

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron December 1985 (5)
Box: 14

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

12
10021

FILE

December 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO SALLY KELLEY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *for Catherine Bergen*
SUBJECT: Letter to Albert Shanker re Case of Balys Gajauskas

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter as amended (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Mr. Albert Shanker, President, American Federation of Teachers, Washington, D.C., concerning the case of Balys Gajauskas.

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed Draft Letter to Mr. Shanker
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

13

UNCLASSIFIED
(CLASSIFICATION)

S/S # 8535436

DATE December 13, 1985

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Mr. Albert Shanker

DATE: November 14, 1985 SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev

Meeting: Human Rights


WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: Dec. 2, 1985 NSC # 352411

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☒ A draft reply is attached
- ☐ A draft reply will be forwarded
- ☐ A translation is attached
- ☐ An information copy of a direct reply is attached
- ☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below
- ☐ Other

REMARKS:


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(CLASSIFICATION)

14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Shanker:

I am replying to your November 14 letter to President Reagan requesting that he raise the case of Balys Gajauskas during his discussions with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. The President appreciates your kind words of support.

Mr. Gajauskas, a Lithuanian Catholic and Helsinki Monitor, was first arrested in 1948 for anti-Soviet partisan activity. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison and has spent most of the intervening years in prison or labor camps for his nationalist and human rights activities. On April 14, 1978, he was sentenced to ten years hard labor and five years internal exile for collecting and preserving historical documents considered by Soviet authorities to be anti-Soviet in nature.

The U.S. Government takes every opportunity to call for an end to Soviet persecution of religious believers and to bring these human rights abuses to international attention. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government has been unresponsive to our

Mr. Albert Shanker,
President,
American Federation of Teachers,
555 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

efforts and to those of concerned Western governments and independent human rights organizations. The Soviets maintain the incarceration of "criminals" on essentially religious grounds is an internal policy matter. Although we condemn such arbitrary and inhumane behavior, we lack the ability to alleviate the prisoners' circumstances or secure their release.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

Sincerely,

14
8535436

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

DECEMBER 2, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 352411

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 14, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. ALBERT SHANKER
PRESIDENT
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS
AFL CIO
555 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON DC 20001

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO RAISE THE CASE OF
MR. BALYS GAJASKAS DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING
WITH MR. GORBACHEV

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

8535436

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 18, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. ALBERT SHANKER

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO RAISE THE CASE OF
MP. BALYS GAJASKAS DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING
WITH MR. GORBACHEV

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LINDA CHAVEZ		ORG	85/11/18		C 85/11/19
✓ LINAS KOTELIS, OPL	REFERRAL NOTE:	A	85/11/20		I I
✓ 99 DOS	REFERRAL NOTE:	D	85/12/02		I I
	REFERRAL NOTE:				I I
	REFERRAL NOTE:				I I
	REFERRAL NOTE:				I I

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: I INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		*OUTGOING	*
*P-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE *			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY *			*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

352411

18



**AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS** AFL
CIO

555 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001
202/879-4400

ALBERT SHANKER
President

8535436

November 14, 1985

The President
Mr. Ronald Reagan
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to take this opportunity to offer my support and best wishes for your upcoming summit in Geneva with Soviet Premier Gorbachev. By maintaining a clear understanding of the past failures and successes of U.S. - Soviet summits, I hope that your administration will succeed in achieving a real, and lasting disarmament.

I would also like to express my support of your pronouncement on the occasion of the United Nations 40th Anniversary. I, too, agree that the opportunity to meet with the Soviet Union's leader should be used to go beyond arms control. In addition to the Soviet instigated regional conflicts cited in your address at the U.N., I am concerned about the hundreds of prisoners persecuted in the Soviet Union because of their political and religious beliefs, or ethnic origins. I believe that every opportunity that the free worlds' leaders have to press for the release of these victims must be exercised.

I write you today at the request of the Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents (CREED) to draw your attention to one such victim. I would like to suggest that in your discussion with Mr. Gorbachev you bring up the case of Mr. Balys Gajauskas as one example of the hundreds of prisoners of conscience persecuted by the Soviet regime. Mr. Gajauskas is a Lithuanian who has spent the last 33 years in a Soviet concentration camp because of his unrelenting commitment to democracy, his faith in God, and his support for human rights. His health is reportedly deteriorating and he is unlikely to survive the remaining eight years of his sentence. I urge you to petition the Soviet leader for Gajauskas' unconditional release. I believe this would be a strong demonstration to the

./..

Soviet regime of your administration's concern for all the prisoners of conscience struggling in the Soviet Union.

Once again, I wish you success in your efforts with Mr. Gorbachev. I also thank you in advance for considering Mr. Gajauskas continued persecution.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Albert Shanker".

ALBERT SHANKER
President

DND/mck
opeiu2
aflcio

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Letter to Albert Shanker re Case of Balys Gajauskas

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft response as amended (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Mr. Albert Shanker, President, American Federation of Teachers, Washington, D.C., concerning the case of Balys Gajauskas. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Sally Kelley for signature.

Sestonovich, Mandel and Raymond concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to Sally Kelley.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A Draft Response to Mr. Shanker
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 24, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Records of Geneva Summit Meetings

The edited records of the meetings in Geneva between the President and Gorbachev and between the First Lady and Mrs. Gorbacheva are at Tabs A through K.

I have supplied a Memorandum to the President (Tab I), in case you wish to forward these memoranda for his review, with a courtesy copy for the Vice President (Tab II). There are also memoranda to Don Regan and George Shultz at Tabs III and IV.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memoranda at Tabs I, II and III.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Memcon - First Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab B Memcon - First Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab C Memcon - Second Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab D Memcon - Second Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab E Memcon - Mrs. Reagan's Tea w/Mrs. Gorbachev
Tab F Memcon - Dinner by the Gorbachev's, Nov 19
Tab G Memcon - Third Private Mtg, Nov 20
Tab H Memcon - Third Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab I Memcon - Fourth Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab J Memcon - Mrs. Gorbachev's Tea w/Mrs. Reagan
Tab K Memcon - Dinner hosted by Reagans, Nov 20
Tab II Memo to Vice President
Tabs A - K Same as above
Tab III Memo to Mr. Regan
Tabs A - K Same as above
Tab IV Memo to Secretary Shultz
Tabs A - K Same as above

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 7/2/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Geneva Summit Records

You may wish to review the records of your meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. They are attached in chronological order. I have also included the summary records of the First Lady's teas with Mrs. Gorbachev (Tabs E and K).

Attachments:

Tab A	Memcon - First Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab B	Memcon - First Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab C	Memcon - Second Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab D	Memcon - Second Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab E	Memcon - Mrs. Reagan's Tea w/Mrs. Gorbachev
Tab F	Memcon - Dinner by the Gorbachev's, Nov 19
Tab G	Memcon - Third Private Mtg, Nov 20
Tab H	Memcon - Third Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab I	Memcon - Fourth Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab J	Memcon - Mrs. Gorbachev's Tea w/Mrs. Reagan
Tab K	Memcon - Dinner by Reagan's, Nov 20

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28/1997
By CIS NARA, Date 7/2/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Geneva Summit Records

You may wish to review the records of the President's meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. They are attached in chronological order. I have also included the summary records of the First Lady's teas with Mrs. Gorbachev (Tabs E and K).

