrad and found other opportunities to rub shoulders with workers in an effort to burnish his image as a man of the people. Soviet television has highlighted his easy give-and-take with ordinary citizens.
- He is carefully managing public relations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Gorbachev played to the photographers.

- Gorbachev has also moved his wife Raisa into the spotlight. She has appeared in the Soviet press and on television, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

While these traits mark Gorbachev as an unconventional Soviet politician, it is his no-holds-barred approach to confronting chronic domestic problems that underscores his new style as a leader. Gorbachev may feel that an aggressive approach is essential if he is to avoid getting bogged down like

Andropov. A wide spectrum of Soviet officials complained of drift and corruption under Brezhnev and became discouraged when Andropov's ill health caused his initiatives to lose momentum. They provide a well-spring of potential support for Gorbachev's approach: 61

- He has instituted a sweeping crackdown on the deep-rooted problem of alcoholism. [REDACTED]

- He criticized his Politburo colleagues in public during his visit to Leningrad, terming their recent decision on the allocation of land for private plots inadequate and dismissing objections apparently raised by his colleagues.

- He has assailed ministers by name for lack of innovation, laziness, and poor management and has strongly implied that they will be removed. He has attacked the complacent attitude toward corruption within the party bureaucracy and called for promotion of younger and more competent officials at all levels. While such rhetoric is not new in itself, he has already underscored his intention to back up his tough rhetoric with dismissals by sacking some middle-level officials.

-- [REDACTED]

Gorbachev has made it clear that he believes his policies are justified by the growing foreign and domestic problems facing the USSR:

- He has studied his speeches with language that evokes the image of a crisis, and suggested that the USSR is now at a turning point. [REDACTED] he has decided to raise Russian national consciousness and to impose "super-enforcement" of order and discipline.
- At the April Central Committee plenum, he was sharply critical of the economic laxity under Brezhnev and the failure to follow through on decisions which had been taken by the leadership.
- In his speech to the S&T conference in early June, he warned that accelerated economic growth was an imperative due to the need to sustain current levels of consumption

while making the investments in defense required by current international tensions. [redacted]

Consolidating Power

Gorbachev is using time honored methods for building his power, advancing his allies into key leadership positions, but he is off to a faster start than any of his recent predecessors. More changes are likely soon:

- By advancing three allies to full Politburo membership in April he has probably achieved a working majority on most issues.
- The designation of Yegor Ligachev--one of the three promoted--as unofficial "second secretary" isolated his major rival, Secretary Grigoriy Romanov, who has been nearly invisible politically. [redacted]
- KGB boss Chebrikov--who was also promoted--appears to be another close ally, giving the General Secretary an important advantage in exerting political pressure against would-be Politburo opponents, most of whom are tainted by corruption.
- Gorbachev also placed a younger protege in charge of the department that oversees personnel appointments, further consolidating his control over personnel policy and setting the groundwork for potentially sweeping personnel changes preceding next February's party congress. He is off to a fast pace in replacing his opponents in the bureaucracy. He has retired one deputy premier and three ministers, and named nine new regional party bosses and three new Central Committee department heads. [redacted]

Domestic Strategy

Using his strong political position, Gorbachev's first priority is to push his domestic economic program. While some Soviet officials have indicated he is sympathetic to the use of pragmatic methods, including tapping private initiative, his statements and actions underscore his overall commitment to the current economic system and his determination to make it work better. Having acknowledged the gravity of the economic problem, Gorbachev exudes an optimism that he and his team can eliminate waste, tighten discipline, increase the quality and quantity of production, and accelerate economic growth. While expressing great pride in the historical accomplishments of central planning, he has sharply criticized its recent performance, and called for

"revolutionary" changes in the way the sytem works. [REDACTED] 13

His first priority fix is to reduce waste and tighten discipline, particularly among managers:

