

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron April 1986 (4)
Box: 16

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/15/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1986 (4/6)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 16

YARHI-MILO

1601

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8224	TALKING POINTS	DOBRYNIN MEETING R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	ND	B1
8225	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS---MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, TUESDAY APRIL 8 AT 9:45 AM R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	ND	B1
8226	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8225 R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	ND	B1
8227	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8225 R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	ND	B1
8228	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	4	ND	B1
8229	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	4	ND	B1
8230	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/15/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1986 (4/6)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 16

YARHI-MILO

1601

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8231	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8230 R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	3	ND	B1
8232	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	3	4/3/1986	B1
8233	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE TALKING POINTS R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	4/10/1986	B1
8234	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT FOR MEETING WITH SHULTZ, WEINBERGER, CASEY, POINDEXTER R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	2	ND	B1
8235	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4	1	ND	B1
8236	MEMCON	PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN TUESDAY APRIL 8, 1986 R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	10	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

90274a
Talking Points
Dobrynin Wtj

PRESERVATION COPY

NOTE: FOLLOWING TO BE USED PRIVATELY WITH DOBRYNIN

COMMUNICATION

- As I noted, Geneva negotiations not moving fast enough. But major issues are clear and principal obstacles have been defined.
- Primary issues must be resolved; will require direct involvement of General Secretary and myself.
- Therefore, I propose that the General Secretary and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of the major issues separating us.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore possibilities for removing obstacles to agreement.
- These discussions would not be binding, but would be referred personally to the General Secretary and myself for decisions by us.
- If Gorbachev agrees, I am prepared to designate Paul Nitze and Jack Matlock as my personal representatives for these discussions.
- They will be prepared to meet with Mr. Gorbachev's representative or representatives at a mutually agreeable time and place.

3
EYES ONLY - TALKING POINTS - MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, TUESDAY,
APRIL 8 at 9:45 a.m.

COMMUNICATION

- GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS NOT MOVING FAST ENOUGH.
- PRIMARY ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED; WILL REQUIRE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF GENERAL SECRETARY AND MYSELF.

-2-

EYES ONLY

- THEREFORE, I PROPOSE THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND I DESIGNATE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES FOR PRIVATE, INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS OF MAJOR ISSUES.
- PURPOSE WOULD BE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR REMOVING OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT.
- THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BE BINDING, BUT WOULD BE REFERRED PERSONALLY TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND MYSELF FOR DECISIONS.

-3-

EYES ONLY

- IF GORBACHEV AGREES, I AM PREPARED TO DESIGNATE PAUL NITZE AND JACK MATLOCK AS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES.
- THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH MR. GORBACHEV'S REPRESENTATIVE OR REPRESENTATIVES AT A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME AND PLACE.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4 #8225
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

4
EYES ONLY - TALKING POINTS - MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, TUESDAY,
APRIL 8 at 9:45 a.m.

COMMUNICATION

- GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS NOT MOVING FAST ENOUGH.
- PRIMARY ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED; WILL REQUIRE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF GENERAL SECRETARY AND MYSELF.

-2-

EYES ONLY

- THEREFORE, I PROPOSE THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND I DESIGNATE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES FOR PRIVATE, INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS OF MAJOR ISSUES.
- PURPOSE WOULD BE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR REMOVING OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT.
- THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BE BINDING, BUT WOULD BE REFERRED PERSONALLY TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND MYSELF FOR DECISIONS.

-3-

EYES ONLY

- IF GORBACHEV AGREES, I AM PREPARED TO DESIGNATE PAUL NITZE AND JACK MATLOCK AS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES.
- THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH MR. GORBACHEV'S REPRESENTATIVE OR REPRESENTATIVES AT A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME AND PLACE.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FO6-114/4 #8226

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

5
EYES ONLY - TALKING POINTS - MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, TUESDAY,
APRIL 8 at 9:45 a.m.

COMMUNICATION

- GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS NOT MOVING FAST ENOUGH.
- PRIMARY ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED; WILL REQUIRE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF GENERAL SECRETARY AND MYSELF.

-2-

EYES ONLY

- THEREFORE, I PROPOSE THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND I DESIGNATE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES FOR PRIVATE, INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS OF MAJOR ISSUES.
- PURPOSE WOULD BE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR REMOVING OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT.
- THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BE BINDING, BUT WOULD BE REFERRED PERSONALLY TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND MYSELF FOR DECISIONS.

-3-

EYES ONLY

- IF GORBACHEV AGREES, I AM PREPARED TO DESIGNATE PAUL NITZE AND JACK MATLOCK AS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES.
- THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH MR. GORBACHEV'S REPRESENTATIVE OR REPRESENTATIVES AT A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME AND PLACE.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOIA 114/4#8227
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

SECRET/SENSITIVE

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8228

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have bilateral talks without preconditions; would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
 - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing ~~reducing~~ strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
 - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
 - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
 - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
 - e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.

- f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
- g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
- Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
- Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
- Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
- We ready to work constructively on all of them.

COMMUNICATION

- As I noted, Geneva negotiations not moving fast enough. But major issues are clear and principal obstacles have been defined.
- Primary issues must be resolved; will require direct involvement of General Secretary and myself.
- Therefore, I propose that the General Secretary and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of the major issues separating us.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore, ~~without final commitment by two of us,~~ possibilities for removing obstacles to agreement.
- These discussions would not be binding, but would be referred personally to the General Secretary and myself for decisions by us.
- If Gorbachev agrees, I am prepared to designate Paul Nitze and Jack Matlock as my personal representatives for these discussions.

