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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1985 (6/7)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 14

YARHI-MILO

1403

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8052	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	12/23/1985	B1
8053	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON REGIONAL ISSUES <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	12/18/1985	B1
8054	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT LETTER FOR GORBACHEV <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	12/13/1985	B1
8055	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8056	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~Matlock~~

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10020

FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Letter to Ms. Vera Politis re Case of Igor Ogurtsov

Catherine M. Bergion
for

We have reviewed and concur with the proposed draft letter as amended (Tab A) to Ms. Vera Politis, Chairperson, Congress of Russian-Americans, Inc. in Ann Arbor, Michigan, concerning the case of Igor Ogurtsov.

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed Draft Letter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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(CLASSIFICATION)

S/S # 8534852
DATE December 13, 1985

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Ms. Vera Politis
DATE: November 11, 1985 SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev
Meeting: Human Rights

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: Nov. 22, 1985 NSC # 351353

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☒ A draft reply is attached
☐ A draft reply will be forwarded
☐ A translation is attached
☐ An information copy of a direct reply is attached
☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below
☐ Other

REMARKS:


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Ms. Politis:

I am replying to your November 11 letter to President Reagan requesting that he raise the case of Igor Ogurtsov during his discussions with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

As you are aware, Mr. Ogurtsov is serving a term of internal exile in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government has been unresponsive to our efforts on behalf of him and other individuals persecuted for their religious beliefs in the Soviet Union. The Soviets maintain the incarceration of "criminals" on essentially political grounds is an internal policy matter. Although we condemn such arbitrary and inhumane behavior, we lack the ability to alleviate the circumstances of prisoners or those in internal exile.

The U.S. Government has consistently condemned Soviet unwillingness to respect basic human rights. These measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We have strongly called for the Soviets to comply

Ms. Vera Politis,
Chairperson,
Congress of Russian-Americans, Inc.
3133 North Wagner Road,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

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efforts and to those of concerned Western governments and independent human rights organizations. The Soviets maintain the incarceration of "criminals" on essentially religious grounds is an internal policy matter. Although we condemn such arbitrary and inhumane behavior, we lack the ability to alleviate the prisoners' circumstances or secure their release.

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

Sincerely,

5

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with their commitments in that agreement. We have made it unequivocally clear in virtually every high-level meeting with Soviet officials that their human rights violations are a serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. We will continue to insist the Soviets live up to their international commitments, including the Helsinki accords.

In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

See at p. 10
with

Sincerely,

6
8534852

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

NOVEMBER 22, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 351353

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. VERA POLITIS
CHAIRPERSON
CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICANS, INC.
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
3133 NORTH WAGNER ROAD
ANN ARBOR MI 48103

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING THE FATE OF IGOR OGURTSOV
AND HIS PARENTS, REQUESTS PERSONAL
INTERVENTION TO BRING HIM EMIGRATION AND
FREEDOM

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

8534852

DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 13, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. VERA POLITIS

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING THE FATE OF IGOR OGURTSOV
AND HIS PAPFNTS, REQUESTS PERSONAL
INTERVENTION TO BRING HIM EMIGRATION AND
FREEDOM

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO:		ACT	DATE	TYPE	C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	CODE	YY/MM/DD	RESP	D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS		ORG	85/11/13		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: <u>1997005</u>					/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:					/ /

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

PI MAIL USEF CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *R-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
*S-FOP-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

REFER QUFSTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

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CONGRESS OF RUSSIAN-AMERICANS, INC.
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE

3084554

3135 North Wagner Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103
(313) 994-0879 or (313) 761-9210

November 11, 1985

- Thank you for your letter -

V. Politis, NHRC Chairman
D. Borodin, NHRC Co-Chairman

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- L. Alexeev, Ph.D.
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- I. Dutikov
- H. Ermolaev
- V. Choudprakow
- N. Gladishev
- A. Gorbatshevich
- W. Jurgens
- A. Koepfen, Ph.D.
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- M. Markof-Beliaeff
- T. Pishenin
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- O. Schidiowski, M.D.
- I. Schidiowski
- M. Somoff
- H. Kovach-Tarakanoff, Ph.D.
- Yu. Olkhovskiy, Ph.D.

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- A. Tolstov, Ph.D. 1979
- V. Leontief, Ph.D. 1980
- S. Jaroff 1981

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

After the appalling handling of Soviet sailor Medvid's dramatic case by our officials and after being insulted by the rude treatment on the phone last Friday by a certain Mr. John Malronev of the Public Liaison Office at the White House, I begin to wonder whether our commitment to human and civil rights is of genuine and deep substance.

I also wonder whether correspondence, such as this this, which entails issues of life and death for deserving men and women, reaches the Office of the President, for which it is intended.

Please, do not refer this letter to the Department of State, Soviet Desk or any other office there, because we found very little understanding or help in their offices.

We have been treated as second-rate citizens by the staff of our country's High Offices and we certainly resent and protest attitudes which are not only disgraceful, but are unbecoming to the Office of an American public servant.

However, in the hope that this time you yourself will consider this letter, Mr. President, we are appealing directly to you for help.

It is with a great sense of urgency that we would like to convey to you a desperate request for your help from the prominent Russian Christian dissident, IGOR V. OGURTSOV, currently serving the last two years of his TWENTY-year sentence in internal exile in KOMI-ASSR, Ust-Vymski rayon, 169060 pos. Mikun.

Ogurtsov's excessively long and unjust sentence of twenty years, eighteen years of unimaginable suffering, poor health and dismal situation of his old ailing parents in Lenin-grad call for immediate and concrete action.

With the highest degree of concern for his safety and his fate, we most seriously request that Mr. Ogurtsov, the founder of the first social-Christian movement in the USSR, a man of extraordinary personality, of superior spiritual, intellectual and political stature, be considered by our Government in any negotiations with the Soviets to EXCHANGE Soviet spies held in the West for the Soviet political prisoners.

I represent Mr. Igor Ogurtsov in the United States. In my phone conversation with him on November 4, he indicated to me that the exchange is the only realistic solution of his case. We concur with him on this and we are turning to you, Mr. President, for assistance.

If such negotiations fail, we most emphatically urge and beg you to personally request the Soviet leader, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachov, during your forthcoming meeting with him in Geneva, to grant permission to Igor V. Ogurtsov and his parents to emigrate to the United States, where they have relatives in Maryland and many thousands of loyal friends.

Ogurtsov's old parents received an invitation from their relatives to come to the United States. They appealed to the Leningrad OVIR for visa and were refused visas last October. This makes them also "refusniks". It also puts them into the category of "reunification of families".

As you know, our United States Congress has been active on behalf of Igor Ogurtsov and his parents.

June 27, 1984, the United States Senate unanimously passed Sen.Res.294, calling upon you, Mr. President, to urge the Government of the Soviet Union to allow Igor Ogurtsov and his parents to emigrate.

A similar Resolution, introduced by Congressman William S. Broomfield, (H.Res.76) has been passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week and is expected to be endorsed by the full House in the near future.

Dear Mr. President, as a private citizen, I have been very active in your first and second bid for the Presidency. As the chairperson of the National Human Rights Committee of the CRA I have been involved in matters of great importance to our national interests.


Our organization has been in the forefront of all other groups, which stand for justice, human rights, end to brutal dictatorships and PEACE WITH HONOR. We also stand loyally and in complete solidarity with those Behind the Iron Curtain who cherish the same standards and values. In this context, we suggest that amnesty for ALL political prisoners in the USSR be requested from Mr. Gorbachov.

In conclusion, we would like to reiterate, that we are deeply concerned about the fate of Igor Ogurtsov and his parents. We are certain that your personal intervention in this tragic case, will bring EMIGRATION and FREEDOM to this most deserving man.

May God have mercy on all of us, and may He bless you for your compassion and concrete help for the worthy family of Ogurtsov.

cc: Relevant Members,
U.S. Congress

VP:hl
Encl

Most respectfully,

Vera Politis
Chairperson

98TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. RES. 294

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the Soviet Union should allow Igor V. Ogurtsov to be released from exile and allowed to emigrate to the West without renouncing his views, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

As of 06/21/84
Additional co-
sponsors:

Sen. Exon
" Wilson
" Sasser
" Burdick
" Huddleston
" McClure
" Heflin
" Pryor
" Proxmire
" Tower

NOVEMBER 18 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 14), 1983

Mr. RIEGLE (for himself, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. JEPSEN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. CHILES, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. DIXON, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DODD, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. INOUE, Mr. ZORINSKY, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. SYMMS, Mr. DOLE, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. HATCH, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. GLENN, and Mr. DENTON) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JUNE 6, 1984

Reported by Mr. PERCY, without amendment

JUNE 27 (legislative day, JUNE 25), 1984

Considered, amended, and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the Soviet Union should allow Igor V. Ogurtsov to be released from exile and allowed to emigrate to the West without renouncing his views, and for other purposes.

Whereas the Soviet Union is a party to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Letter to Vera Politis re Case of Igor Ogurtsov

I have reviewed and concur with the proposed draft letter as amended (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Ms. Vera Politis, Chairperson of the Congress of Russian-Americans, Inc, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, concerning the case of Igor Ogurtsov. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Sally Kelley for your signature.

SS
Sestanovich, *JFM* Mandel and *WZ* Raymond.RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A	Proposed Letter to Ms. Politis
Tab B	Incoming Correspondence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Mrs. Reagan's Tea for Mrs. Gorbacheva

DATE: November 19, 1985
TIME: 3:34 P.M. - 4:30 P.M.
PLACE: Maison de Saussure,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

Mrs. Nancy Reagan
Mrs. E. Arensburger, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mrs. Raisa Gorbacheva
Soviet Interpreter

* * * * *

Mrs. Gorbacheva commented on the large number of photographers and reporters and said there were far fewer in the Soviet Union.

Over tea, Mrs. Gorbacheva began by describing the beauties of her country and invited Mrs. Reagan to come and visit it. Mrs. Reagan replied that she would be pleased to come, but Mrs. Gorbacheva had just mentioned Siberia, and that is one place Mrs. Reagan would not like to go; it is too cold.

Mrs. Reagan extended an invitation to Mrs. Gorbacheva to come and visit the United States and said she would prefer a warm time for both visits.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority
BY

NLSF94-087 #7 7/2/02
7/2/02

NARA, Date

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The ladies then discussed the weather in Geneva, Moscow and Washington; and jet lag, which apparently affected them more than it did their husbands.

A remark about the bouquets in the room led to a discussion of flowers. Mrs. Gorbacheva's favorite flowers, she said, are roses. After those, she prefers wild flowers. Mrs. Reagan spoke of the beauties of wild flowers at their ranch in California.

Both ladies expressed their hope that this meeting in Geneva would lead to greater understanding between their two countries, and eventually to peace in the world for this and future generations.

Prepared by:
E. Arensburger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Dinner Hosted by the Gorbachevs

DATE: November 19, 1985
TIME: 8:00 P.M. - 10:30 P.M.
PLACE: Villa at Soviet Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Reagan
Mrs. Reagan
Secretary of State George Shultz
Chief of Staff Donald Regan
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Mrs. E. Arensbarger, Interpreter
William Hopkins, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Gorbachev
Mrs. Gorbacheva
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
Mr. P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

* * * * *

At the beginning of the dinner, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that he had invited President Reagan to come to the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F96-087#8 DLB 5/15/00
BY CVJ, NARA, Date 7/2/02

Soviet Union and President Reagan had extended an invitation to Gorbachev to come to the U.S.A. Both had accepted, but no definite time was set. At that point the ladies announced that they, too, had extended an invitation to each other to come to their respective countries. There was much joking to the effect that Mrs. Reagan could come alone if President Reagan could not make it.

