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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/11/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (2/12)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1111

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7874	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE HOROWITZ CONVERSATIONS WITH USSR OFFICIAL <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	6	10/3/1985	B1
7875	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7874 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	6	10/3/1985	B1
7876	MEMO	PEARSON TO KELLEY RE MEETING WITH YURI ZHUKOV <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/3/1985	B1
7877	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT BY SOVIET DELEGATION <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	9/28/1985	B1
7878	MEMO	MATLOCK TO PEARSON RE MEETING WITH YURI ZHUKOV <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/2/1985	B1
7879	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT REAGAN <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/3/1985	B1
7880	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEMO FROM GEORGE SHULTZ <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7881	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MY DAY AT UNGA R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	10/3/1985	B1

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BY C1 NARA DATE 10/31/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 3, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Horowitz Conversations with Soviet Official

Larry Horowitz briefed me yesterday in detail regarding meetings he had Sunday and Monday with Andrei Pavlov, who he said works closely with Zagladin in the CPSU Secretariat. Horowitz presumes that the messages were intended not only for Senator Kennedy, but also for passing to us, but he asked that the matter be handled with our usual discretion: that is, that they be shared with you and John Poindexter, and if you deem appropriate, with the President and Secretary Shultz, but not with others. Though it is somewhat disjointed, I will recount Horowitz's report as he gave it to me from his notes.

Background:

Horowitz received a message Friday asking him to come urgently to meet with Pavlov in Helsinki to discuss matters which they had discussed during his visit to Moscow in July. (These had included a Soviet invitation for Kennedy to visit Moscow, which Kennedy had refused unless the Soviets would agree to release both Sakharov and Shcharansky.) At first Horowitz resisted the idea of travelling suddenly to Helsinki, but was told that there was a positive answer to the Senator's requests, and he therefore decided he should go.

Horowitz arrived in Helsinki Sunday and was met by Pavlov. The latter refused to talk in Horowitz's hotel, and they went instead to a Lutheran Church, sat through the latter part of the evening service in the balcony, and stayed there for more than an hour's conversation afterward. On Monday, the conversations took place in a room in a hotel different from the one Horowitz was staying in, by Pavlov's prearrangement. Pavlov explained these bizarre arrangements -- and the selection of Helsinki rather than Moscow for the meeting -- by saying that they had to be away from both Soviet and American listening devices. In fact, he seemed to be concerned primarily about Soviet devices, since he claimed that "not all elements" of the Soviet government were aware of the contact, and that if the meetings had occurred in Moscow, the circle of people who were witting might be inadvertently widened.

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Invitation to Kennedy:

It turned out that Horowitz was misled regarding the "favorable answer." Pavlov did give him a letter from Gorbachev from the Senator -- which Horowitz described as "pap," and had the chutzpah to suggest that the Senator release it to the press. Horowitz told him that the Senator never released private correspondence to the press. Horowitz said that the obvious Soviet desire is for Kennedy to visit Moscow -- if possible before November 19 -- but that Kennedy is aware of the danger of being used as a tool and will not agree, unless he can get both Sakharov and Shcharansky out as part of the bargain. He has already been assured of lectures before student groups, a TV appearance and other such goodies.

The message regarding Sakharov and Shcharansky was, however, negative. Instead, the Senator was offered thirty exit visas for some rank-in-file refuseniks. Horowitz said he refused this on the spot as an adequate step to induce Kennedy to visit.

Pavlov's Spiel

Most of the conversation, however, was devoted to a review by Pavlov of recent developments in Soviet-American relations. He made these comments on the basis of written instructions and insisted that Horowitz take notes. Pavlov's comments went as follows:

Human Rights

Gorbachev sent his personal greetings to Senator Kennedy and considered it important to prepare for a possible meeting with the Senator. Conditions have been changing since July. The optimism of the summer has passed. The cause of human rights was set back by the "disastrous" Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Helsinki. Shevardnadze felt deeply insulted by the fact that Shultz confronted him with human rights questions in their first private meeting. Being new to the game, he did not expect Shultz to put him on the spot. When this was reported to the Politburo, the entire body was incensed and a decision was made to make no concessions whatever in this area. In particular, a decision was made that Sakharov will not be released in the foreseeable future. (In response to Horowitz's question, Pavlov said that this decision did not apply to Shcharansky.)

The Shultz-Shevardnadze Helsinki Meeting:

The Soviet side made all possible efforts to put things on the right track. They exercised restraint in bilateral relations and told Shultz they are ready to consider joint statements on non-proliferation, chemical weapons, and confidence-building measures. They also are making new proposals in the Geneva negotiations. However, they have no intention of placing major

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emphasis on bilateral issues, as distinct from world problems, at the Geneva summit meeting.

Shultz's response to this was that areas of international security and human rights are indispensable. He also made reference to the Nicholson case, which he said was not closed, to Berlin air corridors, to flights over oil rigs in the Bering Sea, and stressed that the Soviets must exercise restraint in all areas. He also stressed the need for verification. He said that it is impossible to negotiate on space weapons and complained about Soviet contacts with Congressmen, Congressional staffers and the Union of Concerned Scientists. [On this point, Horowitz wondered if the Soviets thought we were complaining about his contacts. I explained to him that what Shultz had said was that they were sending messages by Congressmen like Steve Solarz and letters to the Union of Concerned Scientists suggesting positions which were not conveyed at the negotiating table, and that we could not take official notice of "proposals" which were not made officially.] Finally, Shultz was quoted as saying that we absolutely disagree with any connection among the three areas under negotiation in Geneva.

