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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/14/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON JANUARY 1986 (1/3)

**FOIA**

F06-114/4

**Box Number** 14

YARHI-MILO

1405

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8057	MEMO	MATLOCK TO FORTIER RE TASS ON US/LIBYA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	1/13/1985	B1
8058	MEMO	IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL ARTICLE <i>R 1/23/2008 NLRRF06-114/4</i>	2	1/7/1986	B1
8059	MEMO	IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL ARTICLE <i>R 1/23/2008 NLRRF06-114/4</i>	3	1/7/1986	B1
8060	MEMO	IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL ARTICLE <i>R 1/23/2008 NLRRF06-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8061	MEMO	MARTIN TO PLATT; BROWN; GALEBACH; RIXSE; LASALLE; GEER; COSTER RE INTERAGENCY GROUP OF GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVES <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8062	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SHULTZ- DOBRYNIN MEETING, JANUARY 8, 1986 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	1/14/1985	B1
8066	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE JANUARY 8 DOBRYNIN MEETING <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	1/9/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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JET 4/14/2005

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8063	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE POLITICAL CONTROLS ON THE EXPORT OF OIL AND GAS EQUIPMENT TO THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	1/17/1986	B1
8064	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE POLITICAL CONTROLS ON THE XPORT OF OIL AND GAS TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8065	MEMO	MODIFICATION OF EXPORT LICENSING POLICY FOR CERTAIN OIL AND GAS TECHNOLOGY TO THE USSR <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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J4-1  
1NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

January 2, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: East-West Relations Workshop at Airlie House,  
Warrenton on February 9-11

I have been invited by the Wilson Center to participate in a workshop on East-West relations to be held at Airlie House, Warrenton on February 9-11, 1986. Attached at Tab A is the letter of invitation.

All expenses will be covered by the Wilson Center.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my participation in the workshop.

Approve ☒Disapprove ☐

## Attachments:

Tab A Letter of Invitation



# THE WILSON CENTER

PROSSER GIFFORD, Deputy Director

December 27, 1985

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Senior Director for European  
and Soviet Affairs  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
Room 368  
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Jack:

I would like to invite you to attend a workshop on East-West relations to be held at Airlie House near Warrenton, Virginia on February 9-11, 1986. This meeting will be cosponsored by the European Institute of the Wilson Center and the Atlantik-Brücke of Bonn, and it will involve small high-level groups of about twelve Germans and twelve Americans discussing the security and economic dimensions of East-West relations and how these issues will affect relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

This workshop will begin at 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, February 9th, with a small reception and a working dinner to discuss the broad themes of relations between the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union after the Geneva Summit and will end after lunch on Tuesday, February 11th. Beginning Monday morning there will be further sessions on SDI and strategic relations including arms control, the state of the Soviet economy and Western options for economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, and German and American domestic political prospects and their effects on German-American relations.

Introducing key portions of the discussion from the German side will be Dr. Hans-Georg Wieck, President of the Federal Republic's major intelligence agency, on the Soviet economy; Walther Leisler Kiep, Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke and Treasurer of the Christian Democratic Union, on German domestic political prospects; and Horst Teltschik, national security adviser to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, on the possibility for linkage between economic, security, and political relations with the East.

Among other German participants will be Hilmar Kopper, member of the Board of Deutsche Bank AG, Dr. Klaus Liesen, Chairman of the Board of Ruhrgas AG, Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut, State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Helmut Schäfer, FDP member of the Bundestag, Dietrich Stobbe, SPD member of the Bundestag, and Dr. Theo Sommer, Editor in Chief of Die Zeit.

This small workshop will allow an opportunity for discussions among extremely well-informed individuals on the German and the American sides about issues of importance to the relationship between our two countries and between East and West. Since our numbers will be very small and since time is short, I

Page 2

hope that we will be able to have a prompt response from you. I, or one of my colleagues, will call next week to see if your schedule will allow you to attend. Further details of the workshop will be available to those who are attending.

I hope very much that you will be able to join us at Airlie House for this important German-American exchange.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



James H. Billington

*Any chance?*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 8, 1986

0100

~~FILE~~  
FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*  
SUBJECT: Recommendation re Proctor Jones Remarks on  
American- Soviet Policy

We have reviewed Proctor Jones' letter to the President and do not agree with the basic proposition: that economic "interdependence" would guarantee peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we have no objection to your sending this letter to the President.

Attachments:

Tab A Proctor Jones Letter to the President



5

Proctor Jones  
3401 Sacramento Street  
San Francisco, CA 94118 U.S.A.  
(415) 922-9222

December 10, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In August you called me relative to my book of Soviet photographs, Classic Russian Idylls, and the First Lady presented Mrs. Gorbachev with a copy of it at Geneva.

Please allow me to forward a suggestion to you which grew from this rather extensive experience of mine in the Soviet Union.

In speaking to various Rotary Clubs, foreign affairs groups, schools, and just last week to the Foreign Affairs Section of the Commonwealth Club of California, I have picked up a good deal of affirmative response for the idea that until the United States and the Soviet Union can begin to develop an important INTERDEPENDENCE between themselves in industry, commerce, science, and agriculture, we cannot live in anything but an atmosphere of destructive cage-building — a threatened and threatening existence. People are impressed that beyond the accomplishment of our needed extended defense program as you have planned it, can be this far-reaching approach to the future of our country in its relationship with the Soviet Union.

Now, this is the question that must be studied. What elements must be in place for the Soviet Union's communist-supported structured socialism and the capital management system of the United States to work together to achieve industrial, commercial, scientific and agricultural INTERDEPENDENCE?

No other program can provide such a realistic basis for peace. Every other approach requires a stringent and threatening military presence, a presence which threatens free capitalism as well as potential Soviet communism by eroding the productive use of credit, to say nothing of its wasteful use of manpower and raw materials.

President Eisenhower understood this (as stated in his speech before The American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953), but I believe he failed to make the important connection between INTERDEPENDENCE and peace.

Impossible and time-consuming as it may seem, this should be the goal.



The President

2

December 10, 1985

Sovietologists are claiming that the Soviet Union has very little to trade with us, and at this moment this may be true (and a discouraging omen for present efforts at trade arrangements).

But do not be taken by those remarks. The Soviets have the capacity to produce anything. They may have to be encouraged. For example, no pencils were manufactured in the Soviet Union before Armand Hammer showed them how. It became a flourishing business. This is the new frontier, and it can involve adapting the non-financial sections of the Marshall Plan idea to expand both of our marketplaces. You have the God-given opportunity to lay this foundation.

If you add a statement of this goal to your defensive plans, your chances of going into history as a peace-maker will truly be assured, and on very constructive grounds. In addition, the general public will be very much relieved.

No one appears to be saying these things except one little speaker I know in the provinces. But I can tell you, Mr. President, that those remarks are being accepted and applauded. I can't do very much about it, but you can.

I attach a more detailed statement which was pretty much the basis of the Lakeside address that I made at the Bohemian Grove in 1984.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Proctor Jones', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Proctor Jones

1

## THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN PROBLEM AND OUR AMERICAN-SOVIET POLICY

Remarks by  
Proctor Jones

Ladies and gentlemen, please let me begin our discussion today by reading a short statement made by President Eisenhower in 1953.

"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.

"This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children."

We will speak today about the Soviet Union, and in terms quite different from those we read in the newspapers or find in government handouts.

It deals with what I believe to be the reasons behind the antagonism between us as nations, and it demonstrates how anti-Soviet policy, resulting in deficits and debt, can radically affect the freedom of American capitalism. The discussion includes what I have come to feel should be our American policy toward the Soviet Union.

My project for photography in the Soviet Union started when the Soviet Consul General in San Francisco noticed my photographic book *Idylls of France*. After looking it over, he invited me to make such a photographic study of his country. Although at the time I did not believe that I could get clearances for such a broad project, I realized that along with such photographic opportunities as might be offered, I would have a chance to see a land and its people about which up to now I had only been told.

Someone has said that a picture is worth a thousand words. As I am an artist-photographer, it occurred to me that my photographs might just say the thousand words needed to bridge the distance between my country and the Soviet Union.

This became the purpose of my project.

With important help from the Soviet Consulate and a bright young Slavic language and literature scholar who was to accompany me, we were finally on our way, with various members of my family certain that they would never see me again.

Finnair took us to Helsinki in one jump.

There we connected immediately with the sunset flight into snow-covered Moscow.

Though one does not pass lightly through Soviet immigration and customs, we were soon enough in our rooms at the National Hotel, looking out at a well-lighted Kremlin just across Karl Marx Square.

