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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/15/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1986 (1/6)

**FOIA**

F06-114/4

**Box Number** 16

YARHI-MILO

1608

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8302	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO GREGG; PLATT; COOKSEY; BROWN; GALEBACH; KEEL; RIXSE; AND BITOFF RE AGENDA FOR NSPG MEETING ON FRIDAY JUNE 6, 1986 <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	2	ND	B1
8303	MEMO	MATLOCK TO RODMAN, LINHARD, SESTANOVICH, PUGLIARESI RE GORBACHEV MESSAGE <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	6/2/1986	B1
8304	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8302 <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	2	ND	B1
8305	MEMO	PUGLIARESI TO MCDANIEL RE GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	6/2/1986	B1
8306	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE STATEMENT BY GORBACHEV ON NUCLEAR SAFETY <i>R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</i>	1	ND	B1
8314	SPEECH	SPEECH RE NUCLEAR POWER <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	7	ND	B1
8307	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8315	CABLE	021219Z JUN 86 <b>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</b>	6	6/2/1986	B1
8316	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8302 <b>R 6/23/2010 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2</b>	1	6/3/1986	B1
8308	MEMO	POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP JUNE 6, 1986 <b>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</b>	1	ND	B1
8309	AGENDA	NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING JUNE 6, 1986 <b>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</b>	1	ND	B1
8310	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8308 <b>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</b>	1	ND	B1
8311	AGENDA	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8309 <b>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</b>	1	ND	B1
8312	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8308 <b>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</b>	1	ND	B1
8313	MEMO	MATLOCK TO PUGLIARESI RE SCIENCE POLICY <b>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</b>	1	6/2/1986	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

90417

June 2, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY M. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: NSGP Meeting -- June 6, 1986

Attached at Tab I is a multiple-addressee memorandum notifying relevant agencies of an NSPG meeting to be held on Friday, June 6, at 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, in the Situation Room, and forwarding an agenda for the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Multiple-Addressee Memo  
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/21/02*



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON DC 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. STEPHEN GALEBACH  
Senior Special Assistant  
to the Attorney General  
Department of Justice

DR. ALTON KEEL  
Associate Director for National Security  
and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

RADM JOHN BITOFF  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSPG Meeting on Friday, June 6, 1986 (U)

The NSPG meeting will be held in the White House Situation Room at 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on Friday, June 6, 1986, to discuss policy options for managing US-Soviet relations for the balance of 1986. An agenda for the meeting is attached. Attendance is principals only. (U)

Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987  
By 615 NARA, Date 7/26/89

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENDA

NSPG MEETING -- FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 1986 -- SITUATION ROOM

1. The President reviews issues in US-Soviet relations which require further examination.
2. Discussion by principals.

CONFIDENTIAL  
Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8303  
gm Chron 4  
June 2, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR PETER W. RODMAN  
ROBERT E. LINHARD  
STEPHEN R. SESTANOVICH  
LUCIAN S. PUGLIARESI

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK  
SUBJECT: Gorbachev Message

Upon reflection, following our meeting with the Admiral, I am inclined to think that a prompt, general answer to the message -- using the same device as he did -- an oral statement, might be in order. I would suggest something like the following:

"The President has received the General Secretary's oral statement, which was delivered June 1, and welcomes the proposals for international cooperation in dealing with nuclear power plant safety. He has directed that a careful study be undertaken, in a positive spirit, of these proposals and of the overall question of international efforts to improve nuclear power plant safety.

"The President also shares the General Secretary's expressed desire to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals and to find ways to move ultimately to a cessation of nuclear testing and the elimination of nuclear weapons. He hopes, therefore, that the Soviet Union will join the United States in serious negotiations to implement the understandings reached in Geneva last November and to explore ways to verify progressive limitations on nuclear testing, which would move us toward these goals."

Note: The second paragraph may be a bit forward leaning, but it might stimulate some interest in Moscow. As for the timing, I would think that some sort of message along these lines should be sent ASAP. It might encourage some concrete answers to the previous correspondence. I would appreciate your comments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1008-125/2 #8303

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

90417

June 2, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

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FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *SW*

SUBJECT: NSGP Meeting -- June 6, 1986

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Multiple-Addressee Memo  
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/21/02*



8304

4

90417

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. STEPHEN GALEBACH  
Senior Special Assistant  
to the Attorney General  
Department of Justice

DR. ALTON KEEL  
Associate Director for National Security  
and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

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Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CA NARA, Date 4/26/05

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENDA

NSPG MEETING -- FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 1986 -- SITUATION ROOM

1. The President reviews issues in US-Soviet relations which require further examination.
2. Discussion by principals.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify: OADR

6205 ~~Matlock~~ 8  
4297  
jm Chron File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

June 2, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

THRU: STEPHEN I. DANZANSKY *SID*  
FROM: LUCIAN S. PUGLIARESI *LP*  
SUBJECT: Gorbachev Statement on Nuclear Safety

As per your request, the attached tasker (Tab I) informs the State Department that they should bring together today an interagency group to respond to the Gorbachev statement. We ask that State get government-wide agreement on press guidance and/or a Presidential statement by close of business today and work up a specific policy response no later than June 5.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you transmit the attached tasker you to Nicholas Platt (by LDX).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*not available* Peter Rodman, Jack Matlock, and Bob *for 3m* *JP*ahard concur.

