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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/15/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1986 (4/6)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 16

YARHI-MILO

1611

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8344	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MATLOCK MEMO <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	6/16/1986	B1
8345	MEMO	CHERNYAYEV TO GORBACHEV RE U.S. POLICY AND OUR DILEMMA <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	6	ND	B1
8350	CABLE	190821Z JUN 86 <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	4	6/19/1986	B1
8351	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET MESSAGE TO SEN. KENNEDY PRESIDENT PLAYING POLITICS, BUT SUMMIT IS ON <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	5	6/20/1986	B1
8346	MEMO	LINHARD TO MATLOCK, RODMAN, AND SESTANOVICH RE PAPER <i>R 10/8/2010 M125/2</i>	1	ND	B1
8347	MEMO	GUIDANCE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY <i>R 10/8/2010 M125/2</i>	13	6/21/1986	B1
8352	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	6/20/1986	B1
8353	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8352 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8354	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8355	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8356	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8348	MEMO	LINHARD/KRAEMER/MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SAMPLE LETTER TO GORBACHEV & TOR FOR ACSG WORK <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	1	6/20/1986	B1
8349	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE GUIDANCE FOR THE ARMS CONTROL SUPPORT GROUP <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	1	ND	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/16/86 1

Eyes Only

Jack Matlock

PRESERVATION COPY

Eyes Only

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/21/02

~~✓ EYES ONLY~~ ✓

Jack Matlock,
The President was
really pleased with
this. He will anxiously
be awaiting the next
edition. J

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

oss 6/21/02

3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President,

6/16/86

This is a translation of a
fictitious memo by Jack
Matlock that represents his
best analysis as to what
is going on in the minds
of the Kremlin leaders. This
style of paper makes very
interesting reading. I
agree with Jack's analysis.

John
Tell Jack - Thanks. Can
I have a copy of this for my
own pleasure? RR

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NLRR M08-125/E # 8344

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

8345

4

NLRR MD8-125/2 # 8345

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО
ТОЛЬКО ДЛЯ ГЛАЗ ГЕНСЕКА

9. ИЮНЯ 1986 г.

TO: MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV
FROM: YURI CHERNYAYEV
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy and Our Dilemma

You asked me to convene a small group to discuss prospects for dealing with the United States for the remainder of the Reagan term, with particular reference to our options in managing your commitment to meet with Reagan in the United States this year. I can assure you that we conducted our work with the utmost discretion. By meeting here at the Central Committee we stayed out of the way of Chebrikov's KGB snoops, and we never met before 6:00 because we know that by then all of Dobrynin's crew would be long gone. (As you know, they clear out right after 5:00 so they can get soused at Igor's before going home. I know you've been thinking of cracking down on this, but I would suggest you wait a while because it's useful to have them out of the way at times.) And, by the way, we also didn't forget the building guards. We picked the three most lucious secretaries in the Central Committee and had them come up and sit in the outer office. That way they could not only keep watch on the door, but when we all walzed out around midnight, the guards naturally assumed that we had hung around for fun and games and thus will not go around gossiping about folks working late on some secret project. (Bear this in mind if some snitch tells you we were playing around.)

Anyway, we hammered out a consensus on most issues. I'll summarize them, and note the areas where there was some disagreement.

Background: The Situation

For six years now, the correlation of forces has been shifting against us. The Brezhnev crowd was guilty of the most egregious error of judgment in the 1970's. They let our economy stagnate and fall even farther behind our enemies in a technological sense. At the same time, they threw down the gauntlet and started pushing our weight around. That would have been fine if the United States had continued to decline and if we had had a fully developed socialist base at home. But neither of these conditions were fulfilled, and Brezhnev's failure to understand this was truly a case of an "infantile disease of leftism," to use Lenin's trenchant phrase. The old boys just never understood Lenin's teaching to calculate the correlation forces accurately before acting. Their policy was clearly premature. We should not have taken on the U.S. until we were certain we had a firm base of strength at home. As it is, we just galvanized the Americans to revive their strength — and this happened just when we started paying the price of Brezhnev's

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cronyism and "do nothing and it may go away" policies.

As you have said many times to us in private, you really inherited a mess! We've been in now for over a year, and have found out just how bad it is. That would be true even if Ronald Reagan did not exist, but he does, and that makes matters even worse. For a while our pollyannas thought he would overreach himself and stumble. And those foolish enough to pay attention to the idiots in the left-wing press in the West clung to the thought that he couldn't get his programs through. (Lenin said we should exploit useful idiots, not listen to them!) But what do we see: the lucky so-and-so wins every one of the important ones regardless of what we do to encourage opposition to him, and he's riding a wave of popularity that Franklin Roosevelt would envy. Anybody who predicts that we can outflank him in Congress has a half liter of vodka in his belly.

One more factor I need not mention, but since you charged us with looking clinically at *all* factors, I will for the sake of completeness. That is, our problems in getting control of the *nomenklatura* here. The old guys are putting up a lot more fight than we expected. The Party Congress came before you got your ducks in a row, and we still have to put up with empty heads like Kunayev and blockheads like Shcherbitsky (maybe you can use Chernobyl to take care of that one!), not to speak of stonehead Gromyko and his constant grouching. We simply cannot forget that a lot of long knives are out and if you change things too fast they might be used. The very fact that this is the crowd that led us into this mess means that they will fight anything that reflects on their stewardship, and will not shy away from accusing you of treason to the cause if you seem to be retreating from the morass they stumbled into.

The Dilemma

This means we have a real dilemma. If we have any chance to get things on the right track at home, we've got to get the Americans off our backs. But they are just not buying soft soap any more. This time, we're going to have to pay. If we had gotten our people in all the key positions, we could pull it off by explaining very quietly that we have to take a step back so we can take two or three forward in 15 or 20 years. But your opponents here won't buy that. After all, if they admit they were wrong, they will be signing their own political death certificates.

Arbatov keeps advising you to just wait out Reagan. Come January, 1989, he won't be there to kick us around any more. Of course, that's what Arbatov always advises: just wait them out. That's what he said in 1976 (you were still in Stavropol then, but I was in the CC *apparat* and remember it well): don't make a deal with Ford, he said, the next guy may be easier. And what did we get? Carter. Couldn't get a treaty out of the Senate even if it was to ratify a gift of Kamchatka. So old Georgy says, "Don't worry, I see Nixon II just over the 1980 horizon." And what do we get? Ronald Reagan. Frankly, this waiting game is for the birds. If his successor is easier for us to deal with, he won't be able to deliver. And

anyway, it will take him a couple of years to organize his Administration, so we are not talking about two and a half years, we are talking five at least.

You are a better judge than I as to whether we have five years to play with. But I doubt it. If we don't get things moving before then, you may go down in our history as Khrushchev II. Managing a *sovkhos* in the Urals is not the way I believe you want to pass your golden years, but the thought does concentrate the mind.

Actually, there is one strong argument in favor of dealing with Reagan, even if we could afford to wait for his successor. And that is: if we make a deal, he can deliver. The question our group addressed most intensively, therefore, is can we deal with Reagan, or is it futile to try?

American Objectives

All in our group agree that the Americans understand our problems pretty well, and are out to exploit them to their advantage. They are feeling their oats and are pressing us everywhere. They finally seem to understand the importance of ideology and are fighting back just when most of the world is turned off on ours. They clearly want to gain military superiority if they can. They know that we can't compete in trade or economic aid, and therefore are trying to deprive us of our superpower status by blocking our use of military force.

We also agree that Reagan has really stuck it to you this year. Support for counterrevolutionary forces in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua is up. They hit Libya to our great embarrassment — not that we give a fig for Qaddafi, but it really made us look bad with our Arab friends. Makes it look like our weapons are no good — and if our weapons won't work, what do they need us for? They also kicked a lot of our people out of the UN Mission, sent Naval ships through our territorial waters near Sevastopol, and refused to sign the concluding document at the Bern Conference, even though all their European friends wanted it. And now we have the insulting interim restraint decision.

What is puzzling about these actions is not that they were taken (we have to expect this sort of thing from the Americans), but the way they were taken. A lot of trumpeting and fanfare, as if they really wanted to rub it in. After all, if they want to give the bandits in Afghanistan stingers, that's no more than what we would do if we were in their place, but why do they talk about it? They must realize that when they do this, it makes you look like you are knuckling under to them if you carry on with business as usual. Yuri, who spent several years bar hopping in Georgetown, says that sometimes these things happen by accident and that American officials are really pretty indisciplined, but the rest of us think that is absurd. Even two-kopek banana republics do better, and besides, there is a consistent pattern here. (By the way, you might ask Chebrikov to run an audit on what Yuri really did with all that hard currency the KGB gave him for recruitment when he was in Washington; you've got to wonder what sort of

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trash he was buying drinks for — that is, if he didn't spend it all on himself!)