- They will be prepared to meet with Mr. Gorbachev's representative or representatives at a mutually agreeable time and place.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

10
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FDG-114/4#8229
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have bilateral talks without preconditions; would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
 - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
 - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
 - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
 - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
 - e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.

- 12
- f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
 - g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
 - Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
 - Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
 - Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
 - Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
 - We ready to work constructively on all of them.

COMMUNICATION

- As I noted, Geneva negotiations not moving fast enough. But major issues are clear and principal obstacles have been defined.
- Primary issues must be resolved; will require direct involvement of General Secretary and myself.
- Therefore, I propose that the General Secretary and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of the major issues separating us.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore, without final commitment by two of us, possibilities for removing obstacles to agreement.
- These discussions would not be binding, but would be referred personally to the General Secretary and myself for decisions by us.
- If Gorbachev agrees, I am prepared to designate Paul Nitze and Jack Matlock as my personal representatives for these discussions.

- They will be prepared to meet with Mr. Gorbachev's representative or representatives at a mutually agreeable time and place.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

14
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD6-114/4 #8230
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

15

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have bilateral talks without preconditions; would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
 - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
 - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
 - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
 - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
 - e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.

- 16
- f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
 - g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
-
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
 - Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
 - Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
 - Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
 - We ready to work constructively on all of them.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

17
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8231

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have bilateral talks without preconditions; would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
 - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
 - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
 - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
 - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
 - e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.

- 19
- f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
 - g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
-
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
 - Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
 - Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
 - Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
 - We ready to work constructively on all of them.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

Talking Points for President's 4/8 Meeting with Dobrynin

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made selective progress, especially in bilateral areas. Glad to see your interest in people-to-people exchanges, which have wide appeal here. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharanskiy), but progress has stopped.
- Disappointed by overall lack of progress on key security issues since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what can be achieved; your response to our recent proposals has been slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve -- and what seems possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals but are not unrealistic if we both get to work now:
 - a. Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
 - b. Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
 - c. Agreement preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
 - d. Agreement on*more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
 - e. Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
 - f. Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
 - g. Improvements in political atmosphere permitting major expansion of trade and cooperation.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/SUMMIT II

- 2 -

- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would make possible negotiation of treaties in time for 1987 summit.
- Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in a representative number of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
- Also other important goals: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
- We are ready to work constructively on all of them.

ARMS CONTROL COMMUNICATION

*As I have noted,
we're not
getting
anywhere
in Geneva*

- We've been negotiating at Geneva for a year. Major issues have been thoroughly discussed and principal obstacles to agreement clearly defined.
- At Geneva, General Secretary and I agreed to seek early progress. Wrote to him afterwards to suggest we set as private goal practical way of doing this.
- If we are to achieve real progress, primary issues must be resolved. Because of their importance, I believe resolution is possible only if General Secretary and I become more directly involved in their discussion.
- Possibilities should be explored away from glare of public debate.
- Accordingly, I propose that he and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of major issues separating us in Geneva.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore, without final commitment by two of us, possibilities for removing any or all obstacles to agreement.
- Results of discussions would be ad ref and could form basis for decisions by General Secretary and me.
- Am prepared to designate Ambassador Nitze as my personal representative for the discussions.
- Should General Secretary agree to this procedure, Ambassador Nitze will be prepared to meet with Soviet representative at a mutually agreeable time and place.
- Can't overemphasize importance of privacy if effort to succeed.

- Suggest you discuss this further with Secretary Shultz and that you and Ambassador Nitze get together before you depart so you'll have full picture to take back to General Secretary on how this special channel might work.

NUCLEAR TESTING

- Regret your efforts to make propaganda on nuclear testing.
- We are ready to open bilateral talks without preconditions; would encompass entire agenda of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- We intend to stress our priority goal of agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET. We will listen carefully to your position.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- Termination of military involvement will make military involvement of others unnecessary.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." *Soviet escalation has done that.*
- Unfortunately, Soviet actions and pressure on Pakistan *Belie* calls for political settlement. *We are eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.*
- ~~Would welcome details of Soviet withdrawal and clear statement of Soviet willingness to guarantee such a settlement.~~

OTHER ELEMENTS OF GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. This would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

Matlock

4/10/86

23

~~EXES ONLY~~

~~Adm. Poin Dexter~~

~~Am. Matlock~~

PRESERVATION COPY

EYES ONLY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24
4/10/86

JMP less
seen

TO: Admiral Poindexter

SUB: Talking Points on "Channel"

Here are some talking points,
as you requested.

I have not provided a memo
for the President, because I assume
you want to handle orally.

They were written on the
assumption that the President wants
to do the briefing before he knows
whether the Soviets accept.

If he decides to brief only after
the Soviets accept, the wording
would require only slight changes.

I have provided some back-
ground philosophy, in case you
think that is useful. If it is
not needed, the first 8 or 9
points could be dropped.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/4 #8833

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

Jack

TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT

Meeting with Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Poindexter

-- Cannot be sure of Soviet intentions. Easy to draw conclusion that they not serious in reaching any reasonable accommodation on any of the important issues.

-- However, believe it is important to make every effort to find out whether Gorbachev is really willing to deal on some issues.