Regarding space weapons, Shultz had asked Shevardnadze if it would be possible for us to work together on space weapons. In effect, this was tantamount to saying, "Let's do away with the ABM Treaty." The Soviet side felt a shiver of real danger. This seemingly innocent statement by the Secretary of State shocked Shevardnadze to the core.

While the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting was considered an unmitigated disaster, they were encouraged by the Nitze-Kvitsinsky "secret meeting" in Helsinki. Nitze had told Kvitsinsky that they had to reduce the warheads on their heavy ICBM's by at least 50%, and if they did this "the question of other systems could be solved." While he had made clear that the U.S. would not agree to ban SLCM's, he had indicated that "nothing is impossible regarding space weapons if ICBM warheads are cut at least fifty percent."

Developments in August:

Since the Helsinki meeting there has been no real progress. The visit of Senator Byrd and his associates was "a joke." The Soviets could not understand why the United States would send a former member of the Ku Klux Klan to represent it. Byrd's comments were "so bad" that two of the senators in the group took Alexandrov aside to say that Byrd did not speak for them. The Soviets do not know what to make of such behavior on the part of the Americans.

Matters have not moved either in Stockholm or in Vienna at the MBFR talks. Even talks on Aeroflot have been stymied by a demand that the Soviets allow planes to fly "rescue missions" over their territory. [Note: I have no idea what this might refer to.]

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Geneva Negotiations

So far as the Geneva negotiations are concerned, the Soviets see very clearly the American strategy. A few days ago they were told very privately by a senior member of the American delegation that the third round should be very short since little was to be expected. The U.S. position can be summed up as: (1) a substantial reduction of strategic offensive weapons; (2) enhanced verification; and (3) agreement on the increasing importance of defensive systems. Outside these three areas there seems to be no possibility of compromise. As a result of this assessment, the Soviets have concluded that the U.S. wants to abandon the ABM Treaty.

Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting, September 10

Secretary Shultz met with Dobrynin September 10 and, when the question of an agreed statement at the Geneva summit was raised, was non committal. He said we should wait and see what develops. Also, Lesley Gelb told Dobrynin that the summit would be a complicated one with unclear results. Reagan would fight for his SDI because he was emotionally committed to it. Also there might be unpleasant moves in regard to Soviet offices and personnel in the U.S., but this should not disturb the summit. [Note: Horowitz is as nonplussed as I am over how Gelb's comments, whatever they might have been, are relevant to the point they were making. Maybe it was a way of suggesting that well-informed Americans do not believe that the President is serious -- and that he is in fact planning further "challenges."]

The General Secretary wanted the Senator to understand that "such a success" will not be permitted. There is zero chance of any practical agreements at the summit if space weapons are not addressed.

Shevardnadze's Proposal to the President

Regarding Shevardnadze's meeting with the President Friday, a letter had been delivered to the President with a proposal which takes into account American suggestions. The most important point is that there must be a ban on space strike weapons. Research is all right. Anything inside laboratories is OK, but nothing outside labs is OK. The Soviets will propose in Geneva a 50% reduction of launchers, which will leave the U.S. with the greater number, and they will agree to reduce all types of systems. Everything is negotiable, including the percentage of land-based missiles, but everything that can reach the other side must be counted. Re medium-range missiles, the Soviets will bring their numbers down to the British and French level. The number of planes in Europe can be reduced to 300-400 on each side. The Soviets are willing to reduce land-based ICBM's by a full 50% They are proposing this because Nitze said that if the reduction is of this magnitude, the U.S. would discuss SDI. The Soviets also will propose an agreement to ban testing and

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deployment of ASAT systems. They are prepared to reach an agreement on the Krasnoyarsk radar. They will stop all construction all allow on-site verification if the U.S. will do the same in respect to Thule and Flylingdale. However, no agreement anywhere is possible without agreement on SDI. The Soviets feel that if the Administration is reasonable, a solution can be found. Everything is negotiable if SDI is included, but nothing is possible if it is not.

Gorbachev's Prognosis

If Gorbachev concludes that the Administration is inflexible on SDI, there will be either a failed summit or no summit at all. Gorbachev's view is that the ABM Treaty is of paramount importance. It lies at the foundation of mutual deterrence and it is of mutual value. It is, furthermore, essential to the security of the Soviet Union. If it collapses, "we are genuinely vulnerable."

Dobrynin's Status

During the conversation, Pavlov remarked at one point that it had been decided some time back that Korniyenko should replace Dobrynin in Washington. However, Korniyenko's wife had fallen ill and he could not leave Moscow. However, the general feeling is that Dobrynin has been in Washington long enough and he is likely to be replaced early next year. So far as Pavlov was aware, no final decision had been made regarding his successor.

COMMENT:

1. It seems obvious that the principal Soviet motivation in this contact is to pass their point of view to Senator Kennedy. Their understanding of American politics is so distorted that it is entirely possible that they view him as the leading Democrat and the likely Democratic candidate (and possible winner) in 1988. This would explain their efforts both to inform him of events in a way designed to put the Administration in a bad light (they actually probably think their account does so!) and at the same time inveigle him into coming to Moscow in a blatant "splitting" maneuver. I judge from Horowitz's comments that the Senator is aware of this, and recognizes the dangers to his own position if he plays along. However, I cannot be absolutely confident on this score, since Horowitz said as he was leaving that if the Senator could get a deal on Sakharov and Shcharansky, he would feel "morally bound" to go in order to secure their release.