In short, all of us except Yuri agree that Reagan has put the squeeze on you, not only privately — which is understandable — but publicly — the reasons for which are harder to interpret. And this is the point on which we could not reach a consensus. Two broad theories emerged, which I will call A and B.

Theory A: Reagan has no intention of reaching any deals on important subjects. He wants you to come to the U.S. to give the appearance of negotiation to keep Congress and his Allies quiet, and to legitimize his aggressive policies toward us. His ultimate aim is to make it impossible for us to get the country moving again, and would not mind at all if Gromyko-style knuckleheads take over, since he calculates that this would doom us to stagnation or worse, and by the Year 2000 we couldn't even maintain a first-rate military establishment.

Theory B: Reagan might be prepared to reach deals if the price is right. Americans are a riddle and it is dangerous to read logic as we see it into their actions. His messages to you sound like he wants to deal, and he certainly came across as an honest, straightforward man at Geneva. He has to think about history too, and probably does not want to be seen by posterity as one who forced an arms race on the world. His anti-communism need not be a barrier — Nixon was an anti-communist and we dealt with him — and could even help him get treaties ratified. (Besides, we've got to admit that those bungling predecessors of yours didn't do much to make communism look good!)

A Strategy

Since we cannot be certain at this point which of the hypotheses about American intentions is correct, we must devise a strategy which takes both into account. Our recommendation is that it should have the following elements:

1. Although you need the meeting with Reagan, a firm commitment to a date is just about the only real lever we have left, so you should not rush to agree to a date. It is unlikely he will make substantive concessions for a date, but holding off until, say, September may concentrate American minds a bit. Actually, since the meeting cannot take place until November because of the American elections, nothing is lost by waiting until September to lock us in. We must not forget that he also needs the meeting with you, and is most unlikely to take the blame for scuttling it.

2. There is no way to find out which of the hypotheses about American intentions is correct without testing them. The Americans have made much of our failure to get particulars to the negotiating table. (They expect us to understand delays in their interagency process but never understand the problems we have here.) Anyway, things are beginning to jell a bit, and we

should start putting some things down on the table. Our strategy should be to put in just enough in the way of concessions to see whether the Americans will answer with some of their own. Above all, we must not make the 1983 mistake and walk away from any negotiating tables.

3. We should keep up our public campaign on "peace" issues. This has been selling pretty well, particularly to naive publics in Europe, though we shouldn't expect it to persuade anybody intelligent enough to run a government. Even with the Chernobyl setback, we have to keep plugging, and maybe eventually we can even get some advantage out of the fear of everything nuclear that the Chernobyl incident unleashed. Our peace propaganda will continue to be necessary as a hedge, in case Theory A is correct, and as an instrument of pressure if Theory B turns out to be correct. However, we must beware of raising expectations too high here, or else you will seem a failure even if you make some progress.

4. We have already made some progress in setting out an ideological framework which will give you more wiggle room. In developing the theme of "interdependence" we have a framework which will explain making some real concessions if they seem necessary, without really committing us to anything specific. Nevertheless, this will give you much more flexibility to deal than the old Gromyko formulas would have.

5. On nuclear testing, the marshalls are already howling that you have stopped testing too long. (Who could have predicted that Chernobyl would require us to extend the moratorium a few more months?) However, when we resume in August, we should be able to get 20-odd shots off in a few weeks, and that will put us back on schedule. On this one, we clearly miscalculated, since we thought it would at least force Reagan to talk about a CTB. We should consider letting our experts talk about the issue as he has suggested, since we still want to find a way to stop the X-ray laser research. And maybe if things move a little in START, he will give you a fig leaf by agreeing to talk about a CTB at some point down the road. That wouldn't be worth much, but you could at least claim that the whole moratorium caper had brought a useful result.

6. Whenever we manage to knock enough heads to get a negotiable position on START, it will probably be time to ease off some of Gromyko's stupid positions on Star Wars. To be sure, they have been a useful propaganda ploy to cover our problems in getting our act together, but objectively speaking, it is not an immediate military problem, and Gromyko really put us in a box politically. The fact is that we need SDI as much as the Americans, and if we can play for time, the KGB should be able to steal the blueprints before Congress finishes debating whether to fund deployment or not. What we really must have is some face saving at this point. We've made so much of SDI, that you really are going to have to claim that you've gotten something from Reagan, or else there might be mutiny in the ranks here. Some of the fellows are toying with the idea of settling for a commitment not to break out of the ABM Treaty for a few years, and that might do the trick. Not that it really means anything, since the Americans will continue their research no matter what, but just might sell in a pinch,

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since most of our people really don't understand the first thing about SDI — or any other military issue, for that matter.

* * * * *

In sum, we are in a box. The Americans have us where they have wanted us for a long time, and seem to have learned quite a bit from the stupid mistakes dunderheads like Khrushchev and Brezhnev made. It was doubtless a mistake ever to think that they never would wake up and see what was going on. But the bottom line is that all this is coming to a head on your watch, and you don't have an easy out. You can't live without Reagan, and we can't be sure you can live with him. But we really don't see any alternative to giving it a try. One thing is sure: any way you cut it, the price we're going to have to pay for a little breathing space is steep. Your biggest problem may turn out to be how to keep the long knives out of your back in the process.

P.S.: That analysis you requested of specific issues will follow in a couple of days.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Eyes Only
June, 1986

MATLOCK

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/21/02

TG> 190821Z JUN 86
PSN: 033736

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6381

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STADIS////////////////////////////////////

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: KGB OFFICIAL STRESSES MOSCOW ANXIOUS

<TEXT> FOR HIGH LEVEL REENGAGEMENT

REF: MOSCOW 10282

1. S ENTIRE TEXT

SUMMARY

2. ON JUNE 17 A PROBABLE KGB OFFICER TANKRED GOLENPOL'SKIY CALLED TO OUR ATTENTION GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS ON A SUMMIT AND "MILITARY MATTERS" IN HIS JUNE 16 PLENUM SPEECH AND ARGUED THAT THEY REPRESENTED A SOFTENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION. CITING CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC) SECRETARY YAKOVLEV, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS ANXIOUS TO REENGAGE THE U.S. LEADERSHIP, EXPRESSED STRONG SOVIET INTEREST IN A SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IMMEDIATELY AFTER "SEPTEMBER 15," SAID A SUMMIT WAS POSSIBLE AFTER "NOVEMBER 30" AND OUTLINED OTHER POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR HIGH LEVEL REENGAGEMENT THIS YEAR. WHILE GOLENPOL'SKIY'S COMMENTS ON TIMING FOR THE SUMMIT AND A SHULTZ SHEVARDNADZE MEETING WERE UNEXCEPTIONAL, HE FLOATED SOME IDEAS FOR INTERMEDIATE STEPS THAT WE HAD NOT HEARD FROM SOVIET SOURCES. THESE INCLUDED POSSIBLE MOSCOW VISITS BY POINDEXTER OR MATLOCK. FOLLOWING IMMEDIATELY ON GORBACHEV'S PLENUM COMMENTS, GOLENPOL'SKIY'S PRIVATE APPROACH MAY SIGNAL QUICKENING SOVIET INTEREST IN RENEWED HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE AND/OR A DESIRE BY YAKOVLEV TO PLAY A ROLE. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND

3. LATE IN THE WORKING DAY, JUNE 17, STATE COMMITTEE FOR PUBLISHING HOUSES, PRINTING PLANTS AND THE BOOK TRADE (GOSKOMIZDAT) OFFICIAL TANKRED GOLENPOL'SKIY WHOM WE BELIEVE TO BE A KGB OFFICER TELEPHONED THE EMBASSY AND INVITED A POLOFF TO MEET FOR A DRINK THAT EVENING. THE TWO MET IN THE BAR OF THE MFA'S PRESS CENTER AND CONVERSED FOR SOME TWO HOURS.

THE MESSAGE: SOVIET CONDITIONS FOR A SUMMIT ARE SOFTER

4. GOLENPOL'SKIY NOTED AT THE OUTSET THAT HE HAD SEEN CC SECRETARY AND PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT CHIEF YAKOVLEV AND "NEW TIMES" COMMENTATOR AND CC PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SHISHLIN THAT DAY. HE POINTEDLY COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED THAT THE EMBASSY HAD READ CAREFULLY GORBACHEV'S PLENUM REMARKS ABOUT THE SUMMIT AND "MILITARY

Note: Golenpolsky has a history of passing KGB "messages." He, along with a KGB officer named Sytnikov, pushed the idea of a "private channel" with me in '81. Haig toyed with it - I discovered later that he never informed the White House! - but it did not materialize -

Jack

< Could be the main factor here!