-- If I don't try, we could miss an opportunity to put the U.S.-Soviet relationship on a more predictable and less dangerous footing.

-- Not naive. Know who the enemy is, and know that no accommodation will remove the fundamental competitiveness of our systems.

-- However, question whether Congress and public will support indefinitely the steps we must take to deal with the Soviet threat if they are not convinced that we are making every effort on the diplomatic level to solve problems. We have to do something to activate the negotiations -- or prove the Soviets are not serious.

-- Both sides motivated in part by propaganda considerations. Soviets, of course, more than we. Still, if we are going to negotiate anything effectively, we must also have the means to deal with the issues privately before we get into a shouting match publicly.

-- Leaks here limit our ability to deal privately, just as calculated propaganda on their part does.

-- Understand that we cannot get anywhere if we push Gorbachev too much into a corner publicly. (Need to keep as much pressure as we can on him privately, but we don't have a very good record of keeping things quiet.)

-- This is the background of a decision I have made, which I want to convey to you -- and only to you. I want to keep all of you in the loop, but don't want this to go any further.

-- In order to test how far Gorbachev is willing to go -- and to get some better insight into his thought processes -- I have proposed to him, very privately, that we both designate a couple of representatives to meet privately from time to time to review relations and come up with ideas as to how we might solve them.

-- I don't yet know whether he will accept or not. It's going to have to be on a reciprocal basis if he does -- we won't accept doing it through the Soviet Ambassador here, as Kissinger did with Dobrynin. It has to be between counterparts of roughly comparable status, and if it doesn't work, we'll terminate the arrangement.

-- I have made it clear that these discussions will be totally non-binding; our representatives will come up with suggestions Gorbachev and I might consider. But no commitments will be made until everything is negotiated out in the established fora.

-- I want the representatives I have named to report directly to me. I'll keep you informed, and I won't make any decisions until I have your views on the issues.

-- As for the bureaucracy, it is important that nobody know this is going on. Therefore, you should not brief any of your subordinates.

-- I realize that if there are any new ideas, we'll have to staff them. But we can do that without mentioning how they originated. We'll just order studies and advice on this issue or that issue, as the case may be. Nobody will need to know precisely why we are asking: the subjects will be those we would naturally be interested in anyway.

-- You can be absolutely sure that I'm not going to make any decisions without consulting you, and I won't let this arrangement be used by anybody to get a bureaucratic upper hand.

-- This can only work if we are totally discreet. If Gorbachev accepts the arrangement, I will instruct my representatives to work with only a couple of assistants, and to keep a precise list of every person who knows about this arrangement on our side. I don't want anyone else to be told without my personal and explicit authorization. The people I will pick as representatives will be in positions where they would normally be informed about the range of U.S.-Soviet relations and my own desires, so we will not need to single them out for special briefings.

June 27

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 10, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding our suggested reply to Gorbachev's letter of April 2.

The Department of State concurs in the text.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Suggested reply to Gorbachev
Tab B Gorbachev letter of April 2

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CJS* NARA, Date *7/2/02*

28

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev

Issue

Response to Gorbachev's letter of April 2.

Facts

Gorbachev's most recent letter reviews the state of U.S.-Soviet relations since the Geneva summit and reiterates his recent call to meet with you to discuss a nuclear test moratorium.

Discussion

Your response welcomes Gorbachev's suggestion, as conveyed through Congressmen Fascell and Broomfield, that we open a dialogue to discuss our various concerns over nuclear testing and verification, and explains why we are not able to agree to a summit which focuses only on the test ban question. It also urges Gorbachev to review our own recent arms control proposals, which we feel could provide key elements for implementing the Soviet proposals of January 15.

Recommendation

OK

No

_____ That you sign the letter to Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev
Tab B Letter from Gorbachev

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FDG 114/4 #8235
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

29

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of April 2, which Ambassador Dobrynin delivered. As Ambassador Dobrynin will report to you, your letter served as the point of departure for a very useful meeting we held in my office, and for additional meetings between him and Secretary Shultz. It is clear that both of us are concerned about the relative lack of progress since our meeting in Geneva in moving overall relations in a positive direction. While each of us would cite quite different reasons to explain this situation, I agree with your thought that the important thing now is to focus our attention on how we can solve the concrete problems facing us.

I described to Ambassador Dobrynin a number of goals which I believe we could set for our meeting. This was of course an optimum list. I recognize that achieving these goals will be a complex and difficult process and that we may not be able to achieve them all in the immediate future. I am confident, however, that all can be achieved if we have the will to get to work on them promptly. Furthermore, they are sufficiently important that progress on even a few of them would be a worthwhile achievement.

Although I believe we should not relent in our search for ways to bridge critical differences between our countries, I agree with your observation on the desirability of moving step by step when an overall solution to a problem eludes us. I want to assure you that our proposals, like yours, are not "all or nothing at all." We wish to negotiate, to find compromises that serve the interests of each of us, and to achieve as much progress as possible. If we can make a critical

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
Authority NLS F99-051 #422 SMC 10/16/01
BY CJS, NARA, Date 7/2/02

breakthrough, that of course would be best. But as we attempt to deal with the key issues, we should simultaneously try to solve as many of the smaller ones as we can in order to develop momentum for dealing successfully with the larger issues.

This applies particularly to the nuclear testing issue, which you mentioned in your letter. Since nuclear testing occurs because we both depend on nuclear weapons for our security, our ability eventually to eliminate testing is intimately connected with our ability to agree on ways to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons themselves. This is why we simply cannot enter into the moratorium you have proposed.

