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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/11/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON (APPROVED/DISAPPROVED)
SEPTEMBER 1985 (6/6)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1109

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7855	MEMCON	PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE OF USSR R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	15	ND	B1
7856	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7855 R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	15	ND	B1
7864	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE JOHN BROWNE IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	9/30/1985	B1
7859	PAPER	"POST SCRIPT" BY JOHN BROWNE R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	7/2/1985	B1
7860	PAPER	"MR GORBACHEV---A KENNEDY IN THE KREMLIN?" BY JOHN BROWNE R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	19	5/20/1985	B1
7857	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SHULTZ UN MEETING R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	1	ND	B1
7861	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MAY DAY AT UNGA R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	9/26/1985	B1
7858	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PAPERS ON THE SOVIET UNION: SOVIET INSTRUMENTS OF CONTROL R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7865	PAPER	THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	3	ND	B1
7866	PAPER	NOMENKLATURA: THE USSR'S PATRONAGE SYSTEM <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	4	ND	B1
7862	PAPER	THE SOVIET POLITICAL POLICE <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	5	ND	B1
7863	PAPER	THE SOVIET MILITARY <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	5	ND	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

President's Meeting with Shevardnadze:
Memorandum of Conversation

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation of the President's meeting with Shevardnadze September 27, 1985.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *GS* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 # 7855

SYSTEM II
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BY C11 NARA DATE 10/30/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union ~~(S/S)~~

PARTICIPANTS: Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM Chernyshov
Minister Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Counselor to the FM Sergei P. Tarasenko
Mr. Pavel R. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

DATE, TIME Friday, September 27, 1985
AND PLACE: 10:00-12:00 a.m., Oval Office

The President greeted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and led him into the Oval Office for a photo opportunity which ended at 10:10, at which time the other participants entered the room and the President opened the meeting. ~~(U)~~

The President began by observing that in preparing for this meeting he had had a chance to look at how the United States is portrayed in the Soviet press. He observed that the picture is less than flattering. He said that he raised this not to make Mr. Shevardnadze uncomfortable but to make a point. This meeting and the meeting that he would have with Mr. Gorbachev in November would provide an opportunity for each of them to get a more accurate view of the other. He wanted the Soviet leadership to begin to get a true picture of who he, Ronald Reagan, is, what he stands for and what he wants to accomplish. He would like to get the same picture of Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues. ~~(S/S)~~

The President continued by pointing out that we need to get beyond stereotypes and talk frankly about our differences, to explore constructively what we can achieve together between now and November 19, and after that meeting as well. ~~(S/S)~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

The President noted that when he met with Foreign Minister Gromyko last year he discussed his view of the world and our two countries' place in it. Since Mr. Servardnadze was familiar with what he said then he would not repeat himself but he did want to emphasize two things that he said at that time. The first is that our philosophies and political systems are very different and will remain so, but we live in one world and must handle our competition in peace. The second is that neither of us will ever allow the other a military edge, but if we are ever going to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms, there will never be a better time. (S/S)

The President then noted some of the things which he wished to cover in his November meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. He said he wanted to discuss several points--why the Soviet Union should feel threatened by the United States when the United States has never started a war and never will. He wanted to explain why we see the Soviet military build-up and Soviet attempts to expand its influence in the world as threatening to us, and to explain that this is why the United States is rebuilding its strength. We are doing so to defend ourselves and make sure a war is never conceivable. But he also wanted to go beyond a discussion of rivalry--he would like to share with General Secretary Gorbachev our hopes and plans for our people since we both have much to do at home. It might make it easier to reduce suspicion if the two of them could understand each other's priorities better. (S/S)

The President then turned to international issues, saying that disputes in third countries have frequently been the cause of the most serious strains between us. He pointed out that efforts during the seventies to develop understandings came apart in our view because of the Soviet Union's failure to act with restraint. When our friends are militarily threatened by the Soviets and their Allies, they ask us to help and we must respond. We will continue to do so, but we would like to end this cycle. (S/S)

The President noted that we had started discussions on several areas in the world and that he was glad we had done so. We find these exchanges useful and we will have a formal proposal to regularize these discussions. (S/S)

We must go further, however, in dealing with the problems caused by outside military involvement in regional disputes. We need to give greater thought, creative thought, to how we can remove the military element from our rivalry and he would welcome Mr. Gorbachev's thoughts on this. He then noted that there is a lot that could be said about particular issues but he would defer that until later in order to present some thoughts on arms control. (S/S)

Regarding arms control the President made the following points:

- Arms control is one of the most difficult of the issues before us. Frankly, we do not know if your government is serious about

making progress in arms control. We are prepared to make progress; we are prepared to keep our objectives high. ~~(S/S)~~

- Our two governments have underway a number of formal negotiations. In addition, the U.S. has proposed that our representatives get together soon on a number of other specific issues. I believe that what is actually achieved at these negotiations and discussions should be the basis for what General Secretary Gorbachev and I can accomplish in this area in November. ~~(S/S)~~

- As a first priority, the United States seeks stabilizing and radical reductions in the levels and power of offensive nuclear arms. These are the weapons that most threaten mankind. This goal should be paramount to both of us. ~~(S/S)~~

- We must also consider the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. Your country has long had a massive strategic defense program, including major improvements in your existing ABM system deployed around Moscow and your new radar at Krasnoyarsk which is in violation of the ABM Treaty. We are also seeing the upgrading of your strategic air defenses. ~~(S/S)~~

- We are now conducting a research effort in the area of strategic defense technologies, as you have for years. We are morally bound to seeing whether or not strategic defenses can offer a better, safer way of maintaining the peace than is possible by the accumulation of offensive nuclear arms. ~~(S/S)~~

- I have directed that our strategic defense research be conducted within the bounds of the ABM Treaty. ~~(S/S)~~

- Now is the time to take a bold step by agreeing to deep cuts in nuclear forces in a manner which enhances stability. Now is the time to establish stability and begin a serious dialogue on the offense/defense relationship. ~~(S/S)~~

- If we are successful then we can look forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war, perhaps based on an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against nuclear offensive arms. ~~(S/S)~~

- This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we believe the U.S., the Soviet Union and all other nations can agree. ~~(S/S)~~

- I would like to underscore, in strongest personal terms, my commitment to the pursuit of arms reduction. ~~(S/S)~~

- We also ought to look at other ways our senior defense and military officers can have more regular contact. We should ask our experts to explore such approaches. ~~(S/S)~~

- However, we still seem to have a problem with incidents involving our military officers in Germany. We must insist that you take effective steps to enforce discipline on your troops so that our people are treated with the respect we show yours in Germany and lives are not threatened and no one is abused. The incident which affected our people most was the murder of Major Nicholson. This matter is not closed. ~~(S/S)~~

The President then turned to bilateral issues noting that these are very important. He then made the following specific points:

- If we are to make real progress in solving the critical problems, we are going to have to take major steps to improve the climate. ~~(S/S)~~

- We must find a way to live on this planet in peace. Doing that will be much harder if our people don't have more contact and don't have better means to communicate. ~~(S/S)~~

- For this reason, those issues we have under negotiation are very important. We have to make sure our negotiators get on with the talks and start producing some results. There has been too much haggling over minor points, and we have to break that pattern. ~~(S/S)~~

- But, you know, even though it is important to conclude these efforts, they are not nearly enough. The fact is that our societies are dangerously cut off from each other, and we need truly major steps to improve that situation. ~~(S/S)~~

- Frankly, I think our bureaucracies have not been imaginative enough in preparing for our meeting in Geneva. I have instructed our people to go back to the drawing boards and to come up with some ideas which are commensurate to the need for better communication and more cooperation. ~~(S/S)~~

- I have in mind things like:

-- Giving our students and young people more opportunities to meet and study together;

-- Working together in an area like computer education;

-- More contact between our military people;

-- Joining efforts to find cures for cancer and other diseases;

-- Getting some help from you in improving Russian-language instruction here. ~~(S/S)~~

- I have instructed our people to develop some ideas along these lines, and will be passing them along in diplomatic channels. (S/S)

- I hope you will also be thinking of more ambitious ways to expand communication and cooperation between our societies. Tell Mr. Gorbachev that I don't think we should be limited by our cautious bureaucrats. The two of us can lead our countries to some real breakthroughs if we set that as our goal. (S/S)

The President concluded his initial presentation by saying that this is how he sees the overall picture. He regretted that he took so long, but thought it important to give Shevardnadze his thoughts on the October meeting. He then solicited Shevardnadze's views. (S/S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze thanked the President for receiving him, and for the attention given to his visit and his delegation. He regarded the reception as an expression of the President's attitude toward his country and its leadership. Shevardnadze noted that he had seen Gorbachev before leaving Moscow and that Gorbachev sent greetings and best wishes to the President and said that he was looking forward to their meeting in November with interest and hope. (S/S)

Shevardnadze stated that he had arrived with instructions from the Soviet leadership and that he wanted to deliver to the President a letter which is quite substantial and of major importance. He did not expect an immediate reply because of the letter's length, but would make some comment on it. He then handed the letter to the President. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then noted that there had been a recent tradition of communication between our leaders and these messages had been a positive element in our relations. He also pointed out that Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership are engaged just as the President is in serious preparation for their meeting. This meeting will be of importance to more than our two countries. In New York he had had the opportunity to meet with many Foreign Ministers, and he found that they were less interested in discussing bilateral questions than in discussing the prospects for the forthcoming meeting between the President and Gorbachev. This demonstrates that nations and governments of the world have great hope for that meeting. (S/S)

As far as the Soviets are concerned they hope that crucial questions, global questions, will be resolved at that meeting. The people of the world live in fear. They know our two countries have tremendous devastating potential and not only for each other, since we can destroy the earth and even affect the entire solar system. Shevardnadze reiterated that Gorbachev had worked hard on his message and had sought and taken the advice of

his colleagues. He regards the message as a concept for the summit meeting in November. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev agrees with the idea which appeared repeatedly in the correspondence that there are substantial differences between our countries, and also that many of these problems will continue to exist. There are obvious political, economic and social differences between our countries. Nevertheless he believes, like the President, that we must co-exist on this planet and learn to cooperate, and indeed mankind looks to us for such a decision. When American visitors have seen Gorbachev he has said to them, "Either we live together or die together," and he has expressed this thought in the letter. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze pointed out that the prevention of nuclear war is the principal task today, and that Comrade Gorbachev believes that at the Geneva meeting the two sides could come to a mutual understanding regarding the prevention of nuclear war. Such an understanding must be based on the essential principles of the inadmissibility of military superiority on either side and the inadmissibility of encroaching on the security of either side. This was the first thought. The second was that both sides need to confirm their recognition of the need to limit and reduce nuclear arms. This can be done by terminating the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. That would make a radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations possible. Gorbachev thinks that we need to work for this, both before and after the summit meeting. ~~(S/S)~~

What the Soviets have in mind is working on the various problems in a comprehensive way. Indeed questions of space and nuclear arms must be approached in a comprehensive way. The Soviets look at the situation as follows:

- 1) The prevention of the militarization of space is the road to the reduction of nuclear arms.
- 2) We must look for solutions in a dynamic and active way for the summit, if it is to have tangible and positive results. Stopping the arms race in its main area, the nuclear area, is essential. Shevardnadze asserted that the Soviets have stopped nuclear tests but that their moratorium is not an unlimited one. It would be good if the United States would give thought to meeting the Soviets on this issue. If we have an agreement to end nuclear tests, it would not be the final step, but a step along the way to solve the problem of preventing nuclear war. ~~(S/S)~~

There has not been much progress in the Geneva negotiations. Each side says it is the fault of the other. The Soviets will be proposing a formula and a concept which could be the basis of that formula; it is in the General Secretary's letter. It involves (1) a complete ban on space strike weapons and (2) a 50% reduction of appropriate nuclear arms on both sides. ~~(S/S)~~

The picture would be as follows if there could be such an agreement: Nuclear arms capable of reaching the territories of each other would be reduced. He noted that the United States has more delivery vehicles than the Soviet Union, but the Soviets are prepared to take the step because it would preserve strategic equivalence between the two countries. Equality would be assured at equal but lower numbers of nuclear weapons. [Note: The proper translation of the Russian word "zaryad" is "weapon", not "charge", as the Soviet interpreter was saying.] Both sides would have 6,000 nuclear weapons, if one assumes a base of about 12,000. This would be a practical solution to the task set for the negotiators in Geneva. (S/S)

If we could reach such an agreement, Shevardnadze continued, strategic equilibrium and stability would be assured and trust between our two countries would be established. He added that Gorbachev said in his letter that an agreement on our part would be a good stimulus for the other nuclear powers. There is a need for political will on both sides to bring this about. In connection with the agreement the following would be resolved: (1) stopping work to develop space strike systems, (2) freezing nuclear arsenals at current levels,, (3) banning new types of nuclear weapons. The purpose would be to take out of operation and dismantle an agreed number of strategic arms on both sides plus a mutual obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in countries where there are none now deployed. In other words an agreement not to build up stockpiles and not to put new ones in where weapons are now deployed. (S/S)

Shevardnadze indicated that Gorbachev's letter also contained a few ideas regarding medium-range missiles in Europe, stating that the Soviet Union is prepared for the most radical reduction in their numbers and that the Soviet Union would agree not to have these weapons in a greater number than the weapons in UK and French hands, on the basis of warhead numbers. These are simply fundamental considerations on the broad questions; they obviously need to be considered by our specialists. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then referred to the President's remarks on confidence-building measures and stated that the subject matter of the Stockholm CDE Conference can become a part of the meeting. In outline, the picture there is that there seems to be a general understanding in three or four of the confidence-building areas. It would seem, based upon conversations with the US representative in Moscow recently, that there are no great differences in these four areas. (S/S)

Regarding the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Soviets believe that a positive solution could be found. The United States has raised verification questions and we agree that this is an important issue--we are no less interested in verification than you are. He quoted Gorbachev as saying "We are in favor of real and effective verification." He is willing to consider any comments made by the US on this matter. (S/S)

Regarding bilateral and regional problems, he proposed that we prepare a list of issues so that there can be a basis for agreement at the summit meeting in November. If the process continues in a normal manner and it is mutually desired, a concluding document for that meeting could be prepared. He added that he had presented to Secretary Shultz a general outline and that we will continue to have contact in diplomatic channels to work this out. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze then turned to the President's remarks, stating that he had said much regarding the strategic defense initiative. The Soviets understand that the programs in the United States have defensive elements to them, but they believe that the militarization of space should be banned and that space strike weapons should be banned. Those arms under development have not only defensive but offensive potential. Therefore, the Soviet position is to ban all stages except for laboratory research. He thought this position had not been well understood by the Administration. In fact both sides have basic research and this will continue and the Soviets are not trying to ban that. He then quoted from Article V of the ABM Treaty which states that "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM Systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based." The provisions not to develop, test or deploy are extremely important in the Soviet view. ~~(S/S)~~

The Soviets believe, he continued, that there is today a strategic equilibrium and that its basis is the SALT I and II Treaties and particularly the ABM Treaty. Other undertakings and treaties are relevant but those are the basis of our relations which must not be destroyed. Any other approach would mean a spiralling arm race, both quantitative and particularly qualitative. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze then observed that they read our press just as we read their press and in the American press he had seen the idea--perhaps it was not the official US government-view, that the Soviet Union can be exhausted by competition in the arms area. Those who assert this, even hope this, are mistaken. Such people are not aware of the Soviet potential, both economic and scientific. We are against war, he added, but we are not weak. The Soviet Union can withstand competition but does not want it to happen. It is sometimes said that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian regime, he observed. We have a different view--we have in addition to economic strength a moral and political unity and this is a force no less important than that of nuclear weapons. We take pride in it. ~~(S/S)~~

Regarding nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union has declared a moratorium. We expected a positive response. Instead we had a proposal to invite our representatives to observe a nuclear explosion in the United States. We did not come and this was not a capricious decision. We have sufficient scientific potential

that we ~~do~~ not need to observe the tests to know what is going on. (S/S)

For example, since the Soviet moratorium proposal, the United States has conducted one announced nuclear test but also there was one unannounced test--it occurred on August 15th at 1700 hours GMT in Nevada. It had a power of less than two kilotons. The Soviet specialists detected this test and they have no need to come to Nevada to know what happened. You have a beautiful country, of course, which it would be nice to visit, but one can record nuclear explosions in Moscow just as well as on the spot. Instruments exist which can differentiate between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. (S/S)

In this respect he found the President's news conference after Gorbachev's proposal was received of considerable interest. He was interested in a sentence which the President uttered at that time which he did not believe was accidental. It was to the effect that the United States has a projected program and after this program is completed, can revisit the problem. He thought that a date, perhaps January, had been mentioned by the President. Subsequent to this, others have tried to re-interpret the President's remarks but he, Shevardnadze, found the words of interest. (S/S)

Shevardnadze continued by saying that he had spoken with Secretary Shultz in Helsinki about creating a good atmosphere for the meeting. This is as important as anything else. In the Soviet Union we criticize each other in a sharp manner. Therefore, it is not that we are sensitive to criticism; we are accustomed to it. But some statements made in the United States, and not only by correspondents but even by responsible American officials, seem like they are designed to be like an artillery barrage before a battle. Sometimes the arguments are not at all convincing. For example, the talk about the Soviet Union being ahead of the United States in its weaponry. At the same time American officials are saying that the Soviet Union is engaged in stealing technology from the West. There is no logic in this. Now I don't want to sound offensive but our people are offended by statements like "evil empire". When I heard that I thought the President had the old empire in mind, not the Soviet Union of today. (S/S)