Attachments:

Tab A	Memcon - First Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab B	Memcon - First Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab C	Memcon - Second Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab D	Memcon - Second Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab E	Memcon - Mrs. Reagan's Tea w/Mrs. Gorbachev
Tab F	Memcon - Dinner by the Gorbachev's, Nov 19
Tab G	Memcon - Third Private Mtg, Nov 20
Tab H	Memcon - Third Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab I	Memcon - Fourth Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab J	Memcon - Mrs. Gorbachev's Tea w/Mrs. Reagan
Tab K	Memcon - Dinner by Reagan's, Nov 20

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFY on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By C/S NARA, Date 7/2/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Geneva Summit Records

You may wish to review the records of the President's meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. They are attached in chronological order. I have also included the summary records of the First Lady's teas with Mrs. Gorbachev (Tabs E and K).

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attachments:

Tab A	Memcon - First Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab B	Memcon - First Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab C	Memcon - Second Plenary Mtg, Nov 19
Tab D	Memcon - Second Private Mtg, Nov 19
Tab E	Memcon - Mrs. Reagan's Tea w/Mrs. Gorbachev
Tab F	Memcon - Dinner by the Gorbachev's, Nov 19
Tab G	Memcon - Third Private Mtg, Nov 20
Tab H	Memcon - Third Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab I	Memcon - Fourth Plenary Mtg, Nov 20
Tab J	Memcon - Mrs. Gorbachev's Tea w/Mrs. Reagan
Tab K	Memcon - Dinner by Reagan's, Nov 20

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFY on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CIS NARA, Date 7/2/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

First Private Meeting

DATE: November 19, 1985
TIME: 10:20 - 11:20 A.M.
PLACE: Maison Fleur d'Eau,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Ronald Reagan
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Yuri D. Uspensky, Interpreter

* * * * *

After the official photographers and the rest of the staff left the room, President Reagan began the conversation by telling the General Secretary that the two of them could really talk now. The President indicated that he approached this meeting with a very deep feeling and hoped that both of them could realize its importance and the unique situation that they were in.

The President indicated that both he and the General Secretary had come from similar beginnings which were quite different from their current positions. He, Reagan, was born and began his life in a small farming community, and now the two of them were here with the fate of the world in their hands, so to speak. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were the two greatest

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLSF96-087*21 DLB 5/15/00
BY CS, NARA, Date 7/2/02

countries on Earth, the superpowers. They were the only ones who could start World War III, but also the only two countries that could bring peace to the world.

The President said that the two of them would talk about many things, including arms, in the main meeting, but he wondered if the primary aim between them should not be to eliminate the suspicions which each side had of the other. The resolution of other questions would follow naturally after this. To talk about arms while such suspicions exist is an empty exercise as both sides are defensive at the various negotiations because of these suspicions. Countries do not mistrust each other because of arms, but rather countries build up their arms because of the mistrust between them.

The President expressed the hope that in their meetings they could get at the sources of the suspicions which exist. The Soviet Union did not approve of the U.S. system of government, and the U.S. did not approve of the Soviet system, and each could follow its own way, but with peaceful competition.

General Secretary Gorbachev said that he would like to return to the beginning, and thank the President for receiving him. He agreed with the President that this meeting was important in itself and he was glad that it was taking place. There had been no meetings between the U.S. President and the General Secretary of the USSR for six years, and many problems had developed in U.S.-Soviet relations and in the world in that period. He would also speak of these issues at the larger meeting, but would now like to avail himself of the opportunity which such a private meeting affords. He had met with members of the U.S. Congress and representatives of the U.S. Administration, but the Soviet side recognized the importance of a meeting with the President, and he, Gorbachev, would like to talk quietly, with respect for the United States and for the President, about many issues.

Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet side had prepared many months for this meeting, and he had tried to get a better understanding of the U.S. from Soviet and American sources. He had familiarized himself with all of the President's statements, and had paid special attention to the most recent ones. The main conclusion he had come to was that he was convinced that he and the President could not ignore each other. Nothing good would happen if the two sides took a different approach. But he was convinced that he could begin to change our relations for the better. This was his main theme, and the starting point for the meeting. After he had come to this conclusion, he had reviewed it a thousand times: perhaps it was too simplistic, bearing in mind the tremendous differences between the two

27

countries? This was, of course, so, but on the other hand the two countries were so interrelated.

Gorbachev continued that in the Soviet Union it was considered that serious measures ought to be undertaken to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. This would demand political will at the highest levels. A veritable avalanche of information was descending upon Gorbachev and the President, both internally and from all around the world. Gorbachev was convinced that there was not only the fear of mutual destruction, although this did exist, but a realistic evaluation showed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could cooperate, and they had done so in the past, without changing their political systems, culture or ideologies. They had cooperated in the area of economics, trade and culture while respecting the choices made by the U.S. people, and, obviously, the Soviet people as well.

Gorbachev said that there had sometimes been squalls in the bilateral relationship which had been severe, perhaps extremely so, but he could definitely state that in the USSR there was no enmity toward the United States or its people. The Soviet Union respected the U.S. and its people. The Soviet people and the leadership of the Soviet Union recognized the role of the U.S. in the world, and wished it no harm. They realized that international relations could not be built on a desire to harm American interests.

At this point Gorbachev indicated that he would like to pause to permit the President to speak, and then he would like to say a few things about the Soviet side's understanding of the present international situation and what he thought should be changed in our policies in order to have a more constructive relationship based on greater realism.

The President replied that there was no question but that the Soviet and American peoples, if they learned more about each other, would find that they had many things in common, and that friendship between them would grow. Unfortunately, it was not people but governments that created arms.

The President continued that prior to this meeting there had been a wave of good wishes from the people of the United States, primarily expressing the desire to have peace. He knew something about the Soviet Union and its concern about war because of the suffering which the country had undergone in the Second World War -- the courage, the sacrifices and the fact that 20 million people had been lost. People do not like war. Americans hate war. America is too good a place to be when there is no war.

The President continued that people did not get into trouble when they talked to each other, but rather when they talked about each other. There has been too much of the latter on both sides, and not enough of talking to each other. In the meeting with the larger group, where he and Gorbachev should soon move, the sides could explain why there is mistrust between them, but could make a beginning to try to eliminate this mistrust.

Gorbachev replied that they would discuss specific questions during their Geneva meetings, but he wished to give his evaluation of the present international situation as the Soviet side saw it, while they were still in their one-on-one meeting. He thought that a new policy was needed which would be adequate for the present international situation. The first thing that was needed was a policy aimed at resolving the central issue of the present time, that is, the question of war and peace. In the Soviet Union, in the United States, and in the whole world this was the question which was in the minds of everyone, even ordinary people, not to mention those who were more familiar with international processes.

Gorbachev continued that if the two sides reached a substantive agreement in Geneva, which would increase people's hope and would not destroy their view of the future with respect to the question of war and peace, this would be a great accomplishment. The question of ending the arms race was of critical importance in international politics, and we needed to say something to the world about this. The Soviet side is in favor of this. The U.S. side says that nuclear war cannot be permitted, and that it is for peace. We need to find a formula at this meeting which would give impetus toward moving towards resolution of the more important issues. This was the first thing.