Attachments

Tab I

Memo to Platt

Tab A Gorbachev Statement

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *CH* NARA, Date *2/26/05*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statement by General Secretary Gorbachev  
on Nuclear Safety (C)

The attached statement by General Secretary Gorbachev outlines some proposals for improving the safety of current and prospective nuclear power plants. Given the widespread public interest in nuclear safety issues, it is important that a government-wide position on press guidance and/or a Presidential statement be developed by close of business today. In addition, we should develop a specific policy response to the Gorbachev proposals no later than June 5. In this regard the State Department should bring together today an interagency group to develop press guidance, a Presidential statement, and initiate work on a specific policy response to the Gorbachev proposals. (C)

Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Gorbachev Statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CA NARA, Date 7/26/06



In my TV statement of May 14 I addressed the main conclusions which, in our view, follow from the Chernobyl accident. Today I would like to share with you some additional considerations on this subject.

It is quite obvious that it is necessary as a practical matter, without delay, to start setting up an international regime of safe development of nuclear energy. Such a regime would be aimed at reducing to a minimum the possibility of peaceful atom harming people. Ensuring a reliable, safe development of nuclear energy should become a universal international obligation of each state individually and all states taken together.

Preliminary steps in this direction, including in IAEA, are already being taken. Various suggestions and proposals are being put forward by some states. We are carefully studying them.

I would like to make it clear outright: we do not claim that we have ready recipes. The total of 152 accidents at nuclear power plants with emissions of radioactivity have already been registered in the world. So some states have experience in this field, and it is on the basis of that experience that an international regime of nuclear safety should be elaborated.

Of course, the first thing that is required is a system of speedy notification in case of accidents and troubles at NPPs, when they entail emission of radiation. The question of receiving data in case of possible deviations from the levels of the

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natural backgrounds of radioactivity is also connected with the system of notification.

It is beyond the capability of many states to manage an accident on their own. That is why, in our view, an important component of an international regime of safe development of nuclear energy would be a fine-tuned international machinery which would ensure the speediest mutual assistance in dangerous situations. Both IAEA and the World Health Organization could be involved in that machinery. Along with the states on whose territory an accident has taken place, other states, if asked for help, should take part in eliminating the consequences of the accident.

There is also the question of the international legal form of agreements regarding the system of notification and the assistance machinery. It would seem that the appropriate obligations of states could be laid out and recorded in a special international convention or conventions. The Soviet side is currently thinking over all these questions and will submit its suggestions on this subject with account taken of the proposals of other states.

Some states, accepting such a solution to the problem, suggest that before a convention is concluded, already in June a decision be taken to set up as soon as possible within the framework of IAEA a system of notification in case of a nuclear accident. Well, the sooner we can adopt appropriate measures the better, even if they are going to be of a preliminary, temporary nature.

At the same time the main task, in our view, is to adopt preventive measures which would ensure the prevention of



accidents. That objective would be met by providing within short, feasible periods of time IAEA with information on the causes of accidents. Such information would be studied by appropriate experts in order to help IAEA member-countries to take that experience into account for the purpose of further enhancing the safety of nuclear energy.

One should go even further - namely to develop within the framework of the IAEA recommendations on the security of atomic power plants, to stiffen national and, where necessary, international control for their application in all states. One could also foster under the auspices of the IAEA the cooperation of the leading countries in the area of atomic energy with a view of creating an economical and dependable new generation reactor with a better, compared to the present models, level of operational safety.

One also has to take into account the fact that the issue of material, moral and psychological damage linked to accidents on NPPs and nuclear installations, is not internationally developed to a sufficient degree. We are of the opinion that legal order should be introduced into this field, that attempts to exploit nuclear accidents with a view to increasing international tension and distrust among states, should be eliminated.

I believe that the problem of unification of permissible level of radiation existing in different countries, warrants our attention in all of its aspects.

One should not ignore another facet of nuclear security, such as prevention of nuclear terrorism. The facts of intentionally inflicted damage to some nuclear industry plants that have occurred in the West, cannot but instill concern. As a matter of fact, 32 cases of such damage were registered in the USA from 1974 to 1984. In Europe, 10 attacks were launched against various nuclear installations from 1966 to 1977. Failure to take adequate measures to prevent misappropriation of highly enriched fissionable materials is also evident. And this is but a short list of opportunities that can be taken by the terrorists. We believe that all this dictates the necessity to work out a fool-proof set of measures to prevent nuclear terrorism in all of its manifestations.

To work out an international regime of a safe nuclear energy development, one could use what already is available for the matter in various international organizations - that is in the IAEA, World Health Organization, UNEP, World Meteorological Organization and, finally, in the UN. It is necessary to put all this on a firm basis of a broad international cooperation.

Apparently, the IAEA will be the main link of this system. Therefore, the role and capabilities of this Agency should be strengthened. To do this, evidently, its financial and material possibilities should be expanded. This problem could be solved, for example, by ad hoc mandatory contributions by all interested states-members of the Agency. One should also think of creating within the IAEA a special fund with a view to providing urgent assistance in the cases of nuclear accidents, to the countries which might be in need of it.



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On May 14 I already spoke in favor of convening a highly authoritative special international conference in Vienna under the auspices of the IAEA to discuss the whole range of these issues.

I would further like to let you know that we are taking practical measures to improve the work of the USSR State Committee of Supervision on the Safety of Work in Atomic Energy which was established several years ago. We intend to make more active its ties with appropriate international organizations as well as similar national bodies with the aim of exchanging experience in the area of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy.