- Gorbachev has cited cases of such waste, such as the 20 percent loss of the harvest. Figures published in the Soviet press indicate Andropov's discipline campaign has reduced losses in working time about 20 percent, and Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy recently announced that the campaign had saved several hundred million rubles. Gorbachev probably hopes to squeeze out similar resources.
- Soviet officials indicate that Gorbachev has reinvigorated Andropov's discipline campaign. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Gorbachev has reinitiated document checks and crackdowns on drunks and deadbeats, even threatening to fire managers who have failed to correct such problems among their workers.
- His speeches indicate he will extend earlier efforts to tie pay more closely to productivity both for workers and managers, not only rewarding good workers but penalizing--perhaps even docking the salaries--of poor performers. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Building from a base of improved worker discipline and management effectiveness, Gorbachev hopes to further boost long-term growth entail a modernization of the capital base by increased investment in machine-building and retooling existing factories. While the effects of this approach will not be felt for some time, he has remanded the draft Five-Year Plan for 1986-90 to redirect it toward growth based on increased productivity rather than expanded resources. More specifically:

- He has called for investment in modernizing factories to be increased from 1/3 to 1/2 of investment,* and demanded that investment and output in civilian machine-building be doubled. He even called for "mothballing" some new construction projects, as an unusually candid admission of a major Soviet problem in the construction sector. His stress on conservation rather than increased output of raw materials also indicates a heightened emphasis in this area. [REDACTED]

*Soviet bureaucrats, both ministerial and party, have traditionally called for new construction. Such projects have been doled out to satisfy local lobbies like pork barrel projects. In his S&T conference speech, Gorbachev condemned this approach and insisted on focusing investment on where it was needed most.

Beyond this, he has been less specific on other economic initiatives, but his statements suggests he may intend to press even more controversial policies touching of the powers of the bureaucracy:

- His public statements suggests he wants to amalgamate ministries and redirect them and the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) away from day-to-day management decisions.
- He would like to see greater autonomy for plant managers and will probably push for reduction of centrally dictated indicators.
- He has criticized intermediate management bodies that choke off initiative, hinting that they should be streamlined or eliminated. His aim is to eliminate some of the massive bureaucratic apparatus that, as he complained in his speech to the S&T conference, implements Central Committee decisions in such a manner that after they are finished "nothing is left of these principles."
- He may advocate legalizing some parts of the "second economy" and allow a limited expansion of the role of private agriculture, despite potential ideological opposition. He hinted at this in his Leningrad speech in May. Gorbachev may feel some limited concessions--like tolerating private repairmen or allowing greater access to summer gardens for urban dwellers--could help improve the quality of life without undermining the system or forcing a showdown with ideological purists in the elite who have traditionally have resisted such steps. [redacted]

Foreign Policy

Gorbachev's impact on foreign policy has so far been mostly stylistic. He has revealed no urgent agenda to match his determination to accelerate economic growth at home. Some of his gambits--like the INF moratorium--are stable leftovers from his predecessor. His immediate goal has apparently been to demonstrate to both allies and adversaries that there is now a strong and active leader in the Kremlin. Despite the press of domestic business, Gorbachev has received a steady stream of European and Third World leaders. He has been more activist than his immediate predecessors and will reportedly embark soon on a vigorous schedule of personal diplomacy and foreign trips. He is slated to travel to Paris in October for meetings with Mitterrand and he may visit India later this year. [redacted]

Although he has not yet made any serious new initiative toward the US, he has already made his presence felt on Soviet

policy. He reportedly ratified the return to the bargaining table in Geneva even before Chernenko's death in March. He softened Soviet conditions for a summit with President Reagan soon after entering office. Since then, he has apparently sanctioned the recent expansion of bilateral exchanges and met with several US delegations. [REDACTED]

In public statements and private discussions, however, Gorbachev is clearly intent on presenting [REDACTED] a tough hardline image abroad and convincing American policymakers that bilateral relations will improve only if US policy changes. He and his colleagues evidently do not believe an early improvement in relations is likely:

- A variety of sources make clear Gorbachev will concentrate on cultivating an image of strength, not conciliation.

-- [REDACTED]

- In talks with American visitors he has bristled at efforts to raise human rights issues, demanded that the US not take a "carrot and stick" approach, and insisted that Soviet leaders will be ready to deal only when the US starts treating the USSR as an equal.