Gorbachev continued that he would not like to seem irresponsible vis-a-vis the President, vis-a-vis his own country and vis-a-vis the world with regard to this main issue. Young people were wondering about whether they would be alive or not, and the older generation, that had suffered so much, was also thinking about this. Yes, we have a meeting in Geneva, and we need to create an impetus. If no such impetus is created, there will be great disappointment, and no statements or press announcements will justify the meeting. People will say that we are irresponsible. And the two sides should not subject themselves to such a fate.

Gorbachev said that he would like to say two brief things about what realities Soviet and U.S. foreign policy should take into account. There were many problems in the world, involving capitalist countries and socialist countries, not to mention third-world countries, where the problems were the greatest. The problems involved questions of economics, structural change, ecology, sociology, etc. All of these issues demanded our

attention and required solutions based on cooperation rather than confrontation. This was the second thing that Gorbachev wished to say.

Gorbachev continued that the third thing was that the two countries had had conflicts, both openly and privately, with regard to regional, third-world issues. But there was a great number of developing countries, and dozens of newly-created ones. They had great amounts of natural and human resources, but they were not only behind the developed countries, but the gap between them was growing greater. There was hunger, illiteracy and disease, causing a great deal of turmoil. We need to take a new political approach to these issues in order to resolve them. This was the basis for Gorbachev's approach to foreign policy, as well as that of his colleagues.

Gorbachev indicated that the issue of national interests had arisen. The Soviet Union had its national interests and the U.S. had them as well. Other countries also had their national interests. In the international context, we could not speak of advancing some of these interests at the expense of suppressing others. Without such an approach it would be difficult to act in the international arena. He had spoken sincerely about these three things. The Soviet Union was not playing a two-faced game. If it were playing such a game with regard to the United States, if it harbored secret intentions, then there could be no improvement in the relationship. He was sincere about this, and this applied to both countries.

Gorbachev apologized that he had taken so long, and said that he would be ending shortly. Perhaps the President was aware that a slogan had been used during the time of this meeting in Geneva which said that Reagan and Gorbachev should bear in mind that the world did not belong only to the two of them.

The President replied that he had not heard about such a slogan, but he wished to reply briefly to what Gorbachev had said, and then he thought it would be better for them to join with the rest of the group. He agreed that the two countries could mutually help the developing countries, but one of the things that created mistrust of the USSR by the U.S. was the realization of the Marxist idea of helping socialist revolutions throughout the world and the belief that the Marxist system should prevail. The U.S. felt, however, that the most important thing for a country was its right to self-determination. The U.S. and USSR could help these countries, given our advanced technologies. We could help them to improve their standards of living. But the U.S. felt that the Soviet Union attempted to use force to shape the developing countries to their own pattern, and that such force was often used only by a minority of

the people of the country. The U.S. believed that if the competing factions would settle their social and other differences themselves, the U.S. and USSR could then be ready to assist them in improving their economies. Both our countries should eliminate the mistrust which exists between them by discussing the causes of this mistrust. The U.S. had a very firm belief that people in all countries had the right of self-determination and the right to choose their own form of government.

The President indicated that when he and Gorbachev would go into the main meeting, he would greet the members of the Soviet Delegation, and Gorbachev should greet the members of the U.S. Delegation, after which there would be a photo opportunity next to the fireplace before they sat down at the table.

Gorbachev replied that they would continue to discuss these issues in the larger meeting, but he would like to say some more before they left the room. There had been those who considered that the American Revolution should have been crushed. The same applied to the French Revolution and to the Soviet Revolution. Over a long period of time millions of people had engaged in such struggles -- in India, Indonesia, in Algeria (where one-and-a-half million people had died in their struggle for freedom). The Soviet Union did not consider that a way of life could be imposed if a society were not ready for it. These were only empty phrases. All these things which happen in the world have their national roots. The U.S. should not think that Moscow was omnipotent and that when he, Gorbachev, woke up every day he thought about which country he would now like to arrange a revolution in. This was simply not true. Gorbachev indicated that after his interpreter had translated what he had just said, he would like to convey some confidential information to Reagan, after which they could move to the next room.

Gorbachev said that before leaving for Geneva he had received some information from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, specifically the Institute for Earth Studies, where the scientists have become convinced that there would be a major earthquake in the area of California and Nevada within the next three years. Soviet scientists had always worked with U.S. scientists on these issues, and Reagan probably had knowledge of such information already, but this information was in addition to what had already been known. The Soviet scientists considered that the probability of an earthquake of a magnitude of 7 or 7.5 on the Richter scale was two-thirds and the probability of one of 6 or 6.5 was three-fourths. The Soviet side was ready to have its scientists give all the details to U.S. scientists. They have not yet been published.

The President replied that he realized that such an earthquake was considered to be overdue. He mentioned that an entire

area along the Pacific, Asia, South America, and North America was considered to be a "ring of fire" because of the volcanoes there. This had recently been demonstrated in Colombia, before that in Mexico and in the U.S. with Mount St. Helen: these volcanoes were showing greater activity. Because of faults in the earth and shifting plates, we know that such an event is overdue. A great deal of tension has been created along the San Andreas fault, and this tension had not been released by little quakes. The President indicated that he had not heard any specific time frame mentioned of the type that Gorbachev had spoken of, but all of our scientists knew that this was overdue and could happen at any time.

Prepared by:
Dimitri Zarechnak,
Department of State

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

First Plenary Meeting

DATE: November 19, 1985
TIME: 11:27 A.M. - 12:15 P.M.
PLACE: Maison Fleur d'Eau,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Ronald Reagan
George Shultz, Secretary of State
Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR
Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robie M. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central
Committee, CPSU
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department,
Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary
Gorbachev
Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Yury D. Uspensky, Interpreter

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLSF96-087 #12 PLB 5/15/00
BY CS, NARA, Date 7/2/02

The President and the General Secretary emerged from their private meeting and greeted each member of the others' delegation. There was then a photo opportunity. The two delegations were then seated.

The President opened the meeting by stating to the General Secretary that he was pleased that the meeting is finally under way. He noted that the two of them had been talking about how important their meetings are, and then turned the floor over to the General Secretary.

Gorbachev thanked the President. He noted that he and the President had agreed that it was important to have a constructive exchange of views at this meeting. As he had already said during their private meeting, the Soviet Union attaches a lot of importance to this meeting and to the fact that it is taking place after almost seven years since the last summit. A lot of things have changed in the world and in both of our countries. Many problems have come up which are of concern to the American people, to the Soviet people and to their leaders. We regard this meeting as a positive event, he added.

Gorbachev then returned to the question of how to proceed and at what level. He shared the view that we need to bolster confidence in our relationship. We need to think together about a mechanism for implementing this idea. This should include a political dialogue at various levels. It is not good when for extended periods our relationship is reduced to having our entire dialogue take place via the press. He understood that this was the President's idea about dialogue. The President had said that he was for talking to each other rather than about each other. The task before us is strengthening confidence. We should be looking for opportunities in various areas, for example trade and economic relations can be helpful.