Every country has its pride and identity and those things which are sacred to it. We for example would be pleased to pay tribute to George Washington - even our first-graders know about George Washington and the role he played in American history - but you know we are very much offended by some of the things that have been said about Lenin. We haven't done that sort of thing to you. Explaining historical processes that are going on in Africa, Latin America and Asia by incitement by Lenin is quite unjustified. Lenin signed the first Decree on Peace and he formulated this idea even before the Revolution. He called upon the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States even when

the United States did not recognize the Soviet Union. Many of you are religious believers--I am not -- but what sort of offense to believers would it be if we denounced God. For us Lenin is sacred. In addition some of the quotations used and attributed to him are not accurate--he never said anything like that. Now, of course, any personality can be criticized, but one should take into account the opinion of people and the effect upon them. (S/S)

Now when we mention certain elements in the relationship we are not trying just to win arguments. Gorbachev's letter and his concept shows that we do not want rhetorical arguments. Such arguments would not be at all dangerous if neither of us had nuclear missiles pointed at each other, but under the circumstances it is not a desirable thing. (S/S)

In the Soviet Union everyone welcomes the statement that you want to go down in history as a peacemaking President. We sincerely believe that our own proposals are consistent with this. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then concluded by thanking the President for his hospitality. He mentioned that it was his first visit here, although he had read much about the United States and knew that the American people are a great people. He felt the people of the Soviet Union have their own qualities and would like to use these riches for the benefit of mankind as a whole. (S/S)

The President said that Mr. Shevardnadze had raised many points of interest and he would like to comment on a few of them. (S/S)

He welcomed his comments on verification matters observing that this was the first time in his view that such an offer had been made by the Soviet Union. He was very pleased to hear it and hoped that this would indicate a willingness of the Soviet Union to give greater attention to this area. (S/S)

As for the proposal regarding 6,000 nuclear weapons, the President noted that the U.S. proposal was for a level of 5000 missile warheads. He asked if the Soviet proposal would be presented at Geneva, observing that up to now their proposal had not been concrete enough for negotiation. Since this is the first time that they will have made a concrete proposal as opposed to general statements, he was most gratified. (S/S)

Regarding the assertions that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in areas of military strength, the President noted that in 1972 the United States had a slight edge regarding warheads on ICBM's. Since then the Soviet Union has gone ahead, far ahead. In fact they have a three to one advantage now in land-based missile warheads. It is true that the United States has a better balance in its triad of forces. The United States has no intention of forcing the Soviet Union to a different structure it does not desire. Counting all nuclear warheads the Soviet Union also has an advantage - about 9,000 - 7,000. (S/S)

In conventional forces the Soviet Union is far ahead of the United States. Furthermore, we feel that the Soviet Union is building a potentially offensive force. (S/S)

Regarding the SALT agreements which the Minister had referred to it has been precisely since those agreements were signed that the Soviet Union has gone ahead so decisively in the area of ICBM warheads. (S/S)

As for space systems we must remember that everyone knows how to make nuclear weapons today. Suppose we and the Soviet Union reduce our arsenals to zero. No one could be sure that there are no nuclear weapons in the world. For example, in 1925 when countries agreed to ban chemical weapons, they did not give up the gas mask, they kept it, and we have had experience with madmen in international relations. Nevertheless, gas was not used in World War II. It was not used because all knew the others had it and could use it against them, and because we all had gas masks. Now our Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program. It is being carried out within the framework of the ABM Treaty. If a weapon could be developed to intercept nuclear missiles, defensive systems would be like the gas mask. One would not have to worry about others having the weapon, because there would be a defense against it. If our research is successful we would not view it as necessary to deploy the system. We would sit down with you and others to discuss how it might be used. (S/S)

As far as the militarization of space is concerned, nuclear missiles fly through space, and this is militarization. There was once the idea of orbiting nuclear weapons, and we have agreed to ban that. But regarding defensive weapons, both countries should go ahead with research and see what is possible. Today, it is simply uncivilized to say that we can only maintain the peace by threatening innocent people. We need to find a better way and that is why we believe we need to go forward with research in this area. (S/S)

So far as his earlier reference to an "evil empire," perhaps he was responding to charges he had heard repeatedly from the other side that we are blood-thirsty imperialists. However, the point about atmosphere is a correct one. We should do more talking to each other rather than about each other. So far as the quotations of Lenin are concerned, the point is that the idea of our ultimate destruction is inherent in his thought. We have people from every strain on earth in our population. But there is a difference: here our people can dictate to their government what it does, while in your country the people don't have much to say about policy. But you have chosen the system you have and we have chosen another. We must live in peace and we must cooperate more. We could get together to put an end to some of the conflict in other regions. We would hope that you could find a way, for example, to withdraw from Afghanistan. This would have a very good effect on our mutual relationship. (S/S)

Shevardnadze responded that the President had mentioned certain details regarding who has more weapons and such. This is something our specialists should discuss. He had also mentioned some types of Soviet missiles but he had not mentioned cruise missiles and U.S. missiles in Europe which are strategic for the Soviet Union. But this is not the basic question. The basic question is: will the United States abide by the ABM Treaty? If the United States wants to revise or withdraw from that Treaty it should say so forthrightly, because its announced program is incompatible with it. So far as the Kransnoyarsk radar is concerned, we (the Soviets) can also name things such as U.S. radars in the U.K. and Greenland. But this is something our specialists should discuss. The radar near Kransnoyarsk has not been turned on yet. When it is, you can come and see it, and see that it is in compliance with the ABM Treaty. ~~(S/S)~~

The President returned to the matter of nuclear testing, pointing out that our instruments show that there have been Soviet tests above the 150 kiloton limit. The Soviets say that they have not tested above that limit, and have charged us with violating that limit. This was the reason for the invitation, not just to come and witness a test, but to bring instruments and to calibrate them. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze said that what Gorbachev is proposing leads to a final goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We must think of that as the final goal. Our negotiators can discuss numbers, whether it is 5,000 or 6,000, and weigh the impact of the various elements and the details. So long as there is stability one can be flexible about these things. ~~(S/S)~~

The President noted we had been the only ones to put a concrete figure down. He is delighted that the Soviets intend to table some figures for our people to deal with, and he agreed that any agreement must be only a step along the way to total elimination. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze agreed that any reduction should be progressive and should lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. ~~(S/S)~~

Secretary Shultz described the problem with the radar near Krasnoyarsk. He noted that the Soviets had said it is under construction and when completed could be looked at. However, the theory of the ABM Treaty is that certain things would not be undertaken. Large phased array radars are big, they take a lot of time to build, and they are necessary for a defense of the national territory. One must complain when one sees construction which is in violation of the Treaty. It needs to be stopped, not completed. This radar is not on the periphery of the Soviet Union and pointing outward. But this all suggests that if the Soviets think this is compatible with the ABM Treaty, then we should review what we both think the Treaty means. This is what he suggested to Minister Shevardnadze in New York, and this is different from talking about what is in violation or not. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze referred to his statement in New York and mentioned that he had discussed this with their experts in preparation for the meetings. We have discussed radars at Krasnoyarsk and in Greenland. The United States has not convinced us that Krasnoyarsk is a violation of the Treaty: it has a space tracking function. If you think otherwise, if you think this is not the fact, then the doubt must be removed, but then we must also apply this procedure to your radar in Greenland. Regarding the ABM defense in Moscow, this is legitimate in terms of the ABM Treaty. We cannot accept criticism for that. You could have a defense in Washington or New York if you wish, and that would be alright, but the points of real concern should be discussed. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that we are not charging a violation of the ABM Treaty because of the ABM system around Moscow. But we do need a discussion of what the Treaty means and how we obtain a mix of offense and defense in our deterrent strategy. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane referred to the ABM system around Moscow and pointed out that there are restrictions in the Treaty regarding what that system can contain. Limitations regarding such matters as rapid reload capacity, mobility of its components and so on, are a part of the Treaty. Certain activities can be called into question if it seems that the Treaty is not observed. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane continued that it is right to answer these questions in Geneva, but it is also fair to ask about fundamental principles. For example, regarding the Soviet reference to a ban on all new types, it seems that this would ban U.S. new types such as midgetman and the new submarine-launched missile, but would not apply to the new Soviet systems such as the SSX-24 and SSX-25 since the Soviets do not concede that these are new systems. He also noted that the Soviet proposal refers to nuclear weapons (or "charges"), because it seems they want to count U.S. weapons which are directed against the Soviet air defense system, while the U.S. has no air defense system. If these are included, it is not a reasonable basis for a balanced agreement. Therefore, we must conclude that some elements in the Soviet proposal are an apparent attempt to achieve an imbalance in the Soviet Union's favor. (S/S)

The President pointed out that we are acting fully in compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane called attention to Agreed Statement D in the ABM Treaty. It places no prohibition on research, testing or development, only on deployment. (S/S)

Korniyenko argued that the first sentence of Agreed Statement D, "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty," makes these agreements subordinate to Article III where there is a commitment not to deploy a nationwide system. (S/S)

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Mr. McFarlane pointed out that the commitment is not to deploy. ~~(S/S)~~

Korniyenko then referred to Article V of the Treaty which states that "each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based." ~~(S/S)~~

Mr. McFarlane pointed out that the terms of the Treaty do not preclude the development and testing of systems based on new physical principles. This illustrates the need to talk about our interpretation of the Treaty. ~~(S/S)~~

Secretary Shultz mentioned that those in the space and defense group at the Geneva negotiations have a lot to talk about. ~~(S/S)~~

Korniyenko said that the Soviet negotiators will have instructions to discuss the prevention of an arms race in space. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze remarked that they seem to be stealing the work of our negotiators. The Soviets have brought in a proposal which seems quite clear. It is important to establish a basic approach to these questions. The Soviets have often been reproached for having no proposals and although they have mentioned percentages for reductions they had not received a reply. Their proposal is not a demand. It is up to the United States to respond as it wishes. ~~(S/S)~~

The President asked if they would be putting the proposal on the table in Geneva. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze responded that, yes, they would table the proposal on Monday. He added that as he had said in New York, we could go back all the way to 1946 in assessing the situation -- the whole tragedy with nuclear weapons began then. ~~(S/S)~~

The President remarked that that was the period when the truth was made evident that this country has no aggressive intent toward anyone. We had an economy untouched by war damage, we had nuclear weapons -- the only country in the world to have them -- and we did not threaten anyone. In fact, we helped others with postwar reconstruction and did not expand our territory. Why should one think now, when we face so many weapons on the other side, we would suddenly become aggressive? ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze said that he mentioned 1946 not in order to criticize our cooperation in World War II, but only in regard to the postwar development of nuclear weapons. The United States used the weapon against Japan when it was clearly defeated. [At this point both Secretary Shultz and Chief of Staff Regan objected]. The USSR developed the weapon only after the United States did. ~~(S/S)~~

The President mentioned the offer that had been made in the Baruch Plan. ~~(S/S)~~

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Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union had proposed that all nuclear weapons be eliminated. ~~(S/S)~~

Secretary Shultz observed that the problem is not getting people to make declarations, but to get people to agree to make concrete arrangements to carry out these declarations. He added that the President had reacted positively to Shevardnadze's comments of verification, because this is indeed the root of many of the problems. ~~(S/S)~~

Korniyenko said that it is not correct to say that the Soviets have not made proposals on verification. He recalled the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban where an offer of on site verification was made by the Soviet negotiators. The United States broke off these negotiations. They should be resumed, in the Soviet view. ~~(S/S)~~

Shevardnadze remarked that these were historic negotiations and they need to be continued. ~~(S/S)~~

At this point the President noted that the time for the meeting had ended and suggested that the participants proceed to the Residence for lunch and asked that Minister Shevardnadze stay behind for a few minutes for a private meeting. ~~(U)~~

June 17

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

September 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Shevardnadze:
Memorandum of Conversation

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation of the President's meeting with Shevardnadze September 27, 1985.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CLJ* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7856

18
SYSTEM II
90995

BY QJ NARA DATE 10/30/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union (S)

PARTICIPANTS: Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM Chernyshov
Minister Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Counselor to the FM Sergei P. Tarasenko
Mr. Pavel R. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

DATE, TIME Friday, September 27, 1985
AND PLACE: 10:00-12:00 a.m., Oval Office

The President greeted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and led him into the Oval Office for a photo opportunity which ended at 10:10, at which time the other participants entered the room and the President opened the meeting. (U)

The President began by observing that in preparing for this meeting he had had a chance to look at how the United States is portrayed in the Soviet press. He observed that the picture is less than flattering. He said that he raised this not to make Mr. Shevardnadze uncomfortable but to make a point. This meeting and the meeting that he would have with Mr. Gorbachev in November would provide an opportunity for each of them to get a more accurate view of the other. He wanted the Soviet leadership to begin to get a true picture of who he, Ronald Reagan, is, what he stands for and what he wants to accomplish. He would like to get the same picture of Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues. (S)

The President continued by pointing out that we need to get beyond stereotypes and talk frankly about our differences, to explore constructively what we can achieve together between now and November 19, and after that meeting as well. (S)

SECRET

The President noted that when he met with Foreign Minister Gromyko last year he discussed his view of the world and our two countries' place in it. Since Mr. Servardnadze was familiar with what he said then he would not repeat himself but he did want to emphasize two things that he said at that time. The first is that our philosophies and political systems are very different and will remain so, but we live in one world and must handle our competition in peace. The second is that neither of us will ever allow the other a military edge, but if we are ever going to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms, there will never be a better time. (S)

The President then noted some of the things which he wished to cover in his November meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. He said he wanted to discuss several points--why the Soviet Union should feel threatened by the United States when the United States has never started a war and never will. He wanted to explain why we see the Soviet military build-up and Soviet attempts to expand its influence in the world as threatening to us, and to explain that this is why the United States is rebuilding its strength. We are doing so to defend ourselves and make sure a war is never conceivable. But he also wanted to go beyond a discussion of rivalry--he would like to share with General Secretary Gorbachev our hopes and plans for our people since we both have much to do at home. It might make it easier to reduce suspicion if the two of them could understand each other's priorities better. (S)

The President then turned to international issues, saying that disputes in third countries have frequently been the cause of the most serious strains between us. He pointed out that efforts during the seventies to develop understandings came apart in our view because of the Soviet Union's failure to act with restraint. When our friends are militarily threatened by the Soviets and their Allies, they ask us to help and we must respond. We will continue to do so, but we would like to end this cycle. (S)

The President noted that we had started discussions on several areas in the world and that he was glad we had done so. We find these exchanges useful and we will have a formal proposal to regularize these discussions. (S)

We must go further, however, in dealing with the problems caused by outside military involvement in regional disputes. We need to give greater thought, creative thought, to how we can remove the military element from our rivalry and he would welcome Mr. Gorbachev's thoughts on this. He then noted that there is a lot that could be said about particular issues but he would defer that until later in order to present some thoughts on arms control. (S)

Regarding arms control the President made the following points:

- Arms control is one of the most difficult of the issues before us. Frankly, we do not know if your government is serious about

making progress in arms control. We are prepared to make progress; we are prepared to keep our objectives high. (S)

- Our two governments have underway a number of formal negotiations. In addition, the U.S. has proposed that our representatives get together soon on a number of other specific issues. I believe that what is actually achieved at these negotiations and discussions should be the basis for what General Secretary Gorbachev and I can accomplish in this area in November. (S)

- As a first priority, the United States seeks stabilizing and radical reductions in the levels and power of offensive nuclear arms. These are the weapons that most threaten mankind. This goal should be paramount to both of us. (S)

- We must also consider the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. Your country has long had a massive strategic defense program, including major improvements in your existing ABM system deployed around Moscow and your new radar at Krasnoyarsk which is in violation of the ABM Treaty. We are also seeing the upgrading of your strategic air defenses. (S)

- We are now conducting a research effort in the area of strategic defense technologies, as you have for years. We are morally bound to seeing whether or not strategic defenses can offer a better, safer way of maintaining the peace than is possible by the accumulation of offensive nuclear arms. (S)

- I have directed that our strategic defense research be conducted within the bounds of the ABM Treaty. (S)

- Now is the time to take a bold step by agreeing to deep cuts in nuclear forces in a manner which enhances stability. Now is the time to establish stability and begin a serious dialogue on the offense/defense relationship. (S)

- If we are successful then we can look forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war, perhaps based on an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against nuclear offensive arms. (S)

- This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we believe the U.S., the Soviet Union and all other nations can agree. (S)

- I would like to underscore, in strongest personal terms, my commitment to the pursuit of arms reduction. (S)

- We also ought to look at other ways our senior defense and military officers can have more regular contact. We should ask our experts to explore such approaches. (S)

- However, we still seem to have a problem with incidents involving our military officers in Germany. We must insist that you take effective steps to enforce discipline on your troops so that our people are treated with the respect we show yours in Germany and lives are not threatened and no one is abused. The incident which affected our people most was the murder of Major Nicholson. This matter is not closed. (S)