However, there must be practical means by which we can begin resolving our differences on this issue. Congressmen Fascell and Broomfield have reported to me your suggestion that we open a dialogue to discuss both your ideas and ours on this subject. I am prepared to agree to this idea, to have our representatives meet to discuss the principal concerns on both sides without preconditions. If we could agree on concrete verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, we would be prepared to support ratification of those treaties and create conditions which would let us move toward our ultimate goal of banning all tests.

I have taken careful note of your suggestion that we meet in Europe to deal with this issue. While I agree that it is very important, it is hard for me to understand the basis for a meeting on our level, devoted solely to this issue, when it has been impossible to arrange for our representatives to discuss it. In any event, our calendars are such that we should be able to arrange the meeting we agreed on in Geneva as soon and as easily as we could arrange a one-purpose meeting in Europe. Wouldn't it be better to treat this issue first at a lower level, in the hope that a way could be found to produce some concrete result when we meet in the United States?

In addition to the substantive suggestions I made to Ambassador Dobrynin, I asked him to convey to you some ideas for procedures we might follow to speed up resolution of the issues we face. I hope you will give them serious consideration.

I am pleased that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be meeting in May to discuss how we can accelerate the preparations for your visit to the U.S. I would hope, however, that we can begin immediately to exchange ideas regarding practical goals we can set, and therefore look forward to receiving your more detailed letter and your reaction to the ideas I presented to Ambassador Dobrynin. I would also like to suggest that you look again at our most recent arms control proposals -- the comprehensive proposal of November 1 and the INF proposal of February 24. I believe there are positive elements in them on which we can build. Both of these proposals were designed to pick up on positive aspects of your proposals and bridge the previous positions of our two sides. They also would provide key elements in implementing the first phase of your proposal of January 15.

In conclusion, I want to convey to you the high regard in which Ambassador Dobrynin is held in our country. He has played a truly distinguished, historic role in relations between our countries for over two decades, and we view his departure from Washington with regret. I understand, however, that his future duties will involve relations between our countries, so that we look forward to working with him in the future as well.

I am certain that Ambassador Dobrynin's successor will be received by American officials and our public with the respect due the representative of

a great nation. I agree with you that the widest possible contacts by our Ambassadors both in Washington and Moscow are important if we are to achieve a greater measure of mutual understanding.

Nancy joins me in sending our warm personal regards to you and Mrs. Gorbacheva.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 APR 7 9:09

SYSTEM II
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90267

URGENT

ACTION OFFICER: [REDACTED] DUE: IMMEDIATELY

- | | |
|--|---|
| ☒ Prepare Memo For President | ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew |
| ☐ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier | ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott |
| ☐ Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- FYI
- ☐ ☐ Burghardt
 - ☐ ☐ Cannistraro
 - ☐ ☐ Childress
 - ☐ ☐ Cobb
 - ☐ ☐ Covey
 - ☐ ☐ Danzansky
 - ☐ ☐ deGraffenreid
 - ☐ ☐ Djerejian
 - ☐ ☐ Dobriansky
 - ☐ ☐ Donley
 - ☐ ☐ Douglass
 - ☐ ☐ Grimes
 - ☐ ☐ Hughes
 - ☐ ☐ Kraemer
 - ☐ ☐ Laux
 - ☐ ☐ Lenczowski

- FYI
- ☐ ☐ Levine
 - ☐ ☐ Linhard
 - ☐ ☐ Mahley
 - ☐ ☐ Major
 - ☐ ☐ Mandel
 - ☐ ☐ Matlock
 - ☐ ☐ May
 - ☐ ☐ Menges
 - ☐ ☐ Miller
 - ☐ ☐ North
 - ☐ ☐ Platt
 - ☐ ☐ Pugliaresi
 - ☐ ☐ Raymond
 - ☐ ☐ Reger
 - ☐ ☐ Ringdahl
 - ☐ ☐ Sable

- FYI
- ☐ ☐ Sachs
 - ☐ ☒ Sestanovich
 - ☐ ☐ Sigur
 - ☐ ☐ Small
 - ☐ ☐ Sommer
 - ☐ ☐ Soos
 - ☐ ☐ Stark
 - ☐ ☐ Steiner
 - ☐ ☐ Tahir-Kheli
 - ☐ ☐ Teicher
 - ☐ ☐ Thompson
 - ☐ ☐ Tillman
 - ☐ ☐ Wigg
 - ☐ ☐ Wright
 - ☐ ☐ _____
 - ☐ ☐ _____

- INFORMATION
- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| ☒ McDaniel | ☒ Pearson | ☒ Secretariat |
| ☒ Rodman | ☐ Lehman | ☐ _____ |
| ☐ Poindexter (advance) | ☒ Fortier (advance) | |

COMMENTS

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

April 2, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

I have requested A.F. Dobrynin to transmit this letter to you personally as a follow-up to our exchange of views.

I would like to say that we value A.F. Dobrynin's long years of activity as Soviet ambassador to Washington and his vigorous efforts to develop mutual understanding between our two nations. This, of course, has been greatly facilitated by the contacts he maintained with the American leadership, including under your Administration. We hope that similar opportunities will be available to his successor who we are currently selecting and who will be named shortly.

