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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name	MATLOCK, JACK: FILES		Wit	hdrawer
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8317 MEMO	POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH	1	6/5/1986	B1
	NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP			
	R 1/11/2012 M125/2			
8318 MEMO	LINHARD/KRAEMER TO POINDEXTER RE	1	6/5/1986	B1
	NSPG MEETING, FRIDAY JUNE 6, 1986 RE			
	U.SSOVIET RELATIONS			
	R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - I	108-125/2	2	
8319 MEMO	POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH	1	6/6/1986	B1
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8320 AGENDA	NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP	1	ND	B1
	MEETING FRIDAY JUNE 6, 1986			
	R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - N	108-125/2	2	
8321 MEMO	NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP	1	ND	B1
	MEETING FRIDAY JUNE 6, 1986 U.S. SOVIE	Т		
	RELATIONS LIST OF PARTICIPANTS			
	R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - N	108-125/2	2	
8322 TALKING	NSPG MEETING JUNE 6 TALKING POINTS	1	ND	B1
POINTS	FOR PRESIDENT			
	R 1/11/2012 M125/2			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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8323 MEMO	MCD	ANIEL TO GREGO	G; PLATT; COOKSEY;	1	ND	B1		
			N; DUSAULT; RIXSE;					
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8324 TALKING	NATI	IONAL SECURITY	PLANNING GROUP	1	ND	B1		
POINTS	MEE	TING THURSDAY	JUNE 12, 1986					
	R	2/26/2009	GUIDELINES - MO	08-125/2	2			
8325 MEMO			EXTER RE BREAKFAST	Г 1	6/10/1986	B1		
		1: SHULTZ-DUBIN	IN MEETING					
	R	6/23/2010	M125/2					
8326 MEMO	SAMI	E TEXT AS DOC #	8325	1	6/10/1986	B1		
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8329 MEMO	SAMI	E TEXT AS DOC #8	8328	1	ND	B1		
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8332 MEMO		RNYAYEV TO GOI CY AND OUR DIL		6	6/9/1986	B1		
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8334 CABLE	10151	17Z JUN 86		3	6/10/1986	B1		
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8335 CABLE	10143	38Z JUN 86		4	6/10/1986	B1		
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8336 MEMO	SAM	E TEXT AS DOC#8	327	3	6/11/1986	B1		
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8333 MEMO	SAM	E TEXT AS DOC #8	3332	6	6/9/1986	B1		
	R	6/23/2010	M125/2					

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOM

PETER R. SOMMERIC

SUBJECT: Delegation from European Parliament

Roy Denman, the European Communities representative in Washington, has written asking you to meet on June 18 with a visiting delegation from the European Parliament (EP). Denman cites the effect of international terrorism on the Atlantic Alliance as a topic of special interest to the delegation.

In reviewing the delegation list, and recalling the rigors of your schedule, I think, on balance, the NSC staff can handle this meeting request. Furthermore, the EP delegation is not seeing others at your level in meetings around town. Hence, your reply suggests a meeting with Jack Matlock and Steve Danzansky.

Recommendation

That you sign the Tab I reply to Denman.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Jack Maclock, Steve Danzansky, and Ty could concur.

Attachments								
Tab	I	Reply	to	Denman				
Tab	II	Denman	's	letter				

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sir Roy Denman Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities 2100 M Street NW, Suite 707 Washington, DC 20037

Dear Sir Roy:

Thank you very much for the kind invitation to meet with the European Parliament delegation. I regret, but my schedule will not permit me to meet with this important group. I would, however, like to offer a meeting with Ambassador Jack Matlock, my top European expert, and Stephen Danzansky, head of my international economics division.

Please have your staff contact Peter Sommer (telephone: 395-5732) also of my staff, about a mutually convenient time.

Again, I am sorry that my schedule will not permit me to meet personally with the group.

Sincerely,

DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

The Head of the Delegation

19 May, 1986.

The Honorable John Poindexter National Security Adviser The White House Washington DC 20500

Year admiral

I am writing on the behalf of Mr. Piet Dankert, Chairman of the European Parliament's Standing Delegation to the United States to request a meeting with members of the Delegation on Wednesday, June 18 at 5:00 p.m. The Delegation, which will include for the first time representatives from Spain and Portugal, will be in Washington for the 27th Interparliamentary meeting with the U.S. House of Representatives. They very much would like to discuss with you the vital issue of the effect of international terrorism on the North Atlantic Alliance.

I have enclosed for your information a copy of Mr. Dankert's biography and a list of the Members of the Delegation. However, I might also point out to you that in all likelihood Dame Shelagh Roberts, Chairwoman of the Parliament's External Relations Committee and Mrs. Simone Veil, former President of the European Parliament will also accompany the Delegation.

If you or your staff would like more information or would like to confirm this by phone, please contact Mr. Robert Whiteman of my office on 862-9550.

You have my appreciation in advance.

Runcasey Kaylema

Roy Denman

DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

PRESS AND INFORMATION

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

PIETER DANKERT

Pieter (Piet) Dankert, former President of the European Parliament, is Chairman of the Parliament's Delegation for Relations with the United States. He is also Vice-Chairman of the Socialist Group, Coordinator of the Committee on Budgets and a member of the Committee on Budgetary Control.

Born January 8, 1934, in the Netherlands, Mr. Dankert began his career as a history teacher. He joined the Dutch Labor Party (Socialist) in 1958, and was Chairman of the Dutch Young Socialists from 1960 to 1962. He was a member of the Labor Party's Executive from 1963 to 1971, and Party Secretary for International Affairs from 1965 to 1971.

Mr. Dankert was a member of the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament (States-General) from 1968 to 1981. He has been a member of the European Parliament since 1977, and was President from 1982 to 1984. Mr. Dankert was the second President to preside over the Parliament after it became a directly elected body in 1979.

A specialist on East-West and U.S.-European relations, he has published numerous articles on these issues. Mr. Dankert served as Executive Chairman of the Dutch Institute for Peace Issues from 1975 to 1980.



EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DELEGATION

for relations with THE UNITED STATES

List of Members

(31)

Mr	Pieter DANKERT, Chairman	SOC, Netherlands
	Vincenzo GIUMMARRA, 1st Vice-Chairman	PPE, Italy
	Rene PIQUET, 2nd Vice-Chairman	COM, France

Mr Heinrich AIGNER Mr Enrique BARON CRESPO Lord BETHELL Mr Erik BLUMENFELD Mr Elmar BROK Sir Fred CATHERWOOD Mr Mark CLINTON Mr Mario DI BARTOLOMEI Mr Carlos-Alfredo GASÒLIBA I BÖHM Mr Fritz GAUTIER Mr Ernest GLINNE Mr Benedikt HÄRLIN Mrs Magdalene HOFF Mr Stephen HUGHES Mr José Maria LAFUENTE LOPEZ Mr Leonidas LAGAKOS Mr Jean-Marie LE CHEVALLIER Mr Ray MacSHARRY Mr António José MARQUES MENDES Mr Didier MOTCHANE Mr Jean PENDERS Mr Luis PLANAS PUCHADES Mr Walter ROSA Mrs Christiane SCRIVENER Mr Sergio SEGRE Mr Icannis TZOUNIS Mr Michael WELSH Mr Mario ZAGARI

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PPE, Germany SOC, Spain ED, UK PPE, Germany PPE, Germany ED, UK PPE, Ireland LDR, Italy LDR, Spain SOC, Germany SOC, Belgium ARC, Germany SOC, Germany SOC, UK ED, Spain SOC, Greece DR, France RDE, Ireland RDE, Portugal SOC, France PPE, Netherlands SOC, Spain SOC, Portugal LDR, France COM, Italy PPE, Greece ED, UK SOC, Italy

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June 5, 1986

SECRET

MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DATE: LOCATION: TIME:	June 6, 1986 Situation Room 11:00 - 11:45	
FROM:	JOHN M. POINDEXTER	Rom

I. PURPOSE

To discuss policy options for managing US-Soviet relations for the balance of 1986.

