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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/15/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1986 (1/4)

**FOIA**

F06-114/4

**Box Number** 16

YARHI-MILO

1604

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8254	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER: SOVIET REACTOR INCIDENT AND POSSIBLE INCREASED IAEA ROLE <b>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</b>	1	5/5/1986	B1
8268	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET REACTOR INCIDENT--POSSIBLE INCREASED ROLE FOR THE IAEA <b>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</b>	2	5/3/1986	B1
8269	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE UPDATE ON CHERNOBYL REACTOR INCIDENT	3	5/3/1986	B1
8270	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE UPDATE ON CHERNOBYL REACTOR INCIDENT	2	5/5/1986	B1
8255	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO POST RE GUIDANCE ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER <b>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</b>	4	5/6/1986	B1
8256	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE GUIDANCE ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER <b>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</b>	1	5/15/1986	B1
8257	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE A STRATEGY FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS <b>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</b>	5	5/7/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8258	MEMO	POTENTIAL TRADE-OFFS IN U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	3	ND	B1
8259	LETTER	DRAFT PERSONAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8260	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8257 <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	5	5/7/1986	B1
8261	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8258 <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	3	ND	B1
8262	MEMO	NOTIONAL PLAN FOR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	3	ND	B1
8263	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8259 <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8264	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8262 <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	3	ND	B1
8265	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE APPOINTMENT OF USSR AMBASSADOR TO US <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	5/14/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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JET 4/15/2005

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**FOIA**

F06-114/4

**Box Number** 16

YARHI-MILO

1604

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8266	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. FROM THE USSR <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8271	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE APPOINTMENT OF YURIY VLADIMIROVICH DUBININ OF USSR AS AMBASSADOR TO US <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8267	MEMO	PROPOSED NEW AMBASSADOR: YURIY VLADIMIROVICH DUBININ USSR <i>PAR 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8272	MEMO	RIDGWAY TO ROOSEVELT RE SOVIET AGREEMENT REQUEST <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	5/13/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



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JM-1c

3536

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~

May 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Memorandum for ADM Poindexter: Soviet Reactor  
Incident and Possible Increased IAEA Role

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for ADM Poindexter from the  
Department of State. If Secretariat has not already done so, I  
think it should be transmitted immediately to ADM Poindexter.

*[Signature]* Lucian Pugliaresi and *[Signature]* Steve Pestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you transmit the memo at Tab I to ADM Poindexter.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State to ADM Poindexter

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *2/26/07*



Washington, D.C. 20520

#3536

May 3, 1986

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet Reactor Incident -- Possible Increased Role  
for the IAEA

The Department is recommending to the Secretary today that the Summit communique or chairman's statement address four areas of concern stemming from the Soviet accident.

-- Reiteration of the partners' willingness to provide humanitarian and technical assistance to the Soviet Union, to each other as necessary, and to other countries affected by the reactor accident as they may desire.

-- Call for international post-accident assessment of the Soviet reactor incident through the IAEA in Vienna, urging the Soviet Union to participate and to provide the information and conclusions which will be developed by the Soviet commission investigating the accident.

-- Support the development of an international agreement, or other mechanism, under which states would undertake to report nuclear accidents or incidents which could lead to transboundary radiation releases.

-- Call for continued strong emphasis by the IAEA on international nuclear safety including possible expansion of IAEA's safety activities and urge all countries to adhere at a minimum to the safety standards prepared under the IAEA's aegis.

The IAEA currently has a comprehensive nuclear safety program including:

- voluntary safety standards, (NUSS)
- technical assistance upon request,
- on-site safety evaluations upon request,
- a safety related Incident Reporting System (IRS) initiated in 1983 but is not now suited for emergency response communications.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/4#8268  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

~~SECRET~~~~- 2 -~~

IAEA assistance in the safety area is available to all IAEA members at their request. The IAEA is not in a position to impose regulations or other mandatory requirements upon its members.

It is important to understand that the IAEA safeguards inspection system does not involve on-site safety evaluations. The IAEA will provide on-site safety evaluations and safety advice as sought by member states. This advice is usually sought by developing countries whose technical expertise may be limited. The IAEA can and does supplement that expertise if asked.

IAEA inspection is for the sole purpose of implementing the agreements for safeguarding nuclear materials. Those agreements are designed to give assurance against diversion of nuclear materials or equipment to unauthorized (i.e. explosive) purposes. Mixing safeguards inspections with on-site safety evaluations could pose problems which might detract from the effectiveness of the safeguards effort. It is doubtful if wide agreement could be achieved for mandatory IAEA safety inspections.