I intend to send you a more detailed letter on a number of specific issues in our relations and also amplifying on those ideas that I have set forth before. Now, I would like to share with you some of my general observations that I have, and, surely, you must have your own, regarding the state and prospects of the relationship between our two countries. I believe, in doing so, one has to use as a point of departure our meeting in Geneva where we both assumed certain obligations.

I think our assessments of that meeting coincide: it was necessary and useful, it introduced a certain stabilizing element to the relations between the USSR and the USA and to the world

Authority NLSF99-051 DECLASSIFIED RELEASED
BY GLS 428 JMC 10/16/00
7/2/02

situation in general. It was only natural that it also generated no small hopes for the future.

More than four months have passed since the Geneva meeting. We ask ourselves: what is the reason for things not going the way they, it would seem, should have gone? Where is the real turn for the better? We, within the Soviet leadership, regarded the Geneva meeting as a call for translating understandings of principle reached there into specific actions with a view to giving an impetus to our relations and to building up their positive dynamics. And we have been doing just that after Geneva.

With this in mind, we have put forward a wide-ranging and concrete program of measures concerning the limitation and reduction of arms and disarmament. It is from the standpoint of new approaches to seeking mutually acceptable solutions that the Soviet delegations have acted in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm.

What were the actions of the USA? One has to state, unfortunately, that so far the positions have not been brought closer together so that it would open up a real prospect for reaching agreements. I will not go into details or make judgements of the US positions here. But there is one point I would like to make. One gathers the impression that all too frequently attempts are being made to portray our initiatives as propaganda, as a desire to score high points in public opinion or as a wish to put the other side into an awkward position. We did not and do not harbor such designs. After all, our initiatives can be easily tested for their practicality. Our goal is to reach agreement, to find solutions to problems which concern the USSR, the USA and actually all other countries.

I have specially focused on this matter so as to ensure a correct, unbiased and business-like treatment of our proposals. I am sure that it will make it easier to reach agreement.

Now what has been taking place in the meantime outside the negotiations? Of course, each of us has his own view of the policy of the other side. But here again, has the Soviet Union done anything in foreign affairs or bilateral relations that would contribute to mounting tensions or be detrimental to the legitimate interests of the USA? I can say clearly: no, there has been nothing of that sort.

On the other hand, we hear increasingly vehement philippics addressed to the USSR and are also witnessing quite a few actions directly aimed against our interests and, to put it frankly, against our relations becoming more stable and constructive. All this builds suspicion with regard to the US policy and, surely, creates no favorable backdrop for the summit meeting. I am saying it with no ambiguity in order to avoid in this regard any uncertainties or misunderstanding that only one side should exercise restraint and display a positive attitude. Our relations take shape not in a vacuum, their general atmosphere is a wholly material concept. The calmer the atmosphere, the easier it is to solve issues which are of equal concern to both sides.

The issues have to be solved - there is no doubt about it. And above all this bears on the area of security. You are familiar with our proposals, they cover all the most important aspects. At the same time I would like specifically to draw your attention to the fact that we do not say: all or nothing at all. We are in

favor of moving forward step by step and we outlined certain possibilities in this regard, particularly, at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

We maintained a serious and balanced approach to the problem of ending nuclear tests. One would not want to loose hope that we shall succeed in finding a practical solution to this issue in the way that the world expects us to do. It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of this matter as it is. The solution thereof carries with it also a great positive political potential. It is precisely one of the central thoughts contained in the message of the Delhi Six - countries which called for building a favorable atmosphere in the relations between the USSR and the USA and in the international situation as a whole. We took that also into account, having reacted positively to their appeal to our countries not to conduct nuclear tests pending the next Soviet-American summit meeting.

It was the desire that we work together in the cessation of nuclear tests and set a good example to all nuclear powers that motivated my recent proposal for both of us to meet specifically on this issue at one of the European capitals. Have another look at this proposal, Mr. President, in a broad political context. I repeat, what is meant here is a specific, single-purpose meeting. Such a meeting, of course, would not be a substitute for the new major meeting that we agreed upon in Geneva.

I do very serious thinking with regard to the latter, first of all with a view to making that meeting truly meaningful and substantial, so that it should enable us to move closer to putting

38
5.

into practice the fundamental understandings reached in Geneva. As you know, I have mentioned some of the questions pertaining to the area of security which are worthwhile working on in preparing for our meeting. I reaffirm that we are ready to seek here solutions in a most serious way, which would be mutually acceptable and not detrimental to the security of either side. Given the mutual will it would be also possible to ascertain other possibilities for agreement in the context of the forthcoming meeting both in the area of space and nuclear arms and on the issues discussed in other fora. To be sure, we also have things to discuss as far as regional matters are concerned.

I assume that you are also working on all these questions and in the subsequent correspondence we will be able in a more specific and substantive way to compare our mutual preliminary ideas for the purpose of bringing the positions closer together. Obviously, this joint work, including the preparations for our meeting, will benefit from the exchanges of views at other levels and particularly from the forthcoming contacts between our Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State.