Experience has shown that the Soviet Union and the United States can live without each other in the area of trade and economics. But they cannot hope that a strong peace and understanding will emerge without active links and relationships. Economic and commercial ties are important not only in themselves but also as a political link. There needs to be a material basis for the political process.

Some underestimate this fact, he continued. Sometimes these relations are used in a way which is detrimental to the process we want. This had happened in the past. He would note that the President had seen that, and had lifted the grain embargo. But, unfortunately, this action was not followed by other steps. There is interest among U.S. businessmen and in Soviet economic circles. Commercial ties can be part of the mechanism of trust.

Gorbachev said that he welcomed the President's idea for a broad based exchange of people in science, culture and other areas. He was pleased that American people are interested in a greater understanding of the Soviet people and noted that American travel to the Soviet Union was going up and had reached some 50,000 annually. He also welcomed a more lively and dynamic set of contacts between foreign ministries and embassies. High level summits should fit in with this and be the centerpiece of our mechanism for building trust.

The General Secretary said that he would build on this subject of dialogue in greater detail. He mentioned it now since he understood that it is a subject of special importance to the President.

He then returned to what he called the central point: that after many years the two leaders are meeting at a time when relations are at the lowest level ever. He did not know whether the President and his Administration find this good. The President's recent statements seemed to indicate that he wants improved relations. This is definitely the Soviet desire. They feel that despite all the existing differences and without simplifying difficulties, the two sides have to get down to steering their relations into a normal channel. He had said in their private meeting that the Soviet leadership as a whole is for this improvement, that he did not see any opposition to this view. The Soviet leadership is united in a desire to improve relations, if that is the U.S. desire. The Soviet Union is willing to accommodate the United States without preconditions. He stated this because the U.S. has set conditions for an improvement in relations. This has been unacceptable in the past, and continues to be unacceptable.

He mentioned that in Moscow he had said to Secretary Shultz and National Security Advisor McFarlane that he wanted our relations and the process of making policies to be free of delusions. There seem to be several delusions on the part of the American ruling class, to judge by some studies put out by U.S. "think tanks." These include such ideas as the contention that the Soviet economy is in a perilous state and therefore it can be subject to the pressure of an arms race to give more leverage to U.S. foreign policy. Or that the Soviet Union is lagging behind in high technology so that the United States can rush ahead and achieve military superiority. Or that the Soviet Union seeks military superiority.

He would note here what he had said to Shultz and McFarlane. The Soviet Union is often accused of causing problems for the United States in Europe and in the Third World. The two sides may have differences on concrete situations and on specific

bilateral and international matters. But the USSR proceeds from a recognition of the role and weight of the United States in international affairs. The Soviets duly appreciate American achievements in technology, service and other spheres -- the fruits of labor of the American people. The Soviets greatly respect the Americans. This is most important. Yes, there are differences: political, ideological, and in terms of values. But we have managed to stay alive for many years. And we have never been at war with each other. Let us pray to God that this never happens. The broad and fundamental approach he had described would make an improvement in relations possible .

He continued that it would be bad if instead of policy we have only public reactions and pinpricks. This can happen on occasion, but it is a different matter if this becomes the policy itself. This would make both the United States and the Soviet Union insecure. There needs to be a long-term prospect for the future of our relations. The Soviet Union holds that it is necessary to develop a new policy. Our countries should not be captive to outdated approaches. Life has changed and it is always changing.

He continued that whatever the two sides try to do in setting policies, the peoples of the world attach priority to the issue of war and peace. If the two of them are unable to tackle this issue, it is difficult to see how they can deal with others. This would devalue the whole process. They must deal with the critical, pivotal issue of peace and war. Their meeting must conclude by giving an impulse to the negotiations in Geneva. Of course they can send their negotiators back to Geneva. But if he and the President go home without giving any greater hope or impulse to the process, they will take a scolding in their countries and in the world. Isn't this precisely the issue which must be at the center of their attention?

Gorbachev continued that there are people linked to military affairs in both countries. He realized that there are people who earn their living from these matters. But studies in both countries has shown, what for example, Japan and the FRG have been able to do with little expenditure on the military. They have experienced an economic upsurge. Soviet and American scholars have shown that one job in the military sector is three times as costly as in the civilian sector. More jobs can be created if money is channeled into civilian areas. The situation is so acute that if they returned without saying anything about arms control, about the first priority issue, people will maintain that this meeting gave birth to a mouse.

The United States has economic problems and the Soviet Union has them. Each knows his own problems better. But both could do better if they could release resources to the civilian economy.

He knew what institutions like the Heritage Foundation -- which advised the Administration particularly when the President was running for office the first and second time -- were saying. Before this meeting, they had been saying that the United States should use the arms race to frustrate Gorbachev's plans, to weaken the Soviet Union. But history teaches that this was not possible earlier even when the Soviet Union was not so strong. Now that it is even stronger, this is a delusion. The Soviet Union is an enormous country which will take care of its problems.

Gorbachev continued that of course there are many problems which are particularly acute in the developing world. It makes the United States and the Soviet Union selfish to devote so much money to the military when the destiny of millions and billions of people is at stake. It should not be a surprise that there are protests against this in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. The military is devouring huge resources. The two of them must take a realistic approach to this.

Gorbachev added that he believes there is a basis for movement to meet each other's concerns. The President had recently said that a nuclear war must never be fought. He agreed. The President had said that they should proceed on an equal basis. He agreed. The President had said he was for exchange among our peoples. The Soviet side agreed with this as well, so long as it was within a framework of respect for sovereignty and the values each society had developed. There must be a respect for the path each side has chosen.

He then said that they often hear the United States argue that there should be no agreement signed, no document signed that is not consistent with United States national interest. He would not quarrel with this, but how is one to understand national interests if there is no restraint in defining them? Can there be a right to exploit others or to impinge on the security of others in the name of one's security? He could say for himself that this is not the way to define one's interests. He recalled a conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher in which she quoted Lord Palmerston that nations have no permanent enemies only permanent interests. He agrees with this and would say that the Soviet Union is implementing its interests in the community of nations. Both of us must take the interests of others into account.

However, what is the Soviet Union to think if the United States asserts a vital interest in areas distant from it, areas which often are very near the Soviet Union? Many zones are declared vital interests of the United States. The Soviet Union fails to understand how the United States cannot take account of other countries' interests.

Gorbachev stated that he was hopeful that when they came to the afternoon discussion, both sides could express their views about war and peace and disarmament. He would like in conclusion of his overview of the world situation to state that the Soviet Union believes that the central question is how to halt the arms race and to disarm. For its part, the Soviet Union would not put forward proposals which would be detrimental to the United States. They are for equal security. If anything detrimental to the United States was proposed, this would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union because it would not make for stability. The Soviet Union has no ulterior motives. What the President has said about equal security, no superiority and movement toward halting the arms race are the conditions for building a cooperative relationship. The United States is losing a big market in the Soviet Union; the Soviets have good economic cooperation with other countries.

Gorbachev continued that we can live in this world only together, so both must think how to put relations on a new track. If the United States thinks that by saying these things, Gorbachev is showing weakness, that the Soviet Union is more interested than the United States, then this will all come to nothing. The Soviet Union will not permit an unequal approach but if there is on the U.S. side a positive will, the United States will find the Soviets an active participant in the process.