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NLRR M08-125/2 #8350

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

12
AFFAIRS." THE EMBASSY SHOULD RECOGNIZE
THAT THEY REPRESENTED BOTH A SOFTENING OF
THE SOVIET POSITION AND AN EARNEST OF GENUINE
KREMLIN INTEREST IN REENGAGING AT A "HIGH LEVEL."
GOLENPOL'SKIY NOTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "MAY 20
LETTER" CALLING FOR A SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE
MEETING TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A SUMMIT LATER
THIS YEAR. HE SAID MOSCOW NOW SAW THE WAY
CLEAR FOR A FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING SHORTLY
AFTER "SEPTEMBER 15." IF SHULTZ AND
SHEVARDNADZE MET THEN, THERE WOULD BE PLENTY
OF TIME TO PREPARE FOR A SUMMIT AFTER
"NOVEMBER 30." IN BRIEF, GOLENPOL'SKIY
SPOKE IN POSITIVE TERMS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS
FOR A SUMMIT THIS YEAR.

OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACT

5. GOLENPOL'SKIY INDICATED THAT MOSCOW WOULD
WELCOME SERIOUS BUT QUIET REENGAGEMENT AT
OTHER, BUT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVELS AND
HE OUTLINED POSSIBLE SCENARIOS. IN DOING SO,
HE ADVISED THAT HE WAS NOT SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF
BUT ON INSTRUCTIONS:

THE SECRETARY WAS WELCOME TO COME TO MOSCOW
TO MEET WITH SHEVARDNADZE "AT ANY TIME."

PRIVATE, SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS COULD OCCUR ON

<TIME>

ORIG DTG: 190821Z JUN 86

WHCA TOR: 170/1732Z

PSN: 033736 SECRE VAX773

CMC TOR: 19 JUN 86 17:11

DB ADD: 19-JUN-86 17:17:36

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6382

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 10433

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: KGB OFFICIAL STRESSES MOSCOW ANXIOUS

<TEXT> NODIS

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

THE MARGINS OF THE CHAUTAUQUA MEETING IN RIGA
SEPTEMBER 15 19. IF MACFARLANE, AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK AND DAS PALMER COME, YAKOVLEV WOULD
ATTEND AND BE PREPARED FOR SERIOUS, INFORMAL
MEETINGS.

A WORKING VISIT TO MOSCOW BY NSC DIRECTOR
POINDEXTER. GOLENPOL'SKIY SAID THAT MOSCOW
WOULD WELCOME SUCH A VISIT AND INDICATED
THERE "HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION" OF THIS
(IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER HE MEANT DISCUSSION
AMONG SOVIET OFFICIALS).

A WORKING VISIT TO MOSCOW BY AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.
GOLENPOL'SKIY INDICATED THAT A PRIVATE MEETING
INVOLVING MATLOCK AND PERHAPS DOBRYNIN OR
YAKOVLEV ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE WOULD ALSO
BE ACCEPTABLE.

ASKED WHY HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED
DISCRETELY THROUGH OUR EMBASSY, GOLENPOL'SKIY
ASSERTED THAT AMBASSADOR HARTMAN DID NOT
FAVOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

MOVEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL MUST PRECEDE EVERYTHING
6. IN DISCUSSING THE OVERALL STATE OF BILATERAL
RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT,
GOLENPOL'SKIY STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONSIDERED MOVEMENT ON
ARMS CONTROL OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE.
EVERYTHING ELSE WAS SECONDARY. WHILE MOSCOW
RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT ON REGIONAL
AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, THE KREMLIN WOULD
NOT WORK FOR PROGRESS ON THOSE QUESTIONS IN
THE ABSENCE OF MOVEMENT TOWARD AGREEMENT ON
"MILITARY MATTERS." WITHOUT PROGRESS THERE,
GOLENPOL'SKIY EMPHASIZED, THERE COULD BE NO
HOPE FOR PROGRESS ON OTHER MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE
TO WASHINGTON.

COMMENT

7. WHILE GOLENPOL'SKIY IS WELL KNOWN TO US, IT
IS UNUSUAL FOR HIM TO SEEK US OUT AND TO REQUEST
AN IMMEDIATE, PRIVATE MEETING. WHILE HE
SPECIFICALLY CLAIMED THAT HE REPRESENTED YAKOVLEV,
WE CONSIDER GOLENPOL'SKIY TO BE A MEMBER
OF THE KGB. GOLENPOL'SKIY'S OVERTURES MAY
REPRESENT AN ATTEMPT ON YAKOVLEV'S PART TO
BECOME A PLAYER IN THE SUMMIT GAME, AND/OR
TO PROBE ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY.
GOLENPOL'SKIY BROKE NO NEW GROUND ON TIMING
FOR A SUMMIT OR SHULTZ SHEVARDNADZE MEETING.

Likely!

HOWEVER, HIS TRIAL BALLOONS ABOUT VISITS
BY POINDEXTER OR MATLOCK AND TALKS ON
THE MARGINS OF THE "CHAUTAUQUA" SESSION
MAY INDICATE QUICKENING SOVIET INTEREST IN
HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S.
HARTMAN

14

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WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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June 86

(Harowitz)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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8351 16

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 20, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *SW*

SUBJECT: Soviet Backchannel Message to Sen. Kennedy:
President Playing Politics, but Summit is On

I met Larry Horowitz at noon today, and he briefed me on his meetings with his Soviet interlocutor, Pavlov, earlier this week. He asked that I inform only you, Secretary Shultz -- and, of course, the President.

Background:

The Soviets proposed and indeed insisted on the meeting. They invited Horowitz to come to Moscow, and when he said he couldn't (he is moving to California this weekend), they proposed another site and settled for Paris, since Horowitz was planning to be in London over the weekend. The meetings with Pavlov took place in Paris between Monday evening and Wednesday morning this week.

At first, Pavlov read from a prepared text, which he stressed comprised his "official instructions." His "instructions" were typed in Russian, and Pavlov translated as he went along. Horowitz took notes and read them to me from his notes. The following is a close to verbatim version of Horowitz's account.

The "Message" to Kennedy:

The situation in U.S.-Soviet relations has deteriorated, but its essence is clear to the Soviet leadership. It has become more complicated. What appears in public is like the tip of an iceberg. One sees only propaganda, but much is invisible below the surface.

President Reagan has shown a greatly increased interest in a Summit meeting this year. This is part of his political strategy for 1986 and 1988. He wants to keep the Republicans in control of the Senate and of the White House. It is rare that we can see through American political manipulations so clearly, and we can only be amazed that the Administration is so obvious in its tactics. Reagan has no interest in arms control questions as such and is thinking only of politics. We realize that whatever

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NLRR M08-126/2 #8351

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

we do has a bearing on politics in the United States. We regret this, but cannot avoid it, for it is a fact of life.

In official communications and in private messages, the Administration has been planning for the development of U.S.-Soviet relations to include a visit by Reagan to the USSR late in 1987 or even in 1988. In preparing to schedule the summit meetings in the United States and the USSR, he seems prepared to reach more practical agreements than any previous American President. We believe he in fact wants agreements.

On nuclear testing, the President is ready to ratify the 1974 and 1976 treaties -- if there is improved verification of testing. Not a treaty, but an understanding on the process. Communications from the Administration have offered a statement on testing at the Summit, along these lines. Then our experts would meet to discuss their proposals for "rules of the road," but they would listen to our views. Note: these proposals are for discussions, promises for progress in the future, but not a concrete agreement.

On medium-range missiles, Shultz told Dobrynin that it was the "best prospect" for an understanding at the Summit. The President took Dobrynin aside at the end of their conversation in April and said it could be done, but it must be on a global basis. Our position on this is well known.

On space strike weapons, both Reagan and Shultz, at different times, as well as other officials, have raised with us proposals for cooperation. They suggest we do this by discussing methods and means to prevent a first-strike capability and the stationing of offensive weapons in space. This is just a way to avoid discussing the ABM Treaty. The Administration wants verbiage promising not to deploy weapons in space, but a free hand to pursue its research. We believe they want to develop a nationwide territorial ABM capability. This is unacceptable. They will never get anywhere with this approach.

On strategic weapons, the President expressed a willingness to reduce by 50%. But for the 1986 summit he wants only to pave the road for signing the agreement when the President visits Moscow -- in late 1987 or 1988. That is, he wants good feelings and the appearance of progress this year, but no agreement until the eve of his departure from office.

Regarding other matters, the President's people have made clear that they would like progress on a chemical weapons ban and are prepared to negotiate agreements on Afghanistan and a range of bilateral matters. We now believe that there is a real possibility of progress in Vienna and on taking some confidence-building measures.