The President then turned to bilateral issues noting that these are very important. He then made the following specific points:

- If we are to make real progress in solving the critical problems, we are going to have to take major steps to improve the climate. (S)

- We must find a way to live on this planet in peace. Doing that will be much harder if our people don't have more contact and don't have better means to communicate. (S)

- For this reason, those issues we have under negotiation are very important. We have to make sure our negotiators get on with the talks and start producing some results. There has been too much haggling over minor points, and we have to break that pattern. (S)

- But, you know, even though it is important to conclude these efforts, they are not nearly enough. The fact is that our societies are dangerously cut off from each other, and we need truly major steps to improve that situation. (S)

- Frankly, I think our bureaucracies have not been imaginative enough in preparing for our meeting in Geneva. I have instructed our people to go back to the drawing boards and to come up with some ideas which are commensurate to the need for better communication and more cooperation. (S)

- I have in mind things like:

-- Giving our students and young people more opportunities to meet and study together;

-- Working together in an area like computer education;

-- More contact between our military people;

-- Joining efforts to find cures for cancer and other diseases;

-- Getting some help from you in improving Russian-language instruction here. (S)

- I have instructed our people to develop some ideas along these lines, and will be passing them along in diplomatic channels. (S)

- I hope you will also be thinking of more ambitious ways to expand communication and cooperation between our societies. Tell Mr. Gorbachev that I don't think we should be limited by our cautious bureaucrats. The two of us can lead our countries to some real breakthroughs if we set that as our goal. (S)

The President concluded his initial presentation by saying that this is how he sees the overall picture. He regretted that he took so long, but thought it important to give Shevardnadze his thoughts on the October meeting. He then solicited Shevardnadze's views. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze thanked the President for receiving him, and for the attention given to his visit and his delegation. He regarded the reception as an expression of the President's attitude toward his country and its leadership. Shevardnadze noted that he had seen Gorbachev before leaving Moscow and that Gorbachev sent greetings and best wishes to the President and said that he was looking forward to their meeting in November with interest and hope. (S)

Shevardnadze stated that he had arrived with instructions from the Soviet leadership and that he wanted to deliver to the President a letter which is quite substantial and of major importance. He did not expect an immediate reply because of the letter's length, but would make some comment on it. He then handed the letter to the President. (S)

Shevardnadze then noted that there had been a recent tradition of communication between our leaders and these messages had been a positive element in our relations. He also pointed out that Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership are engaged just as the President is in serious preparation for their meeting. This meeting will be of importance to more than our two countries. In New York he had had the opportunity to meet with many Foreign Ministers, and he found that they were less interested in discussing bilateral questions than in discussing the prospects for the forthcoming meeting between the President and Gorbachev. This demonstrates that nations and governments of the world have great hope for that meeting. (S)

As far as the Soviets are concerned they hope that crucial questions, global questions, will be resolved at that meeting. The people of the world live in fear. They know our two countries have tremendous devastating potential and not only for each other, since we can destroy the earth and even affect the entire solar system. Shevardnadze reiterated that Gorbachev had worked hard on his message and had sought and taken the advice of

his colleagues. He regards the message as a concept for the summit meeting in November. (S)

Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev agrees with the idea which appeared repeatedly in the correspondence that there are substantial differences between our countries, and also that many of these problems will continue to exist. There are obvious political, economic and social differences between our countries. Nevertheless he believes, like the President, that we must co-exist on this planet and learn to cooperate, and indeed mankind looks to us for such a decision. When American visitors have seen Gorbachev he has said to them, "Either we live together or die together," and he has expressed this thought in the letter. (S)

Shevardnadze pointed out that the prevention of nuclear war is the principal task today, and that Comrade Gorbachev believes that at the Geneva meeting the two sides could come to a mutual understanding regarding the prevention of nuclear war. Such an understanding must be based on the essential principles of the inadmissibility of military superiority on either side and the inadmissibility of encroaching on the security of either side. This was the first thought. The second was that both sides need to confirm their recognition of the need to limit and reduce nuclear arms. This can be done by terminating the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. That would make a radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations possible. Gorbachev thinks that we need to work for this, both before and after the summit meeting. (S)

What the Soviets have in mind is working on the various problems in a comprehensive way. Indeed questions of space and nuclear arms must be approached in a comprehensive way. The Soviets look at the situation as follows:

- 1) The prevention of the militarization of space is the road to the reduction of nuclear arms.
- 2) We must look for solutions in a dynamic and active way for the summit, if it is to have tangible and positive results. Stopping the arms race in its main area, the nuclear area, is essential. Shevardnadze asserted that the Soviets have stopped nuclear tests but that their moratorium is not an unlimited one. It would be good if the United States would give thought to meeting the Soviets on this issue. If we have an agreement to end nuclear tests, it would not be the final step, but a step along the way to solve the problem of preventing nuclear war. (S)

There has not been much progress in the Geneva negotiations. Each side says it is the fault of the other. The Soviets will be proposing a formula and a concept which could be the basis of that formula; it is in the General Secretary's letter. It involves (1) a complete ban on space strike weapons and (2) a 50% reduction of appropriate nuclear arms on both sides. (S)

The picture would be as follows if there could be such an agreement: Nuclear arms capable of reaching the territories of each other would be reduced. He noted that the United States has more delivery vehicles than the Soviet Union, but the Soviets are prepared to take the step because it would preserve strategic equivalence between the two countries. Equality would be assured at equal but lower numbers of nuclear weapons. [Note: The proper translation of the Russian word "zaryad" is "weapon", not "charge", as the Soviet interpreter was saying.] Both sides would have 6,000 nuclear weapons, if one assumes a base of about 12,000. This would be a practical solution to the task set for the negotiators in Geneva. (S)

If we could reach such an agreement, Shevardnadze continued, strategic equilibrium and stability would be assured and trust between our two countries would be established. He added that Gorbachev said in his letter that an agreement on our part would be a good stimulus for the other nuclear powers. There is a need for political will on both sides to bring this about. In connection with the agreement the following would be resolved: (1) stopping work to develop space strike systems, (2) freezing nuclear arsenals at current levels,, (3) banning new types of nuclear weapons. The purpose would be to take out of operation and dismantle an agreed number of strategic arms on both sides plus a mutual obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in countries where there are none now deployed. In other words an agreement not to build up stockpiles and not to put new ones in where weapons are now deployed. (S)

Shevardnadze indicated that Gorbachev's letter also contained a few ideas regarding medium-range missiles in Europe, stating that the Soviet Union is prepared for the most radical reduction in their numbers and that the Soviet Union would agree not to have these weapons in a greater number than the weapons in UK and French hands, on the basis of warhead numbers. These are simply fundamental considerations on the broad questions; they obviously need to be considered by our specialists. (S)

Shevardnadze then referred to the President's remarks on confidence-building measures and stated that the subject matter of the Stockholm CDE Conference can become a part of the meeting. In outline, the picture there is that there seems to be a general understanding in three or four of the confidence-building areas. It would seem, based upon conversations with the US representative in Moscow recently, that there are no great differences in these four areas. (S)

Regarding the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Soviets believe that a positive solution could be found. The United States has raised verification questions and we agree that this is an important issue--we are no less interested in verification than you are. He quoted Gorbachev as saying "We are in favor of real and effective verification." He is willing to consider any comments made by the US on this matter. (S)

Regarding bilateral and regional problems, he proposed that we prepare a list of issues so that there can be a basis for agreement at the summit meeting in November. If the process continues in a normal manner and it is mutually desired, a concluding document for that meeting could be prepared. He added that he had presented to Secretary Shultz a general outline and that we will continue to have contact in diplomatic channels to work this out. (S)

Shevardnadze then turned to the President's remarks, stating that he had said much regarding the strategic defense initiative. The Soviets understand that the programs in the United States have defensive elements to them, but they believe that the militarization of space should be banned and that space strike weapons should be banned. Those arms under development have not only defensive but offensive potential. Therefore, the Soviet position is to ban all stages except for laboratory research. He thought this position had not been well understood by the Administration. In fact both sides have basic research and this will continue and the Soviets are not trying to ban that. He then quoted from Article V of the ABM Treaty which states that "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM Systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based." The provisions not to develop, test or deploy are extremely important in the Soviet view. (S)

The Soviets believe, he continued, that there is today a strategic equilibrium and that its basis is the SALT I and II Treaties and particularly the ABM Treaty. Other undertakings and treaties are relevant but those are the basis of our relations which must not be destroyed. Any other approach would mean a spiralling arm race, both quantitative and particularly qualitative. (S)

Shevardnadze then observed that they read our press just as we read their press and in the American press he had seen the idea--perhaps it was not the official US government-view, that the Soviet Union can be exhausted by competition in the arms area. Those who assert this, even hope this, are mistaken. Such people are not aware of the Soviet potential, both economic and scientific. We are against war, he added, but we are not weak. The Soviet Union can withstand competition but does not want it to happen. It is sometimes said that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian regime, he observed. We have a different view--we have in addition to economic strength a moral and political unity and this is a force no less important than that of nuclear weapons. We take pride in it. (S)

Regarding nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union has declared a moratorium. We expected a positive response. Instead we had a proposal to invite our representatives to observe a nuclear explosion in the United States. We did not come and this was not a capricious decision. We have sufficient scientific potential

that we do not need to observe the tests to know what is going on. (S)

For example, since the Soviet moratorium proposal, the United States has conducted one announced nuclear test but also there was one unannounced test--it occurred on August 15th at 1700 hours GMT in Nevada. It had a power of less than two kilotons. The Soviet specialists detected this test and they have no need to come to Nevada to know what happened. You have a beautiful country, of course, which it would be nice to visit, but one can record nuclear explosions in Moscow just as well as on the spot. Instruments exist which can differentiate between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. (S)

In this respect he found the President's news conference after Gorbachev's proposal was received of considerable interest. He was interested in a sentence which the President uttered at that time which he did not believe was accidental. It was to the effect that the United States has a projected program and after this program is completed, can revisit the problem. He thought that a date, perhaps January, had been mentioned by the President. Subsequent to this, others have tried to re-interpret the President's remarks but he, Shevardnadze, found the words of interest. (S)

Shevardnadze continued by saying that he had spoken with Secretary Shultz in Helsinki about creating a good atmosphere for the meeting. This is as important as anything else. In the Soviet Union we criticize each other in a sharp manner. Therefore, it is not that we are sensitive to criticism; we are accustomed to it. But some statements made in the United States, and not only by correspondents but even by responsible American officials, seem like they are designed to be like an artillery barrage before a battle. Sometimes the arguments are not at all convincing. For example, the talk about the Soviet Union being ahead of the United States in its weaponry. At the same time American officials are saying that the Soviet Union is engaged in stealing technology from the West. There is no logic in this. Now I don't want to sound offensive but our people are offended by statements like "evil empire". When I heard that I thought the President had the old empire in mind, not the Soviet Union of today. (S)

Every country has its pride and identity and those things which are sacred to it. We for example would be pleased to pay tribute to George Washington - even our first-graders know about George Washington and the role he played in American history - but you know we are very much offended by some of the things that have been said about Lenin. We haven't done that sort of thing to you. Explaining historical processes that are going on in Africa, Latin America and Asia by incitement by Lenin is quite unjustified. Lenin signed the first Decree on Peace and he formulated this idea even before the Revolution. He called upon the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States even when

the United States did not recognize the Soviet Union. Many of you are religious believers--I am not -- but what sort of offense to believers would it be if we denounced God. For us Lenin is sacred. In addition some of the quotations used and attributed to him are not accurate--he never said anything like that. Now, of course, any personality can be criticized, but one should take into account the opinion of people and the effect upon them. (S)

Now when we mention certain elements in the relationship we are not trying just to win arguments. Gorbachev's letter and his concept shows that we do not want rhetorical arguments. Such arguments would not be at all dangerous if neither of us had nuclear missiles pointed at each other, but under the circumstances it is not a desirable thing. (S)

In the Soviet Union everyone welcomes the statement that you want to go down in history as a peacemaking President. We sincerely believe that our own proposals are consistent with this. (S)

Shevardnadze then concluded by thanking the President for his hospitality. He mentioned that it was his first visit here, although he had read much about the United States and knew that the American people are a great people. He felt the people of the Soviet Union have their own qualities and would like to use these riches for the benefit of mankind as a whole. (S)

The President said that Mr. Shevardnadze had raised many points of interest and he would like to comment on a few of them. (S)

He welcomed his comments on verification matters observing that this was the first time in his view that such an offer had been made by the Soviet Union. He was very pleased to hear it and hoped that this would indicate a willingness of the Soviet Union to give greater attention to this area. (S)

As for the proposal regarding 6,000 nuclear weapons, the President noted that the U.S. proposal was for a level of 5,000 missile warheads. He asked if the Soviet proposal would be presented at Geneva, observing that up to now their proposal had not been concrete enough for negotiation. Since this is the first time that they will have made a concrete proposal as opposed to general statements, he was most gratified. (S)

Regarding the assertions that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in areas of military strength, the President noted that in 1972 the United States had a slight edge regarding warheads on ICBM's. Since then the Soviet Union has gone ahead, far ahead. In fact they have a three to one advantage now in land-based missile warheads. It is true that the United States has a better balance in its triad of forces. The United States has no intention of forcing the Soviet Union to a different structure it does not desire. Counting all nuclear warheads the Soviet Union also has an advantage - about 9,000 - 7,000. (S)

In conventional forces the Soviet Union is far ahead of the United States. Furthermore, we feel that the Soviet Union is building a potentially offensive force. (S)

Regarding the SALT agreements which the Minister had referred to it has been precisely since those agreements were signed that the Soviet Union has gone ahead so decisively in the area of ICBM warheads. (S)

As for space systems we must remember that everyone knows how to make nuclear weapons today. Suppose we and the Soviet Union reduce our arsenals to zero. No one could be sure that there are no nuclear weapons in the world. For example, in 1925 when countries agreed to ban chemical weapons, they did not give up the gas mask, they kept it, and we have had experience with madmen in international relations. Nevertheless, gas was not used in World War II. It was not used because all knew the others had it and could use it against them, and because we all had gas masks. Now our Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program. It is being carried out within the framework of the ABM Treaty. If a weapon could be developed to intercept nuclear missiles, defensive systems would be like the gas mask. One would not have to worry about others having the weapon, because there would be a defense against it. If our research is successful we would not view it as necessary to deploy the system. We would sit down with you and others to discuss how it might be used. (S)

As far as the militarization of space is concerned, nuclear missiles fly through space, and this is militarization. There was once the idea of orbiting nuclear weapons, and we have agreed to ban that. But regarding defensive weapons, both countries should go ahead with research and see what is possible. Today, it is simply uncivilized to say that we can only maintain the peace by threatening innocent people. We need to find a better way and that is why we believe we need to go forward with research in this area. (S)

So far as his earlier reference to an "evil empire," perhaps he was responding to charges he had heard repeatedly from the other side that we are blood-thirsty imperialists. However, the point about atmosphere is a correct one. We should do more talking to each other rather than about each other. So far as the quotations of Lenin are concerned, the point is that the idea of our ultimate destruction is inherent in his thought. We have people from every strain on earth in our population. But there is a difference: here our people can dictate to their government what it does, while in your country the people don't have much to say about policy. But you have chosen the system you have and we have chosen another. We must live in peace and we must cooperate more. We could get together to put an end to some of the conflict in other regions. We would hope that you could find a way, for example, to withdraw from Afghanistan. This would have a very good effect on our mutual relationship. (S)

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Shevardnadze responded that the President had mentioned certain details regarding who has more weapons and such. This is something our specialists should discuss. He had also mentioned some types of Soviet missiles but he had not mentioned cruise missiles and U.S. missiles in Europe which are strategic for the Soviet Union. But this is not the basic question. The basic question is: will the United States abide by the ABM Treaty? If the United States wants to revise or withdraw from that Treaty it should say so forthrightly, because its announced program is incompatible with it. So far as the Krasnoyarsk radar is concerned, we (the Soviets) can also name things such as U.S. radars in the U.K. and Greenland. But this is something our specialists should discuss. The radar near Krasnoyarsk has not been turned on yet. When it is, you can come and see it, and see that it is in compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S)

The President returned to the matter of nuclear testing, pointing out that our instruments show that there have been Soviet tests above the 150 kiloton limit. The Soviets say that they have not tested above that limit, and have charged us with violating that limit. This was the reason for the invitation, not just to come and witness a test, but to bring instruments and to calibrate them. (S)

Shevardnadze said that what Gorbachev is proposing leads to a final goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We must think of that as the final goal. Our negotiators can discuss numbers, whether it is 5,000 or 6,000, and weigh the impact of the various elements and the details. So long as there is stability one can be flexible about these things. (S)

The President noted we had been the only ones to put a concrete figure down. He is delighted that the Soviets intend to table some figures for our people to deal with, and he agreed that any agreement must be only a step along the way to total elimination. (S)

Shevardnadze agreed that any reduction should be progressive and should lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. (S)

Secretary Shultz described the problem with the radar near Krasnoyarsk. He noted that the Soviets had said it is under construction and when completed could be looked at. However, the theory of the ABM Treaty is that certain things would not be undertaken. Large phased array radars are big, they take a lot of time to build, and they are necessary for a defense of the national territory. One must complain when one sees construction which is in violation of the Treaty. It needs to be stopped, not completed. This radar is not on the periphery of the Soviet Union and pointing outward. But this all suggests that if the Soviets think this is compatible with the ABM Treaty, then we should review what we both think the Treaty means. This is what he suggested to Minister Shevardnadze in New York, and this is different from talking about what is in violation or not. (S)