As soon as we had checked our luggage, we set out through drafty tunnels under the street to visit Red Square and Lenin's Tomb. As we emerged snow was coming down like lace. We were completely alone except for two frozen guards at attention before the tomb's entrance.

As I stood there looking at this snow-covered mausoleum, I found it hard to believe that I was standing on the historic parade ground which I had seen in newsreels and on television over the last fifty years.

Of the struggle, misery, pain and autocracy which gave Lenin his place in history we are almost totally ignorant.

Our problem with the Soviets today is made more of a problem because of this ignorance and our own willingness to accept misinformation and its resulting faulty political climate.

I have two questions: What is the nature of this alien mass of energy which threatens us? Let me try to construct an informal profile from the words and phrases taken at random and out of context from the statements of some leading Sovietologists, describing various elements of the Soviet Union.

This complex multi-national mass of energy involves — a ritualized and coercive bureaucratic leadership, a propagandizing political monopoly, not without competitive characteristics, depending upon exhausted traditional instruments, subject only to channeled criticism, providing for the generally non-computerized direction of a welfare state for a population of two hundred and seventy million people, supported by a large and well equipped standing army controlling a Soviet bloc of buffer states. Job security — wasteful direction of the workforce — no punishment for job failure — no unemployment — price stability — law and order — public housing, health, and



its people in my day-to-day contact with them, I had no idea. I have now seen in their daily lives many Soviet citizens. I have talked to all of those to whom I could extend my hand. I have shared their television, and I have read their propaganda. I have also seen the school children, the parents, the workers, the soldiers, and police, and the farmers. I saw no barefoot Russians and I saw no evidence of hunger. I didn't see any compelling evidence of discontent, but this may be due to the fact that these people have not yet been exposed to Madison Avenue.

Wherever I went in the Soviet Union, trying to understand them, I noticed that people were trying to figure out who I was. When I caught the eye of someone looking at me, I went over to the person and offered my hand, saying in fractured Russian, "I am an old American from California and I love your country because it is so beautiful." The greeting never failed.

I noticed that mothers seemed to vie with each other to make their children the cleanest, the brightest, the happiest.

I don't know what they teach these youngsters about Americans, but I do know that several groups of them have now met a real live American who tried to speak their language. Some of them tried to say English words, and they were fascinated that I had come from the land of the cowboy.

As I made my photographs, I was not conscious of any serious controls. The assistance given to us never once intruded into our creative efforts.

To my great surprise and as a measure of my ignorance, I found natural beauty rivalling anything I had ever photographed before.

Soviet television gave me unexpected glimpses of the Soviet homeland and their leadership. As we seldom see these things on American television, the experience was impressive.

In restaurants when groups sang, we sang with them, sometimes American songs. You would be amused to hear "Battle Hymn of the Republic" and "I'm An Old Cow Hand from the Rio Grande" sung in Russian.

I must admit I was not trying to seek out dissidents, nor was I bent on talking politics. I was in someone else's home. It was not my

business to suggest that they relocate their kitchen or change the pattern on their wallpaper or, for that matter, correct their interpretation of history.

Nonetheless my project served to generate a new course of thinking for me and unexpected visions for those who have seen my completed work.

It is not difficult to conclude that neither nation's present policy leads to peace or decency. We deal from strength; they deal from strength; neither appreciates that the other has a point of view and a need. Each point of view and need, cry for expression, but in the din of charges and counter-charges, none are noticed.

Since the beginning, groups of people have selfishly forged tenuous security for themselves. In this process, others were subjugated without concern. Today with the equal distribution of nuclear force, we are all subjugated.

It finally filtered through to me that our key to the Soviet problem could be a bona fide effort to grasp their very real concern for the security of their treasure, their natural borders, and the preservation of their system of government.

We have been so busy trying to match megatons and propaganda that leadership seems to have given that premise no thought at all, perhaps because of the futile battle between capitalism and communism going on under the patina of diplomacy.

Prejudice of the years blinds both to the realization that, in the face of the nuclear alternative, our systems must reconcile, live side by side in peace, or perish.

Because of the universal holocaust it threatens, thermo-nuclear danger has to be recognized as a grave international emergency. When it is so recognized, we may be able, the Soviets and ourselves, to overcome the obstacles to cooperation before those unreconciled differences overtake us.

The answer to the problem is not the nuclear freeze, not disarmament conferences, not the never-ending search for deterrents, not groveling surrender, not peace demonstrations, and certainly not isolation. The answer will come with mutual realization that we each share a vital interdependence. Our lives are in the other



education — controlled newspapers, radio, television, and cultural programs — crackdown on dissidents — limited religious activity — suppressed inflation — corruption — ethnic tensions — investment — technological innovation — ambition to play an international role — yearning for strong, incisive leadership — since 1958 possessing the power to blow the United States off the map in 28 minutes — possessing no defense to keep themselves from being blown off the map — enormous untapped mineral wealth — problems of resource allocation — and two national drinks, vodka and Pepsi Cola, one of which is causing a problem.

I must include the fact that the Soviet Union has a new chief of state, Mr. Gorbachev, who recognizes the problems suggested by the matters just mentioned. It is obvious that he must preside over a transitional period from the old habits of the past. Depending on the length of time allowed him to bask in the reflection of a population overjoyed at the prospect of his strong and decisive leadership, he may be able to wheel the Soviet Union in a direction, not only satisfying his people, but also in a direction of peaceful stability with the United States, of which more later.

And, now my second question: What is so badly wanted that Soviets and Americans seem willing to blow up the universe to get it or to keep it? Unfortunately, neither has outlined the problem much further than to indicate that whatever it is, it must be defended or threatened by thermonuclear force.

Along with you, I come to the simple conclusion that as people, we each seek freedom from being threatened. We seek the ability to make our livings, enjoy our families, make our individual political systems work, at least to the extent of carrying away the sewage, providing fresh water to drink, adequate police and fire protection, educating ourselves, and amongst other things, maintaining freedom to operate our marketplace as we see fit. Neither of us wants to see our national treasure stolen. Americans have a very valuable supply of raw materials, and we want to use them to our own benefit. The Soviets have untold billions of the same in Siberia and elsewhere.

Foreign policy today does not provide for the development of a peaceful fall back position

reflecting this philosophy. This is part of our new frontier.

Understanding these concerns is our problem, yours and mine, and of course that of our elected representatives, including the President.

Our generally held prejudices relative to the Soviet Union and theirs towards us, are stumbling blocks to this understanding.

When the Bolsheviks murdered the Czar and his family and seized the private means of production, and indeed all private property, the worst fears of capitalistic America were realized.

Short-sighted American leadership felt called upon to fight what they thought was a socialist threat to our own economy. The weapons used with varying intensity for nearly seventy years consisted of our brand of propaganda and economic sanctions.

The Soviets undertook to spread similar exaggerated and vicious propaganda about the West.

The result is that today, faced with nuclear destruction, whatever international mechanism we had between us, is no longer available for honest conversation. Worse than that, the leadership doesn't recognize that this mechanism has ceased to function. We are faced with a Tower of Babel. Our efforts are confusing and misdirected.

Instead of worrying about the socialist or communist boogey-man, we should be concerned that we are, by pursuing abrasive anti-Soviet policy, wastefully challenging the freedom of our capital management system with an overburgeoning debt and deficit.

Thus, without war, without invasion, without a bomb being dropped, we are literally scaring ourselves out of our system instead of meeting the challenge in the American frontier spirit of our pioneering forefathers.

We don't understand the Soviet psyche. That's part of the frontier. We have no idea of the depressing human conditions which forced a long series of revolutionary efforts, culminating in the revolution of 1917. We do not recognize the scars left by a grim history of invasion, the last of which they say cost 20 million lives. Instead, we charge them with paranoia and attack their government.

Of some of this I had understanding prior to my visit. But what I would actually find amongst



10  
fellow's hands, and theirs in ours. If this interdependence can be extended in the time ahead to include economics, science, and agriculture, the need for the armed camp will disappear.

We should not worry about how this mutuality of interest can be reached, but be guided by the belief that it can be reached. In some manner if the treasure which is being fought for can be attained through the channels of commerce and industry to everyone's advantage, wouldn't that be worth the time, energy and expense of study?

If that seems too difficult for our public representatives to understand, they should not be returned to positions of public responsibility.

Communism, as I saw it operating in the western Soviet Union, is there to stay, even as we feel capitalism is with us to stay. No affordable force on our part is going to chisel away the communist base. But as is suggested indirectly by President Eisenhower's statement, if Americans continue to support policy, wasteful of our natural and human resources, against the threat of communism instead of working to reconcile our interests, we might as well say goodbye to American freedom as we have known it.

