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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1986 (1/4)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1702

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8436	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ <i>R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	1	7/7/1986	B1
8437	MEMO	PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	2	ND	B1
8440	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	7/3/1996	B1
8438	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE USSR <i>PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	1	7/7/1986	B1 B3
8439	MEMO	COMMENTS OF DOBRYNIN ON PLANNING FOR A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT <i>D 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	3	7/2/1986	B1 B3
8441	FAX COVER SHEET	CABLE TO MOSCOW <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	7/8/1986	B1
8443	MEMO	MATLOCK TO VEST RE JUDYT MANDEL	2	7/8/1986	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1986 (1/4)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1702

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8442	LETTER	SAMPLE LETTER TO GORBACHEV PAR 2/25/2008 NLRRF06-114/5 R 10/8/10 M125/2	4	7/9/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

7/9/86

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

5003

Steve Steiner —
pls see JFM's
notation.

Note,
Comments

July 2, 1986

many

FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Rowny Book Chapter

Professor Uri Ra'Anan of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy has requested that Ambassador Rowny write a chapter for a book on technology and arms control. It was further requested that the chapter be on the topic "Strategic Offense-Defense Mixes: The Impact in Arms Control." Ambassador Rowny's proposed submission was sent to you on June 6. OSD and ACDA have cleared.

Request clearance on the latest iteration of this piece to Larry Wolbers, 647-4153 by COB Thursday, July 3rd.

rec'd July 9
10 AM

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

7/9/86
Steve
Don't have
time to read,
OK for me if
you approve
Cash

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Chiron 2
5006

MATLOCK

July 7, 1986

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Whitehead-Dubinina Conversation

The attached memorandum from Nick Platt reports a conversation John Whitehead had with Dubinin last week, during which Dubinin said that Gorbachev's speech in Warsaw contained some positive references to the U.S.

Comment: The "positive" mention was actually rather back-handed, since it implies that our approach to the issues up to now has not been very serious. Nevertheless, it was probably seen as something of a mirror image of the President's comments at Glassboro.

Concur: *by SES* Kraemer, Mandel, *SES* Sestanovich *SRS*

(I thought the State Department was making a little joke here.)

Attachment

Tab A: Platt-Poindexter Memorandum



United States Department of State ³
5006

Washington, D.C. 20520 8620506

July 2, 1986

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Deputy Secretary's Conversation with Ambassador
Dubinin

In the course of a conversation between the Deputy Secretary and Ambassador Dubinin last night at the reception at the White House, Ambassador Dubinin told John Whitehead that Gorbachev had made a second speech in Warsaw that included positive references to the United States. He followed up by sending John today the attached excerpt. While there is little new here, it illustrates what the Soviets consider a positive gesture.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Excerpt of Gorbachev Speech

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CWJ NARA, Date 6/25/02

MO290MO290

P H MSC800

07-01⁸⁶ JUL-2 0242^{010:49}

MSC800

.SPEECH =12.

1/7 TASS 40-2

U.S. PRESIDENT R. REAGAN, SPEAKING RECENTLY IN LASSBORO, ADMITTED, THOUGH NOT WITHOUT RESERVATIONS, THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR NEW PROPOSALS FOR REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. HE STATED THAT A TURNING POINT MAY NOW COME IN THE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY AND PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AND IN THIS CONNECTION HE RAISED AGAIN THE QUESTION OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING.

WE SHALL ONLY WELCOME IF WASHINGTON TAKES A MORE SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT. MR. REAGAN REMARKED CORRECTLY THAT TALK ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH TODAY. THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT WE NEVER TIRE REPEATING ALMOST ALL THE TIME SINCE GENEVA WHILE CONFIRMING OUR STRIVING FOR DISARMAMENT WITH CONSTRUCTIVE MOVES.

A FEW DAYS AGO I SENT A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT WITH CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON HOW TO TAKE THE MATTER OUT OF THE DEADLOCK AND TO BEGIN, AT LAST, REMOVING THE MOUNTAINS OF ARMS. WE HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WILL JOIN IN OUR INITIATIVES AND MAKE

POSSIBLE THE HOLDING OF A MEETING AND THE DRAFTING OF AGREEMENTS WHICH THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AND THE WHOLE WORLD ARE HOPEFULLY WAITING FOR.

MORE 1915 01 07 86!

TASS-07-01 1119EDT<

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

July 7, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Administration Contacts with
Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

State has recommended that we take advantage of the change in Soviet ambassadors to establish more reciprocity in the access our respective ambassadors enjoy here and in Moscow. This will require designating a central point for clearance of senior-level appointments. State recommends that this be done by the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in State.

In my opinion, this is a constructive suggestion, since EUR/SOV will be in a position to monitor Hartman's access in Moscow and, in view of this, monitor and advise our high-level contacts here.

A memorandum for Rod McDaniel to send to the executive secretaries of U.S. departments and agencies is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the attached memorandum for the executive secretaries of U.S. departments and agencies outlining the procedures for handling Administration contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I McDaniel Memorandum
Tab II Platt-Poindexter Memorandum

SECRET

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD6-114/5 #8436
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8437

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. DONALD GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON
Senior Special Assistant to the
Assistant to the Attorney General
and Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

MR. STEPHEN GLEASON
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of the Interior

MR. FLOYD GAIBLER
Confidential Assistant
to the Secretary
Department of Agriculture

MRS. HELEN ROBBINS
Executive Assistant
to the Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. DENNIS WHITFIELD
Under Secretary
Department of Labor

MR. JAMES J. DELANEY
Executive Secretary
Department of Health
and Human Services

MS. RUTH KNOUSE
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Transportation

MR. WILLIAM VITALE
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

MR. PHILIP DuSAULT
Acting Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. JAMES FRIERSON
Chief of Staff
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. JOHN A. SVAHN
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development

MR. BERYL SPRINKEL
Chairman
President's Council of
Economic Advisers

MR. CHARLES SIEGMAN
Senior Associate Director
Division of International
Finance
Federal Reserve Board

MR. JAMES H. DRAPER, III
President and Chairman
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN BITOFF
Executive Assistant
to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM08-125/2 #8437

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

~~SECRET~~

MR. RICHARD MEYER
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
U.S. Information Agency

MR. HENRY E. CLEMENTS
Executive Officer
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

MR. WILLIAM STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. FITZHUGH GREEN
Associate Administrator of
International Activities
Environmental Protection Agency

DR. RICHARD G. JOHNSON
Acting Director
Office of Science and Technology
Policy

DR. BODO BARTOCHA
Division Director
Division of International
Programs
National Science Foundation

MR. RONALD J. POST
Acting Chief of the Executive
Secretariat
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Procedures for Handling Administration
 Contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin (S)

The President has concluded that the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador presents an opportunity to coordinate more closely high-level USG contacts with the Soviet Embassy. This coordination is essential to promote the national interest, to increase the reciprocity in our relationship, and to ensure that the Soviets do not use our open system to play US agencies and policy makers against each other. In general, our position will be that Ambassador Dubinin should not be permitted more extensive contacts in the Executive Branch than those the Soviet authorities allow the American Ambassador in Moscow. (S)

To this end, Departments and other Agencies should observe the following procedures for contacts with the new Soviet Ambassador:

- Secretary Shultz is the primary point of contact with Ambassador Dubinin. (S)
- Ambassador Dubinin's requests for meetings with senior officials in other agencies should be coordinated in advance of a response and responses sent through the State Department. (S)
- Ambassador Dubinin's invitations to senior officials for business and social events at the Soviet Embassy should likewise be coordinated. (S)
- The point of contact in the State Department is the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, telephone: 647-3738. (U)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

SECRET

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

86 JUL 7 0 48:31

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

SYSTEM II
90503

ACTION OFFICER:

MATLOCK

DUE: 9 JUL

☐ Prepare Memo For President☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew☒ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott☐ Prepare Memo _____

to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

☐ Brooks
☐ Burghardt
☐ Cannistraro
☐ Childress
☐ Cobb
☐ Danzansky
☐ deGraffenreid
☐ Djerejian
☐ Dobriansky
☐ Donley
☐ Douglass
☐ Farrar
☐ Grimes
☐ Hanley
☐ Kelly
☐ Kraemer

FYI

☐ Laux
☐ Lenczowski
☐ Levine
☐ Linhard
☐ Mahley
☐ Major
☐ Mandel
☐ Matlock
☐ May
☐ North
☐ Perry
☐ Platt
☐ Pugliaresi
☐ Raymond
☐ Reger
☐ Ringdahl

FYI

☐ Ross
☐ Sable
☐ Sachs
☐ Sestanovich
☐ Small
☐ Sommer
☐ Soos
☐ Stark
☐ Steiner
☐ St Martin
☐ Tahir-Kheli
☐ Teicher
☐ Thompson
☐ Tillman
☐ _____
☐ _____

INFORMATION ☐ McDaniel☒ Rodman☒ Pearson☐ _____☒ Secretariat☐ _____☐ Poindexter (advance)☐ Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CLJ NARA, Date 6/27/02

SECRET

Return to Secretariat



8620714
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

9
SYSTEM II
90503

~~SECRET~~

July 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ

At your luncheon meeting July 1 with Secretary Shultz and other cabinet-level officials, it was agreed that Administration contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin would be handled in a coordinated way. We have attached draft "rules of engagement" based on the understanding reached, and recommend that you circulate them to the heads of relevant agencies.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/5 #8440

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Procedures for Handling Administration Contacts with
Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

The President has concluded that the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador presents an opportunity to coordinate more closely high-level USG contacts with the Soviet Embassy. This coordination is essential to promote the national interest, to increase the reciprocity in our relationship, and to ensure that the Soviets do not use our open system to play U.S. agencies and policy makers against each other.

In general, our position will be that Ambassador Dubinin should not be permitted more extensive contacts in the Executive Branch than those the Soviet authorities allow the American Ambassador in Moscow.

To this end, Departments and other agencies should observe the following procedures for contacts with the new Soviet Ambassador:

-- Secretary Shultz is the primary point of contact with Ambassador Dubinin.

-- Ambassador Dubinin's requests for meetings with senior officials in other agencies should be coordinated in advance of a response and responses sent through the State Department.

-- Ambassador Dubinin's invitations to senior officials for business and social events at the Soviet Embassy should likewise be coordinated. ~~and responses sent through the State Department.~~

-- The point of contact in the State Department is the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Tel. 647-3738.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 7, 1986

~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Meetings

State has suggested that Shevardnadze meet with the President when he comes to Washington for meetings with Secretary Shultz in September. Since the President normally meets with the Soviet Foreign Minister when the latter visits Washington during the UNGA, such a meeting seems appropriate.

Although State has proposed September 19-20 for the meeting, these dates have not yet been confirmed by the Soviets. The memorandum at Tab I requests State to inform us when the dates are set.