Shevardnadze referred to his statement in New York and mentioned that he had discussed this with their experts in preparation for the meetings. We have discussed radars at Krasnoyarsk and in Greenland. The United States has not convinced us that Krasnoyarsk is a violation of the Treaty: it has a space tracking function. If you think otherwise, if you think this is not the fact, then the doubt must be removed, but then we must also apply this procedure to your radar in Greenland. Regarding the ABM defense in Moscow, this is legitimate in terms of the ABM Treaty. We cannot accept criticism for that. You could have a defense in Washington or New York if you wish, and that would be allright, but the points of real concern should be discussed. (S)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that we are not charging a violation of the ABM Treaty because of the ABM system around Moscow. But we do need a discussion of what the Treaty means and how we obtain a mix of offense and defense in our deterrent strategy. (S)

Mr. McFarlane referred to the ABM system around Moscow and pointed out that there are restrictions in the Treaty regarding what that system can contain. Limitations regarding such matters as rapid reload capacity, mobility of its components and so on, are a part of the Treaty. Certain activities can be called into question if it seems that the Treaty is not observed. (S)

Mr. McFarlane continued that it is right to answer these questions in Geneva, but it is also fair to ask about fundamental principles. For example, regarding the Soviet reference to a ban on all new types, it seems that this would ban U.S. new types such as midgetman and the new submarine-launched missile, but would not apply to the new Soviet systems such as the SSX-24 and SSX-25 since the Soviets do not concede that these are new systems. He also noted that the Soviet proposal refers to nuclear weapons (or "charges"), because it seems they want to count U.S. weapons which are directed against the Soviet air defense system, while the U.S. has no air defense system. If these are included, it is not a reasonable basis for a balanced agreement. Therefore, we must conclude that some elements in the Soviet proposal are an apparent attempt to achieve an imbalance in the Soviet Union's favor. (S)

The President pointed out that we are acting fully in compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S)

Mr. McFarlane called attention to Agreed Statement D in the ABM Treaty. It places no prohibition on research, testing or development, only on deployment. (S)

Korniyenko argued that the first sentence of Agreed Statement D, "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty," makes these agreements subordinate to Article III where there is a commitment not to deploy a nationwide system. (S)

lane pointed out that the commitment is not to

(S)

o then referred to Article V of the Treaty which states
h party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM
or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based
land-based." (S)

lane pointed out that the terms of the Treaty do not
the development and testing of systems based on new
principles. This illustrates the need to talk about our
tation of the Treaty. (S)

y Shultz mentioned that those in the space and defense
the Geneva negotiations have a lot to talk about. (S)

ko said that the Soviet negotiators will have
ions to discuss the prevention of an arms race in

(S)

adze remarked that they seem to be stealing the work of
tiators. The Soviets have brought in a proposal which
ite clear. It is important to establish a basic approach
e questions. The Soviets have often been reproached for
o proposals and although they have mentioned percentages
ctions they had not received a reply. Their proposal is
emand. It is up to the United States to respond as it

(S)

ident asked if they would be putting the proposal on the
n Geneva. (S)

adze responded that, yes, they would table the proposal
ay. He added that as he had said in New York, we could go
l the way to 1946 in assessing the situation -- the whole
with nuclear weapons began then. (S)

ident remarked that that was the period when the truth
e evident that this country has no aggressive intent
anyone. We had an economy untouched by war damage, we had
weapons -- the only country in the world to have them --
did not threaten anyone. In fact, we helped others with
reconstruction and did not expand our territory. Why
one think now, when we face so many weapons on the other
e would suddenly become aggressive? (S)

adze said that he mentioned 1946 not in order to
ze our cooperation in World War II, but only in regard to
twar development of nuclear weapons. The United States
e weapon against Japan when it was clearly defeated. (At
int both Secretary Shultz and Chief of Staff Regan
d). The USSR developed the weapon only after the United
did. (S)

ident mentioned the offer that had been made in the
Plan. (S)

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union had proposed that all nuclear weapons be eliminated. (S)

Secretary Shultz observed that the problem is not getting people to make declarations, but to get people to agree to make concrete arrangements to carry out these declarations. He added that the President had reacted positively to Shevardnadze's comments of verification, because this is indeed the root of many of the problems. (S)

Korniyenko said that it is not correct to say that the Soviets have not made proposals on verification. He recalled the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban where an offer of on site verification was made by the Soviet negotiators. The United States broke off these negotiations. They should be resumed, in the Soviet view. (S)

Shevardnadze remarked that these were historic negotiations and they need to be continued. (S)

At this point the President noted that the time for the meeting had ended and suggested that the participants proceed to the Residence for lunch and asked that Minister Shevardnadze stay behind for a few minutes for a private meeting. (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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~~Matlock~~ 33

FILE

Matlock

September 30, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JK*
SUBJECT: British MP's Impressions of Gorbachev

John Browne, Tory MP, served on Gorbachev's reception committee when he visited London in December and accompanied him on a number of sight-seeing excursions. Browne's detailed account of the experience is attached (Tab A).

Browne's comments essentially confirm the general perception of Gorbachev as a dynamic leader capable of projecting a new Soviet leadership image. Browne seems to go a bit overboard, however, searching for similarities in style between Gorbachev and John Kennedy.

Ralph I. Straus, a founding member of the Committee on the Present Danger and a director of the Atlantic Council, sent me the document (letter at Tab B) and asked that it be forwarded to the President with the attached cover note (Tab C). I have assured Mr. Straus (Tab D) that you would see the material.

Attachments

Tab A	Bio on John Browne and Browne's assessment of Gorbachev
Tab B	Letter from Ralph Straus to Ambassador Matlock
Tab C	Letter to President Reagan from Ralph Straus
Tab D	Letter to Ralph Straus from Ambassador Matlock

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NLRR FOI-114/3 47844

BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07



House of Commons,
London SW1
England.

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(01 730 2181/219 4403)

John Browne M.P.

OUTLINE RESUME

John Browne is the Member of Parliament for Winchester, England.

He is a Member of the powerful Treasury Select Committee and the Secretary of the Conservative Finance Committee.

John Browne graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and served in the (Royal) Grenadier Guards, where his duties included parachuting and flying. He gained an MSc at Cranfield Institute of Technology and an MBA from Harvard Business School, before training for three years with Morgan Stanley in New York.

Subsequently he returned to London and after experience on the London Stock Exchange became Director of Middle East operations of European Banking Company, London.

In 1978 he started his own financial consultancy company; Falcon Finance Management Limited. He specialises in providing political and economic assessments of the U.K. economy and in offering financial and investment advice to established clients in Europe, The United States, Middle East and Far East.

In 1980 John Browne led the crusade by 103 Conservative and Liberal MPs to give trade union members a Voluntary Secret Ballot. He participated in the Falkland Islands debates from the outset and defended the Government position on 14 separate TV programmes in the US alone (ABC, NBC, etc.), including live debates with the Argentine Foreign Secretary and their UN Ambassador.

John Browne has always been a keen sportsman and in the late sixties was privileged to play in the Polo team of HRH Prince Phillip. He still participates actively in sport including the Parliamentary Ski team and he took part in the recent MPs parachute jump for charity.

LECTURE RECORD

John Browne has lectured to many and varied audiences throughout the world including: Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, France, Denmark, Korea, Japan and Hong Kong. His audiences have included those arranged by banking firms, business enterprises, educational institutions and by private individuals.

In the United States, John Browne has lectures at many institutions including Harvard University; Harvard Business School; M.I.T.; Layola College, Baltimore; University of Hawaii and Georgetown University; S.A.I.S., Washington; U.S. Naval Academy, Newport; Defence College, Fort McNaire, Washington; U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs and Colorado School of Mines; Baltimore Council of Foreign Affairs; Heritage Foundation, Washington; Small Business Council, Denver. He has also spoken to many private audiences such as to the Pundits in Palm Beach, Florida.

POST SCRIPT - 2nd July, 1985

The announcement today of the election of Mr. Andrei Gromyko to the Presidency of the Soviet Union is most interesting. In my main article (attached) I had pointed to the fact that Mr. Gorbachev had not been appointed either to the post of Soviet President or as Chairman of the powerful Defence Committee and that the nominations for these two positions would be of great importance in analysing Mr. Gorbachev's initial success.

I think that Mr. Gromyko will be widely accepted as an international statesman with long experience and knowledge of international affairs. I believe that his appointment will lend stature to the Presidency of the Soviet Union and that he will continue to take an active interest in foreign affairs. It should also be remembered that Mr. Gromyko is believed to be a strong supporter of Mr. Gorbachev as is his replacement as Foreign Minister, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze. When these appointments are taken together with yesterday's removal of Mr. Gorbachev's main contender, Mr. Grigory Romanov, I believe one can see further strengthening of Mr. Gorbachev's power base at senior levels within the Soviet Union.

Personally, I believe there is a subtle element to the strengthening of Mr. Gorbachev's power in that he has held himself back from the appointment to the figurehead position of President and so, whilst increasing his own power he appears to be modest, thus reducing potential antagonism and jealousy.

Evidently the 57 year old Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze is a man in the Gorbachev mold: energetic and gregarious with a career pattern that is very similar to that of Mr. Gorbachev. His position as Georgian Communist Party leader illustrates his party loyalty.

I believe that the appointment of Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shevardnadze will not only increase further Mr. Gorbachev's personal power base but that it represents evidence of the continuing thrust for a 'new style' of Soviet foreign policy in which the Soviet Union will appear to be increasingly responsible, reasonable and reassuring, whilst their strategic goals remain unchanged. It is possible that Soviet foreign policy will appear to be more concentrated upon Soviet block affairs rather than on an aggressive world-wide strategy. I feel that Mr. Shevardnadze will represent this fresh and potentially beguiling style of Soviet policy whilst Mr. Gromyko maintains the overall strategic goals from his position as President.

Finally, I was very pleased to see that the United States - Soviet summit meeting proposed for 19th/21st November, 1985 will take place, as I had hoped, outside the United States in a neutral country, i.e. Geneva. I believe that this will be to the advantage of the United States President.

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JOHN BROWNE

NLRR F06-714/3 #7859

BY AV NARA DATE 10/30/07

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20th May 1985

MR. GORBACHEV - A KENNEDY IN THE KREMLIN?

by John Browne (Member of Parliament for Winchester, England.)

Impressions of the Man, His Style and his Likely Impact Upon East West Relations.

For decades, the Soviet Union has been ruled by expressionless men who consciously hid behind a wall of secrecy. In March 1985, it appears this image was put aside. A new type of leader was selected - a leader who, whilst not tall, is, nonetheless physically imposing - a man with a penetrating stare and yet a ready smile who exudes confidence and an inner strength. This man is Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev, whose signature surmounts the photograph (seen above) of him standing at Lenins desk in Clerkenwell, London in December 1984. He represents a new generation of Soviet leaders. He brings with him a new combination of deep loyalty to the Communist party and an apparent executive ability. Although he is obviously a product of the Soviet system, Mr. Gorbachev not only exudes self-confidence, but also a distinctive charismatic style which may prove to be of much advantage to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, what is of advantage to the Soviet Union may provide a greatly increased challenge to the West. In order the better to understand the new Soviet leadership it is necessary to speculate as to how such a man was selected for top leadership within the Communist party system and to assess what impact his leadership may have upon East - West relations.

In December 1984 Mr. Gorbachev, accompanied by his wife Raisa, led a high powered delegation on a visit to Great Britain. During their stay in London as guests of the English Parliament I was invited not only to serve on the Reception Committee but also to escort them on certain expeditions during their tour. This included a visit to Lenin's publishing house in Clerkenwell, to the British Museum and to the House of Commons. These tours provided me with an unique opportunity to observe Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev at close quarters, to listen to their questions and to observe their reactions to statements and events.

From this unusual exposure to the Gorbachevs, I made the personal observation that Mr. Gorbachev's charisma was so striking that, if permitted by the Communist Party system, Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev could well become the Soviet equivalent of the Jack and Jacqueline Kennedy team. However, I was at pains to point out that Mr. Gorbachev was a tough and dedicated Communist whose actual policies would differ markedly from those of the late President Kennedy. This was merely my own opinion but one that was based none the less upon a relatively long, and an unusually relaxed and diverse exposure to the Gorbachevs.

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NLRR 606-1143 #7800

BY GN NARA DATE 10/30/06

It is obvious that, for a man to have climbed to the top of the Communist party system by the age of 54, he must have worked extremely hard using both his ambition and his exceptional political competence and panache. Ambition and ability however arouse feelings of jealousy and suspicion. These feelings are particularly strong within the Soviet Communist system where loyalty to party superiors, dogma and traditions is vital to promotion. To have been promoted so rapidly under these circumstances, Mr. Gorbachev must have shown great patience and loyalty to the party. 31

From observing Mr. Gorbachev's speeches, presentations and responses to questions, it became evident that he is a thoroughly polished, able and contemporary politician. He is in no way a 'peoples popular leader' propelled from the ranks of either the agricultural or the military communities. He is one of the first representatives of the generation of 'groomed' Soviet politicians to enter the world stage.

Within the first few moments of meeting Mr. Gorbachev it becomes clear that he is intelligent, alert and inquisitive. Not only is he constantly posing questions but he also listens very carefully and attentively to the answers. This quality has important political implications in that people assume that anyone who is genuinely interested in what they have to say is probably worthy of their respect. These qualities, together with his controlled, yet warm smile, make him attractive and indeed beguiling. However, he can also be extremely tough when he makes use of his voice, his piercing eyes and even his physical gestures to emphasize a point.

I witnessed a vivid example of these two extremes of expression. The instance occurred when I asked him why the Soviet Union continued to encourage and finance terrorism in Latin America. He responded, whilst hitting me repeatedly on the shoulder even before the interpreter had translated my question. This gave me the distinct impression that he probably understands English. He asked me whether I would consider that the colonists who fought in the American Revolutionary War were terrorists or freedom fighters. His whole mannerism then changed abruptly when he then tapped me softly on the wrist saying "but of course we are totally opposed to individual terrorists such as those who killed Dr. Morro in Italy."

Not only did the above example show his capacity for very controlled but extreme ranges of expression but it also illustrated his knowledge and use of western history. His knowledge was further evidenced when he questioned the demonstration that took place within the British Museum. In the course of my explanation, I mentioned that in Britain we allowed

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people a great deal of freedom. Mr. Gorbachev replied that "what you are saying Mr. Browne and what is the truth are two entirely different things. Even Lord Byron had to leave England because of the lack of freedom". His curiosity and interest in history were also displayed when he questioned a curator at the British Museum concerning some Saxon coins that the Russians returned to Britain in the 19th century. He was most anxious to determine whether or not there had been trade links between the two countries in those early Saxon times.

Mr. Gorbachev's curiosity throughout his visit seems to have two implications: first, he is anxious to learn from the West that which may be adapted to the Communist system, and second, he never misses an opportunity to challenge evidence that is presented to him. This latter quality is obviously of critical importance to any leader because it will inspire increased respect and loyalty amongst his subordinates and it will reinforce his effectiveness as an administrator.

Apparently Mr. Gorbachev's incessant and open desire to grasp new knowledge is unusual among Soviet leaders. High ranking Communist officials normally avoid any indications of personal ignorance in order to create an impression of omniscience. On the other hand, Mr. Gorbachev's expression of genuine curiosity may prove to be one of his most effective political tools. Not only does this curiosity provide a constant flow of new information in a society where information is severely censored, but it will gain him greater support from both his superiors and subordinates. Recently as part of a tour of Moscow, he was scheduled to take tea in the apartment of an ordinary working couple. On examination of the cup from which he was drinking, he found it was of government issue and obviously planted by his aides to give him a false impression of the improved living standards of working people in Moscow. Apparently Mr. Gorbachev left in a fury on discovering this deception. Such an incident surely will have left an indelible sense of admiration upon the couple and of respect upon his staff.

Not only does Mr. Gorbachev appear anxious to learn as much as possible about the past, but he was also eager to learn about current customs and procedures that presently exist in the West. He made impromptu-departures from the planned schedules firstly, to visit St. Pauls Cathedral in preference to visiting the Marx tomb and secondly, to look at the Prime Minister's official residence at No. 10 Downing Street. These changes illustrated an apparent wish by him to gain a strong, first hand and subjective impression of Britain. This reinforced the impression I had that Mr. Gorbachev wishes to grasp the essential tools for success in the Western world and to select, adopt and integrate them for use in the Soviet Union. This may prove to be a stark

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and important contrast to the action of Tzar Peter the Great who on returning from visits to the west, sought to impose on the Russian people rather than to integrate customs that he admired in the West.