The elements of Horowitz's conversations relating to the possibility of a Kennedy visit are obviously the most sensitive ones in Horowitz's account. Horowitz said that the Senator wanted you personally to be aware of what was going on, but would appreciate your not conveying this particular information to

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3. Nevertheless, this latest report is a reminder that it would be useful to have a channel to discuss some of these things candidly and directly, just in case some of the misperceptions are genuine.

4. The dramatic language used to describe the importance to Soviet security of the ABM Treaty is interesting. If there is any grain of truth in it, it suggests that we may have some leverage here.

5. Finally, I would note that there was no bragging about great expectations for Gorbachev's trip to Paris, as there was in the July presentation given Horowitz, and also no repeat of the threat voiced in July that there would be a vigorous program of Soviet deployments if the Geneva meeting were deemed unsuccessful.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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~~Admiral John J. Ponder~~

~~Mr. McFarlane~~ m

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→ JACK MASLOCK
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

October 3, 1985

INFORMATION

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COMMENT:

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Linda SASSARD
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK M. MATLOCK *Kum*

SUBJECT: Travel Request to Participate in the Eighth
German-American Roundtable Conference in Bonn
between December 4-6, 1985

I have been invited by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C. and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung of St. Augustin, FRG to participate in a German-American Roundtable Conference in Bonn between December 4-6, 1985.

Transportation and accommodation costs will be covered by the Institute.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A Incoming Letter of Invitation

cc: Administrative Office

Remember -
12/1-4 = Aspen Inst.
German, Amer. Conf. in Berlin

7904 9/20
?

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

In association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University



Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President

Central Plaza Bldg., Tenth Floor
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Telephone (617) 492-2116
TELEX/TWX: 710-328-1128

September 16, 1985

Mr. Jack F. Matlock
Senior Director, European and
Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Jack:

On behalf of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C., and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung of St. Augustin, Federal Republic of Germany, I am extending a cordial invitation to you to participate in the Eighth German-American Roundtable Conference to be held at the Steigenburger Hotel in Bad Godesberg, the Federal Republic of Germany, between December 4-6, 1985.

This meeting represents the latest in a series of German-American Roundtable meetings begun in 1977 under the joint auspices of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Like the earlier Roundtable meetings, this conference will bring together a select group of distinguished participants from the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, including government officials and other policy analysts, for an informal discussion of issues of present and future importance to the Atlantic Alliance.

The Eighth German-American Roundtable will provide a timely forum for the frank exchange of views on such issues as the implications for NATO of new concepts in strategic defense, the role of emerging technologies for defense and deterrence in the European theater, the ongoing arms control negotiations, and current trends in East-West political relations, including intra-German relations. I am enclosing a copy of the tentative agenda setting forth the principal topics to be considered at the Eighth German-American Roundtable, as well as the Conference Report from the Seventh German-American Roundtable held in Washington in December 1984.

17
Mr. Jack F. Matlock
September 16, 1985
Page 2

Funds are available to underwrite the cost of round trip airfare (less than first class) together with other expenses directly related to your participation in the Eighth German-American Roundtable Conference.

I hope that you will find it possible to participate in what promises to be a useful and timely examination of security issues of importance to the Atlantic Alliance and the United States.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,



Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

RLP:mbd
Enclosures

DRAFT AGENDA

EIGHTH GERMAN-AMERICAN ROUNDTABLE

Co-sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany

December 4-6, 1985

December 4, 1985

6:30 PM Opening Reception and Dinner

December 5, 1985

Session I

9:00 - Noon The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
and Nuclear Strategy

1. The concept of defense in Soviet strategic culture.
2. The Soviet strategic defense program.
3. Nuclear deterrence in the late twentieth century.
4. SDI and Extended Deterrence.

Session II

2:30-5:30 PM SDI, new technologies and U.S.-
European relations

1. Technologies for strategic defense
2. European applications of SDI technologies
3. European options -- Eureka and the European Defense Initiative.
4. Technology transfer: A Transatlantic "Two-Way Street"?

December 6

Session III

9:00-Noon The future of conventional defense

1. Improving conventional defense: concepts and costs.
2. Demographic trends, economic constraints, domestic political trends, and Bundeswehr planning.
3. Manpower issues and the potential of Emerging Technologies as a force multiplier.
4. AirLand Battle and Follow-on Forces Attack.

Session IV

2:30-5:30 PM East-West relations

1. East-West relations in the domestic West German political context.
2. Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
3. Strategic defense and arms control: The Reagan-Gorbachev meeting and the Geneva Arms Control Talks.
4. The Soviet Union and SDI: Implications for Alliance Cohesion.

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: October 3, 1985

20

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK

2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To participate in the Eighth German-American Roundtable Conf in Bonn between December 4-6, 1985

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): _____
BERLIN/BONN/WASHING **

** I will be in Berlin attending the Aspen Inst. Berlin Conf from Dec. 1-4

DEPARTURE DATE o/a Dec. 4
TIME _____

RETURN DATE o/a Dec. 7
TIME _____

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____ TOTAL TRIP COST _____

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER IFPA

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
Institute will pay for all transportation and accommodation costs.

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES XX NO _____

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): _____
Traveler will pay for cost of spouses transportation.

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ -

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: _____

13. APPROVALS: _____

Mattho ck

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LEX

7747

*FILE*²⁴

October 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message - October 17 Dinner
Honoring C. William Verity, Jr.

The President wishes to send a message of tribute to C. William Verity, Jr., former co-Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, who is being honored at a dinner benefitting the Citizen Exchange Council on October 17 in New York. Mr. Verity will receive CEC's annual award in recognition of his work toward encouraging better U.S.-Soviet relations through trade. He is a personal friend of the President and served on the original Task Force on the Private Sector Initiatives program and was Chairman of the PSI Advisory Council. Soviet Ambassadors Dobrynin and Troyanovsky will be "distinguished guests" at the dinner. Please have a draft message prepared and submitted to my office by Friday, October 4.