Concur: Lavin

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for Nick Platt at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for NPlatt
Tab A Incoming~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *6/25/02*

12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5005

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Meetings (U)

We have taken note of your memorandum received July 3 on dates for meetings with Shevardnadze. (U)

We will make every effort to schedule a meeting with the President when Shevardnadze is in Washington. Please notify us as soon as precise dates have been agreed upon for Shevardnadze's visit. (S)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By AS NARA, Date 6/25/02

13
SECRET

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

86 JUL 3 A 9: 32

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 5005

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK

DUE: 7 July

☐ Prepare Memo For President

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

☐ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

☒ Prepare Memo McDANIEL

to PLATT

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

☐ ☐ Brooks
☐ ☐ Burghardt
☐ ☐ Cannistraro
☐ ☐ Childress
☐ ☐ Cobb
☐ ☐ Danzansky
☐ ☐ deGraffenreid
☐ ☐ Djerejian
☐ ☐ Dobriansky
☐ ☐ Donley
☐ ☐ Douglass
☐ ☐ Farrar
☐ ☐ Grimes
☐ ☐ Hanley
☐ ☐ Kelly
☐ ☐ Kraemer

FYI

☐ ☐ Laux
☐ ☐ Lenczowski
☐ ☐ Levine
☐ ☐ Linhard
☐ ☐ Mahley
☐ ☐ Major
☐ ☐ Mandel
☐ ☐ Matlock
☐ ☐ May
☐ ☐ North
☐ ☐ Perry
☐ ☐ Platt
☐ ☐ Pugliaresi
☐ ☐ Raymond
☐ ☐ Reger
☐ ☐ Ringdahl

FYI

☐ ☐ Ross
☐ ☐ Sable
☐ ☐ Sachs
☐ ☐ Sestanovich
☐ ☐ Small
☐ ☐ Sommer
☐ ☐ Soos
☐ ☐ Stark
☐ ☐ Steiner
☐ ☐ St Martin
☐ ☐ Tahir-Kheli
☐ ☐ Teicher
☐ ☐ Thompson
☐ ☐ Tillman
☐ ☒ LAVIN
☐ ☐ _____

INFORMATION ☐ McDaniel

☒ Pearson

☒ Secretariat

☒ Rodman

☐ _____

☐ _____

☐ Poindexter (advance)

☐ Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 6/25/02

SECRET

Return to Secretariat



14
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 5005

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Dates for Shevardnadze Meetings

During his June 23 meeting with the President, Soviet Ambassador Dubinin raised the possibility of a mid-September meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to address preparations for the next summit. Ambassador Dubinin confirmed to the Secretary July 2 that Shevardnadze is prepared for such a meeting in connection with, but prior to, the Foreign Minister's participation in the UNGA in late September. We would anticipate that the meeting would take place in Washington.

We recommend that the President receive Shevardnadze during his visit, as he did when Shevardnadze was here last September. The most convenient dates for a Shevardnadze visit from the standpoint of the Secretary's schedule would be September 19 - 20.

The Department requests that space for a meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be reserved on the President's calendar for Friday, September 19.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *CX* NARA, Date *6/25/02*

Mary - ✓


Please send to
the Admiral in a
sealed "eyes only"
envelope.

sent 1/7/80 Jack

~~SECRET~~ / EYES ONLY ⁸⁴³⁸ 15A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1986



NOTE: [redacted] had hoped to see Gorbachev during his recent visit, but the appointment was not arranged. He also did not see Shevardnadze.

Jack

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/5 #8438
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

FOIA(b)(1)(3)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1986

Dear Mr. Yokley:


Thank you for your letter of May 26 inviting the President to participate in the Impact Symposium next year.

I certainly agree with you that your topic for next year is tailor-made for the President, and I hope that it will be possible to arrange for the President to participate. However, as I am sure you understand, it will be difficult to make commitments this far in advance, and also the competition of worthy activities for his time is very keen.

I am forwarding your letter to the White House offices which deal with the President's travel and with his schedule. If there is a possibility of the President's participation in the Impact Symposium next year, you will be hearing directly from them.

With best regards,


Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. James A. Yokley
Chairman
IMPACT 1987
Box 5907
Station B
Vanderbilt
Nashville, TN 37235

File July '86 19
Chrom



impact symposium

Box 5907, Station B · Vanderbilt · Nashville, TN · 37235

May 26, 1986

Hon. Jack Matlock
National Security Council
Room 366, Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Matlock:

I am Chairman of the 1987 IMPACT Symposium to be held in mid-February on the Vanderbilt campus. As you know, IMPACT is a speakers symposium which brings prominent speakers to campus to discuss a topic of national significance. Your participation in IMPACT 1986 was informative and greatly appreciated. We hope that you also enjoyed your involvement with the program.

For our 1987 program we are planning a symposium which will examine the changes that have occurred in America during the Reagan era and a look ahead to what the future holds for the United States. For the keynote address we are considering several different speakers. At this time we are particularly interested in a forum with some of the 1988 Presidential hopefuls.

Nothing could make the IMPACT more complete and more exciting than to have President Reagan deliver an opening address to begin the symposium. An address by President Reagan would not only be perfect for the program, but an outstanding event for the Vanderbilt and Nashville area communities as well.

Although your expertise does not lend itself to our topic, I am writing to request any information, advice, or assistance that you might be able to give us in our efforts to have President Reagan speak at Vanderbilt.


Therese Kavanagh, Vice-Chairman for Speakers, will be responsible for contacting President Reagan to consider speaking at IMPACT later this month. If you can assist us in any way please contact her at the enclosed address.

21

Hon. Jack Matlock
May 26, 1986
Page Two

Thank you for your time and any help you can give in this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "James A. Yokley". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "J" and "Y".

James A. Yokley
Chairman, IMPACT 1987

enclosure

Therese Kavanagh
5475 Collingwood Cove
Memphis, TN 38119

IMPACT

MAGAZINE 1986



**CONFLICT OR
COMPROMISE
IN EAST/WEST
RELATIONS**

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
FEBRUARY 21 - 22

From the Chairman


The meeting of President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in November appeared to signal the start of a new dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now in February some uncertainty exists over what the next move in East/West relations will be. Nuclear arms control talks have thus far produced no new agreements, and the fate of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative remains uncertain. Civil wars in Afghanistan, Angola, El Salvador and Nicaragua — which bring into focus East/West competition in the Third World — continue unabated. Elsewhere in the world, the People's Republic of China must make important economic and political decisions as that country begins to play a larger role in the balance of power between East and West.

"The Next Move: Conflict or Compromise in East/West Relations" will focus on key issues in East/West relations by presenting American and foreign viewpoints that cover the political spectrum. Our intention, as organizers of IMPACT 1986, is to have an unbiased program that stimulates thought and encourages the formation of well-reasoned opinions.

Since its inception in 1964, the IMPACT Symposium has brought several noted, and sometimes controversial, speakers to campus to discuss topics of major significance. The excerpt from Professor Conkin's book *Gone With the Ivy* reprinted in this magazine recounts the turbulent early years, when IMPACT organizers struggled to establish a truly open forum at Vanderbilt. Through the years IMPACT planners have striven to match the standard set by those early organizers. This year we are privileged to have two former Presidents and other distinguished speakers discussing what may be termed the most pressing topic of our day. We hope that our program from IMPACT 1986 continues the tradition set by its predecessors.



John K. Bush
Chairman



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

IMPACT Magazine

THE NEXT MOVE: *Conflict or Compromise in East/West Relations*

Campus Symposium, February 21-22

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What Can The Historian Possibly Add?

Reflections on Russian and Soviet History

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I. "WELL, WHAT ARE THE RUSSIANS REALLY LIKE?"

Historians are, or ought to be, skeptics by nature. We often must admit that our sources of information are limited, our observations and conclusions circumscribed. Those of us who study imperial Russia and the Soviet Union realize especially the validity of this caveat. Barriers of geography, language, culture and ideology have limited our knowledge. Very often, however, the general public is led to believe the opposite. Frequently American audiences think that they possess more than an adequate fund of information to understand their Soviet coun-

terparts. They do, of course, often know a great deal about life in the U.S.S.R.; various "experts" and "analysts" have provided numerous answers to the question "What are the Russians really like?" Yet, for the skeptical historian, it is the character of this knowledge which gives him pause.

Quite naturally, Western public opinion tends to regard the Soviet Union solely in Western terms. How closely "Russia" resembles our own culture with its own specific values and norms significantly affects our image of that land. Hence Americans question the extent of individual civil liberties in the U.S.S.R., wondering when or whether the Soviet state will accommodate the basic rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution for over two centuries. Similarly, debate occurs about possible economic reforms allowing the extension of free market principles into Soviet life. Or experts speculate about the startling appearance of a Soviet-style Madison Avenue public relations effort, again reinforcing this penchant to think of "them" as if they were "us." This tendency to "Americanize" the Soviet Union in order to understand it also is reflected in the commentary of those who warn against "totalitarian" tyranny. The stark fact, buttressed to be sure by numerous examples, that "they" so graphically fail to guarantee "our" fundamental rights and freedoms renders the Soviets an entity threatening the American way of life.

Historically Westerners frequently have utilized this comparative perspective to reach some understanding of Russia. Some characteristics of its society were found to be strikingly different from, others surprisingly similar to, life in Europe or America. This is of course understandable. Since at least the 17th century, Russia has experienced and sampled successive waves of Western influence. The major powers of northern Europe—England, Sweden, Germany and especially France—all preceded the United States as primary cultural influences upon Russia. An elite population assimilated much, but certainly not all, of what these societies had to offer; Soviet city dwellers in the same way today often exhibit remarkable familiarity with the consumer tastes or the avant garde literature of Americans. A much larger part of the population, certainly the vast majority before the 20th century, only slightly, if at all, felt these winds from the West. To western observers, they remained quintessentially Russian. Whatever else that

term meant, it plainly, conveyed the sentiment that these people were profoundly different from, and perhaps inferior to, the modern Western individual.

A society which historically has manifested two such different visages—one Western, the other Russian—inevitably invites comparison with the Western community of nations. Yet Western cultural norms, social structures and political systems did not emerge in Russia and never fully applied to it. Hence should it be surprising that the assimilation of Western values by Russian elites more often than not produced significant changes in the meaning of the values themselves? Should it be surprising that a country which dates its written history to the relatively recent 9th century has evolved distinctly Russian historical patterns and has remained influenced by its own deeply rooted cultural values? How then should the skeptical historian attempt to present aspects of Russian and Soviet history? He invites his audience to consider that explaining Russia or the Soviet Union solely from the Western perspective in the final analysis explains very little. It is necessary and important to examine a historical experience which in fundamental ways differs from that of the West.

II. PATTERNS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY: STATE AND SOCIETY

To begin comprehending the Soviet century of Russia's history necessitates considering several prominent features of this broader tableau. One phenomenon looms large: the central and formative influence exerted upon Russian history by the state. The language which historians have used to conceptualize Russian development since the 9th century is illustrative. They consider the characteristic features of early feudal Russian princes and delineate how from among these medieval lords the grand prince of Moscow rose to preeminence. Envisioning the broad European Russian plain, they portray how the Muscovite tsars gathered the Russian lands" under the aegis of the "centralized Muscovite state." Scholars often utilize the two imperial capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg, as metaphors for the conflicting values which the state was capable of imposing upon the country: Moscow, the center of Russian autocracy and orthodoxy; St. Petersburg, Russia's "window onto the West." Such analyses, to be sure, often have overstated the degree of state influence upon Russian life. They do, however, accurately convey

an essential characteristic of the Russian state, one which Western audiences usually neglect. The state could be, and often was, an agent in Russian history which acted in ways entirely independent of societal influence.

Following upon this fundamental distinction between Western and Russian historical development is an equally important corollary. Indeed it is a second preeminent aspect of Russian history. Given the prominent role which the state has played historically, all other forms of political, civic and societal organizations in Russia never developed that diversity and independence which characterized Western European and particularly North American life. Consider for example the city. In medieval Europe, towns, with their traditional rights and legal charters, often could wield power and enjoy some independence when they confronted the centralized state. For this reason some historians consider that the towns were bastions for the development of modern capitalism and for that entrepreneurial spirit which occupies such a sacrosanct position in North Atlantic civilization.

This argument cannot be applied to Russian cities, of which there were only a dozen of any significance even in 1900. Developed chiefly at the behest of the state, many initially were created as frontier outposts, guarding traditional invasion routes into central Muscovy. Rather than fostering the growth of capitalism or entrepreneurialism, the Russian town served the state as a convenient and accessible source of tax revenue and military recruitment. Indeed economic change in Russia, particularly that spurt of industrialization so essential to European modernization, proceeded almost entirely under state guidance. What is most significant about Russian capitalism and entrepreneurialism is the repeated attempts of the state, especially in the later 19th century, to implant both from above.

We must remember that this peculiar relationship between state and society, so suggestive of the U.S.S.R. today, informs much of Russian history. The preponderant weight of the state — its institutions, bureaucracy and concentrated power — is a primary factor differentiating Russian from Western political and social development. Even on the eve of the First World War, as the empire confronted the first industrial war of the 20th century, Russia remained in many ways a non-western, "pre-modern" society. To be sure, the country had taken significant strides to-

ward modernity, especially given notable industrial and urban development. Yet, it also continued to feel the weight of its state-dominated heritage.