- Moscow's more recent decision to play hard to get on a summit dovetails with this strategy. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] claim Gorbachev will expand previous Soviet efforts to drive wedges between the US and our allies. He has already spoken publicly of a "community of interest" between the USSR and Western Europe, met with a series of European leaders, and indicated that Moscow is now prepared to establish political relations with the European Community:

-- [REDACTED]

Gorbachev has also taken a tough line within the Warsaw Pact, reportedly sending ripples of concern through the more Brezhnevite regimes, such as Czechoslovakia. His public

statements have stressed the need for bloc unity and closer economic integration. [redacted]

[redacted] claimed that Gorbachev's tough guy attitude was meant not only for the West but to signal to allies that he is not to be trifled with. [redacted]

Gorbachev's early actions have also signaled strong support for allies in Afghanistan and Central America:

- Soviet forces in Afghanistan continue to pursue the more aggressive military approach that we began to see last year.
- He met Nicaraguan leader Ortega only days after the US Congress turned down the President's original request for aid to the Contras and pledged increased oil deliveries to bolster the regime. [redacted]

Opposition to Gorbachev's Juggernaut?


Opposition to Gorbachev for now appears disorganized. The old guard in the Politburo--such as Premier Tikhonov, Moscow party boss Grishin or republic bosses Shcherbitskiy and Kunayev--are probably on the defensive due to charges of mismanagement or corruption in their organizations. Secretary Romanov, a potential focus for opposition, has been outflanked by Gorbachev's personnel moves and probably is no longer an effective rallying point. [redacted]

As a result, those threatened by Gorbachev at the Central Committee level lack an effective spokesman. While they can resist by footdragging on his policies, he can probably remove them if they don't appear to be falling into line. Many elderly Brezhnev-era holdovers may well find it easier to retire than fight. [redacted]

Despite his strong position, Gorbachev does not have an entirely free hand. Other Politburo members can still slow up his initiatives. Independents or even allies might balk at some aspects of Gorbachev's freewheeling style. There are some signs, moreover, that Gorbachev's initiatives have already been watered down or met resistance:

- Judging from his remarks in Leningrad, the Politburo rejected his more far reaching proposals for expansion of garden plots, evidently on the grounds that this amounts to encouraging private enterprise.

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-- Some evidence suggests that the timing of a US-Soviet summit has become entangled in leadership politics.



Soviet media treatment of Gorbachev's speeches suggests that his policy agenda is meeting some high-level resistance:

- Press versions of Gorbachev's speech in Leningrad toned down his criticism of the Politburo decision on extending the private plots.
- Published versions also eliminated references to Gorbachev's personal sponsorship or support of economic reform initiatives.
- On some occasions, the media have published full accounts of his speeches only after a delay of several days. [redacted]

[redacted]
Nonetheless, the strength of Gorbachev's position suggests that his detractors will have to wait until he makes a major misstep or overreaches on a controversial issue in order to give them an opportunity to coalesce. The real test may come when evidence begins to roll in on the success or failure of his program. [redacted]

Can Gorbachev Succeed Where Khrushchev Failed?

Gorbachev's efforts to force greater efficiency out of the system is still a risky gamble, despite the disorganized state of resistance. Khrushchev, for instance, succeeded for nearly ten years in keeping the opposition on the defensive through endless reorganizations and campaigns, but eventually he alienated his own supporters. Khrushchev's approach was so helter skelter that the bureaucrats often could not discern what he really wanted them to do. [REDACTED]

Having witnessed Khrushchev's mistakes, Gorbachev's signals are likely to be much clearer and more consistent. Yet, a number of these clear signals are likely to produce resistance. Gorbachev's investment strategy may cause him the most problems with the bureaucracy. The allocation of investment is closely tied to the power of officialdom, who can dole out "pork barrel" projects as a kind of political payment for loyalty. By sharply reducing investment funds in some sectors and requiring a new approach to management, moreover, Gorbachev's approach is bound to alienate many in the bureaucracy upon whom he must depend for policy implementation. While he can use the power of hiring and firing to discipline this group, such an approach--as Khrushchev discovered--potentially has its cost in terms of production and political support. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev's call for faster economic growth may also come back to haunt him. Efforts to reconstruct existing factories may lead to declining output at a time when he is proposing a return to higher economic growth rates. While his four percent growth prediction for the next Five Year Plan may not be entirely out of reach, it forces managers into the position of choosing between increasing output and reequipping their factories. Massive shifts in investment priorities could also create bottlenecks and disruptions in the economy. For instance, shifting resources from energy extraction--at a time when both coal and oil output is declining--to the production of more energy efficient machinery might exacerbate the energy balance in the short term. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev will have to carefully calibrate his policies in order to avoid pitfalls in a system where emphasizing specific priorities at the top frequently translates into slackened effort on other areas. The prospects for a radical reorientation of Soviet managers toward quality rather than quantity are also not good--it runs counter to the approach of the last 55 years. But, Andropov's experience demonstrated that a concerted effort on management discipline--backed by the threat of firing--can probably have beneficial effects. [REDACTED]