President Reagan then began his presentation. He said that as he had noted earlier, if the two sides are to get down to the business of reducing the mountains of weapons, then both must get at the cause of the distrust which had led to building these weapons. Why does the distrust and suspicion exist? We fought together in two wars. Americans who had been bringing in supplies to help the Soviet Union in the second world war are buried near Murmansk. When that war ended, the Americans were the only ones whose industry had not been bombed and who had not sustained great losses. The Americans were the only ones who had a weapon of great devastation, the nuclear weapon. They were the only ones able to use it if they had wanted to. But they reduced their armed forces from twelve million to a million and a half and allowed their navy to go down from a thousand ships to less than half that number. And the United States began making proposals to the Soviet Union and the world about sharing nuclear technology and doing away with the weapon. Eighteen times before this meeting the United States had proposed meetings to discuss arms reduction and for twelve of those times the United States had nuclear superiority. The United States was willing to give it up. Most of these times the United States did not get cooperation from Gorbachev's predecessors.

The President stated that this is the first meeting where we have sat down to consider reducing arms. The other meetings dealt only with regulating the increase in these weapons. In

1980 he had said that he could not condone this approach, but that he would stay at the negotiating table as long as it might take to get real reductions. He recalled that the Soviet leaders had talked about a one-world communist state and had been inspiring revolutions around the world. The United States had watched the Soviet military buildup, including in nuclear weapons. This came after dozens of United States proposals. The United States has fewer nuclear weapons than in 1969, but the Soviet buildup since then has been the greatest in history. Yes, he had made a promise to refurbish the American military and this has been done, but the United States is still behind: The Soviet Union has 5.4 million men in their armed forces: The U.S. has 2.4 million men. The United States also sees an expansionist Soviet Union. It has a satellite in Cuba just 90 miles off our shores. We had problems there with nuclear missiles but this was settled. Now we see Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Yemen -- with for example 35,000 Cubans in Angola.

The President stated that he was setting out all of this to explain the basis for American concern and distrust. With regard to our military industry having a policy effect, he noted that our budget for humanitarian affairs -- for the elderly and handicapped and for other social needs -- is greater than our total military budget. Two thirds of our military spending pays for manpower; only a small percentage is spent on equipment. The total military budget is a very small percentage of our GNP; of course we would be better off without it. The basic interest of our industry is consumer products, for example the automobile and airplane industry. The United States has no economic interest in continuing a military buildup.

The President said that now the two sides have come to this meeting he had said frankly why the American people had fears. Maybe not fears of war, but that the Soviet Union could acquire such an imbalance of strength that it could deliver an ultimatum. The United States has seen violations of arms control agreements already signed. The United States is ready to try to meet the Soviet Union's concerns if the Soviet Union is ready to meet ours. But more than words are needed. We need to get on to deeds. If we just get in bargaining over the numbers of particular types of weapons we are likely go on trying to keep advantages. But deeds can relieve mistrust, if we can go on the basis of trust, then those mountains of weapons will shrink quickly as we will be confident that they are not needed.

The President continued by saying that we are the two superpowers. No other nations in the world can do what the Soviet Union and the United States can. They are the only ones which can bring about a world war. The only ones. That is a measure of their responsibility. The two must remove the causes of distrust. History since World War II has shown that if the United

States had any hostile designs it was in a position to impose its will with little danger to itself. Indeed the United States had set out to reduce its superiority.

The President then said that today he wanted to talk about one specific question. Gorbachev had said that the United States was interested in achieving a first strike capability by having an anti-missile shield which would destroy missiles before they hit the target. The United States did not know whether this would be possible. The United States had a research program. The Soviet Union had the same kind of program. The United States has some hope that it might be possible. If both sides continue their research and if one or both come up with such a system then they should sit down and make it available to everyone so no one would have a fear of a nuclear strike. A mad man might come along with a nuclear weapon. If we could come up with a shield and share it, then nobody would worry about the mad man. He didn't even want to call this a weapon; it was a defensive system.

The President said that he hoped he had made clear that it is the sincerest desire of the United States to eliminate these suspicions. When he thinks of our two great powers, and of how many areas we could cooperate in helping the world, he thinks about how we must do this with deeds. This is the best way for both of us to assure the other that they have no hostile intent.

Gorbachev asked whether there was any more time. Should they stick to their schedule?

The President responded that he thought they should stick to the schedule as it calls next for lunch.

Gorbachev said this was fine and he would respond when they resumed after lunch if the President would give him the floor.

The President said that the floor was Gorbachev's.

Gorbachev said that he understood they would get into more specific discussion in the afternoon.

The President agreed, and the meeting ended at 12:15 P.M.

Prepared by:
R. M. Palmer and
J. F. Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA

November, 1985

Second Plenary Meeting

DATE: November 19, 1985
TIME: 2:30 - 3:40 P.M.
PLACE: Maison Fleur d'Eau
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Ronald Reagan
George Shultz, Secretary of State
Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR
Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State on Arms Control Matters
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Robert E. Linhard, Senior Director, National Security Council
Staff
William Krimer, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central
Committee, CPSU
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department,
Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary
Gorbachev
Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Soviet Interpreter

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NCSA96-087 #14 DLB 5/15/00
BY C/S
NARA, Date 7/2/02

The President offered Gorbachev the floor to comment on the President's presentation during the morning session.

Gorbachev said that they both had discussed how to conduct their meetings and during the preparations had discussed whether to focus on the causes of tensions or on solutions. Both sides had said a lot about causes. He is convinced that if they start making up a list of objections, they will not get far toward normalization, more trust and more respect -- and most importantly, toward giving some impulse to the Geneva process, which is at a crucial stage now.

He will be reasonable in what he proposes. He does not plan an extensive debate over what President said. But, as he said during the private meeting this morning, the Soviets reject a "primitive approach" toward the world around us -- that is that everything can be traced to some Soviet plan for supremacy or world domination. We have discussed this many times, and when it raises regional issues, the U.S. frequently charges the Soviet Union with expansionism -- in Afghanistan, Angola, even South Yemen.

Hotbeds of international conflict do sour international relations, Gorbachev continued, but the Soviets cannot share U.S. views of the causes of regional conflict. You say that the Soviet Union and Soviet expansionism is responsible. But that is either a mistake or a deliberate distortion. If U.S. policies are based on this mistaken view, it is difficult to see the way out of these problems. An assessment of Soviet policy in the Third World on the basis of such a misconception can lead only to undermining international security.

Let me give you our view, Gorbachev said. We take a "principled approach" to the developing countries and their problems. First, we have no monopolies in these countries which exploit their manpower and resources. We seek no commercial concessions, but rely on our own resources one hundred percent. Therefore, we have no selfish interests or expansionist aims, and desire no military bases.

Second, if you look at the developing world in an unbiased way, you will see that there is a long-term objective process which began after World War II. It is a natural one of third-world countries first pressing for political independence and then striving to gain control over their own resources and labor. This is the root cause of what is happening.