I will be looking forward with interest to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

J4-C
39

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 11, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Dobrynin -
Memorandum of Conversation

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Nicholas Platt forwarding a copy of the memorandum of conversation from the President's April 8 meeting with Dobrynin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Nicholas Platt

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CRS* NARA, Date *7/2/02*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Dobrynin (S)

Attached at Tab A for Secretary Shultz is the memorandum of
conversation from the President's April 8 meeting with Dobrynin.
(S)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CH NARA, Date 7/2/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin of the Soviet Union (S)

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary George P. Shultz
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Rozanne L. Ridgway
Donald R. Fortier
Jack F. Matlock

SOVIET

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh
Soviet DCM Oleg Sokolov

DATE, TIME TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1986
AND PLACE: 09:45 - 11:00 a.m., Oval Office

The President opened the meeting by congratulating Dobrynin on his election as Secretary of the Central Committee, and pointing out that he was eager to move forward along the lines agreed at the Geneva Summit. He noted that we had made some progress, especially in bilateral areas, and said that he was particularly encouraged by the Soviet Government's receptiveness to discussing an expansion of people-to-people programs. Charlie Wick, he observed, had informed him of his good reception during his trip. (C)

However, the President added, he was disappointed by the overall lack of progress in our relations, and was aware that much remains to be done. He then invited Dobrynin's comments. (S)

Dobrynin began by thanking the President for the cooperation he had received during his tenure in Washington, and mentioned that his new duties would involve supervision of the Central Committee's International Department, which would include in the future U.S.-Soviet relations. (C)

He also brought personal greetings from Gorbachev, and mentioned that he had delivered a letter from Gorbachev to Secretary Shultz yesterday. He hoped that there would be a reply soon, and

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4 #8236
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

42

suggested that it would be nice if he could carry one back to the General Secretary. He had had a good talk with Secretary Shultz and Admiral Poindexter yesterday, and wondered if the President had any reaction to Gorbachev's letter. (S)

The President said that he would speak frankly. As he had noted, progress in our relations had not been what he had hoped after Geneva. Soviet military involvement in regional conflicts creates major problems in our relations, and furthermore is dangerous. He and Gorbachev bear a great responsibility: they hold the fate of the world in their hands, and such involvement increases dangers. (S)

Libya is a prime example, the President continued. It is hard for the U.S. to accept Soviet criticism of our maneuvers in international waters, since we both agree that the Gulf of Sidra is international. The U.S. has operated there many times, the recent maneuvers were scheduled well in advance, and were not intended to be provocative. Therefore, the Soviet stance could not be understood here. (S)

The U.S. seeks solutions to these regional problems -- but as long as our friends need help, we will give it. He had studied Gorbachev's remarks on Afghanistan at the Party Congress, and wished to say that the U.S. has no desire to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that. (S)

Regarding arms control, he sees potential progress in some areas, but is frustrated by a lack of Soviet response to the U.S. proposals. For example, there has been no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction. In this respect, we may have different approaches to negotiation. Our approach is for each side to present its optimum desires, and then to narrow the differences through negotiation when the differences in approach are clear. (S)

As for nuclear testing, he regrets Soviet efforts to make propaganda on the issue. The U.S. has made numerous efforts to make progress, but it must be understood that the U.S. is behind the Soviet Union in carrying out its testing program. A moratorium when one side has completed its program and the other is still in the middle of its program is unacceptable. Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for the two treaties which have been signed. It is important to take steps to build confidence, since there is too much distrust on both sides to agree immediately to major changes. As he had told the General Secretary in Geneva, nations don't distrust each other because they are armed; they arm themselves because they distrust each other. We are ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions, and they can deal with the concerns of both sides. We see no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at the next summit. (S)

Regarding the next summit, the President stressed that we want a substantive outcome. He then listed the following as optimum goals:

- Agreement on key elements of a treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
- Agreement on key elements of an INF treaty.
- Agreement on methods which eliminate both the threat of an effective first strike by either side and the use of space for basing offensive weapons capable of mass destruction.
- Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests and commitment to create conditions which would permit the ultimate elimination of testing. If we could make progress toward reducing nuclear weapons, that would provide a basis for further limitations on testing.
- Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
- Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
- Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation. (S)

The President then pointed out that agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for meeting planned for 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before the U.S. 1988 election campaign. Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of General Secretary Gorbachev's January 15 proposal. (S)

He then noted that other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures, and said that even if they could not achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be a worthwhile achievement. But we are ready to work constructively on all of them. (S)

The President then concluded his presentation by asking Dobrynin to tell Gorbachev that he very much is looking forward to his visit to the United States. He hopes the General Secretary can stay here for at least a week, since he would like to show him something of the United States. The visit should not be all work, although there will be plenty of time for working sessions. But he would like to hear Mr. Gorbachev's desires on this score. (S)

Dobrynin began his response by commenting that they are not trying to avoid a discussion of regional conflicts. There will be further opportunity when the foreign ministers meet. Our views, of course, differ, but we can discuss this. (S)

As for Afghanistan, U.S. involvement prolongs the war, which is what Gorbachev was referring to in his Party Congress speech. The issue of local conflicts is on their minds, however. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be willing to take up three or four of the most important and discuss them in more detail with Secretary Shultz. The Soviets have made good proposals to Pakistan on Afghanistan, and have even set forth a schedule for troop withdrawal. The situation around Libya also bothers them very much, and that is true also of Nicaragua, but he would not take time now to discuss it. We can go into these issues more thoroughly on other occasions. (S)

Regarding the central security issues, the Soviets want something substantial to come out of the next summit. We need to find a minimum number of issues to try to solve. Diplomats must do the negotiation, but they need instructions from the top. Some recent U.S. actions have introduced uncertainty on the Soviet side. (S)