When the caviar was served, President Reagan spoke of sturgeon in the Sacramento River and Gorbachev told Mrs. Reagan of the building of hydroelectric dams on the Volga, which had decimated much of the beluga in the Caspian Sea. They had made some mistakes, he said, but now they were rectified and the fish were thriving.

Mrs. Reagan asked Gorbachev about tourism in the Soviet Union, and he told her at length about the Soviet tourist industry, how it was being built up and expanded, and at the end joked about the fact that tourism not only builds international understanding, but brings foreign currency into the Soviet Union.

Addressing himself to Mrs. Reagan and Mr. McFarlane, Gorbachev spoke of Russian history, about the fact that Russia had acted as a buffer zone for Europe throughout the centuries. Russia itself was invaded by the Mongols of Central Asia and therefore, he said, "Scratch a Russian and find a Tartar." Because Russia had been Europe's buffer, he said, it had fallen behind. It had experienced many invasions, from the Mongols to Napoleon, not to mention two world wars. Nevertheless, Russia has always been able to recuperate from her wounds and build up her strength.

During the course of the dinner, perhaps to encourage his guests' appetite, Gorbachev quoted the Russian scientist Timiryazev, who said that food was the closest man could come to communing with nature.

Mrs. Gorbachev said that American playwrights were very popular in the Soviet Union, especially Tennessee Williams and Albee. The Gorbachevs had recently seen a Moscow production of Who's Afraid of Virginia Wolf? and argued at the table about who had given the better portrayal -- Elizabeth Taylor or the Russian actress.

Mrs. Reagan asked about the Soviet film industry and was told by Gorbachev and Korniyenko about the many film studios in various parts of the country. Three of the largest are in Moscow.

Mrs. Reagan asked about drug abuse in the Soviet Union and was told that the drug problem was very small in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev then told her that his anti-alcoholism campaign was a huge success and enjoyed great grass-roots support. Coffee shops and ice cream parlors are becoming profitable ventures because people appear to be enjoying them more than hard liquor. He said that he had thought at the beginning of the campaign that moonshine production would increase, however, they found that since the beginning of the campaign the consumption of sugar has actually gone down. He explained that large amounts of sugar were used in distilling a home brew. Apparently, such activity was not being indulged in.

Mrs. Reagan and Gorbachev spoke of their respective families and Gorbachev said it was his belief that the family was the foundation of society. He felt that there was a risk now of that foundation eroding. Too many people were living together without benefit of marriage, and there were too many single-parent families, especially among European Russians. This was not the case in Central Asia, he said, where the average family had 5-6 children and two and even three generations all live together in one house. He said that he meant to speak about family values at the next Party Congress.

IMPROMPTU TOASTS

General Secretary Gorbachev's Remarks

General Secretary Gorbachev rose and remarked that he was happy to have everyone here together, and there would certainly be no speeches at this dinner. However, he said he wanted at this table this evening, where such a good atmosphere reigned, to welcome the President and Mrs. Reagan. (Mrs. Reagan remarked to the Soviet interpreter that the General Secretary had referred to her as "Nancy.") He welcomed President Reagan and his American colleagues to the Soviet Mission, on this "little bit of the Soviet Union."

He said that everyone present knew the reason why they were in Geneva. Yet, he said the fact that they had relaxed a little bit at this dinner did not mean that they would neglect the reasons why they had come here. He added that his purpose in rising to speak was not to bring up the seriousness of the reasons why they were in Geneva. He said that first, he simply wanted to greet his guests very cordially.

He said that speaking in human terms, he was happy to get acquainted with his guests and he expressed the hope that it would be possible to achieve the kind of understanding and spirit in which it would be possible to discuss "people" problems.

He noted that one day of the meetings had passed, and only one day was left. He said he wanted to recall a line from the Bible to express the Soviet side's desire as to how the meetings should go. The Biblical quotation was to the effect that there is a time to throw stones, and there is a time to gather them; now is the time to gather stones which have been cast in the past. The seven years in which there were no meetings between the Presidents of the United States and the General Secretaries of the Soviet Union were filled with considerable changes in the world. It would be possible to describe and explain what happened in the world during that time and much could be said by way of explanation. More important than that, however, is the lesson of those times, namely, that the President and the General Secretary must meet and talk about where the two countries are, and how they view each other, and how the two countries intend to build their relations in this many-faceted world of ours. He said that the current day was waning and in a positive atmosphere at that. He noted that the participants had laid out their positions on a broad range of problems of concern to the USSR and the U.S. and to all of the nations of the world. He said he had noticed the word "responsibility" used frequently in relation to this meeting. He said both the President and he understood that the frequent use of that word in itself emphasized the responsibility they bore as world leaders.

He continued that as far as the future is concerned, it can be built, if it is built by the two countries together. That can be done despite all of the countries' differences and the depth of those differences -- that had been visible even in the discussions held today -- because the process of moving toward each other through this method of meetings had begun, and it was necessary to continue the process of moving forward.

He said that it was true that one cartoonist had sent him a cartoon which showed him and President Reagan standing on the two sides of the abyss. On one side was President Reagan and on the other side was Gorbachev. Reagan calls to Gorbachev across the abyss "Gorby, I am prepared to go my part of the way," and "Gorby" says to Reagan, "Come ahead." Joking aside, he said, if the two leaders go their part of the way together, they will not end up in the abyss finally, but rather with a higher degree of

understanding and trust that will be the basis of the long-term outlook of U.S.-Soviet relations.

He continued that there are certain questions without whose examination it would be difficult to leave Geneva, and he recalled the Nobel prize winner's letter saying that he and the President should stay in Geneva as long as necessary to resolve the questions of war and peace. (He said he thought at that rate they would be there until Christmas.) He added that, seriously, there were problems which would require thinking and an overall approach. If those questions are not addressed, it will be difficult to go on, and there will be more accusations and recrimination. It is evident that the people of the world are sick and tired of the mutual accusations and recriminations the U.S. and the USSR addressed at each other.

He said that he could not say for sure that the sides would reach agreement in the course of the current meetings, even if they worked all night. (He jokingly suggested that all the others ought to work all night.) He suggested that, jokes aside, he and the President should nevertheless continue to work to accomplish the necessary goals.

He said he wished to raise a toast to the President, to Nancy Reagan, and to the U.S. people, whom the Soviet people regard so highly; he wished to drink to the success of the current talks, to an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, and to the resolution of outstanding problems between the sides.

President Reagan's Response

In response to General Secretary Gorbachev's remarks, President Reagan said that the American delegation was pleased to be here in Geneva on this mission.

He said that while the General Secretary was speaking, he had been thinking of various problems being discussed at the talks. He said that previous to the General Secretary's remarks, he had been telling Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (who was seated to the President's right) that if the people of the world were to find out that there was some alien life form that was going to attack the Earth approaching on Halley's Comet, then that knowledge would unite all the peoples of the world.

Further, the President observed that General Secretary Gorbachev had cited a Biblical quotation, and the President, also alluding to the Bible, pointed out that Acts 16 refers to

the fact that "we are all of one blood regardless of where we live on the Earth," and we should never forget that.

The President quoted Theodore Roosevelt to the effect that the true goal of nations is peace with self respect. Theodore Roosevelt loved his people as the current U.S. President and General Secretary love theirs, and Roosevelt believed in peace and security for his people, although some of his detractors would construe that to mean that there was something militaristic in his attitude. Yet despite some such negative attitudes about him, he had been the first person to win the Nobel Prize for peace, and that was specifically for his efforts devoted to ending the Russo-Japanese War.

The President pointed out that there was something else significant about this particular time and this particular occasion. It was exactly 43 years ago on this date that the Soviet Army had begin the counterattack at Stalingrad which had actually turned the war around. The President suggested that this 43rd anniversary of that event could also be the beginning of yet another turning point for all mankind -- one that would make it possible to have a world of peace and freedom.

The President raised his glass to the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, to the Soviet people, to peace, freedom, to our great nations, and to the peoples of the world -- that they may have a world of peace and freedom.

* * * * *

Gorbachev Family

The Gorbachevs have been married one year longer than the Reagans. Their daughter, a doctor, wrote her thesis in medical school on the effects of alcohol on the human system. Their son-in-law is a surgeon. Their daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter live with them. Gorbachev said that he was a man of conservative values when it came to keeping the family together. Their granddaughter, who will be six in January, knows all of the world leaders, he said. She watches the news broadcasts and periodically asks where Mrs. Thatcher is going now. Mrs. Gorbachev added that the granddaughter watches two TV programs: "Good Night, Children" and "Vremya," a news broadcast.

Gorbachev said that he and Mrs. Gorbachev had taken two, apparently private, vacations to Italy and France. They toured each country by car for 21 days.

Gorbachev told Mrs. Reagan about a vacation to the Crimea that Mrs. Gorbachev had taken with her granddaughter. They visited the palace of an ancient khan, where they learned that the khan had 200 wives. Upon her return to Moscow, the granddaughter asked Gorbachev why the khan had 200 wives and he only had one. Gorbachev replied that the khan did not have a single philosopher among his wives, and he did not know what to do with the single one he had.

Prepared by:
Eugenia Arensbarger and
William Hopkins,
Department of State

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THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Third Private Meeting

DATE: November 20, 1985
TIME: 10:15 - 11:25 A.M.
PLACE: Soviet Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Ronald Reagan
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Yuri D. Uspensky, Interpreter

* * * * *

After the photo opportunity in an adjoining room, General Secretary Gorbachev invited President Reagan to join him in a small room next to the main meeting room while the rest of the delegation took their seats, after which he and the President could join them.

President Reagan told the General Secretary that he wanted to talk with him privately about a subject which he knew that the Soviet side considered to be interference in its internal affairs. The President stressed that he did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, but he did want to speak with Gorbachev about human rights.

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BY DLB, NARA, Date 7/2/02

The President indicated that in the U.S. system of government many of the things that we would hope to accomplish with the Soviet Union would require the support of the Congress, which, in turn, is influenced by the people of the country. He could get such support if some things were done in the area of human rights. In the U.S., as Gorbachev knew, we have people from all over the world. Many of them retain a pride in their heritage, with regard to the countries where their parents and ancestors came from.

The President said that religious groups in the U.S. tend to influence Congress through lobby groups. An example of strong attachment to religious celebration occurred in the U.S. on St. Patrick's Day. This was a special holiday for the Irish, and Reagan's father had come from Ireland. Other groups in the U.S., such as Ukrainian Americans, Lithuanian Americans and Polish Americans have their organizations, customs and holidays.

The President said that he did not wish to raise this issue in the main meeting. He was also not asking to get Gorbachev's agreement to publicly announce actions which were being taken to deal with difficulties in this area, such as emigration. The recent release of several men and women who were allowed to join their spouses had made a big impact on the people in the U.S., but the President wished to be frank and said that the question then arose -- why not the rest? An example of such an issue was the desire of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. There was a large Jewish community in the U.S., which had an influence on Congress.

The President told Gorbachev that if he could resolve some of these issues on his own, the President would never boast that the Soviet side had given in to the U.S. We would express our appreciation for what was done, and there would be no hint that this was done as a result of U.S. efforts. But the fact that something was done would make it easier for the President to do the type of things which the two countries could do together, such as in the area of trade, for which the President needed Congressional support.

The President said that he wished to give an example of this type of approach. In 1981, during his first year in office, the Soviet government was eager to have a new long-term grain agreement with the U.S., after the imposition of the grain embargo by Reagan's predecessor. The President had sat down with the Soviet Ambassador and had spoken with him about human rights concerns, citing the specific example of the Pentecostals who had been living for five years in the basement of the Moscow Embassy. If they had left the Embassy, they would have been taken by the police. They had come to the Embassy because they had gotten into trouble after having asked for permission to emigrate. The

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President told the Ambassador that he would not speak publicly about this, but there would be a better chance to have a grain agreement, since there was opposition in the U.S. to such an agreement, if something were done to free those people. Shortly after that, they left the Embassy and emigrated to the U.S. The President never told anyone that he had done this. Those people were gratefully received in the U.S., and they did not even know that the President had spoken on their behalf. A short time later, the long-term grain agreement was concluded without difficulties in Congress, and this agreement is in place today.