Russia in 1914 still was an imperial state which ruled over a disunited population divided among regional and ethnic communities. Russia also was an autocratic state which largely monopolized the legal exercise of political power and did so in the name of the "benevolent tutelage" deemed necessary in a historically peasant and agrarian society. Russia, finally, was a bureaucratic state, buttressed by the law and military force. Here among the most perceptive statesmen of the late imperial period, a keen awareness of the penalties of Russian "backwardness" prevailed. Yet, despite their willingness to accommodate and even accelerate Russian social and economic development, bureaucratic statesmen on the eve of the war seldom contemplated the evolution of what they called "Western parliamentarism." They recognized, as should we, that the foundations for a Western nation-state had not evolved in Russia and that Western social and political evolution had failed to overcome the indigenous patterns of Russian state-building so pronounced in its own history.

III. SOVIET HISTORY AND "EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION"

To the extent that imperial Russian history aids our understanding of the Soviet era, it can be seen that the stereotype of "Marxist-Leninist dictatorship" or Soviet "totalitarianism" in fact is as much a product of long-term historical trends as of Leninist ideology. Of course, Bolshevik ideology and the Soviet state in which it became embedded are significant factors in 20th century Russian history. Yet, as historians initiate study of this era, we are beginning to realize that the issues of central state power and politics preoccupy us and that the moral dilemma of totalitarianism versus Western democracy largely has precluded consideration of the broader socio-economic, cultural and political fabric of the Soviet era.


To examine these aspects of Soviet history is not to suggest that earlier interest in the nature of the totalitarian system was misplaced. It was not. Certainly one of the major paradoxes of these years is that an era which began with an avowedly socialist and working class revolution witnessed the Stalinist state of the 1930s become a much more decisive and domineering influence upon Soviet soci-

ety than the autocracy had been in imperial Russia. The well-known testimony of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn stands first in a genre examining the arbitrary uses of modern power so often characteristic of the Soviet state.

Yet, the centralized state and its utilization of power is not the sum total of Soviet history. It ignores, for example, the character and consequences of the 1917 Russian Revolution itself. Contrary to the stereotype of "communist coup d'etat," which suggests an organized attempt to undermine constituted authority and seize power, we confront a complex revolutionary process within which societal initiative and diverse popular aspirations were more pronounced than at any other prior time in Russian history. The degree of popular support for the early Bolshevik state is a subject for continuing debate. That the debate continues among scholars indicates the wealth of evidence illuminating the popular origins of the Soviet era.

Popular aspirations, societal initiative, the socio-economic and cultural fabric of the Soviet years: these are all analytical terms which Westerners frequently fail to associate with the history of the U.S.S.R. At times one could almost believe that certain analysts think it possible for a political structure to exist somehow in a social and cultural vacuum. We accept this premise at our peril, however, because we thereby risk ignoring how society and culture shaped the formation of the Soviet state.

For example, the damage sustained by Russian society after nine years of world war, revolution, civil war and famine (1914-1922) was immense: decline of urban population, economic contraction, the loss of much technological expertise necessary for modern industrial management. Subsequently Soviet policy makers in the 1920's were to debate these prob-



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lems as a heritage which the revolutionary years had bequeathed to them. How was the young Soviet state to foster industrialization in a still resilient peasant society? How could it acculturate the population to support the Soviet system? What, in the final analysis, had the "socialist revolution" been about and where was it headed? These were all critical dilemmas confronting the party and a variety of conflicting opinions, were offered concerning their resolution. Ultimately only one option would triumph when Stalin implemented the first five-year plan and began the sweeping "revolution from above" (1928-1933). Yet, to understand this radical outcome of wholesale, state-sponsored social engineering, historians realize that it is necessary to explore the rich and diverse historical context of the 1920s which so fundamentally shaped the perceptions of the party and its elite.

Similarly, we might note the consolidation of the Stalinist state in the 1930's—with its massive expansion of stultifying bureaucracy with its sweeping application of police terror and with the probable millions of deaths through social dislocation and deliberate tactics of the Great Purges. These familiar characteristics of the totalitarian model, however, conceal what in retrospect was perhaps the most significant aspect of the Stalin years, as well as an unintended, but far-reaching, consequence of the Russian Revolution. These pre-war decades saw a massive upward movement of lower-class individuals (loosely defined as workers and peasants) into the expanding administrative apparatus of the party and state. That generation of Soviet leadership which only recently passed from the scene—the Krushchevs, Brezhnevs, Chernenkos, and Andropovs—were pacesetters for millions of others who saw the major accomplishment of the revolution as the opportunity it offered to become "middle-class" (*meschanstvo*). Such a popular base, to be sure, fostered the growth of deference to authority, submission to hierarchy and resignation before omnipotent government officials. It also, however, created a popular foundation for a regime which, having been tested in the traumatic Nazi assaults upon the nation itself, can retain legitimacy by supplying the minimal accoutrements of a middle-class life.

Can the historian hope that the preced-

ing discussion contributes in any way to the resolution of East-West confrontation? From the perspective of the 20th century, it would appear that confrontation between two such dissimilar systems is endemic to the relationship. Do the conflicting value systems of the two political cultures dictate mutual confrontation? Often the depressing answer seems to be a tentative yes. Hence, there is some value in a more perceptive and nuanced understanding of Russian and Soviet history. If the confrontation is to be managed in

ways short of military conflict, it is necessary to regard the opponent as something more than an abstract and hostile political entity engaged in a struggle for ideological supremacy. History allows insight into the human condition. By studying our opponent we can begin to regard "him" as a complex culture, society and nation. Humanizing the opponent, in the final analysis, we reduce the likelihood that the inevitable confrontation reaches the stage from which it cannot return. ■

IMPACT

In Search of Better Directions: East and West in Latin America

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The ongoing debate over United States policy in Latin America has fallen victim to Americans' myopic preoccupation with superpower relations. The perception that contemporary problems in Latin America are largely the result of the conflict between East and West and arise out of Soviet (and Cuban) subversion ignores the internal dynamics of Latin American nations and reduces five centuries of historical evolution to insignificance. The Soviets have **exploited** the emerging crisis conditions in Latin America. They did not create them. The United States will not come to grips with the nature of contemporary events in Latin America until Americans understand that the growing crisis arises out of social, economic and political forces existing and evolving long before the rise of the Soviet Union.

The poverty, injustice and inequities that have produced the explosive situation in contemporary Latin America have emerged out of the clash of historical forces beginning with the voyages of Columbus in 1492. The conquest of Latin America by the Spanish and Portuguese in the sixteenth century established many of the basic patterns that continue to plague the region. The most injurious of the legacies of Iberian conquest and col-

onization was the construction of societies built upon a rigid racial and social structure, and upon economic domination of the vast majority by a small (largely European) elite. Control of land and labor lay at the heart of this society, and this situation normally meant European domination of land and Indian or slave labor. Three centuries of Iberian colonial rule cemented this land and labor system firmly in place and promoted the construction of a racial and social system that reinforced the domination of the light-skinned few over the darker majority.

Paradoxically, the wars for political independence from Spain and Portugal in the early nineteenth century did not transform the colonial system, but insured its continuation in a new guise as local elites simply replaced their European counterparts. In other words, independence brought no social and political revolutions. In fact, the patterns of concentrated land ownership, of domination of non-white labor, and of elite controlled politics became more deeply entrenched in the nineteenth century as Latin America entered into the emerging world economic system.

In the nineteenth century Latin Amer-

ican political elites looked to Great Britain and the United States as their models for development, yet their adoption and adaptation of Anglo-American ideals produced harshly distorted caricatures of the Anglo-American system when put into practice. Literally hundreds of constitutions and laws modeled after those of the United States and Great Britain testify to the noble ideals of the Latin American elites. Economic underdevelopment, widespread social injustice and recurring political conflict testify to the failure to put those ideals into practice.

As the elites welcomed British and North American investment and entrepreneurs with open arms in the nineteenth century, the resulting economic growth served to intensify the inequalities and patterns of the colonial heritage. Political elites in search of economic growth promoted the products that gave them a comparative advantage in the international marketplace, and that promotion invariably oriented their economies toward the production and exportation of agricultural products and raw materials. The political and economic elites watched the old plantation and hacienda system flourish anew as they exported coffee, bananas, sugar and raw materials. Along with the crucial need to insure an adequate labor supply for the expanding economy, came the need to maintain political supremacy.

Rather than opening up Latin American society, the entry of foreign investment and capitalism into the region in the nineteenth century ironically led to greater rigidity in the system. With the notable exceptions of countries such as Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile (who did not entirely escape the patterns), most Latin American nations did not experience the emergence of democratic politics with the expansion of capitalism. The historical partnership between democratic expansion and capitalist development that had characterized the British and American experience failed to emerge in Latin America.

As Latin America moved into the twentieth century, continued economic growth increasingly placed pressure on a system characterized by elite control in politics, economics and society. The rise of the Soviet Union and socialist movements in the decades after World War I, then, entered onto the historical stage in Latin America with the play well under way. The Soviets and, more precisely, Marxist-

inspired political movements added an important and powerful new group of actors to the drama, but they moved within the bounds of a script that was already well into the later acts.

The distortions produced by the merger of the old colonial system and the capitalist expansion of the United States and Great Britain produced several generations of critics who saw capitalism—and the United States as its foremost leader—as the root of the problems of poverty, repression and social injustice. The heavyhanded political tactics of the United States in the form of gunboat diplomacy, military intervention and the “Big Stick” seemed to the critics to confirm their analysis. No wonder then that so many Latin American intellectuals and politicians turned to socialism and Marxism as their model in this century. Marxist and socialist analysis offered (and offers) a powerful and cogent critique of capitalism; and many Latin Americans, given their own experience with capitalist development and the United States in the post-independence period, found this critique especially appealing.

Long before the Soviet Union appeared on the scene, United States policy in Latin America had been geared toward two (often contradictory) goals. On the one hand, the U.S. wanted to see the development of stable, democratic regimes modeled after our own. On the other hand, our foreign policy has done everything possible to prevent instability and the rise of revolution on the assumption that revolutionary upheaval could produce regimes antagonistic to U.S. interests in the region. When the forces of change begin to alter the old balance of power and create upheaval, our fear of instability and revolution leads policy makers to opt for stability and alliance with the status quo rather than chance the possible consequences of upheaval. In short, we have repeatedly aligned ourselves with the internal power structure in Latin American nations against the forces of change rather than face the possibility that some of those forces of change might be anti-capitalist and anti-American. Latin American generals and oligarchs learned very quickly that the U.S., despite its dislike of dictators, would come to their aid rather than allow for the rise of the instability upheaval that come from major structural change.

The rising challenge of Marxism in the

form of Soviet Communism added a powerful new element to the old political drama. The ruling elites in Latin America very quickly learned the value of staunch anti-communism and the utility of attacking as communists those who would challenge their power. In the post World War II years, Somoza in Nicaragua, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Pinochet in Chile (to name just a few) adopted the rhetoric of the cold war and transformed the old struggle between the forces of change and the elites into the new struggle between a communist East and a capitalist West. U.S. policymakers in the postwar years saw a bipolar world in which every country, large or small, was our ally or our enemy. The old elites in Latin America simply confirmed this vision as they placed their own struggle in the language of the East-West conflict.

A fundamental flaw in this vision is that it sees the Soviet Union and Marxism as the principal source of instability and upheaval in postwar Latin America. The true source of upheaval is the success of capitalism and U.S.-backed efforts to promote democratic movements. In the forty years since the end of the war, most of Latin America has experienced significant economic growth, and this growth has led to the emergence of an increasingly vocal and assertive middle class. In the 1960s the United States turned to this emerging middle class as the salvation of Latin America and the instrument for blunting the rising forces of leftist revolution. The Alliance for Progress, begun by President Kennedy in 1961, was specifically designed to pour massive amounts of aid into Latin American nations in support of middle-class political movements that opposed communism and called for democratic reforms in the old power structure. The U.S. saw support for these movements as the “last best hope” for thwarting the rise of Marxist-inspired revolutions. If we could not pressure the old elites to accept gradual reforms, so the theory went, we would eventually face political polarization and revolutionary upheaval. As Kennedy put it, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable.”

