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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/12/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (12/12)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 12

YARHI-MILO

1210

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7936	COVER SHEET	MATLOCK RE GORDIYEVSKY <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7937	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GORDIYEVSKY SUGGESTIONS <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	10/29/1985	B1
7938	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE GORDIYEVSKY'S SUGGESTIONS <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	3	ND	B1
7944	PAPER	SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7939	COVER SHEET	MATLOCK RE GORDIYEVSKY <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7940	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7937 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	10/29/1985	B1
7941	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7938 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	3	ND	B1
7945	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7944 <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7942	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE GORDIYEVSKY'S SUGGESTION <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	3	10/30/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7946	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7944 <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7943	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GORDIYEVSKY'S SUGGESTIONS <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/29/1985	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

October 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Materials for President's Interview with Soviet Journalists

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Bill Martin to Larry Speakes forwarding the proposed responses (Tab A) to the five written questions from TASS and themes (TAB B) for the President to review prior to his oral interview, Thursday, October 31. Subsequently we will forward a set of contingency questions for the President to review prior to his oral interview.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the proposed responses to the written questions and the themes for the oral interview and authorize Bill Martin to forward the memorandum at Tab I to Larry Speakes.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Linhard, Covey and Ringdahl concur.

Attachments:

Tab I Martin-Speakes Memorandum

Tab A Written Questions

Tab B Key Themes

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 20, 1987
By CJS NARA, Date 7/1/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY SPEAKES

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Materials for President's Interview with Soviet Journalists

Attached at Tab A are the written responses to the five questions posed by TASS for the President's interview with Soviet journalists. At Tab B are key themes he may wish to review prior to his oral interview with the journalists, October 31. Subsequently we will be forwarding contingency questions with suggested responses that may be raised in the oral interview.

Attachments:

Tab A Written Responses

Tab B Key Themes

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
BY CIS NARA, Date 7/1/02

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QUESTION ONE

QUESTION: The forthcoming meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and you, Mr. President, is for obvious reasons looked upon as an event of special importance. Both sides have stated their intention to make an effort to improve relations between our two countries, to better the overall international situation. The Soviet Union has, over a period of time, put forward a whole set of concrete proposals and has unilaterally taken steps in various areas directly aimed at achieving this goal. What is the U.S. for its part going to do?

ANSWER: I fully agree that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev has special significance, and I am personally looking forward to it very much. I sincerely hope that we will be able to put relations between our two countries on a safer and more secure course. I, for my part, will certainly do all I can to make that possible.

We of course study every Soviet proposal carefully and when we find them promising we are happy to say so. If, on the other hand, we find them one-sided in their effect, we explain why we feel as we do. At the same time we, too, have made concrete proposals -- dozens of them -- which also cover every sphere of our relationship, from the elimination of chemical weapons and resolution of regional conflicts to the expansion of contacts and exchanges, and we hope these receive the same careful attention that we give to Soviet proposals.

Let me give you a few examples. One thing that has created enormous tension in U.S.-Soviet relations over the last few years has been attempts to settle problems around the world by using military force. The resort to arms, whether it be in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or in Africa, has contributed nothing to the prospects for peace or the resolution of indigenous problems, and has only brought additional suffering to the peoples of these regions. This is also dangerous, and we need to find a way to stop attempts to solve problems by force. So I have proposed that both our countries encourage parties to these conflicts to lay down their arms and negotiate solutions -- and if they are willing to do that our countries should find a way to agree to support a peaceful solution and refrain from providing military support to the warring parties. And if peace can be achieved, the United States will contribute generously to an international effort to restore war-ravaged economies -- just as we did after the second world war, contributing to the recovery of friends and foes alike, and as we have done on countless other occasions.

Both of our governments agree that our nuclear arsenals are much too large. We are both committed to radical arms reductions. So the United States has made concrete proposals for such reductions: to bring ballistic missile warheads down to 5,000 on each side, and to eliminate intermediate-range ballistic missiles from our arsenals altogether. These have not been "take-it-or-leave-it" proposals. We are prepared to negotiate, since we know that negotiation is necessary if we are to reach a solution under which neither side feels threatened. We are willing to eliminate our advantages if you will agree to eliminate yours. The important thing is to begin reducing these terrible weapons in a way that both sides will feel secure, and to continue that process until we have eliminated them altogether.

Events of the past ten to fifteen years have greatly increased mistrust between our countries. If we are to solve the key problems in our relationship, we have to do something to restore confidence in dealing with each other. This requires better communication, more contact, and close attention to make sure that both parties fulfill agreements reached. That is why we have made literally 40 to 50 proposals to improve our working relationship, expand communication and build confidence. For example, we have proposed an agreement to cooperate on the peaceful use of space. The Apollo-Soyuz joint mission was a great success in 1975, and we should try to renew that sort of cooperation. We have also made several proposals for more direct contact by our military people. If they talked to each other more, they might find that at least some of their fears are unfounded. But most of all, ordinary people in both countries should have more contact, particularly our young people. The future, after all, belongs to them. I'd like to see us sending thousands of students to each other's country every year, to get to know each other, to learn from each other and -- most of all -- to come to understand that, even with our different philosophies, we can and must live in peace.