I would also add, that we are conducting a comprehensive analysis of the state of atomic energetics, that additional measures to heighten the safety of operation of the atomic power plants <sup>being</sup> are/worked out and will be taken with due regard for conclusions resulting from the accident at the Chernobyl NPP.

I would like to emphasize once more that lessons, derived from this accident, should benefit all mankind. What happened in Chernobyl is a serious reminder of those formidable forces contained in the energy of the atom. If an accident on a peaceful NPP brought about misfortune, one can imagine what tragic consequences for the whole mankind would follow from the use of nuclear weapons which exist solely for the purposes of destruction and annihilation.

Nuclear and space age demands from the leaders of all countries of the world a new political thinking and new policies. These inexorable requirements are met by our program of complete elimination of nuclear weapons and establishment of a comprehensive system of international security.

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From the moment the nuclear weapons emerged, the best minds have been pondering how to drive the nuclear jinn back into the bottle. However, the nuclear arms race grew more intense. Where is that key, that decisive link, the use of which can help to solve the nuclear problem? Cessation of nuclear tests could be the first practical step towards nuclear disarmament. We attach special importance to this measure, since being highly effective it is simple from the point of view of its practical implementation. What one should do is not to conduct nuclear tests - of course, under strict verification. This measure must become at last a reality of the international life.

Having extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union has in fact renounced conducting them for a whole year. We believe that such a long period of time should be more than sufficient for the American side to evaluate the situation in an all-round manner and to take reciprocal steps which would make it possible to terminate nuclear testing on a bilateral basis.

Given the urgent nature of the issue of stopping nuclear tests I have again reaffirmed my proposal to President Reagan that we hold without delay a meeting and come to agreement with regard to a ban on nuclear tests.

Both these tasks - ensuring the safety of peaceful uses of atomic energy and ridding our planet of nuclear weapons - require broad international interaction, joint efforts of all states and,

above all, the international organizations dealing with nuclear issues and public groups which are interested in creating a comprehensive and dependable system of international security. It is a matter for all states taken together, as well as for each state individually. We urge you to make your contribution to this important endeavor whose realization is required by the interests of preserving human civilization.



HOOVER INSTITUTE  
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305-6010

6/✓ John - Megapente 11  
Here is the Teller  
letter I mentioned.  
Cock Matlock  
SB <sup>See</sup> ~~correspondence~~

May 20,

6/2/86

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
Secretary of State  
2201 C Street  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear George:

This letter concerns proposed cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union on controlled fusion in which the working material is confined by magnetic fields. The short expression "magnetic fusion" is sometimes applied.

The relevant material was declassified in 1958 and world-wide exchange of information has proven useful ever since. There is not, and I believe there should not be, any objection to the proposed cooperation from the point of view of secrecy.

Cooperation is partially in effect and partially in the state of discussion with other countries. I would in general prefer international cooperation with the Soviet Union included.

The practical and economic importance of magnetic fusion does not appear to be great. The theoretical and scientific importance is significant. One practical application of magnetic fusion is, however, quite hopeful. This is the fusion-fission hybrid.

The fusion-fission hybrid is an energy source which relies on fusion for generating neutrons and for fission for the main part of energy production. Practical results may be possible by the turn of the century. This energy source would be extremely safe. In view of Chernobyl, this approach could be most interesting to the Russians.

Actually, the Soviet Union has done more than any other nation in developing the fusion-fission hybrid. It is a subject of particular interest to Evgenii Velikhov, who acts as the science advisor to Gorbachev.



# HOOVER INSTITUTION

ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305-6010



May 20, 1986

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
Secretary of State  
2201 C Street  
Washington, D.C. 20520

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Actually, the Soviet Union has done more than any other nation in developing the fusion-fission hybrid. It is a subject of particular interest to Evgenii Velikhov, who acts as the science advisor to Gorbachev.

The Honorable George P. Shultz  
May 20, 1986

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page 2

A further Russian whose name should be mentioned in this connection is Andrei Sakharov. His early suggestions on controlled fusion are important and I know from his wife, Yelena Bonner, that he continues to be highly interested in the topic. He is now exiled to Gorky where it is hardly practical for him to do scientific work. His return to Moscow and his participation in the work would make it scientifically and personally much more attractive to scientists all over the world to participate in the work. To ask that he may be permitted freely to travel outside the Soviet Union may not be practical, but his return to Moscow and his active participation might be a realistic possibility. Such a move would be highly welcomed by scientists in the free world.

If you could find a way in which these messages could be conveyed, some progress in international understanding could be achieved.

Sincerely,

Edward Teller

ET:pf



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY  
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996  
May 27, 1986

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF  
Science Research Laboratory

Ambassador Jack Matlock  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
Room #368  
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Jack:

Here is Edward's letter on fusion cooperation with the Soviets. It was impossible to keep him from riding not one but two of his hobby-horses (the hybrid and Sakharov), but the operative sentence for you is there (second paragraph).

Best,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "T. Johnson", is written over a horizontal line.

THOMAS H. JOHNSON  
Director, Science Research Laboratory

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4213

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1986

~~MATLOCK~~

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

LUNCHEON MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

DATE: June 6, 1986

LOCATION: The President's Study

TIME: 11:45 a.m. - 1:15 p.m.