For example, they are concerned regarding the U.S. position on a nuclear test ban. They are willing to discuss verification, but why not discuss a test ban and verification simultaneously? We could either resume the tripartite talks with the UK, or just open bilateral talks on the subject. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked if he was proposing this as one of the summit announcements. (S)

Dobrynin said yes, and asked what would be wrong with an announcement that negotiation on U.S. and Soviet ideas would be resumed. (S)

The President noted that there is no agreement yet on the time for his next meeting with Gorbachev. (S)

Dobrynin said that this is precisely the point. Although there are no preconditions, they do not want our leaders going blindfolded into a meeting. History has shown that such meetings are not successful. For example, Kennedy met Khrushchev without preparation in Vienna and it was a flop. The same is true of Eisenhower's meeting with Khrushchev in Paris. On the other hand, the summits that Nixon, Ford and Carter had with Brezhnev, and that the President had with Gorbachev in Geneva were well prepared and were successful. (S)

We need to know what minimum will be achieved, he continued. We cannot risk failure at the top level. Gorbachev wants success just as he feels the President wants success, and he is setting no preconditions, but he is asking specifically what areas we can reach agreement on. (S)

45

Dobrynin pointed out that the Soviets are familiar with the three broad areas of our relations, security, regional conflict and bilateral, and are willing to work on all of them. We began to prepare well before the Geneva summit last year, and although we stopped for a while, these preparations permitted the staff to work out the joint statement the last night. This would not have been possible without the prior work. But the joint statement was a good one and had an impact on public opinion. (S)

Now five months have passed, and what do we have that we can announce at the next meeting? That is, if there is a meeting this year -- and Gorbachev assumes there will be one. We have no clearcut minimum goal. (S)

So Gorbachev's main message is: Let's sit down and find at least the minimum. We can work on the proposals of both to define the minimum. When Nixon came to the Soviet Union in 1972 he had 80 percent of the results in his pocket. It is dangerous to go into these meetings entirely ex promptu. We have presented some ideas; you may have other ideas. This is not to substitute for the work at the meeting itself, but rather to insure that it is successful. (S)

The President said that we had in fact proposed a number of things, and observed that we may look at negotiations from different viewpoints. He recalled that for 25 years he had been chief negotiator for his labor union, the Screen Actors' Guild. In those negotiations, the union would make a proposal, and management would make a proposal, and that way they came to understand the differences between them which had to be negotiated. (S)

Regarding INF, we seem close to agreement. We agree that we should go down to zero. We do disagree on how to apply this globally. But we could bridge that at the next summit. (S)

As for START, we have agreed on a 50 percent reduction. We apply this to different systems. It is a complex question because of the types of weapons and the fact that each side has a different force structure. But we have come a long way in agreeing on a world without nuclear weapons. U.S. proposals have been presented in response to Soviet proposals, and if our negotiators are freed up so they can discuss the differences, we might hammer out an agreement on the remaining issues at the next summit. If we could do that, our public would clap their hands, since they fear the nuclear threat and want to have it eliminated. (S)

As for agreements at earlier summits, some of these seem to have been reached just for the sake of agreement. There have been some violations of them, which is evidence of this. Therefore the President said he is not impressed by what had been achieved at these earlier meetings. Previous agreements merely agreed on the pace of an increase, not on reductions. But he wondered what

is keeping us from settling how we do the 50 percent reductions to which we have agreed. (S)

Dobrynin said that what the Soviets are trying to do is to find a way for the leaders to give instructions to our negotiators to narrow the differences. Negotiations will continue in the various fora, but our Foreign Ministers should sit down and see what goals would be realistic. We need something for our bosses to sign or announce. Then they will have some birds in hand as they go into their meeting, and can see how much more they can get during the meeting. (S)

For example, a simple announcement that they agree to begin negotiations on a [comprehensive] test ban and verification of testing is one possibility. Or, as regards SDI, an announcement that we will begin talks on how to strengthen the ABM Treaty. The point is that we need some definition of the minimum which can be achieved or announced. (S)

Dobrynin then observed that Gorbachev, like the President, is a politician, and just cannot risk coming home from the summit without some definable result. He observed that when the President meets with his Allies, he always has something in mind in advance. This is also a good rule to follow with others. That way, formal negotiations can go forward, but at the same time we can reach an understanding on what the minimum results will be. (S)

Dobrynin then pulled out a paper in Russian and translated what he characterized as an "oral message" from Gorbachev, remarking that it had been given to him when he saw Gorbachev the day before his departure from Moscow. It contained the following points:

-- Gorbachev is committed to pursuing the obligation he and the President assumed in Geneva to work toward an improvement of the international situation.

-- Since Geneva, the actions of the USSR have been designed to achieve the aims agreed at the summit. These have been consistent with preparing for the next meeting, agreed to at Geneva.

-- He, Gorbachev, is prepared to be guided by the mutual agreements undertaken at the Geneva Summit.

-- U.S. actions, however, leave a different impression. Rhetoric has intensified. Certain U.S. steps can be interpreted as unfriendly acts, directed against the improvement of relations. And all this has happened while there was no dialogue between the US and USSR regarding plans for the next summit meeting.

-- He is trying to understand what the U.S. wishes to achieve. He took note of Secretary Shultz's statement to Ryzhkov that the President is committed to an improvement in relations.

-- The main thing is to insure the success of the next Summit meeting. We need an understanding on what specific results can be counted on.

-- He wishes to invite the President's personal attention to this problem. When matters of such importance are involved, extemporaneous actions and meetings can be dangerous. Khrushchev's meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, which proceeded on such an "extemporaneous" basis, aggravated relations.