II. BACKGROUND

Given the Soviet delay in setting a date for Gorbachev's visit to the US and the active Soviet propaganda campaign, it is timely to review our strategy in dealing with the Soviet Union over the coming months.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

None

Attachments: Tab A Agenda Tab B List of Participants


Prepared by: Jack F. Matlock

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SECRET ACTION

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June 5, 1986

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MEMORANDUM	FOR	JOHN	Μ.	POIND	EXTE	R	/		
FROM:		BOB		RD/S	VEN	KRAEN	IER		
SUBJECT:				eting, viet R				6,	198

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Attached at TAB I is a meeting memorandum from you to the President providing standard background information about Friday's NSPG.

The Agenda and List of Participants are attached to the meeting memorandum at TABs A and B, respectively. We will forward a separate memorandum today containing your talking points for the conduct of the meeting.

PP

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Recommendation

That you sign and forward to the President the memorandum at TAB I along with TABs A and B.

> Approve Disapprove

Concurrence:

Jack Matlock, Stepher Sestanovich and Peter Rodman

Attachments: TAB I Presidential Meeting Memorandum Agenda TAB A List of Participants TAB B

Adminal This package may be OBE. Based on our conversation last night, cl began working this morning on the talking points requested - remembered

I had not seen a meeting memo, I quickly generated this. I

understand a pockage has already been sent forward -- So all that

eched is to close this

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY GROUP DATE: June 6, 1986 LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE

To review the status of U.S.-Soviet relations and discuss the generation of additional policy options for the U.S. to move the relationship toward U.S. objectives (with a particular focus on arms control).

II. BACKGROUND

The question that we wish to address at this NSPG is how best to position the United States prior to the summer break so that we increase the likelihood of progress in the relationship in the fall. We also wish to avoid being placed on the defensive abroad in the fall due to continued, unanswered Soviet maneuvering in the arms control area. This meeting would kick-off a program of work to generate additional options for your consideration and use by the end of June. We will need a follow-up decision meeting on this subject later in this month. The agenda for today's meeting is at Tab A.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of Participants is at TAB B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

None planned.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will provide a brief introduction. George Shultz will then review the current status of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I will then provide a brief overview of the arms control situation and suggest where we could focus talent to generate additional U.S. options. Following this, we plan to have 25 minutes of discussion, in which you will have the opportunity to hear appropriate Cabinet members views on the matter. No decisions are needed at the meeting.


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Sven Kraemer

Prepared by: Bob Linhard



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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING Friday, June 6, 1986 Situation Room 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Agenda

I. Introduction

John M. Poindexter (5 minutes)

- II. Review of Status of U.S.-Soviet Relations Secretary Shultz (10 minutes)
- III. Overview of Arms Control Issues
- John M. Poindexter (15 minutes)

IV. Discussion

V. Summary

John M. Poindexter (5 minutes)


All Participants

(25 minutes)


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MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY GROUP Friday, June 6, 1986 Situation Room 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The President The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Director of Central Intelligence The Chief of Staff to the President The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

NSPG MEETING JUNE 6 TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT

-- U.S. position vis a vis Soviet Union now very strong; need to exploit subtly but effectively to lock Soviets into some agreements which protect U.S. interests.

-- Need strategy to bring the Soviets out of their shell re arms control negotiations and to keep the high ground in public opinion.

-- Therefore, I am tasking a study of what moves we can make to clarify and reiterate our positions on arms reductions.

-- In particular, I would like approaches that we can characterize as "new" (though the elements may not differ substantially from our current positions) in the following areas:

- a. strategic nuclear weapons;
- b. strategic defensive systems;
- c. nuclear testing; and
- d. INF

-- It is essential that these studies go forward with no risk of leaks. Therefore, I am asking John Poindexter to have the Arms Control Support Group work on the problem, and to compartmentalize their work very closely. John should review their work in the SACG, and we'll get together again in ten days or so to discuss the results.

-- My aim would be to deliver a major speech toward the end of June.

-- Don't worry: I don't plan any major changes in the direction of our positions. But I think we have to take the public offensive in order to drive Gorbachev to the table. If the Soviets can repeatedly put out proposals they claim are new, we should be able to articulate our objectives in a way that will appeal to the public -- and show up the Soviets if they are not serious.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC 20506

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June 9, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

JACK F. MATLOCK FROM:

NSPG Meeting on June 12, 1986 SUBJECT:

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for all relevant agencies forwarding an agenda for the NSPG meeting scheduled on Thursday, June 12, in the Situation Room at 2:00 p.m. for 45 minutes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Agencies Tab A Agenda

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SYSTEM II 90441

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

> MR. NICHOLAS PLATT Executive Secretary Department of State

MS. SHERRI COOKSEY Executive Secretary Department of the Treasury

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON Executive Secretary Department of Defense

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON Senior Special Assistant to the Attorney General Department of Justice

MR. PHIL DUSAULT Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE Executive Secretary Joint Chiefs of Staff

RADM JOHN BITOFF Executive Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSGP Meeting on Thursday, June 12, 1986 (U)

An NSPG meeting will be held in the White House Situation Room at 2:00 p.m. to 2:45 p.m. on Thursday, June 12, 1986, to discuss policy options for managing US-Soviet relations for the balance of 1986. An agenda for the meeting is attached. Attendance is principals only.

Rodney B. McDaniel Executive Secretary

Attachment Tab A: Agenda

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Thursday, June 12, 1986 White House Situation Room

2:00 p.m. - 2:45 p.m.

Combatting Unauthorized Disclosures

I. Introduction

John M. Poindexter (10 minutes)

- Initiatives to combat unauthorized disclosures
 of classified information
- Proposed legislation on unauthorized disclosures
- Administration position on prosecuting disclosures in the media
- II. Discussion

All participants (30 minutes)

III. Summary

John M. Poindexter (5 minutes)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 10, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOC

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: Shultz-Dubinin Meeting

Background

Shultz met with Dubinin on Monday, June 9, and has presumably put this item on the agenda to brief the other participants on the meeting.

State informs me that it was a courtesy call lasting an hour -- although Dubinin spoke in Russian, which required time for translation.

Dubinin had nothing new on dates, either for the Summit or the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting . Shultz reviewed where we stand in the four areas. Dobinin's basic message was that there is "growing concern" in Moscow regarding what they consider "contradictions" between US actions and the agreements at the Geneva Summit.

Talking Points

Since this will be essentially a briefing by Shultz, comment may not be necessary. However, the discussion could turn to issues discussed in last Friday's NSPG -- in which case you are well familiar with the issues.

Concur: Peter Rodman

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 10, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item: Shultz-Dubinin Meeting

JACK F. MATLOC

Background

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
Talking Points

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Concur: Peter Rodman

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

June 11, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER RODNEY B. MCDANIEL Vor

JACK MATLOCH

THROUGH:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Should President Send Gorbachev Another Letter?

Rod has informed me that, in musing on his luncheon meeting with Suzanne Massie, the President indicated an interest in sending Gorbachev another letter or message. The purpose would be to give him some credit for the recently resolved family reunification cases and to propose that, if Gorbachev wishes to accept a summit date after the November elections, the President would accept and announce this publicly. This was, I understand, in the context of Suzanne's comments about the need for keeping private communication open.

Comment:

I agree wholeheartedly about the need to keep the President's private communication with Gorbachev alive and well -- and expand it if possible. However, I believe that now is not a good time for another letter, and feel in particular that it would be a mistake to press Gorbachev directly to agree to a summit date. Also, a further message about family reunification is not likely to have the effect desired. Let me explain why this is.

(1) Gorbachev now has five letters from the President which he has not answered (See list at TAB I). A couple of times (e.g., in the letter of April 2 which Dobrynin brought) he promised answers, but these have not been forthcoming. The President's most recent letter (May 23) was designed to smoke him out, and offered a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Europe, which has also not been answered. I believe it is much too soon to send another letter.

(2) In particular, pressing Gorbachev on a summit date could well backfire. This is because the Soviets strongly suspect that our strategy is to increase pressure on them across the board while lulling our public, Congress and the Allies with empty talks. (I am not saying that they are justified in believing this, but I believe they do genuinely suspect it.) Therefore, if the

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President pushes to announce a date, this will only confirm such suspicions. It certainly will not help Gorbachev with whatever internal problem he may have (and I believe he <u>does</u> have internal problems).