Mr. Gorbachev appeared to be extremely sensitive to ideas that conflicted with Communist principles and also references to any potential weakness within the Soviet system. For instance, in the British Museum when he was shown some ancient Egyptian tombs, he displayed distinct discomfort when told that only the names of those of noble birth were carved in stone. This elitest, Egyptian custom was in sharp contrast to the Soviet communist merit system. Mr. Gorbachev's visible discomfort might be attributed to his origins as the son of a peasant farm worker in Stavropol, from whence he rose, to the leadership of his country by the age of 54. He achieved his present position by ascending the extremely competitive ladder by virtue of his own personal merit. A second instance of his sensitivity was apparent when in response to one of his questions about seating in the House of Commons, I mentioned that we had benches as opposed to pre-assigned seats and even then, by packing the benches, there was room for only about 500 of the 650 members. I also explained that benches, as opposed to pre-assigned seats, lent a certain 'dynamic' to the Chamber which was effectively "The Live Theatre Of English Politics". He greeted this with incredulity. As an example, I explained that he and Mrs. Gorbachev were standing in front of the very interesting, front bench below the gangway on the opposition side. I described how, when in opposition, it was traditionally occupied by the left wing socialist members but that, since the right wing of the Socialist party had split off to form the Social Democratic Party, there were now physical struggles to sit on the bench. I further explained that this behaviour often appeared childish to the ill-informed onlooker but that it represented, in theatre form, the acting out of the dilemma that now faces Socialist voters in the country, whether to side with the left or the right wing of their party. Mr. Gorbachev was incensed that I should mention that the Socialists had any political dilemma whatsoever, such as existed in the early days of the Soviet Union between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and is now expunged from their history books. He spun round upon the rest of his delegation and said "what Mr. Browne has just said illustrates vividly the complete hypocrisy of British politics. They elect 650 members of the Parliament and only allow half of them in!"

It is well known that the Soviet leadership is essentially pragmatic. It was interesting to see the blatant manner in which it was displayed during the first reception at Claridges Hotel. Having been with the Gorbachevs throughout most of that first day, I found myself being asked to help introduce other Members of Parliament to them at the reception. The introductions went in

the usual manner for guests and for MPs. However, it was interesting to note that when Socialist MPs were introduced they often overrode the normal descriptions of "may I introduce Mr A, who is the Member of Parliament for X". They usually insisted upon saying, "I am the 'Socialist' Member for X". This was apparently done to gain an 'inside track' to the Communist leader and his wife. The Gorbachevs, who were moving independently amongst the guests, positively ignored MPs who overrode the introductions in such a manner and moved on to others. It may be possible that this indicated an assessment by the Soviets that, as a result of the recent general election and the current opinion polls which showed the Socialist party at an historic low, it was highly likely that the Conservative party would be in power in Britain for the foreseeable future. It was therefore important to establish contacts with Conservatives rather than Socialists. 40

Despite Mr. Gorbachev's apparent wish to show, on occasion, that his delegation was very democratic and that he was merely the first amongst equals, it was very evident that he exerted great authority and that this was reflected in the way in which his comrades treated him. During the question and answer period with the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons, I was seated next to a very amiable but tired Russian General on the flank of the Soviet delegation. The General appeared hard pushed to stay awake when he was summoned by an aide to go to Mr. Gorbachev's chair. A few words in his ear and he came back sweating and started to take copious notes! Obviously Mr. Gorbachev is not a man who tolerates much bluffing or laziness amongst his staff.

It was also impressive to see how Mr. Gorbachev fielded unnotified questions from the members of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on such difficult subjects as the persecution of Jews and Christians in the Soviet Union and upon Soviet policy in Afghanistan and in the Middle East. It was widely reported, I think wrongly, that Mr. Gorbachev had lost his 'cool'. Whilst it is true that he raised his voice, he did not shout. It is true that he snapped back at the questioners, but he was not personally rude to them. It is also true that he evaded any real answer, but he did this skillfully by throwing back upon the questioner the onus on religious persecution etc. He did so by quoting allegations of religious persecution in Northern Ireland. In short, he answered the questions with a skill that would have done credit to any accomplished Western politician. What was more impressive was that he answered with such authority and confidence - the confidence that can normally be attributed to a position of preeminent power. It was this great degree of confidence that led me to believe, at the time, that he was

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possibly already in the position of preeminent, effective power in the Soviet Union under the ailing Chernenko. It convinced me that he was either certain to be selected or had indeed already been selected as Chernenko's successor.

The London programme arranged for Mr. Gorbachev and his delegation was intense, and would have placed heavy physical and mental demands upon any delegation leader. Mr. Gorbachev undertook his role as delegation leader with great enthusiasm, typically talking so much during official meals that he managed to eat very little. He was so hungry that apparently he had to return to the Soviet Embassy for supplementary meals. It was most impressive to see how well he coped both physically and mentally. Whilst his physique appears to be robust, he could also be fairly described as mentally very tough and agile.

In addition to the obvious physical and mental toughness which was exemplified during his visit to London, I sensed that he possessed an inner strength based upon conviction, control and confidence. In this respect I agree with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's remark that she feels she could do business with Mr. Gorbachev.

The Communist system tends to discourage individuality, creativity and flexibility. I believe that Mr. Gorbachev's inner strength will allow him a good chance of exercising a degree of these attributes that are most unusual in the Soviet Union. For since the death of Stalin, with the possible exception of Mr. Krushchev, such qualities have appeared to be singularly absent in the Soviet leadership.

Balancing Mr. Gorbachev's toughness and pragmatism, I detected a distinctly human side to his character. It is this human element in a leader's character that is often so important in contributing to that elusive quality of charisma. The leader appears so human and yet, in himself, is different.

The above photograph depicts Mr. Gorbachev standing, with his wife in the background, at Lenin's desk in his old publishing house at Clerkenwell in London. It was from this desk that much of the very earliest of Communist thought emanated. As one of the very few people able to squeeze in to this tiny office I was most interested to see how deeply moved was Mr. Gorbachev, the potential leader of the Communist world, when standing at Lenin's desk.

It was also interesting to note how very affected and embarrassed he was by the demonstration of three students in one of the rooms at the British Museum. They rushed up to about 12 feet of Mr. Gorbachev and his delegation shouting words to the effect that he was a killer and a murderer. Mr. Gorbachev's blush stretched even down the back of his neck and he appeared deeply shocked.

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Despite some tense moments, it was obvious to me that Mr. Gorbachev has a keen and subtle sense of humour. A number of examples have been quoted in the press. The one which most amused me was in the Saxon Department of the British Museum. The Curator had just finished describing the greatness of King Alfred. He ended by saying that "the problem is that the average English school boy only remembers one thing about the great King Alfred and that is that he burnt the cakes." As quick as a flash Mr. Gorbachev replied, "Well, you did not have to do much to become famous in those days".

From the above I determined that Mr. Gorbachev is a very considerable character and personality. The fact that these qualities have shone through, from within the strict stereotype Communist party system is all the more remarkable.

The popular western image of the wives of Soviet leaders is that they are large, bland and uninvolved in their husbands' careers. Mr. Gorbachev's wife Raisa proved to be the antitheses of this popular image. She is extremely well educated, having a PhD, and is alert and attractive. In fact, by Soviet standards I believe she could justly be termed chic. I found her extremely intelligent, and well poised. She also has a keen sense of humour. When the Curator of the Egyptian department at the British Museum apologised for the fact that their route was taking them backwards through time, she interjected "Well you can only travel backwards in time in a museum." What was most interesting and particularly apparent during Mr. Gorbachev's meeting with the Foreign Affairs Select Committee was that Mrs. Gorbachev appeared deeply interested and aware of what was going on. I believe that she takes a keen interest in her husband's career and, I was given the impression, an active interest in his dress. Figuratively speaking, she stands beside rather than behind him. In short, she is a very professional politician's wife and together they make a most formidable and impressive political team.

It is also interesting to note that the Gorbachev's appear to take an interest in the arts, attending the ballet as private citizens. Mr. Gorbachev also remarked that the performance he saw of Così fan Tutte was an example of Mozart at his best. It is possible that this interest in the arts appeals to the intelligentsia within the Soviet Union, a section of society which, since 1917, has been almost totally opposed to the Soviet leadership. It is therefore possible that Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev may provide the political bridge of influence between the Soviet leadership and the Soviet intelligentsia. In time, this could provide a very useful political ally for him if properly managed.

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As I have said earlier, Mr. Gorbachev is no liberal - he is a dedicated Communist and a product of the Communist school to which he must have deep rooted loyalties. However, unlike all of his predecessors, except for Krushchev and Stalin, Mr. Gorbachev has, in my opinion, charisma - western style charisma, and an ability and willingness to use the western media, particularly television.

In evaluating the characteristics of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev it is hard to imagine what additional public qualities were possessed by President Jack and Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy. I believe it is entirely reasonable to think that Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev, if they are permitted to do so by the party system, could well become the Soviet equivalent of the Kennedy team and, as such, they will make a major impact upon the world. The advent of a charismatic leader in Moscow could have a very beneficial effect upon the Soviet Union. Equally it could have the effect of greatly increasing the challenge to western leaders. Notwithstanding the advantages that may accrue, it does seem strange that the inherently conservative Communist party elite or Nomenklatura, would have chosen Mr. Gorbachev as party secretary.

Exactly how the Soviet leader is chosen is known probably to only very few people even within the Soviet Union. It appears that a mere handful of senior members of the Politburo, and possibly on occasion the outgoing leader, nominate a successor who has to be not only acceptable to the majority power structure within the Politburo but also to the Soviet elite or Nomenklatura.

It is well known that the Soviet Nomenklatura was created by Stalin to run the Union of Soviet Republics in place of the Russian Tzarist aristocracy and Civil Service whom Stalin had largely liquidated. In return for their loyalty this elite were given great privileges including special shops etc. To ensure further their undivided loyalty, Stalin subjected them to part of his Terror. Members of the Nomenklatura who remember Stalin's Terror have a strong distrust and fear of any leader possessing too much individual charisma and therefore power outside the Communist party machine. It is interesting to note, in passing, that when Mr. Krushchev began to develop his own brand of charisma, he was quickly ousted from office, possibly as a result of this innate fear on the part of the Nomenklatura. The Nomenklatura enjoy such relatively vast privileges that their vested interest is in maintaining the status quo within the Soviet system. Amongst the Nomenklatura are, of course, many of the Soviet military and part of the status quo is the maintenance of massive military spending which is sustained by the maintenance of a constant fear of invasion. The Tartar invasion which held Russia in subjection for about 250 years; Napoleon's invasion in 1812; and finally Hitler's invasion in the second world war, lend serious historic weight to this argument.

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In addition the Soviet military point to the apparent encirclement of Russia by western allies, from Canada and the United States over the North Pole to NATO; to CENTO (now dissolved); to SEATO (now dissolved); round to the United States bases in the Far East. The Soviet elite is therefore conditioned both by fear and by privilege, to support the status quo - a status in which they individually have a vested interest. They would naturally support the selection of a 'Committee man' as leader and would be highly suspicious of an individualist, particularly one with potential charisma. Furthermore, the very senior members of the Nomenklatura, namely those in the Politburo, have shown a tendency to choose leaders who are faceless committee men and virtually indistinguishable from themselves.

Why is it that the handful of top Politburo members, who probably make the leadership decision, have chosen, as Party Secretary a man so out of character with the leadership concept that must obviously receive the support of the Soviet Nomenklatura upon whom the entire Soviet Union depends? I believe it is because the Soviet leaders, though cautious, are essentially pragmatic and they see the Soviet Union facing a time of economic, social and military crisis. They realise that their backs are to the wall and that change is not only necessary but desirable if their view of the Soviet Union and the life style of the bulk of the Nomenklatura is to continue.

It is widely believed that the Soviet Union's economy is in a stagnant condition. Both management and workers are desperately under-motivated to produce effectively and profiteering is wide spread. The Soviet military have shown a serious inability to translate research and development on advanced technologies into production and effective deployment. This is one of their greatest concerns over President Reagan's proposed Strategic Defence Initiative. Furthermore, the enormous proportion of Soviet productive capacity that has been devoted to military use has resulted in a serious and continuing shortfall in the production of consumer products.

The Soviet leaders must also be conscious of the fact that they are fast falling behind in the essence of the technological revolution - the race for the new generation of computers. This race for computer technology is not only way beyond the wildest dreams of the third world, but is increasing the difference in the so-called developed world between first and second rate technological powers. It is apparent that the United States and Japan are successfully competing in this race and that the Soviet Union may join Europe in the 'second world', rendering its survival as a super power impossible. This aspect of computer technology and the impact of any acceptance of personal computers, has major implications for a totalitarian state in which the control and censorship of information is a vital

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ingredient to power. Just as the power of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe was eroded by the advent of the printing press, power of a totalitarian government, such as exists in the Soviet Union, could be severely eroded by the acceptance of personal computers which would enable large numbers of the population to transmit and receive information that, by its very volume, made it impracticable, if not impossible, to censor .

Not only are the Soviet leaders faced by this technological challenge from the relatively 'passive' United States, but they are faced by another new economic challenge from the potentially 'aggressive' China on their south eastern border.

When I was in Hong Kong in October 1983, there was great pessimism with the majority feeling it would be impossible for Great Britain, under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, to conclude a treaty with Communist China that would be acceptable to the Hong Kong Chinese. In the event, this was achieved. Now, the Chinese appear not to be extending Communism into Hong Kong but, on the contrary, to be sucking capitalism into China. Chairman Deng Xiaping appears to be conducting a revolution in China equally as significant as that which occurred in Russia in 1917. He is encouraging limited private ownership, decentralisation, and capitalist profit incentives. Such a change in party dogma must be an enormous challenge to any Communist leader. However, Chairman Deng Xiaping has three major advantages over the Soviets. Firstly, China is relatively closer to its Communist revolution and is therefore able more easily to rekindle a spirit of capitalist enterprise and even to welcome home some of its emigres who are skilled and still of working age. Secondly, the Chinaman is more hard working than the Russian. Finally, Chairman Deng Xiaping can expect less resistance from the Nomenklatura established by Mao Tse-tung because most of them were either liquidated or neutralised in the cultural revolution.

The effects of Deng's reforms are already being felt. A new 'responsibility system' has been introduced in the rural areas and private farming, (in plots of up to 150 acres), has been introduced. Rural income has increased by more than 250% since 1978 and China recorded the worlds highest economic growth rate in 1984.

New slogans such as "strive to be rich" have replaced old favourites such as "better to have socialist weeds, than capitalist seedlings".

The Soviet Union has to face the direct economic challenge now posed by Communist China who already talks of having its own space shuttle mounted on Arian rockets. The Soviets also have to

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face the fact that the new Chinese, capitalistic style economy may prove abundantly successful in the eyes of the third world. Such relative success could threaten the crucial influence of the USSR in a strategic sense.

The Soviet leaders also have to face a society in which corruption, laziness and drunkenness are reaching epidemic proportions. At the same time, there is a serious groundswell of public opinion demanding more consumer products in the shops. A stagnant or shrinking real economy is placing even greater strains upon the Soviet Union in its hopes of maintaining the military balance and its status as a super power.

Reports emanating from Afghanistan speak of very large Soviet casualties and defectors. Whilst this can be partially discounted as exaggeration, there can be little doubt that it must cause great concern to the Soviet leadership particularly with their large Islámic population. Furthermore, with the successful deployment by NATO of Cruise and Pershing missiles and the advent of President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, the Soviets are faced with renewed demands for vast military spending if they are to maintain the present military balance. Not only is it unlikely that their economy can sustain such an increase in expenditure but they must also realise their weakness in computer technology and their relative inability to translate advanced, computer based weapon systems from the research phase to effective deployment.

This area of computer technology is one of critical importance to modern weapon systems. Here it is interesting to note the implications of wide ownership of personal computers. The retention of power in a totalitarian state depends largely on the comprehensive censorship and control of information. The wide ownership of personal computers in a totalitarian state will tend to weaken dramatically the power of the Government to control information. This means that if the Soviets push forward with computer technology to the extent that they allow wide use of personal computers they will incur serious weaknesses in their present power system.

Faced with this situation of internal crisis, I believe that the top Soviet leaders felt that change was vitally necessary in the Soviet Union if they were to remain a super power. Not only did they have to choose a leader whom they trusted, but one with the intellect both to see and to grasp the essential problems facing the Soviet Union and with the ability to solve them. More importantly, but involving the greatest risk, I believe they had to choose a leader with the power to persuade the Soviet elite not only of the necessity but of the desirability of change.

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Born on 2nd March 1931 to a peasant family in the village of Priolnoye in the Stavropol region of the northern caucasus, Mr. Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev was evacuated between 1946 and 1950 when he worked at a machine tractor station near the Caspian Sea. This job must have given him deep experience of the Soviet economy at the 'grass roots' level. He then went on to study law at Moscow State University and joined the Communist party in 1952. Following his graduation in 1955, he was made First Secretary of the Stavropol City Komsomol (the Party youth organisation). This is a most interesting date, being two years after Stalin's death and one year prior to Krushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956. It is therefore difficult to see whether Mr. Gorbachev's early political views were strongly Stalinist or more moderate. At 31 he studied for an agriculture degree. At 35 he assumed responsibility for increasing farm production in the Stavropol region, an area that benefited from relatively fertile soil which enabled him to preside over high yielding harvests at a time when Soviet agriculture as a whole was suffering. At 39 he was appointed First Secretary to the Stavropol regional committee. In 1978 he was sent to Moscow where he was placed in charge of Soviet agriculture as Secretary of the Central Committee. In this role he showed himself to be a 'political survivor' for although he presided over a series of disastrous harvests, so bad that the government ceased printing crop statistics, the failure was not attributed to him, but to bad weather. Whilst Mr. Gorbachev was not in a position to implement fundamental changes at that time, he was in a good position to see and obviously had the intellect to understand the processes that drove the agricultural 'machine' but which were not succeeding. He must have seen the problems of collective agriculture. He had a chance to see, at first hand, what needed to be done to restore efficiency to Soviet Agriculture. In 1979 he was promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo and in October 1980, when he was still less than 50, he became a full member of the Politburo of which he was easily the youngest member.