The Alliance for Progress and growth of Latin American economies in the 1960's succeeded in ways that Kennedy and his policy makers never envisioned. These democratic movements with middle-class leadership experienced a “revolution of

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Risk, Deterrence, and War


By Jack Kugler
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Students of international conflict have long concentrated on general or global wars, not because such wars are intrinsically different from other conflicts, but because they have lasting and devastating consequences for the major participants and on the continuity and stability of the entire international system. One of the most consistent findings of the vast literature of major wars is that participants have been unable to fully control the conditions which lead to conflict. The critical question today is whether nuclear weapons have altered these conditions sufficiently to assure that a massive nuclear war can be avoided.

One school of thought which supports Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) holds that the development of nuclear weapons has resulted in an ultra-stable international system and has all but eliminated the possibility of a general war. Advocates of MAD argue that major wars that would otherwise be waged among disgruntled powers are now thwarted by the threat of costly retaliation for unacceptable actions. Potential opponents continue to desire competing goals but the fear of nuclear devastation prevents them from aggressively pursuing their political objectives. Those who have labored to redefine deterrence strategies since 1945 have found support for their position by noting that every nation has adopted some variant of deterrence upon acquiring nuclear weapons and that no nuclear power has directly fought another in the last 40 years.

More skeptical analysts find such arguments insufficient. While conceding that a nuclear war has not occurred, these analysts point out that the use of nuclear weapons has been approached on several occasions. They also argue that their skepticism is sustained by empirical evidence showing that threats of nuclear attack have not always averted the escalation of



some crises or even determined their final outcome. Finally, they find support for their skeptical position in overviews of severe crises since 1945 which indicates that, as in the past, conventional rather than nuclear superiority is the best predictor of crisis resolutions.

Recent work on relative power and the relationship between cycles and war also leads to doubt about the efficacy of deterrence. This growing literature suggests that a major war has been avoided since 1945 because the necessary conditions for such a war have not been present, rather than because nuclear weapons have been added to national arsenals. Thus it is unclear whether we have survived since 1945 because of nuclear weapons or in spite of them.

The academic debate on both sides of this question is undoubtedly going to continue. Yet, short of a nuclear war, it is impossible to directly determine whether nuclear weapons are, or are not, responsible for the absence of war. Nevertheless indirect tests are possible. One way to circumvent the lack of empirical evidence on nuclear stability is to formalize the argument of deterrence. From a formal model, the conditions necessary for deterrence to function can be derived and, in some cases, tested empirically. Results from a formal exploration of these conditions can

provide support for deterrence by exploring the consistency of these structures and their logical deductions. At the same time such evaluations can identify potential instabilities by noting the absence of necessary preconditions. They may also be able to indicate ways in which potential instability can be avoided.

We begin by defining deterrence in a rather narrow way. By nuclear deterrence we mean that nuclear war is prevented by the threat of nuclear retaliation against an opponent. Once a threat is made, a challenger is presumably intimidated by the tremendous cost of pursuing the desired goal. Conflict is averted, therefore, not because both actors prefer the status quo, but because the cost of the expected retaliation exceeds any potential gain.

Since costs play such a critical role in deterrence logic, let us expand briefly on the damage anticipated from a strategic nuclear war. The distinction between conventional and nuclear war has become less clear with the advent of tactical nuclear weapons. Conflicts that involve only tactical nuclear weapons may result in losses equal to those incurred in larger conventional wars, but a confrontation that involves strategic nuclear weapons in even a limited exchange would produce demographic and industrial losses that no longer compare to past experience. Because of this difference in the costs of war, the operation of *nuclear* deterrence requires that peace be maintained through nuclear threats whose costs, if carried out, far exceeds the losses that can be inflicted with conventional weapons or even those that could be attained with tactical nuclear arsenals. Thus, strategic nuclear deterrence comes into play only when opponents perceive a massive "gap" between the 'acceptable' costs of a major conventional war and the 'unacceptable' costs of a strategic nuclear war.

There is little doubt that the use of strategic nuclear weapons can produce

the levels of devastation anticipated by nuclear strategists. Abundant evidence supports the notion that the most severe conventional wars produced losses that do not come near those expected from a nuclear exchange. The most intense wars in the last century produced losses that approached 15 percent of the total population. This level is the "low" threshold anticipated in the case of a strategic nuclear exchange. Moreover, such losses would occur in a nuclear encounter in a matter of days rather than years, and could easily escalate to an expected limited of 60 to 80 percent of each participant's population within six weeks of a nuclear exchange, depending of course on the decisions made by the belligerents. This ability to threaten massive destruction is the key to strategic deterrence.

Since nuclear weapons have been deployed, conflict at the international and the intra-national level has occurred quite frequently. Yet, all these conflicts have thus far remained at the conventional level. A strict definition of the scope of this inquiry may, therefore, be helpful here. By "major wars" we mean conflicts that potentially exceed the cost, in both industrial and human terms, of all conflicts previously waged. Given the massive human and industrial losses incurred in World Wars I and II, it is unlikely that a conventional war between major powers could once more achieve such severity without involving nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, losses of population and industry of such massive proportions would presumably result from any nuclear war where strategic nuclear weapons are used. Our study is restricted, therefore, to the analysis of this type of strategic exchange.

The starting point for this evaluation is provided by our findings which show that deterrence is potentially unstable. Specifically, using an expected utility model, we found that nations facing nuclear parity achieved a tenuous stability, which however could be maintained only when opposing actors are either risk-neutral or risk-averse.* Concurrently, working within a game-theoretic framework, we demonstrated that nuclear deterrence can be stable, but only when each player has invulnerable second-strike capability and a credible retaliatory threat. Thus, under MAD the necessary conditions for war and peace are simultaneously present. The objective of this summary is to pro-

vide a connection between the results of two paradigms in order to outline the exact conditions that distinguish war from peace under conditions of MAD.

According to our analysis, the credibility of MAD comes into question even when absolute losses are enormous. Decision makers in the United States or the Soviet Union who are risk-acceptant can precipitate a nuclear confrontation. The stability of deterrence can be maintained by insuring high costs and preserving a balance of nuclear forces, only when these decision makers are risk-neutral or risk-averse. However, like MAD, our analysis shows that an inequality in nuclear capabilities can also be destabilizing, since it can provide even risk-neutral or risk-averse actors with the necessary conditions for initiating conflict. Thus, attempting to achieve a nuclear imbalance would further destabilize the relationship between nuclear nations. Maintaining nuclear balance will in the long run lead to a nuclear war.

Our analysis produces very specific and unexpected results. The systematic exploration of risk propensity isolates instability only when a reduced number of situations occur. Conflict is not implied simply because one actor is risk-acceptant. Risk-acceptant actors, however, will seek and extract gains from opponents whose resolve is weaker. Thus, under these conditions, confrontations will be settled short of war.

Deterrence is generally stable when one of the actors is risk-neutral. Against a risk-averse or risk-neutral opponent, such decision-makers maintain stability despite competition. Even confronted with a risk-taking opponent, the ensuing conflict would most likely be resolved short of massive devastation because a firm response to the initiatives of the risk-taker will rapidly restore reality to the risk-taker's optimistic expectations.

We also show that actors who maintain a consistent risk-neutral perspective are most likely to maintain stability. Risk-neutral actors induce superior outcomes to those of risk-averse actors because the latter induce stable behavior only from their counterparts and from risk-neutral actors, but they increase demands and further challenges by appeasing risk-takers. In other words, risk-neutral actors produce stable outcomes against risk-averse and risk-neutral counterparts and minimize the costs of war if they are faced with a risk-acceptant actor.


The most dangerous conditions for deterrence are created when risk-acceptant actors enter the picture. Risk-acceptant actors can trigger war against risk-neutral countries, or even risk-averse actors, by continuously imposing new demands on the latter actors who are then replaced. Most importantly, war will rapidly escalate when the decision-makers in both nuclear countries are risk-acceptant.

Despite these results, we do not argue that the stability of nuclear deterrence hangs on a very thin thread. Decision-makers like Hitler or Khomeni, who fit the profile of extreme risk-takers, are not frequently selected to lead major nations. Our logical evaluations simply predict that when such actors become the leaders of major nations, nuclear threats may not be sufficient to avert major war.

Can Mutual Assured Destruction be a stable policy? The answer is, perhaps. If leaders are chosen among risk-neutral or risk-averse individuals, the stability of the international system can be preserved over a very long time. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether citizens of the nuclear nations have the ability to manipulate the selection of their leader to insure that individuals with the correct risk profiles are always selected. In our view, since the nuclear balance was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States in the last decade, we live with the specter of potential war regardless of our actions. Although the "balance of terror" has so far remained stable, it is a tenuous stability indeed. Others have, of course, pointed this out. But to our knowledge, no one has systematically outlined, as we have, the exact conditions for its potential demise. ■

Editors Note: A detailed explanation of the Kugler and Zagare study may be found in Explaining the Stability of Deterrence.

* Risk is simply calculated as the willingness to suffer. A risk-averse leader is one who is inhibited when his population is exposed to a retaliatory nuclear strike smaller than the one imposed with a first-strike on the opponent. A risk-neutral actor is one inhibited by equivalent losses from a retaliatory strike. Finally, a risk-acceptant decision-maker is one who is inhibited only when a second-strike assures population losses larger than those inflicted in the first strike.



Espionage (spying) may indeed be the world's second oldest profession. Today, it also appears to be the world's major growth industry. Spies have played a role in international relations from earliest times. During the past year, however, hardly a week went by without disclosure of some new spy scandal. Twice as many spies were discovered in the United States in the past two years as were disclosed in the previous decade.

Consider selected headlines of recent times:

F.B.I. AGENT ACCUSED OF SPYING
WALKER SPIES ON NAVY FOR
RUSSIA

WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF DEFECTS

SENIOR KGB OPERATIVE IN
BRITAIN DEFECTS

BRITISH EXPUL 31 SOVIET SPIES
MOSCOW SEND BRITISH

"SPIES" PACKING
FRENCH SECRET AGENTS SINK
"PEACE"

YURCHENKO, KGB CHIEF IN
U.S., DEFECTS

MORISON CONVICTED BY U.S.
OF ESPIONAGE

U.S. NAVY EMPLOYEE SPIES
FOR ISRAEL

EX-CIA EMPLOYEE NABBED FOR
SPYING FOR CHINA

These headlines exemplify a spy mania that is sweeping the West. My purpose in this brief essay is to explore the meaning of all this. What is the nature of modern espionage? How can we explain the large number of spy and counter-spy stories disclosed in recent times? Who is winning the espionage war? Why does there seem to be so much more current espionage activity on the part of governments? Can we expect a growth in espionage disclosures in the future? What is the significance of all of this to international relations and to the prospects for world peace?

To put the subject in perspective, consider the nature of modern espionage. Espionage is the illegal collection of information for intelligence use that the holder of such information wishes to keep secret. Intelligence refers to evaluated and processed information needed to make deci-

IMPACT

Spy Wars and the Relations of Nations

By Harry Howe Ransom
Professor of Political Science
Vanderbilt University

sions. The word *intelligence* can be used with reference to business, military, economic or political decisions; but it most commonly relates to governmental, foreign and defense policy. Intelligence generally has a national security connotation and therefore exists in deep secrecy.

Espionage, or spying, is illegal according to national laws. Spying efforts proceed against the attempts of counterespionage (or counterintelligence) agencies to protect the secrecy of the information desired.

In the United States the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the main agency for gathering secret overseas information that may have bearing on national security. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, or FBI, performs the counter-espionage role within the United States, attempting to thwart the espionage efforts of foreign agencies, such as the Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (KGB or Committee of State Security) of the Soviet Union. The KGB is the CIA and FBI rolled

into one. The functions of both the CIA and the KGB extend beyond intelligence; both are responsible for counterintelligence overseas and for various forms of covert action (political intervention, secret propaganda, paramilitary activities) that have little to do with gathering information but are performed secretly.