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JMS*

I. PURPOSE

To follow up on their meeting of May 20.

II. BACKGROUND

The President and Mrs. Massie have met on several occasions to discuss internal developments in the Soviet Union and U.S.-Soviet relations.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The First Lady  
Donald T. Regan  
John M. Poindexter  
Suzanne Massie

IV. PRESS PLAN

None; staff photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Welcome Massie and initiate informal discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

cc First Lady  
Vice President  
Don Regan

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8307  
4213

22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

- Nancy and I appreciate this chance to follow up on our earlier conversation.
- We are particularly interested in your ideas on the growing influence of religion and Russian nationalism in the USSR.
- How do you think this trend will effect Soviet society and government policy over the coming years? What should our reaction be?
- Any pointers on how to deal with the Russian nationalist streak in Gorbachev (if there is one)?
- What sort of things should we stress in our exchange programs?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 108-125/2 #8307

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506**SIGNED**UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

May 28, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: President's Lunch with Suzanne Massie, June 6,  
1986, 11:45 a.m. - 1:15 p.m.

The President and First Lady will have lunch with Suzanne Massie  
as a follow up to their May 20 meeting.

*WAC*  
Johnathan Miller concurs.RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *JF* \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Meeting Memorandum  
Tab A Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)  
Tab II Clearance List

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
*FBI*  
*2/16/05*

24

## REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, June 6, 1986  
for THE PRESIDENT of \_\_\_\_\_:  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

### PARTICIPANTS

The First Lady  
Donald T. Regan  
John M. Poindexter  
Suzanne Massie

### MEETING LOCATION

Building WEST WING Requested by Jack F. Matlock  
Room No. The President's Study Room No. 368 Telephone 5112  
Time of Meeting 11:45-1:15 PM Date of request May 30, 1986

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

**APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742**



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WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MOSCOW 9279  
DOBRYNIN/STOESSER  
5/30/86

PRESERVATION COPY



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Poindexter	O	
Fortier		
Thompson		
McDaniel	C	
Pearson	C	
Bohn		
MATLOCK	C	
RODMAN	C	
Zerhard	C	
FILE	C	
NSC/S		LDX/TTY APPROVAL : _____
REMARKS :		
C: Copy    O: Original    F: FYI    S: Should See C/H: Copy Hand Delivered    C/T: Contacted via Phone		

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S/P EO SOLOMON; S/S PASS CIA EO DCI & NSC EO MCDANIEL FOR  
POINDEXTER VIA COURIER  
ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION PER S/S, NPLATT, 6/2/86

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ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS.

WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED, THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-I, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By CAS NARA, Date 6/21/02

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: DOBRYNIN-STOESSEL MEETING, MAY 30, 1986

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

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2. CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL  
DEPARTMENT AND CC SECRETARY ANATOLIY DOBRYNIN  
RECEIVED AMBASSADOR WALTER STOESSEL (RET.)  
MAY 30 FOR AN HOUR'S DISCUSSION OF DOBRYNIN'S  
NEW JOB AND U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS. ONLY  
DOBRYNIN AND STOESSEL (WHO BRIEFED US LATER  
THAT DAY) WERE PRESENT. DOBRYNIN WAS CRITICAL  
OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON SALT INTERIM  
RESTRAINTS, PESSIMISTIC ABOUT A SUMMIT, BUT  
DID NOT TOTALLY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A  
1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING. HE ARGUED THAT  
IT WAS UP TO THE U. S. TO COME UP WITH SUBSTANTIVE  
AREAS OF AGREEMENT THAT WOULD MAKE A SUMMIT  
POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

DOBRYNIN'S NEW JOB  
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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/04



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3. DOBRYNIN SAID HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT COMPARABLE TO THE NSC, ALTHOUGH HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR "ALL FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS," FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S "GLOBAL" FOREIGN POLICY. HE SAID HIS STAFF WOULD TOTAL ABOUT 200 AND THAT HE WAS TRYING TO RECRUIT "GOOD PEOPLE," PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAD HAD PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE WAS THUS PLEASED TO HAVE KORNIYENKO AS ONE OF HIS DEPUTIES. OF COURSE, DOBRYNIN ADDED, HE HAD CLOSE FRIENDS SUCH AS VORONTSOV AND BESSMERTNYKH IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON SALT II  
-----

4. SPEAKING IN A RELATIVELY LOW KEY, DOBRYNIN SAID THE PRESIDENT'S JUST-ANNOUNCED DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT A HELPFUL STEP. IT WAS "REGARDED HERE AS VERY SERIOUS." AN OFFICIAL SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD BE MADE VERY SHORTLY. HOW, DOBRYNIN ASKED, COULD THE U.S. EXPECT GORBACHEV TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE FALL, JUST AT THE TIME WHEN THE U.S. WOULD EXCEED THE SALT II LIMITS? THIS WOULD BE "ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE."

5. STOESSEL UNDERScored THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, THE SECOND "NEW TYPE" OF STRATEGIC MISSILE, AND TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION. DOBRYNIN SAID WE HAD DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES AT GREAT LENGTH IN THE SCC AND WERE STILL TALKING ABOUT THEM. IN

MOSCOW'S MIND, THEY WERE INSUFFICIENT TO "BLOW UP" THE SALT TREATY. THE DECISION WAS "DIFFICULT

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TO UNDERSTAND, UNFORTUNATE." IN LIGHT OF  
THE CURRENT SITUATION, DOBRYNIN SAID HE "COULD  
NOT BE ENCOURAGING" ABOUT A SUMMIT.

SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING  
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6. STOESSEL EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT SHEVARDNADZE  
AND SHULTZ SHOULD MEET IN ORDER TO PROVIDE  
A FOCUS FOR OUR RESPECTIVE BUREAUCRACIES.  
THEY HAVE MET BEFORE, DOBRYNIN RESPONDED.  
SHULTZ REVIEWS EVERYTHING, FROM A TO Z.  
THERE IS NO FOCUS ON POSSIBLE AGREEMENT.  
YOU HAVE REJECTED OUR PROPOSALS; WE "NEED TO  
FEEL" WHAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY.  
DOBRYNIN AND HIS STAFF WERE LOOKING FOR AREAS  
OF AGREEMENT, AS WAS THE MFA, BUT "WE FEEL  
STUMPED." BETTER PRIVATE COMMUNICATION WAS  
NEEDED: PERHAPS DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT  
AND GORBACHEV, PERHAPS BETWEEN SHULTZ AND THE  
SOVIET CHARGE, PERHAPS SOME OTHER CHANNEL.  
SUCH COMMUNICATIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT  
IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. GIVE US ONE OR TWO  
SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF AGREEMENT, SAID DOBRYNIN.  
THEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SHULTZ AND  
SHEVARDNADZE TO MEET.

7. STOESSEL COMMENTED THAT IT SOUNDED AS IF  
THE SOVIET SIDE WERE SETTING PRECONDITIONS.

NO, SAID DOBRYNIN, IT WAS JUST THAT HIS  
APPROACH MADE GOOD SENSE. STOESSEL SUGGESTED  
THAT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT HOLD AN  
INITIAL PLANNING SESSION, THEN FOLLOW UP WITH  
A MORE FOCUSED MEETING. DOBRYNIN REJECTED

THIS AS INSUFFICIENT.

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POSSIBLE SUBSTANCE FOR A SUMMIT: INF, TESTING

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8. STOESSEL THOUGHT THE INF AREA MIGHT BE WORTH PURSUING. DOBRYNIN SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD MADE GREAT CONCESSIONS REGARDING FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS BUT COULD NOT AGREE TO INF REDUCTIONS UNTIL THE FRENCH AND UK SYSTEMS WERE CONSTRAINED.

9. DOBRYNIN THOUGHT THE ISSUE OF A NUCLEAR TEST BAN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. THERE WAS "NO LOGICAL REASON" AGAINST THIS SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY FOR VERIFICATION ALREADY EXISTED. STOESSEL SAID THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW THIS WAS NOT PROMISING. WE FELT IT MORE REALISTIC TO WORK TOWARD RATIFICATION OF THE PNET AND TTBT TREATIES. THE U.S. SEES A RATIONALE FOR CONTINUED TESTING; WE THEREFORE SHOULD START WITH SMALL STEPS. DOBRYNIN SAID THE TREATIES WERE FINE AS THEY HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED AND INITIALED. THEY SHOULD BE PUT INTO FORCE, THEN ASSESSED AFTER A YEAR OR SO.

10. STOESSEL NOTED THAT WITH DOBRYNIN'S LONG EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WHEN GORBACHEV MAKES SWEEPING ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS VIA THE PUBLIC MEDIA, WASHINGTON TENDS TO DISMISS THEM AS PROPAGANDA. DOBRYNIN VIGOROUSLY DENIED THAT GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVES WERE PROPAGANDISTIC, CLAIMING

THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAD MASTERED THE DETAILS OF ARMS CONTROL, UNDERSTOOD ALL THE NUANCES, AND WAS SERIOUS ABOUT MAKING PROGRESS. BESIDES, DOBRYNIN CONTINUED, THE SAME CHARGE COULD BE MADE AGAINST THE U.S. WHEN THE U.S.

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ANSWERED SOVIET PROPOSALS ABOUT A TEST MORATORIUM  
WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIETS SEND  
OBSERVERS TO WITNESS A U.S. TEST, IT SEEMED  
CLEAR THE U.S. DID SO FOR PROPAGANDA REASONS.  
GORBACHEV PERSONALLY HAD BEEN BAFFLED BY THIS  
U.S. PROPOSAL AND COULD NOT SEE THE RATIONALE  
FOR IT. SOVIET SCIENTISTS DID NOT HAVE TO BE  
PRESENT TO VERIFY U.S. TESTS; THEY COULD  
ALREADY DO SO, INCLUDING LOW-YIELD, UNANNOUNCED  
TESTS. DOBRYNIN STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS  
HAD SUGGESTED ONLY "RESUMPTION" OF NEGOTIATIONS  
ABOUT A POSSIBLE TEST BAN AND THOUGHT THIS  
SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. SIDE.

## OTHER ISSUES

11. DOBRYNIN SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE  
WILLING TO TALK ABOUT "ANYTHING" AT THE NEXT  
SUMMIT, INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER  
REGIONAL PROBLEMS. HE REFERRED TO THE  
VARIOUS BILATERAL REGIONAL TALKS AS WORTHWHILE.  
THE SOVIET SIDE FAVORED THEIR CONTINUATION, HE  
SAID.