Some people argue, by pointing to his attempt to carry out agrarian reforms during the US grain embargo, that he is somewhat of a 'liberal' by Soviet standards. This is difficult to substantiate.

Essentially Mr. Gorbachev is a product of the Communist party. Obviously he knew his place and must have resisted any temptation to undermine his elders. From past precedent, and in keeping with many other political regimes, promotion does not come by ability and loyalty alone. Patronage and luck are also vital ingredients. Mr. Gorbachev's earliest and perhaps most important patrons were perhaps Fyodor Kulakof and Mikhail Suslov. Like Mr. Gorbachev, both these men had held the post of Party

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Secretaryship in Stavropol. Stavropol is a resort. Mr Gorbachev was therefore required to entertain and was able to impress many senior Politburo members during their holiday visits to the area. Mr. Gorbachev followed Mr. Kulakov directly both in Stavropol and subsequently in Moscow. In 1978, Mr. Kulakov died unexpectedly early. This stroke of luck catapulted Mr. Gorbachev forward. Mr. Suslov, who evidently played a leading role in promoting Andropov as Soviet leader was apparently a most important patron for Mr. Gorbachev. For it was Mr. Suslov who was assigned to ensure the continuance of the Marxist/Leninist ideological purity of the Communist party. Apparently, as part of this job he recruited young, ideological and loyal talent for the party which he started to mould in his own style. When in Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev evidently became friendly with Marshal Ustinov. Under the leadership of Yuri Andropov (ex KGB Chief) he was promoted from agriculture to a position of responsibility for the oversight of the entire Soviet economy. (I believe that it is possible that Mr Andropov may have nominated Mr Gorbachev as his successor but that the pro-Gorbachev faction within the Politburo were not, at the time of Andropov's death, a strong enough influence within the Politburo to force through his wishes for succession. It is possible that, in an effort to buy time in order to consolidate further their position within the Politburo, the pro-Gorbachev faction pushed for the selection of the dying Mr. Chernenko, whose fatal illness was first exposed to the world by Dr. David Owen, M.P. In the event, the ailing Mr. Chernenko increased his responsibility still further and before Mr. Chernenko's death, Mr. Gorbachev was seen often in the company of Mr. Gromyko from whom he was assumed to be receiving information and advice.) I believe that the pro-Gorbachev faction within the Politburo succeeded in having him nominated and even unofficially selected as Party Secretary, even before Mr. Chernenko's death. It is possible and indeed probable that, at the time of Mr Gorbachev's visit to London in December 1984, he was in fact 'Managing Director' of the Soviet Union under the 'Chairmanship' of the dying Mr. Chernenko.

In choosing a leader to divert the Soviet Union from impending crisis, the top Soviet elite had to choose a man who was not only able but politically and ideologically loyal. However, at the same time he had to be an 'engine' for change because, however unattractive it appeared, change was probably seen as vitally necessary. The new leader therefore had to be able to communicate and persuade the rest of the Nomenklatura of not only the necessity, but also the desirability of change.

In choosing Mr. Gorbachev, I believe that the Soviet leaders took a calculated risk. Mr. Gorbachev was not only able, energetic and loyal but was a force for change and also potentially charismatic which, in the political infighting of the Communist Party system, must have already been obvious. He was also young

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which meant that if they made a mistake it would remain with them for a long time. It is for this reason that I believe they withheld the other two key posts of Head of State and of Chairmanship of the five man Defence Council.

Following Mr. Gorbachev's visit to London in December 1984 and the deteriorating health of Mr. Chernenko, speculation increased that Mr. Gorbachev might be considered for selection as the next Soviet leader. I said at a number of presentations, both in America and in England, that I believed Mr. Gorbachev had already been selected and was in fact the 'Managing Director' of the Soviet Union under the 'Chairmanship' of the ailing Chernenko. I gained this conviction not only from my personal assessment of Mr. Gorbachev, which I have tried to explain above, and the chronic need for some form of change in the Soviet Union's political machine, but also from a number of indications that I felt occurred during Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev's pre-Christmas visit to London.

It was strange that a visit of such an apparently high powered Russian team would be carried out under the auspices of a Parliamentary as opposed to a Government delegation. The Soviets appeared to be unusually cautious as if to protect against the slightest risk of failure. Secondly, unlike most parliamentary delegations from the Communist block, where the 'real' leader is normally ranked as either second or third, Mr. Gorbachev was very definitely the leader of his delegation from the outset. The way in which other members of his delegation treated him and reacted to his wishes gave me the impression that he was extremely important and in possession of very great power. The authority with which he spoke and the confidence with which he answered unprepared and potentially embarrassing questions from the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and others, gave me the distinct impression that here was a man who was no longer jockeying for power but already had the reins in his hands. Finally, when Marshal Ustinov died, the announcement was not made as is customary, in Moscow by Pravda or Tass, but uniquely by Mr. Gorbachev in Edinburgh. This appeared to indicate that he was already in a position of top power and confirmed many of my earlier observations during his visit to London.

Following Mr. Chernenko's death I was impressed by the somewhat unusual speed and smoothness of the succession which again has led me to believe that Mr. Gorbachev had been pre-selected. I was further reinforced in this view by the fact that the Geneva Arms talks were neither postponed for Chernenko's funeral nor did they change in character. Whilst the overall pattern of the talks has not changed much from previous talks, in that both super powers have, so far, circled around each other with no major, serious, new proposals, I believe that the style of the Soviet negotiating team has continued to reflect a style which is

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distinctly of the Gorbachev ilk. This style is vastly different to the Soviet approaches in the past where their negotiators brushed past newsmen with poker faces and without comment. At Geneva, Soviet negotiators not only posed for Western photographers but spoke and joked with the pressmen - a decidedly new style and one with appeal in the West.

At Mr. Chernenko's funeral, Mr. Gorbachev's speech was more than a eulogy of his old comrade. It appeared to be a State of the Union Message in which he told the Soviet people that they must begin to get up and work and that there was no time to lose. Indeed, it was reported that one Communist worker was somewhat worried and asked whether the succession of Mr. Gorbachev meant that workers would now have to work much harder. In the past few months the Western news media has contained many stories of Mr. Gorbachev and, indeed his family, including his daughter and grand-daughter.

Based upon what I heard of remarks he made concerning his family during his London visit, I felt that it would not be long before his family were brought to the fore. This has now begun to happen and represents a radical change from the excessively discreet attitude previously taken by Soviet leaders with regard to their families. I believe that Mr. Gorbachev's more open manner will lend his popular image a humanist side which could prove to be of importance in the increasing struggle for the hearts and minds of not only the Third World but also amongst the people of the industrialised democracies.

Since his succession, it appears that Mr. Gorbachev has not been slow to move his own proteges into positions of power and so start to consolidate a strong personal power base. Furthermore, he has not been shy, indeed he has been unusually frank in his comments upon corruption, drunkenness and laziness within the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the amount and type of coverage he has been given in the Western news media since his succession leads me to believe that the latent charisma I believe he has will not remain unobserved for long.

I strongly believe that Mr. Gorbachev's charismatic leadership style will have a major influence both inside and outside the Soviet Union.

Within the Soviet Union he is likely to be the first leader to succeed in persuading rather than forcing Soviet workers to work. They are therefore likely to work more effectively. This should have a dramatic effect upon the Soviet economy and upon the ability of the USSR to sustain its role as a super power both in terms of impressing and keeping the allegiance of large parts of the third world and also in maintaining its military balance, or

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should I say superiority, with the West. In addition, it will fall to Mr. Gorbachev to persuade the bulk of the Soviet Nomenklatura, in which the military is well represented, not only of the necessity but also the benefit and indeed urgency of the need to accept at least some important economic changes. From this we are likely to see increased flexibility not only in trade but in military and political negotiations. It is unlikely to reflect any weakness in the Soviet position or indeed any change in their ultimate goals, but it will represent increased opportunities for western traders and politicians to do business with the Soviet block. For instance it is probable that major opportunities will exist in the fields of trade and project financing, even including major financings in the Western capital markets.

Mr. Gorbachev is likely to prove to be the first Soviet leader with the ability to use the Western media to talk over the heads of western negotiators or politicians directly to western grass roots. This will be effectively a 'one way street' because western leaders will not be given the same access to the Soviet media to talk in the reverse direction to grass roots in the Communist block. By virtue of television in particular, he is likely to provide external leadership and inspiration for such movements as the CND, Anti-nuclear Movement and also to many surreptitious and anti-democratic forces which the western democracies not only harbour but with which they have to contend internally.

Furthermore, Mr. Gorbachev is likely to use his very considerable powers of personal persuasion directly upon western leaders. He is likely to exploit even the smallest splits and differences of opinion that may occur within the western alliance over such issues as the SDI programme, the transfer of high technology in the fields of trade and the political implications of harbouring American military hardware or bases etc.

It is interesting, when considering the East-West power struggle, to compare the fundamental strengths and weaknesses of the totalitarian states, such as the Soviet Union, and the democracies, such as the United States. The totalitarian state's strength is in its ability to sustain armed conflict when no direct threat to the home country exists. Its greatest weakness is its inability to generate enormous economic wealth. The great strength of a democracy, such as the United States, is its ability to generate enormous economic wealth. Its weakness especially since Vietnam, is its inability to conduct sustained military operations in defence of freedom and other democracies when there is no apparent threat to the mainland of the United States. We should learn that lesson and always be conscious of it. It is always much better for us to use our economic power in preference to risking being placed in an inherently weak position where we have to use our short-term military power.

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It is most unlikely that Soviet goals will change under Mr. Gorbachev, but Soviet style has and I believe will, continue to change. Out will go the brutish Russian Bear and in will come the new image of the Soviet Union - responsible, reasonable and reassuring. (In sighting the contrary view some people point to the recent shooting of US Army Major Nicholson by a Russian sentry. Personally, I believe that this incident was an error similar to the downing of KAL flight 007 in 1983 which caused great embarrassment to the Soviet hierarchy.) The Soviet's dirty work will increasingly be done by surrogate states such as North Vietnam, Cuba, East Germany, etc. Speaking figuratively I feel that whilst the hammer will be kept available, it will be replaced by the sharpened sickle. However, the back drop will remain the same - red, blood red, Soviet red. We in the West must never forget it.

Whilst his public posture may appear attractive and similar to that of the late President Kennedy, there is no way that his active, political posture will be seen or felt as liberal.

I have never intimated that Mr. Gorbachev's policies would be liberal or indeed anything like those of the late President Kennedy. However, when I consider the physical, mental and personal attributes of both Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev, I wonder, what additional public attributes were possessed by President and Mrs. Kennedy. When I look at the impact Mr. Gorbachev has already had in the West, and the ability he continues to show in exploiting the western media, I become increasingly convinced that my initial impression was correct. For instance, have we ever seen a Soviet leader conduct a 'walk about' within the Soviet Union? How often have the photographs of the wife, let alone the daughters or grand-daughters, of Soviet leaders appeared in the Western media? If and when Mr. Gorbachev speaks at the United Nations in the autumn of 1985, I feel that the full effect of what I am trying to communicate will become increasingly apparent. Many people, particularly in the United States, will then see for themselves that Mr. Gorbachev truly has western style charisma. As time passes, they will see that, in addition to ability, appeal and decisiveness, he has a type of inner strength that will make him a formidable foe. This may be good for the Communist block but it spells danger for the West. For Mr. Gorbachev has, I believe, great potential power to beguile and lull western leaders and grass roots opinion. He has the ability to talk billions of dollars off the defence budgets of the Western allies.

Last month I had the great privilege of meeting President Reagan. In the near future, it is possible that both President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev will join in a super power summit meeting. The vast majority of us will hope for some substantial achievement to arise from such a meeting. In reality a serious

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achievement is unlikely and the main battle between the leaders will be one of words to establish a personal leadership credibility in the hearts and minds of the world.

In anticipation of a possible summit in which personality will play possibly a critical role, it is interesting to compare the two leaders. In my opinion, both men are physically impressive, Mr Gorbachev for the reasons given earlier. President Reagan gave me the impression of being larger than I had expected from having seen him previously both on television and from seeing him at a distance such as when he spoke to the English Parliament. He is also strikingly fit for his age, particularly when one considers that not long ago he was the subject of an assassins bullet.

Both men appear to have a sense of inner strength. In my opinion President Reagan's strength seems to be based, like Margaret Thatcher's, upon a genuine conviction in the rightness of his cause. Mr. Gorbachev's strength appears to me to be based upon a great confidence in his own ability and past track record.

Both men are outstandingly good communicators. However, Mr. Gorbachev is new and that in itself is newsworthy.

Both men have great charm. President Reagan's charm is quite remarkable and appears to be perfectly genuine and come from the heart. Mr. Gorbachev's charm, on the other hand, appears to come from the head and is very controlled and calculated.

This latter point may appear to some readers to be frivolous. However it probably forms a very significant part of that elusive quality known as charisma and certainly can play a very crucial role in the image produced on world wide television in the battle for hearts and minds. I believe that President Reagan should be alert, during the televised portion of any summit meeting, to the risk that Mr. Gorbachev might lull him into a situation where both leaders appear to be charming and engaging in 'bonhomie' in front of the cameras. In such an instance, Mr. Gorbachev's control and sharpness could prove devastating by apparently wrong footing the American President and so reducing his credibility.

I also feel that the location of any summit meeting is important. The American press is usually more supportive of their President when he is abroad. My advice to the President is that if he should agree to a summit, then it should be held on neutral territory, outside the United States.

In conclusion, I believe that Mr. Gorbachev does represent the potential equivalent of a Kennedy in the Kremlin. I feel that, despite the powerful strictures of the Communist Party system, he could have a major impact upon Soviet politics. Many will

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disagree with this statement upon which only history can be the true judge. However, if I am right, we in the west have reason to alert ourselves. Mr. Gorbachev may remain in the Kremlin for a long time, possibly greatly increasing his power. He is likely to present the West with a set of new and more complex challenges which we must meet with increasing imagination, unity and fortitude. For instance, the battle for the hearts and minds in the non-aligned world and also for grass roots opinion within the western democracies, is likely to be stepped up in new and more subtle ways. The choice and conduct of any super power summit is likely to be of crucial importance.

Politicians of western democracies are likely to face an increasingly sophisticated political challenge from Mr. Gorbachev both at home and abroad.

RALPH I. STRAUS
950 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

September 13, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am keenly aware of the important and difficult negotiations you are about to undertake with Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva on the 19th/21st of November. With this in mind, I am enclosing herewith an account by John Browne (Member of Parliament for Winchester, England, together with an outline resume of his background) of his Impressions of the Man, His Style and his Likely Impact Upon East-West Relations.

I have met Mr. Browne, who was invited not only to serve on the Parliamentary Reception Committee for Mr. Gorbachev, but also to escort them on certain expeditions during their tour; during which period he had the opportunity to observe Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev at close quarters, to listen to their questions and to observe their reactions to statements and events.

The enclosed paper may already have been brought to your attention, but if not, I do hope and think that it will help in adding to the very extensive back-ground briefing that you undoubtedly must be receiving from your able staff.

Mr. President, I have been an ardent supporter of you and your Presidency, both financially and by membership as a Director of the Atlantic Council, and as a founding member of the Committee on the Present Danger.

Respectfully yours,



Ralph I. Straus

RIS:kk

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1985

Dear Mr. Straus:

Many thanks for forwarding Mr. Browne's account of his experiences with General Secretary Gorbachev. As you are well aware, first hand impressions of Soviet leaders are hard to come by and always useful in planning for future direct contacts.

Please be assured that I have passed on Mr. Browne's commentary to Robert McFarlane, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Again, thank you for contacting me.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Ralph I. Straus
950 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

September 30, 1985

~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's UN Meetings

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's readout on his various bilateral meetings at the UN last week (excluding the Sevardnadze meeting) as well as the Summit Seven Foreign Ministers' dinner.

Bob Linhard concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum forwarding the Secretary's memorandum to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Secretary Shultz's memo

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 22, 1997
By *AS* NARA, Date *6/9/02*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: George Shultz's UN Meetings

Issue

Whether to read the attached memo from George Shultz on his meetings last week at the UN.

Facts

In addition to his meeting with Shevardnadze, George had a series of useful meetings with West European and Japanese counterparts and Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez.

Discussion

George discussed a number of high priority issues including Gorbachev's upcoming visit to France, European views of your SDI program, Spanish participation in NATO, and bilateral trade problems with the Japanese.

RecommendationOKNo

That you read the attached memorandum from George.