The President indicated that this was the type of thing which he was seeking here and that is why he did not wish to raise these issues in the full meeting, not to make it appear that he was trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. It would make it easier for us to do the type of things that we could do together if he were not constantly reminded about the restrictions imposed on Soviet people, the refusal to permit them to practice their religion, etc. The President would not tell anyone that he had raised this issue with Gorbachev.

Gorbachev replied that he considered that at some stage of U.S.-Soviet relations, the issue of human rights was being used for political purposes, not only by representatives of various political organizations which were anti-Soviet, but, and this came as a surprise, also by officials of the U.S. Administration, including the President. The Soviet side did not understand this. The President had mentioned why and how he had come to be involved in these issues. Gorbachev wished to say in all sincerity that the Soviet Union was in favor of broader contacts, exchange of people -- scientists, cultural representatives, all types of people -- with the U.S. The Soviet side felt that this was necessary, and Gorbachev thought that Reagan had said the same. The two countries depended on each other today and would in the future. We should get to know each other better and create a good atmosphere. The Soviet people have no enmity for the American people. The Soviet people have a positive attitude toward the people of the United States. If we work at this on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country, the Soviet side would be ready to broaden its contacts with the U.S. It is truly interested in doing so. But what we need first is an atmosphere of good will between the countries. This was the fundamental question.

Gorbachev then went on to give specific examples. People from the U.S. travel to the Soviet Union and vice versa. People in the U.S. have relatives in the USSR, and they come visit the places of their origin, such as the Ukraine, the Baltic States, and so on. The Soviet Union welcomes this and is open to such visits. There are no difficulties in this regard. Lately, there

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has been an increase in contacts between representatives of religious groups. The Soviet side was in favor of this. There were marriages between U.S. and Soviet citizens. This was a very natural and understandable thing, and there were no objections to this. Since the group of U.S. Senators that had met with him before this meeting in Geneva had mentioned these issues, Gorbachev had looked into them. During the past five years more than 400 marriages had taken place, and out of these, only ten people had not been permitted to emigrate. The only obstacle to emigration is involvement of the person in question with state secrets. In this case, the state has a specific responsibility, but it tries to let time pass, to let the individual do different kind of work so that his knowledge becomes outdated. His case is then returned too, and he is released. Gorbachev repeated that within the past five years restrictions had been placed only on ten of 420 to 450 people. But these were Soviet regulations, and the Soviet side asked that they be respected. This was one example.

Gorbachev continued that the President had mentioned Jews. The fate of Jewish people was of concern to the Soviet government. There are many Jews in the Soviet Union, as there are in the U.S. (which has the greatest number) and in other countries. After what the Fascists had done to the Jews, the Soviet Union had done everything it could to give them special attention, and it had not regretted doing so. Since many Jewish families had been separated, difficulties existed because of this, and the Soviet side tried to examine such cases. But when such issues are mixed in with discussion of the situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union in general, this is not right. Then the Soviet side objects and furnishes data to back up what it says. This has been the Soviet Union's approach in all cases, including in its discussions with the U.S. The Soviet Union was willing to look at specific cases, but when these things are used for political aims, they would be rebuffed. Specific cases would be examined quietly, in a humane way.

Gorbachev said that when a U.S. Congressional delegation had visited the USSR at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet, the two bodies had agreed to establish a permanent group to examine such issues, and the Soviet side was in favor of this, but would not permit this issue to be used for political aims.

The President said that with regard to Jews and other religious groups, there were restrictions in the Soviet Union on their ability to practice their religion, e.g., Jews were not permitted to teach Hebrew. In the U.S., in addition to attending the usual schools, Jewish families sent their children to their own schools to study their ancient language. Perhaps some people would not think of emigrating from the Soviet Union if they were allowed to practice their religion.

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The President continued that with regard to other questions, the two countries had signed the Helsinki Accords which assured certain freedoms, such as family reunification and the right to emigrate. However, our two countries were big ones, with very large bureaucracies. It was not possible for Gorbachev or the President to know everything that went on at the lower levels, where people could make decisions which were contrary to the desires of the leadership.

The President said that Gorbachev had mentioned that only ten people had not been permitted to rejoin their spouses. But he had a much larger list of cases of separate families. He also wished to give Gorbachev one more example of a case in this category. He knew of a piano player, a young man in the Soviet Union, who wished to emigrate to Israel. Not only was he denied such permission, but he was also denied permission to play the piano with major orchestras, and his records could no longer be sold in stores. His career had been destroyed as a result of the fact that he had wished to emigrate. The bureaucracy could do many things of which Gorbachev was not aware. This man had a wife and a small child. Apparently, he and his wife had been told that they could emigrate, but the baby would have to remain. Since the child was only one year old, they certainly could not have left him behind, so they did not emigrate.'

Gorbachev said that he would like to ask the President about the following. For the Soviet leadership and for everyone in Soviet society it was clear whose side the President was on in the area of human rights. The President always spoke of the lack of human rights in socialist countries. In other countries there was democracy and everything was okay. Since people were aware of the rights situation in the Soviet Union and in other countries, and could compare the situations, why was the President taking this point of view. If other people said this, this might be understandable, but the President always said that there is a clear distinction, namely, that there are no rights in socialist countries, but they are in bloom in the democracies. This caused consternation.

Gorbachev continued that at the level of General Secretary and President one should be responsible and call things by their proper names, no matter where they occur. If things are painted only in black and white, this would only inflame the distrust between the countries. He thought that it would be better to take steps to improve the general atmosphere of our relationship, and then specific humanitarian issues could quickly be resolved. The Soviet Union was prepared to resolve them. But if questions of human rights were used for political purposes, the Soviet side would rebuff such attempts. He repeated that the Soviet Union was ready to examine specific cases, especially those mentioned by the President.

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The President replied that he was trying to clearly indicate that if such changes occurred, he would not indicate that he was the one that had persuaded Gorbachev to do this. He realized that both of them had concerns about their political image, namely, that they did not want to have it seem that they were giving in to outside influences. He wished to assure Gorbachev that he would have no such problems with the President. What happens is that various groups in the United States have relatives and families in other countries, and they get information from these people. Then organizations deliver this to the President and demand that their grievances be resolved with regard to people in the Soviet Union. These things make their way into the press, and he could not do anything about that since the U.S. has a free press. He was trying to say that we could work better together if such issues did not appear on the front pages, but rather if he spoke with Gorbachev about these things confidentially.

Gorbachev replied that he welcomed the President's decision to have such a private meeting. He had heard him out, and the President had heard him out as well, and the two of them would bear in mind what had been said.

The President indicated that he would like to make one last point. With regard to what Gorbachev had said about issues like this in the U.S., the President wished to say that in the U.S. there are laws which prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, national origin, sex and race.

Gorbachev interjected that he was familiar with the state of things in the U.S. The President had said that there was no discrimination on the basis of sex. This was not true. According to U.S. law a woman could make 60 percent of the salary a man made for the same job. The President had spoken of equality. But so much time had passed since the American Revolution, and women still did not have the same rights as men. He knew this to be the case. He was informed. He had a legal education. The President should not think that he saw only the negative aspects of things in a primitive way. He saw things from a broad perspective, and he was responsible. He supported the rights of families. If there was a need, we should have exchanges and see what could be done about specific problems. But if we are referring to changing laws, with other interests in mind, this could not be done. The Soviet people set their laws. Any other approach shows a disrespect for the Soviet people. This must be the basic framework. The U.S. had its own system, and the Soviet Union had its own. The President would defend the United States, and he, Gorbachev, would defend the Soviet Union. Such a discussion could take a very long time.

The President replied that there were differences in our economic system and in our societies. Gorbachev had mentioned the question of women's rights. The President noted parenthetically that women own more than 50 percent of all the wealth in the United States. But the difference in the systems was that, yes, there were individuals, perhaps employers in factories, with personal prejudices about hiring women, blacks, and so on. But the law says that there can be no discrimination. So when various groups indicate that there are those who discriminate, the government must abide by the law and punish those individuals. No U.S. law permits discrimination -- quite the contrary.

The President continued that he had spoken about the bureaucracy. He wished to recall that when he was Governor, he learned from one of his assistants that the latter had taken some young black people to the State Labor office to fill out some job applications (the President explained that there was a Department of Labor in California, which helped people to find jobs). When the applicants had subsequently been questioned about whether they had filled out the applications correctly, one said that he had not. Reagan's assistant took the man back and asked to see his application. They could not find it. Then the man to whom they had been talking slowly edged over to the wastebasket and pulled the application out of it. The Governor was not the one responsible for this. It was one prejudiced clerk who had thrown the application into the wastebasket.

Gorbachev said that people in the U.S. should live as they like. If they choose something, the Soviets would not judge them. The U.S. had many achievements, and the USSR would not interfere in its internal affairs. But the U.S. should do the same with regard to the USSR.

The President said that it would be easier for him to fulfill some of the possible agreements between the two countries if he were not beset by people in the U.S. Congress and by organizations that hear of their relatives and friends and complain about the restraints which they consider should not be imposed upon them, such as with respect to the right to live in other places or the right to emigrate. So if Gorbachev would think about these things, the President would have more freedom to work together.

Gorbachev said that he had heard the President's thoughts, but he could not agree that the President was so dependent on the opinion of small groups. He knew what the President could do as a political leader when he wanted to. When he did not want to, he would talk about pressure groups, and so on. The Soviet side saw all of this. If had a realistic view of life, and asked the U.S. side to have a realistic view of the USSR.

The President said that he realized that it was difficult for the General Secretary, within his system, to believe the President that he, Gorbachev, was wrong about the President's power. In the U.S. system, including during the time after he had become President, one part of the Congress, i.e., the House of Representatives, was dominated by the opposition party.

Gorbachev interrupted, without listening to the translation, to say that he had understood what the President had said, and that he took all of this into account. He was familiar with the American political process, and the President should not hide behind this. (U.S. Interpreter's Note: Gorbachev's indication that he had understood what the President had said without translation was unexpected, since he had never shown any indication of understanding English in previous or subsequent conversations. After the President's following remarks, Gorbachev specifically asked for interpretation and looked like he had not understood what the President had said. I think that the first time he was simply assuming that he knew what the President was saying, and was anxious to get into the plenary meeting.)

The President indicated that there were things which he was not able to get approved at the present time because of his opposition, which based its position on what was said by lobby groups.

Gorbachev said that the President had talked about certain issues and he, Gorbachev had expressed his views.

The President interjected that with regard to some cases involving individuals Gorbachev could make it easier for him with regard to the relationship between the two countries.

Gorbachev said that he was glad that they had had a private talk and that this had let them get to know each other better, and this was important. When the two of them would communicate, especially about the larger political issues, they would know what the other one looked like, and the image of the other person would be present when decisions would be made.

Prepared by:

Dimitri Zarechnak,
Department of State

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Third Plenary Meeting

DATE: November 20, 1985
TIME: 11:30 A.M. - 12:40 P.M.
PLACE: Soviet Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Ronald Reagan
George Shultz, Secretary of State
Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR
Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs
Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State on Arms Control Matters
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Mark Parris, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department
of State
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central
Committee, CPSU
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department,
Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary
Gorbachev
Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Yury D. Uspensky, Interpreter

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After the press had been ushered out of the meeting room, Gorbachev invited President Reagan to lead off.

The President noted that he wished to address a number of items which there had not been time for the previous day. He would open with a few words on the Geneva arms control negotiations.