Looking Ahead

With the urgent rhetoric and ambitious agenda he has set so

far, Gorbachev will be under the gun to show continuing evidence of momentum or else risk allowing potential opponents to draw together and work against him. [REDACTED]

Consolidating power. Gorbachev is likely to be elected President at next week's Supreme Soviet session. He might also advance other allies into junior slots in the leadership at a plenum preceding the Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev will almost certainly use the party elections campaign before the party congress next year to replace many Brezhnev holdovers among regional party and government leaders. Party Secretary Romanov, once Gorbachev's major rival, is already in decline, and a recent smear campaign linking him to Gorbachev's opponents may be intended to pave the way for his removal. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev will continue to oust symbols of the Brezhnev old guard in the economic bureaucracy. The ministers he named at the S&T conference are almost certain to go. Gorbachev's attacks on the ministries have made Premier Tikhonov's position increasingly untenable, and he could be gracefully eased out even before the party congress. The retirement of Gosplan chief Baybakov, a symbol of resistance to change since the Brezhnev era, would send a strong message to the bureaucracy. [REDACTED]

Domestic Agenda. If Gorbachev wants to signal a new tone, he could defer the traditional summer vacation and work on getting the draft Five Year Plan and party program in shape for the congress. The draft program might be unveiled at the next plenum and should certainly echo his themes of increased discipline and technological progress. When the draft of the economic plan is made public, it should reflect his demands for increased economic growth rates and a new investment strategy. [REDACTED]

He could also make additional forays outside of Moscow to demonstrate his leadership and activism. He is currently visiting the Ukrainian capital Kiev and might undertake a visit to somewhere in Siberia to further increase his exposure. He could use these trips to keep up the rhetorical pressure on the economic bureaucrats. [REDACTED]

Foreign Policy. We will probably begin to see a growing Gorbachev impact on foreign policy. Gromyko's influence will decline further from its high point in the Chernenko regime. A meeting with President Reagan would also burnish his image as a statesman, and an early move by Moscow to arrange a summit cannot be ruled out. [REDACTED]

His activism may also be reflected in bolder efforts to put pressure on current US policy. We could, for example, see more skillful attempts to woo Tokyo by exploiting trade frictions between the US and Japan, or a symbolic gesture toward Beijing designed to disrupt Sino-US relations. New initiatives to undermine NATO cooperation on SDI and COCOM restrictions are also

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likely.

up

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BOX

Signals of Setback for Gorbachev

Opponents will be looking for opportunities to slow Gorbachev's momentum. An early indicator of political difficulties would be his failure to get the Presidency. While there may be reasons for a General Secretary to delay assumption of the Presidency--Andropov may have for instance--Gorbachev would have to consider the cost of losing political momentum, especially when he so clearly linked the offices of General Secretary and President in nominating Chernenko as chief of state last year. [REDACTED]

-- [REDACTED] On balance, however, Gorbachev would probably still benefit more from holding both posts, and it would facilitate his enagement in personal summitry with foreign heads of state. [REDACTED]

Another sign of resistance would be delays in the publication of the draft Five Year Plan or party program or the failure of the drafts to show new approaches to economic and social policy. If Gorbachev fails to follow up on his tough rhetoric by firing the ministers he has criticized, it would be widely read in the USSR as a setback. He has made personnel turnover a major issue, and failure to make changes in the top echelon of the party and ministries would signify that his Politburo colleagues are unwilling to go along. [REDACTED]

END BOX

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7493
SYSTEM II
90725

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

CIA Paper on "Gorbachev, the New Broom"

Bill Casey has supplied, for the President's reading, a well-written paper on Gorbachev's first hundred days in office. Although I received the paper after the President's departure for Chicago today, I believe it is very appropriate for weekend reading.

Recommendation:

That you forward the paper at Tab A to the President.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memorandum from DCI Casey with the paper entitled
"Gorbachev, the New Broom"

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRRF 06-114/2 #7493
BY KML NARA DATE 11/29/11