We think there are possibilities in all five of these areas. The President and Shultz have persistently pushed the idea that in 1986 we need agreements on the key elements, but no agreements need be finished. These can be ready for signature in Moscow in 1987 and ratified by the Senate, maybe just before the 1988 election. As Shultz put it, "We need to identify elements now to have agreements ready next year." When Dobrynin had his final meeting with the President, the President said, "What would you think about identifying the elements of an INF agreement at the 1986 Summit. If we could, we would have almost a year to build an agreement and sign it in 1987."

Therefore, we believe that the President is proposing a two-stage process. It is a cynical and politically motivated attitude. Preliminary agreements in 1986 and complete agreements in 1987. American officials make it very clear. For example, Matlock told one of our people that we need to settle on the types of weapons to be covered and the numbers, and to talk in precise terms. These are just words. They have nothing practical in mind, just words. [Horowitz commented that he thought the words attributed to me demonstrated the opposite of what the Soviets were trying to prove. I agreed, and explained that I was merely pressing them to get down to business in Geneva.]

What is President Reagan's intention? First, to avoid agreements in 1986. Second, to pave the way for a Summit in 1987 or 1988. Third, all this is politically motivated. The White House would be satisfied with smiles when Gorbachev comes to the U.S., and a document of words but no substance. Things like rules of behavior and mutual understandings. That is worthless.

We are deeply concerned that international affairs are now so deeply tied to Republican Party politics. We can see that the President needs to employ harsh rhetoric to placate his right wing. We also know why he announced the decision on SALT-II the way he did. It was to play to the right wing. We do not take it seriously because it has no practical significance.

END OF "MESSAGE"

Other Matters:

In addition to his "official message," Pavlov made a number of comments on other questions, some of which he represented as only his personal view. The ones Horowitz mentioned to me are the following:

Summitry: Shultz and Shevardnadze will meet, Pavlov said. (He did not say when.) The Summit will be held in the U.S. this year. (When Horowitz asked whether this was Pavlov's opinion, the latter said, "It is fact, not opinion.") And, finally,

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Pavlov repeated that it was the Soviet assessment that agreements would be reached with the President before the end of his term.

Human Rights: The Soviets are releasing 10 more families, as the "second wave" of visas promised Kennedy. One of the persons included, a physicist named Azernoy, could have more than routine significance since he worked in Sakharov's laboratory and is the first scientist who worked with Sakharov who has been permitted to leave. Pavlov said that this might set a "useful" precedent for dealing with Sakharov, but that he had "no word" whether anything would be done to alleviate Sakharov's status. (He observed that Sakharov's Moscow home "was being maintained" so the practical possibility exists for him to return there, but that he was unaware of any decision to allow this to happen.)

American Politics: The Kremlin, Pavlov said, had reached the conclusion that the Democrats could not gain control of the Senate in 1986 or 1988, and could not win the Presidency in 1988, therefore they would have to deal with the Republicans. (Pavlov claimed that he personally did not agree with this analysis, but stated that it was the Kremlin assessment.)

Pavlov added that, of the potential Republican candidates in 1988, they liked Bush the most and Laxalt the least. He explained that they knew Bush and thought they could deal with him. But they considered Laxalt an ideologue who would be most difficult. They thought they might have the best chances of all with Dole, he continued, since they "liked his approach," but felt that he didn't have a chance. After reviewing these names Pavlov observed that of course they would prefer to deal with any Democrat rather than a Republican, but they just didn't see this as a real possibility and assumed that they would be dealing with Republicans beyond 1988.

Soviet Bureaucracy: Pavlov is a close friend of Gorbachev's foreign affairs assistant Chernyayev. When Horowitz asked him what had happened to Zagladin (also a friend), Pavlov claimed that Zagladin is still in charge of "parliamentary contacts" in the Central Committee, including with the U.S., and stated that Dobrynin does not have the field totally to himself. He stated that his meeting with Horowitz had been approved personally by Gorbachev, that his written "instructions" had been approved personally by Shevardnadze, and that Bessmertnykh had participated in the drafting.

Matlock Comment: The chutzpah in the Soviet effort to play both sides of the street on the American political scene is rather breathtaking. Not surprising, but it is so blatant that it is more likely to backfire than to achieve whatever purpose they have in mind. (They probably assume that Kennedy is their pipeline into the entire Democratic Party -- which would be typical of the sort of assumptions they make. Actually, I doubt

that he tells any of his colleagues about this in any concrete fashion.)

Horowitz started our conversation by observing that he had "good news" for us. "They're telling us they plan to deal with the President," he added. I think that is exactly right. They have concluded that they have no real alternative but to deal, and are attempting to give the Democrats "fair warning" not to expect "assistance" in the form of stonewalling agreements and such to "help" them in coming election campaigns. I don't know whether they really believe all the claptrap about the President's political motivations -- they possibly may -- but the analysis they offered was obviously tailored for Kennedy's ear. Even if they believe it, it may not be too damaging, unless they assume that political motivations will make the President "soft" in the end game. If they should make that mistake, they will probably find they are wrong too late to do much about it.

It occurs to me that, in this caper, the Soviets may have been too clever by half. If the message they were peddling gets out to the Democrats, it could be most helpful, since the only logical conclusion to draw from it is that it is most dangerous to make a campaign issue out of the President's alleged inability to deal with the Soviets. By the Soviets' own admission, he is dealing effectively, and is likely to have something to show for it before the votes are cast in November, 1988. On the interim restraint decision, the implication seems pretty clear: "Save your breath; it isn't going to make any difference!"

Horowitz's Plans

Larry is moving to California this weekend, to take up a job with an investment banker. (Says a couple of years there should take care of his kids' education!) However, he will continue to be Kennedy's contact with the Soviets. (They like to deal with people they know.) He offered to be of service to us if we have anything for him to do, and said he would keep us informed if there are any further substantive contacts. He repeated again that he is not sure his Soviet contacts know that he passes this on to us, so that we should not play any back to Soviet officials.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 20, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Draft Form Letter re Afghanistan

I have reviewed and concur with the attached draft letter in response to public correspondence regarding the Soviet-inspired war in Afghanistan. Attached at Tab I for your signature is memorandum to Chuck Donovan noting NSC concurrence.

Dennis Ross concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for Chuck Donovan
Tab A Draft Letter

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4675

MEMORANDUM FOR CHUCK DONOVAN

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Draft Form Letter re Afghanistan

NSC has reviewed and concurs with the attached draft form letter in answer to public correspondence regarding the Soviet-inspired war in Afghanistan.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Form Ltr

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4675

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC

FROM: CHUCK DONOVAN ~~et~~
Office of Correspondence

The attached draft form reply is submitted for review by the appropriate staff member. This issue is running in current mail and the volume justifies use of a form response. I can be reached at x7610 if any information on the incoming mail regarding this issue is required by your office.

Thank you very much.

Moderate volume.

cc: Pending File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AVH/cso/ *th* 24

Chen NSC

June 17, 1986

AVH408

On behalf of President Reagan, thank you for your message of support for the Administration's strong stand on the Soviet-inspired war in Afghanistan.

You can be sure that the President will continue to make the American position on Afghanistan clearly understood. In his meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva, he left no doubt about the strength of American feeling on the need for a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and for a negotiated settlement of the problem along lines demanded by seven successive United Nations resolutions passed with overwhelming (and record) majorities.

American support for the cause of Afghan freedom will continue, as will our efforts to aid the victims of Soviet tyranny and refugees from the fighting in their homeland. As President Reagan said in a statement released following his meeting with leaders of the Afghan resistance on June 16, "My message to the resistance delegation was simple. In your struggle to regain your nation's independence, the American people stand with you. This policy has broad and deep bipartisan support. It is an unshakeable commitment. Your goal is our goal: the freedom of Afghanistan. We will not let you down."

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I am enclosing for your information a copy of President Reagan's statement last December on the sixth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It comes to you with his appreciation and best wishes.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 16, 1986

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I met this morning with leaders of the Afghan resistance Alliance: Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, who is the spokesman of the Alliance, and his colleagues. They speak for the many citizens of Afghanistan who are battling Soviet forces in the name of national liberation.

[My message to the resistance delegation was simple. In your struggle to regain your nation's independence, the American people stand with you. This policy has broad and deep bipartisan support. It is an unshakeable commitment. Your goal is our goal: the freedom of Afghanistan. We will not let you down.

Like the Afghan people, we hope for a negotiated end to this war. Year after year, U.N. resolutions have called for a total and rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops, and for self-determination for the Afghan people.

Let us renew that call today. Only an agreement that has the support of the Afghan people can work. This is a fact of life. And it is why the role of the resistance Alliance is crucial. The diversity of the Alliance -- its roots in the faith and traditions of Afghanistan -- shows that the Alliance is the true representative of the Afghan people.

People everywhere admire the courage of the Afghans, but the people and government of Pakistan have also borne a large share of the burden of Soviet pressure and intimidation. We are honored to join with them in supporting Afghan freedom.