International espionage methods and operations have few boundaries. Spying has been romanticized in popular fiction and the mass media, but in reality espionage exists in a tawdry world of deception, fraud and sometimes violence. Espionage involves the recruiting of agents in foreign nations, the encouraging of disloyalty of those possessing significant information and particularly the recruiting of "defectors." Techniques of eliciting secret information include audio surveillance as well as the full range of modern photographic, sensing and detection devices. In an atmosphere of mutual distrust, the two super-powers assume that they have vast informational requirements. Not surprisingly then the United States and Soviet Union, which have thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on each other, assume that survival requires the fullest information possible about each other's strategic capabilities and intentions as well as detailed political and economic information from most other areas of the world.

Although all nations have laws against espionage, most nonetheless send their spies into other lands. Recently Americans have been discovered spying for Israel and China as well as for the Soviet Union. Because of the clandestine nature of espionage, no reliable count exists of how many intelligence officers—only a small percentage of whom are actually spies—are at work at any one time in the world. A common estimate is that the United States today employs some 200,000 intelligence personnel; the number generally ascribed to the Soviet Union is 400,000, a figure that undoubtedly includes such categories as border guards and internal security police. Perhaps less than 10 percent of these can be accurately categorized as spies.

Today scores of developed nations have efficient intelligence organizations with

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systematic programs for recruiting new intelligence professionals. They come from three sources: the university world, where graduates are sought for intelligence careers; the armed services and policy forces, where some degree of intelligence proficiency may already exist; and the underground world of espionage, which produces an assortment of persons including criminal informers with relevant experience.

Those who do the actual spying, which may involve stealing information or performing disloyal acts of disclosure, are variously motivated. Greed or financial need is a leading incentive in many cases, but other motivations, such as ambition, political ideology, sexual involvement or nationalistic idealism, can figure importantly. Believing that the West must be warned of war danger, Oleg Penkovsky, a highly placed Soviet officer, provided secret information to Western intelligence services. H.A.R. ("Kim") Philby, the English spy, worked for the Soviet Union on ideological grounds. Most recent American spies were motivated by financial greed. Ideology seems to be fading as a motivator.

Some spies must be seduced into cooperation; others volunteer and are termed "walk-ins." The latter must be handled with extreme caution, as double agents often appear among the volunteers. Double agents are spies who pretend to be disloyal, but in reality they maintain their original loyalty and hope to deceive their new masters. Counterintelligence staffs are usually skeptical of walk-ins or defectors, subject them to careful lie detector testing and restrict their use for positive espionage purposes. The most valuable spy of all is the "agent-in-place," the person who remains in a position of trust with access to secret information but who has been recruited by a foreign intelligence service. Such a spy is sometimes called a "mole."

High-priority espionage targets are the penetration of the various international terrorist organizations and those involved in international narcotics and illegal arms sales. If the leadership of such units can be infiltrated by spies, foreknowledge can be obtained of the location and identity of intended victims or markets, the nature of the disguises being used by the hit team and the secret sources of weapons or narcotics. Such information can be used to foil terrorist operations and control inter-

national drug traffic. Indeed there is little chance of deterring terrorism without effective intelligence.

All forms and techniques of intelligence are now aided by an accelerating technology of communications and a variety of computing and measuring devices. Tiny cameras and microfilm have made it easier for persons engaged in all forms of espionage to photograph secret documents and conceal the films. Space satellites also have an espionage function—that of aerial photography for such purposes as detecting secret military installations. The most advanced of high-technology devices remain secret, but it is known that telephones can be tapped without wires, rooms can be bugged (planted with electronic listening devices) without entry and photographs can be taken at night. This same technology is used in countermeasures, and the competition escalates between those seeking secret information and those trying to protect it.

In sensitive areas of foreign embassies, confidential discussions routinely take place in plastic bubbles surrounding secure rooms to protect secrecy. Intelligence agencies have long been known to use expert lip readers. Security of communications remain under constant assault by high technology.

Why then so many spy scandals in the recent past? The answer in broadest terms is that we are entering the "Age of Intelligence." Primarily as a result of an accelerating technology in weapons systems, communications and high speed transportation, information is becoming one of the world's most precious commodities. Nations are coming to see their security as depending upon certain types of information, accurately gathered and rapidly transmitted. Because this is so, nations increase the amount of secrecy for certain information which they want to protect from adversaries. Secrecy between nations begets secrecy. But it also causes intensified efforts to steal the other nation's secrets. Accordingly, the world's two great superpowers have created enormous and ever-growing intelligence systems. The spy business is booming. This increase in turn fosters the growth of protective counter-intelligence systems.

The build up of huge nuclear arsenals by the superpowers has the side effect of creating new demands for secret information about the "other side." Although its

feasibility is highly doubtful, President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) would place the most intensive demands on secret information, almost instantly transmitted. Developments in that direction, even if in a "research" mode, stimulate the espionage wars and cause espionage activity to grow exponentially. The most fundamental cause of the growth of espionage, however, is the mutual mistrust among nations.

Additional pressures that sustain espionage industry growth are such problems as international terrorism and narcotic import control, as well as information on world-wide political and economic developments. And so espionage and counter-espionage activities have become full-employment enterprises. A result of this situation is the dilution of professionalism as the ranks of spies are filled with new recruits and poorly trained operatives. The cardinal rule in spying is "Don't get caught." Obviously more and more are getting caught, not only because more amateurs are spying but also because modern technology aids in the entrapment of spies. Espionage spawns a vast counter-espionage industry.

On the question of who is winning the espionage war, the answer is that there is a standoff. As a generalization, the Soviet Union seeks technical or "capability" information from the United States. The United States, on the other hand, is primarily interested in ferreting out information on Soviet intentions. This difference in emphasis reflects the differences in each nation's situation. The United States is generally ahead in fields of advanced technology and complex weapons systems with substantial leads in computers, electronics, integrated circuits and photo-optics. The Soviet Union by the nature of their system routinely keeps secret internal policy discussions as well as general information about their industrial system, economy and social system. Most of such information is free for the asking in the United States. The United States spends billions seeking information on the Soviet Union where as similar information about the United States is easily available with a subscription to *The New York Times*, *Congressional Record* and technical journals. Clearly the espionage motivations are different. Like the nuclear arms race, mutual distrust prompts each side into espionage actions and reactions which fuel the secret espionage war.

Why does espionage activity on the part of governments seem to be increasing? We, of course, do not see the annual espionage budgets of governments. It has been estimated, however, that over the past five years the annual budgets of the CIA have in percentage increases kept pace with those of the Department of Defense. These annual increases approach twenty percent. If this assumption is plausible, it is likely that as the United States increases its intelligence efforts, the other side responds accordingly.

And as earlier suggested, the advancing technology of the world's major nations puts an ever-increasing premium on information. Arms control agreements require information for "verification." Deterrence requires information to maintain a posture of credibility. A growing economic interdependence requires information on natural resources, industrial production and a variety of economic factors. Revolutionary ferment in various parts of the globe in which the United States perceives an interest requires information for judging the power equation.

As a concrete example, consider the posture of the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. According to expert testimony, the Soviets in the early 1970s came to a realization that they were being overtaken by the rapid advancements in Western technology. Suspicious all the while that the West had the ultimate purpose of undoing the Bolshevik revolution, they mobilized their resources to cope with the new technology. According to testimony by Admiral Bobby Inman, former Deputy Director of the CIA, they mounted a mul-

tifaceted effort. They created a catalogue of developments in high technology. Then they decided what they wanted to acquire, hardware that they could adapt quickly to their own needs. They used overt means to purchase it and to divert it to themselves. When these efforts failed, they tried to get someone in a European country to purchase and then divert it. If none of these efforts worked, they turned to espionage. Here they sought basic designs of high technology hardware by means of espionage that is, by stealing or buying the information. In the open society of the West, it is not difficult to determine who is working on key projects and to single out individuals who are looking for cash and are willing to sell secrets. Alternatively they look to academic research, in which laboratories tend to be more open. In this way the Soviet Union has been dramatically closing the technological gap, particularly in recent years. Espionage has been a substantial element in the speed of their success.

Possibly we are moving towards a "Strategic Intelligence State" that will be incompatible with democratic government. But this outcome is not inevitable. It can be avoided if the incipient dangers are recognized and a balance is maintained concerning proper secrecy for the intelligence function, and if popular information remains sufficient to the functioning of representative government. Recent frantic efforts by the American government to impose greater secrecy could do more harm than good to national security.

The spy mania of recent times is a man-

ifestation of distrust among the superpowers. This distrust breeds additional secrecy that fosters a secret World War III of espionage and counterespionage. Espionage is not merely a manifestation of mutual distrust among nations. Spying on one's adversaries, and allies as well, turns distrust into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

World peace may require a strategic intelligence limitations agreement among nations in which participating nations agree to recall their hordes of spies and to share information mutually. This solution may be practical because technology makes it increasingly difficult to conceal vital information. Indeed, the technology of counter-intelligence makes it increasingly likely that more and more spying activity will be disclosed in the future and will make espionage eventually a self-defeating enterprise.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind three main points: one, that espionage is a symptom of mistrust among nations; two, that spying creates additional mistrust; and three, that in the last analysis the product of espionage has been vastly overrated as an aid to decision makers. In other words, espionage may be seen as a symptom of the disease of cynical nationalism and power politics and the absence of a world order based upon the reign of international law. Espionage in international relations will continue to grow until nations develop the will to curtail the arms race, begin to remove the causes of international terrorism and discover new roads to world peace. ■



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IMPACT: The Beginnings

Reprinted from *Gone With The Ivy*

By Paul Conkin
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Vanderbilt University

When Alexander Heard came to Vanderbilt in 1963, little on campus suggested the ferment to come. Politically, the student body continued to reflect the views of affluent, Republican parents. In October, 1963, the Student Government Association (SGB) finally dropped its membership in a purportedly too "liberal" National Student Association, and by a unanimous vote. The conservative majority of the campus supported the action. Meanwhile, the **Hustler** continued to make evident its opposition to the **Banner**. During the year the well-publicized and well-attended Impact, on "The South in Transition," featured two able journalists James Kilpatrick and Ralph McGill—who debated the merits of integration, a not very daring interchange to say the least, but even McGill's appearance provoked sharp protests.

The stirring events of 1965 seemed to have more effect on busy Vanderbilt administrators than on students. Impact for 1965 did tentatively broach a bit more controversy. George Wallace, Roy Wilkins, and Robert Wagner all spoke, once again and typically reflecting a broad political spectrum. But Wallace's appearance led to hostile student demonstration that may have inspired the burning of two crosses on campus. In the spring of 1965 the escalating Vietnam war finally became a campus concern, not only for young men who faced the draft but for a very small coterie of campus antiwar activists. Briefly, the first of two Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) chapters formed at Vanderbilt and helped secure a campus broadcast of the proceedings of the teach-in, all mild initiatives condemned by the **Nashville Banner**. Such antiwar activities gained remarkably little support on campus and triggered a brief but intense reaction.

A committee of campus leaders in December, 1965, formed a Students for the Support of the Soldiers in Vietnam and launched a blood donor's drive in their behalf. Then, in February, 1966, students gathered in Benton Chapel to honor William Settlemyre, the first known Vietnam

casualty from among former Vanderbilt students. Before his death Settlemyre had written a moving letter to fraternity brothers at Vanderbilt. This marked the apex of prowar sentiment at Vanderbilt, but in early 1966 such demonstrations distinguished Vanderbilt students from those beginning to assemble on northern campuses.

Continuing peace on campus in 1966-67 belied a major crisis in campus public relations and within the Board of Trust over the 1967 Impact. Finally tensions had increased on campus, but they still fell short of any action either illegal or violent. In a countercultural vein, a few students launched an underground newspaper in the spring of 1967, the **Dirty We'jun**. In February, 1967, a Marxist study group formed and gained recognition, supplementing SPEAC, but neither avowedly leftist organization enlisted more than a handful of students. Counter groups, including a conservative club, also attracted few active supporters. From the outside, the increasingly alarmed **Banner** did all it could to rouse opposition to radicals on campus.