- 2 -

(3) Praising Gorbachev for allowing some of the divided families to be reunited could also backfire. First, because Gorbachev will not want to acknowledge that this was done to please the U.S. Second, because it could lead to the impression that they have done enough in this area and need not move on emigration (which is abysmally low, and has gotten worse since Geneva).

Finally, I just learned that Sokolov told Palmer or Ridgway at lunch today that a letter in reply to the President's recent letters is now "on Gorbachev's desk." Sokolov expects Dubinin to bring it with him when he returns to Washington at the end of next week.

For these reasons, I believe it would be ill-advised to send another letter right at this time. We should wait a week or so to see if Gorbachev in fact answers the President, and also to assess the latest Soviet moves at Geneva. However -- even if Dubinin does not bring a letter back -- when we have the substantive portion of the President's address ready, it might not hurt to send a letter in advance explaining what is in it, why it is there, and (perhaps) addressing the SALT-II question in a conciliatory way (desire for restraint and for reductions, etc.).

Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, the President might want to consider sending a message with an emissary who would go to Moscow quietly and try to get some real feed-back. (This would require assurance in advance that the emissary could see Dobrynin, at least.) A cable from Moscow today reports that Bessmertnykh commented to visiting American academics that our relationship "suffered from a lack of 'informal conversation' at senior levels (see cable at Tab III), so such a move might be welcomed.

My gut feeling is that what Gorbachev feels he needs most at the moment is some <u>public</u> indication that the President will move on some of the issues important to him. Completely private messages do not help that much -- unless they indicate more "give" on our part than we should grant. However, a private discussion with feedback from an authoritative interlocutor might clarify some things which we could safely do, if we only knew.

Attached are three papers which amplify points above: Tab I lists the President's letters which Gorbachev has not yet answered. Tab II provides a sample of the sort of analysis which Soviet officials may be making of the present situation. The Moscow cable mentioned is at Tab III.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

RECOMMENDATION:

That you discuss the matter with the President and encourage him not to send another letter immediately but to consider trying the "emissary" approach -- perhaps with a letter outlining any new ideas that would be imporporated in a speech.

Approve

Attachments:

- Tab I -- List of unanswered letters
- Tab II -- Soviet "Worst Case" Analysis
- Tab III -- Moscow telegram of June 10, 1986



SECRET/SENSITIVE

UNANSWERED LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Feb. 16: Long handwritten letter (suggestions re SDI)

Feb. 22: Reply to Gorbachev's Jan. 14 letter with new arms control proposal. (suggestions re INF)

March 14: Proposal re Corrtex and nuclear testing

April 11: Letter carried by Dobrynin; said President waiting for answers to earlier letters

May 23: Letter proposing Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Europe.

NOTE: The proposals tabled in Geneva today may possibly be considered an indirect reply the letter of February 22.

Regarding human rights cases: The President sent a letter December 7 via Secretary Baldrige, with lists of people. Gorbachev answered on January 11, saying that divided families would be considered, but that issue not connected with trade.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED NLRR M08-125/2# 8328 BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

UNANSWERED LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED NLRR_M08-125/2#8324 BY AW NARA DATE 1/11

SECRET/SENSITIVE

UNANSWERED LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Feb. 16: Long handwritten letter (suggestions re SDI)

Feb. 22: Reply to Gorbachev's Jan. 14 letter with new arms control proposal. (suggestions re INF)

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SECRET/SENSITIVE Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED NLRR <u>MD8-125/2</u>#833D BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

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SECRET/SENSITIVE



SECRET/SENSITIVE 2331 STOOF CHANNEL ONLY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 6/11/86 John -A quick and dirty translation of a comment our Kremlin mole picked up. The says he might get his hands on more such if there is any interest -Regards _ Jack

DECLASSIFIED NLRR M08-125/2 # 8331 BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

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SECRET/EYES ONLY GENERAL SECRETARY

June 9, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV TO:

FROM: ANATOLY CHERNYAYEV

U.S. Policy and Our Dilemma SUBJECT:

You asked me to convene a small group to discuss prospects for dealing with the United States for the remainder of the Reagan term, with particular reference to our options in managing your commitment to meet with Reagan in the United States this year. I can assure you that we conducted our work with the utmost discretion. By meeting here at the Central Committee we stayed out of the way of Chebrikov's KGB snoops, and we never met before 6:00 because we know that by then all of Dobrynin's crew would be long gone. (As you know, they clear out right after 5:00 so they can get soused at Igor's before going home. I know you've been thinking of cracking down on this, but I would suggest you wait a while because it's useful to have them out of the way at times.) And, by the way, we also didn't forget the building guards. We picked three of the most luscious secretaries in the Central Committee and had them come up and sit in the outer office. That way they could not only keep watch on the door, but when we all left around midnight, the guards naturally assumed that we had hung around for fun and games and thus will not go around gossiping about folks working late on some secret project. (Bear this in mind if some snitch tells you we were playing around.)

Anyway, we hammered out a consensus on most issues. I'll summarize them, and note the areas where there was some disagreement.

Background: The Situation

For six years now, the correlation of forces has been shifting against us. The Brezhnev crowd was guilty of the most egregious error of judgment in the 1970's. They let our economy stagnate and fall even farther behind our enemies in a technological sense. At the same time, they threw down the gauntlet and started pushing our weight around. That would have been fine if the United States had continued to decline and if we had had a fully developed socialist base at home. But neither of these conditions were fulfilled, and Brezhnev's failure to understand this was truly a case of an "infantile disease of leftism," to use Lenin's trenchant phrase. The old boys just never understood Lenin's teaching to calculate the correlation of forces accurately before acting. Their policy was clearly premature. We should not have taken on the U.S. until we were certain we had a firm base of strength at home. As it is, we just galvanized the

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

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Americans to revive their strength -- and this happened just when we started paying the price of Brezhnev's cronyism and "do nothing and it may go away" policies.

As you have said many times to us in private, you really inherited a mess! We've been in now for over a year, and have found out just how bad it is. That would be true even if Ronald Reagan did not exist, but he does, and that makes matters even worse. For a while our pollyannas thought he would overreach himself and stumble. Those foolish enough to pay attention to the idiots in the left-wing press clung to the thought that he couldn't get his programs through. (Lenin said we should make use of useful idiots, not listen to them!) But what do we see: the lucky so-and-so wins every one of the important ones regardless of what we do to encourage opposition to him, and he's riding a wave of popularity that Franklin Roosevelt would envy. Anybody who predicts that we can outflank him in Congress must have a half liter of vodka in his belly.

One more factor I need not mention, but since you charged us with looking clinically at <u>all</u> factors, I will for the sake of completeness. That is, our problems in getting control of the <u>nomenklatura</u> here. The old guys are putting up a lot more fight that we expected. The Party Congress came before you got your ducks in a row, and we still have to put up with empty heads like Kunayev and blockheads like Shcherbitsky (maybe you can use Chernobyl to take care of that one!), not to speak of stonehead Gromyko and his constant grousing. We simply cannot forget that a lot of long knives are out and if you change things too fast they might be used. The very fact that this is the crowd that led us into this mess means that they will fight anything that reflects on their stewardship, and will not shy away from accusing you of treason to the cause if you seem to be retreating from the morass they stumbled into.

The Dilemma

This means we have a real dilemma. If we have any chance to get things on the right track at home, we've got to get the Americans off our backs. But they are just not buying soft soap any more. This time, we're going to have to pay. If we had gotten our people in all the key positions, we could pull it off by explaining very quietly that we have to take a step back so we can take two or three forward in 15 or 20 years. But your opponents here won't buy that without a fight. After all, if they admit they were wrong, they will be signing their own political death certificates.