#

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

December 27, 1985

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON AFGHANISTAN

Today, December 27, marks the 6th Anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Since December 27, 1979 when a massive Soviet force crossed the Afghan frontier to support a faltering Marxist regime, the Afghan resistance has grown increasingly effective. The Soviet supported regime in Kabul has failed to gain even a modicum of popular support or international acceptance. The Soviets and their Afghan surrogates have resorted to barbaric methods of waging war in their effort to crush this war of national liberation. Indiscriminate air and artillery bombardments against civilian areas, savage reprisals against noncombatants suspected of supporting the resistance, and the calculated destruction of crops and irrigation systems have ravaged the Afghan countryside. Thousands of young Afghans are being shipped to the Soviet Union for "re-education" in summer camps, universities and specialized institutions.

The Afghan people, however, are unswerving in their determination to resist the invader. The resistance fighters are more numerous, better armed, and more effective than ever before. Unable to trust Kabul's forces to counter the enhanced resistance, the Soviets have begun using their own troops in a more active combat role. But the effort has availed them little. Last summer, when fighting was at its peak, resistance forces repeatedly attacked Soviet lines of communication, convoys, barracks and facilities, and mounted their largest, longest, and best coordinated offensive operation of the war. The resistance has also drawn together into a political alliance which can present Afghanistan's cause to the world in unambiguous terms, and coordinate all aspects of the liberation struggle.

Since 1980, the United States has strongly advocated a negotiated political settlement, the only reasonable alternative to the bleak prospect of an open-ended military struggle. Seven United Nations resolutions passed by growing and overwhelming margins since that year show that the United States is not alone in this view. These resolutions call for the withdrawal of foreign troops, the restoration of Afghanistan's independent and non-aligned status, self-determination, and the voluntary and safe return of the refugees.

The US reiterated its support for UN sponsored talks during the November summit meetings in Geneva. We also indicated that the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan remains an obstacle to overall improvement in our relationship. Although we welcome any suggestion that the Soviets are prepared to back UN-led peace efforts, we will await positive developments on the ground and concrete evidence of Soviet willingness to agree to a timetable for withdrawal of their troops.

The victims of this war also command American attention. The United States has played, and will continue to play, a major role in the humanitarian efforts to alleviate the suffering of the two to three million Afghan refugees now living in Pakistan. Since 1980, we have spent over \$430 million in aid. In the face of deteriorating conditions inside Afghanistan caused largely by the increasingly widespread Soviet reprisals against civilians suspected of opposing the regime, we have allocated, in the current two year time frame, almost \$25

MORE

million in assistance to the brave people who remain inside Afghanistan.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan six long and bloody years ago, few in the West knew much about that distant land and its proud people. That certainly has changed, as the Afghan people, in their determination to defend their liberty, have added new chapters to the long annal of human courage in the face of tyranny. Forged in a similar crucible two centuries ago, the United States stands squarely on the side of the people of Afghanistan and will continue its support of their historic struggle in the cause of liberty.

* * *

husband

SAGE I
6/21/86

Jack Matlock

~~EYES ONLY~~

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

~~CAS 6/21/02~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK
PETER RODMAN
STEVE SESTANOVICH

FROM: BOB LINHARD 
SUBJECT: SAGE 01 PAPER

Attached is the latest version of the basic SAGE paper which will serve as the TOR for the ACSG work. It has been modified to reflect today's minor changes to the sample Presidential letter.

Putting this together with a final version of Jack's sample letter (which will become SAGE 02) as a single package for the President's review tomorrow. Should have the cover memo's etc. by about 6 p.m. Would like to put this into the system by 7 p.m. Would appreciate any comments or feedback on this version soonest.

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NLRR M125/2 # 8346

BY KML NARA DATE 10/8/10

E347

GUIDANCE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY (S/S)

Basic Guidance. The United States will seriously consider the Soviet proposals put on the table in Geneva during the current round of negotiations and develop appropriate counter-proposals, on a priority basis. While this work is in progress, our public posture should project a positive/serious stance. (S)

Soviet Objectives. The Soviet Union fears the SDI program will provide the U.S. with a first-strike advantage. The latest Soviet proposals attempt to "lock in" U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty to slow/stop SDI development and, failing that, to block SDI deployments. They also seek public diplomacy leverage to weaken the U.S. position with other free governments. (S)

U.S. Objectives. For our part, the U.S. seeks to "lock in" the SDI research program itself and to use SDI to permit a long-term strengthening of stability and deterrence through stabilizing reductions of existing nuclear arsenals and to create the basis for a stable transition to a system of deterrence involving the increasing contribution of defensive systems. The task the USG now faces is to determine how it can best position itself to:

1. begin immediate stabilizing reductions in offensive forces, setting in motion a negotiating process that will lead to significant reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals through equitable and verifiable agreements;
2. maintain near-term support for SDI and institutionalize support so that the program lives beyond this Administration;
3. avoid commitments that constrain U.S. options for SDI;
4. establish the foundation for a stable transition to a more defense dominated deterrence;
5. develop a means to share the benefits of strategic defenses resulting from our SDI research with the Soviet Union and other responsible governments; and
6. maintain Alliance solidarity and integrity. (TS/S)

New U.S. Initiative. The Soviet Union is holding reductions in offensive nuclear forces hostage to a U.S. response to Soviet concerns about SDI. Therefore, to achieve its goals, the U.S. must develop an initiative which addresses Soviet concerns about SDI providing a U.S. first-strike advantage while reducing the size of existing arsenals and leading to a system of mutual deterrence based upon the increasing contribution of defenses. The introduction of the elements of such an initiative should begin no later than by mid-July. (TS/S)

~~TOP SECRET/SAGE~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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NLRR M25/2 #8347

BY KML NARA DATE 10/8/10

End-game Elements. The U.S. initiative should ultimately lead to U.S./Soviet agreement on the following elements. (S)

1. Both sides hold the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons as a long-term goal. While other nuclear powers will have to be involved in this process, the initial step now needed is the significant reduction in the existing arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Therefore, both sides agree that this reductions process should begin as quickly as possible. (S)

2. As an element of this reduction process, both sides agree to pursue an outcome in which neither side retains any offensive ballistic missiles, and both sides share the benefit of defenses against such systems as insurance that the threat posed by these missiles never again arises from any source. (TS/S)

3. U.S. SDI research should be permitted to continue, with the U.S.S.R. free to continue its corresponding research. (TS/S)

4. Permitted research will include testing which can demonstrate in principle the potential of advanced systems sufficiently to permit a decision to move from research to system development at the appropriate time. (TS/S)

5. When either side conducts such testing, the other side will be afforded the opportunity to verify the purpose, nature and extent of that testing to its satisfaction. (TS/S)

6. Based upon such testing, from the point that a side decides to initiate system development, there will be an agreed period of negotiation (e.g., one year) before any system deployment based upon this development could begin. (TS/S)

7. When either side determines that it would be appropriate to deploy an advanced defensive system, it would be required to offer to share the benefits of such a system with the other side in return for further mutual reductions in offensive ballistic missiles. This offer would be effective for a specified period of time during which negotiations would be conducted to seek agreement on specific sharing arrangements. No deployments could occur until the completion of this period of negotiation. After the specified time, deployment would proceed. (TS/S)

8. Based upon this sharing of the benefits of advanced defenses, actual deployments of advanced defensive systems would be coordinated so as to be mutually beneficial and linked to further, phased reductions in offensive ballistic missile capability on both sides. (TS/S)

9. An eventual goal would be sharing of the benefits of advanced defenses with all responsible nations so that there is a positive incentive against further investment in offensive ballistic missiles, while also requiring a parallel reduction in nuclear forces by all participating nuclear powers. (TS/S)

Capturing Such an End-game Position in a Framework Agreement. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would agree to the desired U.S. end-game position if it were presented as a formal, free standing agreement. However, it may be in the U.S. interest to present this position as an executive agreement providing a framework to guide the direction of formal negotiations. Such an agreement could then be supported by an approach designed to move the Soviets to the U.S. position via a series of more limited specific negotiating moves implemented over time. (S/S)

Example of a "Framework Agreement". The following is an example of an "endgame" version of such an agreement. (S/S)

The ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons remains a long-term goal shared by both the U.S. and Soviet Union. While other nuclear powers will have to be involved before this goal can be achieved, both sides agree that the initial step needed now is the significant reduction in the existing arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This step beginning the reductions process should be taken without further delay. (TS/S)

As a key element of this reduction process, both sides also agree to seek the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, and to share the benefit of defenses against such systems as insurance that the threat posed by such systems never again arises. (TS/S)

To support this goal, research should be permitted to continue. This research includes testing to demonstrate in principle that advanced systems can contribute to stability and to do so sufficiently to permit a decision to move from research to advanced system development at the appropriate time. Agree procedures will be needed to permit the verification of the purpose, nature and extent of such testing. (TS/S)