William F. Martin
William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

22

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SIGNED

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Presidential Message of Tribute to
C. William Verity, Jr.

We think it would be helpful for the President to send a message of tribute to C. William Verity, Jr.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at TAB I to State.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

n Judyt Mandel and Bud Korengold concur. *JK*

Attachments

TAB I	Memo to Platt
TAB II	Memo from Higgins
TAB III	Memo from Ryan
TAB IV	Letter from Citizen Exchange Council

23

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN, NSC

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for Tribute to WILLIAM VERITY
by the Citizen Exchange Council, NYC, OCTOBER 17

I would appreciate NSC review and advice on the attached request from Fred Ryan.

The President and First Lady were invited to attend the above event, but this was declined. Fred Ryan has asked that a message be sent -- though one was not specifically requested. As you know, Bill Verity, former head of ARMCO Steel, is a friend of the President and served on the original Task Force on the Private Sector Initiatives program and then as first Chairman of the PSI Advisory Council.

This event honors Verity's efforts to further US-USSR relations through his service as Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, 1973-1984. The Citizen Exchange Council, which is sponsoring this event, was set up in 1962 to promote better US-USSR relations (Averill Harriman is the Honorary Chairman.). USSR Ambassadors Dobrynin and Troyanovsky will be there as "distinguished guests." No messages have been sent to the Council in past years.

If NSC feels a message would be helpful at this time, my staff will be happy to assist -- but I think State ought to provide the initial draft because the text would focus solely on Verity's efforts to promote trade relations with the USSR over the last ten years and not on his PSI involvement.

Charles A. Donovan 
(for) ANNE HIGGINS

(ck)

CG 117
24

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter - October 17 Dinner Honoring
C. William Verity, Jr.

We would like to request a Presidential letter be prepared in response to the attached correspondence.

As you know Mr. Verity is a long-time supporter and personal friend of President and Mrs. Reagan, so there is much that can be said in the letter. We would like, however, for the letter to include something about Mr. Verity's outstanding efforts on behalf of the President's private sector initiatives program. He served on the original Task Force on PSI, the subsequent Advisory Council on PSI, and will be appointed to our newly created Board of Advisors (this appointment will not be announced until sometime in October).

Please have the letter sent to Nancy Wilson, room 134. She will arrange delivery to the appropriate person.

Thank you for your assistance.



Citizen Exchange Council

18 East 41st Street
New York, NY 10017 (212) 889-7960

June 14, 1985

Dinner Honoring C. William Verity, Jr. October 17, 1985

The Honorable W. Averell Harriman
Honorary Chairman

Robert H. Knight
Chairman

Jane K. Lombard
Chairman, Citizen Exchange Council

Benefit Committee

Mr. Robert O. Anderson
Atlantic Richfield
Sandra Carter
Sandra Carter Productions
The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
Mr. Michael V. Forrestal
Shearman & Sterling
Mr. James H. Giffen
*Mercator Corporation and
The U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council*
Mr. Claus M. Halle
The Coca Cola Export Corporation
Mr. Amory Houghton, Jr.
Corning Glass Works
The Honorable Juanita M. Kreps
Mrs. Paul Laxalt
Mr. Richard D. Lombard
Mr. John J. Murphy
Dresser Industries
Mr. William F. Ragan
Ragan & Mason
Mr. Burnell R. Roberts
Mead Corporation
Mr. David Rockefeller
Mr. Laurance S. Rockefeller
Mr. Robert V. Roosa
Brown Brothers Harriman
Ruth A. Roosa
Mr. Erwin A. Salk
Salk, Ward and Salk
Mr. Alexander B. Trowbridge
National Association of Manufacturers
Grace Kennan Warnecke

List incomplete

Distinguished Guests

His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Ambassador of the USSR to the United States
Mrs. Dobrynin
His Excellency Oleg A. Troyanovsky
*Permanent Representative of the USSR
to the United Nations*
Mrs. Troyanovsky

Contributors

American Express Philanthropic Services
Archer Daniels Midland Foundation
Corning Glass Works Foundation
The Honorable C. Douglas Dillon
Mr. David Rockefeller
Mr. Laurance S. Rockefeller
Mr. Robert C. Seamans
United Telecommunications
The Honorable Thomas J. Watson, Jr.

Dear Mr. President and Mrs. Reagan:

The Board of Trustees of Citizen Exchange Council and I are pleased to announce that C. William Verity, Jr., will receive CEC's annual award in recognition of his work toward encouraging better U.S.-Soviet relations through trade.

Bill was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ARMCO, Inc. from 1971 to 1982. He remains on the Board as Chairman of the Executive Committee. Until 1984, Bill served as Co-Chairman of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council. His interest and efforts in working for better trade relations between the two countries led to his selection as CEC's honoree.

Bill will receive his award at a dinner benefiting Citizen Exchange Council on October 17, 1985. The black tie dinner will be held at the Plaza Hotel in New York. The Benefit Committee and I want very much to make the evening a success; we hope you will plan to come. Formal invitations will be mailed in August, but I wanted to be sure you had enough advance notice to save the date. Your presence will be meaningful to Bill and your contribution a valuable asset to CEC's program.

Founded in 1962, CEC is nonpolitical and nonprofit. Its primary purpose is to promote better understanding between citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union. All proceeds from the dinner will be used to expand CEC's educational programs.

I hope you will agree to help with this special project — and help to make the evening special for Bill.