Arbatov keeps advising you just to wait out Reagan. Come January, 1989, he won't be there to kick us around any more. Of course, that's what Arbatov always advises: just wait them out. That's what he said in 1976 (you were still in Stavropol then, but I was in the CC apparat and remember it well): don't make a 31

deal with Ford, he said, the next guy may be easier. And what did we get? Carter. Couldn't get a treaty out of the Senate even it it was to ratify a gift of Kamchatka. So old Georgy says, "Don't worry, I see Nixon II just over the 1980 horizon. And what do we get? Ronald Reagan. Frankly, this waiting game is for the birds. If his successor is easier for us to deal with, he won't be able to deliver. And anyway, it would take him a couple of years to organize his Administration, so we are not talking about two and a half years, we are talking five at least.

- 3 -

You are a better judge than I as to whether we have five years to play with. But I doubt it. If we don't get things moving before then, you may go down in our history as Khrushchev II. Managing a <u>sovkhoz</u> in the Urals is not the way I believe you want to pass your golden years, but the thought does concentrate the mind.

Actually, there is one strong argument in favor of dealing with Reagan, even if we could afford to wait for his successor. And that is: if we make a deal, he can deliver. The question our group addressed most intensively, therefore, is can we deal with Reagan, or is it futile to try?

American Objectives

All in our group agree that the Americans understand our problems pretty well, and are out to exploit them to their advantage. They are feeling their oats and are pressing us everywhere. They finally seem to understand the importance of ideology and are fighting back just when our own people and much of the world is turned off on ours. They clearly want to gain military superiority if they can. They know that we can't compete in trade or economic aid, and therefore are trying to deprive us of our superpower status by blocking our use of military force.

We also agree that Reagan has really stuck it to you this year. Support for counterrevolutionary forces in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua is up. They hit Libya to our great embarrassment -- not that we give a fig for Qaddafi, but it really made us look bad with our Arab friends. Makes it look like our weapons are no good -- and if our weapons won't work, what do they need us for? They also kicked a lot of our people out of the UN Mission, sent Naval ships through our territorial waters near Sevastopol, and refused to sign the concluding document at the Bern Conference, even though all their European friends wanted it. And now we have the insulting interim restrait decision.

What is puzzling about these actions is not that they were taken (we have to expect this sort of thing from the Americans), but the way they were taken. A lot of trumpeting and fanfare, as if they really wanted to rub it in. After all, if they want to give the bandits in Afghanistan stingers, that's no more than what we would do if we were in their place, but why do they talk about it? They must realize that when they do this, it makes you look like you are knuckling under to them if you carry on with business as usual. Yuri, who spent several years bar hopping in Georgetown, says that sometimes these things happen by accident and that American officials are really pretty indiciplined, but the rest of us think that is absurd. Even two-kopek banana republics do better, and there is a consistent pattern here. (By the way, you might ask Chebrikov to run an audit on what Yuri really did with all that hard currency the KGB gave him for recruitment when he was in Washington; you've got to wonder what sort of trash he was buying drinks for -- that is, if he didn't spend it all on himself!)

In short, all of us except Yuri agree that Reagan has put the squeeze on you, not only privately -- which is understandable -- but publicly -- the reasons for which are harder to interpret. And this is the point on which we could not reach a consensus. Two broad theories emerged, which I will call A and B.

Theory A: Reagan has no intention of reaching any deals on important subjects. He wants you to come to the U.S. to give the appearance of negotiation to keep Congress and his Allies quiet, and to legitimize his aggressive policies toward us. His ultimate aim is to make it impossible for us to get the country moving again, and would not mind at all if Gromyko-style knuckleheads take over, since he calculates that this would doom us to stagnation or worse, and by the Year 2000 we couldn't even maintain a first-rate military establishment.

Theory B: Reagan might be prepared to reach deals if the price is right. Americans are a riddle and it is dangerous to read logic as we see it into their actions. His messages to you sound like he wants to deal, and he certainly came across as an honest, straightforward man at Geneva. He has to think about history too, and probably does not want to be seen by posterity as one who forced an arms race on the world. His anti-communism need not be a barrier -- Nixon was an anti-communist and we dealt with him -- and could even help him get treaties ratified. (Besides, we've got to admit that those bungling predecessors of yours didn't do much to make communism look good!)

A Strategy

Since we cannot be certain at this point which of the hypotheses about American intentions is correct, we must devise a strategy which takes both into account. Our recommendation is that it should have the following elements:

1. Although you need the meeting with Reagan, a firm commitment to a date is just about the only real lever we have left, so you

- 4 -

should not rush to agree to a date. It is unlikely he will make substantive concessions for a date, but holding off until, say, September may concentrate American minds a bit. Actually, since the meeting cannot take place until November because of the American elections, nothing is lost by waiting until September to lock us in. We must not forget that he also needs the meeting with you, and is most unlikely to take the blame for scuttling it.

2. Aside from the Washington summit, there is no way to find out which of the hypotheses about American intentions is correct without testing them. The Americans have made much of our failure to get particulars to the negotiating table. (They expect us to understand delays in their interagency process but never understand the problems we have here.) Anyway, things are beginning to jell a bit, and we should start putting some things down on the table. Our strategy should be to put in just enough in the way of concessions to see whether the Americans will answer with some of their own. Above all, we must not make the 1983 mistake and walk away from any negotiating tables.

3. We should keep up our public campaign on "peace" issues. This is selling pretty well, particularly in Europe, though we shouldn't expect it to persuade any important governments. (Even with the Chernobyl setback, we have to keep plugging, and maybe eventually we can even get some advantage out of the fear of everything nuclear that the Chernobyl incident unleashed.) Our peace propaganda will continue to be necessary as a hedge, in case Theory A is correct, and as an instrument of pressure if Theory B turns out to be correct. However, we must beware of raising expectations too high here, or else you will seem a failure even if you make some progress.

4. We have already made some progress in setting out an ideological framework which will give you more wiggle room. In developing the theme of "interdependence" we have a framework which will explain making some real concessions if they seem necessary, without really committing us to anything specific. Nevertheless, this will give you much more flexibility to deal than the old Gromyko formulas would have.

5. On nuclear testing, the generals are already howling that you have stopped testing too long. (Who could have predicted that Chernobyl would require us to extend the moratorium a few more months?) However, when we resume in August, we should be able to get 20-odd shots off in a few weeks, and that will put us back on schedule. On this one, we clearly miscalculated, since we thought it would at least force Reagan to talk about a CTB. We should consider letting our experts talk about the issue as he has suggested, since we still want to find a way to stop the x-ray laser research. And maybe if things move a little in START, he will give you a fig-leaf by agreeing to talk about a

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CTB at some point down the road. That wouldn't be worth much, but you could at least claim that the whole moratorium caper had brought a useful result.


6. Whenever we manage to knock enough heads to get a negotiable position on START, it will probably be time to ease off some of Gromyko's stupid positions on Star Wars. To be sure, it has been a useful propaganda ploy to cover our problems in getting our act together, but objectively speaking, it is not an immediate military problem, and Gromyko really put us in a box politically. The fact is that we need SDI as much as the Americans, and if we can play for time, the KGB should be able to steal the blueprints before Congress finishes debating whether to fund deployment or not. What we really must have is some face saving at this point. We've made so much of SDI, that you really are going to have to claim that you've gotten something from Reagan, or else there might be mutiny in the ranks here. Some of the fellows are toying with the idea of settling for a commitment not to break out of the ABM Treaty for a few years, and that might do the trick. Not that it really means anything, since the Americans will continue their research no matter what, but just might sell in a pinch, since most of our people really don't understand the first thing about SDI -- or any other military issue, for that matter.

* * * * * *

In sum, we are in a box. The Americans have us where they have wanted us for a long time, and seem to have learned quite a bit from the stupid mistakes dunderheads like Khrushchev and Brezhnev made. It was doubtless a mistake ever to think that they never would wake up and see what was going on. But the bottom line is that all this is coming to a head on your watch, and you don't have an easy out. You can't live without Reagan, and we can't be sure you can live with him. But we really don't see any alternative to giving it a try. One thing is sure: any way you cut it, the price we're going to have to pay for a little breathing space is steep. Your biggest problem may turn out to be how to keep the long knives out of your back in the process.

P.S.: That analysis you requested of specific issues will follow in a couple of days.