Attachment:

Tab A

Memorandum from George Shultz

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NLRR F06-114/3#7857

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

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A

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SYSTEM II: 90987

NLRR F06-114/3 #7861

BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/87THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S/S 8528711

~~SECRET~~

NOV 15

September 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: My Day at UNGA

I had a good meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez. The NATO/US Bases issue was the main topic, with Gonzalez groping for a way out of his self-imposed dilemma on holding a referendum on NATO that polls show he is likely to lose. I underlined the importance of Spanish participation in Europe and in the defense of Western values, and the need to make no changes in our bases until the NATO issue is resolved and we negotiate a new bases agreement. Gonzalez, for the first time in my many meetings with him on this subject, agreed that, while we will start discussions on our bases before a NATO decision is taken, no decision will be taken until after the NATO matter is clear. We will be drafting a statement supportive of the Spanish efforts to move into both the European Community and NATO, to be issued by January 1, the projected date of Spain's accession to the EC.

French Foreign Minister Dumas told me at lunch today that President Mitterrand will not agree to a joint declaration when he meets with Gorbachev next week because it would be bad form and might be used for propaganda against your November meeting. Instead, each side will set forth its position in separate statements. I challenged Dumas' assertion that our SDI R&D program is simply a response to Soviet efforts by explaining that we see improved defense as a means of countering a first strike capability and ensuring stability and confidence in deterrence. Also, I asked Dick Walters to brief Dumas on Soviet R&D efforts since Dumas had only limited knowledge of what the Soviets are doing.

I met for approximately one hour with Sir Geoffrey Howe to continue our broad ranging discussion of international issues which we started during previous encounters this week. On arms control, Sir Geoffrey said Margaret Thatcher and he are concerned that the Soviets not be able to preempt us in the propaganda area, and he commented favorably on the line that I had taken regarding East-West and arms control issues in my UNGA speech. We agreed that it would be important to conclude our SDI agreement in October, prior to your meeting with Gorbachev. I assured Sir Geoffrey that we would strongly oppose any resolution calling for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa in the Security Council. On the Middle East, I spent fifteen minutes alone with Sir Geoffrey bringing him up to date on our thinking as well as briefing him on Mubarak's visit to Washington and my conversations with King Hussein here in New York.

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NOV 15

DECL:OADR

~~SECRET~~ NOBIS

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The highlight of my meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Abe was our mutual affirmation of intent to work urgently to resolve bilateral trade issues and fight protectionism. We issued a statement of accomplishments (an impressive list) and goals. I stressed that we will need help from our trading partners if we are to overcome protectionist pressures. Abe, for his part, affirmed that his government respects and welcomes your effort, exemplified by the recent trade speech as well as the G-5 decision, to approach the trade issue in a positive, comprehensive manner. Abe stressed his government's willingness to contribute through further improvements in market access and expansion of domestic demand.

At the Summit Seven Foreign Ministers dinner, the Ministers agreed to 1) publish a report on the African economic situation, 2) place the narcotics issue on the agenda for the Tokyo Summit, 3) ask the experts to develop recommendations for broader cooperation in combatting terrorism before the next summit, and 4) to keep in touch with respect to implementing our respective policies toward South Africa. There was general approbation for the measures taken by the key finance ministers with respect to the dollar, and for your recently enunciated steps to fight protectionism and promote fair trade.

~~SECRET~~ NOBIS

DECL:OADR

JH-C
63NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

September 30, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union: Instruments of Control

Attached is the next group of papers on the Soviet Union, which deals with the instruments by which the regime exercises its totalitarian control of Soviet society.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

Tab A	The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Tab B	Nomenklatura: The USSR Patronage System
Tab C	The Soviet Political Police
Tab D	The Soviet Military

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union: Soviet Instruments of Control

You have previously read two groups of papers, dealing with the sources of Soviet behavior and the problems of Soviet society. Those attached here deal with the principal instruments by which the top Communist Party leadership controls the society.

The Soviet Union, of course, has a governmental structure which in theory is not much different from that in other countries, except that there is literally no private sector. Everything, from farms to schools to factories to banks to sporting clubs, is administered by the government. The government even has a department which oversees those churches which are allowed to operate legally. The formal government, however, though omnipresent, merely administers the country. It is in fact subordinate to the Communist Party, which uses it to implement policy the Party sets, and in fact is run by persons who are themselves Party members and subject to Party discipline. The whole country is run by a chain of "interlocking directorates" which receive decisions from above and are expected to implement them with total discipline.

The lines of real authority, therefore, run top-down from the Communist Party leadership, with the ultimate policy makers being the thirteen full members of the party Politburo. Though the Communist Party calls itself a political party, it is of course totally unlike anything we would call a political party. It is not made up of private citizens who join together to campaign and try to win elections, but of a co-opted elite group, selected on the basis of loyalty and discipline, whose function is to see to it that the policies set by the top leadership are implemented throughout the society. Even the Soviet Constitution, which sounds very liberal in theory, provides that the Communist Party will be the "leading core" of all organizations, whether governmental or "non-governmental." Not even a sporting society or a chess club can be organized without the sufferance and supervision of Communist Party officials.

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NLRR F06714/3 #7858

BY CJ NARA DATE 10/30/07

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The paper at Tab A describes how the Communist Party is organized and how it applies its control to the society. Over the decades of communist rule in Russia, a new controlling elite has formed under Communist Party auspices, usually called the nomenklatura: those persons who occupy supervisory, influential or prominent positions, and whose appointment therefore requires the approval of higher party authority.

The nomenklatura forms the privileged class in the Soviet Union, those who enjoy a significantly higher standard of living than their compatriots, and also the trappings and perquisites of authority. It shows a tendency of becoming hereditary, since members use their connections to get their children into the best schools and into nomenklatura jobs. It also has an international aspect, since similar elite classes have been created in those countries under Soviet domination, with the result that -- for example -- the nomenklatura in Czechoslovakia tends to identify its interests with the nomenklatura of the Soviet Union, not with their fellow Czechs and Slovaks. (It is a bit like the aristocracy in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, which tended to support each other across national boundaries if there was a challenge from within to the rule of the aristocracy.) The paper at Tab B describes how it is organized and how it operates in the Soviet Union.

In many ways, the Soviet Union is run more like an organized criminal organization in the West than like a government. Using this analogy, one can say that if the Party forms the control elite, the secret police (KGB) and the military are its "enforcers," the first in a direct sense, and the second as a reserve if things ever threaten to get out of hand. Both institutions are totally controlled by the Communist Party, and provide the muscle if physical coercion is required. Papers describing these two institutions are at Tabs C and D.

Recommendation

OKNo

That you read the papers attached as general background for your upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.

Attachments:

Tab A	The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Tab B	Nomenklatura: The USSR Patronage System
Tab C	The Soviet Political Police
Tab D	The Soviet Military

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

~~SECRET~~

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TAB A

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEBY CJ NARA DATE 10/30/07 68THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Communist party is the core institution of the Soviet political system, focus of the levers of power and prestige in the USSR. Every branch of the bureaucracy--state, economic, military and police--is subordinated to its control. At the same time, the party is the guardian and interpreter of Marxist ideology and responsible for indoctrinating the population with the ideas and values of Soviet-style communism.

The CPSU now numbers over 18 million members (including 700,000 candidates, i.e., probationers), encompassing about 6 percent of the adult population. The party does not solicit adherents; it chooses its members. Prospective candidates are carefully screened. Each must be recommended by three persons who have already been party members for at least five years. White-collar workers are prime targets for recruitment. They made up close to half of the membership in 1983, even though accounting for only a quarter of the general population.

Party members all belong to a party organization at their place of work. There are 426,000 of these primary party organizations in the Soviet Union, and they exist in every factory, office, farm, school, military unit -- in short, in every organized unit in the society. Each party member is expected to stimulate production within his own primary organization; these units in turn provide the central authorities with a vehicle for constant pressure on lower echelon officials.

Every member has the duty to "master Marxist-Leninist theory, raise his ideological level, and contribute to the molding and rearing of the man of communist society." The political training of communists ranges from short-term evening and correspondence courses to the university-level Higher Party School in Moscow which has a regular four-year curriculum. Training at fulltime party schools is regarded as so important that middle-aged officials holding responsibilities as great as those of the governor of an American state are sent to the schools before being given new assignments.

Mass Organizations

Several mass organizations exist outside the party framework, but operate under its close and direct supervision. The Communist Youth League, Komsomol, is the most important of these. Its 41-million membership includes a majority of the country's adolescents (aged 14-18) and a substantial minority of the 19-26 age group. The Komsomol not only serves to indoctrinate the youth but it is also a testing and screening agency for prospective CPSU members. Furthermore, the Youth League exercises tutelage over the Pioneers, the organization to which all children of primary school age (10-15) belong.

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Declassify on: OADR

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The Soviet trade unions, with some 130 million members, serve the party by stimulating production and prompting "socialist emulation," competitive campaigns aimed at raising productivity. They also administer social insurance funds, and to a limited extent defend worker rights. Other mass organizations effectively run by the party include the Knowledge Society (Znaniye), an adult-education body with over 1 million members, and DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy), which fosters military-type sports for civilians and school children.

Party Structure

Theoretically, the CPSU's sovereign organ is the Party Congress which, by statute, meets every five years. It is a gathering of some 5000 delegates which, among other functions, elects the Central Committee, which is responsible for policymaking in the interim between congresses. The Central Committee (470 members - 319 full and 151 alternate) in turn formally elects the members of smaller executive bodies to handle the day-to-day matters -- in particular the Politburo for policy decision, and the Secretariat to oversee and control party and government operations.

In practice, however, these two latter bodies are the decision making organs of the party, the peak of the CPSU's nearly perfect bureaucratic pyramid. The Politburo and Secretariat control the appointment of the regional secretaries throughout the country and, through them, the lesser secretaries down to the lowest echelons. The Secretariat sends binding "recommendations" for major personnel changes to the non-Russian republics or regional-level party offices, and often has its executives monitor the electoral plenums at those levels which implement its "recommendations."

The whole process of electing the party committees that choose the secretaries at each level is actually controlled by the very secretaries who are supposed to be elected by those same subordinates. Each non-Russian republic or regional party headquarters has an Organizational Party Work Department to manage the process. And the top leadership in Moscow controls the election of delegates to the sovereign party congress, which, through the Central Committee it elects, technically elects the General Secretary.

In the 5-year intervals between congresses, supreme authority in the CPSU is formally delegated to the Central Committee to which most of the important officials of the USSR belong. They are drawn from all segments of the bureaucracy, but most come from the party apparatus itself. (The party apparatus is the body of fulltime officials that arranges implementation of decisions, manipulates elections and controls discussions in party meetings.)

The Central Committee's brief and infrequent plenary meetings (two-three per year) rule out its management of day-to-day decision-making. Consequently, the real focus of Soviet power is the Politburo. It is now composed of 13 voting members and 5 alternates, and meets weekly (usually on Thursday afternoons) to discuss and decide on major issues. The General Secretary (Gorbachev) is de facto chairman of the Politburo, which in recent years has seemed to reach most of its decisions by consensus.

The Party Secretariat -- a sort of NSC staff estimated to have as high as 10,000 employees -- sets the Politburo agenda, provides the requisite documentation and oversees implementation of Politburo decisions. Of the 11 Secretaries, Gorbachev, Ligachev and Ryzhkov are full Politburo members; 2 of the 5 Politburo alternates are also central party Secretaries. (Six Party Secretaries hold no status in the Politburo).

With the exception of the General Secretary, each of the Secretaries exercises supervision over a specific sphere of operations. He does so via departments of the Secretariat which run parallel to all major state bodies and administer key areas of Soviet society and foreign affairs. A crucial function of the Secretariat's Organizational Party Work Department, for example, is controlling the assignments of the high and medium-level personnel to party and Komsomol organizations, as well as to State and trade union agencies.

Equally close to the heart of party operations are the Secretariat departments for ideology and indoctrination. These include the Propaganda, Culture, and Science and Educational Institutions Departments. Their function is to assure that every medium for conveyin ideas is actively and properly promoting the objectives of the regime.

Personal rivalries and frictions permeate the CPSU. Corruption is known to be rife from top to bottom. And there has been an increasing tendency among the youth to regard the Komsomol as a boring and restrictive institution. Nevertheless, the CPSU has succeeded in creating a strong amalgam of self-interest and pride in achievement which binds many to the Soviet system. Gorbachev is clearly eager to overhaul the party apparatus to make it more responsive to economic management, committed to reform and to rejuvenate its ranks. But neither he nor the apparatchiki have any intent of introducing changes that threaten to loosen their present grip on every facet of Soviet life.

Prepared by:
SPloss
Department of State

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NOMENKLATURA: THE USSR'S PATRONAGE SYSTEM

Structure

The Soviet institution of nomenklatura amounts to an encyclopedia of "plum books." Its rules dictate that all key jobs throughout the USSR -- in the party bureaucracy, government, economy, cultural life, military or academic establishments, even agriculture -- be reserved for candidates picked and approved by the supervisory party organ. Stalin developed this system of personnel patronage as a vehicle for gaining control of both party and society. His successors have enlarged on it to such an extent that it has no real parallel in the noncommunist world. The Soviet party machine has greater power in co-opting, black-balling and ejecting personnel than does the most exclusive club in the west. Inside, one is entitled to a lifestyle befitting the position; outside, one is relegated to the "masses," to scramble as the average Soviet for an existence. Ousted from the system one is excluded from even marginal benefits available to the masses.

The so-called nomenklatura are the elite of the USSR, the most prominent and best rewarded people in each professional group, all the decision and policymakers. They fall into various categories:

- a) The political elite, consisting of the leaders of the party apparatchiki.
- b) The managerial elite, who actually operate the government, the economy, the armed forces, the police apparatus, and other parts of the Soviet system.
- c) The cultural and scientific elite, the artists, scientists, writers, performers, and scholars.

These groups differ in political influence, social status, prominence, and rewards. The political elite are those in the Communist hierarchy who enjoy decisive influence. The managerial elite, though not without political power, essentially occupy nonpolitical career tracks. Although the cultural and scientific elite wield relatively little political influence; they enjoy greater prominence: members of this group are often more visible and better paid than are the managers or political leaders.

The political and managerial elite are known in Soviet parlance as "leadership cadres". All in all they are estimated to number around 4 million. About 500,000 are top-level bureaucrats, half of them in the party apparatus itself. Another 500,000 hold government positions. Some 2 million are the economic managers who are regarded as the cream of the economic and technical intelligentsia. The rest occupy management or supervisory positions ranging from shop stewards to kolkhoz chairmen.

Getting Ahead

Ability and expertise are only one element in getting to the top in Soviet society. Conformity with the current party line and mastery of the techniques of maneuvering within the system on the one hand, plus personal patronage from within the nomenklatura itself on the other, are the aids on which the ambitious rely.

The leaders of the USSR have long viewed economic efficiency and consumer satisfaction as matters of secondary importance. Their primary objective has always been a maximization of the national power of the USSR. And the consolidation, expansion and preservation of their own power is justified as a means to that end. That in turn justifies the higher income and perquisites of the ruling class.

Life Style

The nomenklatura by and large enjoy a life style well above the drab level of reality faced by the average Soviet citizen. The upper crust has its cars and special access to goods and services. Its members move in a tight, private universe of suburban dachas, downtown co-operative apartments, exclusive clubs and vacation resorts. The sons and daughters have preferred access to the better schools and often intermarry. Those further down the pecking order have similar special stores, housing, resorts and benefits befitting their rank.

Money income is the least important advantage of making it in the USSR. The real boons derive from a compendium of tangible and intangible privileges: greater freedom, better medical care, the opportunity to travel abroad and ready access to domestic and imported goods unavailable to the average citizen at any time.

Many in the ruling class experience such a sheltered existence they have not the faintest idea how the rest of the country really lives. Others -- the collective farm chairmen for example -- are more directly exposed but still are far better off than their non-nomenklatura associates. Gorbachev has spearheaded a drive against the isolation of the apparatchiki from the masses, but the privileges of the Gorbachevs will unquestionably remain palatial by Soviet standards. Nor is there any real popular resentment of the advantages enjoyed by Raisa and the other "wives of" since their life style is not flaunted before the public. The gap between the elite and the masses is studiously ignored by the media.

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Other Side of the Coin

The material advantages enjoyed by the power elite would be reduced if a larger share of the national product were to be allocated to economic investment and mass consumption. As a result, the economic managers' advocacy of greater recognition of economic factors and for greater professional autonomy constantly runs into opposition from the political decision makers.

Even deeper is the tension between the ruling elite and the prestigious intellectuals who advocate greater individual freedom and more personal property. Although many cultural figures are conformists and as jealous of their perks as the power elite, some have advocated an easing of the internal control system under the rubric of "de-Stalinization." One of their targets is the party apparatus and its total domination of the elite structure. The party ideologists for their part are determined to keep a tight rein on the social sciences and the arts; they see their mission as the preservation of doctrinal purity which in turn justifies the rule of the party, and of course, their own privileged existence.

A generational conflict has also been developing within the nomenklatura itself, given the marked age difference between the CPSU leadership and its rank and file. While about 40 percent of the party's 18 million members are under 40 years of age (6.9 million), there is no one under 50 in the top leadership at all. And while men and women are represented about equally within the educated strata of Soviet society, only 9 women are full members of the Central Committee. (Women makeup 27 percent of the party membership.) Nor is any woman now included in the party's supreme leadership.