The President observed that our peoples were particularly concerned by nuclear missiles, which, if the button were pushed, could kill millions in a matter of minutes. It was important to show our people that we were concerned.

We had therefore shaped our proposal on strategic offensive systems so as to achieve deep reductions, focusing in particular on what we think are destabilizing weapons. Our proposals dealt with a number of delivery systems: ICBMs, SLBMs, etc. It built upon the fifty percent reduction concept contained in the Soviet counterproposal. It also incorporated reductions to 4,500 ballistic missile warheads and a limit on ALCMs of 1,500; the overall sum would be the 6,000 figure that the Soviets had proposed.

The U.S. had to insist, however, that the reductions be applied to the proper categories of systems. We could not agree to the Soviet's proposed definition of "strategic delivery systems" or any definition that included within a common limit a category of delivery systems on the US side while excluding it on the Soviet side. The two sides, of course, had a long negotiating history on this issue, so the President would not repeat the U.S. rationale, but rather restate its insistence on the definition agreed upon in past strategic offensive arms agreements as to the categories of systems to be included in limits on strategic offensive arms.

The aggregate result of the reductions and limits we proposed for strategic offensive arms would be a more stable world in which the number of these arms would be radically reduced to comparable levels on both sides, the threat to the retaliatory capabilities of each side would be significantly diminished, and the prospects of verification would be enhanced. The President stressed that verification was vital if we were to reduce suspicion between our two governments.

In the area of intermediate-range nuclear arms, the U.S. proposal built, in part, on Soviet ideas. The U.S. was prepared to cap US LRINF missiles in Europe at the level deployed as of December 31, 1985, in return for your agreement to reduce your LRINF missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same launcher number. The U.S. would be prepared to discuss with the USSR the exact mix of these systems. The U.S. proposal included

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reductions in the number of SS-20 launchers located in Asia and outside range of NATO Europe. The end result, the President stressed in conclusion, would be that both sides would be limited to an equal global LRINF missile warhead number.

Before moving onto other issues, the President offered Gorbachev a chance to respond.

Gorbachev indicated that he did, in fact, have a few comments. The Soviets had carefully assessed the U.S. NST proposal. They welcomed the U.S. agreement to accept 50 percent reductions in nuclear strategic arsenals. It was of fundamental importance to note any basis for moving ahead in the search for mutually acceptable proposals which could be components of possible agreements.

But Gorbachev also had some critical observations to make regarding practically all the elements of the Soviet proposal. He did not wish to dramatize this. He believed that this approach coincided with the President's own in welcoming the basic thrust of Soviet proposals for radical reductions, while not welcoming other elements. Both sides now had proposals on the table. There was plenty to work with.

Reiterating that he did not want to dramatize differences in the two sides' approach, Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union truly desired a serious search for mutually acceptable proposals. He stressed that the Soviet Union was not proposing elements which would be unacceptable to the U.S., which could jeopardize U.S. security, since this would make it impossible to reach agreements in the future. But the Soviets expected the same treatment from the United States. If the U.S. advanced proposals which sought to undermine Soviet security, it would make agreement impossible and complicate future work in this area.

There were elements in the U.S. proposal, however, which clearly departed from the January 1985 U.S.-Soviet understanding on the goals and subjects of the Geneva talks. On the one hand, the President and his colleagues asserted that the U.S. had not departed from this understanding, that the U.S. was in favor of radical reductions in defensive nuclear weapons and in favor of preventing an arms race in space.

The President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was regarded by the U.S. as consistent with the January understanding. This was a "revelation" to the Soviets. No matter under what flag the U.S. chose to cover it, SDI amounted to placing weapons in space, to spreading the arms race to space. This view devalued the remaining elements of the U.S. proposals. What purpose could be served by radical reductions if the U.S. contemplated deploying weapons in space -- with all the attendant consequences.

When the Soviets had proposed that the two sides agree to close the door to deployments of weapons in space, it was consistent with both the U.S. and USSR's security interests. Gorbachev noted that the U.S. had claimed the Soviet Union was ahead in scientific research on space questions; if so, the U.S. should want to stop the process now. As the U.S. did not, Soviet superiority in space research did not appear to be the problem.

Gorbachev felt he had to say that he did not know what lay at the bottom of the U.S. position. How the U.S. had come to its position was not important to him, however. What was important to him was the position itself. Gorbachev was concerned that the position was fed by an illusion that the U.S. was ahead in the technology and information transfer systems on which space systems would be based, and that a possibility therefore existed to obtain military superiority over the USSR. The U.S. might even consider it possible to obtain a first-strike capability, or, under certain circumstances, to launch a first strike. The Soviet Union needed to consider worst cases in developing its policies.

Gorbachev told the President that he had recently observed to a Soviet scientist that he could see no reason why the President should be committed to SDI. Gorbachev had wondered why the President could have any interest in injecting a new element of instability into the relationship, in further exacerbating U.S.-Soviet relations. The scientist had said that she had done research into the matter and found the explanation: SDI would produce from 600 billion to a trillion dollars in new military expenditures. That was the reason.

With mounting urgency, Gorbachev said he must return again to the problem of SDI, even at the risk of injecting some tension into the discussion. He did not want to do this. But he could not ignore the importance of the problem. Gorbachev expressed regret that the U.S. appeared determined to depart from the January agreement on stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. If the U.S. departed from that road, Gorbachev did not know when it would be possible for the two countries to meet on it again. Everything at the Geneva NST talks would come to a halt. For its part, the Soviet Union remained committed to the goals of the January understanding, and was prepared to do everything possible to achieve them.

The President stated that the scientist Gorbachev had referred to was dealing with a fantasy. She reminded the President of the scientists who had told President Eisenhower that ICBMs would never work.

The President underscored that SDI was not a weapons system or a plan for conducting a war in space. It was an effort to find a more civilized means of deterring war than reliance on thousands of nuclear missiles which, if used, would kill millions on both sides. Never before in history had the possibility existed of a war which would bring about the end of civilization.

Even if the two sides reduced offensive arms by 50 percent, there would still be too many weapons. The U.S. did not see in SDI a means of obtaining military advantage over the Soviet Union. The benefits of SDI research would be for the USSR as well as the U.S. If defensive systems could be found, they would be available to all. This would end the nuclear nightmare for the U.S. people, the Soviet people, all people. The Soviet Union and the United States had the capability to move beyond simply aiming weapons at each other with the risk of ending the world as we know it. As to the argument that the U.S. sought to build an offensive arsenal, the U.S. objective was that whoever developed a feasible defensive system would share it, so that any threat to the other side would be eliminated. If there was opposition to that concept, the President speculated it might be based on the assumption that nuclear weapons might, at some point, be used. The U.S., on the other hand, was seeking a security system based on "shield," not "spears" or missiles. Under the current system of deterrence, it would be impossible to tell the winner from the loser in the event of war.

Gorbachev replied that he understood the President's arguments but found them unconvincing. They contained many emotional elements, elements which were part of one man's dream. Gorbachev did not wish to suggest that the President did not want peace. But the fact was that SDI would result in the appearance of weapons in space. They might be built as anti-missile weapons, but they would have the capability of striking earth. The USSR could never know for sure. The Soviets had agreed on 50 percent reductions in nuclear weapons. But the President was advocating a whole new class of weapons. Describing these weapons as a shield was only packaging. They would open a new arms race in space. The President would be held responsible.

Gorbachev said that there were dreams of peace and there were realities. He did not believe the President saw him as a blood-thirsty person who wanted to drag his country into conflict. The Soviet Union was for reducing the number of weapons. History would remember the President, as well as the Soviet leader, for having begun to eliminate nuclear weapons. But agreement had not yet been reached. And now SDI threatened to open a new arms race.

The President observed that, under the U.S. open laboratories concept, scientists from both sides could satisfy themselves that

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SDI research was not being directed toward the development of an offensive capability. Gorbachev shot back his agreement that laboratories should be opened, but only if the development of space weapons had first been banned. The President reiterated that Soviet scientists would be able to verify by visiting U.S. laboratories whether the U.S. was building destructive weapons or a shield. The U.S. was after a shield.

This got to the point that it was necessary for the two countries to get beyond suspicions. The President asked whether he would not be justified in suspecting that, under certain circumstances, the Soviets would use their missiles against the U.S. Words could not reduce the idea of a threat from one side to another. The Soviet interpretation was that SDI would lead to the development of new offensive weapons. The U.S. was trying simply to see if there was a way to end the world's nightmare about nuclear weapons. The President emphasized that the U.S. would share its research with the Soviet Union; attempts to develop destructive weapons would be discovered.

Gorbachev asked the President with some emotion why he would not believe him when he said the Soviet Union would never attack. Before the President could respond, Gorbachev repeated the question. He again interrupted the President's answer to insist on a response.

The President stated that no individual could say to the U.S. people that they should rely on his personal faith rather than on sound defense. Gorbachev questioned the sincerity of the President's willingness to share SDI research, pointing out that the U.S. did not share its most advanced technology even with its allies.

Gorbachev called for a more realistic discussion. The Soviet Union was prepared to compromise. But the U.S. had the impression that the USSR was weak and could be painted into a corner. That was no illusion. There would soon be a disillusionment; perhaps not in the President's time, but ultimately. The President would be held responsible. SDI would open a new sphere for the arms race. Why was this necessary?

The Soviet Union had said it would agree to a separate INF agreement, to deep cuts. These had not been easy decisions. The Soviets had their concerns. But they felt that if steps were not taken in the next year to 18 months, the consequences would be grave. The President wanted to catch the "Firebird" of SDI by using the U.S. technical advantage. There would be disillusionment, but it would come too late, as the "infernal" train would already be moving.

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Gorbachev observed that perhaps his remarks had grown a bit heated. He had meant only to convey to the President the depth of Soviet concern on this issue.

The President replied that, with all due respect, Gorbachev's concerns were based on a false premise. Overcoming several interruptions from Gorbachev, the President reaffirmed that the U.S. would be prepared to reduce nuclear weapons to zero and ultimately to eliminate them. The fact was, however, that they still existed. A defensive shield was therefore necessary. He compared nuclear weapons to chemical weapons. Conventions had been negotiated to ban the use of chemical weapons, but gas masks had been retained. With a defensive shield against nuclear weapons, people would have an additional guarantee against their use. The President could not see how SDI research could be interpreted as threatening to human life or targets on earth. Moreover, he repeated, the ultimate idea was to share SDI research; neither nation would be able to use it to develop a first-strike capability.

Gorbachev alleged that the U.S., under the guise of a shield, intended to introduce weapons into space. The Soviet Union must base its policies on this fact. The Soviets could not be sure what the U.S. ultimately had in mind. The fact was that to destroy weapons other weapons were necessary. The President countered that no one was sure whether SDI would work; the U.S. effort was designed only to find out if a defense was possible. Gorbachev said that this meant only that the U.S. was seeking to determine if space weapons were possible.

The President explained that his instructions to those responsible for SDI research had been to find out if there were a means to stop nuclear missiles. He had said that if such a means existed, the U.S. would share it with other countries so as to make nuclear weapons unnecessary. He was aware that SDI research dealt with systems such as lasers and particle beam devices which had weapons applications. These systems, however, were designed not to kill people, but to stop nuclear missiles from reaching their target. The President noted that the Soviet Union already had the world's most developed ABM system.

Gorbachev said he felt it inappropriate in their conversation to inject banalities more in keeping with press conferences. The Soviet ABM system was in compliance with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union had chosen to place its system around its capital; the U.S. had placed its near missile fields. The USSR was scrupulous in complying with treaties dealing with nuclear weapons. It was too dangerous to engage in deceptions in this area. The President agreed, noting that the U.S. had raised the question of Krasnoyarsk radar and its possible battle management role. He asked Gorbachev whether the U.S. expression of

willingness to share its SDI research did not adequately deal with Soviet suspicions.