At the outset of these remarks, I tried to draw a profile of the Soviet Union. Aware as we are of what we see as a stark structure, we must, without prejudice to our system or theirs and without threat to the internal security of either, integrate American and Soviet peaceful self-interests. We must insist that our leaders investigate the avenues to the integration and the interdependence we need to satisfy our mutual concerns for the universal improvement of the human condition.

Once this policy is set, the United States and the Soviet Union, in this otherwise insecure twilight zone of existence, can together begin to bring effective answers to the matters troubling the world's surface today, which alone, we cannot; which alone, they cannot. This is our new frontier.

Of course if it is true that there is a mutual lust for treasure, then the promised joys of liberty may as well be forgotten, while we spend that treasure to kill each other.

In a recent article in *The New Yorker*, George Kennan, our former ambassador to the Soviet Union, said "The issue of war and peace is the

crucial issue. The others, real or fancied, Angola, Afghanistan, Central America, human rights, what you will, all pale beside it. These others can wait. The crucial issue cannot."

We have the option of interdependence or the option of continued American and Soviet independence, threatened and threatening, a continued wasteful pursuit for superiority in fire power to the great profit of the military and industrial complex, the \$500 hammer, the \$1,400 toilet seat, the \$2,000 ashtray, and the deteriorating human condition. How can we honestly rationalize such policy to our posterity?

In view of the terrible alternative, let our policy makers be encouraged by each of us to develop a program to implement the suggestions of this paper. Let them start breaking the ice with the Soviets, and keep breaking it until the Soviets notice. This should be the goal of our American-Soviet policy.

To sum up, we should:

1. Accept the fact that communism and capitalism must reconcile their differences.
2. Develop an understanding of the life and death interdependency which exists between the United States and the Soviet Union.
3. Develop a meaningful exchange program.
4. Learn the language.
5. Stop name calling.
6. Stop wasting time disagreeing about the size, shape and number of our weaponry. Maintain what we need for internal defense. We don't need disarmament conferences to decide that.
7. Impress members of congress with your idea. Foreign policy eventually follows public opinion.
8. As we develop policy, equate its desired result against its effect upon the human condition.

When you analyze these conclusions, it is simple enough at first glance to pass them off as naive. I submit to you that they may also suggest the beginnings of a blueprint for the public safety and prosperity of the American people which no amount of nuclear force can guarantee.

Proctor Jones      Telephone: (415) 922-9222  
3401 Sacramento Street, San Francisco, CA 94118

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 7, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO WILLIAM F. MARTIN

**SIGNED**

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*  
SUBJECT: Recommendation re Jones Remarks on  
American-Soviet Policy

I have reviewed Proctor Jones' letter to the President and do not agree with the basic proposition: that economic "interdependence" would guarantee peace between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I have no objection in having this letter sent to the President. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Chew for your signature.

Steve Sestanovich concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *WFM*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Martin-Chew Memorandum

Tab A Proctor Jones Letter to the President

54-C 12  
0061

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 10, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Pavlovskis re Release of  
Latvian Human and National Rights Activists

I have reviewed and concur, with minor changes, with the draft response (Tab A) to Olgerts R. Pavlovskis, President, World Federation of Free Latvians. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Sally Kelley for your signature noting our concurrence.

*WK* Raymond, *SS* Sestanovich and *JM* Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Sally Kelley  
Tab A Draft Reply  
Tab II Incoming

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Pavlovskis re Release  
of Latvian Human and National Rights Activists

We have reviewed and concur, with our changes annotated, with the draft response to Olgerts R. Pavlovskis, President, World Federation of Free Latvians.

Attachment:

Tab A Draft Response



Department of State

Suggested Reply

Dear Dr. Pavlovskis:

Thank you for your letter of November 8, 1985, regarding Gunars Astra, Int Calitis, and Gunars Freiman, who are imprisoned in the Soviet Union.

We have consistently condemned Soviet persecution of Christians and other religious believers. Such measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and we have strongly called for Soviet compliance with their own undertakings in that agreement. In bilateral exchanges with the Soviets, we have made it unequivocally clear that their abuses of individual rights have a serious detrimental effect on US-USSR relations.

The United States Government is also very concerned about the pervasive Soviet use of psychiatric "treatment" as an instrument of political repression, particularly in the cases of religious dissenters. We have publicly condemned these

The Honorable

Olgerts R. Pavlovskis PhD

World Federation of Free Latvians

Post Office Box 4016,

Rockville, Maryland.

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abuses in many forums, including CSCE and the UN Human Rights Commission.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Government has not been responsive to our efforts or to those of other concerned Western governments and independent human rights organizations. The Soviets persist in maintaining the incarceration of "criminals" on essentially religious grounds is an exclusively internal policy matter.

~~While we condemn such arbitrary and inhumane behavior, and have often made this known to Soviet officials, we lack the ability to~~  
*STRONG CONCERN OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ABOUT THE*  
~~alleviate the circumstances of prisoners of psychiatric hospital~~  
*THE SOVIET UNION.*  
~~detainees in any direct fashion.~~ *OR*  
*WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO SECURE AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR SITUATION.*

If we can be of assistance to you in this or any other matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

0061 16

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8533876

Date December 20, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Olgerts R. Pavlovskis Ph.D

Date: November 7, 1985 Subject: The Release of Three Latvian Human  
and National Rights Activists from Soviet Gulag

WH Referral Dated: November 15, 1985 NSC ID# 360300

(if any)

           The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

  X   A draft reply is attached.

       A draft reply will be forwarded.

       A translation is attached.


       An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.

       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.

       Other.

Remarks:

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

17  
8523876

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE  
REFERRAL

NOVEMBER 15, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:  
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:  
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 360300  
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1985  
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN  
FROM: DR. OLGERTS R. PAVLOVSKIS PH.D.  
PRESIDENT  
WORLD FEDERATION OF FREE LATVIANS  
POST OFFICE BOX 4016  
ROCKVILLE MD 20850


SUBJECT: REQUESTS PRESIDENT TO ASK MR. GORBACHEV TO  
RELEASE THREE LATVIAN HUMAN AND NATIONAL  
RIGHTS ACTIVISTS FROM SOVIET GULAG

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE





# EXPEDITE

ID #

88300 18

FD 00600

## WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☐ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence  
Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 / 1

8533876

Name of Correspondent: Olgerts R. Pavlovskis, Ph.D.☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Requests President to ask Mr. Gorbachev to  
release three Latvian human & national rights  
activists from Soviet Gulag.

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>PLKWE</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>85/11/12</u>			<u>1 / 1</u>
<u>V99DOS</u>	Referral Note: <u>D</u>	<u>85/11/15</u>			<u>1 / 1</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1 / 1</u>			<u>1 / 1</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1 / 1</u>			<u>1 / 1</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1 / 1</u>			<u>1 / 1</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1 / 1</u>			<u>1 / 1</u>

#### ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action  
C - Comment/Recommendation  
D - Draft Response  
F - Furnish Fact Sheet  
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary  
R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
S - For Signature  
X - Interim Reply

#### DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered  
B - Non-Special Referral  
C - Completed  
S - Suspended

#### FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
Code = "A"  
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

# EXPEDITE

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional  
Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_

**EX-101**  
Media: 8

Individual Codes: 4400 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime

Subject Code: FO 006.09

Secondary

Subject Codes: HU 013.79 HU \_\_\_\_\_

IL 003. CO 165. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
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C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
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DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____
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### SIGNATURE CODES:

#### CPn - Presidential Correspondence

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

#### CLn - First Lady's Correspondence

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

#### CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence

- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

### MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

360300

20

# WORLD FEDERATION OF FREE LATVIANS

AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION  
LATVIAN FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND  
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR LATVIAN FREEDOM  
LATVIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION IN CANADA  
LATIN AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION

8533876



November 8, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

We are forwarding the names of three prominent Latvian human and national rights activists who are presently serving prison terms in the Soviet Gulag: Gunars Astra, Ints Calitis and Gunars Freimanis. All three men have been adopted by the Amnesty International. The latter two, I. Calitis and G. Freimanis, have close relatives: a cousin and an aunt and a brother, respectively, residing in the United States who are citizens of this country. We are also enclosing two letters, Mr. President, one from Calitis' cousin and the other from Freimanis' brother.

On behalf of the American Latvians, we respectfully ask that you raise the issue of these three men, whose only crime was a sincere respect for human rights and a love for their native country, in your talks with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and request that these individuals be released from the Gulag.

Thank you very much, Mr. President!