Obviously we are not going to solve all the differences between us at one meeting, but we would like to take some concrete steps forward. Above all, I hope that our meeting will give momentum to a genuine process of problem solving, and that we can agree on a course to take us toward a safer world for all -- and growing cooperation between our countries.

QUESTION TWO

QUESTION: The Soviet Union stands for peaceful coexistence with countries which have different social systems, including the U.S. In some of your statements, the point has been made that in spite of differences between our countries, it is necessary to avoid a military confrontation. In other words, we must learn how to live in peace. Thus, both sides recognize the fact that the issue of arms limitation and reduction is and will be determining in these relations. The special responsibility of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for the fate of the world is an objective fact. What in your opinion can be achieved in the area of security in your meeting with Gorbachev?

ANSWER: Well, first of all, I would say that we think all countries should live together in peace, whether they have the same or different social systems. Even if social systems are similar, this shouldn't give a country the right to use force against another.

But you are absolutely right when you say that we must learn to live in peace. As I have said many times, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And this means that our countries must not find any type of war.

You are also right when you say that our countries bear a special responsibility before the world. This is the case not only because we possess enormous nuclear arsenals, but because as great powers, whether we like it or not, our example and actions affect all those around us.

Our relations involve not only negotiating new agreements, but abiding by past agreements as well. Often we are accused by your country of interfering in your "internal" affairs on such questions as human rights, but this is a case in point. Ten years ago we both became participants in the Helsinki Accords and committed ourselves to certain standards of conduct. We are living up to those commitments and expect others to do so also. Soviet-American relations affect as well regional conflicts, political relations among our friends and allies, and many other areas.

The fact that our countries have the largest and most destructive nuclear arsenals obliges us not only to make sure they are never used, but to lead the world toward the elimination of these awesome weapons.

I think that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev can start us on the road toward the goal our countries have set: the radical reduction of nuclear weapons and steps to achieve their complete elimination. We can do this by finding concrete ways to overcome roadblocks in the negotiating process and thus give a real impetus to our negotiators. Of course, we will also have to deal with other problems, because it will be very hard to make great progress in arms control unless we can also act to lower tensions, reduce the use and threat of force, and build confidence in our ability to deal constructively with each other.

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QUESTION THREE

QUESTION: As is well known, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reached an understanding last January in Geneva that the top priority of the new negotiations must be the prevention of the arms race in space. But now, the American delegation in Geneva is trying to limit the discussion to consideration of the question of nuclear arms and is refusing to talk about the prevention of the arms race in space. How should we interpret this American position?

ANSWER: You have misstated the January agreement. Actually, our Foreign Ministers agreed to "work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability." Further, they agreed that the "subject of negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms--both strategic and medium range--with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Since your question reflects a misunderstanding of the United States position, let me review it for you:

First, we believe that the most threatening weapons facing mankind today are nuclear weapons of mass destruction. These are offensive weapons, and they exist today--in numbers that are much too high. Our most urgent task therefore is to begin to reduce them radically and to create conditions so that they can eventually be eliminated. Since most of these weapons pass through space to reach their targets, reducing them is as important to prevent an arms race in space as it is to terminate an arms race on earth.

As I noted earlier, we have made concrete, specific proposals to achieve this. Recently, your government finally made some counterproposals, and we will be responding in a genuine spirit of give-and-take in an effort to move toward practical solutions both countries can agree on.

Second, we believe that offensive and defensive systems are closely interrelated, and that these issues should be treated, as our Foreign Ministers agreed, as interrelated. Our proposals are fully consistent with this understanding. We are seeking right now with Soviet negotiators in Geneva a thorough discussion of how a balance of offensive and defensive systems could be achieved, and how -- if scientists are able to develop effective defenses in the future -- we might both use them to protect our countries and allies without threatening the other. And if we ever succeed in eliminating nuclear weapons, countries are going to require a defense against them, in case some madman get his hands on some and tries to blackmail other countries.

Specifically, we have proposed:

--On strategic nuclear arms, a reduction of each side's nuclear forces down to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles. That would be a very dramatic lowering of force levels, in a way that would greatly enhance strategic stability. We have also offered to negotiate strict limits on other kinds of weapons. Because our force structures are different, and because the Soviet Union has complained about having to reconfigure its forces, we have offered to seek agreements which would balance these differing areas of American and Soviet strength.

--On intermediate-range nuclear forces, we believe the best course is to eliminate that entire category of forces, which includes the 441 SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union has deployed, and our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. If this is not immediately acceptable, we have also offered an interim agreement which would establish an equal number of warheads on U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category, at the lowest possible level.

--In the area of space and defense, we are seeking to discuss with Soviet negotiators the possibility that new technology might allow both sides to carry out a transition to greater reliance on defensive weapons, rather than basing security on offensive nuclear forces.

So that there would be no misunderstandings about our research program on new defensive systems which is being carried out in full compliance with the ABM Treaty, I sent the director of our Strategic Defense research program to Geneva to brief Soviet negotiators. Unfortunately, we have not had a comparable description of your research in this area, which we know is long-standing and quite extensive.