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Note concidenty 31 page 3 -AFilm

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: SOVIET OFFICIALS ON US SOVIET RELATIONS

<TEXT> 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: TWO AMERICAN ACADEMICS VISITING MOSCOW MAY 31 JUNE 7 UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE USA INSTITUTE BRIEFED US ON THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND GOVERMENT OFFICIALS REGARDING US SOVIET RELATIONS. AMONG THE COMMON THEMES: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IS BEING REASSESSED, WITH NEW EMPHASIS UPON THE "INTERRELATED" NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND GLOBAL PROBLEMS; THE OVERALL POLICY EMPHASIS WILL SHIFT FROM FOREIGN TO DOMESTIC CONCERNS; COMPETITION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR IS INEVITABLE BUT NEED NOT BE A NEGATIVE FHENOMENON. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

3. VIEWS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE FUNCTIONARY SHISHLIN: NIKOLAI SHISHLIN, WHO FREQUENTLY APPEARS ON SOVIET TELEVISION AS A FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMENTATOR, SAID HE NOW WORKED AT YAKOVLEV'S CC PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT. HE TOLD THE AMERICAN VISITORS THAT MOSCOW HAD LEARNED FIVE DIFFERENT FOREIGN POLICY LESSONS DURING 1986:

NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS (E.G., ON VERIFICATION, A ZERO ZERO INF OUTCOME) GOT NOWHERE, AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE MOSCOW COULD NOT EXPECT A "NEW ATTITUDE" ON THE PART OF U.S. LEADERS;

NOT EVERYTHING DEPENDS UPON US SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE USSR MAY HAVE DEVOTED TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THIS RELATIONSHIP. WHILE PRESIDENT REAGAN SEEMS DETERMINED TO "SPOIL" THE RELATIONSHIP, MOSCOW WILL NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW HIS EXAMPLE;

THE MILITARY EQUATION IS "RATHER STABLE." MILITARY SUPERIORITY CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BY EITHER SIDE, NOR CAN THE MILITARY BALANCE BE CHANGED BY SPECIFIC STEPS TAKEN BY EITHER SIDE;

THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD BE EVEN WORSE IF EITHER THE U.S. OR THE USSR DISAPPEARED. "WE NEED EACH OTHER." IT IS INCORRECT TO CLAIM THAT "IMPERIALISM" IS BAD AND "SOCIALISM" IS GOOD.

THE WORLD IS COMPLEX AND INTERDEPENDENT. THERE IS NO SINGLE SOLUTION, NO ONE PACKAGE THAT WILL SET THINGS RIGHT. INCREMENTAL STEPS ARE NEEDED. 4. REGARDING HIS POINT ABOUT THE MILITARY EQUATION SHISHLIN WAS ASKED WHETHER THE USSR HAD CONSIDERED "TURNING THE OTHER CHEEK" AND PURSUING A DEGREE OF UNILATERAL ARMS CONTROL. SHISHLIN CLAIMED MOSCOW WAS CLOSE TO SAYING THAT THE USSR POSSESSED ENOUGH MILITARY POWER. "SUFFICIENCY," HE SAID, WAS THE

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KEY TO UNDERSTANDING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. 5. CONCERNING THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS, SHISHLIN SAID THE SOVIET UNION INTENDED TO COMPETE ONLY PEACEFULLY. "OUR FRIENDS (IN THE THIRD WORLD) CAN GET CARRIED AWAY AND CAUSE TROUBLE; WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THEIR FEELINGS."

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6. MEETING WITH BESSEMERTNYKH. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKE TOLD HIS VISITORS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS RESHAPING ITS VIEWS ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. IT HAD SHIFTED FROM THE CONCEPT OF "EQUAL SECURITY (I.E., PARITY) TO "MUTUAL SECURITY," WHICH INVOLVED MORE THAN MILITARY HARDWARE. OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN US SOVIET RELATIONS REQUIRED RESOLUTION OF BASIC ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, ALTHOUGH INTERIM ARMS CONTROL MEASURES COULD HELP. BESSMERTNYKH REPEATED THE STANDARD LINE ON A SUMMIT: IT REOUIRED A SUITABLE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, WHICH MEANT RESTRAINT OF ALL KINDS, INCLUDING ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS; IT ALSO REQUIRED RESOLUTION OF ONE OR TWO CENTRAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. MEANWHILE, THERE COULD BE MOVEMENT ON BILATERAL ISSUES. THE SOVIET SIDE WELCOMED SECRETARY SHULTZ' POSITION THAT BILATERAL ISSUES WERE NOT

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<ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PSN: 012321 <.DTG> 101517Z JUN 86 <CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 MOS <PREC> 5 ROUTINE 'TO> UTS2081 7. TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5967 INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 09829 <SUBJ> SUBJECT: SOVIET OFFICIALS ON US SOVIET RELATIONS <TEXT> STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR CDE GENEVA FOR USCD TAGS: PREL, UR, US TIGHTLY LINKED TO THE STATE OF THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. BESSMERTNYKH COMMENTED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP SUFFERED FROM A LACK OF "INFORMAL CONVERSATION" AT SENIOR LEVELS. 7. VIEWS OF KAREN BRUTENTS. BRUTENTS, OF THE CC INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, SAID THAT WHILE PRESIDENT REAGAN SEEMED TO THINK THAT US SOVIET COMPETITION WAS UNIFORMLY NEGATIVE, THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT AGREE. COMPETITION BETWEEN US WAS NATURAL BUT NOT NECESSARILY BAD, HE SAID. IT COULD BE DANGEROUS IN THE THIRD WOLRLD, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS CENTRAL AMERICA AND LIBYA. THE SOVIET UNION, BRUTENTS ADDED, DID NOT ADVOCATE LIBYAN POLICY. JOINT STEPS AGAINST TERRORISM COULD BE CONSIDERED. IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON DEFINING TERRORISM. IN BRUTENTS' VIEW, THIS INVOLVED TWO ASPECTS: METHODS (E.G., KIDNAPPING, HIJACKING, ASSASSINATION), AND THE NATURE OF THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED. THE USSR COULD NOT AGREE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE PLO WAS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. 8. OTHER VIEWS: SPACE SCIENTIST SAGDEYEN' SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY AT GENEVA TO REVIVE THE US USSR SPACE AGREEMENT. HE CLAIMED THAT GENERAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE SOVIET SIDE, BUT AT GENEVA "GROMYKO'S PEOPLE" PREVENTED MOVEMENT BECAUSE THEY OPPOSED BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD (PRESUMABLY BECAUSE IT MIGHT UNDERCUT THE SOVIET POSITION ON SDI). REGARDING SDI, SAGDEYEN SAID JOINT LABORATORY WORK COULD BE A GOOD THING, ASSUMING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. GENERAL STARODUBOV OF THE GENERAL STAFF SAID THERE WAS NO POINT IN ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY. SDI COULD BE DEFENDED AGAINST IN A NUMBER OF COST EFFECTIVE WAYS (HE IMPLIED THAT INCREASED NUMBERS OF WARHEADS ON ICBM'S WOULD BE THE BEST WAY TO GO). CC INTERNATIONAL DEPT. DEPUTY CHIEF KORNIYENKO SAID THAT "INTERDEPENDENCE" HAD BEEN STRESSED IN I he would say so! GORBACHEV'S RECENT SPEECH AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WOULD BE A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. HE REPEATED THE STANDARD LINE (PROPER POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, RESOLUTION OF ONE OR TWO ARMS CONTROL ISSUES) ON THE NEXT SUMMIT. KORNIYENKO NOTED THAT THE USSE HAD LEARNED ITS LESSON AFTER ITS WALKOUT FROM THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD NOT REPEAT THAT TACTIC AGAIN. HARTMAN

Note page Z- 4 (Sums to outer (Sums to outer to today's START propriesal)

<ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PSN: 013010 <'DTG> 101438Z JUN 86 <CLAS> C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOS <PREC> 4 PRIORITY 6 TO> STU7553 8335 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5953 CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 09818 NODIS PREL, UR, US, PARM TAGS: <SUBJ> SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH'S COMMENTS TO THE AMBASSADOR ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS AND MFA PERSONNEL CHANGES <TEXT> 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT. SUMMARY IN A JUNE 6 DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR, 2. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE U.S. ATTACK ON LIBYA HAD CAUSED INTERNAL SOVIET CONSIDERATION OF NEW STEPS IN U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS TO "UNWIND BACKWARD." BESSMERTNYKH NONETHELESS ASSERTED THAT RECENT SOVIET PROPOSALS IN THE NST TALKS WERE SERIOUS AND MERITED CAREFUL AMERICAN CONSIDERATION. HE ADDED THAT MOSCOW KNEW THE U.S. COULD NOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS UNCRITICALLY, BUT THE SOVIETS WOULD WELCOME A SERIOUS RESPONSE. BESSMERTNYKH HAD NOTHING NEW ON SUMMIT DATES, SAID GORBACHEV WAS CONSIDERING A DRAFT REPLY ON A FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN EUROPE, AND PROVIDED SOME INTERESTING TIDBITS ON HIGH LEVEL MFA PERSO NEL CHANGES. END SUMMARY DURING A JUNE 9 MEETING ON OTHER SUBJECTS, 3. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN GAVE BESSMERTNYKH A BRIEF READOUT ON HIS WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS. AMBASSADOR UNDERSCORED THE FRUSTRATION IN WASHINGTON WITH OUR CURRENT INABILITY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN GENEVA OR TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE NEEDED TO PREPARE FOR A GORBACHEV TRIP TO THE U.S. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED BESSMERTNYKH FOR HIS VIEWS ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE. IN PARTICULAR, WE HAD NEVER RECEIVED A REPLY TO THE IDEAS PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ DURING DOBRYNIN'S APRIL VISIT AND WONDERED WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED THEM. SOVIET BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS: UNWINDING BACKWARD BESSMERTNYKH REPLIED THAT DOBRYNIN'S 4 CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN GOOD AND HAD APPEARED TO OPEN "MANY POSSIBILITIES." DOBRYNIN AND BESSMERTNYKH HAD BEEN PLANNING TO DISCUSS THESE POSSIBILITIES SERIOUSLY WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES IN MOSCOW, BUT, ACCORDING TO BESSMERTNYKH, THE U.S. ATTACK ON LIBYA HAD MADE IT "IMPOSSIBLE" TO PUSH THESE INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET DECISION MAKING PROCESS ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HAD BEGUN TO "UNWIND BACKWARD" AND THAT THESE BUREAUCRATIC CONSIDERATIONS REMAINED A "VERY IMPORTANT PART OF THE PICTURE." BESSMERTNYKH NONETHELESS SAID THAT THE PROPOSALS MADE TO DOBRYNIN WERE BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECLASSIFIED NLRR MD8-125/2 # 8335

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

AND THAT GORBACHEV WAS CONSIDERING A DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. SOVIET NST PROPOSALS: A "POSITIVE" STEP 5. TURNING TO ARMS CONTROL, BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE SOVIET NST DELEGATION HAD RECENTLY TABLED SOME NEW "ELEMENTS" WHICH MOSCOW HOPED WOULD MOVE THE TALKS FORWARD. (COMMENT: WE ASSUME THAT BESSMERTNYKH WAS REFERRING TO THE IDEAS TABLED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE SPACE GROUP DURING THE WEEK OF JUNE 2 4. END COMMENT) BESSMERTNYKH ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TRIED HARD TO DEVELOP IDEAS WHICH THEY THOUGHT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. HE ADDED THAT LEAKS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE UNFORTUNATE BUT THAT MOSCOW HOPED WASHINGTON WOULD STUDY THE IDEAS CAREFULLY. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT HE REALIZED THE PROPOSALS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED UNCRITICALLY BY THE U.S. THEY WERE AN EFFORT TO GET THE PROCESS MOVING, AND SERIOUS AMERICAN COUNTERPROPOSALS WOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. MFA PERSONNEL CHANGES: SORTING OUT CONTINUES

6. THE CORRIDOR LEADING TO BESSMERTNYKH'S

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<ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PSN: 012992 < DTG> 101438Z JUN 86 <CLAS> C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOS PREC> 4 PRIORITY TO> STU7557 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5954 CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 09818 <SUBJ> SUBJECT: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH'S <TEXT> NODIS TAGS: PREL, UR, US, PARM EIGHTH FLOOR CORNER OFFICE WAS REPLETE WITH FURNITURE MOVERS AND TELEPHONE INSTALLERS. WHEN THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT NEW DEPUTY MINISTERS WERE OBVIOUSLY STILL SETTLING IN, BESSMERTNYKH JOCULARLY AGREED AND VOLUNTEERED THAT PETROVSKIY WOULD SOON MOVE IN ACROSS THE HALL. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE DIVISION OF SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES WAS SIMILARLY UNSETTLED. THE GENERAL IDEA WAS TO GIVE EACH DEPUTY OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY FOR AT LEAST ONE MAJOR ISSUE OR GEOGRAPHIC REGION, AS WELL AS SEVERAL LESSER PROBLEMS. 7. WHILE INDICATING THAT MORE CHANGES COULD BE EXPECTED, BESSMERTNYKH PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PERSONALITIES: VORONTSOV WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON EUROPEAN GEOGRAPHIC AREAS AT THE LEVEL OF FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER: KOVALEV WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WESTERN EUROPE; BESSMERTNYKH HIMSELF WOULD HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE MINISTER ON U.S. AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS; KAPITSA AND IL'ICHEV WOULD STAY ON FOR "THE TIME BEING." HOWEVER, BESSMERTNYKH ALSO SAID THAT ADAMISHIN WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR AFRICA, THUS IMPLYING A SIGNIFICANT NARROWING OF IL'ICHEV'S BRIEF. PETROVSKIY WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MULTI LATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FOR "THE TIME BEING." BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR HOW KARPOV'S NEW ARMS CONTROL OFFICE WOULD INTERFACE WITH OTHER MFA OFFICES INTERESTED IN THAT ISSUE, AND HE INDICATED THAT THE NEW OFFICE ITSELF WAS STILL BEING ORGANIZED; NEAR EAST COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT CHIEF POLYAKOV WOULD NOT AT PRESENT BECOME A DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. (COMMENT: THE MOSCOW RUMOR MILL HAD BEEN PREDICTING POLYAKOV'S PROMOTION. WE HAVE HEARD FROM BOTH MFA AND ARAB DIPLOMATIC SOURCES THAT A REORGANIZATION WILL MOVE ALL ARAB COUNTRIES TO THE NEAR EAST COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT GIVING POLYAKOV ONE OF THE LARGEST AND MOST ACTIVE DEPARTMENTS IN THE MFA. END COMMENT) COMMENT 8. BESSMERTNYKH'S LINE ON THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. ATTACK ON LIBYA ON SOVIET INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS IS SELF SERVING, BUT NONETHELESS HAS A RING OF AUTHENTICITY. HE DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THE PESSIMISM OF OTHER SOVIETS, INCLUDING OFFICIALS OF HIS OWN USA DIVISION, ABOUT AN EARLY SHULTZ

SHEVARDNADZE MEETING. WHILE HE WAS NEGATIVE ABOUT THE U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINTS DECISION, BESSMERTNYKH INSTEAD EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SERIOUS U.S. RESPONSE TO RECENT SOVIET PROPOSALS AT GENEVA. HARTMAN

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<TIME> ORIG DTG: 101438Z JUN 86 CONFI WHCA TOR: 161/2155z PSN: 012992 VAX055 CMC TOR: 10 JUN 86 18:10 DB ADD: 10-JUN-86 18:13:30 < GE#>006814 <SECT> 02 < PSN> 012992 < SSN> 9818 <TOR> 860610181330

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NLRR M08-125/2#8336

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

June 11, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

THROUGH: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Should President Send Gorbachev Another Letter?

Rod has informed me that, in musing on his luncheon meeting with Suzanne Massie, the President indicating an interest in sending Gorbachev another letter or message. The purpose would be to give him some credit for the recently resolved family reunification cases and to propose that, if Gorbachev wishes to accept a summit date after the November elections, the President would accept and announce this publicly. This was, I understand, in the context of Suzanne's comments about the need for keeping private communication open.