-- He is not making an attempt to impose preconditions for the summit meeting. Rather, his desire is to agree in advance on the possible content of the meeting -- what we each will be bringing to the meeting and what we hope to achieve. Specifically, what agreements or understandings, as a minimum, will be the result?

-- He believes that every opportunity should be taken to prepare a productive meeting so he can visit the United States this year. But he wants that meeting to be meaningful and substantial. (S)

Having read these points, Dobrynin observed that our Foreign Ministers would be meeting in May. [Secretary Shultz observed, "May 14-16."] Dobrynin then summed up his presentation by saying that his main message is that we should try together to clarify what the positive results of the next summit will be, and that Gorbachev hopes to see the President in this country this year. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that he would like to repeat what the President had already said, so that it would be clearly understood. (S)

First, we want a meeting associated with progress in reaching accords. (S)

Second, we know the only way is to work on the subject matter ahead of time. We must know 80-90% of what we have in hand before the meeting. It is therefore good that his meeting with Shevardnadze has been scheduled. (S)

Third, they should look carefully at what the President has said regarding potential areas for agreement. He will go through them with Dobrynin later this week, but he wanted to emphasize their importance now. [Note: A written text of the President's "optimum goals" was given to Dobrynin's staff later, and Secretary Shultz reviewed them again with Dobrynin at his April 9 meeting.] (S)

The President observed that both sides have now made similar statements. They have made proposals, and we have answered them. We accepted some of the Soviet ideas, and made some of our own. But we have no response. (S)

However, both of us have expressed a desire to achieve the same goal. He understands the point that both he and Gorbachev are politicians, and that a political leader cannot be pushed into a corner. This holds true on both sides. (S)

If he and the General Secretary get together and come to an agreement, some elements will be from the proposals of one side and some elements from those of the other. That way each can say afterward what he obtained in terms of his own proposals. (S)

The President then said that he wanted to mention another subject -- human rights. He has no desire to push the General Secretary into a corner on this issue. He noted that he had discussed it previously with Dobrynin, and emphasized that he was not pushing for an agreement as such. However, this is one area where, if the Soviet Union takes some actions, it will make it possible for him, the President, to do some things that both want. (S)

The President added that one out of ten Americans has relatives or ancestors in the Soviet Union. They are emotional about what happens there. If positive action is taken, he will never open his mouth to say that we suggested it. But it will be easier for him to say that he had agreed to this or that with the Soviet Union. Therefore, he hoped that we would see more progress in this area. (S)

Regarding arms control, testing and the like, he felt that we have enough areas to work on. We use the same figures as our basis for negotiation. But if the General Secretary proposes one date as a goal for something and we propose an earlier one, that is not the sort of issue where one side "caves in" if it agrees with the other. Rather it would be a compromise. (S)

The President then wondered if we have the same understanding of the word "compromise." We seem to look at it in different ways. (S)

Dobrynin stated that "compromise" means the same in both languages, and that Gorbachev is in favor of compromise. He knows there must be compromise on security issues. (S)

As for dates when things can be accomplished, Gorbachev had mentioned some in his January 15 proposal. If the U.S. wants to speed them up, that is all right with Gorbachev. (S)

Regarding the U.S. November 1 proposal, this was made before the Geneva summit. Gorbachev's January 15 proposal was based on the discussion at Geneva and took the November 1 proposal and the

discussions at the summit in Geneva into account. We must look at the situation now and find a way out. (S)

Regarding medium-range missiles [i.e., INF], the Soviets have made major concessions. They have agreed that there could be a separate agreement, that the SS-20's could be eliminated in Europe, that deactivated missiles would be destroyed and not just moved, and have even compromised on the role of British and French systems in any agreement. It is natural that they would insist on a non-transfer provision, so that the agreement could not be circumvented, but the U.S. has said no to this. Secretary Shultz has said that this topic may be an area for a "minimum" achievement at the next summit, but he is not sure we are close enough. (S)

Dobrynin continued by saying that there may be other subjects which could be agreed upon. The 50 percent reductions, for example, but we still have the critical problem of how we define the "content" of the reduction. (S)

Dobrynin then asked if he could say that the U.S. is in favor of activating the negotiating process and simultaneously thinking about what results can be anticipated from the next summit? (S)

The President agreed and Secretary Shultz noted that the President has gone farther than suggesting goals for 1986. He has pointed out that if we are to have a successful meeting in 1987 as well as 1986, we must begin preparations now. That means working on a solution in the strategic arms area. (S)

Dobrynin said that we should hope that the two foreign ministers can get a clearer picture of the prospects for the 1986 meeting. (S)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that Dobrynin would be here until Friday evening, and that we would be pursuing discussion of these matters with him and with Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh. He then asked if there is agreement on Shevardnadze's visit to the United States. (S)

Dobrynin confirmed that there is, and Secretary Shultz suggested that by Friday they would try to sum up just where things stand at present. (S)

The President noted that we still need a date for Gorbachev's visit. The Soviets are aware of our problem in the fall -- the election campaign -- and it is not desirable to have the visit at that time. (S)

Dobrynin assured the President that Gorbachev has no desire to be involved in any way in domestic U.S. politics, and understood that a visit during the Congressional campaign would not be a good idea. (S)

The meeting ended about 10:50; Dobrynin stayed for a few minutes with the President after the others had left the room. (C)