Sincerely yours,



Olgerts R. Pavlovskis, Ph.D.  
President

Enclosures: A letter addressed to the President of the United States from the Rev. Juris Calitis.  
A letter addressed to the President of the United States from Mr. Laimons Freimanis  
Case histories of G. Astra, I. Calitis and G. Freimanis.



# WORLD FEDERATION OF FREE LATVIANS

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LATVIAN FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND  
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LATVIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION IN CANADA  
LATIN AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION



GUNARS ASTRA, born 1931 (Address in prison: 618263 Permskaya obl., Chusovskoy rayon, pos., Kuchino uchr. VS-389/36-1 U.S.S.R.), a well known human and national rights advocate was sentenced on December 19, 1983 to serve seven years in strict regime labor camp, plus five years exile. Astra was accused of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

During the legal proceedings, prosecutor Batarags reproached Astra for the "harboring of anti-Soviet literature, with intent to distribute such in order to destroy and weaken the Soviet state." What constituted this subversive literature? According to the presiding judge, such literature included George Orwell's 1984, Anslavs Eglitis' The Five Days, and books by Germanis and Balodis about the history of Latvia.

The court also reproached Astra for translating and rewriting the so-called Baltic dissident statement, in which Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian human and national rights fighters demanded the nullification of the 1939 Stalin-Hitler nonaggression pact. The European Parliament used the Baltic statement in its request to the United Nations to review the decolonization of the Baltic States.

Prosecutor Batarags based the severity of the sentence upon the present "strained international situation."



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LATIN AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION



INTS CALITIS, born 1931 (Address in prison: 618810 Permskaya obl., Chusovskoy rayon, st. Vsesvyatskaya uchr., Vs-389/35 U.S.S.R.), a Latvian human rights activist and an advocate of Baltic cooperation, was sentenced to six years of imprisonment by the Supreme Court of the Latvian S.S.R. in Riga for activities deemed hostile to the state. He was accused of violating Article 65, section 2 (anti-Sovie agitation and propaganda) of the Latvian S.S.R. criminal code.

Ints Calitis was one of the signatories of the predominantly Baltic dissident statement of August 23, 1979, challenging the legitimacy of the Stalin-Hitler pact and the secret protocol appended to it (The Soviet-German agreement stipulated that, in the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the northern frontier of Lithuania was to serve as the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R). The Baltic and Russian dissidents, including I. Calitis, asked that the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare the Stalin-Hitler pact and its secret protocol null and void and that the United Nations implement the right of self-determination for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

# WORLD FEDERATION OF FREE LATVIANS

AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION  
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LATVIAN NATIONAL FEDERATION IN CANADA  
LATIN AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION



GUNARS FREIMANIS, born 1927 (Address in prison: 618263 Permskaya obl., Chusovskoy rayon, pos., Kuchino, uchr. Vs-389/36 U.S.S.R.), a Latvian poet (whose work was not allowed to be published in occupied Latvia) was brought to trial on December 1, 1983, in Riga. Freimanis was tried together with Gunars Astra. It is not clear why the two cases were handled by the Soviet court at the same time. Perhaps the reason was that both Freimanis and Astra were charged by the Prosecutor, Ints Batarags, with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. The charges were upheld by the court and Judge Aivars Krumins sentenced Gunars Freimanis to four years in strict regime labor camp plus five years in exile.

Gunars Freimanis is one of six Latvian human and national rights activists arrested during the KGB crackdown on dissidents in Latvia starting on January 6, 1983. Prior to Freimanis' arrest at the end of March 1983, the KGB searched his apartment at 86 Darzciema Street in Riga and ransacked his summer cottage in Carnikava. Some papers, including Freimanis' poetry and Western publications, were confiscated. While Freimanis was in detention at the KGB prison in Riga, he suffered a heart attack and his health is seriously impaired.



24  
*Svētā Andreja evaņģēliski luteriska latviešu draudze*

**St. Andrew's Ev. Lutheran Latvian Church**  
**Mācītājs Juris Cālītis**

November 3, 1985

Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
of America  
White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing this letter as an appeal to you in connection with your forthcoming meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Since you have so often been willing to address the Soviet Union with candor and courage on its appalling record on human rights, I have great trust in your good offices on behalf of my cousin, Mr. Ints Calitis, who is presently incarcerated in a Soviet Prison. He was convicted in 1983 on charges of spreading anti-Soviet propaganda.

My cousin, aged 55, is born in Latvia, married, with three young children. He received his recent six-year sentence for being a signatory to several petitions seeking elementary human rights for Latvia and Latvians. He was also a signatory to a request that the Baltic territories and the Baltic Sea be included in the late Party Secretary Brezhnev's proposed nuclear free zone of Northern Europe. All of these petitions were done in the spirit of the Helsinki Accords. These ordinary requests to the Soviet Government were viewed by the courts as a danger to the State. Mr. Calitis has spent previous long terms in Soviet prisons on a record of working for the human and national rights of Latvians.

I am a citizen of the United States and currently the pastor of a congregation of the Lutheran Church in America located in Toronto, Canada. I know that you recognize that respect for human rights is an integral part of any plan (or hope) for meaningful moves toward world peace. An appeal to General Secretary Gorbachev may restore a father to his family, and would be both a humanitarian gesture and a stand for human dignity and justice. I appeal on his behalf.

With every good wish and God-speed for your meetings, I am,  
Sincerely yours, *Juris Calitis* Juris Cālītis, pastor

Church: 383 Jarvis St., Toronto, Ont., M5B 2C7, 416-924-1563

25  
1411 Aldenham Lane  
Reston, VA 22090

November 6, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am a native of Latvia and have been a United States citizen since 1954. This country has given me an opportunity to live in freedom as well as to achieve higher education and professional fulfillment. The rest of my family, however, who did not have a chance to leave Latvia, have not been as fortunate.

Today, I ask you, Mr. President, to help my brother, Gunārs Freimanis, who in his poetry has expressed the aspirations of the Latvian people for freedom from the Soviet domination. As a result, he has been deported to the Gulag in the Soviet Union already three times, the last being in 1983, when after reading his poetry, he was arrested and convicted to 5 years hard labor. He has a wife and two daughters, the younger one in her teens, from whom he has been separated by now for many years.

I am his only relative in the West, and he has relied on me in the past for moral and spiritual support. Since his last arrest, however, the Soviet authorities have denied me any communication with my brother who, as I understand from his family, is in ill health. His only hope and consolation is in the knowledge that he has not been forgotten and that the free world supports his cause.

Therefore, I kindly ask you, Mr. President, that in your deliberations with Mr. Gorbachev, you speak up for human rights as expressed in the Helsinki Accords. And I sincerely hope that as a result of your stand on this issue some channel of communication can be opened up for me with my brother, and that others who dared to express their conscience and are suffering the consequences can be helped as well.

Respectfully yours,

Laimons Freimanis

Laimons Freimanis



JW-C  
26NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Thank You Letter to Amb Dobrynin

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed Presidential letter (Tab A) to Ambassador Dobrynin thanking him for his Christmas gift. Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum to John E. Hilboldt for your signature.

Sestanovich and Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I	Martin-Hilboldt Memo
Tab A	Proposed Presidential Letter
Tab B	Greeting Card from Amb Dobrynin

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN E. HILBOLDT

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Presidential Thank You Letter to Ambassador  
Dobrynin

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed Presidential letter to Ambassador Dobrynin (Tab A) thanking him for his Christmas gift.

## Attachments:

Tab A	Presidential Thank You Letter
Tab B	Greeting Card from Ambassador Dobrynin

28  
0169

January 3, 1986

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Dobrynin for your kind thought of us at Christmas. Your warm holiday greetings and the handsome wood plaque were truly appreciated. Please know that you and Mrs. Dobrynin have our warm best wishes for every happiness in the new year.

Sincerely,  
RR

His Excellency Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Ambassador of the the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics

Add to envelope:

1125 - 16th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

RR:CMF:JEH:AVH

DISPATCH THRU STATE VIA NSC.

gH



Dear Mr. President and Mrs. Reagan

With very best wishes of happiness and  
good health.

The Ambassador  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
and Mrs. A. Dobrynin

Send Season's Greetings and Best Wishes  
for the New Year

Happy New Year!

A. Dobrynin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*Eyes only* 24  
*Chron File*

January 13, 1985

TO : Don Fortier  
FROM : Jack F. Matlock *JFM*  
SUBJECT : Tass on US/Libya

Sorry for delay; was nursing cold/flu last week.