The Department is recommending that the Summit express its support for instituting more formal obligations for reporting during emergency situations. This reporting can build directly upon previously prepared IAEA Guidelines.

Some recommendations are of a level of detail not appropriate for the Summit. The Department sees a clear role for the IAEA, inter alia, to assist as a communications center for all member states during an emergency. It would also recommend that IAEA members increase attention in the IAEA on accident related standards (NUSS) and emergency response recommendations.

*Nicholas Platt*  
to Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~



## REVIEW WORKSHEET

PROJECT CONTROL NUMBER

87R00132R

RECORD GROUP NUMBER	ENTRY NUMBER	BOX NUMBER 13	PERCENTAGE CLASSIFIED	PAGE	OF	PAGES
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TO: 13											
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SUBJECT:							REASON WITHHELD		MARKING APPLIED		
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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3536  
*already sent*

May 5, 1986

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum for ADM Poindexter: Update on Chernobyl  
Accident

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for ADM Poindexter from the  
Department of State. If Secretariat has not already done so, I  
think it should be transmitted immediately to ADM Poindexter.

*JP* Lucian Pugliaresi and Steve *SS* Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you transmit the memo at Tab I to ADM Poindexter.

Approve *done*


Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State for ADM Poindexter

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 6, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum for ADM Poindexter: Update on Chernobyl Accident

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for ADM Poindexter from the Department of State. If Secretariat has not already done so, I think it should be transmitted immediately to ADM Poindexter.

*h* Lucian Pugliaresi and Steve Sestanovich <sup>N.A.</sup> concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you transmit the memo at Tab I to ADM Poindexter.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ *John Deady*

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State for ADM Poindexter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *CJS* NARA, Date *10/20/02*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8255  
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File


Hollock

May 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD POST  
Acting Chief of the Executive Secretariat  
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Guidance on Soviet Nuclear Disaster (C)

Attached is guidance on public handling of the Chernobyl disaster which was requested by VOA, but which we believe can also be useful to other elements of USIA. (C)

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FOI-114/4#8255

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

CONFIDENTIAL

12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS TREATMENT OF THE CHERNOBYL  
NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT

Outlined below are some general themes and specific suggestions that USIA (particularly VOA) may find useful in its ongoing coverage of the Chernobyl incident. Some of these themes are receiving wide coverage in the press and undoubtedly already figure into USIA planning.

In addition to news coverage and editorials, it would be useful to develop a series of VOA features which focus on particular aspects of the accident (e.g. potential health effects, the need for a full accounting of what happened, etc.) and their implications for the world public. These programs would be particularly useful for East European audiences, the Soviet language services and third world countries which acquire technology from the USSR. Other themes, as indicated below, should receive world wide treatment.

In many cases the substance will speak for itself even without a specific mention of the Chernobyl accident. Local audiences will understand the connection.

In general, in dealing with the international implications of the accident we should avoid going beyond the statements made by the President, press spokesmen, and senior administration officials. We should avoid speculation and stick to known facts, emphasize our humanitarian concerns, and note our support for the other governments who have requested more information from the Soviets to assess potential hazards to their populations. We should avoid appearing to try to make political capital from the event.

Themes

- Soviet failure to inform their own people and the world. (world wide)

Media coverage on this point has been intense. VOA features on how industrial accidents in other countries are handled (Three Mile Island, Bhopal, etc.) would add a new dimension, emphasizing the immediate and detailed reporting of what happened and full public investigation of the incidents. The secrecy surrounding Chernobyl is in sharp contrast to accepted practice and Gorbachev's own call for more public discussion of problems in the USSR.

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CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- The public's right to know - for its own safety and as a check on official abuses. (USSR and Eastern Europe)

Soviet delay in informing its neighbors of the accident is unjustifiable, whatever the immediate circumstances of the incident may have been. It is indicative of Soviet callousness toward the longer term dangers of exposure to radiation outside the immediate accident site.

Features might include interviews with doctors, physicists and environmental specialists on the potential medical, public health and environmental effects of exposure to high levels of radiation. Such features will be of sufficient interest in and of themselves that they can be run well after the immediate problem of radiation exposure has receded.

- Absence of public information leads to speculation and rumor. (world wide)

This should be used in rebuttal to Soviet charges that the West has exaggerated the nature of the accident. Interviews with members of the press or public investigators who have covered this or other industrial accidents might prove effective.