Gorbachev indicated that the President already had the Soviet assessment of the U.S. position. Gorbachev wanted to emphasize it because it was the key question of their meeting. It would define the future political dialogue between the two countries, the nature of the Geneva negotiations, the outcome of important decisions on domestic policy in both countries. It appeared that the President was very committed to the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons. The Soviets would have to consider and base their policy on this fact. The Soviets had heard similar views expressed by many of the President's advisers. But these were only advisers. The President had the ultimate responsibility. Gorbachev sometimes had felt that the President's advisers feared the President's prestige would suffer if he gave up SDI. Gorbachev was "500 percent" convinced that the President would in fact benefit from such a decision.

The President expressed concern that the discussion had gone too far and suggested a more reasonable approach. The two sides had agreed to a reduction in strategic offensive weapons of 50 percent. It was unfortunate that this was being frustrated because the Soviets objected to an attempt to determine if there was a defense against nuclear missiles. It would be years before this was known. We had made clear our willingness to share SDI research. There was no reason why such research should prevent us from going ahead with reductions in nuclear forces.

The President did not know whether or not Gorbachev believed in reincarnation. Perhaps the President in a previous life had been the inventor of the shield. In any case, the President believed that trust and prospects for peace would improve if both sides began to rely more on defense, with offensive weapons being reduced.

Gorbachev asked rhetorically what was the result of the Geneva talks thus far. There had been negotiations, with the objectives and subjects clearly determined: to stop the arms race on earth and prevent its spread to space. The Soviets had felt that the work done thus far in Geneva would enable the two leaders to give an impulse to the process in their own meeting. The leaders had now met and it seemed clear that the President felt that weapons could be introduced into space. Gorbachev feared the negotiations would go by the wayside in this case. What, he asked, was to be done.

The President replied that, where Gorbachev saw a threat, we saw an opportunity. We should both seek to reduce offensive arms by 50 percent and to determine if defense was possible. We could then sit down and decide if deployment was desirable. We would

share our findings. Was that not a fair deal? The Soviet Union would be aware of our arms program. We would look at the Soviets's. We were talking about several years. Would people not, the President asked, be more confident that a defense would work if both sides reduced by 50 percent.

Gorbachev asked that the President not treat the Soviets as "simple people." The President replied that he did not see how he had in any way shown disrespect or charged the Soviets with naivety. He had explored the various issues with Gorbachev as openly as possible. He could see no logical argument against going ahead with research when we have made clear that we will not have a monopoly on defense if a feasible solution is found.

Gorbachev questioned why it was necessary to conduct research when nuclear weapons were being reduced -- and by 50 percent as a first step. SDI was torpedoing the possibility of steps to reduce nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union wanted to lock the door against space weapons -- to bar it or even drive in nails -- and then begin reductions. The Soviets did not know what weapons might be developed by researchers. If the past was any guide, they would find things they had not expected to find. The Soviets had repeatedly shown in recent months their willingness to seek reasonable solutions. The U.S. approach could only lead to an expansion of the arms race on earth and in space.

The President denied this. He stressed that the U.S. was prepared to open its laboratories to demonstrate that it was not seeking a new offensive potential. Gorbachev interrupted to state that the Soviets were looking for a way out. They were serious. The President countered that the way out was to reduce and not to miss the opportunity to develop a defense because of fear that it might have an offensive potential.

Gorbachev asked if the President had money to spare. The President replied no. Gorbachev said he knew that. The President had in the past expressed the view that SDI could be used to prevent "some madman" from using a nuclear weapon. The U.S. and USSR should reduce their own weapons by 50 percent and then have other countries join them. More could be done with the NPT Treaty. Ways could be found to prevent madmen. Because of one madman, should we have an arms race in space?

The President again wondered why the Soviets should object to research. At this point, we were only talking about a theory. We were also talking about safeguards. If the problem appeared to be solvable, then we could talk. But both sides would for the moment retain nuclear weapons. Reductions would make it possible to save considerable expenditures, e.g., for modernization.

Gorbachev expressed his regret that the two leaders would have so little positive to say on the Geneva talks. The President replied that the U.S. would have to tell people that the possibility of reducing nuclear arms by 50 percent had been destroyed by suspicion of ulterior motives. Gorbachev noted that strategic defense was the President's idea; it was hard to dispute the notion that the Geneva negotiations were based on the January understanding, which deal with two elements: stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. After his discussion with the President, it was clear that the U.S. was determined to develop and introduce weapons into space.

The President said that the U.S. side would tell a different story. We would say that current effort to develop a system that would not kill people, but only stop missiles, was the cause of Soviet suspicions which had prevented reductions of nuclear weapons. An opportunity was thus being lost. The President felt that public opinion would find that difficult to understand.

Gorbachev said that this was the U.S. assessment. But it was important the leaders deal in substance not propaganda. The Soviet side had expected that, when the two leaders met, after months of preparation, it would be possible to reach solutions and to clarify what had been agreed to in January.

Noting that they had already run over the allotted time, the President urged Gorbachev to consider further the safeguards the President had mentioned. It would reassure publics in both countries if the leaders could agree on this and go forward with reductions in nuclear weapons. The President had no further elaborations other than to repeat his inability to comprehend how, in a world full of nuclear weapons, it was so horrifying to seek to develop a defense against this awful threat, how an effort to reduce nuclear weapons could break down because of such an attempt.

Gorbachev for his part, questioned how, in such a difficult situation and with the threat that the arms race would expand in the absence of restraints, one could contemplate a new arms race in space. It was not even possible to reduce armaments on earth. What could be done when weapons were orbiting the globe? How could one verify this? Gorbachev could not commit himself to developing such systems.

The President said it was necessary to give each side the freedom to look at what the other was doing. He recalled President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal in expressing disappointment at the Soviet Government's one-sided approach to verification.

Gorbachev suggested that the two sides think about and analyze the thorough discussion which had taken place. It might be possible to return to the subject that afternoon. He reiterated that he saw no obstacles to movement towards a solution which might serve both sides' interests. The President urged Gorbachev to consider the verification ideas he had shared. Gorbachev indicated his willingness to do so, but stressed that what was being verified was important. The Soviets would be prepared to verify an end to nuclear testing; they would not be willing to verify a continuation of such tests. They would be similarly willing to verify a prohibition of space-strike weapons, but not a process by which such weapons would be developed, whether through open laboratories or other means. But in principle, they were open on the question.

The President again urged Gorbachev to consider whether he could not accept the idea of a shield.

Gorbachev did not respond, proposing that the meeting end and resume at 2:30 PM.

Prepared by:
Mark Parris,
Department of State

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Fourth Plenary Meeting

DATE: November 20, 1985

TIME: 2:45 P. M. - 3:30 P.M.

PLACE: Soviet Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Ronald Reagan
George Shultz, Secretary of State
Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR
Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of
State on Arms Control Matters
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Mark Parris, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department
of State
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central
Committee, CPSU
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department,
Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary
Gorbachev
Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Soviet Interpreter

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BY C15, NARA, Date 7/2/02

Gorbachev opened the meeting by remarking that just days before the two leaders had been moving toward Geneva. They were now moving toward the completion of their meeting. Gorbachev understood that this would be their last official session. He invited the President to start the session.

The President began by noting that he would like to summarize his discussions with Gorbachev over the previous two days. He had a few points to make and would be interested in seeing if Gorbachev could agree.

There had been two days of candid conversation on a wide range of issues. There were clear differences on such questions as nuclear weapons, on the political philosophy of the two countries. It was important to be realistic and to have no illusions regarding our differences.

But there were some common concerns as well. Both sides had expressed their commitment to deep reductions in nuclear armaments and their hope to eliminate such weapons entirely some day. Both would like to intensify discussions on how to increase strategic stability and reduce the dangers to either side.

The President repeated his conviction of a need for a shift from deterrence based on strategic arms to a greater reliance on defensive systems. If our research was borne out it would be necessary to discuss how to introduce defensive systems. There was also a need for greater mutual trust through compliance with obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements from arms control to the Helsinki Final Act.

In addition to creating a safer strategic environment, it was necessary to end tragic regional conflicts. The two sides differed on the causes of regional tensions, but the President believed both saw the need to intensify the consultative process on local conflicts. As he had said in his October UNGA speech, the United States was prepared to associate itself with bold initiatives to resolve conflicts which had damaged U.S.-Soviet relations and aggravated international tensions. This was behind our proposals for military disengagement and to end outside involvement in regional struggles. The people of the various regions must be able to solve their own problems.

There were a number of bilateral questions which could be resolved if the necessary political will was there. The two sides should be able to agree to a fundamental expansion of exchanges in the areas of culture, science, and athletics as a means of promoting greater mutual understanding.

The President described his discussions with Gorbachev as rich and constructive. He was pleased that the two leaders would

continue the process by visiting each others' countries. He looked forward to the pleasure of Gorbachev's visit to the U.S. in 1986, and to his own visit to Moscow in 1987. The results of the Geneva meetings would be clear only in the months and years ahead.

The President then read the following statement on the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) for the Soviets' consideration as a joint statement of what might be accomplished in those discussions:

"The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. They agreed that work on these negotiations should be accelerated with a view to accomplishing the tasks assigned in the Joint US-Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985, specifically to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability. Offensive nuclear arms will be significantly reduced applying the general concept of 50% reductions to equal ceilings on specific, comparable categories. There will be a separate interim agreement resulting in reductions and limitations on land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missile systems as a step toward the total elimination of this class of missiles. To insure effective verification of compliance, meaningful measures to this end will be negotiated concurrently with limits on weaponry and incorporated in all agreements resulting from these negotiations."

After first confirming that the President was finished, Gorbachev indicated that he would like to sum up the meeting from the Soviet perspective.

Gorbachev felt that the very fact of the meeting should be considered a positive development, since it demonstrated a joint understanding of the significance of U.S.-Soviet relations and of the two sides' responsibilities and role in the world. He agreed with the President that the meeting had taken place in an atmosphere of frankness, which permitted the two leaders to outline in detail their positions on the full range of bilateral and international questions.

Gorbachev concurred further that the discussions had revealed deep differences in the two sides' assessments of the causes of certain bilateral and international differences. The talks had allowed both sides to understand one another better; this was of some importance, even major importance. Gorbachev felt, however, that the discussion had shown that the two sides were unable to build a joint concept for dealing with the broad range of bilateral and international questions. Nonetheless, they had agreed to continue their political dialogue. It was in this context that the two leaders had agreed on an exchange of visits at a time to be arranged.

For its part the Soviet side would have to say in describing the meeting that questions of war and peace had been at the center of the meeting in one way or another both during private discussions and in plenary sessions. He felt that the people of both countries, as well as the world as a whole, were concerned by the number of nuclear weapons and the need to stop the arms race and to proceed to disarmament. Unfortunately, it was impossible to report to our peoples and to the world that there had been a rapprochement of positions.

The Soviet side had tried in the meetings to make an extra effort to explain its views. Discussions had been held, but it would be a distortion of the truth to say that there had been progress. Such progress as had been achieved was limited to a detailed discussion and exchange of positions. Gorbachev hoped that this was not the last word. Both sides would take into account the frank discussions which had taken place. Joint efforts should be continued.

The Soviet Union was in favor of continuing negotiations on the basis of the January 1985 Joint Statement on stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. Serious work lay ahead. Gorbachev felt that movement was possible. The Soviet Union was committed to the spirit of the January 1985 understandings and prepared to act in accord with them, on the clear understanding that it was against the arms race on earth. The USSR was prepared as a first step to seek to implement the idea of a 50% reduction of offensive nuclear forces on the basis of both sides' proposals. But this was based on the understanding that neither side would take steps which would open up an arms race in space. On the basis of this understanding the Soviet Union was open to further movement toward deep reductions in nuclear arms.