I believe the Soviets had multiple objectives in mind in this propaganda campaign:

- (1) Deter U.S. military action by raising a clamor;
- (2) Make hay with Arab extremists;
- (3) Have splitting effect on Allied opinion by making it seem U.S. is trigger-happy and following dangerous course.

What is missing is any suggestion that Soviets would act militarily to oppose U.S. action against Libya.

However, they will doubtless try to garner some "credit" for U.S. restraint.

In my opinion, the Soviets would do absolutely nothing with their own forces -- other than positioning them in awkward places -- if we actually undertook a military strike. *(If some of their folks in Libya got hit, they would swallow it.)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4 #8057

BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/9/11*

JACK MATLOCK / STEVE SESTANOVICH 31

For views on what this  
does and doesn't mean.

Thanks

Dan



JH-C  
39

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0174

January 13, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JH*

SUBJECT:

Geneva Exchanges Initiatives

Plans to implement the President's Geneva Exchanges Initiatives have moved more slowly than we originally anticipated, partly because of Ambassador Salgo's withdrawal as Coordinator. Charlie Wick has identified a replacement (Steve Rhinesmith) whom we have interviewed, and he looks very strong. Shultz has already noted to Dobrynin that Rhinesmith will be our coordinator. (Rhinesmith's biographic profile is attached.) Rhinesmith is prepared to start to work immediately.

There are still a number of policy questions which need to be addressed early on, including the various agency responsibilities with respect to the initiatives, and security guidelines and procedures. Therefore, it is important that we have an interagency group which can discuss these issues at a policy level, vet the proposals and provide general oversight for their implementation.

To underline the importance the President attaches to these initiatives, I propose that we establish an Interagency Group for the Geneva Exchanges Initiatives to be chaired by myself and to include initially senior representatives, at the Assistant Secretary level, of State, USIA, Justice (including FBI and INS), CIA, and DOD, as well as NSC staff. The group would meet as required, and report to principals on progress in fulfilling the President's mandate. The first meeting would be convened this week, and the first order of business would be to seek agency views on the draft NSDD.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo at Tab I establishing the IG, and authorize Bill Martin to send the attached memo to his counterparts announcing the first meeting of the IG and the agenda. Once the agency representatives are identified, we will forward the NSDD text draft to them.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



Sm. Brier

32

Current listing of: T10066:3  
Slug: IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL ARTICLE VI  
Category: FBIS

01/07/86 13:53 Page: 1  
Date: 01/07/86 13:10:31  
Story: 077

TAKE 1 OF 3 -- IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL ARTICLE  
PM071706 MOSCOW IZVESTIYA IN RUSSIAN 8 JAN 86 MORNING EDITION P 5  
(EDITORIAL ARTICLE: "CONCERNING THE EXACERBATION OF THE  
SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN")

(TEXT) PEOPLES IN THE WORLD AWAITED THE ONSET OF 1986 WITH REVIVED HOPES FOR CHANGES FOR THE BETTER IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. THE GENEVA DIALOGUE OFFERED GENERALLY FAVORABLE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS, FOR ENHANCEMENT OF STABILITY IN THE WORLD ARENA AND REGIONAL SECTORS, AND FOR REDUCTION OF THE THREAT OF WAR.

BUT THE FIRST DAYS OF THE YEAR ARE ELAPSING BENEATH THE SIGN OF ACUTE EXACERBATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. FACTS INDICATE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS EMBARKED ON A COURSE OF WHIPPING UP TENSION IN THIS REGION. FURTHERMORE, HAND IN HAND WITH ITS "STRATEGIC PARTNER" -- TEL AVIV -- WASHINGTON HAS LAUNCHED PREPARATIONS FOR DIRECT MILITARY OPERATIONS CAPABLE OF EVOLVING INTO OPEN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOVEREIGN ARAB STATE OF LIBYA. BACK ON 30 DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR A U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SPOKESMAN DECLARED THAT THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION "HAS TAKEN MEASURES AIMED AT EXERTING DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON LIBYA," AND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO STUDY MEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN IN THIS DIRECTION, "RESERVING ITS RIGHT TO CHOOSE THE MILITARY OPTION." TO JUDGE BY EVERYTHING, THE FINAL CHOICE IS YET TO BE MADE, BUT THE SCALES ON THE BANKS OF THE POTOMAC ARE TIPPING PRECISELY TOWARD THE "MILITARY OPTION."

DECLASSIFIED/RE/04502)  
NLR 6-11/4 7808  
BY AL NARA DATE 1/23/04

ACCORDING TO U.S. PRESS REPORTS, AT THE WHITE HOUSE'S URGENT REQUEST THE PENTAGON PREPARED A DETAILED LIST OF POSSIBLE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST LIBYA, INCLUDING A LIST OF POSSIBLE TARGETS FOR STRIKES, AS EARLY AS LAST WEEK. THE "OPERATIONS" RANGE FROM SUPPORT FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON TARGETS SITUATED IN LIBYA TO THE USE OF B-52 STRATEGIC BOMBERS STATIONED IN THE UNITED STATES FOR BOMBING RAIDS AGAINST THAT COUNTRY. THESE PLANS ARE ALREADY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE.

THE U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER "CORAL SEA" SAILED FROM NAPLES 3 JANUARY AND TOOK A COURSE TOWARD THE LIBYAN SHORES. IT HAS FOUR SQUADRONS OF F-18 FIGHTER-BOMBERS, ONE SQUADRON OF A-16 GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT, AND SEVERAL E2-C AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND



Current listing of: T10066:3

01/07/86 13:53 Page: 2

MONITORING AIRCRAFT ON BOARD. THIS "FLOATING AIRSTRIP" IS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO CRUISERS, TWO DESTROYERS, AND TWO FRIGATES. SUBUNITS FROM THE "RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES" ARE BEING TRANSFERRED TO SHIPS OF THE U.S. 6TH FLEET OPERATING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND IN PARTICULAR FROM THE BASE SITUATED IN WESTERN EGYPT.

U.S. F-111 BOMBERS HAVE ARRIVED ON BRITISH TERRITORY FROM THE UNITED STATES. PEOPLE IN THE PENTAGON MAKE NO SECRET OF THEIR INTENTION TO USE THESE AIRCRAFT, WHICH ARE FITTED WITH EQUIPMENT FOR LOW-ALTITUDE NIGHT FLIGHT AND CARRY LASER-GUIDED BOMBS ON BOARD, FOR STRIKES AGAINST LIBYA. SPECIAL EA-6B AIRCRAFT, FITTED WITH ELECTRONIC APPARATUS FOR ANTI-AIR DEFENSE JAMMING, HAVE BEEN SECRETLY TRANSFERRED FROM A U.S. AIR FORCE BASE IN WASHINGTON STATE TO SIGONELLA BASE, LOCATED ON ITALY'S ISLAND OF SICILY. THIS SQUADRON IS DUE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER TASK FORCE THAT HAS MOVED FROM NAPLES TO THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN.

ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED FOR A TASK FORCE OF U.S. NAVY SHIPS BASED IN NORFOLK (VIRGINIA), CONSISTING OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER "AMERICA," THE BATTLESHIP "IOWA," AND ANOTHER EIGHT SUPPORT SHIPS, TO PREPARE FOR A 10-DAY CROSSING OF THE ATLANTIC.

TO PUT IT BRIEFLY, THE UNITED STATES IS OPENLY BUILDING UP ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL AIMED AGAINST LIBYA. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN PLACED IN A STATE OF HEIGHTENED COMBAT READINESS, INCLUDING THE CANCELLATION OF LEAVE FOR ALL U.S. SERVICEMEN IN ITALY AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

(MORE)

7 JAN 1802Z RDC



Current listing of: T10075:3  
Slug:TAKE 2 OF 3 -- 077 (IZVESTIYA  
Category:FBIS

01/07/86 13:52 Page: 1  
Date: 01/07/86 13:21:00  
Story: 078

///WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

PM071708

(TEXT) ISRAEL IS STEPPING UP ITS CORRESPONDING MILITARY  
ACTIVENESS (TOTALLY COORDINATED WITH THE UNITED STATES, OF COURSE).

THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN PRESS REPORTS ABOUT A STATE OF COMBAT  
READINESS ("IN CONNECTION WITH THE TENSE SITUATION") IN THE ARMED  
FORCES OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

THESE PREPARATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE TO THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF A  
NOISY CAMPAIGN OF SLANDER AND THREATS POURING OUT OF WASHINGTON AND  
TEL AVIV AGAINST THE LIBYAN JAMAHIRIYAH. THE UNITED STATES AND  
ISRAEL HAVE CHOSEN THE TERRORIST ACTS COMMITTED AT VIENNA AND ROME  
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS 27 DECEMBER AS A PRETEXT FOR THE LATEST ANTI-  
LIBYAN CAMPAIGN. IT IS HITHERTO UNKNOWN WHO WAS BEHIND THE  
TERRORISTS AND WHO GUIDED THEM. QUITE A FEW STORIES ARE IN  
CIRCULATION. THERE ARE SOME AMONG THEM WHICH POINT OUT, IN  
PARTICULAR, THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROVOCATION AIMED AT SUPPLYING THE  
UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WITH A PRETEXT FOR WHIPPING UP TENSION IN  
THE NEAR EAST AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A WHOLE.

THE COMPETENT ITALIAN AND AUSTRIAN SERVICES ARE CONDUCTING  
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE TERRORIST ACTS. ONLY TIME WILL SHOW WHAT  
CONCLUSIONS THEY WILL DRAW, BUT TIME HAS ALREADY SHOWN -- AND  
CONTINUES TO SHOW -- WHO HAS BENEFITED FROM THE TRAGIC EVENTS ON  
ONE OF THE LAST DAYS OF DECEMBER. THE ECHO OF SHOTS AND GRENADE  
EXPLOSIONS HAD NOT YET DIED DOWN AT ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS AND  
WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV HASTENED TO PROCLAIM THAT LIBYA IS "A HAVEN  
FOR TERRORISTS."

THEY DID NOT TAKE THE TROUBLE TO SEEK SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS.  
THEY ACTED, AND CONTINUE TO ACT, ACCORDING TO THE SCHEME THAT "ONE  
IS LIKELY TO SUSPECT THAT THE TERRORISTS POSSIBLY HAD LINKS WITH  
SOME ORGANIZATION WHICH MAY HAVE SOME CONNECTION OR OTHER WITH  
LIBYA." A CRUDE APPROACH, BUT FAR FROM A NEW ONE.

A STATEMENT BY THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU FOR FOREIGN LIAISON,  
DISTRIBUTED AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND  
SECURITY COUNCIL, NOTES: "OUR COUNTRY CONDEMNS AND REJECTS ANY  
ACTS WHICH HURT TOTALLY INNOCENT PEOPLE AND ENDANGER THEIR LIVES.  
ITS LAWS PROHIBIT AND CONDEMN SUCH ACTS AND PROVIDE THE MOST SEVERE  
PENALTIES FOR THOSE COMMITTING THEM." AS REGARDS THE ANTI-LIBYAN

BY CA NARA DATE 1/23/09

NLR 606-11414-8059

DECLASSIFIED 12/10/09

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Current listing of: T10075:3 01/07/86 13:52 Page: 2  
1CAMPAIGN CONDUCTED UNDER THE PRETEXT OF "COMBATTING TERRORISM," THE  
DOCUMENT EMPHASIZES THAT IT IS AIMED AT "PREPARATION FOR ARMED  
AGGRESSION AGAINST LIBYA."

SO WHERE ARE THE SOURCES OF THIS AGGRESSIVENESS ON THE PART OF THE  
UNITED STATES AND ITS "STRATEGIC PARTNER" -- ISRAEL -- TOWARD LIBYA,

WHICH DID NOT COME ABOUT TODAY BUT HAS BEEN INCREASING WITH THE  
PASSAGE OF TIME? WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV DO NOT CONCEAL THE FACT  
THAT NEITHER THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST POLICY OF THAT COUNTRY, NOR ITS  
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, NOR ITS GROWING  
INFLUENCE ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION ARE  
TO THEIR LIKING. HENCE THE CONSTANT ATTEMPTS BY ANY MEANS TO MAKE  
LIBYA SHARPLY ALTER ITS FOREIGN POLICY COURSE AND TO ADAPT THAT  
COURSE TO A PATTERN CAST (ZATVERZHDENNY) ON THE BANKS OF THE  
POTOMAC.

LIBYA IS BY NO MEANS AN EXCEPTION IN THIS RESPECT. THE U.S.  
ADMINISTRATION, IN ITS DOCTRINE OF "NEW GLOBALISM," MAKES ALL STATES  
OF THE WORLD EQUAL IN TERMS OF THEIR RIGHTS. IT MAKES THEM EQUAL  
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ITS GREAT POWER POSITIONS, ITS CLAIMS TO  
HEGEMONISM, ITS INTOLERANCE OF THE MANIFESTATION OF INDEPENDENCE,  
AND ITS POSITIONS OF DICTAT AND PRESSURE. THIS WHOLE "COMPLEX OF  
INTERFERENCE," WHICH DISTINGUISHES WASHINGTON'S APPROACH TO  
INTERRELATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD, IS MUCH IN EVIDENCE TODAY, AT  
A TIME WHEN THE TEMPERATURE IS BEING RAISED OFF THE SHORES OF LIBYA  
AND THROUGHOUT THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION.

IN PREPARING TO USE MILITARY FORCE AGAINST A SOVEREIGN STATE THE  
UNITED STATES IS MAKING USE OF THE BUGBEAR OF THE "STRUGGLE AGAINST  
TERRORISM" FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURSUING A POLICY OF STATE TERRORISM --  
A POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE VAST MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

AT THE 39TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION IN 1984 A RESOLUTION WAS  
ADOPTED "ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF A POLICY OF STATE TERRORISM AND  
ANY ACTIONS BY STATES AIMED AT UNDERMINING THE SOCIOPOLITICAL  
SYSTEM IN OTHER SOVEREIGN STATES." AS AN INITIATOR OF THIS  
RESOLUTION, THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDED FROM THE PREMISE THAT ANY  
ACTIONS IN RELATIONS AMONG STATES AIMED AT UNDERMINING THE  
SOCIOPOLITICAL SYSTEM LEAD TO THE WRECKING OF THE POSSIBILITY FOR  
ENSURING THE PEACEFUL NATURE OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS. AS A  
VIOLATION OF THE ELEMENTARY INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF CONDUCT AND

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IMORALITY, ANY FORMS AND METHODS OF STATE TERRORISM ARE ESPECIALLY  
DANGEROUS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE WHEN THEY CAN LEAD TO PERNICIOUS.  
CONSEQUENCES -- NOT ONLY FOR ONE'S OWN PEOPLES BUT, ALSO FOR THEIR  
VERY EXISTENCE.

(MORE)

7 JAN 1811Z RDC



Current listing of: T10091:3  
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Category:FBIS

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Date: 01/07/86 13:44:38  
Story: 082

///THEIR VERY EXISTANCE.  
PM071710

(TEXT) CONSONANT WITH THE TIMES AND CORRESPONDING TO THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND SECURITY ON OUR PLANET, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL RECEIVED BROAD SUPPORT EXPRESSED IN THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION, BUT THE UNITED STATES ABSTAINED DURING THE VOTING. WAS THIS NOT IN ORDER TO KEEP ITS HANDS FREE FOR THE ACTIONS THAT WASHINGTON IS TAKING TODAY AGAINST LIBYA? OR AGAINST NICARAGUA, AFGHANISTAN, AND ANGOLA?

THE EVENTS THAT ARE UNFOLDING JUST NOW IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION ATTEST THAT INFLUENTIAL FORCES EXIST IN THE UNITED STATES THAT ARE INTERESTED IN RESERVING FOR THEMSELVES THE "RIGHT" TO A POLICY OF STATE TERRORISM AND PREPARED TO PURSUE SUCH A POLICY. THE QUESTION ARISES: HOW FAR ARE THESE FORCES PREPARED TO GO AND HOW FAR CAN THEY GO? THIS QUESTION WAS RECENTLY PUT BY NEWSMEN TO U.S. PRESIDENT R. REAGAN. THE HEAD OF THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION WAS ABOUT TO TRY TO GET AWAY WITH ASSURANCES THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS DOING "NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY" IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, BUT ASKED THE BLUNT QUESTION: "DOES THIS MEAN, MR PRESIDENT, THAT YOU ENVISION A MILITARY RESPONSE TO LIBYA?" R. REAGAN GAVE THE CURT REPLY: "NO COMMENT."

THUS, THE PRESIDENT DID NOT GIVE A BRIEF AND LUCID ANSWER ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD LIBYA. HOW SHOULD THIS BE INTERPRETED? DOES THIS NOT GIVE RISE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT POSSIBLY OPEN HOSTILITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA? ALL OTHER STATES CANNOT FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS FACT, AND THEY DO SO BECAUSE THE UNLEASHING OF UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE LIBYAN JAMAHARIYAH COULD ENTAIL THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE -- AND NOT JUST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: LOCATED AT THE CROSSROADS OF THREE CONTINENTS, THIS REGION IS LINKED BY A COMMONALITY OF DESTINIES WITH EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA, AND THE NEAR EAST.