- The need for openness and full disclosure in order to build confidence and trust. (world wide)

Failure to provide accurate, timely information on a matter as important to health and safety undermines confidence and breeds mistrust.

- Multilateral cooperation in the nuclear field. (world wide)

Develop features on the IAEA and efforts to establish international safety procedures, including the 1984 memorandum of understanding on the subject and Soviet failure to date to agree to any IAEA inspection. Reference can be made to the May 5 Tokyo summit declaration on the implications of the Chernobyl accident.

- The arrogance of treating small countries as if they had no right to complain to large ones. (world wide)

Features on public reaction to the accident in Poland, Sweden, and other West European countries.

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14

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- 3 -

- The accident's exposure of Soviet reluctance to provide essential information, a point which has relevance to the US objective of achieving effective verification of arms control agreements. (world wide)

This theme can be gradually developed over the coming weeks, citing the Chernobyl accident as an example of the need for verification. The reopening of the NST talks this week provides an opportunity to remind the world of our own verification proposals.

In addition, the Soviets have used this incident to score U.S. nuclear testing policy and promote their arms control proposals of Jan. 15. This can and should be rebutted, pointing out that the closed nature of Soviet society and Soviet withholding of information demonstrates anew the need for effective verification, a point which the US has stressed in our arms control proposals and to which the Soviets have so far been unwilling to agree.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT: Guidance on Soviet Nuclear Disaster

Attached, as we discussed at our meeting this afternoon, is a memo from you to Ronald Post containing guidance on USIA, particularly VOA, handling of the Chernobyl disaster. We are also preparing this guidance to be sent out to diplomatic posts and public affairs officers abroad.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached to Ronald Post.

Approve *m<sup>5-6</sup>*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*IP/K.S.* Karna Small, Peter Rodman, Steve Steiner, Walt Raymond, Judyt Mandel, and Lou Pugliese concur. *W.R.* *mm*

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Ronald Post  
Tab II Guidance Memo

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/4 #8256  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/20/13



JFM10 16  
JM-C  
Strategy Paper

*Eyes Only*

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CVS 6/20/02



8257 17

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

May 7, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: A Strategy for U.S.-Soviet Relations

Before leaving for Tokyo, you asked me to think about possible trade-offs to consider in our negotiations with the Soviets. I have also been working on a re-draft of NSDD-75 as you requested, but find that we will probably need some additional guidance before we can get a draft into reasonable shape to show you. Before I get into these matters, however, let me summarize the current situation as I see it, as background for the various recommendations which will follow.

Current Situation

1. The Soviets are playing games with the summit date and conducting a very public propaganda campaign on arms control in part to bring pressure to bear on us and to place strains on the Alliance, but also in part because Gorbachev has not yet really consolidated his power and has been unable to obtain agreement on how (and perhaps whether) to proceed in concrete negotiations with us.
2. Up until the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviet propaganda campaign was beginning to make inroads in the broad public in Europe: what they saw was the image of a Soviet leader making proposal after proposal for "peace" and the President always saying "no." A distorted, inaccurate -- even ridiculous -- impression, but one obtained by headline readers who do not understand the precise issues and probably never will.
3. The Soviet handling of the Chernobyl disaster has set this Soviet campaign back in a dramatic way, but its impact may not be lasting. The net effect a few months from now could be an upsurge in generalized anti-nuclear sentiments, unless we act rapidly to lead public opinion.
4. The PR fiasco which Chernobyl represents will, for a time, make the Soviets very testy. They will be inclined to lash out verbally in very belligerent ways. But their belligerence is unlikely to lead to dangerous moves. Nevertheless, they will be

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NLRR File-11714 #8257  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

careful to avoid any appearance of caving into to US pressure during a time when they are perceived as being in a weak position.

5. We have given Gorbachev every opportunity to negotiate in private on the relevant issues, and up to now he has not been willing (or able) to do so. We need to keep these offers open, but at the same time step up our own public campaign. We must demonstrate to him that he does not have the PR field to himself, and if he wants results he must get his act together and come to the table with negotiable positions.

6. For this reason, I believe we need a combination of private negotiating strategies and a highly public campaign to put the President out with some dramatic proposals. They need not be radically different from our current policies, but should build on them and be presented as new, even if they are largely repackaging.