In such an inhospitable setting, the few politically involved or radically included students had only one effective outlet to try to bring the larger world of political conflict to campus in the form of controversial speakers. As Heard had intended back in 1963, the Impact series ended up providing what he believed to be a constructive outlet for student frustrations as well as for their healthy, moral idealism. On campus this strategy worked as planned, particularly in 1967, when Impact planned the most absorbing and exciting interlude in recent Vanderbilt history. The students poured their energies into the now very successful Impact and thought they had found a perfect forum for voicing basic dissent—they welcomed notorious and effective speaks from both the right and left and then turned to leading academic speakers to moderate from the center. It is hard to fault their balancing. The 1966 Impact was unable to attract any famous antiwar activist and thus allowed right wing speakers—Goldwater and Alexander Kerensky—to gain the largest audiences and headlines. Impact by then had become rather famous, gaining na-

tional news coverage and imitations on other campuses. Even celebrities often found it a desirable platform.

The 1967 Impact theme, "The Individual in American Society," was broad and inclusive enough to allow the students a wide, and desired, leeway in inviting speakers. Impact was not only a forum but a self-sustaining student organization. It needed celebrities and controversy to draw a paying audience. This time, the radicals of the left seemed to overbalance the right, since only the old reliable, Strom Thurmond, really represented a rightist perspective. The most sought-after celebrity was Martin Luther King, Jr., who gave the keynote address. Allen Ginsberg, the old Beatnik and now countercultural guru, added color, stimulated some local opposition, but was not yet as notorious as he would soon become after voicing a series of shocking platform obscenities. Three middle-of-the-road speakers all added balance, but eventually all of the attention centered on Stokely Carmichael. By 1967 Carmichael had the needed notoriety. Chairman of a declining but increasingly violent Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), outspoken advocate of black power, he loved to give inflammatory speeches to blacks and de-



Stokely Carmichael - Impact's
Controversial black activist speaker

liberately shocking, even if carefully reasoned, speeches before white audiences. Carmichael's speech, by most accounts, was both literate and informative. But because of repercussions in the city and in the Board of Trust, the Carmichael visit led to a Vanderbilt crisis second in gravity only to the Lawson case of 1960.

Much of the deep and embittering controversy preceded Carmichael's speech. The first letters of opposition began to pour into the chancellor's office, and several key board members telephoned or wrote about their concerns. James Stahlman was among those most horrified at Carmichael's tactics and most distressed at his invitation to appear at Vanderbilt. From the time he heard about it, he blamed Heard and other administrators for not blocking the invitation, for not setting stricter limits on student organizers. Stahlman responded to Carmichael's speeches with a rare front-page editorial.

Carmichael's eloquent and moderate speech at Impact might have vindicated Heard's good judgment even in the eyes of his opponents, save for what followed. Carmichael left Vanderbilt, briefly visited Fisk, and then motored on to Knoxville for another speech. The areas around Fisk and A & I were tense, in part because of inflammatory speeches and the organizing work by Carmichael and his colleagues. At about 8:00p.m., on the same Saturday evening, a proprietor of the University Dinner Club, near Fisk, called the Nashville police to evict a rowdy student. But meantime black students began gathering and taunting the police, setting off a chain of events in a fearful city. For two days Nashville riot police had been waiting for an expected incident, one incited by Carmichael. Thus, when alerted of a developing problem, the police came to the Fisk area in large and intimidating numbers, a move that may either have prevented more violence or triggered it. In any case, a dangerous confrontation ensued. Students rallied behind the stone wall of Fisk, threw bricks and stones, overturned automobiles, and set fires. Apparently some students also fired guns. The whole area became engulfed in sporadic outbursts of violence before most of the students returned to dorms.

These riots represented the first major social disorders in the nation in 1967 and the worst ever in Nashville. The police never doubted that Carmichael planned

the riots and that students set up the triggering incident. Whatever the several necessary conditions for what happened, the city had an easy answer—Stokely Carmichael. To the extent that Carmichael instigated the riots, he did so by his inflammatory speeches at Fisk and A & I, not by his almost scholarly analysis at Vanderbilt before a largely white audience.

The Impact controversy had diverse effects. It even had a mildly intimidating effect on freedom of speech at Vanderbilt. Without repudiating any policies, administrators now more closely monitored student invitations to outside speakers and in a few cases effectively used appeals to good judgment, or to the larger interests of the university, to prevent invitations, a policy followed unsuccessfully in the case of a return engagement by Allen Ginsberg. More critical, though, the publicized reports of Heard's problems with a few vocal members of the board, even his erroneously reported threats to resign, cemented a deeper alliance between students and their chancellor. Not only the few leftists but most students backed the principle of an open forum and with it the freedom of students to manage their own affairs. On campus, Stahlman became the greatest devil since old Bishop Hoss back in 1914. Heard, in seemingly placing his career on the line in support of student interests, became a hero.

After 1967 Impact played less of a role on campus. Vanderbilt students became more directly involved in their own multiple causes. In the 1968 Impact, William Buckley debated Julian Bond, but they did not draw near the audience of Robert Kennedy, who spoke to 12,000 in March at a pre-Impact appearance. In 1969, in what proved a financially disastrous shift in emphasis, Impact began to feature primarily

academics or prominent politicians, and with this attendance and revenues plummeted. By 1970, with the second appearance of James Kilpatrick, a sense of déjà vu set in, although William Kunstler and Roy Innis tried to spark some controversy. In 1971 Impact actually lost \$8,000, or most of the surpluses accumulated in the glory years. Its stars from a flamboyant Bella Abzug to a dull George McGovern failed to excite anyone. Financial problems and less able student organizers led to Impact's temporary death after an even less successful 1972 effort, although students revived it in 1977.

Editor's Note: In the fall of 1976 Mike Keathley, a student, discovered the IMPACT files in the University Archives and started reading about the spectacular programs of the sixties. Keathley and other students successfully charted a new IMPACT organization and presented the 1977 symposium.

Since its second beginning in 1977, IMPACT has resumed its role of bringing nationally known speakers to campus to discuss relevant topics. Speakers have included General Omar Bradley, George Bush, Edward Kennedy, Tom Brokaw, Jack Kemp, Gary Hart, Jerry Brown and Sam Donaldson.

As a result of the efforts of student organizers, IMPACT has once again become an important force as a positive outlet for student concerns. Each year the symposia succeed in raising campus consciousness. This year Impact brings the concern of world relations into view on campus in its symposium: The Next Move: Conflict or Compromise in East/West Relations. ■

In Search of.....CONTINUED From Page 5

rising expectations" in an era of democratic opening all over Latin America in the early sixties. These hopes were crushed in the late sixties and early seventies by a rising wave of military regimes. The traditional political elites sent their internal critics and the U.S. a very clear message: cosmetic change is allowed, but real, fundamental change is not. In other words, the old system of control of politics and the economy by the few will allow the emerging new middle sectors to participate in the power structure, but not to achieve true political power, and certainly not via a democratic politics that unleashes the impoverished masses. The rise of increasingly powerful leftist guerrilla insurgencies all over Latin America in the late 1960s accompanied this democratic opening and frightened a U.S. already under fire in Southeast Asia. The United States opted for stability and support for the traditional power structure rather than taking a chance on revolutionary change, even if commanded by non-Communist leaders.

Ironically, it was U.S. economic and political pressure aimed at producing gradual, peaceful change that led to increasing polarization and instability in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. As the leaders of democratic movements in places like Brazil, Chile and Central America saw their hopes for gradual reform vanish with the rise of military rule, they faced a traumatic choice. Either they could continue to work within a system that refused to allow them access to real power or they could ally with leftist guerrilla movements and fight to overthrow that system. This coalition of forces is the real source of the rising power of leftist revolutionaries and is essential to their survival and success. Central America in the 1970s most vividly illustrates this process as middle-class reformists, earlier backed by the United States, gave up on the system in El Salvador and Nicaragua and joined with Marxist guerrilla movements to attack the system through revolutionary struggle.

The messages in this historical drama are clear. The Soviet Union has not created the conditions for revolutionary upheaval in contemporary Latin America; they have

exploited them. The root of the crisis lies in the creation of an inequitable and repressive economic, social and political system during three centuries of colonial rule, and in the maintenance of that system for the past one hundred and fifty years. The pressures for change on these antiquated structures have increased dramatically in the past fifty years with the most important challenge coming from the rise of a discontented and disenfranchised middle class, itself the product of capitalism's success in the region. The policies of the United States have, paradoxically, promoted polarization and tension as our efforts to modernize Latin America have placed greater pressures on the traditional power structure. The rise of conflict between East and West has placed this polarization in a new light as those who would oppose the status quo find themselves opposing the United

States and allying with Marxist movements.

If the United States is willing to learn from the history of the region, we will be able to avoid tragic mistakes in the coming years. If we are to avoid the unpleasant choice between supporting repressive right-wing dictators or seeing the triumph of antagonistic leftist revolutionaries, we must work now to avoid greater polarization. We must recognize that the greatest threat to the United States in the region is not the Soviet Union, but the continuation of the old colonial heritage in the form of elite-controlled politics, a repressive militaries and weak agricultural-export economies. If we are to avoid violent revolutions in the future, we must work for peaceful revolutions now. We must understand that the future of the United States and Latin America lies in a better relationship between North and South, not in the conflict between East and West. ■



Bio- ographies

Participants

IMPACT 1986

THE NEXT MOVE: Conflict or Compromise In East/West Relations



JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter is a graduate of Georgia Southwestern College and the Georgia Institute of Technology where he received a Bachelor of Science Degree. From 1946 to 1953, he served in the United States Navy rising to the rank of lieutenant. In 1971 he was elected Governor of the State of Georgia. Following his term as Governor, he was elected the 39th President of the United States in 1977. In 1982 he founded the Carter Center at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. This center serves as a permanent policy organization for addressing world issues through non-partisan study and consultation. Major consultations include the Middle East, Arms Control and US-Soviet Relations.

Key events in the history of East/West relations took place during the Carter Administration. Such as the breakdown of detente, the non-ratification of the SALT II treaty, official U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent U.S. grain embargo and boycott of the 1980 Olympic games.

Mr. Carter is the author of many books including *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* and *A Government as Good as Its People*.

His most recent book, *The Blood of Abraham*, deals with the politics of the Middle East.



GERALD R. FORD

Gerald R. Ford received a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Michigan in 1935 and a Bachelor of Laws Degree from Yale University Law School in 1941. In 1942 after a brief stint in the law profession, he entered the U.S. Navy, serving almost four years during World War II. Mr. Ford was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1948 and served 25 years in this position. In 1972 he was nominated as Vice-President to succeed Spiro Agnew. He succeeded to the presidency following the resignation of Richard M. Nixon, serving from August 9, 1974 to January 20, 1977.

Mr. Ford played an important role in American foreign policy decisions while serving as the ranking Republican on the Defense Department Appropriations Committee in Congress. As President, he served during the difficult transition period in American foreign affairs as U.S. military and diplomatic ties with South Vietnam were officially ended.

Mr. Ford published his autobiography in 1979 which is entitled *A Time to Heal*.



ROBERT MCNAMARA

Robert McNamara received his Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of California and his Master of Business Administration Degree from Harvard University. He served as lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Air Force. He is a former president and director of the Ford Motor Company and a former Secretary of Defense for the U.S. Government. From 1968 to 1981 Mr. McNamara served as the president of the World Bank. He has received numerous awards including the President's Medal of Freedom with Distinction. Mr. McNamara is also the author of several books including: *The Essence of Security* and *One-Hundred Countries. Two Billion People: The Dimensions of Development*.

ZYGMUNT BRONIAREK

A native of Warsaw, Poland, Zygmunt Broniarek began his career as a journalist for the newspaper *Life of Warsaw*. For the past thirty-six years, Mr. Broniarek has reported for *Trybuna Ludu* in Paris, Washington, D.C. and Stockholm. He has covered three sessions of the United Nations, the 1954 Geneva Conference of Korea and Indo-China, and East and West Africa. Mr. Broniarek is responsible for the forty-one program television series, "Behind the Scenes of International Politics" which aired in Warsaw from 1982 to 1985. He has also written four books about the United States. Presently, Mr. Broniarek is the Washington correspondent for *Trybuna Ludu*.