United We Stand

The interests of the nomenklatura are diverse: there are orthodox and pragmatic conservatives as well as moderate reformers within the policymaking bodies of the regime. They are frequently at odds among themselves, usually over questions which affect the status of different groupings within the nomenklatura itself. But there is no open opposition at any level or within any group to the system per se. After all, careers, lifestyle, future, and family well-being are all dependent on and a function of that system.

For the sake of efficiency, Gorbachev apparently is prepared to make certain concessions to dissatisfied elements of the elite. He has urged more operational autonomy for lower managerial personnel, and encouraged creative artists to be more

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realistic in their portrayals of life. The younger generation and women have been promised a larger role in the conduct of political affairs. In the field of domestic policy, the pressure is on for less cronyism and nepotism and more specialized knowledge and expertise as the major criteria for advancement. But the Gorbachev-led political elite is still part of the nomenklatura, and any basic reform of the system would threaten its power and its perks. Whatever changes Gorbachev might introduce -- and even the smallest will run into opposition from some quarter -- the nomenklatura as a whole will insist on retaining control of the social processes in the USSR. It cannot do otherwise and still preserve communist rule in the USSR.

Prepared by:
SPloss
Department of State

2

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SOVIET POLITICAL POLICE

Lenin created the "Sword and Shield of the Revolution"--the Cheka--to crush domestic opposition and to protect the Bolshevik party from its enemies, using any and all means, including terror. By any standard, the Cheka succeeded brilliantly and bloodily. Its present-day incarnation, the KGB, has become one of the three pillars of the Soviet regime, the other two being the party and the military.

There is no American analog for the KGB: apart from a political role which would be unthinkable in a democracy, it has the functions of the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, the NSA, the EPS, and it has two divisions of heavily armed troops. The KGB also controls resources and uses tactics which in the US could only be likened to those of organized crime. Because of strict Soviet secrecy, no accurate figure on personnel strength is available for the secret police or even for the regular police.

Historical Background

The Cheka has strong roots in Russian history. Stalin in his heyday gave favorable publicity to Tsar Ivan the Terrible's equivalent institution, the Oprichnina, which ruthlessly and bloodily suppressed the Tsar's enemies. Although much subdued compared to its 16th century predecessor, the Tsarist Okhrana was the main persecutor of the Bolsheviks prior to the 1917 Revolution.

Soviet propaganda on the glamor and romance of the Cheka goes back to its early period under Felix Dzerzhinskiy when it launched "Red Terror" against the Bolsheviks' domestic and foreign enemies. This was the time when Operation Trust snared the feared British agent Sidney Reilly and when "Iron Felix" and his underlings were hailed as the "knights of the Revolution."

Its image worsened in the 1930s when the secret police participated in Stalin's assaults against the peasantry and destroyed the Old Bolsheviks and the Red Army's officer corps. Led by such men as Yagoda and Yezhov, it doomed millions to forced labor in the GULAG forced labor camps under inhuman conditions and with appalling casualty rates. During World War II it conducted a successful espionage effort against the Nazis and created a special wartime disciplinary unit known as SMERSH (Death to Spies). The GULAG population was at a peak--an estimated 15 million--in the postwar reconstruction period, swollen by captured Axis prisoners and Soviet victims of Stalin's harsh policies.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb 11/4/3 #7842

BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

The KGB's Political Role after Stalin

Following the execution of Lavrentiy Beriia after Stalin's death in 1953, the KGB gradually became intertwined with leadership politics and has at key moments played a role in leadership successions.

As the agency which provides the leadership with bodyguards and secure communications, the KGB could also isolate the top leader at a critical moment. When the Politburo members in October 1964 chose to oust Khrushchev, the conspirators took care to prevent Khrushchev from mobilizing his allies (as he had done in June 1957). The party secretary for security, Alexander Shelepin, called upon his protege, the KGB chief at that time, to cut off Khrushchev's communications from his vacation dacha to Moscow. After the coup Khrushchev was flown back to Moscow and expelled from the Politburo.

The KGB's resources were used in 1982 by Yuriy Andropov (who gained the political police job after Brezhnev's successful power play against Shelepin in 1967) to mount a campaign aimed at capturing the succession from Brezhnev's putative heir Chernenko. Andropov undertook in March 1982 a widely leaked investigation of corruption on the part of Brezhnev's political supporters and even Brezhnev's daughter Galina. Andropov's goal was to taint Brezhnev's associates and to demonstrate that Brezhnev could no longer protect his followers. The most publicized target was Galina Brezhneva's association with the colorful Boris the Gypsy, a shady figure involved in underworld jewel dealings. The campaign was successful; Andropov left the KGB when he acquired the party secretaryship in May. Memories of the 1930s are still strong enough that he could not move directly from the KGB into Brezhnev's shoes.

The Gorbachev-KGB Link

As his health declined, Andropov pushed Gorbachev as his successor but could not determine the succession. During Chernenko's reign, the KGB's disappointment and vexation over having lost its moment of glory with the death of Andropov was widely bruited. It was equally clear that the KGB as an institution sided with Gorbachev, viewing him as Andropov's heir. Its loyalties were repaid upon Gorbachev's accession in March of this year. Chebrikov, brought into the KGB with Andropov in 1967 and named by him as KGB chief in 1982, was promoted to full member of the Politburo this April, obviously as a member of Gorbachev's ruling coterie.

Two members of the Politburo--Chebrikov and Aliyev, who was the Azerbaydzhan KGB chief until he became the republic party chief--have had professional experience in the KGB. Obviously, KGB prestige and influence are now high and its relations with Gorbachev are demonstrably supportive.

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The KGB's Domestic Security Role

Like the party, the KGB is virtually everywhere in Soviet society. There are KGB units on every level of government. Every major factory and institution has its "first department" which handles security matters, including employee clearances and access to classified information. The KGB official who sits on every party committee probably has the last word on security issues, and even a republic first secretary is bound to respect the KGB representative on the republic party bureau.

As a true political police, KGB local units have a widespread net of informers who report on their fellow workers and neighbors. Citizens are encouraged to report deviant speech and behavior to the authorities. Unauthorized assemblies and publications are searched out and terminated, sometimes with significant criminal penalties for the participants.

The KGB has organized special units to monitor religious organizations and nationalist activities. A voluminous literature exists abroad on these activities in addition to the documentation of the KGB suppression of political dissent and control over emigration.

The political police function extends to the armed forces in which a net of secret informants reports on moods and attitudes among the troops. Any security incident draws the attention of KGB investigators.

In addition to their security responsibilities, the KGB has special police jurisdiction over cases involving large amounts of foreign currency, gold, and jewels. This conveniently permitted Andropov in 1982 to investigate the scandals involving Brezhnev's daughter Galina. Otherwise, the regular police, headed by Brezhnev's crony Shchelokov, could have whitewashed the affair.

KGB Influence over the Civilian Police

The KGB under Andropov began an extensive purge of the regular police following the ouster of MVD minister Shchelokov in December 1982. (Shchelokov was disgraced and reportedly committed suicide in December 1984 to avoid a trial for corruption.) The regular police or MVD is now headed by a former KGB official and several other KGB officials were transferred to the MVD's top leadership. In addition, a new political administration was created in the MVD and a large number of party members were detailed to police work in an effort to purge and upgrade the police, which is now playing a larger role in Gorbachev's anti-corruption and anti-alcohol

campaigns. There is no question about the superior status of the KGB compared to the MVD and its ability to intervene in the jurisdiction and processes of the MVD and the courts, but there is also a strong history of bad relations between the two police agencies which occasionally erupts in ugly incidents.

Foreign Intelligence and Counter Intelligence

Abroad, the KGB is especially active in intelligence collection--political, military, technical--under diplomatic, journalistic, and business cover. It is without doubt the world's largest and most active intelligence service, and it also draws upon the resources of its Warsaw Pact allies to complement its intelligence effort abroad.

KGB foreign reporting goes independently of foreign ministry reporting to Moscow where it is coordinated and submitted to the Politburo. KGB activities and reporting partly parallel and duplicate those of the Defense Ministry's Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) and inevitably there is rivalry between the two.

The KGB also engages in covert action "active measures," agent-of-influence operations, clandestine support of foreign political parties, and forgeries and bribery to get press placement of Soviet materials.

KGB counterintelligence work most often shows up in public accounts of agent arrests and the declaration of foreign diplomats persona non grata, but some of the counter-intelligence materials published in the Soviet press must be put into the prophylactic propaganda category, aimed primarily at Soviet citizens. However, Western diplomats in Moscow and Leningrad are primary, but not sole, targets of KGB counter-intelligence efforts. Heavy surveillance, active attempts to penetrate the staff and buildings, and the creation of effective obstacles between Soviet citizens and foreigners are permanent elements in the KGB's operations.

Soviet Views of the KGB

While Soviet dissidents who have faced KGB harassment see it as the regime's arm of repression, most Soviet citizens seem to regard the KGB as a necessary part of a well-ordered state. While Soviet citizens -- are skeptical regarding their media, the flood of books, films and TV glorifying the KGB's exploits in counter-intelligence and intelligence leaves its impression. But the public's respect for the KGB still rests mostly on fear.

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Careerists look upon the secret police as an avenue for upward mobility. The KGB successfully recruits the cream of university graduates for careers in overseas intelligence work, careers often under diplomatic and journalistic guise which are regarded as more rewarding and interesting than most.

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THE SOVIET MILITARY

Civil-military relations in the Soviet Union are replete with paradox. The military as an institution is a dominant force in national security decision-making, yet it is also under firm party control.

Civilian authority sets the broad outlines of defense policy but relies almost exclusively on military expertise to elaborate the military-technical side of strategy and doctrine. On military planning and technical assessments, there is no civilian counter weight to the General Staff.

Despite its internal bureaucratic politics, interservice rivalries, and long history of alliances and intrigues between individual military and civilian leaders, there is no evidence that the military has ever plotted to take power. The military as an institution has not aspired to rule. Nevertheless, it has sought to protect its own interests and professionalism.

In recent years, military figures have been much in the limelight. It has been primarily the arms control process and the civilian leadership's need for expert opinion which has put them there.

Anti-Bonapartist Tradition

There is a longstanding tradition of the importance of military power in Soviet life. Externally, Russian and now Soviet security and position in the world have rested primarily on military strength. Domestically, both Tsars and General Secretaries have played up military values and, when possible, their own military careers in order to buttress personal and regime authority.

Yet the military establishment itself is subject to more rigorous political controls than any other institution in the Soviet system. In both pre-and post-revolutionary societies, the military has been subservient to political authority.

This seeming inconsistency -- on the one hand, the Soviets emulate military values and, on the other, distrust the military as an institution -- reflects an anti-Bonapartist tradition in Soviet and Russian history. Indeed, the Bolsheviks who took power in 1917 frequently used analogies to the French revolution to discuss political developments in Russia, including the danger of a man on horseback taking over the revolution.

This wariness of the military stems in part from traditional revolutionary distrust of standing professional armies. Marx and

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Engels viewed standing armies as the tools of the 19th century monarchic-bourgeois states. Although their doctrine eventually evolved to strongly supporting the idea of a class-based revolutionary force, they left undefined the role of the armed forces in a post-revolutionary socialist society.

Lenin did not reconcile himself to the need for a standing army until after the 1917 revolution, and even then the Bolsheviks' first order of business was to destroy the old army. The early Bolsheviks moved cautiously in building the new Red Army, emphasizing the principles of voluntary recruitment and elected commanders -- thus nullifying efforts to turn the new army into an effective fighting force. When War Commissar Trotsky, with Lenin's approval, finally undertook to transform the Red Army into a centralized, efficient professional force, he also incorporated the idea of political officers at every rank who could check the actions of their military counterparts.

Checks and Balances

Today, a set of extensive institutional arrangements is in place intended to ensure civilian control over the military.

--The Main Political Administration (MPA) is the party's political watchdog in the armed forces. As Trotsky envisaged, political officers are assigned to every level down to battalion and in general act as representatives of the party. Although the MPA reports to the Ministry of Defense, it also functions as a distinct department of the CPSU Central Committee and is ultimately accountable to the Politburo for the military's political reliability.

--In addition to the MPA network, party and Komsomol membership is encouraged and widespread -- over ninety percent of officers and enlisted men belong to one or the other of these bodies.

--On top of all this, the KGB maintains its own secret agents throughout the military establishment.

These arrangements underscore the continuing importance for Soviet leaders of political loyalty over military interests. The gravest charge made against Marshal Zhukov before his fall from grace in 1957 was that he had sought to eliminate party control. More recently, Marshal Ogarkov's demotion from Chief of Staff a year ago was accompanied by intimations that he harbored "unparty-like tendencies."

Civil-Military Interaction at the Top

Even though it is under Party Control, the military is one of the most highly organized and influential interest groups in the

USSR. It has effectively used this influence to protect its own general interests (with regard to resource allocation, for instance) and professionalism.

Nevertheless, the military has only played an ancillary role in Soviet leadership consideration of broader policy questions. This is partly attributable to the fact that in upper levels of the party, the military carries relatively little weight. Only two professional military leaders have been full Politburo members: Zhukov (1956-57) and Grechko (1967-76). Ustinov, who succeeded Grechko as Defense Minister in 1976, was a civilian Politburo member who had spent his entire career dealing with defense production and was only given the military rank of Marshal when he became Defense Minister. The present Defense Minister, Marshal Sokolov, is a long-time career military officer. He was promoted to candidate member of the Politburo in April 1985, but is widely regarded as a transitional figure with little political clout.

Likewise, the military's representation on the Central Committee is minimal. In 1981, only 30 professional military officers were candidate or full members, about six percent of total Central Committee membership.

The party's predominance over the military has allowed civilian leaders to meddle in military affairs at times. Stalin of course, decimated the high command in the purges of the late 1930s, and after WWII moved quickly to reduce Marshall Zhukov's stature.

Zhukov later regained his influence under Khrushchev. In 1957, Zhukov as Defense Minister was instrumental in helping Khrushchev put down a challenge from his colleagues in the Politburo. Khrushchev, however, soon ousted his erstwhile ally and undertook to overturn measures instituted under Zhukov to bolster professional autonomy within the armed forces. Khrushchev even sought to intervene personally in the formulation of military strategy, though he did not attempt to create an institutional rival to the General Staff.

Gorbachev Continues the Tradition

Gorbachev presumably assumed the function of chairman of the Defense Council (where actual decision-making on national security issues -- including arms control -- appears to be centered) and, in effect, supreme commander-in-chief when he became General Secretary. Events over the past year do not suggest that the military has enjoyed greater than usual influence as a result of the civilian leadership transition.

Although Gorbachev has pushed for increased industrial investment as the number one priority in the next five-year plan (1986-90), he has also spoken out against cutting defense programs. At a

June Central Committee meeting, he reaffirmed that "requisite funds" for the country's defense would be maintained. In his V-E Day address, Gorbachev stated that the importance of a "military-political" upbringing for Soviet citizens was growing.

Following the July 1 removal of Grigoriy Romanov as the CPSU Secretary responsible for military affairs, Gorbachev has moved vigorously to assert his leadership in this sphere. On July 10 he delivered an address to an unusual meeting of top military officers in Minsk and immediately afterward a number of key changes in military personnel began surfacing. Following the pattern of his personnel appointments in the civilian sphere, he replaced several older military leaders with younger -- in some cases relatively junior -- people.

The Soviet Military: Coming of Age

The military has gradually assumed a more important role in national security decision-making over the past two decades and, in the process, has assumed a higher public profile. This has largely been due to the arms control process and increasingly sophisticated weaponry which have generated the civilian leadership's need for more military expertise and advice. The military has consequently also become more involved in decision-making on arms control itself. Because of the General Staff's technical expertise and its function, in effect, as executive secretariat to the Defense Council, the military is well positioned to argue its views and try to shape the internal debate in this area.

In the early days, the role of the military in the arms control process appeared to be limited to exercising a veto option over any given proposal, after which it stepped back. In the first SALT negotiations, sensitive information on the Soviet side appeared to be strictly compartmented and there was little interaction between military and civilian elements. When Ogarkov was a member of the Soviet delegation in the early 1970s, he once appealed to an American negotiator not to discuss classified information in front of Soviet civilian team members,

In recent years, however, the Soviets seem to have adopted more of an American style in the internal arms control process. Now the military is much more involved in interacting on an ongoing basis with other components of the Soviet national security structure both in Moscow and on the various negotiating teams in Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own stable of arms control experts, and the major Soviet negotiating teams are all led by diplomats with many years of negotiating experience. Nevertheless, the Soviets have no counterpart either to ACDA or the oversight of Congressional committees. Few, if any, civilians would dare challenge the professional military analysis of their requirements.

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The military has also assumed a more prominent role in explaining and advancing Soviet positions on military matters, particularly with regard to the arms control process. By the beginning of the INF period, it was Defense Minister Ustinov who in October 1979 in Pravda began to lay out the public argument that an INF balance already existed. Much of the Soviet INF argument since then has been framed around the assertion that the American deployment would upset this balance, with Defense Ministry officials taking the lead in its public formulation.

Both former Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov and now his successor Akhromeyev, as well as Col. Gen. N.F. Chervov, head of the Defense Ministry's arms control directorate, have been active public spokesmen for Soviet positions. Far from staying in the background, as would have been traditionally expected, they have been at the cutting edge of publicly developing and explicating Soviet positions.

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