When a decision is reached to move beyond research to advanced system development, there will be an agreed period of negotiation before any system deployment based upon such advanced system development could begin. Also before deployment begins, there will be an additional agreed period of negotiation on how the benefits of such a deployment can be shared in return for further mutual reductions in offensive ballistic missiles. Actual deployments of advanced defensive systems would be coordinated so as to be mutually beneficial and linked to further, phased reductions in offensive ballistic missile capability on both sides. (TS/S)

The eventual goal would be sharing of the benefits of advanced defenses with all responsible nations so that there is a positive incentive against further investment in offensive ballistic missiles, while also requiring a parallel reduction in offensive nuclear forces by all participating nuclear powers. (TS/S)

Considerations in Developing a Phased Approach. To develop an appropriately phased approach to achieving the U.S. desired end-game, the following considerations apply. (TS/S)

1. In the initial interim phases of such an approach, the U.S. should address the widest range of arms reduction issues that are in the U.S. interest. As a minimum, it should address U.S. goals in START, INF, DST and nuclear testing. This is essential not only to counter the impression that only the Soviet Union has a coherent, comprehensive plan for the reduction of arms, but also to allow the U.S. to use linkage where appropriate to the maximum U.S. advantage. (TS/S)

2. Given limited U.S. negotiating capital, it is essential that this capital be husbanded so that the U.S. continues to have the negotiating leverage needed to achieve its goals in each area over time. (TS/S)

3. Initial U.S. leverage can most likely best be applied by constructively responding to the Soviet suggestions concerning an extended ABM Treaty commitment. However, any US agreement to an extended ABM treaty commitment would require that:

a. the baseline be clarification of the ABM Treaty based upon the broader interpretation of the treaty;

b. the definitions of permitted testing associated with that interpretation clearly include testing to the degree our programs will require during the period of such a commitment;

c. any initial time period of commitment be shorter than the 15-20 years the Soviets want; and

d. future periods of commitment, if agreed to, be based on achievement of substantial offensive system reductions and real promise of still further reductions. (TS/S)

3. Any U.S. counter-proposal should be phased in over time, with the first step balancing a limited US acquiescence to non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty (appropriately clarified) against significant reductions of offensive systems within that same time period. (TS/S)

3. There MUST be an effective "sundown clause" in any such initial interim agreement, a clause that would automatically release the U.S. from further restraint unless specified Soviet performance of obligations permitted positive U.S. commitments to additional time periods of observance. (TS/S)

4. Further codicils to the ABM treaty as needed to restrict deployment of advanced systems or significant improvement of existing ballistic missile defenses, while permitting the legitimate research objectives of both sides to be achieved,

could be a matter of negotiation during the initial interim time period. (TS/S)

5. Any initial interim step should consider addressing nuclear testing in some associated manner so as to allow the U.S. position in this area to reinforce other U.S. goals and deny the Soviets additional propaganda benefits with respect to this issue. (TS/S)

6. Effective verification of Soviet compliance with its commitments during any such initial interim agreement must be fully incorporated into such an agreement. (TS/S)

Example of an Initial Step. The following is an example of an integrated initial interim step. (S)

1. ABM Treaty Clarification. Clarifications of the ABM treaty could be negotiated, working from the base of the broader interpretation, to include definitions of testing, research, and development, that would permit the US (and USSR) to continue their research and investigation programs, but could not deploy or produce operational components of the system. (TS/S)

2. Interim START Reductions. In the START forum, initial, interim agreements on reductions could be agreed, to be accomplished, on a verifiable basis, in a definite time period (perhaps 5 years), the same time to be the period of agreed adherence to the modified ABM treaty. Possible reductions agreements, weighted toward US interests, might include:

a. modifications of elements of either the original U.S. START position (limit on ballistic missile RVs to 5,000) or our latest START position as an interim step;

b. modifications of elements of the latest Soviet proposal to pocket positive elements; and

c. more radical new elements like the elimination of all ballistic missiles (although full achievement of this may not occur until a later stage). (TS/S)

3. Interim INF Reductions. In the INF area, the U.S. most recent U.S. position could be stretched out so that the the first, or first and second years' reductions served as the basis for the first stage reductions. (TS/S)

4. Linkages. If both the ABM Treaty Clarification and the Interim Reductions above were agreed, the U.S. would be prepared to agree to abide by the clarified ABM treaty for the period of the initial reductions. During this period, serious negotiations on further reductions would occur, as well as discussions on the concept of satisfying each other on the nature, intent and purpose of specific SDI testing activities. (TS/S)

5. Follow-on Steps. At the end of the agreed initial interim stage, we would determine whether:

- a. the initially-agreed offensive reductions had been implemented and scrupulously observed by both sides;
- b. further reductions in offensive arms, to be achieved during the next period, had been agreed; and
- c. both sides had agreed to make any needed amendments to the the ABM treaty. (TS/S)

If the above conditions had not been met, both sides would be free to exercise the withdrawal clause of the ABM treaty. If all of the above were accomplished, the US would be prepared to consider a follow-on period (perhaps another 5 years) of adherence to the clarified ABM treaty. (TS/S)

6. Nuclear Testing. Associated with this, there could be a parallel program in the nuclear testing area along the following lines. (S/S)

- a. In the initial interim period, the U.S. and Soviet Union could agree on the additional verification procedures required to permit ratification of the TTBT and PNET. (TS/S)
- b. Upon ratification, a baseline level of yearly nuclear testing (based on the higher number of tests conducted that year be either side) would be established. (TS/S)
- c. From that point, the number of nuclear tests conducted by each side would be reduced by some factor associated with progress in the actual reductions achieved in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. (TS/S)

Tasking. The examples provided above are are intended to be purely examples. However, they are consistent with the President's guidance that the USG should take Soviet proposals seriously and develop appropriate counter-proposals. Accordingly, the Senior Arms Control Group and the Arms Control Support Group are directed to undertake an urgent, compartmented effort, working from the guidance and examples cited above, to develop:

- (1) a phased strategy for achieving the desired U.S. end-game;
- (2) a refined ingoing "framework" proposal; and
- (3) a coherent and supporting package of initial U.S. proposals in the appropriate major areas of negotiation. (TS/S)

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Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have taken careful note of the interesting proposals your negotiators made during the current round in Geneva. I have also continued to ponder our discussion in Geneva last November and our subsequent correspondence. As you may have guessed from our earlier exchanges, I heartily agree with the statement you made in your recent address to the CPSU Central Committee about the need to "search for new approaches to make it possible to clear the road to a reduction of nuclear arms." That is certainly the most urgent task before us.

It seems clear to me that the principal obstacle on this road is the fear that the other side will somehow acquire the capacity to deliver a disarming first strike against the other -- especially by adding strategic defenses to a large arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons. The "new approach" you have called for should address this problem directly.

With this in mind, let me suggest the following in regard to research on advanced systems of strategic defense:

First, in order to ensure that neither side can deploy systems of strategic defense simply to augment and enhance its offensive capability, there could be agreed measures such as the following:

(a) Both sides would continue research to determine whether, in principle, advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research could include testing as necessary to support this determination, but not support the development of an advanced system itself. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to verify the purpose and nature of the test to its satisfaction, in accord with mutually agreed procedures.

(b) If either party determines, at some point in the future, that it is desirable to proceed to development of an advanced strategic defense system, it will enter into negotiations with the other party for a specified period of time (e.g., one year) and make a good-faith effort to obtain agreement on the manner in which such a system, once developed, may be deployed. No deployment of the system can begin until these negotiations are conducted.

(c) Also, when either side determines that it would be appropriate to deploy an advanced strategic defense system, it would be required for that side to offer to share the benefits of such a system with the other side in return for further mutual reductions in offensive ballistic missiles. This offer would be effective for a specified period of time during which

negotiations would be conducted to reach agreement on specific sharing arrangements. The aim would be to coordinate deployment of such systems to ensure that they are mutually beneficial and linked to further reductions in offensive ballistic missile capability on both sides. No deployments could occur until the completion of this period of negotiation. After the specified time deployment would proceed.

(d) In the context of such commitments, there could be a commitment by both sides not to exercise their rights under Article XV of the ABM Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty during the period set for the agreed initial reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, provided these reductions are implemented as agreed.

Second, these commitments would be made in conjunction with steps to proceed with the radical reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, along the following lines:

(1) Agreement to the long-term goal of the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons.

(2) Agreement to an immediate initial step involving the radical reduction (up to 50%), on an equitable and verifiable basis, of existing strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

[NOTE: further details might be added here, if desired.]

(3) These reductions to be completed within an agreed period of time (for example, five years).