Gorbachev agreed that it was possible to intensify bilateral relations. This would contribute to greater trust between the two countries. The USSR would be ready to work to expand exchanges in the economic, cultural and scientific fields.

On regional problems (which he at first forgot to mention), Gorbachev acknowledged that both sides attached importance to the problem and shared a desire to seek political settlements of regional disputes to relieve tensions on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. He agreed that bilateral regional expert consultations should be continued.

Noting that the President had raised the possibility of a statement summarizing the results of their discussions, Gorbachev asked if this would be justified. The President indicated that we had hoped to get to the subject, and called on Secretary Shultz to outline the options as we saw them. Gorbachev commented that the Soviets did not insist that there be a statement. If there

was nothing to report, it was better to say so. The President felt nonetheless that it would be useful to share views on how to handle the question of reporting the results of their meetings.

Secretary Shultz outlined a number of options, noting that one could envision an outcome involving all, some, or none.

-- First, there could be a written compilation of all items which had been agreed during the leaders' meetings or in the preparations for their meetings. There were quite a number of these, of varying importance. There was a possibility of developing joint language on certain arms control questions: e.g., on the Stockholm conference and chemical weapons proliferation. Agreed language existed on nuclear non-proliferation. The President in the statement he read had raised the possibility that NST might be treated, although that morning's conversation had shown the depth of differences on that set of issues. There could also be agreement on a range of regional and bilateral questions, and on a process for the future. In this connection the Secretary had been struck by Gorbachev's references the day before to a mechanism for regulating U.S.-Soviet relations. Thus, it might prove feasible to develop a package which would register areas of agreement reached in Geneva. Disagreements would not be registered except to acknowledge that they existed.

-- A second possibility would be to sign some sort of document. The general exchanges agreement was already agreed at the technical level and could be signed if the leaders wished.

-- A third element would be separate statements by leaders at a common site. While each leader would say what he wished, the U.S. felt there should be some coordination to avoid surprises. The Secretary speculated that statements could refer to differences but could also include parallel language where appropriate. For example, on NST there were issues on which U.S. and Soviet views coincided, and others where they did not. The kind of statement he had in mind would make clear both areas of agreement and disagreement.

- A fourth option would be to release a short joint report saying, essentially, that the leaders had met and agreed to meet again. Both sides could then issue statements of their own.

- Finally, the two sides could make individual statements at different sites. The Secretary speculated that both leaders would, in any case, be reporting publicly to their peoples in their meetings.

The Secretary concluded by noting that the U.S. would be willing to consider some sort of joint ceremony on the next morning, but was prepared to go in a variety of ways. He was aware of the

great responsibility each leader had before their own people and the world to report on their discussions. A dignified ceremony at which areas of agreement could be reported and differences laid out in a modulated fashion would seem to be an appropriate way to proceed. In such a context, the President's statement on NST could be either included in a joint statement or used unilaterally.

Gorbachev, noting that the issue required some thought, indicated that he was nonetheless prepared to respond. If he understood correctly, both sides wanted to continue the dialogue that was begun in preparations for the Geneva meeting, which had been expanded in Geneva, and which would be continued in the future. Even if one were subjectively against such dialogue, objectively it was necessary to continue contacts and exchanges, and to deepen the process of searching for solutions in the interests of U.S. and Soviet peoples and of the people of the whole world. The Soviet Union, therefore, welcomed Secretary Shultz's expression of willingness to continue work in the future.

On how to document the Geneva meeting, Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accommodate a U.S. desire for a joint document, whether a communique or simple statement. Noting that the Soviet Union had originally advocated a communique, but had dropped the idea when it appeared the U.S. was not interested, he outlined his assessment of how to proceed. If a communique incorporated the fundamental results of the meeting, there would be no need for separate statements. If such a communique were impossible, the Geneva program should end with the present meeting.

Gorbachev felt that it would be inappropriate to seek simply to list minor agreements in a joint document. This would not be understood in our two countries or internationally. A more substantive statement would be necessary. Gorbachev wondered whether the two leaders should reassess the problem and perhaps deputize senior members of their staffs to propose a solution. He joked that he and the President might take a walk, leaving Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to work on the problem.

More seriously, Gorbachev recalled that the Soviets had always been prepared for a communique; indeed at one point they had thought the U.S. had agreed to such a document. He felt that there was still time to work out an acceptable document if both sides were willing. He repeated his suggestion that the Foreign Ministers should study the problem and present their findings to the leaders.

The President observed that he might have been to blame for any confusion the Soviets had felt with respect to a communique. In considering the question before the Geneva meeting, the

President had been concerned about how a prearranged communique might be perceived. He had been similarly uncomfortable early in his presidency with the practice at the OECD summit meeting of having one leader read a pre-cooked document on behalf of the others. His concern for Geneva was that a document emphasize that the meeting was part of an ongoing process. In this context, a document might be worthwhile. The President felt, however, that such a document should include bilateral issues already worked out.

Gorbachev said he shared the President's view. After seven years without a U.S.-Soviet summit, the President was probably right in being somewhat apprehensive about how the meeting would develop. Now that the meeting had taken place, it might be possible to compile "a joint approach in a fundamental way." Gorbachev again suggested that the Secretary and Shevardnadze consult and report to the leaders.

The Secretary commented that U.S. and Soviet representatives had been at work since 11:30 that morning to explore possibilities of developing acceptable joint language. It would be necessary to check with them before he and Shevardnadze could begin work. Gorbachev agreed. He proposed a break and quipped that the most important task facing the Foreign Ministers now was to find their subordinates.

Secretary Shultz confessed jocularly that he and Shevardnadze had agreed in a September dinner conversation that they should let their leaders carry as much of the burden in Geneva as possible. Until Gorbachev had given the Foreign Ministers their current assignment, they thought they had succeeded. Gorbachev suggested that the Secretary was simply trying to turn his joke about a walk around on him. The Secretary told him not to worry, that he (the Secretary) had a thick skin.

The President and Gorbachev agreed to adjourn the meeting and, after a ten minute conversation in the Mission reception room, retired to a separate area for an extended private conversation.

Prepared by:
Mark Parris,
Department of State

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Mrs. Gorbacheva's Tea for Mrs. Reagan

DATE: November 20, 1985
TIME: 4:00 P.M. - 5:15 P.M.
PLACE: Soviet Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

Mrs. Nancy Reagan
Mrs. Eugenia Arensburger, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mrs. Raisa Gorbacheva
Soviet Interpreter

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Mrs. Gorbachev led Mrs. Reagan upstairs, where the walls of the first room were hung with children's posters. She explained that they were done by children of the Soviet Union for an exhibition entitled, "What the World Means to Me." She pointed out each poster in detail, noting the theme, as well as the name and age of the child. At the end of the tea, Mrs. Gorbachev presented Mrs. Reagan with the book of these posters.

A lavish Russian tea was served in the second room, with Mrs. Gorbachev explaining each dish and demonstrating the samovar.

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The ladies talked about their families, and the busy life each led as the wife of the head of the State/Party. Mrs. Gorbachev said that besides accompanying her husband on many trips, she continues to teach, keeps up correspondence with her former students, tries to keep up with the literature in her profession, and looks after the family. Her daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter live with the Gorbachevs.

Prepared by:
Eugenia Arensbürger

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Dinner Hosted by President and Mrs. Reagan

DATE: November 20, 1985
TIME: 8:00 P.M. - 10:30 P.M.
PLACE: Maison de Saussure,
Geneva, Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Reagan
Mrs. Reagan
Secretary of State George Shultz
Chief of Staff Donald Regan
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Mrs. E. Arensbarger, Interpreter
William Hopkins, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Gorbachev
Mrs. Gorbacheva
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
Mr. P. Palashchenko, Interpreter

* * * * *

The conversation began by continuing a topic touched upon at last night's dinner about the fact that people are marrying and having children younger now in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev said that, on the other hand, youth is becoming less responsible,

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which is illustrated by a saying which the older generation now has; we must see our grandchildren through until they reach pension age.

Gorbachev again lovingly talked about his granddaughter. President Reagan told of a letter he received from a little girl who told him exactly what she wanted him to do and at the end said "Now go into the Oval Office and get to work."

Mrs. Gorbachev then told of a letter Gorbachev received which wished him success, expressed full agreement with his anti-alcohol campaign and said that the author kept Gorbachev's picture next to her icon. The author said she was 83 years old, prayed every day, and gave her telephone number. She then said to call only early in the morning; she was busy all other times. She lived in Kostroma. President Reagan asked whether Gorbachev called. The other replied that he would report as soon as he got back from Geneva.

Secretary Shultz asked about a revival of religion in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev replied that this question should be addressed to Mrs. Gorbachev, who taught a course on the topic; however, her course was on atheism rather than theology. Gorbachev said that many find the ritual, ceremonial part of religion attractive. However, true believers are dying out with the older generation. Still, one third of the population marry and baptize their children in the church. The Islamic religion, however, seems to have deeper roots. Shevardnadze confirmed that traditions survive in the Islamic religion. Gorbachev said that he was speaking of the Russian orthodox Church, which is preparing to celebrate the 1,000th anniversary of the Christianization of Russia. The church has even petitioned the government to return to a monastery for church use. Mrs. Gorbachev said there were also many sects in Russia, including the Baptists, Pentecostalists and "Tresuny."

Secretary Shultz asked whether Khomeini had had an influence on the Islamic population of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev answered, "No." He also said that right after the revolution there were many slogans for renouncing all of the past, as if doing away with everything which took place before the revolution. This was wrong, he said. But such were the times. He remembered that at that time even wearing a tie would brand one as a member of the bourgeoisie.

As for Khomeini, President Reagan said, he felt that both countries -- the U.S. and the USSR -- born of revolution, ought to keep an eye on another revolution: an attempt to bring about a fundamentalist Islamic revolution, where the revolution would become the government, and which teaches that the way to heaven is to kill a non-believer.

Gorbachev said that as we end this summit, he felt that he and President Reagan had truly made a start. It would have been unrealistic to expect great progress right away. But the whole world was very concerned, and it was a good thing that they had made this start. Donald Regan said that the President had said the same thing to him.

At this point President Reagan said that in one of the U.S.'s oldest towns, Philadelphia, a toast to the living is always given sitting down. Only a toast for the dead is given standing up. So he wanted to continue in this tradition because what the two sides were dealing with here definitely concerned the living. This is a beginning, he said. No matter what it was we failed to agree on, the important thing was that the two of them would continue to meet. Each of them had accepted an invitation to come to the other's country and continue these meetings. Even though the two of them had not agreed on many things, they had not closed the door. They would continue to meet.

One of the early leaders of the American Revolution, Thomas Payne, in those dark days when they did not know whether the revolution would succeed, said, "We have it in our power to start the world over again." Something of that is present in what we are doing today, because the problems we are trying to solve have plagued mankind for a long time.

We have started something, President Reagan said, and he felt that these meetings expressed the will and desire of both sides to find answers that would benefit not only all the people of the world now living, but also the yet unborn. His toast, therefore, and his devout prayer was that we could deliver something better than in the past. We will continue meeting, he said, and continue to work for those clauses which had brought the sides together here in Geneva.

Gorbachev answered, saying that he was confident tonight that the two of them had started something. After a very long interval between summit meetings, he shared the President's view that it would be wrong to give a false signal from Geneva. He said that Soviet side would very carefully assess the results of this meeting, fully cognizant of a mutual sense of responsibility. Every beginning is difficult. If now we have laid the first few bricks, he said, we have made a new start, a new phase has begun. This in itself is very important. The major differences are ahead, he said, but he wanted to invite the U.S. side to move ahead on the appointed road together with the Soviet side, with mutual understanding and a sense of responsibility. We will do our part on that road, he said. We will not change our positions, our values, or our thinking, but we expect that with patience and wisdom we will find ways toward solutions. We have had the opportunity to speak privately, he said, and he

attributed great importance to those talks. Without them it would have been difficult to arrive at this result. Let us then move toward each other with an understanding of our responsibility before all the countries of the world. Gorbachev's toast was for better dialogue and cooperation, for which the Soviet Union was prepared and hoped for reciprocity from the United States.