In this effort, we should be careful about using the Chernobyl disaster too directly. To appear to be exploiting it could backfire with the public eventually (particularly in Europe) if it appeared that we were just berating the Soviets to avoid negotiation. Obvious and direct exploitation of the issue also could push Gorbachev even further into a corner and delay his ability to draw rational conclusions from the disaster, including the desirability of getting on with arms reduction negotiations with us. But the disaster is on everybody's mind -- particularly in Europe -- and there are ways we can capitalize on this indirectly.

In this effort, we should couch our proposals so that rhetorically they seem responsive to at least some of Gorbachev's proposals. This is not a matter of going easy on him (which he certainly does not deserve), but rather of giving him enough wiggle room to claim some "achievements" at home. So long as what he gets is cosmetic, this can serve our interests (and bolster the President's image in Western Europe).

#### The Public Track

We should immediately try to identify some areas where the President can make some "new" proposals. When we have identified them, we must plan a strategy for getting them out to the public: the timing of the speeches and/or announcements and the follow-up to insure proper public attention.

If we are really serious about a given proposal, we should present it to the Soviets a few days in advance privately. However, we should not rule out some ideas, less serious, which



we will want to float by surprise -- just to show that we too can play that game if that is the way the Soviets want it.

Some ideas which come to mind as worth careful thought are the following:

1. Civilian nuclear power plants: Propose a negotiation to establish international safety standards and an international system of monitoring for safety. (We have asked the State working group to look at this possibility, but it may take a formal memo to ensure that it gets proper attention. I am sending a separate memo setting forth the idea in more detail.)
  2. START/SDI: Reiterate our current START proposals in simple form (without pointing out that it is our old proposal), along with some indication of how we would solve the defensive weapons problem. (For example, the President could state that we are willing to negotiate verifiable measures to prevent use of defensive systems to increase a first-strike potential and to ban deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space; he might also offer a formal commitment to negotiate for a specified period should strategic defense systems prove feasible, survivable and cost-effective.)
  3. Nuclear Testing: Acknowledge importance of issue and propose that our specialists meet to review each other's proposals, with a view toward progressive, verifiable limitations on testing, commensurate with the pace of reductions of offensive weapons. (Note: this is not really new, but the public does not grasp these elements of our position since they have usually been buried in a lot of other detail in our proposals and have not been stressed by press accounts.)
- Alternatively, if it proves possible to propose a time-limited stand-down on both nuclear testing and missile testing, this could be very dramatic, and would provide an organic link between START and testing.
4. Chemical Weapons: We should give our CW draft higher visibility by reemphasizing the need for prompt agreement on effective verification. This could take the form of a "proposal" for verification which would in effect summarize the provisions in our current draft -- a matter which has not received much public attention (most people don't even know that we have proposed a CW ban).
  5. Biological Weapons: We might consider proposing an international verification regime to supplement the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This would address a real problem which has been largely swept under the rug (the virtual certainty that the Soviets have retained a BW capability) and utilize the



renewed concerns raised by Soviet secrecy as a result of their handling of Chernobyl.

6. Ideally, we should also include some proposals (or spin-off proposals from our previous ones) in the regional conflict area and the area of increasing contacts and the flow of information.

#### A Comprehensive Proposal to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?

The most ambitious way to present our ideas would be to take off from the President's desire to eliminate nuclear weapons and Gorbachev's January 15 proposal and present a comprehensive proposal of our own. This would be far more difficult to staff than the piecemeal proposals listed above, but -- at least conceptually -- it could have some advantages:

1. It could provide a framework for working our entire four-part agenda into the "peace" theme.
2. It would provide a vehicle for making clear not only why but how arms reduction is related to regional conflict, openness, human rights, and the like.
3. It would answer the charge that the President is either not serious about the elimination of nuclear weapons, or has not thought through how it can be done.
4. It would provide a clear basis for retaining nuclear weapons and testing until such time as a series of conditions have been met -- many outside the strict arms control field.
5. It could be designed to appear constructively responsive to Gorbachev's initiative.
6. It would make a very big splash if we took special efforts to play it up, and has the potential for keeping the President out front as the major champion of peace and arms reduction.

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Approve \_\_\_\_

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Tab I      Potential Trade-Offs

Tab II     Notional Proposal for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Tab III    Draft Letter to Gorbachev

— 22

Strategy a



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If it is impossible to make such a proposal, we could consider proposing a diminishing number of nuclear tests, and perhaps a lower threshold, provided we can get a better verification regime and there is an agreement to reduce offensive nuclear weapons.