(4) Agreement to pursue negotiations, when the reductions agreed on for the initial step have been accomplished, for further reductions in strategic arsenals, inviting other nuclear powers to participate. Such negotiations could focus on the reduction of the size of nuclear arsenals then held by the negotiating powers, or on the elimination of classes of strategic systems (for example, all offensive ballistic missiles), or both. The overall aim should be to take a further significant step toward the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world.

Third, the question of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, could be settled along the following lines:

(1) Agreement on the goal of eliminating this entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles world-wide.

(2) Agreement on phases of reduction to the zero goal.

[NOTE: further details could be added here if desired]

Fourth, associated with the program to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, there would be a parallel program to achieve progress in effectively limiting and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing in step-by-step fashion. It could have the following elements:

(1) Agreement on verification procedures to permit ratification of the treaties signed in 1974 and 1976.

(2) Upon ratification of these treaties, establishment of a "baseline" number of tests conducted annually by both sides.

(3) Agreement to reduce, from that time, the number of nuclear tests by a factor associated with the scale of nuclear weapons reductions actually implemented.

Mr. General Secretary, I hope that you will notice that I have tried explicitly to take into account the concerns you expressed to me in Geneva and in our correspondence, as well as key elements of your most recent proposals. I believe you will see that this approach provides complete insurance that neither country would be able to exploit research on strategic defense to acquire a disarming first-strike capability, or to deploy weapons of mass destruction in space. The framework I propose should permit us to proceed immediately to reduce existing nuclear arsenals as we have agreed is desirable, and to establish the conditions for proceeding to further reductions toward the goal of total elimination.

I will be instructing our negotiators to present this proposal, along with appropriate implementing details, when the next round of negotiations begins in Geneva in September. I hope that your negotiators will be prepared to respond in a positive and constructive fashion so that we can proceed promptly to agreement.

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(b) If either party determines, at some point in the future, that it is desirable to proceed to development of an advanced strategic defense system, it will enter into negotiations with the other party for a specified period of time ^(2-3 years) and make a good-faith effort to obtain agreement on the manner in which such a system, once developed, ^{may} ~~could~~ be deployed. No deployment of the system can begin until these negotiations are conducted.

(c) Also, ^{when} ~~if~~ either side determines that it would be appropriate to deploy an advanced strategic defense system, it would be required to enter into negotiations for a specified period ^{to seek agreement on sharing the benefits of such a system.} ~~to seek agreement on sharing the benefits of such a system.~~ The aim would be to coordinate deployment of such systems to ensure that they are mutually beneficial and linked to further reductions in offensive ballistic missile capability on both sides. No deployments could occur until the completion of this period of negotiation. ~~after the specified time deployment would proceed.~~

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~~Agreement would be conducted on~~

would be conducted to reach agreement on ^{specific} sharing arrangements.

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GUIDANCE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY (S/S)

Basic Guidance. The United States will seriously consider the Soviet proposals put on the table in Geneva during the current round of negotiations and develop appropriate counter-proposals, building upon existing policy guidelines, on a priority basis. Our public posture should project a positive/serious stance. (S)

Soviet Objectives. The Soviet Union fears the SDI program will provide the U.S. with a first-strike advantage. The latest Soviet proposals attempt to "lock in" U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty to slow/stop SDI development and, failing that, to block SDI deployments. They also seek public diplomacy leverage to weaken the U.S. position with other free governments. (S)

U.S. Objectives. For our part, the U.S. seeks to "lock in" the SDI research program itself and to use SDI to permit a long-term strengthening of stability and deterrence through the significant reduction of the size of existing nuclear arsenals and a stable transition to a system of deterrence involving the increasing contribution of defensive systems. The task the USG now faces is to determine how it can best position itself to:

1. begin immediate reductions in offensive forces, setting in motion a negotiating process that will lead to significant reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals through equitable and verifiable agreements;

2. maintain near-term support for SDI and institutionalize support so that the program lives beyond this Administration;

3. avoid commitments that constrain realistic U.S. options for SDI;

4. establish the foundation for a stable transition to a more defense dominated deterrence; and

5. develop a means to share the benefits of strategic defenses resulting from our SDI research with the Soviet Union and other responsible governments. (TS/S)

New U.S. Initiative. The Soviet Union is holding reductions in offensive nuclear forces hostage to a U.S. response to Soviet concerns about SDI. Therefore, to achieve its goals, the U.S. must develop an initiative which addresses Soviet concerns about SDI providing a U.S. first-strike advantage while reducing the size of existing arsenals and leading to a system of mutual deterrence based upon the increasing contribution of defenses. Development of such an initiative should commence immediately, and the introduction of its elements begin no later than by mid-July. (TS/S)

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End-game Elements. The U.S. initiative should ultimately lead to U.S./Soviet agreement on the following elements. (S)

1. Both sides hold the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons as a long-term goal. While other nuclear powers will have to be involved in this process, the initial step now needed is the significant reduction in the existing arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Therefore, both sides agree that this reductions process should begin as quickly as possible. (S)

2. As an element of this reduction process, both sides agree to pursue an outcome in which neither side retains any offensive ballistic missiles, and both sides share the benefit of defenses against such systems as insurance that the threat posed by these missiles never again arises from any source. (TS/S)

3. U.S. SDI research should be permitted to continue, with the U.S.S.R. free to continue its corresponding research. (TS/S)

4. Permitted research will include testing which can demonstrate in principle the potential of advanced systems sufficiently to permit a decision to move from research to advanced system development at the appropriate time. (TS/S)

5. When either side conducts such testing, the other side will be afforded the opportunity to verify the purpose, nature and extent of that testing to its satisfaction. (TS/S)

6. Based upon such testing, from the point that a side decides to initiate advanced system development, there will be an agreed period of negotiation before any system deployment based upon this advanced system development could begin. (TS/S)

7. Also before deployment begins by either side, the deploying side will propose a specific proposal concerning how the benefits of its deployment can be shared with the other side to permit a stable mutual transition to system of deterrence that is defense dominated and leads to the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. Once offered, there will be an additional agreed period of negotiation before any system deployment could begin to permit the other side to act on the proposal. (TS/S)

8. Based upon this sharing of the benefits of advanced defenses, actual deployments of advanced defensive systems would be coordinated so as to be mutually beneficial and linked to further, phased reductions in offensive ballistic missile capability on both sides. (TS/S)

9. The eventual goal would be sharing of the benefits of advanced defenses with all responsible nations so that there is a positive incentive against further investment in offensive ballistic missiles, while also requiring a parallel reduction in nuclear forces by all participating nuclear powers. (TS/S)

Capturing Such an End-game Position in a Framework Agreement. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would agree to the desired U.S. end-game position if it were presented as a formal, free standing agreement. However, it may be in the U.S. interest to present this position as an executive agreement providing a framework to guide the direction of formal negotiations. Such an agreement could then be supported by an approach designed to move the Soviets to the U.S. position via a series of more limited specific negotiating moves implemented over time. (S/S)

"Framework Agreement" Example. The following is an example of such a framework agreement. (S/S)

The ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons remains a long-term goal shared by both the U.S. and Soviet Union. While other nuclear powers will have to be involved before this goal can be achieved, both sides agree that the initial step needed now is the significant reduction in the existing arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This step beginning the reductions process should be taken without further delay. (TS/S)

As a key element of this reduction process, both sides also agree to seek the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, and to share the benefit of defenses against such systems as insurance that the threat posed by such systems never again arises. (TS/S)

To support this goal, research should be permitted to continue. This research includes testing to demonstrate in principle that advanced systems can contribute to stability and to do so sufficiently to permit a decision to move from research to advanced system development at the appropriate time. Agree procedures will be needed to permit the verification of the purpose, nature and extent of such testing. (TS/S)

When a decision is reached to move beyond research to advanced system development, there will be an agreed period of negotiation before any system deployment based upon such advanced system development could begin. Also before deployment begins, there will be an additional agreed period of negotiation on how the benefits of such a deployment can be shared. Actual deployments of advanced defensive systems would be coordinated so as to be mutually beneficial and linked to further, phased reductions in offensive ballistic missile capability on both sides. (TS/S)

The eventual goal would be sharing of the benefits of advanced defenses with all responsible nations so that there is a positive incentive against further investment in offensive ballistic missiles, while also requiring a parallel reduction in offensive nuclear forces by all participating nuclear powers. (TS/S)

Considerations in Developing a Phased Approach. To develop an appropriately phased approach to achieving the U.S. desired end-game, the following considerations apply. (TS/S)

1. In the initial interim phases of such an approach, the U.S. should address the widest range of arms reduction issues that are in the U.S. interest. As a minimum, it should address U.S. goals in both START and INF. This is essential not only to counter the impression that only the Soviet Union has a coherent, comprehensive plan for the reduction of arms, but also to allow the U.S. to use linkage where appropriate to the maximum U.S. advantage. (TS/S)