ELEANOR CLIFT

Eleanor Clift is the *Los Angeles Times'* White House Correspondent.

She attended Hofstra College and Hunter College. In 1963 she joined *Newsweek* as a secretary to the National Affairs Editor. From there she was named Acting Bureau Chief in Atlanta and covered Jimmy Carter's presidential campaign. Following him to the White House, she maintained this position. In 1985 Ms. Clift joined the *Los Angeles Times* and continues to cover the administration of President Reagan. Recently, she traveled to Geneva to cover the 1985 Summit.


Ms. Clift is a frequent guest of CNN's "Press Box" and on "Washington Week in Review" and has appeared on the "MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour" and "Face the Nation."

She is the 1986 Hemphill Fellow for Impact. The Hemphill Fund is a memorial for Vanderbilt graduate and journalist John Hemphill; it provides for a journalist of national stature to be a part of Impact.



JOHN SEIGENTHALER

John Seigenthaler attended Peabody College and was a Neiman Fellow of Harvard University. In 1949 he accepted a position as a staff correspondent for the *Nashville Tennessean*. For ten years beginning in 1962, he was the Editor of this newspaper, and now he is both the publisher and president of the *Nashville Tennessean*. He is also the editorial director for *USA Today*.



ANDREW YOUNG

Andrew Young began his political career as a leader in the civil rights movement. A graduate of Howard University and Hartford Theological Seminary, Reverend Young was a pastor in Georgia and Alabama. In 1972 he was the first black Representative to be elected to serve the State of Georgia in one-hundred years. After serving three consecutive terms as a congressman, he was appointed Ambassador to the United Nations by President Jimmy Carter. Since 1981 Andrew Young has served as the Mayor of Atlanta. Mayor Young received the President's Medal of Freedom.

ANDREI BUGROV

Andrei Bugrov, born in Moscow, studied at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, majoring in international economy. After obtaining his doctorate, he lectured at the Moscow State Institute. In 1979 Mr. Bugrov joined the foreign service. Presently he is First Secretary of the U.S.S.R. Mission to the United Nations.

ALEXANDER SHALNEV

Alexander Shalnev, a native of Moscow, graduated from the Moscow University in 1969 and joined TASS that same year. He was a TASS correspondent in New Delhi, India from 1970 to 1974 and in London from 1976 to 1980. For the past three years, Mr. Shalnev has been in the United States. After first working in New York, he is presently TASS White House correspondent. Mr. Shalnev is married and has one daughter.



ALEXANDER BRITTON HUME

Alexander Britton Hume received a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Virginia in 1965. After graduating, he served as a reporter for the *Hartford Times*, the *Baltimore Evening Sun* and UPI. After working in Washington as a freelance reporter, he consigned with ABC News and is now working as Senate Correspondent. He is the author of *Death and the Mines* and *The Inside Story*. In the spring of 1969, he became a Washington Journalist Center fellow.

JACK MATLOCK, JR.

Jack Matlock, Jr. is presently a Special Assistant to the President for National Security and a Senior Director for Europe and the USSR in the National Security Council. His experience in Europe and the USSR merits his present position. Mr. Matlock, received a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Duke University, a Master of

Arts Degree from Columbia University and a Certificate of the Russian Institute. He has held many positions in the American Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Matlock has also served as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. He has served as a Consul for Zanzibar and a Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission in Dar es Salaam. In 1978 he was a diplomat in residence and a visiting professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University. He was the recipient of the Department of State Superior Honor Award in 1981.

QIAN YONGNIAN

As a member of the Chinese Diplomatic Service since the 1950s, Qian Yongnian has served as a diplomat in several countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. He participated in the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw, Poland from 1964 to 1970. Mr. Qian has served as Chief of Division and Deputy Director of the African Department in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1980 and is presently the Minister Counselor of the Chinese Permanent Mission to the United Nations.



SANDER VANOCUR

Sander Vanocur graduated from Northwestern University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science and spent a year in graduate study at the London School of Economics. Vanocur worked as a reporter in London for the *Manchester Guardian* and in New York City for *The New York Times*. Soon after, he joined the staff of NBC News where he remained for fourteen years. In 1971 he became Senior Correspondent for the National Public Affairs Center for Television of PBS. In 1975 he was the television editor and critic for the *Washington Post*. Two years later, he became a correspondent for ABC News reporting on ABC's "World News Tonight." In February 1981, he reported a five-part series on American and Soviet relations, "The U.S. and the U.S.S.R.: A Question of War and Peace?" Since 1983 Vanocur has been covering the national political scene for ABC News as Senior Political Correspondent.

IMPACT 1986

The Next Move: Conflict or Compromise in East/West Relations

Schedule of Events

Friday, February 21, 1986

8 p.m. Seminar: "The Military: Player Strategies and Strengths," a discussion of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), Arms Control and the balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Underwood Auditorium
Speakers: Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General, United States Air Force and former Head of the National Security Council
Jack Matlock, Deputy Assistant to President Reagan for National Security Affairs
Moderator: Sander Vanocur, ABC News Senior Political Correspondent

10 p.m. Open Campus reception, Alexander Room of the Law School

Saturday, February 22, 1986

1 p.m. Seminar: "The Media: Reporting the Moves," a discussion of the media's perspective and role in East/West relations.
Underwood Auditorium
Speakers: Henry Brandon, former Associate Editor of the London Sunday Times
Alexander Shalnev, White House reporter for TASS News Agency
Sander Vanocur, ABC News Senior Political Correspondent
Eleanor Clift, White House reporter for the Los Angeles Times
Zygmunt Broniarek, Washington reporter for the Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw, Poland
Moderator: John Seigenthaler, President and Publisher of The Tennessean, Editorial Director of USA Today

3:00 p.m. Seminar: "The Third World: Pawns in the East/West Conflict?"
Underwood Auditorium
Speakers: Andrew Young, former U.N. Ambassador, Mayor of Atlanta
Andrei Bugrov, First Secretary of U.S.S.R. Mission to the U.N.
Quain Yongnian, Minister-Counsellor of People's Republic of China Mission to the U.N.
Pablo Alvergue, Ambassador of El Salvador to the U.S.

5 p.m. Closing Reception for "Political Statements" exhibit, Sarratt Center Gallery

6 p.m. Dinner in Branscomb Dining Room featuring The Original Cast

8 p.m. Keynote Session in Memorial Gymnasium
Welcome: Charles Kiesler, Provost of the University
Speakers: Jimmy Carter
Gerald Ford
Moderator: Britt Hume, ABC News Senate Correspondent

Special Appreciation

The IMPACT Committee extends sincere gratitude to the following people and organizations for their generous assistance during the past year.

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 IMPACT reserves special thanks to the following people: Paddy Bowman, *Assistant Director for Programs, Sarratt Student Center* - our con-

stant source of inspiration, creativity and coolheadedness. Your continued support has been vital to the success of the symposium. Chancellor Emeritus Alexander Heard - one of IMPACT's longtime supporters. Sincerest gratitude is extended for all the time and assistance you have offered to assure the continuation of the symposium.

Chancellor Joe B. Wyatt - your confirmation of the value of IMPACT continues to be vital to the program.

James H. Sandlin, *Associate Dean and Advisor to IMPACT* - we would like to express our deepest thanks to you for your unwavering support of us and IMPACT 1986.

1986 IMPACT Committee - A talented and dedicated group of individuals.

Thank you to the Vanderbilt professors who contributed articles to the IMPACT magazine: Francis Wcislo, *Assistant Professor of History*; Marshall Eakin, *Assistant Professor of History*; Harry Ransom, *Professor of Political Science*; Jacek Kugler, *Associate Professor of Political Science*; and Paul Conkin, *Professor of History*.

A special thanks to Professor Wcislo, Professor Eakin and Professor Ransom whose essays were written exclusively for this magazine.



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42

'86 JUL -2

nm



S/S #

86 JUL 8 P 6:

SITUATION

MESSAGE NO. 009136 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 3

FROM: K. Quinn S/S 647-8448 7224 MS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Cable to Moscow -- SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Points
for Meeting with Korniyenko

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Robert Pearson	456-6534	
NSC	Executive Secretariat		
	McDaniel		
	McDaniel		
	Tahir-Kheli		
	Sestonovich		
FOR:	CLEARANCE ☒	INFORMATION ☐	PER REQUEST ☐
			COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Please clear by: *COB 7/9*

Look OK to me - if others, including Rodman,

april - July

S/S Officer:

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NLRR F06-114/5 #8441

BY CH NARA DATE 11/29/07

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

43

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 8, 1986

NOTE FOR FRANK LAVIN

Frank,

Please forward attached
to appropriate office.

Thanks,

Mary W

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5005

~~Matlock~~ 40
Chen

July 8, 1986


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Meetings (U)

We have taken note of your memorandum received July 3 on dates for meetings with Shevardnadze. (U)

We will make every effort to schedule a meeting with the President when Shevardnadze is in Washington. Please notify us as soon as precise dates have been agreed upon for Shevardnadze's visit. (S)


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By  NARA, Date 6/25/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 7, 1986

~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Meetings

State has suggested that Shevardnadze meet with the President when he comes to Washington for meetings with Secretary Shultz in September. Since the President normally meets with the Soviet Foreign Minister when the latter visits Washington during the UNGA, such a meeting seems appropriate.

Although State has proposed September 19-20 for the meeting, these dates have not yet been confirmed by the Soviets. The memorandum at Tab I requests State to inform us when the dates are set.

Concur: *J. L. Lavin*
LavinRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for Nick Platt at Tab I.

Approve *[Signature]* 7-2

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for NPlatt
Tab A Incoming~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, January 1997
By *CAS* NARA, 6/25/02



United States Department of State 48

Washington, D.C. 20520 5005

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Dates for Shevardnadze Meetings

During his June 23 meeting with the President, Soviet Ambassador Dubinin raised the possibility of a mid-September meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to address preparations for the next summit. Ambassador Dubinin confirmed to the Secretary July 2 that Shevardnadze is prepared for such a meeting in connection with, but prior to, the Foreign Minister's participation in the UNGA in late September. We would anticipate that the meeting would take place in Washington.

We recommend that the President receive Shevardnadze during his visit, as he did when Shevardnadze was here last September. The most convenient dates for a Shevardnadze visit from the standpoint of the Secretary's schedule would be September 19 - 20.

The Department requests that space for a meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be reserved on the President's calendar for Friday, September 19.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CVS NARA, Date 6/25/12

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 JUL 3 A 9: 32

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 5005

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK

DUE: 7 July

☐ Prepare Memo For President

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

☐ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

☒ Prepare Memo McDANIEL

to PLATT

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

☐ Brooks

☐ Burghardt

☐ Cannistraro

☐ Childress

☐ Cobb

☐ Danzansky

☐ deGraffenreid

☐ Djerejian

☐ Dobriansky

☐ Donley

☐ Douglass

☐ Farrar

☐ Grimes

☐ Hanley

☐ Kelly

☐ Kraemer

FYI

☐ Laux

☐ Lenczowski

☐ Levine

☐ Linhard

☐ Mahley

☐ Major

☐ Mandel

☐ Matlock

☐ May

☐ North

☐ Perry

☐ Platt

☐ Pugliaresi

☐ Raymond

☐ Reger

☐ Ringdahl

FYI

☐ Ross

☐ Sable

☐ Sachs

☐ Sestanovich

☐ Small

☐ Sommer

☐ Soos

☐ Stark

☐ Steiner

☐ St Martin

☐ Tahir-Kheli

☐ Teicher

☐ Thompson

☐ Tillman

☒ LAVIN

☐

INFORMATION ☐ McDaniel

☒ Rodman

☒ Pearson

☐

☒ Secretariat

☐

☐ Poindexter (advance)

☐ Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

Under House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CS NARS, Date 6/25/02

SECRET

Return to Secretariat

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1986

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your recent letter.

I was also disappointed that my schedule did not permit me to address the Working Group. Because of the importance we attach to US-European relations and your Working Group, I made a special effort to send one of my most senior assistants, Jack Matlock, to address the group. I am confident he did an outstanding job.