You overestimate the power of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev observed. The U.S. attributes to USSR the power and capability to upset the whole world, but we are realistic pragmatists who categorically oppose attempts to dominate other countries from

the outside. We do oppose the export of counterrevolution. Attempts have been made to crush revolutions in the past. This happened with the American revolution, with the French Revolution and with the October Revolution. But the idea that that small numbers of people from outside a country can turn it to revolution is not realistic. India, Indonesia, Korea -- these are all countries with millions of people.

The U.S. speaks of Afghanistan and Ethiopia as if it were the Soviet Union that stirred the pot there. But we first heard of revolutions there on the radio. We had good relations with Haile Selassie and were not the cause of the revolution there. It is wrong to think we are plotting; this is just not right. But people want freedom and we do support "progressive movements." We make no secret of this and it is in the Party program. But we have no secret plans for world domination.

The U.S. has its values and the Soviet Union has its own. Regional problems are caused by a social struggle evolving over many stages. Sometimes you support one faction and we another, but both of us can play a role together to solve problems, and in some areas we already do so.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union supports a "regularizing process" around that country, a political settlement under the United Nations, and you could help. The U.S. however does not help. You say the USSR should withdraw its troops, but actually you want them there, and the longer the better.

Gorbachev continued, saying that the Soviets are ready to promote a package solution involving a non-aligned Afghanistan, Soviet troop withdrawal, the return of refugees, and international guarantees of no outside interference. There are possibilities for a political reconciliation, he added, and said that Afghanistan is already ready to cooperate, but requires the cooperation of all groups.

He then asserted that the Soviet Union has no plan for using Afghanistan to gain access to a warm water port, to extend its influence to the Persian Gulf, or to impinge on U.S. interests in any way. It is a situation which could be used to improve our overall relationship, by fostering cooperation by the conflicting sides and abstaining from interference. It is an area we should explore, he concluded.

Gorbachev then stated that these are just examples to illustrate the Soviet policy toward the Third World. Basically the issues are internal problems for the states involved. We can continue to work on these issues with our discussions by specialists on regional matters.

Gorbachev then noted that the President had charged that it is the Soviet Union which had been building up its arms while the U.S. acted with restraint. This is a major question. Much depends on the character of the present strategic situation and how it will develop in the future. It is the central question of our relations.

Gorbachev continued by saying that twenty years ago there was no strategic balance; U.S. had four times as many strategic delivery systems than the USSR and also forward-based systems. He then asked rhetorically what the U.S. would have done if the Soviet Union had possessed four times as much? The U.S. would have had to take steps, just as the Soviet Union did, to establish parity.

In fact, Gorbachev asserted, the U.S. has tripled the number of its nuclear weapons and has more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union. Negotiations began as we approached parity, and the Soviets have not violated the nuclear balance and are not trying to surpass the U.S., since superiority cannot be the basis for normal relations. All institutes which study the problem, including the ISS in London, conclude that there is strategic parity. Force structures are different, but they support different strategies.

The Soviet Union wants parity at a lower level, he continued. We are for equal security and agreed to embark upon the negotiations in Geneva. We must meet each other half way if we are to find a way to reduce strategic weapons. The time has come for us both to muster the political will and realism to make progress and to end efforts to outsmart or overrun the other side. Even now, due to computer technology, one side could get ahead in space. But we can match any challenge, though you might not think so. We know that the U.S. can meet any challenge from us and we can meet any challenge from you. But why not make a step which would permit lowering the arms level?

Gorbachev then said that they, the Soviets, think SDI can lead to an arms race in space, and not just a defensive arms race but an offensive arms race with space weapons. Space weapons will be harder to verify and will feed suspicions and mistrust. Scientists say any shield can be pierced, so SDI cannot save us. So why create it? It only makes sense if it is to defend against a retaliatory strike. What would the West think if the Soviet Union was developing these weapons? You would react with horror. Weinberger has said that if the USSR had such a defense first, it would be bad. If we go first, you feel it would be bad for the world, feeding mistrust. We cannot accept the rationale which says it is good if you do it and bad if we do it.

Gorbachev then said that he knows President is attached to the program, and for that reason the Soviets have analyzed it seriously. The Soviet conclusion is that if the U.S. implements its plan, the Soviet Union will not cooperate in an effort to gain superiority over it. We will have to frustrate this plan, and we will build up in order to smash your shield.

You say the Soviet Union is doing the same, he continued, but asserted that this is not the case. Both of us do research in space of course, but Soviet research is for peaceful purposes. The U.S. in contrast has military aims, and that is an important difference. The U.S. goal violates the ABM Treaty, which is of fundamental importance. Testing is also inconsistent with the Treaty, and can only exacerbate mistrust.

If the U.S. embarks on SDI, the following will happen: (1) no reduction of offensive weapons; and (2) Soviet Union will respond. This response will not be a mirror image of your program, but a simpler, more effective system. What will happen if you put in your "seven layers" of defense in space and we put in ours? It will just destabilize the situation, generate mistrust, and waste resources. It will require automatization which will place important decisions in the hands of computers and political leaders will just be in bunkers with computers making the decisions. This could unleash an uncontrollable process. You haven't thought this through; it will be a waste of money, and also will cause more distrust and more weapons.

Gorbachev then referred to the President's remarks regarding the need for a defense against some madman in the future who might get his hands on nuclear weapons. He observed that they should remember that they will have sufficient retaliatory force for a long time to deter such use.

Gorbachev then concluded by saying that verification will not be a problem if the basic question is solved. The Soviets are prepared for full verification of a ban on space weapons. If such a ban is agreed upon, then the two countries could negotiate on their respective proposals for offensive weapons reduction. The Soviets are ready to compromise. If space weapons are banned, the situation would be completely different; it would create a new attitude on the Soviet side. The process would be different, however, if they leave Geneva without any agreements. If agreement on this point is not possible, they the Soviets would have to rethink the current situation.

The President then made the following points:

45

-- Gorbachev's presentation illustrates the lack of trust between us. It is difficult for us to understand the level of suspicion which the Soviet Union holds.

-- Even when we were allies in World War II we encountered inexplicable Soviet suspicion. For example, permission was not given for U.S. bombers to land on Soviet territory in order to reduce the dangers of bombing our common enemy. We cannot understand this kind of suspicion.

-- Gorbachev spoke of parity, but there is none today. True that U.S. once had nuclear superiority, but in June, 1946, offered to place all nuclear weapons under international control. It has also made numerous other offers, and the President listed twelve such between 1953 and 1969.

-- Since SALT-I was signed, the Soviet Union has added 6,000 nuclear warheads. Since SALT-II, 3,850 have been added. Meanwhile, the U.S. removed 2400 warheads from Europe, while the Soviet Union threatened Europe with its SS-20's. Our Allies requested protection and it fell to President to implement their request when Soviets refused to conclude an agreement to remove the threat.

-- Now we are locked in a Mutual Assured Destruction policy. The U.S. does not have as many ICBM's as Soviet Union, but has enough to retaliate. But there is something uncivilized about this. Laws of war were developed over the centuries to protect civilians, but civilians are the targets of our vast arsenals today.