Comment:

I agree wholeheartedly about the need to keep the President's private communication with Gorbachev alive and well -- and expand it if possible. However, I believe that now is not a good time for another letter, and feel in particular that it would be a mistake to press Gorbachev directly to agree to a summit date. Also, a further message about family reunification is not likely to have the effect desired. Let me explain why this is.

(1) Gorbachev now has five letters from the President which he has not answered (See list at TAB I). A couple of times (e.g., in the letter of April 2 which Dobrynin brought) he promised answers, but these have not been forthcoming. The President's most recent letter (May 23) was designed to smoke him out, and offered a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Europe, which has also not been answered. I believe it is much too soon to send another letter.

(2) In particular, pressing Gorbachev on a summit date could well backfire. This is because the Soviets strongly suspect that our strategy is to increase pressure on them across the board while lulling our public, Congress and the Allies with empty talks. (I am not saying that they are justified in believing this, but I believe they do genuinely suspect it.) Therefore, if the

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY Declassify: OADR President pushes to announce a date, this will only confirm such suspicions. It certainly will not help Gorbachev with whatever internal problem he may have (and I believe he does have internal problems).

(3) Praising Gorbachev for allowing some of the divided families to be reunited could also backfire. First, because Gorbachev will not want to acknowledge that this was done to please the U.S. Second, because it could lead to the impression that they have done enough in this area and need not move on emigration (which is abysmally low, and has gotten worse since Geneva).

Finally, I just learned that Sokolov told Palmer or Ridgway at lunch today that a letter in reply to the President's recent letters is now "on Gorbachev's desk." Sokolov expects Dubinin to bring it with him when he returns to Washington at the end of next week.

For these reasons, I believe it would be ill-advised to send another letter right at this time. We should wait a week or so to see if Gorbachev in fact answers the President, and also to assess the latest Soviet moves at Geneva. However -- even if Dubinin does not bring a letter back -- when we have the substantive portion of the President's address ready, it might not hurt to send a letter in advance explaining what is in it, why it is there, and (perhaps) addressing the SALT-II question in a conciliatory way (desire for restraint and for reductions, etc.).

Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, the President might want to consider sending a message with an emissary who would go to Moscow quietly and try to get some real feed-back. (This would require assurance in advance that the emissary could see Dobrynin, at least.) A cable from Moscow today reports that Bessmertnykh commented to visiting American academics that our relationship "suffered from a lack of 'informal conversation' at senior levels (see cable at Tab III), so such a move might be welcomed.

My gut feeling is that what Gorbachev feels he needs most at the moment is some <u>public</u> indication that the President will move on some of the issues important to him. Completely private messages do not help that much -- unless they indicate more "give" on our part than we should grant. However, a private discussion with feedback from an authoritative interlocutor might clarify some things which we could safely do, if we only knew.

Attached are three papers which amplify points above: Tab I lists the President's letters which Gorbachev has not yet answered. Tab II provides a sample of the sort of analysis which Soviet officials may be making of the present situation. The Moscow cable mentioned is at Tab III.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you discuss the matter with the President and encourage him not to send another letter immediately but to consider trying the "emissary" approach -- perhaps with a letter outlining any new ideas that would be incorporated in a speech.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

- Attachments:
- Tab I -- List of unanswered letters
- Tab II -- Soviet "Worst Case" Analysis
- Tab III -- Moscow telegram of June 10, 1986

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UNANSWERED LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Feb. 16: Long handwritten letter (suggestions re SDI)

Feb. 22: Reply to Gorbachev's Jan. 14 letter with new arms control proposal. (suggestions re INF)

March 14: Proposal re Corrtex and nuclear testing

April 11: Letter carried by Dobrynin; said President waiting for answers to earlier letters

May 23: Letter proposing Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Europe.

NOTE: The proposals tabled in Geneva today may possibly be considered an indirect reply the letter of February 22.

Regarding human rights cases: The President sent a letter December 7 via Secretary Baldrige, with lists of people. Gorbachev answered on January 11, saying that divided families would be considered, but that issue not connected with trade.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

OP SECRET/EYES ONLY GENERAL SECRETARY

June 9, 1986

: MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

FROM: ANATOLY CHERNYAYEV

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy and Our Dilemma

You asked me to convene a small group to discuss prospects for dealing with the United States for the remainder of the Reagan term, with particular reference to our options in managing your commitment to meet with Reagan in the United States this year. I can assure you that we conducted our work with the utmost discretion. By meeting here at the Central Committee we stayed out of the way of Chebrikov's KGB snoops, and we never met before 6:00 because we know that by then all of Dobrynin's crew would be long gone. (As you know, they clear out right after 5:00 so they can get soused at Igor's before going home. I know you've been thinking of cracking down on this, but I would suggest you wait a while because it's useful to have them out of the way at times.) And, by the way, we also didn't forget the building guards. We picked three of the most luscious secretaries in the Central Committee and had them come up and sit in the outer office. That way they could not only keep watch on the door, but when we all left around midnight, the guards naturally assumed that we had hung around for fun and games and thus will not go around gossiping about folks working late on some secret project. (Bear this in mind if some snitch tells you we were playing around.)

Anyway, we hammered out a consensus on most issues. I'll summarize them, and note the areas where there was some disagreement.

Background: The Situation

For six years now, the correlation of forces has been shifting against us. The Brezhnev crowd was guilty of the most egregious error of judgment in the 1970's. They let our economy stagnate and fall even farther behind our enemies in a technological sense. At the same time, they threw down the gauntlet and started pushing our weight around. That would have been fine if the United States had continued to decline and if we had had a fully developed socialist base at home. But neither of these conditions were fulfilled, and Brezhnev's failure to understand this was truly a case of an "infantile disease of leftism," to use Lenin's trenchant phrase. The old boys just never understood Lenin's teaching to calculate the correlation of forces accurately before acting. Their policy was clearly premature. We should not have taken on the U.S. until we were certain we had a firm base of strength at home. As it is, we just galvanized the

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Americans to revive their strength -- and this happened just when we started paying the price of Brezhnev's cronyism and "do nothing and it may go away" policies.

As you have said many times to us in private, you really inherited a mess! We've been in now for over a year, and have found out just how bad it is. That would be true even if Ronald Reagan did not exist, but he does, and that makes matters even worse. For a while our pollyannas thought he would overreach himself and stumble. Those foolish enough to pay attention to the idiots in the left-wing press clung to the thought that he couldn't get his programs through. (Lenin said we should make use of useful idiots, not listen to them!) But what do we see: the lucky so-and-so wins every one of the important ones regardless of what we do to encourage opposition to him, and he's riding a wave of popularity that Franklin Roosevelt would envy. Anybody who predicts that we can outflank him in Congress must have a half liter of vodka in his belly.

One more factor I need not mention, but since you charged us with looking clinically at all factors, I will for the sake of completeness. That is, our problems in getting control of the <u>nomenklatura</u> here. The old guys are putting up a lot more fight that we expected. The Party Congress came before you got your ducks in a row, and we still have to put up with empty heads like Kunayev and blockheads like Shcherbitsky (maybe you can use Chernobyl to take care of that one!), not to speak of stonehead Gromyko and his constant grousing. We simply cannot forget that a lot of long knives are out and if you change things too fast they might be used. The very fact that this is the crowd that led us into this mess means that they will fight anything that reflects on their stewardship, and will not shy away from accusing you of treason to the cause if you seem to be retreating from the morass they stumbled into.

The Dilemma

This means we have a real dilemma. If we have any chance to get things on the right track at home, we've got to get the Americans off our backs. But they are just not buying soft soap any more. This time, we're going to have to pay. If we had gotten our people in all the key positions, we could pull it off by explaining very quietly that we have to take a step back so we can take two or three forward in 15 or 20 years. But your opponents here won't buy that without a fight. After all, if they admit they were wrong, they will be signing their own political death certificates.