For the record, Charlie Price is one of our most active and effective Ambassadors. As you know, there are many in the US government who are highly knowledgeable about the UK. Indeed, one of my staff served for four years in London.

Again, thank you for writing. I found your op-ed piece to be thoughtful and perceptive. Keep up the good work.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

Mr. Joseph Godson
European Coordinator
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
8 Campden Hill Court
Campden Hill Road
London W8 7HX, England

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506**SIGNED**ACTION

June 25, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*
SUBJECT: Reply to Joe Godson

You have received a rather nasty letter from CSIS's European Coordinator, Joe Godson. He is "sadly disappointed that at the last moment you had to cancel" your meeting with CSIS' European Working Group. He also notes that you couldn't attend a dinner in his honor. In forwarding an extract from a critical London Observer article, he indirectly takes a shot at Ambassador Price and Embassy London. On the plus side, Joe did write a thoughtful op-ed piece on anti-Americanism in Europe.

Because of the tone of Godson's letter, Jack and I believe you should give him a straightforward reply.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I reply to Godson.

Approve *J*

Disapprove _____

JM
Jack Matlock concurs.

cc: Paula Dobriansky

Attachments

Tab I Reply to Godson
Tab II Godson's incoming



JUN 20 1986

52

4772

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

Joseph Godson
European Coordinator

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)

PARA

CS Date 6/25/02

June 16, 1986.

~~Private & Confidential~~

Admiral John M. Poindexter,
National Security Adviser,
West Wing,
White House,
Washington, D.C.,
U.S.A.

Dear John,

I was sadly disappointed that at the last moment you had to cancel out your scheduled meeting with the European Working Group, which I brought to Washington for the fourth time in so many years.

I have been working closely with these Europeans - all pro-American in one way or another - since 1979. These people have a message to convey and I would have thought some of our people would go out of their way to encourage them in what they are trying to do. But this was not the case - others as well also had to back out.

In connection with the above, I enclose an op-ed piece which I did for the New York Times of June 11. This was based on my remarks at a dinner given in my honour by the National Strategy Information Center last month, which you couldn't attend. Also enclosed is a piece from the London Observer about our Embassy.

Best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Joseph Godson

Encls:

Anti-Americanism Grows New Roots

The New York Times

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 1986

By Joseph Godson

LONDON — Widespread European criticism of President Reagan's announcement that the United States may no longer comply with the second strategic arms limitation accord has brought into focus the increasingly common European view that American society is violent, chaotic, crime-ridden and, under President Reagan, hell-bent on the use of force.

Many European critics of America call themselves liberals. But what underlies their attitude, known as neo-anti-Americanism, is in fact a repudiation of liberal democratic capitalism and most of its values.

United States officialdom must handle this phenomenon with care and tact. How America deals with this challenge will be a test of its superpower status. How its friends and allies respond to it in their own countries will be a test of their maturity.

The assault on American values is especially troubling because it comes at a time when a new generation is about to assume the leadership of Western Europe — a changing of the guard that will have important implications in the 1990's and beyond. The European peace movement, which is largely dominated by young people and motivated by deep suspicion of America, provides a kind of window on the coming changes.

Postwar Europeans have matured under circumstances of affluence and political stability. They do not remember the postwar reconstruction or the first, most difficult days of the cold war: they have at best only a vague memory of the building of the Berlin Wall. They came of age during a period of détente, and their views of Soviet society have been colored by Leonid I. Brezhnev and Mikhail S. Gorbachev rather than Stalin. For them, America does not connote the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift or even John F. Kennedy, but rather the Vietnam War and the installation of Pershing and cruise missiles. The rifts opened by the debate over those deployments are deep and enduring.

Earlier bouts of European anti-Americanism were rooted mainly in resentment of what was seen as American hegemony. The current strain, on the other hand, reflects fear rather than resentment — fear generated by apocalyptic visions of nuclear

disaster. Many Europeans are also frustrated by their inability to control their own destiny in the nuclear era — an exasperation that is probably here to stay, regardless of any change in the occupancy of the White House.

Most troubling of all, however, are those Europeans who equate American power with that of the Soviet Union. It is a view best expressed by the pernicious formulation of Neil Kinnock, the leader of the British Labor Party, that "the two countries pose an equal threat to world peace." This may not exactly reflect pro-Sovietism, but far too many Europeans are now inclined to say that, if it is American, it must be suspect.

Americans should, however, remember that Europeans have always viewed Russia rather differently than we do: the sheer propinquity of the Soviet Union inevitably softens Europeans' attitudes. Yet few people in Europe have any liking for the Soviet system. The Chernobyl nu-

Europeans fear nuclear Armageddon

clear disaster was informative in this respect. In Europe, as in America, Moscow's handling of the catastrophe showed the inefficiency of the Soviet system and the implausibility of Mr. Gorbachev's claim to be making radical changes in that system.

That is the good news. The bad news is that things may get worse after the next round of national elections in Europe. In the next year or so, Labor may come to power in Britain and the Social Democrats may win in West Germany. The Labor Party almost certainly, and perhaps the Social Democrats, too, would require the removal of cruise and Pershing missiles from their territories — decisions that could have devastating effects for the alliance. Americans must not, however, announce that they do not wish Labor or the Social Democrats to win — for this would almost certainly help both parties at the polls.

What, then, can Americans do? Alas, not very much. The roots of the new anti-Americanism run deep and have little to do with anything that we actually do in the world. What's needed on both sides is sensitivity. That is our only hope for preventing the trouble from getting worse and doing us all needless damage. □

Joseph Godson, a former Foreign Service officer, is the European coordinator of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Circumstances at the US embassy contribute to the transatlantic gap. The last ambassador had to be removed because he was so hopeless that even Washington noticed; and the man who abruptly replaced him, Mr Charles Price, the former head of a candy company in Kansas City, is scarcely visible. When he arrived, he said he was glad to be given London because the people spoke English, which made it an advance on Brussels, his previous post.

Marked change

Robert Chesshyre, until recently *The Observer's* correspondent in Washington, says he noticed a marked change even in five years. 'When I went there you had a one-in-ten chance of finding someone in the State Department who knew Britain; now it's one-in-fifty.' Britain these days is one of about six countries that comes under the same desk. Chesshyre says the young chap in charge of the desk talks about the special relationship, 'but you can tell he doesn't believe a word of it.'

ITEM RETURNED

TO NSC

SECRETARIAT

IN APRIL 1987

Log # 507

Doc No 40268

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

SCS 0002F86
SAMPLE LTR-GORD
9/9/86
SL

EYES ONLY

Jack Matlock

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CLS 6/25/02

PRESERVATION COPY

July 9, 1986

NSJFM

SAMPLE LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV (S/S)

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have taken careful note of the interesting proposals your negotiators made during the current round in Geneva. I have also continued to ponder our discussion in Geneva last November and our subsequent correspondence. As you may have guessed from our earlier exchanges, I heartily agree with the statement you made in your ~~recent~~ address to the CPSU Central Committee ~~about the~~ need to "search for new approaches to make it possible to clear the road to a reduction of nuclear arms." That is certainly the most urgent task before us.

It seems clear to me that the principal obstacle on this road is the fear that the other side will somehow acquire the capability to deliver a disarming first strike against the other, especially by adding strategic defenses to a large arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons. The "new approach" you have called for should address this problem directly.

With this in mind, let me suggest the following in regard to research on advanced systems of strategic defense. We both agree that neither side should deploy systems of strategic defense simply to augment and enhance its offensive capability. To ensure that this does not occur, we would be prepared to immediately conclude an agreement along the following lines:

(a) Both sides would continue research for no less than five years to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research could include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures.

(b) Following this period of research or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Therefore, either party may then desire to proceed beyond research and associated testing to development of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to develop an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides. The details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years. The same arrangement would be offered to Great Britain, France and China, and such other

NSJFM

~~TOP SECRET/SAGE~~

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NLRR M125/1 # 8442

BY KML NARA DATE 10/8/10

industrialized nations as the U.S. and the Soviet Union might agree to invite to participate in these negotiations.]

(c) If, subsequent to two years after either side has offered a sharing plan, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months notice of such intention is given to the other side. (new)

I would expect that you would agree that significant commitments of this type with respect to strategic defenses would make sense only if made in conjunction with the implementation of immediate actions on both our sides to begin moving towards our commonly shared goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Towards this goal, I believe we also share the view that the process must begin with radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the area of strategic offensive nuclear forces, we remain committed to the immediate implementation of the principle of a fifty percent reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of existing strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. However, we are prepared to consider initial reductions of a less sweeping nature as an interim measure. [The central provision should be reduction (up to 50 percent) of strategic ballistic missile warheads. There should also be sublimits on systems of particular concern -- warheads on heavy ICBMs, on mobile ICBMs (provided appropriate verification procedures can be agreed upon), and on MIRVed ICBMs. In this context, we are prepared to limit long-range air-launched cruise missiles to well below our current plan, and to limit the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level in the range (1600-1800) suggested by the Soviet side. (NOTE: The details of this bracketed section are still under study.)] These reductions should be completed within an agreed period of time (for example, five years).

At the same time, we could deal with the question of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by agreeing on the goal of eliminating this entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles world-wide, which is consistent with the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, and by agreeing on immediate steps that would lead toward this goal in either one step, or, if you prefer, in a series of steps. Once again, however, we should agree that reductions begin immediately and that significant progress be achieved within an agreed period of time.

Of course, I would hope that we could also agree now that once we have achieved a fifty percent reduction in the U.S. and Soviet offensive nuclear arsenals and the progress we seek in eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles, we would continue to pursue negotiations for further reductions in

strategic offensive nuclear arsenals, inviting other nuclear powers to participate. Such negotiations could focus on the reduction of the size of nuclear arsenals then held by the negotiating powers. The overall aim should be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Finally, associated with the program to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, we would be prepared to agree to a parallel program to achieve progress in effectively limiting and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing in step-by-step fashion. This program could begin by our prompt agreement on verification procedures to permit ratification of the treaties signed in 1974 and 1976. Upon ratification of these treaties, we could then establish a "baseline" number of nuclear tests at or below 150 kilotons which would be permitted to be conducted annually by both sides. At the same time, we could agree to reduce, from that time, the number of nuclear tests by a factor associated with the scale of nuclear weapons reductions actually implemented and achieved.

Mr. General Secretary, I hope that you will notice that I have tried explicitly to take into account the concerns you expressed to me in Geneva and in our correspondence, as well as key elements of your most recent proposals. I believe you will see that this approach provides complete insurance that neither country would be able to exploit research on strategic defense to acquire a disarming first-strike capability, or to deploy weapons of mass destruction in space. The framework I propose should permit us to proceed immediately to reduce existing nuclear arsenals as we have agreed is desirable, and to establish the conditions for proceeding to further reductions toward the goal of total elimination.

With respect to those aspects of the above subject to negotiation at the Nuclear and Space Talks, I will be instructing our negotiators to present this proposal, along with appropriate implementing details, when the next round of negotiations begins in Geneva in September. I hope that your negotiators will be prepared to respond in a positive and constructive fashion so that we can proceed promptly to agreement. We also look forward to the beginning of expert level discussions on the related area of nuclear testing.

Sincerely yours,

NSJFM

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- Wrap up letter next week
- Tell Allies
- Send letter

[Sovs want inter-level mtgs -
Bersmornykh]

- came abt time we did ltr -

→ Talk to Roz re handing AB vs JF
- must be well orchestrated -

Mid-August (e.g. ^{before} 16th) - Speech?

→ Testin - jt announcement

SCC Decision

[Gromov - NBC News
US-Sov debates
TG's to Seastate
Chm JCS, Felling, ^{sample}
5-10 min debates
Shv, Vel, Abh,
Karpov]

[Allies & ltr]

NSPG - (Testin) Tuesday -

Briefing Hill?

GS Q's

What abt ABUT?

... kind of testin?

What does "Shury benefits" mean?

[Comment:] Concerned ~~that~~ re zero
ballistic missiles (SLBM's?) -