-- The Strategic Defense Initiative is the President's idea. History teaches that a defense is found for every offensive weapon. We don't know if strategic defensive weapons will be possible, but if they are, they should not be coupled with an offensive force. Latter must be reduced so it will not be a threat. And if strategic defenses prove possible, we would prefer to sit down and get rid of nuclear weapons, and with them, the threat of war.

-- Regarding Afghanistan: Their "leader" was supplied by the Soviet Union. Actually he was their second choice, since the first one did not work out as they wished. The Soviet invasion has created three million refugees. He made suggestion for solution at UN. Specifically, how about bringing about the mutual withdrawal of all outside forces, then forming a coalition of Islamic states to supervise the installation of a government chosen by the people of Afghanistan?

-- Regarding Cambodia: We signed an agreement with North Vietnam. It was violated and the North Vietnamese took over South

Vietnam and also Laos and Cambodia. It now rules Cambodia. We should put an end to this and together supervise establishment of a government chosen by the Cambodian people.

-- Regarding Nicaragua: The Soviets have advisers there. The Sandinistas have built a tremendous military machine, far more than they need for defense. They have declared an aim of spreading revolution elsewhere. The President then reviewed the history of Somoza's removal -- the appeal to the OAS, and the Sandinista promise of free elections and a free press. But then when Somoza was removed, the Sandinistas forced other groups out of the coalition and are trying to establish totalitarian control. The Contras are only trying to reinstate the goals of the original revolution.

-- Such things as those noted are behind our suspicion and mistrust.

-- Every military judgment has it that Soviet forces are designed for offensive operations.

-- The U.S. willing to work on an agreement to move away from mutual threats. SDI would never be used by U.S. to improve its offensive capability or to launch a first strike. SDI should not lead to an arms race; we can both decide to reduce and eliminate offensive weapons.

-- These are things we could do to remove mistrust. Our goal is not an arms race. We can return to parity in one of two ways: either we both reduce offensive weapons, or we can build them up and use defensive systems to offset them. The U.S. does not seek superiority, but will do what is necessary to protect its freedoms.

Gorbachev then asked what they should tell their negotiators in Geneva.

The President replied that they could be given guidelines to reduce nuclear weapons, say by 50%. We could negotiate on the structure of forces, since we know the structure of our forces is different.

Gorbachev asked about the U.S. goal of SDI and how this relates to our January agreement to prevent an arms race in space.

The President said that he did not see a defensive shield as an arms race in space. He then recounted a conversation between a Chinese official and Ambassador Walters, in which Walters was asked what happens when a man with a spear that can penetrate anything meets a man with a shield that is impenetrable. Walters responded that he did not know, but that he did know what happens

when a man with no shield meets that same opponent who has the spear. Neither of us wants to be in the position of having no shield.

Gorbachev then asked whether the President considered developing SDI weapons as the militarization of space.

The President replied that he did not. If the technology was developed, it should be shared. Neither side should deploy until the other did. It should be done in combination with lowering offensive weapons so that neither could gain a first-strike advantage.

The President then invited Gorbachev to take a walk for another private conversation and the two departed at 3:40 p.m.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Second Private Meeting

DATE: November 19, 1985
TIME: 3:40 P.M. - 4:45 P.M.
PLACE: Pool House, Maison Fleur d'Eau
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Reagan
William D. Krimer, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Gorbachev
N. Uspensky, Interpreter

* * * * *

During their brief walk from the villa at Fleur d'Eau to the pool house, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev did not discuss substance, confining their conversation to the President's old movies. In the course of that conversation the President suggested to Mr. Gorbachev that he inform Mr. Arbatov that he had made not only grade-B movies, but also a few good ones. Gorbachev mentioned that he had recently seen "Kings' Row" and had liked it very much.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NUSF 96-087 #6 DLB 5/15/00
BY: CJS, NARA, Date: 7/2/02

INF and SDI

Seated in front of a fireplace at the pool house the President handed Gorbachev some papers and suggested that they might contain the seed of something the two of them could agree upon. He added that he had one copy done in Russian.

Gorbachev devoted a few minutes to reading through the separate documents.

Gorbachev prefaced his reaction by saying that, of course, what he would present now was based on his first impression of what was contained in the formulations. He thought that some of the issues dealt with did contain some substance that merited serious discussion with a view to bringing the positions of the sides closer together.

With reference to space weapons he had some questions to ask and, on the basis of his first reading, some considerations and objections to state. He would first refer to something that could be left for further discussions.

The President interjected to the effect that the material set forth in these papers should be viewed as a seed for possible instructions to the arms negotiators of both sides.

Gorbachev said he understood the President's idea, but still had some objections to state.

With reference to paragraph 1 of the first paper, concerning 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, that was acceptable and he was prepared here to discuss this matter in terms of seeking a mutually acceptable solution. However, he would have to note that during the meeting between Foreign Ministers in Geneva last January agreement had been reached that such reductions would be negotiated together with an agreement halting an arms race in space. In other words, arms reductions must be viewed in their interrelationship with space weapons. That idea had been agreed upon in Geneva in January, but he had to note that here it seems to have evaporated.

The President said that he did not see these defensive weapons as constituting a part of the arms race in view of what he had said just a few moments ago at the table, to the effect that if and when such arms were developed, they would be shared with everyone involved in nuclear weapons. Why could this matter not be set aside in order to see what could be agreed upon regarding the sharing of such things? This would enable the two sides to determine what policies were available that could help all of us to get rid of nuclear weapons.

Without reacting to the President's latter remark, Gorbachev said that that was his first comment. His second comment regarding the same section of the document he had just read was to note the suggestion that a separate interim agreement be concluded limiting land-based INF missiles with a view to eventual complete elimination of such missiles. This, too, required further clarification. What weapons would be covered in such an agreement, taking into account the existence of not only U.S. but also British and French missiles of that type? This had not been made clear.

Secondly, in the paper mentioning the possible interim agreement only land-based medium-range missiles were mentioned; what about medium-range cruise missiles launched from aircraft or from aircraft carriers? One had to note immediately that under the language contained in the document some nuclear weapons would clearly remain outside limitations; nevertheless, they did exist, they could be fired and naturally should also be covered by any agreement.

Moving on to paragraph 3 of the same document concerning research conducted by each side in the area of strategic ABM defense, Gorbachev wanted to ask precisely what the President had in mind when speaking of such research. He understood that basic research in laboratories was underway (he meant scientific laboratories, of course) but would also note that such research should not include the construction of prototypes or samples, or their testing. He emphasized that it was necessary to clarify the precise meaning of that research. The reason he was asking this question was that he knew that in the President's White House today two different interpretations of the ABM Treaty's provisions were in existence. One was a narrow interpretation which had been contained in a number of documents of the U.S. Congress and of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That narrow interpretation was always limited to research not going beyond the threshold of laboratory work. Now, however, he was also aware of a broader interpretation, under which the construction of prototypes and samples would be permitted. Under that interpretation one could in no way speak about complying with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Thus, further clarification was needed here as well.

The President said that we did indeed have more than one interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Under one such interpretation testing would be included in order to know that in practice we did have such a weapon. Just to have a laboratory theory would not be enough. It was his thought that all this could be covered by an agreement under which we as well as others could agree that no country would have a monopoly of such weapons. They would be shared by all. The worst thing that he could imagine was for any one country to acquire a first-strike capability.