2. Given limited U.S. negotiating capital, it is essential that this capital be husbanded so that the U.S. continues to have the negotiating leverage needed to achieve its goals in each area over time. (TS/S)

3. Initial U.S. leverage can most likely best be applied by constructively responding to the Soviet suggestions concerning an extended ABM Treaty commitment. However, any US agreement to an extended ABM treaty commitment would require that:

a. the baseline be the broader interpretation of the present treaty;

b. the definitions of permitted testing associated with that interpretation clearly include testing to the degree our programs will require during the period of such a commitment;

c. any initial time period of commitment be shorter than the 15-20 years the Soviets want; and

d. future periods of commitment, if agreed to, be based on achievement of substantial offensive system reductions and real promise of still further reductions. (TS/S)

3. Any U.S. counter-proposal should be phased in over time, with the first step balancing a limited US acquiescence to non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty (appropriately modified) against significant reductions of offensive systems within that same time period. (TS/S)

3. There MUST be an effective "sundown clause" in any such initial interim agreement, a clause that would automatically release the U.S. from further restraint unless specified Soviet performance of obligations permitted positive U.S. commitments to additional time periods of observance. (TS/S)

4. Further modification of the ABM treaty as needed to restrict deployment of advanced systems or significant improvement of existing ballistic missile defenses, while permitting the legitimate research objectives of both sides to be

achieved, could be a matter of negotiation during the initial interim time period. (TS/S)

5. Any initial interim step should consider addressing nuclear testing in some associated manner so as to allow the U.S. position in this area to reinforce other U.S. goals and deny the Soviets additional propaganda benefits with respect to this issue. (TS/S)

6. Effective verification of Soviet compliance with its commitments during any such initial interim agreement must be fully incorporated into such an agreement. (TS/S)

Example of an Initial Step. The following is an example of an integrated initial interim step. (S)

1. ABM Treaty Modification. The ABM treaty, in the START (or NST) forum at Geneva, could be modified, working from the base of the broader interpretation, to include definitions of testing and research that would permit the US (and USSR) to continue their research and investigation programs, but could not deploy or produce operational parts of the system. (TS/S)

2. Interim START Reductions. In the START forum, initial, interim agreements on reductions could be agreed, to be accomplished, on a verifiable basis, in a definite time period (perhaps 5 years), the same time to be the period of agreed adherence to the modified ABM treaty. Possible reductions agreements, weighted toward US interests, might include:

a. modifications of the original U.S. START position (limit on ballistic missile RVs to 5,000) as an interim step;

b. modifications of the latest Soviet proposal to pocket positive elements; and

c. more radical new elements like the elimination of all ~~ABM~~ BM's. (TS/S)

3. Interim INF Reductions. In the INF area, the U.S. most recent U.S. position could be stretched out so that the timing of the first, or first and second years' reductions served as the basis for the first phase reductions. (TS/S)

4. Linkages. If both the ABM Treaty Modification and the Interim Reductions above were agreed, the U.S. would be prepared to agree to abide by the modified ABM treaty for the period of the initial reductions. During this period, serious negotiations on further reductions would occur, as well as discussions on the concept of satisfying each other on the nature, intent and purpose of specific SDI testing activities. (TS/S)

5. Follow-on Steps. At the end of the agreed initial interim period, we would determine whether:

a. the initially-agreed offensive reductions had been implemented and scrupulously observed by both sides;

b. further reductions in offensive arms, to be achieved during the next period, had been agreed; and

c. both sides had agreed to make any needed additional modifications to the the ABM treaty. (TS/S)

If any of the above conditions have not been met, the US would be automatically released from all obligations of both the ABM treaty and any initial offensive reductions constraints. If all of the above were accomplished, the US would be prepared to agree to a follow-on period (perhaps another 5 years) of adherence to the modified ABM treaty. (TS/S)

6. Nuclear Testing. Associated with this, there could be a parallel program in the nuclear testing area along the following lines. (S/S)

a. In the initial interim period, the U.S. and Soviet Union could agree on the additional verification procedures required to permit ratification of the TTBT and PNET. (TS/S)

b. Upon ratification, a baseline level of yearly nuclear testing (based on the higher number of tests conducted that year be either side) would be established. (TS/S)

c. From that point, the number of nuclear tests conducted by each side would be reduced by some factor associated with progress in the actual reductions achieved in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. (TS/S)

Tasking. The examples provided above are are intended to be purely examples. However, they are consistent with the President's guidance that the USG should take Soviet proposals seriously and develop appropriate counter-proposals. Accordingly, the Senior Arms Control Group and the Arms Control Support Group are directed to undertake an urgent, compartmented effort, working from the guidance and examples cited above, to develop:

(1) a phased strategy for achieving the desired U.S. end-game;

(2) a refined "framework" proposal; and

(3) a coherent and supporting package of initial U.S. proposals in the appropriate major areas of negotiation. (TS/S)

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Capturing Such an End-game Position in a Framework Agreement. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would agree to the desired U.S. end-game position if it were presented as a formal, free standing agreement. However, it may be in the U.S. interest to present this position as an executive agreement providing a framework to guide the direction of formal negotiations. Such an agreement could then be supported by an approach designed to move the Soviets to the U.S. position via a series of more limited specific negotiating moves implemented over time. (S/S)

"Framework Agreement" Example. The following is an example of such a framework agreement. (S/S)

The ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons remains a long-term goal shared by both the U.S. and Soviet Union. While other nuclear powers will have to be involved before this goal can be achieved, both sides agree that the initial step needed now is the significant reduction in the existing arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This step beginning the reductions process should be taken without further delay. (TS/S)

As a key element of this reduction process, both sides also agree to seek the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, and to share the benefit of defenses against such systems as insurance that the threat posed by such systems never again arises. (TS/S)

To support this goal, research should be permitted to continue. This research includes testing to demonstrate in principle that advanced systems can contribute to stability and to do so sufficiently to permit a decision to move from research to advanced system development at the appropriate time. Agree procedures will be needed to permit the verification of the purpose, nature and extent of such testing. (TS/S)

When a decision is reached to move beyond research to advanced system development, there will be an agreed period of negotiation before any system deployment based upon such advanced system development could begin. Also before deployment begins, there will be an additional agreed period of negotiation on how the benefits of such a deployment can be shared. Actual deployments of advanced defensive systems would be coordinated so as to be mutually beneficial and linked to further, phased reductions in offensive ballistic missile capability on both sides. (TS/S)

The eventual goal would be sharing of the benefits of advanced defenses with all responsible nations so that there is a positive incentive against further investment in offensive ballistic missiles, while also requiring a parallel reduction in offensive nuclear forces by all participating nuclear powers. (TS/S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

June 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: BOB LINHARD / SVEN KRAEMER / JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Sample Letter to Gorbachev & TOR For ACSG Work

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President which provides the sample letter to General Secretary Gorbachev (modified as you directed based on this morning's session) and the associated paper that we have been working. The memorandum asks the President to review the letter (Tab A) to satisfy himself on the direction of the project, and then to approve the use of the paper (Tab B) to serve as a TOR for the ACSG work program.

With respect to the paper at Tab B, we have incorporated the fixes necessary to make the paper track the latest version of the letter. We have also reviewed the suggested fixes that you provided yesterday (copy at Tab II). Not all of the fixes tracked the direction that we are now going. Those that did were included.

Recommendation

That you approve the memorandum for the President at Tab I and forward it with the attachments at Tabs A and B to the President for his review/approval.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Rodman, Sestanovich

Attachments:

Tab I -- Memorandum for the President (S/S)
A -- Sample Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev (TS/S)
B -- Guidance Paper for ACSG Work (TS/S)

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Guidance for the Arms Control Support Group

Issue

Should we use the paper at Tab B as the terms of reference for the Arms Control Support Group's work program?

Background

Over the last two weeks we have had a series of discussions, including two NSPGs, on how best to guide and direct the Administration's work program to develop a response to the latest Soviet arms control proposals and position the U.S. for the fall.

Discussion

At Tab A is a sample letter to General Secretary Gorbachev which is based on these discussions and designed to give you a feel for the general direction that we believe you wish us to pursue.

At Tab B is a more detailed paper that is designed to serve as a terms of reference to guide a detailed work program to permit us to be in a position to send such a letter by mid-July. The substance of the sample letter is based upon the approach that is outlined in this more detailed paper.

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	
—	—	That you review the letter (<u>Tab A</u>) to satisfy yourself that we are pursuing the general direction that you desire.
—	—	That you approve the use of the paper (<u>Tab B</u>) to guide the detailed Arms Control Support Group work program.

Prepared by: Bob Linhard
Jack Matlock
Sven Kraemer

Attachments:

Tab A -- Sample Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev (TS/S)
Tab B -- Guidance Paper for ACSG Work (TS/S)

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/1/12