THE STATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION IS BY NO MEANS A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE FOR THE SOVIET UNION -- AND IT IS NOT JUST THAT THE RELATIONS THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE USSR AND LIBYA ARE OF A CLOSE AND LASTING NATURE AND ARE BASED ON LONG-STANDING TRADITIONS AND THE MANIFESTATION OF PROFOUND LIKING AND MUTUAL RESPECT BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND LIBYAN PEOPLES. OUR COUNTRY'S COURSE TOWARD THIS REGION IS ALSO DETERMINED BY THE FACT THAT THE USSR, AS A MEDITERRANEAN POWER, HAS A VITAL INTEREST

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Current listing of: T10091:3

01/07/86 13:57 Page: 2

1 IN THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN. OUR  
COUNTRY PROCEEDS FROM THE CONVICTION THAT IN THIS PARTICULAR  
REGION, JUST AS ANYWHERE ON EARTH, ALL PROBLEMS AND ALL SITUATIONS  
THAT ARE FROUGHT WITH CONFLICT MUST BE OVERCOME SOLELY BY PEACEFUL  
MEANS AND SOLELY BY POLITICAL MEANS.

THE SITUATION CAN STILL BE CONTROLLED AND STILL ALLOWS ONE TO  
STOP BEFORE THE DANGER MARK IS CROSSED (ESHCHE POZVOLYAYET  
OSTANOVITSYA U OPASNOY CHERTY). THERE IS STILL TIME TO CURTAIL THE  
MILITARY PREPARATIONS, TO RENOUNCE PLANS FOR INFLECTING STRIKES  
AGAINST LIBYA, AND TO REBUFF ISRAEL, WHICH IS ITCHING FOR  
ADVENTURES. JUST NOW THERE IS STILL TIME. THE QUESTION IS SIMPLY  
WHETHER WASHINGTON WILL MANAGE TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE DECISION FROM A  
POSITION OF RESTRAINT, CONSCIOUS OF ALL ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE  
MORROW.

(ENDALL)

7 JAN 1819Z RDC

40  
Wf Kd G JL  
Walt Raymond, Ken DeGraffenreid, Dave Majors, John Lenczowski,  
Judy Mandel concur.

Attachment

Tab I Memo Establishing the IG

Tab II Rhinesmith Biographic Information



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT

Executive Secretary  
Department of State

DAVID R. BROWN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

STEPHEN H. GALEBACH  
Special Assistant to the Attorney General  
Department of Justice

JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

C. WILLIAM LASALLE  
Chief of the Executive Secretariat  
U.S. Information Agency

JAMES GEER  
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

CLARENCE M. COSTER  
Executive Assistant to the Commissioner  
Immigration and Naturalization Service

SUBJECT: Interagency Group on Geneva Exchanges  
Initiatives

One of the most important achievements to come out of the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva was agreement on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts in a wide variety of fields. These programs, which are intended to go beyond traditional exchanges, will require careful planning and coordination if we are to ensure true reciprocity and that these programs fulfill the purpose of promoting better understanding and communications between the peoples of the US and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the NSC is hereby establishing an Interagency Group on the Geneva Exchanges Initiatives (IG/GEI) to provide policy guidance on the programs to be included under the exchanges initiatives, to vet proposals for such programs, and oversee their implementation.

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BY AD

NARA DATE 3/1/11

NLRR 6-11-14 #8061

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The IG will be chaired by Special Assistant to the President, Jack Matlock. Each agency is requested to name a senior representative (Assistant Secretary level) to the IG. Representatives will be invited to attend the first meeting on Friday, January 17, at 3:00 p.m., in Room #208 OEOB.

Agenda:

Organizational issues

Proposed NSDD on the Geneva Exchanges Initiatives

William F. Martin  
Executive Secretary



## STEPHEN E. RHINESMITH

Stephen E. Rhinesmith is President of Rhinesmith and Associates, Inc., an independent management consulting practice he formed to provide services in organization planning and development on a domestic and international level. His work involves all aspects of organizational life, from strategic planning to the management of day-to-day operations. He specializes in analyzing the influence of culture on organizational behavior. His focus is on improving the managerial effectiveness of persons from differing backgrounds who are working together in the same organization.

Dr. Rhinesmith brings to this practice fifteen years of management experience, thirteen of which were as President of three different service corporations - the American Field Service International Scholarship Program, Holland America Cruise Lines and Moran, Stahl and Boyer, Inc., a relocation management consulting firm where he remains a Director. The diversity of these organizations has provided him with unique experience in leading and motivating people from over sixty countries.

In addition to his management experience, Dr. Rhinesmith has gained a reputation as an international management specialist with broad management training and consulting expertise in both the public and private sector. Since 1976, he has been a consultant for the World Bank, training leaders of international economic missions in cross-cultural management and providing organization development counsel to a multinational workforce from 105 countries. Most recently he has served as a consultant on international human resource development for EuroDisneyland and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization.

Dr. Rhinesmith is a frequent speaker and writer on the management of multinational corporations, public service and volunteer organizations. His book, Bring Home the World: A Management Guide for Community Leaders of International Exchange Programs, in its second edition, has been used in the United States and abroad as a guide for training volunteers for international management responsibilities. His second book, Managing Performance Internationally: A Guide to the Selection, Training and Management of International Personnel, will be published next year.

Dr. Rhinesmith is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He received his B.A. from Wesleyan University in 1965, and his M.A. and Ph.D. in International Management from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh in 1966 and 1972, respectively.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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FILE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

January 14, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

**NOTED**

SUBJECT: Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting, January 8, 1986

Secretary Shultz's report on his January 8 meeting with Dobrynin is at Tab I.

Dobrynin said that he did not have a reply to our proposal regarding the timing of the Washington Summit. He also thought that Shevardnadze would be unable to come to the U.S. for a meeting with Shultz until early March.

Since I understand that the President has already been briefed on this meeting, I believe it is unnecessary to send it to the President at this time.

*W* Cobb and Lenczowski *NA* concur.

*I agree. J*

Attachment:

Tab I Secretary Shultz's Report of Dobrynin Meeting on  
January 8, 1986

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/4 #3062  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/9/11

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1986

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *ups*  
SUBJECT: January 8 Dobrynin Meeting

I used the meeting primarily to share with Dobrynin your thinking on the timing of Gorbachev's visit. Dobrynin said he had no answer from Moscow on our initial proposal, a silence he attributed to Gorbachev's heavy involvement in preparations for the February Party Congress. Dobrynin felt it was useful to have the benefit of your own thinking, understood the considerations on which it was based, and promised to report fully to Gorbachev.

Dobrynin did have an answer to my suggestion that Shevardnadze come here in late January. The Foreign Minister will be busy in his capacity as Politburo member in the run-up to the Congress and is unable to meet in January or February. Dobrynin hinted that it might be possible to schedule a visit in early March. He handed over a schedule for proposed expert-level meetings on various arms control, regional and bilateral questions between now and June -- a good indication that the Soviets do not want to lose momentum on the agenda we agreed to in Geneva.

I took advantage of the meeting to put into perspective your decision to impose sanctions against Libya, going into some detail to impress upon him our certainty of Qaddafi's links to terrorism. His response, that the roots of terrorism lie in the unresolved Palestinian problem, was disappointing boilerplate. It was made without conviction, and he ultimately agreed with me that there was no justification for actions like the Rome/Vienna attacks.

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/9/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 15, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Request to Travel to Ditchley, England to  
Participate in Conference on May 9-11, 1986

I have been invited by the American Ditchley Foundation (TAB A) to participate in a conference on Divided Germany and the Future of Europe to be held in Ditchley, England on May 9-11, 1986. Issues to be reviewed and discussed will be related to the two German states and other European matters as outlined in the enclosed draft terms of reference.

It would be appreciated if NSC would cover transportation expenses. Accommodation expenses will be covered by the Ditchley Foundation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab A Letter of Invitation with Enclosure



# AMERICAN DITCHLEY FOUNDATION

477 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017  
Phone: (212) 754-6700  
Telex: 236554 Cable Address: MURDER

Under the Chair  
Cyrus R. Vance  
Chairman  
Hovt Aronson, CBE  
President  
Keith Hight  
Vice President  
J. G. Clarr  
Treasurer

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Mrs. Rita E. Haus  
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Philip M. Kaise  
George N. Lindsay  
William F. Ma

William Matson, RSM  
Dr. Donna E. Shafer  
Stephen Stamp  
Mrs. Ronald Tree  
Sir H.D.H. Wills, CBE, TD, DL  
Paul Guthrie  
Secretary  
Charles W. Muller  
Administrative Director

December 23, 1985

Mr. Jack F. Matlock, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security  
368 Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. Matlock: *Jack*

We will hold a conference on Divided Germany and the Future of Europe, May 9-11, 1986. The Chairman will be Sir Nicholas Henderson (former Ambassador to West Germany and the United States), and I enclose a draft terms of reference. This is an early invitation to mark your calendar, and I very much hope that you will be able to participate.