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-- Agree to negotiate on Gorbachev's "Atlantic to Urals" conventional weapons concept if Soviets agree to Western proposals regarding verification of MBFR reductions.

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-- Loosen political controls on export licensing in response to progress in Jewish emigration, family reunification, and release of notable political prisoners.

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Strategy c

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DRAFT PERSONAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Now that I have returned from my trip to East Asia, I want to express in more direct fashion my sympathy for the Soviet citizens who have been affected by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. I know that you and your officials are working diligently to contain the effects of the accident and to assist those affected, and you have my sincere best wishes for your success. As I indicated to you before, if there is anything we can do to help, we stand ready and willing.

Industrial accidents, of course, occur in all countries. As political leaders, our duty -- it seems to me -- is to see that our specialists learn from them in order to prevent them in the future. This is a common problem of all industrialized nations, and this is why there has been so much interest outside the Soviet Union in the details of what happened at the Chernobyl reactor. Since we all have an interest in making nuclear power safe, we have a common interest in learning from mishaps wherever they may occur.

I want you to know that the United States would like to develop a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union on these and other industrial safety issues. I hope we both can think in these terms as we look to the future.

I also hope that we can proceed as soon as possible in dealing constructively with the various issues about which we have corresponded recently. Therefore, I await with interest your comments on the ideas I conveyed through Secretary Dobrynin in March and those in my earlier letters.

With personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

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NLRR F06-114/4#8259  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

May 7, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: A Strategy for U.S.-Soviet Relations

Before leaving for Tokyo, you asked me to think about possible trade-offs to consider in our negotiations with the Soviets. I have also been working on a re-draft of NSDD-75 as you requested, but find that we will probably need some additional guidance before we can get a draft into reasonable shape to show you. Before I get into these matters, however, let me summarize the current situation as I see it, as background for the various recommendations which will follow.

Current Situation

1. The Soviets are playing games with the summit date and conducting a very public propaganda campaign on arms control in part to bring pressure to bear on us and to place strains on the Alliance, but also in part because Gorbachev has not yet really consolidated his power and has been unable to obtain agreement on how (and perhaps whether) to proceed in concrete negotiations with us.
2. Up until the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviet propaganda campaign was beginning to make inroads in the broad public in Europe: what they saw was the image of a Soviet leader making proposal after proposal for "peace" and the President always saying "no." A distorted, inaccurate -- even ridiculous -- impression, but one obtained by headline readers who do not understand the precise issues and probably never will.
3. The Soviet handling of the Chernobyl disaster has set this Soviet campaign back in a dramatic way, but its impact may not be lasting. The net effect a few months from now could be an upsurge in generalized anti-nuclear sentiments, unless we act rapidly to lead public opinion.
4. The PR fiasco which Chernobyl represents will, for a time, make the Soviets very testy. They will be inclined to lash out verbally in very belligerent ways. But their belligerence is unlikely to lead to dangerous moves. Nevertheless, they will be

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13



careful to avoid any appearance of caving in to to US pressure during a time when they are perceived as being in a weak position.

5. We have given Gorbachev every opportunity to negotiate in private on the relevant issues, and up to now he has not been willing (or able) to do so. We need to keep these offers open, but at the same time step up our own public campaign. We must demonstrate to him that he does not have the PR field to himself, and if he wants results he must get his act together and come to the table with negotiable positions.

6. For this reason, I believe we need a combination of private negotiating strategies and a highly public campaign to put the President out with some dramatic proposals. They need not be radically different from our current policies, but should build on them and be presented as new, even if they are largely repackaging.

In this effort, we should be careful about using the Chernobyl disaster too directly. To appear to be exploiting it could backfire with the public eventually (particularly in Europe) if it appeared that we were just berating the Soviets to avoid negotiation. Obvious and direct exploitation of the issue also could push Gorbachev even further into a corner and delay his ability to draw rational conclusions from the disaster, including the desirability of getting on with arms reduction negotiations with us. But the disaster is on everybody's mind -- particularly in Europe -- and there are ways we can capitalize on this indirectly.

In this effort, we should couch our proposals so that rhetorically they seem responsive to at least some of Gorbachev's proposals. This is not a matter of going easy on him (which he certainly does not deserve), but rather of giving him enough wiggle room to claim some "achievements" at home. So long as what he gets is cosmetic, this can serve our interests (and bolster the President's image in Western Europe).