12. DOBRYNIN MENTIONED THE U.S. "VETO" OF A  
FINAL DOCUMENT AT THE BERN CSCE MEETING, CLAIMING  
THIS WAS ANOTHER LINK IN A CHAIN OF DISTURBING  
U.S. ACTIONS. HE SAID HE DOUBTED THAT THE  
RIGID, UNILATERAL U.S. POSITION AT BERN  
WOULD BE HELPFUL IN WORKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE. STOESSEL INDICATED

IT WAS SILLY TO THINK THERE WAS A U.S. PLOT  
TO FORGE A CHAIN OF HOSTILE ACTIONS. SUCH  
MATTERS WERE UNRELATED AND STEMMED FROM  
CASE-BY-CASE DECISION MAKING. DOBRYNIN COMMENTED  
THAT EVEN SO, THESE DECISIONS MADE A "BIG PILE"

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AND WERE ALL ANTI-SOVIET. (DOBRYNIN DID NOT  
MENTION THE LIBYA RAID OR SDI IN THIS CONTEXT.)

## STOESSEL'S IMPRESSIONS

13. STOESSEL FELT THAT DOBRYNIN WAS HIS USUAL JOVIAL SELF, IN GOOD PHYSICAL SHAPE AND PLEASED WITH HIS NEW POSITION. STOESSEL ALSO FELT DOBRYNIN SEEMED GENUINELY DISCOMFORTED OVER THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING AREAS OF SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT. HE REPORTED DOBRYNIN AS SAYING HE WAS NOT ONE WHO FELT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT DEAL WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. DOBRYNIN SAID HE WAS FOR A SUMMIT BUT DID NOT SEE IT HAPPENING UNLESS "SOMETHING CHANGES." GIVEN THE UPCOMING (1988) U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, DOBRYNIN NOTED, "THE TIME TO DEAL" WAS GROWING SHORT.  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 3, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON  
Senior Special Assistant  
to the Attorney General  
Department of Justice

DR. PHIL DuSAULT  
Associate Director for National Security  
and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

RADM JOHN BITOFF  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSPG Meeting on Friday, June 6, 1986 (U)

The NSPG meeting will be held in the White House Situation Room at 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on Friday, June 6, 1986, to discuss policy options for managing US-Soviet relations for the balance of 1986. An agenda for the meeting is attached. Attendance is principals only. (C)

Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Agenda

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DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA KML, DATE 6/28/10



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 4, 1986

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*  
SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting  
Friday, June 6 -- 11:00 a.m.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding an agenda and a list of participants for the NSPG meeting scheduled on Friday, June 6, at 11:00 a.m., in the Situation Room.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo for Pres  
Tab A Agenda  
Tab B List of Participants

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997  
By *GLS* NARA, Date *6/21/02*

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: June 6, 1986  
LOCATION: Situation Room  
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon  
FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE

To discuss policy options for managing US-Soviet relations for the balance of 1986.

II. BACKGROUND

Given the Soviet delay in setting a date for Gorbachev's visit to the US and the active Soviet propaganda campaign, it is timely to review our strategy in dealing with the Soviet Union over the coming months.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

You would lead off by outlining your views on the work to be done in developing a strategy, after which you would invite the comments of the participants.

Attachments:

Tab A Agenda  
Tab B List of Participants

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

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NLRR F06-114/4 #8308  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Friday, June 6, 1986  
White House Situation Room  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

US-Soviet Relations

Agenda

1. The President reviews issues in US-Soviet relations which require further examination.
2. Discussion by principals.

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NLRR FOI 114/4 #8309  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13



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PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

Director, Office of Management and Budget

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 4, 1986

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Tab A Agenda  
Tab B List of Participants

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White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997  
By *as* NARA, Date *6/24/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

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Tab A Agenda  
Tab B List of Participants

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13



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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Friday, June 6, 1986  
White House Situation Room  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

US-Soviet Relations

Agenda

1. The President reviews issues in US-Soviet relations which require further examination.
2. Discussion by principals.

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NLRR F06-114/4 #8311  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

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PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

Director, Office of Management and Budget

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 4, 1986

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Tab B List of Participants

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DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *als* NARA, Date *6/21/02*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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DATE: June 6, 1986  
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Tab B List of Participants

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

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NLRR FD6-114/4 #8312  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

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ACTION OFFICER: PUGLIARESI

DUE: 5 JUNE

☐ Prepare Memo For President

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

☒ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

☐ Prepare Memo

CONCURRENCES/COMME

FYI

☐ Burghardt

☐ Cannistraro

☐ Childress

☐ Cobb

☐ Covey

☒ Danzansky

☒ deGraffenreid

☐ Djerejian

☐ Dobriansky

☐ Donley

☐ Douglass

☐ Grimes

☐ Hughes

☐ Kraemer

☐ Laux

☐ Lenczowski

TO: Pugliaresi  
Lou - Negroponte is really  
exercised about this. We  
should keep an eye on it.  
State has the statutory  
responsibility to coordinate  
USG international science  
policy - At least, OSTP should  
make sure State is on board  
before they take positions in  
annual testimony -  
Jack

INFORMATION ☐ McDaniel

☒ Rodman

☐ Poindexter (advance)

☐ Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

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NLRR F06-114/4#8313

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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Return to Secretariat

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*Matlock*  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 5, 1986

NOTE FOR KARNA SMALL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJ: News Conference Materials

Please find attached my comments  
and re-writes.

cc: Bob Linhard  
John Douglass  
Mike Donley



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1986

NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK

BOB LINHARD

JOHN DOUGLASS

MIKE DONLEY ✓

FROM: KARNA SMALL

SUBJ: News conference materials

May I have your urgent clearance/  
re-write of attached talking points  
to be submitted to the President  
for his upcoming news conference.