Gorbachev noted that the Soviet Union had declared for all the world to hear, and was now declaring to the United States as well, that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Was this not sufficient if this matter were taken seriously? However, he had to note that the United States did not believe him.

The President interjected that he and Gorbachev might not always be here.

Gorbachev said that when he spoke of not being believed he meant that the United States did not believe the Soviet Union's statement he had just mentioned. In that case, why should the Soviet Union believe the President's statement about sharing results of the research in question, and that the United States would not take advantage of having developed a strategic defense?

The President replied that that was because the negotiators of both sides could set down in a specific agreement that both governments had agreed not to retain a monopoly of defensive weapons, an agreement that he and Gorbachev would sign. He would also point out that our two countries were not alone in the world. There were others, such as Qaddhafi, for example, and people of that kind, who would not at all be averse to dropping a nuclear weapon on the White House. He believed in the idea of both our governments agreeing that both conduct relevant research and that both share the results of such research; if one country produced a defensive shield before the other, it would make it available to all.

As for believing the Soviet Union's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the President would remind Gorbachev that in Stockholm we had subscribed to the doctrine that countries must not use force against each other.

With some emotion Gorbachev appealed to the President as follows: if the two sides were indeed searching for a way to halt the arms race and to begin to deal seriously with disarmament, then what would be the purpose of deploying a weapon that is as yet unknown and unpredictable? Where was the logic of starting an arms race in a new sphere? It must clearly be understood that verification of such weapons would be totally unreliable because of their maneuverability and mobility even if they were classified as defensive. People would not be in a position to determine what it was that would be placed into space and would surely regard it as an additional threat, thereby creating crisis situations. If the goal was to get rid of nuclear weapons, why start an arms race in another sphere?

The President asked Gorbachev to remember that these were not weapons that kill people or destroy cities, these were weapons that destroy nuclear missiles. If there were agreement that

52

there would be no need for nuclear missiles, then one might agree that there would also be no need for defenses against them. But he would also urge Gorbachev to remember that we were talking about something that was not yet known, and that if it were known, that would still be years away. Why then should we sit here in the meanwhile with mountains of weapons on each side?

Gorbachev countered by suggesting that they announce to the world that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had declared firmly in official statements that both countries would refrain from research, development, testing and deployment of space weapons and that such agreement would be subject to appropriate verification. Thus they could implement the idea of open laboratories and at the same time begin the process of 50-percent reductions in offensive arms.

The President asked if Gorbachev had in mind that Soviet laboratories would be open to visits by our experts and that their experts would be free to visit our laboratories.

Gorbachev replied that the Soviet Union would agree to open its laboratories provided they were used for the purpose of verifying how the agreement on banning and non-use of space weapons was being complied with.

The President said he did not know why Gorbachev kept on speaking of space weapons. We had no idea of precisely what the nature of these weapons would be; however, we certainly had no intention of putting something into space that would threaten people on Earth. Some years ago there had been some talk about putting nuclear missiles into orbit in space, weapons that could be dropped on any point on Earth. This was not what he was talking about. He would recall that in 1925 in this city of Geneva all of the countries that had participated in World War I had met and had reached agreement not to use poison gas warfare. Nevertheless, all had kept their gas masks. What he was saying now was that we should go forward to rid the world of the threat of nuclear weapons, but at the same time retain something like that gas mask, i.e., a shield that would protect our countries should there be an unforeseeable return to nuclear missiles.

Gorbachev wanted to repeat something he had said at the plenary meeting. He had pointed out that the Soviet Government had really carefully considered everything that had been said by the President with regard to SDI, especially all his arguments in favor of SDI. To a certain extent he could understand the President on a human level; he could understand that the idea of strategic defense had captivated the President's imagination. However, as a political leader he could not possibly agree with the President with regard to this concept. He would assure the President that this was not the result of some merely capricious attitude. He was not saying this for some sort of petty reasons.

On the basis of profound analysis by scientists, Soviet as well as American, he had to conclude that if the Soviet Union were to agree to proceed along the direction of SDI, and this was confirmed by almost all authoritative people, if it were dragged into this new dimension of the arms race, the other side would be bound to lose confidence and would seek to counter SDI in any possible way, including by increasing the numbers of its offensive arms. Thus, it would not make any sense at all for the Soviet Union to help the U.S. in the development of a strategic defense. In addition, he would point out that a defense against one certain level of strategic missiles was one thing, but a defense against a much larger number of such missiles would not be reliable at all. This could only lead to the conclusion that the only possible use of a strategic defense was to defend against a weakened retaliatory strike not against a first strike. It should certainly be realized by the President as well that the great majority of people throughout the world, including scientists, were extremely concerned over the development of space weapons, whatever their avowed purpose. Among such people were a number of U.S. Secretaries of Defense and such experts as Ambassadors Smith and Warnke. Gorbachev knew what they had said about it, he had read their statements and it was clear that strategic defense would only be useful after a first strike by the side deploying such defense. This was a very serious problem today and he would ask the President to reflect on it seriously. The Soviet Union had no desire to harm him as President or to harm the United States as a country. He firmly believed it necessary to do all in his power to prevent this from happening. He would urge the President jointly with him to find a way of formulating guidelines for their negotiators with a view to stopping SDI.

The President thought they had used up a considerable amount of time at this meeting. He thought the plenary meeting was about to conclude in any event, but he would say one thing. He would ask Gorbachev to consider this matter once again. He recognized that both of them had made some strong statements and that it would be difficult for either of them to reverse direction. However, it seemed to him that in his idea of ultimately sharing the results of research there was something that might be of interest to both of them. He had to tell Gorbachev that our people overwhelmingly wanted this defense. They look at the sky and think what might happen if missiles suddenly appear and blow up everything in our country. We believe that the idea of having a defense against nuclear missiles involved a great deal of faith and belief. When he said we, he meant most of mankind.

Gorbachev pointed out that missiles were not yet flying, and whether or not they would fly would depend on how he and the President conducted their respective policies. But if SDI were actually implemented, then layer after layer of offensive weapons,

Soviet as well as U.S. weapons, would appear in outer space and only God himself would know what they were. In this connection he would note that God provides information only very selectively and rarely. He appealed to the President to recognize the true signal he was conveying to him as President and to the U.S. Administration as a whole that the Soviet Union did indeed wish to establish a new relationship with the United States and deliver our two nations from the increasing fear of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had conducted a deep analysis of the entire situation and had come to the conclusion that it was necessary precisely now to proceed on the basis of the actual situation; later it would be too late. This was why the Soviet Union had tabled serious and comprehensive proposals concerning strategic weapons, medium-range weapons and others. This had been the result of a thorough assessment and profound understanding of where the two countries stood today. They now had a chance which they must not fail to take advantage of. He would ask the President not to regard this as weakness on the part of Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership.

During the walk back to the villa Gorbachev noted that this would not be their last meeting. The President expressed the hope that their next meeting would take place on U.S. soil, and said that he would be pleased to accept an invitation to visit the Soviet Union in return. Gorbachev agreed and suggested that dates and modalities be worked out by their respective staffs.

Prepared by:
William D. Krimer