* * * * *

AFTER-DINNER CONVERSATION

Having moved into the study after dinner, Secretary Shultz said he wanted to make a suggestion to both of the leaders about each of them making individual statements at the ceremony there would be tomorrow. He said in his personal opinion, he thought the people of the U.S. and USSR and the people of all the world really wanted to feel the presence of both of the world leaders at such a ceremony. If these leaders were simply present and went through the business of signing documents, it would not be the same thing as having them actually speak.

Gorbachev responded that in the first place he thought a joint statement or communique would represent the embodiment of the significance of such a document. Therefore, he said, he thought that a communique was of primary significance. Its presence would show that the current meetings had led to common judgments, common results and common motives in matters of principal importance. The Soviet side feels that such a document would demonstrate to the U.S. and Soviet peoples and to the world that the leaders of the two most powerful countries, despite their deep differences, are exercising their responsibility, and the document would show and convince the people of the world that the leaders were demonstrating their commitment to their principles. A joint document then would be a basis for further statements on the problems involved, both to each of the countries' allies and in the legislative bodies of both countries.

However, said Gorbachev, he thought if the leaders started to give commentaries, most especially short ones, on any document that they signed, it could very well detract from the significance of the document, because there might even be an unfortunate phrase which would detract from the weight and significance of the document. He said he hoped to save any possible document from that fate.

President Reagan responded that he begged to disagree with the General Secretary. He said that a full statement would be an honest, frank and open document about what had and had not

been achieved, and about the fact that these meetings between them would be continuing. He suggested that what Secretary Shultz had been speaking about concerned the world press and the European press. He said that if he and General Secretary Gorbachev were there at a ceremony, they would not have to comment on the specifics of any document. However, hope in the world had grown as a result of this summit meeting, and people should not be disappointed in this respect.

General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to a statement of one to three minutes' duration by each of the leaders. President Reagan concurred and added that it had been his idea not to go into detail.

Gorbachev noted that one other thing bothered him, namely, that having produced a document, the sides do not believe in themselves; commenting on it, even briefly and generally, would only serve to strengthen and reaffirm the content of that document. The President responded that instead of being silent, it would be better for the people who have placed so much hope in the outcome of these meetings to hear that he and Gorbachev are going to continue to meet despite the fact that they have not solved all of the problems connected with the communique. He said that the tone and the need here were simply not to leave this meeting and have people disappointed that there had been no progress, and thus have the hopes of so many people dashed.

Gorbachev responded that both leaders' statements ought to be in support of the document, and the statement would not last longer than two to three minutes. Moreover, the statements should not concentrate on differences, but on areas where there was agreement. He said there was no need for rose-colored glasses. Both leaders could be frank about the result reflected in the document: meanwhile, the process of their meeting would be continuing.

President Reagan said it would be necessary to decide when and where the leaders would make their statements.

When some of those present suggested it might be a good idea to have the leaders' statements at 10:30 or 11:00 AM, President Reagan explained that he preferred 10 AM, because precisely 17 hours later he would be appearing on U.S. television and giving his report about this meeting to the U.S. Congress and the American people, so the upcoming day would certainly be one of the longest working days.

Secretary Shultz said he wanted to add one thing. He had just received information about the joint understanding, and apparently the work on it was going backward. He noted that

U.S. aides had been instructed to stay up all night and work to get a document out, and he expressed the hope that the Soviet leader would give his people similar instructions. Shultz said the statements would be made in the Geneva International Conference Center at 10 AM.

Korniyenko asked, "Is there anything to announce?" Shultz responded there could be -- agreement had been reached about certain things; however, the Soviets were now beginning to go backward on some of what had been agreed.

Shevardnadze interjected that he had a question of principle. He said that it should be agreed not to detail differences but just make the statements in a general form.

Gorbachev said that he thought that the people involved were clever enough not to have the tail wag the fox, however, there are two foxes and two tails involved here. He said the sides ought not to come out with an empty document. Indeed, it would be better to have no document than an anemic one.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the Soviet side was now beginning to link civil aviation and the cultural agreement. Korniyenko responded that it was Shultz who had always wanted to make those two things a package.

Shultz said that if it came to that, everything could be linked -- bilateral issues and regional issues. But it would be a mistake to make everything into such a package and link everything. Korniyenko said that it would be possible to say that the sides have completed working out details on exchanges but this should not be linked to other documents.

Gorbachev said that in conclusion it can be said that the Soviet side will give its people instructions to wind up and the U.S. side can give its people instructions to wind up, and they will, even if they have to be there all night.

Shultz said yes, all night, even if they have to be there without food. He said the U.S. was glad to a civil aviation agreement with the USSR, but there had to be in it commercial terms to make the route financially attractive to PanAm, otherwise the company would simply not fly the route and there was no reason for Aeroflot to have a monopoly on that market.

Korniyenko said that yesterday the Soviet side had compromised on that issue and then the U.S. had advanced 30 points which had knocked everything out of kilter.

To Gorbachev's suggestion that everyone continue working, Shultz said that it was good and the U.S. side would work all

night and that would be great if agreement could be achieved and if that were not possible, then there just would not be agreement.

Gorbachev said he thought he did not completely understand all the differences with all of the documents, but in any event he spoke to his people to the effect that he wanted everyone to get his act together and somehow iron out these last minute difficulties in regard to these issues.

President Reagan said that he and Gorbachev were meeting for the first time at this level. They had little practice, since they had never done it before. Nevertheless, having read the history of previous summit meetings he had concluded that those earlier leaders had not done very much. Therefore, he suggested that he and Gorbachev say, "To hell with the past," we'll do it our way and get something done.

Gorbachev concurred. The conversation broke up at 10:30 P.M.

Prepared by:

William Hopkins and
Eugenia Arensburger,
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLSF91-051 #3645MF 10/10/20
Auth: OS, NARA, Date 7/2/02
BY

55
Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have already written to you informally to express some of my thoughts on the issues facing us in the wake of our meeting in Geneva. I would like in this letter to deal with some of the particularly pressing regional issues which I believe we must address in the months ahead.

I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but I would like to share with you some further thoughts. Afghanistan was, after all, the regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva. You expressed Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to cooperate with others on practical steps. Three elements could form the basis for a lasting solution: A process of negotiations among the warring parties including the Soviet Union; verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms; and movement toward political self-determination and economic reconstruction.

As you know, we have been disappointed with the results of the proximity talks conducted by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative. Five rounds in Geneva have not addressed the real issue on which a resolution of this problem depends -- withdrawal of your forces. No other element of the problem presents real difficulty.

To underscore this, we have formally notified the Secretary General that we accept the agreed formulation on guarantees. For your part, I believe that the talks would gain a real impetus from Soviet action to permit discussion of a timetable for withdrawal at Geneva and a public announcement to that effect. Were such action taken by the time of our Ministers' next meeting, it would enable them to have a more focussed and productive discussion.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is Southern Africa. Because we have covered this ground often in the past, the point I need to make is a simple one.

As I am sure you are aware, I am reviewing our policy in Southern Africa, specifically with respect to the war in Angola. This review might not be necessary if there were real evidence that the outside forces in that country could be reduced, and then withdrawn, making possible the reconciliation of the indigenous parties to the war. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, the evidence is clear that your own involvement in Angola is deepening.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola.

I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that the Soviet Union had expressed an interest in calming tensions between Libya and Egypt. At the same time, it appears that Libya is preparing at least two sites for the emplacement of SA-5 Air Defense Missiles to be supplied by the Soviet Union. It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest in restraint in this region with the provision of advanced weapons to a leader whose reckless behavior is a major danger to regional stability. Because we view this development with utmost

seriousness, I was disappointed to see that the Soviet response to our presentation failed to address the transfer of these weapons to Libya. Our Ministers and experts should address this vital matter, since it raises the prospect of dangerous incidents that I hope you want to avoid as much as we do.

If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with our agreement in Geneva to put our regional experts' talks on a regular basis. When we met in Geneva we agreed that it was important for both of us to avoid a U.S.- Soviet clash over regional conflicts and to work for solutions. I believe that we must move forward on some of these issues before we meet again. In that regard, I was pleased to note that in your remarks to Secretary Baldrige you referred to the importance of dealing with regional trouble spots.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

58
ID 8591241

REFERRAL

DATE: 26 DEC 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 26 DEC 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

AFGHANISTAN

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:

Julie K. Madison

FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

----- FOR NSC USE ONLY -----

FOR INFO

F SII

O B C

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen 12/24
SYSTEM II
91241
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

December 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 
SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Issue

Whether to sign a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Facts

In your handwritten letter of November 28, you promised Gorbachev a more formal letter with detailed suggestions regarding some of the issues before us.

Discussion

The letter at Tab A urges steps to move toward a peaceful settlement of conflicts in Afghanistan and Southern Africa and reiterates your concern regarding the Soviet action in supplying SA-5 air defense missiles to Libya.

Recommendation

OK

No

 _____ That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FDG-114/4 #8052
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

December 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Regional
Issues

A letter from the President to Gorbachev on regional issues is at Tab A. It would follow up, in greater detail and on a more formal basis, some of the suggestions he made in his handwritten letter.

SRS Sestanovich, *ML* Ringdahl, *S.P.R.* Tahir-Kheli and *JC* Covey concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
Tab B Platt-McFarlane Memo

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4 #8053
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 7/2/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CROSSMATCH ACTION SHEET

MESSAGE # 365
DATE TIME: _____

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE
DEP EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

ACTION OFFICER

COMMENT OFFICER

INFO

FLANSON

~~Matlock~~
Sestanovich
Lingdahl comm
Covey

ACTION: CONCL TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCAL
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: 12/17

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

CLEARED BY: _____ DATE: _____ TIME: _____

CLEARED TO: _____ DATE: _____ TIME: _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

2/4/05

ORIGINAL 82

12/16

~~SECRET~~

EUR/SOV/MULTI:EEDELMAN
12/16/85 632-9806 WANG 2137P
THE ACTING SECRETARY

EUR/SOV:MPARRIS
AF/S:JDAVIDOW
P:MARMACOST
S/S:

EUR:MPALMER
NEA:RPECK
NSC:JMATLOCK
S/S-0

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

NOBIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY
- GORBACHEV ON REGIONAL ISSUES

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AT
PARA 3 TO HIGHEST APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY,

I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOU INFORMALLY TO EXPRESS SOME
OF MY THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUES FACING US IN THE WAKE OF OUR
MEETING IN GENEVA. I WOULD LIKE IN THIS LETTER TO DEAL
WITH SOME OF THE PARTICULARLY PRESSING REGIONAL ISSUES
WHICH I BELIEVE WE MUST ADDRESS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

I MENTIONED AFGHANISTAN IN MY EARLIER LETTER, BUT I WOULD
LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS.
AFGHANISTAN WAS, AFTER ALL, THE REGIONAL QUESTION ON
WHICH WE SPENT THE MOST TIME IN GENEVA. YOU EXPRESSED

JW
EE
MP
JR
MA
S/S

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLSFOP DS/349 SMC 10/16/00
BY CX-5, NARA, Date 7/2/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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SOVIET READINESS TO SEE AN AGREEMENT EMERGE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH WOULD ENTAIL A CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. THE DISCUSSION RECALLED THE SUGGESTION IN YOUR JUNE 20 LETTER THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAD "OPPORTUNITIES TO CONFIRM BY ITS ACTIONS" OUR READINESS TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. AS I EXPLAINED IN MY OCTOBER SPEECH TO THE UNGA, WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH OTHERS ON PRACTICAL STEPS. THREE ELEMENTS COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR A LASTING SOLUTION: A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION; VERIFIED ELIMINATION OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE AND RESTRAINT ON THE FLOW OF OUTSIDE ARMS; AND MOVEMENT TOWARD POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS CONDUCTED BY THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. FIVE ROUNDS IN GENEVA HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE REAL ISSUE ON WHICH A RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM DEPENDS -- WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES. NO OTHER ELEMENT OF THE PROBLEM PRESENTS REAL DIFFICULTY. TO UNDERScore THIS, WE HAVE FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE ACCEPT THE AGREED FORMULATION ON GUARANTEES. FOR YOUR PART, I BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS WOULD GAIN A REAL IMPETUS FROM SOVIET ACTION TO PERMIT DISCUSSION OF A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AT GENEVA AND A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THAT EFFECT. WERE SUCH ACTION TAKEN BY THE TIME OF OUR MINISTERS' NEXT MEETING, IT WOULD ENABLE THEM TO HAVE A MORE FOCUSSED AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION.