You will note we have inputs from  
BOTH State and Defense...please decide  
which page you want to use on each  
issue -- incorporate other comments  
as appropriate, cut and paste or  
whatever you wish and tube back to  
me. We will retype. (It would be  
terrific if you could talk to  
eachother on this, though - so I  
don't receive three different  
mark-ups and have to decide which  
to use).

Sorry for quick turn-around--we need  
these BEFORE LUNCH TODAY...but we  
just received the material.

Many thanks.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
June 5, 1986

NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK  
BOB LINHARD  
JOHN DOUGLASS  
MIKE DONLEY ✓  
FROM: KARNA SMALL

SUBJ: News conference materials

May I have your urgent clearance/  
re-write of attached talking points  
to be submitted to the President  
for his upcoming news conference.

You will note we have inputs from  
BOTH State and Defense...please decide  
which page you want to use on each  
issue -- incorporate other comments  
as appropriate, cut and paste or  
whatever you wish and tube back to  
me. We will retype. (It would be  
terrific if you could talk to  
each other on this, though - so I  
don't receive three different  
mark-ups and have to decide which  
to use).

Sorry for quick turn-around--we need  
these BEFORE LUNCH TODAY...but we  
just received the material.

Many thanks.



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## U.S.-SOVIET

### What are the prospects for a U.S.-Soviet Summit this year?

- o At our Summit last year, I invited General Secretary Gorbachev to visit the U.S. in 1986 and he accepted. That invitation stands without preconditions.

-- The two of us made progress at Geneva last November and there's more to be made if the Soviets are ready. We certainly are.

### SALT II: Does the Interim Restraint decision put U.S.-Soviet dialogue in jeopardy?

- o Not as far as we're concerned.
- o The decision was clear. SALT II was inadequate; under its terms the Soviets increased their threat to us.
- o My highest priority now is a meaningful arms control agreement on deep reductions of offensive nuclear arms. I am ready to work now with Mr. Gorbachev to achieve this.

### SDI, Compliance with ABM

- o In SDI we're researching whether defenses against nuclear weapons are feasible. That research will go on until we have answered the basic questions.
- o Unlike SALT, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified treaty. We have said again and again that we will adhere to it as we conduct our defense research. Our policy has not changed.

-- We are concerned about Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, and we seek to reverse the Treaty's erosion.

### New Soviet offer in Geneva

- o We've said Geneva was the place for detailed negotiations, so the way they've handled their latest proposals may be a good sign.
- o Obviously we will study the Soviet proposals very closely and very seriously.

-- I certainly won't comment now on the details of a confidential proposal.



How do you view the announced Soviet decision to resolve 71  
U.S.-Soviet divided family cases?

- o We welcome this important step. It is significant in human and political terms, and contributes to an improvement in our overall relations.

-- This is the largest number of divided family cases the Soviets have agreed to resolve since we began raising the issue with them almost thirty years ago.

- o This shows that the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on these issues can produce results.

- o Of course, our thoughts and prayers are with those families whose cases remain unresolved. We will not forget them.

-- We also remain concerned about the continued low levels of Jewish emigration.

## STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION

### What are your Plans for Strategic Modernization?

- o The balanced five-part modernization program I announced in 1981 stands. That program is designed to:
  - redress what was in 1981 a growing strategic imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union;
  - strengthen and modernize the U.S. forces that have deterred war for almost 40 years; and
  - pave the way for meaningful arms control negotiations.

### Has the Program been Successful in Obtaining your Objectives?

- o Since 1981, much has changed in the world. These changes have both vindicated the wisdom of our comprehensive program and shown us the need for continued modernization.
- o We have achieved many of the military and political results we expected.
- o Deterrence has been strengthened and we are stronger and more able to defend the values we hold dear. The Soviets have taken note of this and returned to the negotiating table.

### Where Do Defensive Systems Fit In?

- o Trends set in motion by extensive Soviet programs in both strategic offense and strategic defense suggest that it may be unwise in the future to depend exclusively on offensive forces.
- o This is why our SDI research program and ASAT testing programs are also essential for our long-term security. They are prudent steps for ensuring deterrence and stability over the long term.

### Where should Congress Take Cuts in Strategic Programs?

- o We have been able to hold spending on strategic program to less than 15% of the DOD budget. This modest investment is far below the percentages devoted to strategic forces built during the 1960s which we now need to replace.
- o I have recently submitted to the Congress a message explaining why it would be most unwise to make any cuts in strategic programs.

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## U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT

### What are the Prospects for a Summit at this Time?

- We continue to believe a Summit should and will be held. The General Secretary has repeatedly indicated he is willing, and I see no reason why a suitable time and place cannot be worked out. Both these points are under discussion, and I would not want to go into the details at this time.

### A Number of Issues have Tended to Aggravate U.S.-Soviet Relations in Recent Weeks--the Resumption of Nuclear Testing, Chernobyl, and the U.S. SALT Decision. Have these not Diminished the Chances of a Summit?

- Not at all. These are the very issues we should discuss at the Summit.