Sincerely,

Robert H. Knight

/cb
Enclosures

"Trade brings immediate benefits to both parties in the form of jobs, improved living conditions — a better life. Throughout history, trade has been a builder of bridges. It forges understanding of each other's cultures. It requires negotiations. It allows for the shaking of a hand — as one's word."

C. William Verity, Jr.

RECEIVED 30 SEP 85 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 28 SEP 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

INF

PRICE, CHARLES C

AP

MP

SUBJECT: CHMN EXE COM WORLD FEDERALIST ASSOC REQUEST PRES MET W/ PRES SOVIET
PEACE COUN

ACTION: MEMO PEARSON TO SALLY KELLEY DUE: 05 OCT 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

KRAEMER

SESTANOVICH

LINHARD

COMMENTS

REF# 8527355

LOG

NSC/FID

(LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 10/3 Pearson Pgt Memo gm, sk

DISPATCH *by 10/3* W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: W. ROBERT PEARSON

SUBJECT: Meeting with Yuri Zhukov

Caslyn J. Cleveland

Charles G. Price, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the World Federalist Association, has written to the President inviting him or his aides to meet with Yuri Zhukov, President of the Soviet Peace Council (Tab A). The State Department advises (Tab B), and NSC concurs, that neither the President nor any of his advisers meet with Zhukov. Please respond to Mr. Price using the suggested language at Tab C.

Attachments

Tab A Letter from Charles Price
Tab B State Department memorandum
Tab C Suggested reply

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Folio-114/3 #7876

BY RW NARA DATE 3/2/11

World Federalist Association

418 7th STREET, S.E., WASHINGTON, DC 20003 (202) 546-3950

Seeking the abolition of war through just and enforceable world laws



8527355

August 26, 1985

President
Norman Cousins

Chair of the Board
Robert Stuart

Vice Chair of the Board
Dale M. Hiller

Secretary
Lawrence Abbott

Treasurer/
Administrative Director
Edward Rawson

National Advisory Board
John B. Holden, Chair
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Joseph S. Clark
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Dorothy Hammerstein
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Theodore H. Hesburgh, C.S.C.
Bradford Morse
C. Maxwell Stanley
John S. Toll
Paul W. Walker
Jerome B. Wiesner
James Zabin

First Vice President
Gerard G. Grant, S.J.

Vice Presidents
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Neal Potter
Floyd Ramp
Juanita Soghikian
Lucy Webster
Sam Winograd

Executive Director
Bill Wickersham

Development Director
Sandford Zee Persons

Field Director
Eric Cox

President Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

A year ago a delegation from the World Federalist Association was invited to Moscow by Yuri Zhukov, President, Soviet Peace Committee, for nine days in Moscow at their expense. We met with leaders from nine different groups for very friendly and useful discussions on alternatives to war.

We have invited a delegation from the Soviet Peace Committee to come to Washington this fall. A delegation of four, led by Yuri Zhukov, will be our guests in Washington from October 17-23. Should you or your aides wish to meet with them, we will be pleased to arrange a time suitable to you.

Enclosed is a memo from Academic Leaders for Alternatives to War, addressed to you, President Reagan, and Chairman Gorbachev. It would seem to us highly important before the summit meeting to explore what Chairman Gorbachev really has in mind in his comments quoted therein. Perhaps an informal opportunity to discuss this briefly with Yuri Zhukov, a member of the Supreme Soviet, might be useful.

Best wishes,

Charles C. Price
Chairman, Executive Committee

CCP:es

Enclosure

cc: Walter Hoffmann
Edward Rawson
John Holden

DECLASSIFIED

7 7 9 0

8527355

NLRR 60-114/3 #7877 United States Department of StateBY CW NARA DATE 10/30/87 Washington, D.C. 20520

September 28, 1985

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Proposed Response to Request for Appointment
with The President By Soviet Delegation

Charles C. Price, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the World Federalist Association, has written to the President proposing he meet with Yuri Zhukov, President of the Soviet Peace Council. The letter indicates Mr. Zhukov and his delegation will be in the U.S. in mid-October. The stated purpose of the meeting is to discuss the President's upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.

Yuri Zhukov, who writes for Pravda, has been in the forefront of a number of Soviet propaganda campaigns against U.S. policies, including INF deployment in Europe. The Soviet Peace Committee, which Zhukov heads, is the national U.S.S.R. body affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC). As such, it is the guiding force behind WPC efforts worldwide, almost all of which have an orientation strongly opposed to U.S. policies.

The attached proposed response declines Mr. Price's offer to arrange a meeting with the President or his staff. We do not believe any officials in the Administration should meet with this delegation.

We have also considered whether to issue a visa to Zhukov and the three Soviets accompanying him to the United States, particularly in light of the September 12 NSC memorandum on visas for WPC members. We believe this is a case where it is not in our interest to deny the visas. Zhukov himself is an ineffectual public spokesman, who tends to create a bad impression. A visa denial at this point would surely create publicity for him. It would also undercut our calls for increased U.S. access to Soviet media, and imply a lack of confidence that we have in the public relations competition leading up to the November meeting. A visa denial would, in fact, play the Soviet game.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

- 1) Suggested reply to Mr. Price.
- 2) Moscow 13072 -- Zhukov visa application.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR



Department of State
Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Price:

I have been asked to respond on behalf of the President to your letter of August 26 in which you propose that he or his aides meet with a delegation from the Soviet Peace Committee led by Yuri Zhukov.

Thank you for taking the time to bring this delegation to our attention. However, as we prepare for the meeting between the President and Chairman Gorbachev in November, schedules are very crowded and we are not able to arrange an appointment.

Sincerely,

Mr. Charles C. Price

Chairman, Executive Committee,

World Federalist Association

418 7th Street, S.E.,

Washington, DC.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR W. ROBERT PEARSON

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Meeting with Yuri Zhukov *fm*

Charles G. Price, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the World Federalist Association, has written to the President inviting him or his aides to meet with Yuri Zhukov, President of the Soviet Peace Council (Tab A). The State Department advises (Tab B), and I concur, that neither the President nor any of his advisers meet with Zhukov. Attached at Tab C is a suggested reply to Mr. Price.

State further recommends, and again I concur, that it would be counter productive to refuse Zhukov a visa. He is well known as an ineffectual spokesman, and brings no credibility with him to the United States.

SK
Sven Kraemer concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding our suggested reply to Sally Kelley for response to Mr. Price.

Approve CEC Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A Letter from Charles Price
Tab B State Department memorandum
Tab C Suggested reply

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/3#7878
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

JM-C
33

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 3, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Shultz Memorandum to the President

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding a memorandum from Secretary Shultz on the French attitude toward a meeting between Presidents Reagan and Mitterand prior to the November Geneva meetings with Gorbachev. The Secretary also provides a further readout on his UN meetings, including sessions with the Yugoslavs, Israelis, Koreans, Chinese, Saudis, Cambodians, and ASEAN foreign ministers.

Bob Bob Shultz concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum forwarding the Secretary's memorandum to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Secretary Shultz's memo

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3#7879

BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/8/11*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Memorandum from George Shultz

Issue

Whether to read the attached memo from George Shultz on French suggestions for a possible meeting with Mitterand and recent meetings George has had at the UN.

Facts

George has sent you a readout on a recent conversation with the French and meetings with a variety of foreign officials at the UN.

Discussion

French Foreign Minister Dumas telephoned George to discuss the possibility of a meeting between yourself and President Mitterand sometime before the Geneva meeting with Gorbachev. George relays Dumas' suggestions and, in addition, provides a readout on recent UN meetings with the Yugoslavs, Israelis, Koreans, Chinese, Saudis, Cambodians, and ASEAN foreign ministers.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you read the attached memorandum from George.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from George Shultz

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7880
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

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NLRR 106-714/3 #7881

BY C-15 NARA DATE 10/30/07

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

October 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GP*
SUBJECT: My Day at UNGA

French Foreign Minister Dumas telephoned me yesterday about Mitterrand's inability to accept our invitation for a summit seven session prior to your meeting with Gorbachev. Mitterrand will be in Brazil on October 24 but is willing, Dumas says, to meet with you in Martinique or some other French Western Hemisphere location sometime between October 26 and November 2. Dumas also promised to give us a full read-out of the Mitterrand-Gorbachev meeting, either through Joe Rodgers or by making a trip here himself.

Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Dizdarevic told me that there have been greater changes in the Soviet Union in the few months since Gorbachev's accession than had occurred during the previous five years. He sees massive personnel changes there in favor of younger, less dogmatic people. He also said that the Soviets are taking a more serious approach to negotiations with the West, but will continue to insist on a position of "equal partnership."

I had a private talk with Israeli UN Ambassador Netanyahu. He told me that the Soviets and East Europeans are putting a heavy rush on Israel, smothering Israelis with friendly gestures, even today, despite Israel's attack on the PLO near Tunis. Netanyahu believes that the Soviets are dangling the prospect of diplomatic relations in front of the Israelis in the hope of getting Israel to turn off pressure from the world Jewish community to enlarge Soviet Jewish emigration. The Soviets hope this will ease the pre-November meeting atmosphere. The Israelis are on to the game, Netanyahu said, and are not about to give the Soviets a "free smile."

Korean Foreign Minister Lee made a special plea that you include Korea in your agenda for talks with Gorbachev, in particular South Korea's desire for dual membership of the Koreas in the UN and for cross-recognition of the Koreas by the major powers. Lee asked for my view of President Chun's negotiations on a Korean north-south summit. I told him that we supported this effort, but that expectations must not be exaggerated.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wu shared our view that despite changes in Soviet atmospherics and personnel, the absence of substantive change puts both our countries in a wait-and-see position. Wu said Moscow still believes that among Socialist countries the USSR is the boss. He strongly protested our withholding of funds for UNFPA. He

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

38

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

-2-

also said Beijing is ready to begin direct discussions with Asian Development Bank head Fujioka on seating the PRC while retaining Taiwanese representation.

My meeting with the Saudis on the day after the Israeli strike at the PLO was unusually free of the usual rhetoric. Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Sultan said that the attack was a severe setback for Arab moderates and that he and King Fahd do not want the incident to disrupt the peace process. Sultan said the Saudis need a high-level U.S. statement specifically condemning the violence done in Tunisia, a clear demonstration of continued U.S. support for King Hussein, and a U.S. gesture to help restore Tunisian dignity. Sultan warned us not to allow the Soviet Union to benefit from this incident on the eve of your meeting with Gorbachev. In my speech last night, I addressed the Saudi points, while continuing to recognize the legitimacy of Israel's retaliation.

In a meeting with non-communist Cambodian leaders Sihanouk and Son Sann, I expressed our support for their efforts to expel the Vietnamese from Cambodia. I urged that the Cambodian forces maintain internal unity and greater confidence in the outcome of their struggle. Sihanouk and Son Sann both expressed deep appreciation for our assistance. While their forces are increasingly active inside Cambodia, they see no signs Vietnam wants a negotiated settlement. They remain concerned that the balance will tip in Vietnam's favor by 1990, the date Vietnam says its military will withdraw.

I had constructive discussions with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, with Thai Prime Minister Prem, and with the new Indian Foreign Minister Bhagat, who told me Rajiv Gandhi wants to build on positive trends in our relations.

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

40

ROAD TO GENEVA AND BEYOND

Themes and Perceptions for Public Presentation

Theme: BUILDING A SAFER WORLD

Basic Messages: (Bracketed portions to be used when proposals made.)

- We want countries to stop trying to expand their influence through armed intervention and subversion.

[That is why we are proposing negotiated settlements, withdrawal of outside forces, and international efforts to build economies and meet human needs.]

- We have the mandate and opportunity to reduce the danger of nuclear war by drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals.

[That is why we are proposing radical, verifiable and balanced reductions of offensive nuclear weapons and are pursuing research to identify defensive technologies - which threaten no one.]

- We must defend human rights everywhere, since countries which respect human rights are unlikely to unleash war.

[That is why we insist that the Helsinki accords and other international commitments be observed.]

- We must establish better communication between our societies, since misunderstandings make the world more dangerous.

[That is why we are proposing dramatic increases in people-to-people exchanges, programs to share information, and enhanced cooperation in meeting human needs.]

- The meeting in Geneva marks a new phase in this process. Our efforts to reach these ambitious goals will continue.

SECRET

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PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENEVA MEETING

Working for a Safer Future

The President seeks to build the foundation for peaceful and constructive relations with the Soviet Union. This will require a long-term, sustained effort. It must be based on the principles of fairness, reciprocity and honest fulfillment of all agreements.

Soviet Behavior: The Roots of Tension

The use or threat of force by the Soviet Union and its proxies is an underlying cause of Soviet-American and world tension. The President is determined to defend the United States and its Allies. The USSR must cease using arms and force to expand its influence if tensions are to diminish.

Leading from Strength

The President's hand is strong: he has reversed the decline in American strength and has a robust economy, a united public and strong alliances behind him. He is able to defend us whatever the Soviets do. But he wants more: he wants to lower arms levels, reduce tensions and create a more cooperative relationship with the USSR.

Promoting Democratic Ideals

The President will speak out for democracy, freedom, justice and decency everywhere since these values are the surest foundation of a just and peaceful world in the future. He does not attempt to impose our political or economic system on others, but will insist that the Soviet Union also refrain from attempts to dominate others.

Probing Soviet Intentions

We can have a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union only if the Soviet leaders also want it. The Geneva meeting will determine whether there has been a change in Soviet policy or only in Soviet style.

Realistic but Determined Effort

The President is preparing seriously for the meeting in Geneva. He has no illusions about the profound differences in our philosophies and societies but will go the extra mile for enduring peace and a safer world. He will bring creative and ambitious ideas to the meeting. His efforts will not end when the Geneva meeting is over. He is in this for the long haul.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~DRAFT~~

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1700 October 4, 1985

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PROPOSED MAJOR PRESIDENTIAL EVENTS ON THE ROAD TO GENEVA

October 7: 15 minutes meeting with Lord Carrington. Oval office. Theme: Cooperation with Allies; Peace Through Strength

October 12: Radio Address

October 15-18: 10 minute meeting/photo op with Jerzy Milewski of Poland's Solidarity Trade Union. Theme: American Respect for Freedom; Human Dignity

October 16: Lunch or Dinner (proposed by Jim Rosebush with visiting Soviet Women)

October 19: Radio Address previewing Global Visions Theme of UNGA Speech

October 21: First Lady's Drug Conference at the UN

October 23: Trip to New York

Bilaterals with President Zia and President Gandhi (Emphasis on U.S. concern for Third World; Afghanistan)

Thirty Minutes Bilateral with Prime Minister Nakasone (Emphasis on close consultation with Allies prior to Geneva).

Reception for visiting Heads of State/Government (hosted by President and Mrs. Reagan); potential mini meetings with several leaders

October 24: Presidential Address before the United Nations General Assembly (Global Vision Theme; East/West references)

Two hour Meeting with Thatcher, Kohl, Nakasone, Mulroney, Craxi at USUN at U.S. Mission (Emphasis on Close Allied Consultation)

President attends 40th Anniversary ceremony at the U.N. Brief remarks

Private Dinner, hosted by President and Mrs. Reagan in honor of Allied leaders.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By OW NARA, Date 7/1/02

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October 25: Mid morning bilaterals of 45 minutes each with P.M. Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl; Late morning departure from New York for Washington (and then Camp David)

October 26: Radio Address from Camp David. Theme: Reemphasizing message of UN Speech and Consultations with Allies

October 28: 15 minutes Statue of Liberty Anniversary Ceremony at the White House

November 2: Radio Address

Soviet Experts meet with President at Camp David

November 4: Televised Press Conference (Opening Statement on Free and Open Society; next day is Anniversary of Soviet Revolution when tanks, etc. will be seen in Red Square)

November 5: * Working lunch with outside advisors (^{for} ~~per~~ former National Security Advisors)

November 9: Radio Address. Theme: U.S. efforts to reduce nuclear danger

November 11: Veterans' Day Appearance at Arlington National Cemetery. Theme: The need to discourage the use of force

November 12: Cabinet Room meeting with bipartisan Congressional Group. Theme: A United America goes to Geneva

November 14 or 15: Oval office (or Indian Treaty Room) Presidential Address to the Nation. Themes: 1) Desire to reduce Nuclear Danger and Respect for Human Rights-Geneva is just the beginning of a process.

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November 16:

Breakfast at the White House with former Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. Theme: United America

Predeparture remarks (5 minutes) to be broadcast worldwide. Theme: Commitment to Peace.

Taped Radio Address. Theme: Confident and Ready to Negotiate

Short arrival statement in Geneva (variation on predeparture statement of Commitment to Peace; Geneva's legacy in such efforts)

November 21:

Televised Address to Joint Session of Congress (helicopter directly to Capitol from Andrews)
Theme: Looking Backward and Looking Forward)

* Notional idea for WFM consideration

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45NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506LIMITED OFFICIAL USEACTION

October 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Background Paper for the First Lady

Attached at Tab A is the second in a series of weekly papers on the Soviet Union that we are doing for the First Lady. It concerns the problem of alcoholism and Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign. It was prepared by the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to James G. Rosebush at Tab I forwarding the paper to the First Lady.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to James G. Rosebush

Tab A "USSR: The Problem of Alcoholism"

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES G. ROSEBUSH

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Background Paper for the First Lady

Attached at Tab A is the second in a series of weekly papers we are putting together for the First Lady as background reading on the Soviet Union. It deals with the problem of alcoholism and Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign. It was drafted by the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the paper to the First Lady.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A "USSR: The Problem of Alcoholism"

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By GIS NARA, Date 7/1/02



GA 7/1/82

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USSR: THE PROBLEM OF ALCOHOLISM

Plaguing the Soviet scene today are rising rates of alcoholism among all major population groups, a steady increase in crime and corruption countrywide, and an obvious deterioration in basic public services and the supply of consumer goods. All are linked in varying degrees, as each one feeds and exacerbates the others.

The effect on the Soviet population has been a deep malaise, a sense that something has gone wrong in recent years. But there is little expectation that things will change for the better any time soon. Given that lack of expectation, the Soviet people have been resorting increasingly to the traditional Russian remedy for boredom and hopelessness--alcohol.

* * * *

Drinking to excess may be part of the national heritage, but in the last decade or so, alcohol consumption has jumped to unprecedented levels. Soviet statistics show that in 1984 the USSR's citizens spent 10 percent of their incomes on alcoholic beverages, and more than one in eight spent at least one night in a sobering-up station. While the Soviet Union as a whole does not lead the world in alcoholism, it is definitely one of the leaders. The domestic impact is also worse than the statistics suggest since alcoholism in the USSR is geographically concentrated, confined primarily to the Slavic regions--the Muslim nationalities have much lower, albeit rising, rates. The Slavs thus may consume more alcohol per capita than any other group in the world. Furthermore, since the Slavic pattern is binge drinking, the favored beverage is high proof vodka rather than beer and wine.

The consequences both immediately and long term are staggering in terms of lowered industrial productivity and accidents at the workplace. Death rates among adult males have jumped, and their life expectancy has dropped by about five years over the last decade. And because women are drinking more, alcoholism has also contributed to a substantial rise in infant mortality through premature births and malnutrition. (The USSR has stopped publishing statistics on infant mortality because of the dramatic extent of that rise.) Other forms of social degeneration--family breakups, retardation, physical abnormalities--are on the rise as well, at least in part attributable to alcoholism.

- 2 -

The very blatancy of the problem and its persistence have frequently led Russian governments, both Imperial and Soviet, to counterattack, but never with lasting success. Indeed, many of the campaigns against alcoholism have proven counterproductive. Alcohol is after all very much part of the national tradition and culture. Russians have always shown themselves adept at finding it in some form, resorting to home brew when legal supplies were unavailable. Moreover, depriving them of alcohol--the chief form of recreation for many--risks stimulating domestic unrest and reduces state income from vodka sales. These latter considerations have usually gutted official decrees against alcoholism over the years.

Aware of the pitfalls, Gorbachev is nevertheless tackling the problem head on. Liquor now cannot be sold before 2 pm, and the number of outlets were cut sharply. Managers and foremen are under pressure to stop drinking at the workplace; fines and punishments for public drunkenness and drunken driving have been increased substantially. Sobriety is now demanded of public officials and made a factor in promotion prospects. Production quotas for state distilleries meanwhile were reduced dramatically and shipments to the provinces curtailed. Although rehabilitation facilities for alcoholism are also supposed to be expanded in parallel, outside major urban centers this provision most likely will be honored in the breach rather than in reality.

Gorbachev's immediate objective is to cut the economic cost of alcoholism. If his measures succeed marginally in doing so, the odds are that the other aspects of the campaign will gradually lose steam in the face of competing problems, and the age-old inertia of Russian culture will take over. But with the boss setting the temperance example and insisting on his colleagues' compliance, the Kremlin itself promises to be a drier place for some time to come.

Drafted: INR/SEE: PGoble
Wang 3652S
10/3/85

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 4, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Geneva Meeting: Themes, Perceptions and Schedule
of Presidential Activity

Attached at Tabs I, II, and III are draft papers suggesting the basic themes to be used in the public presentation of the Geneva run-up, a statement of the perceptions we wish to promote, and a suggested schedule of Presidential activities.

If these are acceptable to you, we would work them into a Memorandum to the President to obtain his approval or further guidance. Then, we would recommend conveying the themes and perceptions in an NSDD in order to get the word out to the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, our staff here will develop a package of materials, organized around these themes to use in speeches, press statements and backgrounders.

Bill Martin, Jonathan Miller, Bud Korengold and Judy Mandel concur. *NA* *JM* *JM*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve or amend the papers at Tabs I, II and III.

Approve *NA*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Themes and Perceptions for Public Presentation
Tab II Perceptions of the Geneva Meeting
Tab III Draft Proposed Presidential Events on the Road to Geneva

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