#### The Public Track

We should immediately try to identify some areas where the President can make some "new" proposals. When we have identified them, we must plan a strategy for getting them out to the public: the timing of the speeches and/or announcements and the follow-up to insure proper public attention.

If we are really serious about a given proposal, we should present it to the Soviets a few days in advance privately. However, we should not rule out some ideas, less serious, which

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we will want to float by surprise -- just to show that we too can play that game if that is the way the Soviets want it.

Some ideas which come to mind as worth careful thought are the following:

1. Civilian nuclear power plants: Propose a negotiation to establish international safety standards and an international system of monitoring for safety. (We have asked the State working group to look at this possibility, but it may take a formal memo to ensure that it gets proper attention. I will be sending a separate memo setting forth the idea in more detail.)
2. START/SDI: Reiterate our current START proposals in simple form (without pointing out that it is our old proposal), along with some indication of how we would solve the defensive weapons problem. (For example, the President could state that we are willing to negotiate verifiable measures to prevent use of defensive systems to increase a first-strike potential and to ban deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space; he might also offer a formal commitment to negotiate for a specified period should strategic defense systems prove feasible, survivable and cost-effective.)
3. Nuclear Testing: Acknowledge importance of issue and propose that our specialists meet to review each other's proposals, with a view toward progressive, verifiable limitations on testing, commensurate with the pace of reductions of offensive weapons. (Note: this is not really new, but the public does not grasp these elements of our position since they have usually been buried in a lot of other detail in our proposals and have not been stressed by press accounts.)

Alternatively, if it proves possible to propose a time-limited stand-down on both nuclear testing and missile testing, this could be very dramatic, and would provide an organic link between START and testing.

4. Chemical Weapons: We should give our CW draft higher visibility by reemphasizing the need for prompt agreement on effective verification. This could take the form of a "proposal" for verification which would in effect summarize the provisions in our current draft -- a matter which has not received much public attention (most people don't even know that we have proposed a CW ban).

5. Biological Weapons: We might consider proposing an international verification regime to supplement the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This would address a real problem which has been largely swept under the rug (the virtual certainty that the Soviets have retained a BW capability) and utilize the



renewed concerns raised by Soviet secrecy as a result of their handling of Chernobyl.

6. Ideally, we should also include some proposals (or spin-off proposals from our previous ones) in the regional conflict area and the area of increasing contacts and the flow of information.

#### A Comprehensive Proposal to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?

The most ambitious way to present our ideas would be to take off from the President's desire to eliminate nuclear weapons and Gorbachev's January 15 proposal and present a comprehensive proposal of our own. This would be far more difficult to staff than the piecemeal proposals listed above, but -- at least conceptually -- it could have some advantages:

1. It could provide a framework for working our entire four-part agenda into the "peace" theme.
2. It would provide a vehicle for making clear not only why but how arms reduction is related to regional conflict, openness, human rights, and the like.
3. It would answer the charge that the President is either not serious about the elimination of nuclear weapons, or has not thought through how it can be done.
4. It would provide a clear basis for retaining nuclear weapons and testing until such time as a series of conditions have been met -- many outside the strict arms control field.
5. It could be designed to appear constructively responsive to Gorbachev's initiative.
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It has obvious downsides as well, since if we attempt to put together such a grandiose scheme quickly, we could inadvertently create problems for ourselves in some specific negotiations. And it might prove impossible to overcome bureaucratic objections to the individual parts. Nevertheless, I have outlined at Tab II a notional plan of what such a proposal might look like.

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NOTIONAL PLAN FOR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Three phases, lasting minimum of 5 years each, but of a sufficient duration to achieve the objectives of each. (Second and third phases are likely to take longer than five years, since they will require basic changes in Soviet habits and practices.) Nevertheless, if plan is issued, public position is that it could be done by the Year 2000 if we start now and keep up momentum.

Phase One:

- 50% reduction of nuclear weapons in appropriate categories;
- INF reduced to zero world-wide;
- Elimination of any imbalance in first-strike capabilities;
- Verifiable CW ban;
- BW verification regime;
- Expanded CBM's;
- Compliance with all agreements to satisfaction of both parties;
- Reduction of superpower military involvement in regional conflicts;
- Effective international actions against terrorism, including quarantine of states sponsoring terrorism and of groups committed to it, and ban on military supplies or military training to such countries and groups.
- Agreement on verification measures to limited nuclear testing; further limitations on testing as nuclear weapons are reduced.
- Tightened non-proliferation regime;
- Substantial improvements in citizen-to-citizen contacts and the flow of information across national boundaries.
- MBFR agreement to establish verification measures during time-limited freeze.

Phase Two:

- Further reductions on conventional weapons, world wide;
- Agreed, verifiable limits on use of military force outside national boundaries;
- Termination of direct or indirect superpower military involvement in regional conflicts; peaceful settlement of major regional conflicts;
- Establishment of free contacts and information flow across national borders, including:
  - a. No restrictions on travel of one's own citizens to foreign countries;
  - b. No restrictions on travel of foreigners in one's own country;
  - c. No restrictions, legal or administrative, on contact of one's citizens with foreigners;
  - d. Reserved access in the mass media for foreign opinion;
  - e. Right to establish cultural and information centers, and outlets for periodical, book and VCR sales, in the other country, at the sole discretion of the "sending" country;
  - f. Elimination of national legislation which makes the expression of divergent opinion a criminal act; effective guarantees of the freedom of speech.
- Negotiations with other nuclear powers to achieve a substantial additional reduction of nuclear weapons -- at least 50% overall.
- Negotiations on conditions for a CTB, to take effect in third stage.
- Reduction of strategic controls on trade.
- Agreements on role to be played by defensive weaponry.



Phase Three:

- Fine-tune and extend various verification measures developed in previous stages;
- Establish in practice the habits of openness and restraint from use of military force negotiated earlier;
- Eliminate all strategic and political controls on trade;
- Negotiate a legal enforcement regime for a world free of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, and for the control of the level and use of conventional weapons;
- Deploy agreed systems of strategic defense;
- As these measures go into place and are proven in practice, proceed to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in final stages.

DRAFT PERSONAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV

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Strategy 6

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### Third Stage:

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-- Establish in practice the habits of openness and restraint from use of military force negotiated earlier;

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*Suggested t.p.'s  
for Pres. Press Conf -  
Tokyo, May 7,  
1986*

*→ Chron<sup>43</sup>*

Q - Anything new on next summit with Gorbachev?

A - General Secretary Gorbachev has accepted my invitation to visit the U.S. this year. We are still waiting for a Soviet reply to our suggestion for a date, but my assumption is that the meeting will take place as agreed.

Q - Impact of Chernobyl?

A - 1. We are concerned, first of all, for the health of those persons affected; we hope they are getting proper treatment and remain ready to help if this is desired.

2. Shows Soviet Government still does not understand necessity of providing prompt and detailed information on incidents that can effect many people, including those outside their borders. Hope this experience will lead to a change in Soviet practices.

3. Incident quite serious, but we do not have enough information to assess its impact with accuracy.

4. Incident illustrates once again the urgent need to establish more openness regarding nuclear accidents and industrial safety in general. Bureaucrats must not be allowed to cover up their mistakes.

Q - Impact on Gorbachev's political position?

A - Not appropriate to speculate.

Q - Impact on Soviet standing internationally?

A - Hope that this experience will lead Soviet Government to draw proper conclusions: First, that it is in their interest to open up so mistakes can be spotted and corrected before they have a tragic outcome. Second, that we need to get on with negotiations to bring about a radical reduction of nuclear weapons.

- Negotiations will resume in Geneva this week, and we hope that Soviet negotiators will be prepared for progress as ours are.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 14, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*  
SUBJECT: Appointment of USSR Ambassador to the US

I have reviewed the information provided by the Department of State (Tab II) and concur in their recommendation of the appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to the US.

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum to Nick Platt noting our concurrence.

*AD* Paula Dobriansky, *RS* Steve Sestanovich and *JM* Judyt Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo for NPlatt  
Tab II Incoming from State

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Declassify on Appointment as Ambassador

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/4#8265  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3816

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Ambassador to the United States from the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (S/S)

The President has reviewed and concurs in the recommendation of the Department of State that the appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United States. You are requested to so inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (S/S)

Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on Appointment as Ambassador

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/4 #8206  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 MAY 14 A 7: 23

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 3816

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 16 MAY

<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter Fortier	<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____	to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*		PHONE* to action officer at ext. <u>5112</u>
FYI	FYI	FYI
<input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt	<input type="checkbox"/> Levine	<input type="checkbox"/> Sachs
<input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro	<input type="checkbox"/> Linhard	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich
<input type="checkbox"/> Childress	<input type="checkbox"/> Mahley	<input type="checkbox"/> Sigur
<input type="checkbox"/> Cobb	<input type="checkbox"/> Major	<input type="checkbox"/> Small
<input type="checkbox"/> Covey	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mandel	<input type="checkbox"/> Sommer
<input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky	<input type="checkbox"/> Matlock	<input type="checkbox"/> Soos
<input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid	<input type="checkbox"/> May	<input type="checkbox"/> Stark
<input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian	<input type="checkbox"/> Menges	<input type="checkbox"/> Steiner
<input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky	<input type="checkbox"/> Miller	<input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli
<input type="checkbox"/> Donley	<input type="checkbox"/> North	<input type="checkbox"/> Teicher
<input type="checkbox"/> Douglass	<input type="checkbox"/> Platt	<input type="checkbox"/> Thompson
<input type="checkbox"/> Grimes	<input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi	<input type="checkbox"/> Tillman
<input type="checkbox"/> Hughes	<input type="checkbox"/> Raymond	<input type="checkbox"/> Wigg
<input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer	<input type="checkbox"/> Reger	<input type="checkbox"/> Wright
<input type="checkbox"/> Laux	<input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski	<input type="checkbox"/> Sable	<input type="checkbox"/> _____

INFORMATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> McDaniel	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pearson	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rodman	<input type="checkbox"/> Lehman	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
	<input type="checkbox"/> Poindexter (advance)	<input type="checkbox"/> Fortier (advance)	

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat





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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 #3816

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MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as  
Ambassador to the United States

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to the United States (Tab 2). A biography of Mr. Dubinin is attached (Tab 1).

The Department believes from the information available that Mr. Dubinin will make an acceptable Ambassador to the United States and recommends that the President agree to the proposed appointment. If he concurs, the Department will inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Nicholas Platt*

Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Biography
2. EUR Memo

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Decl:Oadr

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NLRR FOI 114/4#8271  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/01




~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Proposed New Ambassador: Yuriy Vladimirovich DUBININ  
(doo BEE nin)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin is a West European specialist who was the Soviet ambassador to Spain from 1978 to 1986 until his appointment as the Permanent Representative of the USSR at the United Nations in March, 1986. A foreign policy professional, Dubinin began his career in 1955 after graduating from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations with a degree in history.

Ambassador Thomas Enders, US Ambassador to Spain, has described Dubinin as an able representative of Soviet views who worked in a patient, low-key, and tactful way to advance the Soviet-Spanish relationship. He also characterized Dubinin as understanding Western political institutions and particularly adept in dealing with the Western press.



Dubinin also worked in France during his early career, serving twice in Paris. From 1955-60 he was first a Foreign Service trainee and then a translator for UNESCO; during 1963-68 he was a First Secretary and then a Counselor at the Soviet Embassy. Between these tours he worked on the French Desk at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. In 1968 he became Deputy Chief for the First European Department, which has responsibility for France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, and the Benelux. Three years later he was appointed Department

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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-2-

Chief, and from 1972 until his departure for Spain he was a member of the Ministry's governing board. In addition to his work on France and Spain, Dubinin served in Geneva as Deputy Head of the Soviet CSCE delegation from 1973 to 1975, where he was responsible for basket three issues (cooperation in humanitarian matters).

Dubinin speaks French, English, and Spanish. [REDACTED]

His wife, Liana Zevinovna, speaks German and Spanish and holds a doctorate in French history. They have three daughters.

A check of U.S. Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

Sources Include:

[REDACTED]  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation  
The Department of State

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8272 50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1986

Secret/Sensitive

TO: S/CPR - Selwa Roosevelt  
FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway <sup>KLR</sup><sub>m2</sub>  
SUBJECT: Soviet Agreement Request

On May 12th, Soviet chargé Sokolov requested agreement to appoint Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin the new Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Attached is a brief biography of Mr. Dubinin that Mr. Sokolov gave us.

Secret/Sensitive  
Decl:Oadr

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NLRR FD6-114/4#8272  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11



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Yuri Vladimirovich Dubinin was born in 1930. Graduated from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations. Has Ph.D. in history. Foreign languages - French, English and Spanish.

Has great experience in diplomatic work. 1971-1978 - Head of the First European Department, member of the Collegium of the USSR Foreign Ministry. 1978-1986 - USSR Ambassador in Spain. Since March 1986 - Permanent Representative of the USSR at the United Nations and the USSR Representative in the UN Security Council.

Has the diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Recipient of the USSR Government awards.

Member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU.

Married. Has three daughters.