Arbatov keeps advising you just to wait out Reagan. Come January, 1989, he won't be there to kick us around any more. Of course, that's what Arbatov always advises: just wait them out. That's what he said in 1976 (you were still in Stavropol then, but I was in the CC apparat and remember it well): don't make a deal with Ford, he said, the next guy may be easier. And what did we get? Carter. Couldn't get a treaty out of the Senate even it it was to ratify a gift of Kamchatka. So old Georgy says, "Don't worry, I see Nixon II just over the 1980 horizon. And what do we get? Ronald Reagan. Frankly, this waiting game is for the birds. If his successor is easier for us to deal with, he won't be able to deliver. And anyway, it would take him a couple of years to organize his Administration, so we are not talking about two and a half years, we are talking five at least.

- 3 -

You are a better judge than I as to whether we have five years to play with. But I doubt it. If we don't get things moving before then, you may go down in our history as Khrushchev II. Managing a <u>sovkhoz</u> in the Urals is not the way I believe you want to pass your golden years, but the thought does concentrate the mind.

Actually, there is one strong argument in favor of dealing with Reagan, even if we could afford to wait for his successor. And that is: if we make a deal, he can deliver. The question our group addressed most intensively, therefore, is can we deal with Reagan, or is it futile to try?

American Objectives

All in our group agree that the Americans understand our problems pretty well, and are out to exploit them to their advantage. They are feeling their oats and are pressing us everywhere. They finally seem to understand the importance of ideology and are fighting back just when our own people and much of the world is turned off on ours. They clearly want to gain military superiority if they can. They know that we can't compete in trade or economic aid, and therefore are trying to deprive us of our superpower status by blocking our use of military force.

We also agree that Reagan has really stuck it to you this year. Support for counterrevolutionary forces in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua is up. They hit Libya to our great embarrassment -- not that we give a fig for Qaddafi, but it really made us look bad with our Arab friends. Makes it look like our weapons are no good -- and if our weapons won't work, what do they need us for? They also kicked a lot of our people out of the UN Mission, sent Naval ships through our territorial waters near Sevastopol, and refused to sign the concluding document at the Bern Conference, even though all their European friends wanted it. And now we have the insulting interim restrait decision.

What is puzzling about these actions is not that they were taken (we have to expect this sort of thing from the Americans), but the way they were taken. A lot of trumpeting and fanfare, as if they really wanted to rub it in. After all, if they want to give the bandits in Afghanistan stingers, that's no more than what we would do if we were in their place, but why do they talk about it? They must realize that when they do this, it makes you look like you are knuckling under to them if you carry on with business as usual. Yuri, who spent several years bar hopping in Georgetown, says that sometimes these things happen by accident and that American officials are really pretty indiciplined, but the rest of us think that is absurd. Even two-kopek banana republics do better, and there is a consistent pattern here. (By the way, you might ask Chebrikov to run an audit on what Yuri really did with all that hard currency the KGB gave him for recruitment when he was in Washington; you've got to wonder what sort of trash he was buying drinks for -- that is, if he didn't spend it all on himself!)

In short, all of us except Yuri agree that Reagan has put the squeeze on you, not only privately -- which is understandable -- but publicly -- the reasons for which are harder to interpret. And this is the point on which we could not reach a consensus. Two broad theories emerged, which I will call A and B.

Theory A: Reagan has no intention of reaching any deals on important subjects. He wants you to come to the U.S. to give the appearance of negotiation to keep Congress and his Allies quiet, and to legitimize his aggressive policies toward us. His ultimate aim is to make it impossible for us to get the country moving again, and would not mind at all if Gromyko-style knuckleheads take over, since he calculates that this would doom us to stagnation or worse, and by the Year 2000 we couldn't even maintain a first-rate military establishment.

Theory B: Reagan might be prepared to reach deals if the price is right. Americans are a riddle and it is dangerous to read logic as we see it into their actions. His messages to you sound like he wants to deal, and he certainly came across as an honest, straightforward man at Geneva. He has to think about history too, and probably does not want to be seen by posterity as one who forced an arms race on the world. His anti-communism need not be a barrier -- Nixon was an anti-communist and we dealt with him -- and could even help him get treaties ratified. (Besides, we've got to admit that those bungling predecessors of yours didn't do much to make communism look good!)

A Strategy

Since we cannot be certain at this point which of the hypotheses about American intentions is correct, we must devise a strategy which takes both into account. Our recommendation is that it should have the following elements:

1. Although you need the meeting with Reagan, a firm commitment to a date is just about the only real lever we have left, so you should not rush to agree to a date. It is unlikely he will make substantive concessions for a date, but holding off until, say, September may concentrate American minds a bit. Actually, since the meeting cannot take place until November because of the American elections, nothing is lost by waiting until September to lock us in. We must not forget that he also needs the meeting with you, and is most unlikely to take the blame for scuttling it.

2. Aside from the Washington summit, there is no way to find out which of the hypotheses about American intentions is correct without testing them. The Americans have made much of our failure to get particulars to the negotiating table. (They expect us to understand delays in their interagency process but never understand the problems we have here.) Anyway, things are beginning to jell a bit, and we should start putting some things down on the table. Our strategy should be to put in just enough in the way of concessions to see whether the Americans will answer with some of their own. Above all, we must not make the 1983 mistake and walk away from any negotiating tables.

3. We should keep up our public campaign on "peace" issues. This is selling pretty well, particularly in Europe, though we shouldn't expect it to persuade any important governments. (Even with the Chernobyl setback, we have to keep plugging, and maybe eventually we can even get some advantage out of the fear of everything nuclear that the Chernobyl incident unleashed.) Our peace propaganda will continue to be necessary as a hedge, in case Theory A is correct, and as an instrument of pressure if Theory B turns out to be correct. However, we must beware of raising expectations too high here, or else you will seem a failure even if you make some progress.

4. We have already made some progress in setting out an ideological framework which will give you more wiggle room. In developing the theme of "interdependence" we have a framework which will explain making some real concessions if they seem necessary, without really committing us to anything specific. Nevertheless, this will give you much more flexibility to deal than the old Gromyko formulas would have.

5. On nuclear testing, the generals are already howling that you have stopped testing too long. (Who could have predicted that Chernobyl would require us to extend the moratorium a few more months?) However, when we resume in August, we should be able to get 20-odd shots off in a few weeks, and that will put us back on schedule. On this one, we clearly miscalculated, since we thought it would at least force Reagan to talk about a CTB. We should consider letting our experts talk about the issue as he has suggested, since we still want to find a way to stop the x-ray laser research. And maybe if things move a little in START, he will give you a fig-leaf by agreeing to talk about a

CTB at some point down the road. That wouldn't be worth much, but you could at least claim that the whole moratorium caper had brought a useful result.

6. Whenever we manage to knock enough heads to get a negotiable position on START, it will probably be time to ease off some of Gromyko's stupid positions on Star Wars. To be sure, it has been a useful propaganda ploy to cover our problems in getting our act together, but objectively speaking, it is not an immediate military problem, and Gromyko really put us in a box politically. The fact is that we need SDI as much as the Americans, and if we can play for time, the KGB should be able to steal the blueprints before Congress finishes debating whether to fund deployment or not. What we really must have is some face saving at this point. We've made so much of SDI, that you really are going to have to claim that you've gotten something from Reagan, or else there might be mutiny in the ranks here. Some of the fellows are toying with the idea of settling for a commitment not to break out of the ABM Treaty for a few years, and that might do the trick. Not that it really means anything, since the Americans will continue their research no matter what, but just might sell in a pinch, since most of our people really don't understand the first thing about SDI -- or any other military issue, for that matter.

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In sum, we are in a box. The Americans have us where they have wanted us for a long time, and seem to have learned quite a bit from the stupid mistakes dunderheads like Khrushchev and Brezhnev made. It was doubtless a mistake ever to think that they never would wake up and see what was going on. But the bottom line is that all this is coming to a head on your watch, and you don't have an easy out. You can't live without Reagan, and we can't be sure you can live with him. But we really don't see any alternative to giving it a try. One thing is sure: any way you cut it, the price we're going to have to pay for a little breathing space is steep. Your biggest problem may turn out to be how to keep the long knives out of your back in the process.

P.S.: That analysis you requested of specific issues will follow in a couple of days.