- We want to make progress on controlling nuclear testing, and therefore have made concrete and practical proposals to improve verification.  
~~I would be happy to explain to General Secretary Gorbachev why we believe nuclear testing is important: to modernize and to make safer and more reliable our nuclear stocks.~~  
*and international cooperation*
- In the light of Chernobyl, it is vital to develop mechanisms for prompt international notification when such ~~cross-border~~ nuclear incidents occur. I am pleased to note that Mr. Gorbachev has already indicated a willingness to move in this direction.
- On the matter of SALT II, the issue is really not one of compliance or violation of an ill-considered agreement; it is whether the United States is going to stand by and let the other side take advantage of our good will. ~~The sand has just run out of the SALT hourglass. I would welcome the opportunity to revisit this matter with Mr. Gorbachev.~~  
*accidents*

Prepared by:  
Long Range Policy  
ODASD/Negotiations Policy  
04 June 1986

The important thing is to move now to negotiate real reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.



SALT II

Is the decision that the U.S. will no longer observe SALT II limits reversible if the Soviet Union's conduct improves?

o I decided that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces -- NOT on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance. Such decisions cannot be determined by a flawed SALT II treaty which:

- codified major arms buildups rather than reductions,
- was never ratified,
- would have expired if it had been ratified, and
- has been violated by the Soviet Union.

o *I have made clear that the U.S. will continue the utmost restraint in our*  
~~Our goal cannot be to resurrect the SALT structure, which simply will not improve our security or moderate the arms race even if observed by the USSR. No policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms which is our primary goal.~~

*deploy-  
ments and  
will not  
exceed  
Soviet  
levels....  
However,  
no policy  
of interim*

*will begin negotiating*  
 o I continue to hope that the Soviet Union ~~terminates its non-compliance with existing arms control agreements, reverses its military buildup and negotiates constructively in Geneva.~~  
 If it does, we will take this into account.



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SDI: COMPLIANCE WITH ABM TREATY

Will the United States continue to comply with the ABM Treaty?

- o I have directed that the SDI research program be formulated in full compliance with all U.S. Treaty obligations. The Defense Department has planned and reviewed the program to ensure that it remains compliant, and will continue to do so.
- o The Soviet Union, in contrast, has violated the ABM Treaty. The large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is in clear violation of the Treaty.
- o ~~That radar and other Soviet ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR might be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Such an action, if left without a U.S. response, would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.~~

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SDI: INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY

Do you have any plans to restructure the SDI program toward the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

- o Last year my Administration carefully reviewed the ABM Treaty as it relates to future strategic defensive systems based on "other physical principles".
  - As a result of that review, I determined that a reading of the ABM Treaty that would allow the development and testing of such systems based on other physical principles, regardless of basing mode, is fully justified.
- o In October, 1985, while reserving the right to do so in the future, I decided not to restructure the SDI program, towards the boundaries possible under that interpretation -- so long as the program receives the support necessary to implement its carefully drafted plan.
  - Obviously, we must continue to review the extent to which this requirement is being met.

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RECENT SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL

Is it true that the Soviet Union recently presented a new proposal in Geneva, and if so, what do you think of it?

- o Our study of their new proposal indicates that it is merely a way of restating part of their previous proposal and is still unacceptable.
- o Like their previous proposal, the new proposal would effectively ban research and technology development of the type we are pursuing in the Strategic Defense Initiative.
- o Such a ban on SDI remains a Soviet precondition for agreement on reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
- o The potential benefits of SDI -- not only to ourselves and our allies, but to the whole world -- means we won't use it as a bargaining chip. Consequently, the original Soviet proposal and its reformulation is unacceptable to us.

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DOD BUDGET -- STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION

Would you please comment on Congressional proposals to limit the budget deficit by cutting the Strategic Modernization Program?

- o Nothing is more critical to the security of this nation than the full and timely implementation of the Strategic Modernization Program.
  - Significant progress has been made over the last few years in restoring the credibility and military effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
  - We are on the threshold of deploying several new systems which are absolutely essential to continued effective deterrence in the years ahead.
  - It would be foolhardy to abandon now our commitment to completing this vital modernization of our nuclear forces.



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## DEFENSE BUDGET

How about congressional proposals to reduce your defense budget by \$19 billion to \$35 billion?

- o We have urged Congress to maintain the momentum of our efforts to restore U.S. defenses. Our budget requests are consistent with the goal we all endorsed nearly 6 years ago. To stop now denies us success and risks falling back into the hollow, ill-prepared, and under-equipped military of the 1970's.
  - Cuts of that magnitude on top of last year's large reduction will lead both our friends and enemies to question our resolve.
  - What global national security commitments would they have us abandon? Even the exaggerated claims of waste in the defense budget will not cover a \$20 billion reduction.
  - Congress risks squandering the gains we have made and the initiatives in progress if it backslides on its responsibility to provide for the common defense.

Where will the cuts hit?

- o I hope there are no large reductions. No one should believe they wouldn't hit key areas like manpower and readiness.
  - Cuts of the magnitude of \$20-\$30 billion would devastate military R&D, preclude or drastically curtail new programs like the C-17 cargo aircraft, and reduce training.
  - The efficiencies, such as multiyear contracting, which allow DoD to save money would also become impossible with a large cut.
  - I recently provided the Congress with a long list of programs that would have to be considered for reduction if the budget is cut deeply. We need to keep that list from becoming a reality.