ANOTHER AREA WHERE I BELIEVE MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE IS SOUTHERN AFRICA. BECAUSE WE HAVE COVERED THIS GROUND OFTEN IN THE PAST, THE POINT I NEED TO MAKE IS A SIMPLE ONE.

AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, I AM REVIEWING OUR POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE WAR IN ANGOLA. THIS REVIEW MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY IF THERE WERE REAL EVIDENCE THAT THE OUTSIDE FORCES IN THAT COUNTRY COULD BE REDUCED, AND THEN WITHDRAWN, MAKING POSSIBLE THE RECONCILIATION OF THE INDIGENOUS PARTIES TO THE WAR. SUCH AN OUTCOME, OF COURSE, WOULD DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 435 -- AN OBJECTIVE WE SHARE WITH THE U.S.S.R. UNFORTUNATELY, THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT YOUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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DEEPENING.

AS I SAID AT THE UN IN OCTOBER, OUR AIM IS TO REDUCE, NOT INCREASE, MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BY THE SUPERPOWERS IN LOCAL DISPUTES LIKE THAT IN ANGOLA.

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN CALMING TENSIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT APPEARS THAT LIBYA IS PREPARING AT LEAST TWO SITES FOR THE EMPLACEMENT OF SA-5 AIR DEFENSE MISSILES TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS HARD TO RECONCILE SOVIET INTEREST IN RESTRAINT IN THIS REGION WITH THE PROVISION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO A LEADER WHOSE RECKLESS BEHAVIOR IS A MAJOR DANGER TO REGIONAL STABILITY. BECAUSE WE VIEW THIS DEVELOPMENT WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS, I WAS DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR PRESENTATION FAILED TO ADDRESS THE TRANSFER OF THESE WEAPONS TO LIBYA. OUR MINISTERS AND EXPERTS SHOULD ADDRESS THIS VITAL MATTER, SINCE IT RAISES THE PROSPECT OF DANGEROUS INCIDENTS THAT I HOPE YOU WANT TO AVOID AS MUCH AS WE DO.

IF YOU AGREE, BOTH ANGOLA AND LIBYA ARE ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT TAKE UP IN THEIR NEXT MEETING.

IN CLOSING, LET ME UNDERLINE MY SATISFACTION WITH OUR AGREEMENT IN GENEVA TO PUT OUR REGIONAL EXPERTS' TALKS ON A REGULAR BASIS. WHEN WE MET IN GENEVA WE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH OF US TO AVOID A U.S. - SOVIET CLASH OVER REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND TO WORK FOR SOLUTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST MOVE FORWARD ON SOME OF THESE ISSUES BEFORE WE MEET AGAIN. IN THAT REGARD, I WAS PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IN YOUR REMARKS TO SECRETARY BALDRIGE YOU REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH REGIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS.

---SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

4. A SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

VV



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United States Department of State **65**

Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II
91241 dd-

December 13, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Letter for General Secretary Gorbachev

We are providing a revised text of a draft Presidential letter to General Secretary Gorbachev on regional issues. This draft urges forward movement on Afghanistan and southern Africa and reiterates U.S. concern over Soviet supply of SA-5 air defense missiles to Libya.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By GIS NARA, Date 7/2/02
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8054
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I have already written to you informally to express some of my thoughts on the issues facing us in the wake of our meeting in Geneva. I would like in this letter to deal with some of the particularly pressing regional issues which I believe we must address in the months ahead.

I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but I would like to share with you some further thoughts. Afghanistan was, after all, the regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva. I was struck by your businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take practical steps. Three elements could form the basis for a lasting solution: a process of negotiations among the warring parties including the Soviet Union; verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms; and movement toward political self-determination and economic reconstruction.

change
As an initial contribution to this process, in advance of the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva, we have formally notified the United Nations that we accept the agreed formulation on guarantees. I hope that this will give an impetus to the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. For real progress to be made it is important that the sixth round of talks in Geneva get down to the central issue of troop withdrawals. In any event, I believe Afghanistan deserves more in-depth treatment at the next meeting between our ministers.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground that we have covered often in the past. The point I want to make is a simple one.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLR File-114/4 #2055
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa, specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I would not face this decision if there were some evidence that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in the outside forces in that country which would make possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the U.S.S.R.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola.

I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that the Soviet Union had expressed an interest in calming tensions between Libya and Egypt. At the same time, it appears that Libya is preparing at least two sites for the emplacement of SA-5 air defense missiles to be supplied by the Soviet Union. It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest in restraint in this region with the provision of advanced weapons to a leader whose reckless behavior is a major danger to regional stability. We view this development with utmost seriousness. I hope that our ministers and experts will address this subject and eliminate any prospect of an incident between us.

If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with our agreement in Geneva to put our regional experts' talks on a regular basis. When we met in Geneva we agreed that it was important for both of us to avoid a U.S. - Soviet clash over regional conflicts and to work for solutions. I believe that we must move forward on some of these issues before we meet again. In that regard, I was pleased to note that in your remarks to Mac Baldrige you referred to the importance of dealing with regional trouble spots.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

SEQUENCE TO

HAS BEEN

Do: Passed Bill -

W I discussed this with J...
Jo night. First letter is a little off...
Pe President's hand written note) and...
W The wrong thrust on Afghanistan. We
W do need to start, however, on a
Bu longer letter that provide the follow-up
W points the President promised in
NE his. The second letter is more urgent
SI since I gather there is some desire
- to have Redcliffe carry it out
[on his trip.

Suggest we give to Steve S.
for action with coordination / concern
to Ty Cobb. They should call
draft to fact in Europe to get his
views need to process by mid-day
tomorrow.

Dan

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GP*
SUBJECT: Letters to Gorbachev

We need to take advantage of the momentum generated by your meeting with Gorbachev to move ahead in a number of fields of interest to us. The most significant:

-- In the Geneva talks, we want to prod the Soviets toward a more constructive dialogue on the offense/defense relationship;

-- On regional issues, we should pursue Gorbachev's suggestion of greater seriousness on an Afghanistan settlement and use our review of aid to UNITA to engage the Soviets in a more serious discussion of Southern Africa;

-- On human rights, you indicated you wanted to follow up on your exchange with Gorbachev in Geneva to emphasize the possibilities which would open up in areas of interest to the Soviets if we saw progress.

I have attached for your approval two draft letters to Gorbachev on these issues. The first deals with the Geneva talks and regional questions, and proposes that Shevardnadze and I take up these and other issues at a meeting here in January. The second addresses human rights, and could be delivered by Mac Baldrige during his visit to Moscow next week. Using Mac as a channel would reinforce our message on the inherent links between human rights and other areas of the relationship. As the first letter refers in passing to Mac's mission, it should be sent this week.

Attachments: As indicated

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BY *CS* NARA, Date 7/2/02

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Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I have been heartened since returning from Geneva by the enthusiasm and hope with which reports of our recent meeting have been greeted around the world. This reaction by men and women everywhere confirms our joint assessment in Geneva of the utility of our meeting, and the responsibility we both share to ensure that that enthusiasm, and those hopes, are not in vain.

I do not intend in this letter to get into an exhaustive review of where our relationship stands after our meeting, or of where it may go. There are certain issues, however, which I do feel merit particular attention in the weeks ahead. I would like to share with you some thoughts on how we may approach them.

On substance, if our discussions in Geneva revealed anything, they revealed the extent of our differences on some of the core issues in the Geneva arms control talks and of the depth of our convictions on these issues. I took to heart the concerns you expressed so eloquently; I hope that you came to appreciate better my own concern that we not make the nuclear arms reductions we both consider overdue hostage to fears I am convinced are ungrounded.

This is not the place to go over once again the terrain we covered in Geneva. I wish only to say that our discussion convinced me that some of our positions, divergent at present to be sure, are not mutually exclusive. I am instructing my experts to explore how we can bridge the gap in the Geneva talks in the months ahead; I trust you are giving similar instructions. It is my hope that, with a joint effort in this regard, the sides will in fact be able to build common elements on which to realize concrete progress before we meet again next year.

Surely the Soviet Union cannot be opposed to strategic defense in principle. There must be a practical way to approach the relationship of offense and defense. Our negotiators in Geneva will of course be prepared to follow up on these possibilities when they return in January. I think Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

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should also be prepared to address these issues further when they meet.

In addition to the Geneva talks, I would hope that we can register some forward motion on some of the regional issues we discussed in Geneva before we meet again.

The regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva, of course, was Afghanistan. I was struck by your businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take practical steps, including the three elements I mentioned: a dialogue among the warring parties; cessation of outside military presence and supplies; and economic reconstruction.

I believe that our two countries might in the first instance seek agreement on the question of guarantees and a timetable for withdrawal. As an initial contribution to this process, in advance of the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva, we will formally notify the United Nations that we accept their formulation on guarantees. Perhaps the U.S. and the USSR also could work out together an explicit statement that we are prepared to guarantee an appropriate settlement, including a reasonable timetable for the withdrawal of your forces. This could give an impetus to the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative. If you agree, we might seek to develop such a statement by the time Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next meet so as to enable them to have a more focussed and productive discussion on Afghanistan.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground that we have covered often in the past. The point I want to make is a simple one.

As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa, specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I would not face this decision if there were some evidence

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that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in the outside forces in that country which would make possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the USSR.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola. If you agree, this is another issue which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

Finally, I wanted to reiterate how much I valued the candor and detail of our discussion on human rights issues. I hope you left that conversation with a better understanding of how I want to deal with what -- for us -- is a key determinant of our relationship. Secretary of Commerce Baldrige will be in Moscow December 9 - 11 for a meeting of the U.S. - Soviet Trade and Economic Council. He will be carrying a letter from me which builds on our discussion in Geneva, and which I hope you will carefully consider.

In closing, let me reiterate how much I appreciated the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with you in Geneva. I am confident that that tie will be invaluable in the months ahead as we seek to consolidate and expand the start we made there in putting our relations on a more satisfactory basis. You will have received separately an invitation to visit Washington in late June of next year. I hope that you will find the timing convenient, and look forward to what I am confident you will find a productive and informative visit.

From the standpoint of procedure, I think it is important that we do not allow the momentum which we established in Geneva to wane. We will be able in this channel and through our embassies to follow-up on the agreements reached in the past few weeks and to flesh out some of the new ideas which emerged from our meeting. I believe it would be useful, nonetheless, for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet periodically to review progress and identify areas where work is necessary in advance of our next meeting. We would be delighted if Mr. Shevardnadze could come to the United States for this purpose in late January of next year.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan