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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/14/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1986 (2/6)

**FOIA**

F06-114/4

**Box Number** 15

YARHI-MILO

1511

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8194	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S 4/8 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	3	4/3/1986	B1
8195	MEMO	SESTANOVICH TO MATLOCK RE DOBRYNIN TALKERS <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	2	4/4/1986	B1
8196	TALKING POINTS	ARMS CONTROL AND NEXT SUMMIT <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	ND	B1
8197	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S 4/8 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	2	ND	B1
8198	MEMO	MATLOCK/MADEL/LENCZOWSKI TO POINDEXTER RE GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVE <i>R 10/29/2012 M125/2</i>	3	4/4/1986	B1
8199	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE NSDD ON GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVE <i>R 10/29/2012 M125/2</i>	2	ND	B1
8200	MEMO	WEINBERGER TO POINDEXTER RE DRAFT NSDD ON GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVE <i>D 11/5/2009 F06-114/4 R 6/23/2010 M08-125/2</i>	2	3/12/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8201	MEMO	MATLOCK/MADEL/LENCZOWSKI TO POINDEXTER RE GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVE <i>R 10/29/2012 M125/2</i>	3	3/11/1986	B1
8202	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE RHINESMITH UPDATE ON U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	4/4/1985	B1
8210	MEMO	RHINESMITH TO MATLOCK RE PROGRSS REPORT ON GENEVA EXCHANGE INITIATIVES <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	3	4/2/1986	B1
8203	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8194 <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	3	4/3/1986	B1
8204	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, APRIL 8, 1986 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	2	4/5/1986	B1
8205	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOCS #8196 & #8197 <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	3	4/3/1986	B1

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1511

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8206	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S 4/8 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	3	ND	B1
8207	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE U.S.-SOVET RELATIONS: DISARRAY IN MOSCOW? (SAME TEXT AS 8185) <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	3	4/2/1986	B1
8208	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8185 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	3	4/2/1986	B1
8209	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S 4/8 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN (SAME TEXT AS 8186) <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	4	4/2/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Chron - April 86

Jack Matlock

The Honorable John Poindexter  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
First Floor West Wing

Eyes Only

PRESERVE

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QJ 7/2/02



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION MEMORANDUM  
S/S

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway  
SUBJECT: Talking Points for President's Meeting with Dobrynin

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to approve the attached talking points for the President's use during Ambassador Dobrynin's February 8 farewell call.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The attached talking points for the President's use with Dobrynin next Tuesday reflect our discussion this morning. If you approve, we will send them to Jack Matlock for inclusion in his briefing memo for the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached talking points.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Drafted: S/ARN:MStafford<sup>WZ</sup>/EUR/SOV:JFTefft<sup>WZ</sup>  
4/3/86 Ext. 78040 (0638M)  
Cleared: S/ARN:PNitze<sup>WZ</sup>  
PM: AHolmes<sup>WZ</sup>  
EUR: MPalmer<sup>WZ</sup>  
EUR/ SOV: BLPascoe<sup>WZ</sup>

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CJS NARA, Date 7/2/02



Talking Points for President's 4/8 Meeting with Dobrynin

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made selective progress, especially in bilateral areas. Glad to see your interest in people-to-people exchanges, which have wide appeal here. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharanskiy), but progress has stopped.
- Disappointed by overall lack of progress on key security issues since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what can be achieved; your response to our recent proposals has been slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve -- and what seems possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals but are not unrealistic if we both get to work now:
  - a. Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
  - b. Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
  - c. Agreement preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
  - d. Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
  - e. Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
  - f. Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
  - g. Improvements in political atmosphere permitting major expansion of trade and cooperation.



- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would make possible negotiation of treaties in time for 1987 summit.
- Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in a representative number of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
- Also other important goals: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
- We are ready to work constructively on all of them.

ARMS CONTROL

- We've been negotiating at Geneva for a year. Major issues have been thoroughly discussed and principal obstacles to agreement clearly defined.
- At Geneva, General Secretary and I agreed to seek early progress. Wrote to him afterwards to suggest we set as private goal practical way of doing this.
- If we are to achieve real progress, primary issues must be resolved. Because of their importance, I believe resolution is possible only if General Secretary and I become more directly involved in their discussion.
- Possibilities should be explored away from glare of public debate.
- Accordingly, I propose that he and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of major issues separating us in Geneva.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore, without final commitment by two of us, possibilities for removing any or all obstacles to agreement.
- Results of discussions would be ad ref and could form basis for decisions by General Secretary and me.
- Am prepared to designate Ambassador Nitze as my personal representative for the discussions.
- Should General Secretary agree to this procedure, Ambassador Nitze will be prepared to meet with Soviet representative at a mutually agreeable time and place.
- Can't overemphasize importance of privacy if effort to succeed.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/SUMMIT II

- 3 -

- Suggest you discuss this further with Secretary Shultz and that you and Ambassador Nitze get together before you depart so you'll have full picture to take back to General Secretary on how this special channel might work.

NUCLEAR TESTING

- Regret your efforts to make propaganda on nuclear testing.
- We are ready to open bilateral talks without preconditions; would encompass entire agenda of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- We intend to stress our priority goal of agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET. We will listen carefully to your position.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- Termination of military involvement will make military involvement of others unnecessary.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound."
- Unfortunately, Soviet actions and pressure on Pakistan belie calls for political settlement.
- Would welcome details of Soviet withdrawal and clear statement of Soviet willingness to guarantee such a settlement.

OTHER ELEMENTS OF GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. This would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/SUMMIT II



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NLRR M08-125/2 # 8195

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4 April 1986

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*

SUBJECT: Dobrynin Talkers

As drafted the talking points prepared by State for the Dobrynin meeting don't convey much of a message, let alone a strong one. ("We've given you some good ideas on Coast Guard cooperation" -- what does SOV think this meeting is about?)

My sense is that, given the spectacle of Soviet public maneuvering over the past few weeks, a clear and direct message is needed to tell them to stop screwing around.

On regional issues there is no purpose served in referring to "another round of experts discussions" or in calling for more specific ideas on how to minimize confrontation. I agree that Afghanistan and Libya are the right areas to hit, but as your note suggested the message needs to be very brief -- and pointed.

° On Afghanistan, two recent developments are important: escalation of the fighting (unfortunately, it appears the Soviets may be doing better) and the presentation of a totally absurd withdrawal timetable in the UN talks (rejected even by Cordovez!). The President does not have to get into a lot of details but if possible he should show he is aware of these events and comment on them. I suggest:

-- SOVIET ESCALATION IS WHAT KEEPS AFGHANISTAN A BLEEDING WOUND. OTHERS WILL CONTINUE TO RESPOND TO THESE ACTIONS.

-- A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE, BUT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL PROPOSALS ARE NOT SERIOUS.

° On Libya, no real discussion is necessary except to convey that we will act to protect our interests and regard the Soviets as Qadhafi's main international supporter.

-- WE'LL DO WHAT WE MUST VS. QADHAFI. SOVIET SUPPORT FOR HIM IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE, DANGEROUS.

On other issues, if he gets substantive at all Dobrynin may raise the testing issue, and even if he doesn't get substantive summit timing is likely to come up. Neither of these is covered in the two pages you showed me. On testing, we have a clear position but the President could sharpen it by saying that we simply don't see this as a way into other arms issues; of course, the Soviets are free to keep pursuing it but for our part we will regard the effort as purely propagandistic.

I have shown these points to Peter Rodman, who concurs.

~~SECRET~~



- 1
- f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
  - g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
- 
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
  - Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
  - Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
  - Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
  - We ready to work constructively on all of them.

#### GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.



ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have bilateral talks without preconditions; would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
  - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
  - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
  - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
  - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
  - e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.

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NLRR M08-125/2 #8196

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10



8197 10

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President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin  
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

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BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

- f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
- g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
- Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
- Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
- Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
- We ready to work constructively on all of them.

#### GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
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- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

ACTION

April 4, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK/JUDYT MANDEL/JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Geneva Exchanges Initiative

Attached for your approval at TAB I is a memo to the President forwarding the text of the NSDD on Implementation of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative. The text and related policy issues have been worked out in meetings of the subcommittee on security issues, chaired by Steven Rhinesmith, the new Coordinator for the US-Soviet Exchanges Initiative, and the Interagency Group on the Geneva Exchanges Initiative (IG/GEI), chaired by Jack Matlock.

Per your instructions, the text of the NSDD contains general language outlining our security concerns, but leaving the specifics for a separate directive from you to the concerned agencies. The subcommittee on security issues has agreed on the language for that directive, which will be forwarded to you shortly.

OMB has also informally reviewed the NSDD, and has expressed some concern about the possible cost of the new programs. They suggested that we add a sentence indicating that the new programs would be funded within existing budget plans, which is true for the short run. However, we would prefer to have flexibility to request additional money should the Soviets agree to a dramatic expansion of these programs at some time in the future.

In addition, the IG has reviewed and approved a package of program proposals which Steve Rhinesmith presented to the Soviets in Moscow. The Soviets have indicated they want a return visit to the US in late April to work out further details. Our aim is to have Soviet agreement to at least some of the programs by May, so that the people-to-people exchanges can get underway this summer.

OSD previously concurred with the NSDD, but Cap Weinberger sent you a memo (at TAB B) suggesting the inclusion of two additional paragraphs spelling out our strategic objectives in

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BY KML NARA DATE 10/29/12



proposing the new exchanges. He argues that the additional language is needed to distinguish this Administration's policy from that of its predecessors, and avoid giving the impression that the exchanges are an end in themselves, rather than a means of ending Moscow's monopoly on information to its citizens and about it to the outside world. Moreover, he argues that without such language, officials implementing the initiative will have no guidance on the question of our larger objectives, and the public may get the impression that the exchanges are indicative of a return to the "detente" era.

Although this language aptly defines our long-term objectives, including it in the largely unclassified NSDD could undermine our ability to achieve that objective. We believe that this language is a little too explicit to be fully consistent with the President's own approach to treating our objectives confidentially if they are to have a prospect of success. Even if the OSD language were classified, it could leak and be used by the Soviets to vilify and reject the kind of programs and contacts we are proposing.

John Lenczowski has alternative language at TAB II which deals with Secretary Weinberger's suggestion in a more nuanced manner. He believes we should not put the President in the position of having to flatly reject the Secretary's constructive suggestion, and has therefore modified the language of the introductory paragraph in a way that: 1) makes our objectives sound less "detentist"; 2) supplies guidance on the broader strategic purposes of the exchanges; and 3) is not so explicit as to risk undermining our objectives if the language of the NSDD is made public. (Most of the text is unclassified and intended for public use.) We have incorporated the two paragraphs of this language into the NSDD as a replacement for the first paragraph of the old version (which appears at Tab III).

We did not have time to submit the substitute language to the other concerned agencies. However, State has informally indicated that it has no objection to the substitute language, and we believe USIA will not have any objection.

Walt Raymond feels that the Weinberger/Lenczowski modifications are unnecessary and inconsistent with the President's Geneva and post-Geneva statements, and thus he prefers the old version. Others on the staff believe the Lenczowski language is a reasonable compromise.

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo forwarding the NSDD to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>RR</sup> Rodman, <sup>WR</sup> Raymond, <sup>PM</sup> Major and <sup>KD</sup> deGraffenreid concur.

Attachments:

Tab I      Memo to the President  
          Tab A    Text of NSDD  
          Tab B    Memo from Secretary Weinberger  
Tab II      John Lenczowski's Substitute Language  
Tab III     Page One of Old NSDD Draft  
Tab IV      Transmittal Memo to Agencies  
Tab V      Original Matlock/Mandel/Lenczowski memo

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8199 15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: NSDD on Geneva Exchanges Initiative

Issue

Whether to sign the National Security Decision Directive at Tab A.

Facts

The NSDD:

-- defines U.S. goals and objectives for the new exchanges;

-- outlines the six areas you and Gorbachev agreed to pursue initially, and others in which we are interested; and

-- spells out the institutional and administrative arrangements for implementing the programs.

Discussion

The NSDD translates your vision of opening Soviet society through dramatically expanded people-to-people contacts into broad policy guidance, recognizing the need for reciprocity and measures to deal with the security and counterintelligence implications.

Cap Weinberger feels that additional language is needed (at Tab B) in the NSDD to spell out our strategic vision of using the exchanges to end the Soviets' monopoly on information to their own citizens, and thus undermine their political controls. While this reflects our "strategic" goals, saying so as explicitly as this language does in this kind of document which could leak, could undermine our ability to

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR M125/2 #8199

BY KNL NARA DATE 10/29/12

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achieve those objectives, and give the Soviets a pretext for stonewalling. We have, therefore, amended the old version of the NSDD to include language which addresses Secretary Weinberger's concerns, but which expresses his points more delicately and thus avoids undercutting our objectives. (The new language appears in the first two paragraphs of the NSDD at Tab A.)

RECOMMENDATION

OK

No

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

That you sign the NSDD at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A	NSDD
Tab B	Weinberger's Memo

Prepared by:  
John Lenczowski &  
Judy Mandel

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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IMPLEMENTING THE GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVE (U)

A major emphasis in my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva was to seek ways to increase and broaden direct contacts between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. The objectives underlying expansion of such contacts are: 1) to deal more constructively with the problems arising from the open and closed nature of the respective societies; 2) to reduce, in particular, the misconceptions that the people of the Soviet Union have about the United States and the world in general; 3) to promote understanding by Americans of the realities of the Soviet system; 4) to build individual bridges of cooperation in a variety of fields; and 5) to mitigate the many international security and humanitarian problems that arise from existing barriers to free movement of people, information and ideas. (U)

While we hope we can develop real cooperation with the Soviet people through expanded exchanges, we recognize that the Soviet government's interest in these exchanges differs from ours in important respects. But the contest of ideas is a competition in which we can engage confidently so as to build a basis for a more secure peace. (U)

Prior to Geneva, the US made a number of proposals to the Soviets for contacts, exchanges, and cooperation which were to go beyond the traditional exchanges covered by the US-USSR General Exchanges Agreement. In turn, we asked the Soviets for their ideas for programs to promote better understanding, to work cooperatively on some of today's most difficult human problems, and to open up our societies to each other. (U)

In Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and I agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts in a wide variety of fields, and agreed to begin on a reciprocal basis, with six areas in education, medicine, and sports, with others to follow:

- cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school education;
- measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR;

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BY CS , NARA, Date 7/2/02



- the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education;
- mutual allocation of scholarships for the best students in the natural sciences, technology, social sciences, and humanities for the period of an academic year;
- holding regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports events;
- resumption of cooperation in combatting cancer diseases. (U)

General Secretary Gorbachev and I agreed that relevant agencies in both governments would be asked to develop specific programs which could be reviewed by both sides at our next meeting. (U)

A primary objective of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative is to enhance bilateral cooperation at all levels. Given this emphasis, it is imperative that our planning be coordinated early and frequently with the corresponding designated officials in the Soviet Union. In the development of these programs, a continuing emphasis must be on mutually beneficial and fully reciprocal programs. Highest priority is to be given to programs which emphasize participation of youth between the ages of 16 and 25. We consistently must make clear to the Soviets that we are not looking for token programs, but rather those which are imaginative, bold, and hold the most promise for meeting the objectives of this undertaking. (U)

However, I view this as just the beginning of a process to expand dramatically contacts and communications between the peoples of our two countries. My objective is to stimulate a process that goes well beyond these initial programs, both in numbers and in developing new kinds of exchanges to increase cooperation and mutual understanding between our two countries. Thus, we should continue to pursue on a reciprocal basis the full range of initiatives that we outlined to the Soviets and others which appear promising. These would include:

#### Educational and Student Exchanges

- substantial exchanges of undergraduates;
- an ambitious youth exchange program for secondary school children;
- establishment of university positions in each other's country to teach national studies;
- nomination of distinguished American and Soviet



educators or public figures to study ways of improving understanding through language studies;

People-to-People

- expansion of "sister-city" relationships;
- increased exchanges of civic, religious, and other groups;

Media and Information Exchanges

- inauguration of regular media exchanges;
- establishment of out-of-embassy cultural centers and/or libraries in each other's capital;
- facilitation of direct satellite transmissions to each other's country;
- increased publication and distribution of each other's books and publications;

Consultations

- broader consultations on a variety of topics of mutual interest, including health and social problems such as alcoholism and drug abuse and trafficking. (U)

I attach high priority to the exchanges initiative, and am requesting that all United States Government agencies which have responsibilities in the areas of agreed cooperation give high priority and render every possible assistance to their implementation. (U)

To provide overall policy guidance, a new Interagency Group on the President's Geneva Exchanges Initiatives (IG/GEI) has been established. It is chaired by the NSC's Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs, and includes representatives of all concerned U.S. Government agencies. The IG will review programs and implementation to ensure that they are in conformity with U.S. policy and objectives toward the Soviet Union. (U)

In addition, I have asked USIA Director Wick to create a new office of the Coordinator for the President's U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Initiative, established at USIA with the express purpose of working with USIA, other concerned U.S. Government agencies, and the private sector to develop concrete programs in each of the six agreed areas and others which appear promising. The Coordinator will also chair a working group to develop and coordinate proposals for new initiatives, establish guidelines and operating procedures for the programs, coordinate the response to other U.S. and Soviet proposals, and



identify other innovative proposals which could form the basis of additional programs. Upon agreement of the working group, the Coordinator will pursue implementation of the programs with Soviet counterparts. (U)

Additional responsibilities of the Coordinator will be to inform the American public about the possibilities for new exchanges with the USSR, to generate support for the Initiative, either through fundraising or matching private support with potential programs, and to serve as the central point of contact with the private sector. (U)

The Coordinator will be located in the Office of the Director, and will work closely with the staff of the United States Information Agency, the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies concerned with administrative, programmatic and security aspects of the exchanges, and with the American Embassy Moscow. The coordinator will rely principally upon the USIA staff for operational support, calling upon other U.S. Government agencies for support as needed. He should seek the advice, guidance, involvement, support and services of academia, private agencies which are engaged in US-Soviet exchange activities, and other elements of the private sector which have an interest in this important bilateral effort. (U)

It is essential that programs established under the President's U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Initiative provide for reciprocity and the protection of U.S. national security interests. Our objective of increasing contacts and dialogue between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union should not obscure the realities of the Soviet system and the differences which exist between our open and their closed society. Accordingly, the working group will develop, with the participation of concerned agencies, procedures to ensure that U.S. participants in the exchanges are informed of these realities, including the regulations and the conditions governing foreigners in the Soviet Union, and that U.S. hosts are informed of the elements of the program and the conditions under which Soviet citizens are admitted to the United States for these exchange programs. These programs will continue to be governed by adherence to the existing Export Control guidelines and subject to U.S. Government mechanisms to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology. (U)

In implementing the Exchanges Initiative, priority will be given to programs which can be implemented expeditiously and become either self-sustaining within a period of one to two years or incorporated into an existing United States Government program. These programs are not to replace existing programs called for under the General Exchanges Agreement or other bilateral agreements, but will be in addition to them. (U)





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SYSTEM II  
90198

12 MAR 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Draft NSDD on Geneva Exchanges Initiative

The draft NSDD has, in my view, a serious shortcoming. It depicts the initiative as an end in itself -- i.e., an exchange, like virtue, is its own reward. None of the sober and analytical realism regarding US-USSR relations that distinguishes President Reagan from his predecessors (or from his current domestic opposition) finds expression in the document. This creates two problems: Officials implementing the initiative will find in the NSDD no guidance on the question of its grander or "strategic" purposes. And if the NSDD is made public -- by leak or authorized release (most of it is unclassified anyway) -- the President is likely to be embarrassed by the apparent aimlessness of this exercise and by the rhetoric in the NSDD that is redolent of the "detente" era and Carter Administration pronouncements.

These problems can easily be remedied through an addition to the draft of the following paragraphs:

The primary objective of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative is to mitigate, along with the other US information programs, the many international security and humanitarian problems arising from the Soviet government's monopoly on information to Soviet citizens about the West, East-West relations, and the USSR itself, and its monopoly on information to the outside world about the USSR. Through increasing the flow of people and information in and out of the USSR -- through whittling away at the monopoly -- we can serve the cause of peaceful relations by inhibiting the Soviet government's ability to gain acceptance for aggressive or anti-democratic action. We can also usefully broaden American appreciation of the realities of Soviet life in ways as little controlled by the Soviet government as possible.

These fundamental aims necessarily conflict with aims that the Soviet government will pursue through the exchanges. It can be expected to try to maximize its access to otherwise denied information and technology, enhance its ability to press its own propaganda and

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BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS T  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22  
2

political lines in the United States, and insulate its own citizens as much as possible from influences beyond its control. Thus the GEI must be seen as part of our continuing contest with the Soviet system and its ideology of secretiveness and control. It is a contest of incalculable consequences, one in which we can engage confidently so as to build a basis for a secure peace.

I would hope that the foregoing paragraphs, even after inclusion in the NSDD, could remain unclassified and accompany any public release of the document or of the official rationale for the initiative.

I would greatly appreciate it if you will give this memorandum to the President, since it embodies a matter I think is very important.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Sap' or similar, with a large, sweeping initial 'S'.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



### John Lenczowski's Alternative Language

A major emphasis in my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva was to seek ways to increase and broaden direct contacts between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. The objectives underlying expansion of such contacts are: 1) to deal more constructively with the problems arising from the open and closed nature of the respective societies; 2) to reduce, especially, the misconceptions that the people of the Soviet Union have about the United States and the world in general; 3) to promote understanding by Americans of the realities of the Soviet system; 4) to build individual bridges of cooperation in a variety of fields; and 5) to mitigate the many international security and humanitarian problems that arise from existing barriers to free movement of people, information and ideas. (U)

While we hope we can develop real cooperation with the peoples of the Soviet Union through expanded exchanges, we recognize that the Soviet government's interest in these exchanges differs from ours in important respects. But the contest of ideas is a competition in which we can engage confidently so as to build a basis for a more secure peace. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPLEMENTING THE GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVES (U)

Old language

A major emphasis in my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva was to seek ways to increase and broaden direct contacts between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. The objectives of increased contacts based on reciprocity are to: reduce misunderstanding; establish a basis for trust through increased openness; build numerous individual bridges of cooperation in a variety of fields; and to open our two societies more fully to each other. A better flow of people and information can advance the causes of peace and mutual security. (U)

Prior to Geneva, the US made a number of proposals to the Soviets for contacts, exchanges, and cooperation which were to go beyond the traditional exchanges covered by the US-USSR General Exchanges Agreement. In turn, we asked the Soviets for their ideas for programs to promote better understanding, to work cooperatively on some of today's most difficult human problems, and to open up our societies to each other. (U)

In Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and I agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts in a wide variety of fields, and agreed to begin on a reciprocal basis, with six areas in education, medicine, and sports, with others to follow:

- cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school education;
- measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR;
- the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education;

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

25  
SYSTEM II  
90256

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION  
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Implementing the Geneva Exchanges Initiative  
(U)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on Implementing the Geneva Exchanges Initiatives. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attachment  
NSDD-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 21, 1997  
By OLS NARA, Date 7/2/02

3-20

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

John Henryowski

Pls rework package to:

- 1) Have one WSSD for President  
(the Tab C one)
- 2) Lower memo to President that  
notes Cap's concerns & says  
we accommodated them (but  
not his exact words) - include  
Cap memo as tab in memo to P.
- 3) Memo to JMR that briefly  
outlines Walt Raymond's  
concerns & indicates how  
USIA draft was changed  
coord w/Rodman, athen

Rod



8201 27

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II  
90055 ADD-ON

ACTION

March 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK/JUDYT MANDEL/JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Geneva Exchanges Initiatives

Attached for your approval at TAB I is a memo to the President forwarding the text of the NSDD on Implementation of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative. The text and related policy issues have been worked out in meetings of the subcommittee on security issues, chaired by Steven Rhinesmith, the new Coordinator for the US-Soviet Exchange Initiative, and the Interagency Group on the Geneva Exchanges Initiative (IG/GEI), chaired by Jack Matlock.

Per your instructions, the text of the NSDD contains general language outlining our security concerns, but leaving the specifics for a separate directive from you to the concerned agencies. The subcommittee on security issues has agreed on the language for that directive, which will be forwarded to you shortly.

OMB has also informally reviewed the NSDD, and has expressed some concern about the possible cost of the new programs. They suggested that we add a sentence indicating that the new programs would be funded within existing budget plans, which is true for the short run. However, we would prefer to have flexibility to request additional money should the Soviets agree to a dramatic expansion of these programs at some time in the future.

In addition, the IG has reviewed and approved a package of program proposals which Steve Rhinesmith is presenting to the Soviets in Moscow this week. The Soviets have indicated they want a return visit to the US in late April to work out further details. Our aim is to have Soviet agreement to at least some of the programs by May, so that the people-to-people exchanges can get underway this summer.

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NLRR M125/2 # 8201

BY KML NARA DATE 10/24/12



28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSD previously concurred with the NSDD, but Cap Weinberger sent you a memo (at TAB B) suggesting the inclusion of two additional paragraphs spelling out our strategic objectives in proposing the new exchanges. He argues that the additional language is needed to distinguish this Administration's policy from that of its predecessors, and avoid giving the impression that the exchanges are an end in themselves, rather than a means of ending Moscow's monopoly on information to its citizens and about it to the outside world. Moreover, he argues that without such language, officials implementing the initiative will have no guidance on the question of our larger objectives, and the public may get the impression that the exchanges are indicative of a return to the "detente" era.

Although this language aptly defines our long-term objectives, explicitly including this in the largely unclassified NSDD would undermine our ability to achieve that objective. We believe that this language is not consistent with the President's own approach to treating our objectives confidentially if they are to have a prospect of success. Even if the OSD language were classified, it could leak and be used by the Soviets to vilify and reject the kind of programs and contacts we are proposing. Moreover, neither the officials implementing the programs, nor the public involved will be under any illusions that this is a return to detente, given the language of the NSDD, our explicit emphasis on reciprocity, and the kind of programs to which we are giving priority. There are other ways to convey the correct message to the public, and we will be pursuing these as we implement the programs.

We therefore recommend not including this language in the NSDD, but will forward Secretary Weinberger's memo to the President for his decision.

John Lenczowski has alternative language at TAB II which deals with Secretary Weinberger's suggestion in a more nuanced manner. He believes we should not put the President in the position of having to flatly reject the Secretary's constructive suggestion, and has therefore modified the language of the introductory paragraph in a way that: 1) makes our objectives sound less "detentist"; 2) supplies guidance on the broader strategic purposes of the exchanges; and 3) is not so explicit as to risk undermining our objectives if the language of the NSDD is made public. (Most of the text is unclassified and intended for public use.)

We have no substantive objections, but have not had time to submit the substitute language to the other concerned agencies, including Rheinsmith, who has already left for Moscow. State has informally indicated that it has no objection to the substitute language, however, and we believe USIA will not have any objection.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



CONFIDENTIALRECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo and options on the NSDD to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Ken & David + Peter*  
*Disapprove with the addition of JL's language and believe it is necessary*  
*Kol/19*  
 David Major, Kenneth deGraffenreid, Peter Rodman and Walter Raymond concur.

*but Walt feels the modifications are unneeded and inconsistent with the President's Geneva and Post-Geneva Statements. He favors*  
 Attachments: *TAB A text of NSDD.*

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Text of NSDD

Tab B Memo from Secretary Weinberger

Tab C Alternative NSDD with John's substitute language

Tab II John Lenczowski's Substitute Language

Tab III Transmittal Memo to Agencies

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Rhinesmith Update on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

Stephen Rhinesmith, Coordinator for the President's U.S.-Soviet Exchange Initiatives, has just returned from a ten day trip to Moscow. Attached at Tab I is his detailed report. Progress toward implementing the initiatives has been good, and Rhinesmith concludes that, despite complaints about the state of the overall relationship since Geneva, the Soviets are still eager to move ahead with the exchanges.

Attachment:

Tab I Progress report on Geneva Exchange Initiatives

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NLRR MD8-125/2 #8202

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10





EYES ONLY 35  
4/4

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 7/2/02

Jack Matlock,

George Shultz gave  
this to me this morning.

It looks very close to what  
you gave me.

Please work with Roz  
this afternoon and firm up  
the points. Clear arms  
control related points with  
Bob Zirkhard (less Hitzge/Matlock  
item). I want to get a  
package to President tomorrow  
so he can read on way back. (over)



George and I will meet with  
President on Monday to  
go over them.

*[Signature]*

8203 36  
4/3/86

Talking Points for President's 4/8 Meeting with Dobrynin

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made selective progress, especially in bilateral areas. Glad to see your interest in people-to-people exchanges, which have wide appeal here. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharanskiy), but progress has stopped.
- Disappointed by overall lack of progress on key security issues since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what can be achieved; your response to our recent proposals has been slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve -- and what seems possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals but are not unrealistic if we both get to work now:
  - a. Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
  - b. Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
  - c. Agreement preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
  - d. Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
  - e. Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
  - f. Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
  - g. Improvements in political atmosphere permitting major expansion of trade and cooperation.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2 #8203

BY KML NARA DATE 6/15/10



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/SUMMIT II

- 2 -

- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would make possible negotiation of treaties in time for 1987 summit.
- Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in a representative number of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
- Also other important goals: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
- We are ready to work constructively on all of them.

#### ARMS CONTROL

- We've been negotiating at Geneva for a year. Major issues have been thoroughly discussed and principal obstacles to agreement clearly defined.
- At Geneva, General Secretary and I agreed to seek early progress. Wrote to him afterwards to suggest we set as private goal practical way of doing this.
- If we are to achieve real progress, primary issues must be resolved. Because of their importance, I believe resolution is possible only if General Secretary and I become more directly involved in their discussion.
- Possibilities should be explored away from glare of public debate.
- Accordingly, I propose that he and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of major issues separating us in Geneva.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore, without final commitment by two of us, possibilities for removing any or all obstacles to agreement.
- Results of discussions would be ad ref and could form basis for decisions by General Secretary and me.
- Am prepared to designate Ambassador Nitze as my personal representative for the discussions.
- Should General Secretary agree to this procedure, Ambassador Nitze will be prepared to meet with Soviet representative at a mutually agreeable time and place.
- Can't overemphasize importance of privacy if effort to succeed.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/SUMMIT II

- Suggest you discuss this further with Secretary Shultz and that you and Ambassador Nitze get together before you depart so you'll have full picture to take back to General Secretary on how this special channel might work.

#### NUCLEAR TESTING

- Regret your efforts to make propaganda on nuclear testing.
- We are ready to open bilateral talks without preconditions; would encompass entire agenda of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- We intend to stress our priority goal of agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET. We will listen carefully to your position.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

#### REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- Termination of military involvement will make military involvement of others unnecessary.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound."
- Unfortunately, Soviet actions and pressure on Pakistan belie calls for political settlement.
- Would welcome details of Soviet withdrawal and clear statement of Soviet willingness to guarantee such a settlement.

#### OTHER ELEMENTS OF GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. This would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.



8204 39

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

April 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Dobrynin, April 8, 1986

Attached at TAB A are the talking points I worked out with Mark Palmer in accord with your instructions following your meeting with Secretary Shultz.

I asked Bob Linhard to review the arms control portions, and he strongly recommends three changes in the talking points. His memo citing his reasons is at TAB II. I conveyed Bob's suggestions to Palmer and Ridgway, but they feel strongly that the original version is preferable. Palmer tells me they spoke to Secretary Shultz this morning, and that he also strongly prefers the original version. Accordingly, I have indicated the disputed language in brackets. These points are on page 2 of the talking points at Tab A.

In a separate but related issue, State/EUR and -- according to Palmer -- the Secretary feel that the April 8 test should be delayed a week so as not to coincide with the President's meeting with Dobrynin. Their reasoning is that the timing of the test will be read by the Soviets -- and by many on the Hill -- as provocative, and that this could give momentum to Congressional efforts to limit the testing program. Bob Linhard holds the opposite view, as indicated in his memorandum at TAB II. However, the bottom line at State is that they consider this an NSC call and will not formally insist on a postponement, although they want you to be aware of their views and of their reading of Congressional attitudes.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you convey the version of the talking points which you approve to the President for him to read prior to the prebrief Monday.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M08-125/2 #8204  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

Attachments:

Tab I      Memorandum to the President

Tab A      Talking Points for Dobrynin Meeting

Tab II     Linhard Memorandum

Tab III    Clean copies of the two versions of the talking points



8205 41  
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin  
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

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NLRRM08-125/2 # 8205

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

42

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions; [would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues,] including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
  - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
  - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
  - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side [and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space].
  - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue [State: further limits on testing with] [Linhard: conditions which would let us move forward toward the] ultimate goal of banning all tests.
  - e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.



- 43
- f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
  - g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
  - Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
  - Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
  - Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
  - Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
  - We ready to work constructively on all of them.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions; [would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues,] including concerns of both sides. ||
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
  - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
  - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
  - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side [and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space]. ||
  - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue [State: further limits on testing with] [Linhard: conditions which would let us move forward toward the] ultimate goal of banning all tests. ||

DECLASSIFIED



45

- e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
  - f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
  - g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
- 
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
  - Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
  - Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
  - Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
  - We ready to work constructively on all of them.

COMMUNICATION

- As I noted, Geneva negotiations not moving fast enough. But major issues are clear and principal obstacles have been defined.
- Primary issues must be resolved; will require direct involvement of General Secretary and myself.
- Therefore, I propose that the General Secretary and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of the major issues separating us.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore, without final commitment by two of us, possibilities for removing obstacles to agreement.
- These discussions would not be binding, but would be referred personally to the General Secretary and myself for decisions by us.
- If Gorbachev agrees, I am prepared to designate Paul Nitze and Jack Matlock as my personal representatives for these discussions.

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- They will be prepared to meet with Mr. Gorbachev's representative or representatives at a mutually agreeable time and place.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

April 2, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Disarray in Moscow?

Recent Soviet behavior can be interpreted broadly in two ways. Assertive Soviet behavior in regional conflicts, the heavy ideological tone of Gorbachev's Party Congress report, the clearly propagandistic nature of Soviet arms control proposals and the apparent attempt to extract substantive concessions in exchange for agreeing to a summit date are read by some as a sign that Gorbachev is not serious in reaching any accommodation with the United States, but rather is determined to test our resolve and to play to the "peace" galleries in the West in order to strain our alliances and bring pressure to bear for unilateral concessions.

The alternate interpretation is that Gorbachev in fact sees it in his interest to lower tensions with the United States, but is constrained by internal divisions and major opposition to changes of policy and furthermore misled by faulty political advice regarding the most effective tactics in dealing with the United States. The current Soviet stance, according to this interpretation, does not signify that Gorbachev has set out to challenge the United States, but rather that he must maintain the image of standing up to U.S. pressure to change long-standing Soviet policies. Those inclined to this interpretation see signs that he may be subject to criticism for returning from Geneva empty-handed, and simply cannot risk another summit without some concrete results. This interpretation, of course, does not deny the obvious fact that Soviet actions have been heavily influenced by propagandistic considerations, but would hold that these are not inconsistent in Soviet eyes with a genuine effort to reduce tensions.

After careful reflection on the events since the Geneva Summit, I am convinced that the second interpretation is closer to reality than the first. It would take an extended essay to describe all the reasons which led me to this conviction, but the key factors are the following:

1. Evidence of disarray at the Party Congress: no consistent line, directly contradictory elements -- even in the "Central

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M08-125/2# 8207  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Committee report" read by Gorbachev -- and striking differences in approach by some of the speakers.

2. Retention of persons Gorbachev clearly wished to remove.
3. Contradictions in the Five-Year Plan.
4. A slowdown (and in some cases a total stalling) of some of the "campaigns" and "reforms" proposed by Gorbachev.
5. Accumulating evidence that the military is not enthusiastic about accommodation with the U.S.: lukewarm treatment of Geneva summit in the military press; behavior of military representatives in the various negotiations (introducing elements which political representatives had agreed to change).

In sum, Gorbachev seems not to have his act together yet. Furthermore, he has made some mistakes which open him to criticism. For example, in espousing the nuclear testing moratorium, he can be accused of failure to achieve anything. Not only has the U.S. not gone along, but it has not had the propaganda effect anticipated. (It is probably not accidental that he made his speech last Saturday on Soviet TV. It was in part aimed at peace movements in the West, but more importantly it was aimed at a Soviet audience, and was meant to explain his failure and to cast the U.S. as the guilty party. There was an unmistakable note of defensiveness in the Russian text.)

He also is possibly accused of agreeing too readily to a pattern of future summit meetings. The argument likely used is that the President uses the meetings to obtain backing for his policies at home, and that Gorbachev -- inexperienced in national security affairs -- fell into a trap. Both elements of the military and the old guard political leadership -- the latter now fighting for its life -- probably resorts to such arguments.

Even if this second interpretation is correct, it does not mean that we should change any policies. In my opinion, we are exactly on the right track. We must demonstrate firmness and continuity. However, if we are to put Gorbachev's intentions and political clout to a valid test, we should do two things: (1) convey clearly to him what sort of substantive outcome we consider possible at the next summit (and perhaps the one after that); and (2) avoid gratuitous public slaps.

Regarding the second point, I would observe that such moves as supplying stingers to the mujahedin can be most useful. Talking about it, however, can be counterproductive. The same goes for drawing public attention to programs like stealth. The leverage is in the action itself. Public threats (even in the form of leaked stories) simply pushes the Soviet leadership into a corner. The thing they are unable to tolerate is public humiliation. Under such circumstances, their habit is to stand pat and become demonstrably truculent.

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It is of course a tall order to attempt to bring pressure to bear quietly, given our inability to control leaks and the need to go public on a number of issues in order to garner support. However, we need to do better on this score if we are to maximize pressure and the prospects for successful negotiation.

One final note regarding Soviet (and Russian) psychology: As I have pointed out in previous papers, Russians tend to proceed deductively in their reasoning and approach to negotiations. This is in contrast to the normal American inductive approach. Concretely, what this means is that they have a psychological need to be assured in advance where we are headed, before they will address the concrete steps necessary to get there. They are quite capable of proceeding step by step -- but only if they are convinced that there is a real prospect of agreement at the end of the process.

Although we cannot and should not interpret recent Soviet actions as benign, it seems clear to me that there is some measure of a genuine element in the repeated Soviet requests to define what we wish to achieve at future summit meetings. In effect, they are asking: "Is the President willing to conclude major agreements at all, or is he simply diddling us with negotiations to hold domestic forces at bay?"

In sum, my judgment is that the greatest tactical risk at present is not that our actions can be interpreted by the Soviets as showing insufficient resolve (I think they are fully convinced on this score), but that they may draw the conclusion that concrete negotiation is futile. Therefore, I believe that some steps to provide reassurance that the President has a real desire to enter into major arms reduction agreements could be helpful. I believe this can be done without in any way damaging our substantive positions.

Recommendations:

1. That the President stress to Dobrynin his desire to conclude concrete agreements on key issues, and sketch out a plan of what he would like to achieve. He should make clear that optimally, he would like to see a resolution of the key issues of the NST talks and appropriate treaties signed and ratified during his administration. (Note: he can make reference to some of the suggestions in his private correspondence.)
2. That we make another effort to establish more private means of communication. Dobrynin's new appointment may facilitate this, since he may now be a key player in Moscow and not just a messenger here. His appointment could provide the Soviets with an appropriate counterpart in Moscow for dealing with (for example) Paul Nitze in a very quiet way.
3. That we take concrete steps to compartmentalize very restrictively any confidential consultations, so as to preclude any risk of leaks.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

April 2, 1986

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3. That we take concrete steps to compartmentalize very restrictively any confidential consultations, so as to preclude any risk of leaks. ~~(This may require cutting the staffs of some Departments out altogether.)~~



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8209 53  
4/2/86

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin  
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in U.S.-Soviet relationship.
- We do not see improvement up to now.
- Soviet actions in support of Qadhafi add extra burden.
- Must address seriously.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Best to reach settlements which avoid Soviet and U.S. military involvement.
- Afghanistan good place to start - but progress in any will be welcome.

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NLRR M68-125/2 #8209

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

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ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Second example: U.S. efforts to make progress on nuclear testing ignored or just turned aside. We cannot respond positively to one-sided demands.
- If we are to solve these issues we must negotiate in good faith.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive progress. However, beginning to wonder if Mr. Gorbachev does. Strange tactics on his part.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve, since Soviet response to U.S. proposals slow and disappointing. However, can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Optimum Goals:
  - a - Agreement in 1986 on the key elements of a treaty to reduce strategic weapons by 50%, to eliminate any first-strike potential on either side and to prevent basing weapons of mass destruction in space.
  - b - Agreement for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles - with stages of reduction if necessary.
  - c - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and a commitment to pursue further limitations on testing - with an ultimate goal of banning all tests.
  - d - Progress in bringing peace to some of the regions now torn by conflict.
  - e - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit a major expansion of trade and cooperation.

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- These are optimum goals, but I believe they are not unrealistic if we both get down to work now and stop jockeying for propaganda points.
- Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
- Minimal Goals
  - A meeting would be most useful even if we are not able to achieve the optimum goals.
  - Substantial progress in any one of these areas would be a worthwhile achievement.
  - There are also other important areas: agreement on a chemical weapons ban, agreement on an approach to reducing conventional forces in Central Europe, agreement on more effective confidence-building measures.
  - We are willing to work constructively on all of them.

#### COMMUNICATION

- Playing to the public galleries harms the negotiation process.
- U.S. wants serious negotiations.
- Secretary Shultz can go over our ideas in more detail when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze accepts our invitation for a meeting.
- Willing to designate Paul Nitze to work privately with whomever Mr. Gorbachev wants to designate.
- But we must get on with it.

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- 4 -

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell the General Secretary I am very much looking forward to his visit.
- I hope he will be able to stay at least a week. This would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- I would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- But we want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

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President's United States - Soviet  
Exchange Initiative

Office of the Coordinator

~~SECRET~~

April 2, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK

FROM: Stephen H. Rhinesmith  
Coordinator

SUBJECT: Progress Report on Geneva  
Exchange Initiatives

I have just returned from ten days of discussions in Moscow on the implementation of the Geneva Exchange Initiatives. It was a highly productive visit.

Project Status

The Soviets and we have reached agreement on specific projects to implement each of the six people-to-people concepts agreed upon by the President and the General Secretary in Geneva. These project areas are:

- Exchange of ten professors annually;
- Exchange of at least ten undergraduate students annually;
- Increased language exchanges;
- Cooperation in the application of computer software to elementary and secondary education; and the exchange of school children;
- Increased sports competitions and interchanges;
- Resumption of joint cancer research.

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Classified by: Stephen H. Rhinesmith, Coordinator  
President's U.S.-Soviet Exchange Initiative  
Declassify: OADR

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In addition, we are moving rapidly to implement a series of exchange projects under the General Exchanges Agreement. These cover nine different areas: education, youth and citizen exchange, professional exchanges, language study, sports, health, performing arts, exhibits and film.

We carried thirty-seven (37) private sector projects with us representing thirty (30) different organizations. While there, we discussed an additional twenty-one (21) project concepts. Of the total of fifty-eight (58), the Soviets did not reject any out-of-hand. We agreed in principle to thirteen (13); forty (40) more are being seriously considered; and the remaining five (5) we jointly agreed were duplicative or unnecessary.

We will continue intense discussions, including with the U.S. private organizations, over the next eight weeks in order to start some of these exchanges by the end of June.

We expect a visit by a delegation of Soviet officials to the United States the beginning of May for specific discussions with U.S. private sector organizations.

#### Additional Observations

You may be interested in the following observations:

1. Tone - After each incident in recent weeks at the political level, i.e., the U.N. Personnel reduction order, the Crimea exercise of "Right of Innocent Passage," the underground tests and the Libyan demonstration of International Maritime Freedom, the Soviets expressed concern. They saw these as related tests of the political relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and warned repeatedly that cultural relations could not go ahead as fast as they would desire, if the "overall political relationship" was not favorable. I also believe that they feel these incidents have embarrassed General Secretary Gorbachev domestically and have made it difficult for him to agree to discuss dates under "mixed signals" of American commitment. Nevertheless, we could detect no direct significant impact on their willingness to go forward with expanded cultural programs during the time we were there.

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2. Youth exchanges - It is clear that the exchange of teenagers will not come easily. The barriers are cultural, economic, organizational and political. Culturally, teenagers are still considered too young by many parents to be sent abroad to the West. Economically, sending teenagers abroad is not seen as good use of hard currency or scarce Aeroflot space. Organizationally, the Soviets are not structured to select young people to go abroad and do not currently have the manpower, policies or procedures in place to accomplish this. And fourth, the reward of a trip to the United States is so sought after as a political payment by various government and party officials that the thought of using this leverage to send young people will be difficult for them to adjust to. In spite of this, they understand the President's personal interest in youth exchange and I believe they will be responsive in sending selected teen-age groups to the United States this summer.

3. Readiness in health, sports, performing arts, exhibits, TV and film exchanges - It is clear that they are ready to move quickly in these areas and we are already feeling the impact with a telebridged exchange of New Year's greetings, the National Gallery Exhibition in Leningrad and Moscow during the last month, and the visits of Horowitz to the Soviet Union and the Kirov Ballet to the United States in the near future. Many of the 58 projects mentioned earlier are in these areas.

### Conclusion

The Soviets appear eager to develop a broad range of contacts between the people of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. through the Geneva Exchanges Initiatives and the cultural agreement. They are pressing ahead in spite of their expressed concerns about the overall political relationship. We look forward to many projects this year and are fully prepared for a Summit meeting which could demonstrate a great deal of progress in this area since Geneva.

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