If you will so indicate, I will send you further information when it becomes available.

With all good wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

*Charles W. Muller*  
Charles W. Muller

THE DITCHLEY FOUNDATIONS

CONFERENCE

~~Star~~ May, 9/11, 1986

DIVIDED GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

TERMS OF REFERENCE

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1. To review:-

(a) the way in which it has proved possible to cope with the absence of a peace settlement in Europe after the second world war - emergence of the two blocs (the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact and the US-led NATO), and the enforcement of mutual respect for the status quo by mutual deterrence.

(b) the manner in which German affairs have been shaped by this situation - the evolution of two German states and a divided Berlin, the nature of the division of Berlin being determined by the Quadripartite Agreements.

(c) the main pressure points and friction areas on the line of division in Europe - the North Cape, the Baltic, Berlin, Yugoslavia, the Turkish straits - and the likelihood of pressure at any of these points leading to change in the established balance.

2. Against the background of this review to consider the following issues:-

(a) as regards Germany, the nature and strength of the forces in the two German states which keep alive the concept of a single German nation. The limitations on the scope of these forces and the extent of the possibilities for achieving change by rapprochement.

(b) the degree of solidarity in the Soviet Bloc/Warsaw Pact/Comecon. Has any organic community of interest established itself in eastern Europe other than the instinct for survival among Communist Party leaders under Soviet Communist Party hegemony? Does the trend of economic forces point towards loosening or tightening of the Soviet Bloc? Do the international balance of forces (including the balance of deterrence) and the growing complexity and sophistication of the economies and societies of the eastern European countries make the implementation of the Brezhnev doctrine harder or easier for the Soviet Union? Has the Solidarity phenomenon in Poland been an isolated and passing one, or is there a real prospect of fresh challenges to Communist Party and Soviet authority in eastern Europe?



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(c) does it have to be assumed that the Soviet system has to crack inside the Soviet Union before any change can occur in the division of Europe? Does it further have to be assumed that a crack in the Soviet system is most unlikely in the next half-century? Is any evolution conceivable by which the Soviet government could tolerate a much greater degree of cooperation in the economic, cultural and political fields between the countries of western and eastern Europe?

(d) the special importance for the Soviet Union of its position in the German Democratic Republic and Berlin. Does the maintenance of the Soviet system in eastern Europe, and therefore to some extent also in the Soviet Union itself, depend on the maintenance of the Soviet position in the GDR, and does this in turn depend on the maintenance of massive Soviet armed forces there?

(e) the possibility of the European Community acting as an agent for change in Europe as a whole. What are, realistically, the limits to Community enlargement? Is it conceivable that the Community could eventually develop a network of relationships with the countries of eastern Europe which could provide a non-military basis for maintaining stability in Europe?

(f) the relationship between arms control and the future of Europe. Is it by achieving some measure of arms control and limitation, supplemented or facilitated by confidence building measures, that the way might eventually be opened to greater alleviations in the division of Germany and greater cooperation between European countries across the dividing line; or is it by developing cooperation across the dividing line (including cooperation between the two German states) that the way might eventually be opened to significant progress in arms control?

(g) the extent to which pressures in the old continent, where a de facto balance exists, might eventually be reduced by progress in reaching a better balance in the newer continents, ie, through the achievement of more effective containment of the Soviet Union world-wide. Is there a chance that the Soviet Union, put on the defensive by the rise of new forces in the world (China, Japan and the NIC's in Asia and Latin America) and new technologies (in telecommunications and dataflow, in space and on the seabed) will finally be obliged to adopt changes in its own policy priorities which would allow the evolution of greater cooperation in Europe and some loosening of its controls over its bloc members? In such circumstances would it be possible for the forces at work in the German nation to be sufficiently restrained for the Soviet Union and others to accept the prospect of change in Europe?



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506SECRET

January 17, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*SUBJECT: Political Controls on the Export of Oil and Gas  
Equipment to the Soviet Union

A Memorandum to the President which explains the decision to renew export controls on the sale of oil and gas production technology to the Soviet Union is attached at Tab I. By interagency consensus, the controls will be extended but will be modified to allow consideration of license approval on a case by case basis. (Current regulations carry a presumption of disapproval.)

At Tab II is a paper from the Commerce Department which explains the background of the decision. I do not believe the President needs to read it, unless he has further questions about the matter.

*Steve*  
Steve Danzansky concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab II Paper from the Department of Commerce

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4 #8063  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Political Controls on the Export of Oil and Gas  
Technology to the Soviet Union

The political controls imposed on licensing of oil and gas production technology for export to the Soviet Union are due to expire January 20 and current legislation requires review and recertification by the Secretary of Commerce if they are to continue. These are not strategic controls; they were originally applied by the Carter Administration in response to the Soviet arrest of human rights activists and have been maintained in the past because of the absence of improvement in the Soviet human rights performance.

Secretary Baldrige, with the concurrence of Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger, has decided to announce Monday that the controls will be extended, but modified to allow consideration of export license applications in this category on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the controls will be maintained pending further improvement in Soviet human rights practices, yet we will introduce some flexibility in their application as a response to the recent relatively minor gestures by the Soviets in this area. As you know, Mac Baldrige told Gorbachev in December that we would consider lifting these controls if there is a substantial change in Soviet human rights policy.

There was general interagency agreement that this minor change in the regulations is appropriate at this time, and I believe this is a sound judgment. It will please the Jewish community and other groups pressing for human rights in the Soviet Union. Our petroleum equipment producers, who have been pressing for a total lifting of these controls, will be disappointed, but will -- I believe -- be mollified by the new flexibility which allows some license approval and by the hope that an increase in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union could lead to removal of the controls later.

In announcing the decision, Commerce will avoid publicly linking the action to specific Soviet practices.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET~~

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NLRR F06-114/4 #8064  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13



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NLRR F06-114/4#8065  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13 52

Modification of Export Licensing Policy  
For Certain Oil and Gas Technology To The U.S.S.R.

- o In 1978 and 1980, the United States imposed unilateral controls on the export of oil and gas equipment and technology to the Soviet Union. Our allies in COCOM did not follow suit and, to this day, do not control the export of such equipment or technology unless it is determined to be of strategic importance. (U)
- o The net result is that the overwhelming majority of oil and gas equipment and technology is not controlled multilaterally. Moreover, such equipment and technology has been and is freely available to the Soviets from a variety of foreign sources including suppliers in COCOM countries. This has left the entire burden of the controls to be borne by U.S. industry. (U)
- o In December 1985, Secretary Baldrige, with the concurrence of the NSC, indicated to the Soviets our willingness to take certain concrete, yet quiet, steps to improve our trade relationship, commensurate with corresponding concrete, yet quiet, steps in the human rights area by the Soviet Union. Specifically, we offered as a first step the removal of U.S. unilateral foreign policy-based controls on oil and gas equipment and technology commensurate with a corresponding increase by the Soviets in emigration. (S)
- o Recent developments in Soviet human rights policy have been encouraging, but modest. We were slightly encouraged by Soviet steps in recent months to resolve a number of longstanding divided family cases and by their treatment of Elena Bonner and some longstanding refusenik cases like Hebrew teacher Elie Essas. (S)
- o These modest Soviet actions do not merit the wholesale dismantling of these foreign policy controls. However, it was agreed at an interagency meeting on January 14, 1986, that some modification of these current U.S. controls could give us greater flexibility to respond to Soviet movement on human rights issues, while underscoring our interest in there being parallel progress. (S)
- o Specifically, it was agreed to leave intact existing controls on oil and gas production and exploration equipment and to make an incremental change in U.S. export licensing policy for the technology related to oil and gas production and exploration. This change would be conveyed to the Congress in the context of the Secretary's annual report extending all existing foreign policy controls, due January 20, 1986. (S)
- o Thus, export licenses will still be required on all oil and gas production and exploration equipment and technology to the Soviet Union. However, the licensing review policy is changed from a presumption of denial to a simple case-by-case review of license applications for technology. (C)

~~SECRET~~