Frankly, I have difficulty understanding why some people have misunderstood and misinterpreted our position. The research we are conducting in the United States regarding strategic defense is in precisely the same areas as the research being conducted in the Soviet Union. There are only two differences: first the Soviet Union has been conducting research in many of these areas longer than we have, and is ahead in some. Second, we are openly discussing our program, because our political system requires open debate before such decisions are made. But these differences in approaches to policy decisions should not lead to erroneous conclusions. Both sides are involved in similar research, and there is nothing wrong in that.

However, this does make it rather hard for us to understand why we should be accused of all sorts of aggressive intentions when we are doing nothing more than you are. The important thing, however, is for us to discuss these issues candidly.

In sum, what we are seeking is a balanced, fair, verifiable agreement -- or series of agreements -- that will permit us to do what was agreed in Geneva in January: to terminate the arms race on earth and prevent it in space. The United States has no "tricks" up its sleeve, and we have no desire to threaten the Soviet Union in any way. Frankly, if the Soviet Union would take a comparable attitude, we would be able to make very rapid progress toward an agreement.

QUESTION FOUR

QUESTION: Mr. President, officials of your Administration claim that the U.S., in its international relations, stands for the forces of democracy. How can one reconcile statements of this kind with the actual deeds of the U.S.? If you take any current example, it seems that when a particular country wants to exercise its right to independent development -- whether it be in the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in Central America in Asia -- it is the U.S. in particular, which supports those who stand against the majority of the people, against legitimate governments.

ANSWER: Your assertion about U.S. actions are totally unfounded. From your question, one might think that the United States was engaged in a war in some other country and in so doing had set itself against the majority of the people who want self determination. I can assure you that this is not the case. I am proud, as are all Americans, that not a single American soldier is in combat anywhere in the world. If every country could say the same, we would truly live in a world of less tension and danger.

Yes, we are very supportive of democracy. It is the basis of our political system and our whole philosophy. Our nation was not founded on the basis of one ethnic group or culture, as are many other countries, but on the basis of the democratic ideal. For example we believe that governments are legitimate only if they are created by the people, and that they are subordinate to the people, who select in free elections those who govern them. But democracy is more than elections in which all who wish can compete. In our view there are many things that even properly elected governments have no right to do. No American government can restrict freedom of speech, or of religion, and no American government can tell its people where they must live or whether they can leave the country or not. These and the other individual freedoms enshrined in our Constitution are the most precious gift our forefathers bequeathed us and we will defend them so long as we exist as a nation.

Now this doesn't mean that we think we are perfect. Of course we are not. We have spent over 200 years trying to live up to our ideals and correct faults in our society, and we're still at it. It also doesn't mean that we think we have a right to impose our system on others. We don't, because we believe that every nation should have the right to determine its own way of life. But when we see other nations threatened from the outside by forces which would destroy their liberties and impose the rule of a minority by force of arms, we will help them resist that whenever we can. We would not be true to our democratic ideals if we did not.

We respond with force only as a last resort, and only when we or our Allies are the victims of aggression. For example, in World War II, we took a full and vigorous part in the successful fight against Hitlerism, even though our country was not invaded by the Nazis. We still remember our wartime alliance and the heroism the peoples of the Soviet Union displayed in that struggle. And we also remember that we never used our position as one of the victors to add territory or to attempt to dominate others. Rather we helped rebuild the devastated countries, friends and erstwhile foes alike, and helped foster democracy where there was once totalitarianism. Have we not all benefitted from the fact that Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany are today flourishing democracies, and strong pillars of a stable and humane world order? Well, the German and Japanese people deserve the most credit for this, but we believe we helped along the way.

In the areas you mention, we are heartened by trends we see, although there are still many troubling areas. In the southern part of Africa, Angola is torn by civil war, yet we have determined not to supply arms to either side, and to urge a peaceful settlement. In South Africa, the system of apartheid is repugnant to all Americans, but here as well we seek a peaceful solution and for many years we have refused to supply arms or police equipment to the South African Government. In Latin America, great progress in the transition from authoritarian to democratic societies has been made, and now on that continent there exist only four countries that do not have democratically elected governments. Since 1979 seven Latin American countries have made major strides from authoritarian to democratic systems. Over the years, we have been a leading voice for decolonization and have used our influence with our closest friends and allies to hasten this process. We are gratified by the nearly completed process of decolonization, and take pride in our role.

I should emphasize that our aim has been to encourage the process of democratization through peaceful means. And not just the American government, but the American people as a whole have supported this process with actions and deeds.

American society has long been characterized by its spirit of volunteerism and by its compassion for the less fortunate. At home, we are proud of our record of support for those who cannot manage for themselves. It is not simply that the government, but the American people, through a host of voluntary organizations, who bring help to the needy--the victims of floods and fires, the old, the infirm and the handicapped. Americans have been no less generous in giving to other peoples. I remember the efforts of Herbert Hoover in organizing the American Relief effort to feed Soviet victims of famine in the 1920's, and these efforts continue to this day, whether it be food for the victims of famine in Ethiopia, or of earthquakes in Mexico.

QUESTION FIVE

QUESTION. The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken a series of major steps. It has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has undertaken a moratorium on any kind of nuclear tests. It has stopped deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European part of its territory and has even reduced their number. Why hasn't the U.S. done anything comparable?

ANSWER: Actually, we have frequently taken steps intended to lower tension and to show our good will, though these were rarely reciprocated. Immediately after World War II, when we were the only country with nuclear weapons, we proposed giving them up altogether to an international authority, so that no country would have such destructive power at its disposal. What a pity that this idea was not accepted!

Not only did we not use our nuclear monopoly against others, we signalled our peaceful intent by demobilizing our armed forces in an extraordinarily rapid way. At the end of the war in 1945, we had 12 million men under arms, but by the beginning of 1948 we had reduced our forces to one-tenth of that number, 1.2 million. Since the 1960's we have unilaterally cut back our own nuclear arsenal: we now have considerably fewer weapons than in 1969, and only one third of the destructive power which we had at that time.

The United States and the NATO allies have repeatedly said that we will never use our arms, conventional or nuclear, unless we are attacked.

Let me add something that might not be widely known in the Soviet Union. In agreement with the NATO countries, the United States since 1979 has removed from Europe well over 1,000 nuclear warheads. When all of our withdrawals have been completed, the total number of warheads withdrawn will be over 2,400. That's a withdrawal of about 5 nuclear weapons for every intermediate-range missile we plan to deploy. It will bring our nuclear forces in Europe to the lowest level in some twenty years. We have seen no comparable Soviet restraint.

If the Soviet Union is now reducing its intermediate range missiles in Europe, that's a long overdue step. The Soviet Union has now deployed 441 SS-20 missiles, each with three warheads--that is 1323 warheads. I don't have to remind you that this Soviet deployment began when NATO had no comparable systems in Europe. We first attempted to negotiate an end to these systems, but when we could not reach agreement, NATO proceeded with a limited response which will take place gradually. Today,

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the Soviet Union commands an advantage in warheads of 7 to 1 on missiles already deployed. Our position remains as it has always been, that it would be better to negotiate an end to all of these types of missiles. But even if our hopes for an agreement are disappointed and NATO has to go to full deployment, this will only be a maximum of 572 single-warhead missiles.

Moreover, President Carter cancelled both the enhanced-radiation warhead and the B-1 bomber in 1978, and the Soviet Union made no corresponding move. In fact, when asked what the Soviet Union would reduce in response, one of your officials said, "We are not philanthropists." In 1977 and 1978 the United States also tried to negotiate a ban on developing anti-satellite weapons. The Soviet Union refused, and proceeded to develop and test an anti-satellite weapon. Having already established an operational anti-satellite system, the Soviet Union now proposes a "freeze" before the U.S. can test its own system. Obviously, that sort of "freeze" does not look very fair to us; if the shoe were on the other foot, it wouldn't look very fair to you either.

The issues between our two countries are of such importance that the positions of each government should be communicated accurately to the people of both countries. In this process, the media of both countries have an important role to play. We should not attempt to "score points" against each other. And the media should not distort our positions. We are committed to examining every Soviet proposal with care, seeking to find areas of agreement. It is important that the Soviet government do the same in regard to our proposals.

The important thing is that we both deal seriously with each other's proposals, and make a genuine effort to bridge our differences in a way which serves the interests of both countries and the world as a whole. It is in this spirit that I will be approaching my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

—

BASIC THEMES FOR THE TASS INTERVIEW

1. America's Desire for Peace. Peace is my most fervent goal, and that of the American people. We appreciate the enormous suffering the Soviet people experienced during WWII. We are no less committed to the cause of peace. A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.

2. America Does Not Threaten the Soviet Union: We threaten no one. We seek no territory. We do not seek to dominate other states. But we will defend our interests and those of our allies.

3. Confidence and Optimism: I believe in the future of democracy. It is in the ascendancy. It responds to the dreams of ordinary men and women. We will never, and need never, seek to impose our preferred system on others. United States foreign policy is firmly grounded in the principles of freedom, independence of states and the dignity of man.

4. U.S.-Soviet Common Interests: Despite current differences, our two countries cooperated successfully in past. Heroism in WWII. American soldiers died bringing aid to USSR; some lie buried on Soviet soil. Despite the problems in U.S.-Soviet relations, we have avoided war and cooperated in many areas -- nuclear non-proliferation, science, culture.

5. Realism. Our relations will be competitive in many respects; we must find realistic ways to manage that competition peacefully, and to expand areas of cooperation where possible. This means seeking the attainable in our relations: peace, recognition of other side's reasonable interests, adherence to mutual obligations. We will do our part; we insist that you do yours.

6. Contacts between People: Our relations should be more than just relations between governments. We want ties between peoples. We want to expand personal contacts, exchanges, communication.

7. The November meeting. I look forward to productive talks in Geneva. We want to get beyond stereotypes, compare hopes and plans for the future, and set our governments to work in solving problems. This is the hope of our two peoples and all mankind.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CLASSIFIED

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Gordiyevsky

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Matlock

PRESERVATION

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NLRR f06-114/3 #7936

BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

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JM-4
JFM08 15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

October 29, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOOK *JM*
SUBJECT: Gordiyevsky's Suggestions

As you requested in your PROF's note, I have prepared a Memorandum (TAB I) for the President which discusses the points made in the paper which Prime Minister Thatcher gave the President last week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Summary of Gordiyevsky's Points

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 606-714/3 #7937
BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Gordiyevsky's Suggestions

You will recall that Margaret Thatcher gave you a paper summarizing points made by Soviet KGB defector Gordiyevsky regarding dealing with Gorbachev. Gordiyevsky worked for British Intelligence for years before his defection and provided the information on which the recent mass expulsion of Soviet agents from the UK was based. Therefore, there seems no reasonable doubt of his bona fides. His view would be that of a person who worked in the most "sensitive" Soviet security organization and was well informed about the attitudes of those around him and of his superiors, but one who did not have direct access to the highest policy making levels.

His observations and assessments are in general accord with my own. I would agree with him that the principal Soviet concern over SDI is not so much that they consider it a threat as that they feel that it forces them to accelerate their own program in a way that they cannot afford if they are to tackle the economic problems plaguing their economy. But there can be little doubt that they will try to keep up with us if they feel they have to.

I also think that Gordiyevsky is right when he says that they will not be persuaded by the argument that we would share the results of our research with them. Soviet leaders (like many other people) tend to judge others by their own standards. They know that they would under no circumstances share such information and cannot be persuaded that such offers on our part are made in good faith. Rather, they would be inclined to view such arguments as a blatant attempt to deceive them.

Gordiyevsky's suggestions for dealing with this problem, however, are a bit unclear. When he speaks of removing Soviet "paranoia" "by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices," we cannot be certain of the precise meaning. However, he may have in mind certain types of confidence-building measures, proposals for specific negotiations, and proposals for cooperative efforts in areas of Soviet interest. If so, we are well off in this respect, having made a number of suggestions in these areas.

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7938

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

On the other hand, I am dubious about his suggestion regarding the argument that money saved on reducing offensive weapons can be applied to strategic defense. I don't see how Gorbachev could find this persuasive; it would be asking him to forego an area where his military-industrial complex has an excellent track record (turning out offensive weapons) for one where he knows they would be competing at a disadvantage (developing new complex technologies).

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I agree with Gordiyevsky that the Soviets are to a degree under the influence of their own propaganda. Often, of course, they manipulate the truth quite cynically, but over time the perpetrators of lies often begin believing them -- or at least half believing them. Therefore, I agree that you need to be very clear and forceful (though at the same time reasonably tactful) in pointing out how we see Soviet actions and why we see them as a threat.

Gorbachev's need for a "personal diplomatic success" -- which I believe is real -- does give us a certain leverage, if we apply it correctly. This may incline Gorbachev to pay some concrete prices in areas of interest to us in return for the appearance of having extracted U.S. respect and treatment as an equal. Such leverage is limited, however, and will not be very effective on the larger issues. One relatively cheap way to flatter Soviet egos without running into larger problems is to praise their role in World War II.

Gordiyevsky's comment about the Soviet military becoming increasingly dissatisfied about the deterioration of the economy is interesting. If true, and if agreements with the U.S. can be "sold" as improving Soviet ability to cope with their economic problems, this attitude could mitigate to some degree the traditional reluctance of the Soviet military to agree to real arms reduction.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

18

George Shultz and I will probably have a better feel for some of these matters following our trip to Moscow next week, and we will keep them in mind as we prepare the materials for your Geneva meeting.

Attachment:

Tab A Summary of Gordievskiy's Points

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS

1. Strongest wish of the Soviet Union not to be involved in strategic defence, which would impose a terrible economic strain.
2. They would see the American proposal for sharing information about the SDI but not stopping research and development as a trick. They would believe that the United States was trying to ruin the Soviet economy.
3. The Russians could be brought aboard only if the Americans could remove Russian paranoia about the aims of the United States and of the West generally. This could be done by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices.
4. Another argument would be to say that money saved on reducing offensive nuclear missiles can be devoted to strategic defence. This would avoid the need for an overall increase in military expenditure.
5. But the Soviets will invest heavily in strategic defence if it has to. The leadership would justify this to their people by means of a greatly stepped up propaganda campaign against the United States.
6. The Soviet leaders are too self-confident and too much under the influence of their own propaganda. The United States needs to set out its views on permissible Soviet behaviour more forcefully.
7. The President also needs to explain to Gorbachev the real nature of developments in various parts of the world. Gorbachev's own information will be heavily influenced by propaganda.
8. Gorbachev's priorities are arms control and Soviet/United States relations. Everything else is secondary.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR File-114/3#1944

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

9. Gorbachev's main motives for improving Soviet-United States relations will be to gain better access to Soviet ^{U.S.} technology and science; and to score a personal diplomatic success. It is also psychologically important for the Russians to feel that they are the equal of the United States. United States/Soviet co-operation in World War II was very flattering for them.

10. They need to have the security of feeling equal above all in the nuclear field. They think there is nuclear parity at present but fear the situation is changing in favour of the United States.

11. It will be very difficult for the Soviet leaders to improve the functioning of the Soviet economy, and much more so if they have to go for the SDI. But the Russian people are probably prepared to accept further hardship if necessary.

12. Gorbachev and the Party are not dependent on the people. The military complex is a real power: and the military are increasingly dissatisfied with the deterioration in the economy.

54-C
21

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

October 29, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting following SecState's Consultations in
Moscow

Recommendation

That you authorize Bill Martin to forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I to Fred Ryan requesting time with the President for a debrief for the NSC following Secretary Shultz' consultations in Moscow.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal for Fred Ryan

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CIS* NARA, Date *7/1/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: NSC Meeting.

PURPOSE: Secretary Shultz will debrief the NSC
following his consultations in Moscow.

BACKGROUND: Secretary Shultz, Robert C. McFarlane and
Jack Matlock will be in Moscow November 3-6
for consultations with General Secretary
Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
This meeting will enable the President to
hear their report of the discussions and to
provide guidance for the preparations for
Geneva.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE & TIME: Friday, November 8
DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President, the Vice President, Secretary
Shultz, Mr. Regan, Mr. McFarlane, Jack
Matlock, and others as appropriate.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Meeting with the President.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

PROPOSED "PHOTO": None

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Jack F. Matlock

Prepared by:
Tyrus Cobb

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By Cis NARA, Date 7/1/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Not For Syst
godlyewsky

[Handwritten signature]
MATLOCK

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED/RE/0450
NLRR F06-114/3 #7939
BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

October 29, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Gordiyevsky's Suggestions

As you requested in your PROF's note, I have prepared a Memorandum (TAB I) for the President which discusses the points made in the paper which Prime Minister Thatcher gave the President last week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Summary of Gordiyevsky's Points

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-114/3 #7940

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Declassify on: OADRBY *CN* NARA DATE 10/30/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Gordiyevsky's Suggestions

You will recall that Margaret Thatcher gave you a paper summarizing points made by Soviet KGB defector Gordiyevsky regarding dealing with Gorbachev. Gordiyevsky worked for British Intelligence for years before his defection and provided the information on which the recent mass expulsion of Soviet agents from the UK was based. Therefore, there seems no reasonable doubt of his bona fides. His view would be that of a person who worked in the most "sensitive" Soviet security organization and was well informed about the attitudes of those around him and of his superiors, but one who did not have direct access to the highest policy making levels.

His observations and assessments are in general accord with my own. I would agree with him that the principal Soviet concern over SDI is not so much that they consider it a threat as that they feel that it forces them to accelerate their own program in a way that they cannot afford if they are to tackle the economic problems plaguing their economy. But there can be little doubt that they will try to keep up with us if they feel they have to.

I also think that Gordiyevsky is right when he says that they will not be persuaded by the argument that we would share the results of our research with them. Soviet leaders (like many other people) tend to judge others by their own standards. They know that they would under no circumstances share such information and cannot be persuaded that such offers on our part are made in good faith. Rather, they would be inclined to view such arguments as a blatant attempt to deceive them.

Gordiyevsky's suggestions for dealing with this problem, however, are a bit unclear. When he speaks of removing Soviet "paranoia" "by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices," we cannot be certain of the precise meaning. However, he may have in mind certain types of confidence-building measures, proposals for specific negotiations, and proposals for cooperative efforts in areas of Soviet interest. If so, we are well off in this respect, having made a number of suggestions in these areas.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR R06-114/3 #7942
BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

On the other hand, I am dubious about his suggestion regarding the argument that money saved on reducing offensive weapons can be applied to strategic defense. I don't see how Gorbachev could find this persuasive; it would be asking him to forego an area where his military-industrial complex has an excellent track record (turning out offensive weapons) for one where he knows they would be competing at a disadvantage (developing new complex technologies).

I would think that a better way to approach this problem is to press Gorbachev to tell you exactly what he finds threatening about SDI. Why does he think it might be part of a first-strike strategy on our part? A discussion along these lines might give us some further clues to his real concerns and reveal whether there are practical steps we could take to meet them (in exchange for sharp reductions in offensive weapons, of course) without crippling our SDI program. It is conceivable -- though not likely -- that Gorbachev is looking for a fig leaf to justify turning down demands by the Soviet military for massive increases in their SDI budget. Even though the odds are that this is not the case, we should probe to make sure, since if it is the chances of reaching an agreement for radical nuclear arms reduction would be much improved.

I agree with Gordiyevsky that the Soviets are to a degree under the influence of their own propaganda. Often, of course, they manipulate the truth quite cynically, but over time the perpetrators of lies often begin believing them -- or at least half believing them. Therefore, I agree that you need to be very clear and forceful (though at the same time reasonably tactful) in pointing out how we see Soviet actions and why we see them as a threat.

Gorbachev's need for a "personal diplomatic success" -- which I believe is real -- does give us a certain leverage, if we apply it correctly. This may incline Gorbachev to pay some concrete prices in areas of interest to us in return for the appearance of having extracted U.S. respect and treatment as an equal. Such leverage is limited, however, and will not be very effective on the larger issues. One relatively cheap way to flatter Soviet egos without running into larger problems is to praise their role in World War II.

Gordiyevsky's comment about the Soviet military becoming increasingly dissatisfied about the deterioration of the economy is interesting. If true, and if agreements with the U.S. can be "sold" as improving Soviet ability to cope with their economic problems, this attitude could mitigate to some degree the traditional reluctance of the Soviet military to agree to real arms reduction.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

27

George Shultz and I will probably have a better feel for some of these matters following our trip to Moscow next week, and we will keep them in mind as we prepare the materials for your Geneva meeting.

Attachment:

Tab A Summary of Gordievskiy's Points

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS

1. Strongest wish of the Soviet Union not to be involved in strategic defence, which would impose a terrible economic strain.
2. They would see the American proposal for sharing information about the SDI but not stopping research and development as a trick. They would believe that the United States was trying to ruin the Soviet economy.
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7. The President also needs to explain to Gorbachev the real nature of developments in various parts of the world. Gorbachev's own information will be heavily influenced by propaganda.
8. Gorbachev's priorities are arms control and Soviet/United States relations. Everything else is secondary.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7945

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

SECRET

29

9. Gorbachev's main motives for improving Soviet-United States relations will be to gain better access to Soviet ^{U.S.} technology and science; and to score a personal diplomatic success. It is also psychologically important for the Russians to feel that they are the equal of the United States. United States/Soviet co-operation in World War II was very flattering for them.

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Matlock
~~NOT FOR SYSTEM~~

30

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
91139

SECRET

October 30, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Gordiyevsky's Suggestions *RR*

You will recall that Margaret Thatcher gave you a paper summarizing points made by Soviet KGB defector Gordiyevsky regarding dealing with Gorbachev. Gordiyevsky worked for British Intelligence for years before his defection and provided the information on which the recent mass expulsion of Soviet agents from the UK was based. Therefore, there seems no reasonable doubt of his bona fides. His view would be that of a person who worked in the most "sensitive" Soviet security organization and was well informed about the attitudes of those around him and of his superiors, but one who did not have direct access to the highest policy making levels.

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SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-114/3 #7942

BY AL NARA DATE 10/30/07

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~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

32

George Shultz and I will probably have a better feel for some of these matters following our trip to Moscow next week, and we will keep them in mind as we prepare the materials for your Geneva meeting.

Attachment:

Tab A Summary of Gordievskiy's Points

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS

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7. The President also needs to explain to Gorbachev the real nature of developments in various parts of the world. Gorbachev's own information will be heavily influenced by propaganda.
8. Gorbachev's priorities are arms control and Soviet/United States relations. Everything else is secondary.

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~~SECRET~~

~~NOT FOR SYSTEM~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

October 29, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOOK *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Gordiyevsky's Suggestions

SIGNED

As you requested in your PROFs note, I have prepared a Memorandum (TAB I) for the President which discusses the points made in the paper which Prime Minister Thatcher gave the President last week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Summary of Gordiyevsky's Points

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED *[Signature]*
NLRR F06-114/3 # *1937 1943*
BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/8/11*

J01-C30

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 30, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Soviet Films for the President

I think it would be extremely useful for the President to see two Soviet films before his November meeting with Gorbachev. The first film has been selected to help give him a feel for everyday life in the USSR. The second will focus on Soviet perceptions of World War II. Attached at Tab I is a Schedule Proposal requesting that the first film be placed on the President's calendar for this weekend, November 1-2, at Camp David, for viewing at his leisure.

The film, "Moscow Doesn't Believe in Tears", traces the marriages of three young women and, in the process, provides a rare look at the social pretensions and prejudices at work in Soviet society. A synopsis card is attached at Tab A. The film runs 2 hours 45 minutes. The 35 mm reels are in the East Wing projection room ready for shipment to Camp David.

mfr
Johnathan Miller concurs.RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the attached Schedule Proposal to Fred Ryan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Schedule Proposal
Tab A Synopsis CardLIMITED OFFICIAL USEDECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *C/S* NARA, Date *7/1/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: Soviet Film showing

PURPOSE: To assist in preparing the President for his
November meeting with Gorbachev

BACKGROUND: Several films were obtained from the Soviet
Embassy and previewed by Jack Matlock's
staff. Two have been selected as useful
preparation for the November meeting with
Gorbachev. One film will give the President
a feel for everyday life in the USSR, and the
second will focus on Soviet perceptions of
World War II. It is recommended that the
first film be viewed this weekend.

DATE & TIME: November 2 or 3 at the President's leisure
DURATION: 2 hours and 45 minutes

LOCATION: Camp David

PARTICIPANTS: The President and Mrs. Reagan

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: View films

RECOMMENDED BY: Jack F. Matlock

OPPOSED BY: None

Attachment:

Tab A Film Snyopsis

MOSCOW DOESN'T BELIEVE IN TEARS

This film traces the romances and marriages of three young Soviet women. In the process it is unusually frank in its portrayal of Soviet life - revealing many of its pretensions and prejudices. The story's heroine rises from simple factory worker to plant manager (a Soviet Horatio Alger) despite the burdens of being a single parent.


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

October 30, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Travel Request to Accompany Secretary of State
Shultz to Moscow November 2 - 5, 1985

I have been asked to accompany Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow to participate in his talks with Soviet officials on November 2-5, 1985, in preparation for the Geneva Meeting.

I will be traveling on government aircraft. Per Diem costs will be covered by the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: October 30, 1985

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): Accompany SecState Shultz to Moscow to participate in discussions with Soviet Officials re Geneva Meeting November 19-20, 1985
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington/Helsinki/Moscow/Washington
- DEPARTURE DATE Nov. 2 RETURN DATE Nov. 5, 1985
TIME TIME
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV RAIL OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC OTHER X
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO X
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE:
13. APPROVALS:

5H-C
41

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~

October 31, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK ^{SW} and BOB LINHARD

SUBJECT: Letter from President to Gorbachev

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he sign the letter to Gorbachev which notifies Gorbachev of our new proposals in the NST negotiations and supports Secretary Shultz's meetings next week.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A President's Letter to Gorbachev

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Cos NARA, Date 7/1/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev

Issue

Whether to sign a letter to Gorbachev.

Facts

Shevardnadze delivered to you a letter from Gorbachev when you met September 27. This letter has not yet been answered.

Discussion

Gorbachev's letter notified you that the Soviets would be making new proposals at the Geneva negotiations. Now that we are prepared to reply to that offer, it would be appropriate for you to respond to Gorbachev's letter by notifying him of our new proposals. This letter also serves to give your personal endorsement to George Shultz's mission to Moscow next week.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

OK

No

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on : OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CVS NARA, Date 7/1/06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York October 24, I have been giving careful consideration to your letter dated September 12. The issues you raise are important ones, the ideas you have put forward are in many ways interesting, and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before replying.

Many of the specific points you addressed in your letter have been or will be dealt with by our delegations in the Geneva arms control negotiations or by our Foreign Ministers. In this letter I will therefore focus on what I consider the most significant issues you have raised.

You suggested in your letter that we might reach an understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war and other general principles which should guide us. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has since proposed specific language for our consideration. As I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. I therefore have instructed Secretary Shultz to discuss this matter with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in their meetings next week.

As we address this and other elements which may figure in any document we may issue in Geneva, I believe it is important to give the most careful consideration to our words. The experience of the past has been that overly vague or rhetorical language has led to expectations which, given the competitive aspect of our relationship to which you referred in your letter, cannot be sustained.

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If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstandings and disillusionment, our own statements should be clear and based on concrete achievements. I am convinced that there is substantial common ground on the range of areas we have been discussing in connection with our forthcoming meeting, and I would hope that this common ground can be expanded during our meeting in Geneva.

You raised several specific areas in the security field where this might be possible. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to discuss all your ideas in concrete terms while he is in Moscow. I believe you will find that we are indeed prepared to go our fair share of the way to ensure our meeting is a productive one.

I do, however, want to address your response to the proposals we had previously made in the Geneva arms control talks, which was foreshadowed in your letter and which your delegation subsequently tabled in Geneva.

We have been carefully assessing your counter-proposal over the last month. As I stated in my address to the United Nations on October 24, I believe that within it there are seeds which we should nurture and that in the coming weeks we should seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

In order to foster such a process, I have approved a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon the positive elements of your counterproposal and bridge the positions of our two sides. I have asked our negotiators to extend the current round to permit your experts to achieve a full understanding of our approach. This new proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva negotiations. Its essence is a proposal for radical and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missile systems, both of which bridge US and Soviet ideas. We also propose that both sides provide assurances that their strategic defense programs are and will remain in full accord with the ABM Treaty.

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Such assurances assume a resolution of our current differences over compliance with the Treaty.

In the area of strategic arms, the United States agrees with the objective of a fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive forces. Our proposal builds on this, applying the fifty percent principle in a manner that is both equitable and can enhance stability. In the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, we have also looked for elements we find in common. While I continue to firmly believe that the best outcome would be the complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on both sides, in our new proposal, we have also moved in your direction. In defense and space we must begin now to establish a framework for a cooperative transition to more reliance on defenses and we would like to see a more developed dialogue on how such a transition could be jointly undertaken.

We have designed our approach to provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of the range of nuclear and space arms issues; to take account of the interrelationship between the offense and the defense; and to address those concerns that you and your negotiators have described as being of great importance to you. I am convinced that this new proposal can provide the basis for immediate and genuine progress on the numerous and complex issues facing us in the nuclear and space area, and I look forward to discussing it with you in Geneva later this month.

We will also have the opportunity in Geneva to discuss the other areas which make up our relationship. Much work remains to be done if we are to be able to announce specific progress on regional and bilateral issues. I hope that Secretary Shultz's Moscow visit will be a stimulus to rapid progress in the weeks ahead.

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In conclusion, may I say once more that I am looking forward to our meeting and that I sincerely hope we will be able to set our countries on a less confrontational and more cooperative course in the years ahead. I will personally spare no effort to help bring this about.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Moscow