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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/19/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1986 (3/4)

**FOIA**

F06-114/5

**Box Number** 17

YARHI-MILO

1704

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8453	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	2	7/14/1986	B1
8465	MEMO	BESSMERTNYKH VISIT <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	2	ND	B1
8454	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8453 <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	2	7/14/1986	B1
8455	MEMO	TIMESCALES IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE <b>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</b>	9	7/14/1986	B1
8456	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE HARTMAN CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	1	7/14/1986	B1
8466	CABLE	090848Z JUL 86 <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	9	7/9/1986	B1
8457	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE HARTMAN- DOBRYNIN CONVERSATION, JULY 8, 1986 <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	1	7/10/1986	B1
8458	MEMO	PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ (SAME TEXT AS 8437) <b>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</b>	2	7/14/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8459	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ (SAME TEXT AS 8436) <b>R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</b>	1	7/7/1986	B1
8467	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	2	7/3/1986	B1
8460	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SDI TIMESCALES <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	1	7/7/1986	B1
8461	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8460 <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	1	7/7/1986	B1
8462	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS FROM MATLOCK RE NITZE <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	1	7/7/1986	B1
8463	MEMO	ACHIEVE A PRODUCTIVE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN U.S. <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	1	7/21/1986	B1
8464	MEMO	MATLOCK TO RODMAN; MCDANIEL; LINHARD; SESTANOVICH RE BESSMERTNYKH <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	1	7/22/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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**FOIA**

F06-114/5

**Box Number** 17

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1704

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8468	SCHEDULE	NATIONAL SCHEDULE FOR BESSMERTNYKH VISIT TO WASHINGTON <b>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</b>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Chron ~~EYES ONLY~~ 7/14/86  
Bessmertrykh

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CWS 6/25/02

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1986

John -

This is a "concept" paper for the Bissmertrykh visit prepared by EUR following my meeting with Ridgway Saturday. It is informal and has no status other than reflecting Ridgway's views.

On the whole, I think it is all right - although I think the matter of Nitzel's meeting(s) with Bissmertrykh should be discussed in advance - by you and Schultz. We should have a clear idea of what the ground rules are and what Paul will be saying.

As for the other meetings, I think it is OK for Ridgway to chair, and to provide meetings with Kampelman and perhaps others as appropriate. However, memos should be prepared for restricted circulation interagency in order to diminish suspicions that State is going off on its own.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/S 778453

BY AV NARA DATE 11/29/07

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

It will surprise me if the Soviets are willing to schedule the Bessmertnykh visit before they get the President's letter. However, I see no harm in State trying to get a date now if they can. (They anticipate that the Soviets will react negatively to the letter as it now stands (i.e., no mention of the ABM Treaty), I am not so sure. I think they have set themselves on a course of trying to work out some agreements and will probably be willing to work the issue if we can keep down leaks. (Publicity could goad them into taking a hyper-negative position.)

I will try to get to Nitze this week privately to smoke out just what he has in mind. (I assume his meeting would be a quiet one at lunch or dinner. In my opinion it should not at this point go much beyond determining if they want a private channel - and listening ~~back~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Bessmertnykh Visit

Objectives

- 1. Reach agreement on mechanism for handling NST prior to resumption of Geneva negotiations.
- 2. Reach agreement on fora for handling non-NST issues, with a view to accelerating progress in areas of primary interest to us.

Desired Outcome

- 1. On NST: establish Nitze-Bessmertnykh channel during visit. Follow-up meeting in neutral European capital in August. Outcome of discussions handed to Kampelman-Karpov when talks resume September 18. Additional Nitze-Bessmertnykh meetings as necessary before/after that date.
- 2. Non-NST arms control:
  - CDE/MBFR/CW ban: Confirmation that current negotiators will be channel. Instructions to accelerate efforts to reach agreement.
  - CW proliferation: Soviet agreement to U.S. proposal for second experts meeting in early September with view to beginning drafting of joint statement for summit.
  - Risk Reduction Centers: Soviet agreement to U.S. proposal for second experts meeting in early September to define more precisely possibilities.
  - Nuclear Testing: Confirmation that Barker group will be focus of efforts to produce package for endorsement by leaders at summit
- 3. Regional Issues:
  - Experts Talks: Confirmation that foreign ministries will remain channel for organizing further meetings, including sessions on specific issues such as joint steps on Iran-Iraq..

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL:OADR

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR FO6-114/S #8465

BY Cd NARA DATE 11/29/07

4. Humanitarian Issues:

-- Make clear growing concern here over Soviet Jewry. Notify this will be major theme for us in ministerial meeting.

5. Bilateral Issues:

-- General Issues: (e.g., consulates) Confirm will be handled through diplomatic channels.

-- Specialized Issues:

o Fusion: Confirm agreement for second experts meeting.

o Nuclear Energy Safety: Confirm agreement to work in IAEA.

o Space Cooperation: Confirm readiness to have experts explore areas to be included in renewed bilateral agreement.

o People-to-People Exchanges: Confirm visit by Soviet authorities to nail down projects suggested by Rhinesmith.

o Terrorism: Reach agreement on expert discussions in August/September.

Timing

1. Bessmertnykh should come Friday, July 25. Talks to begin July 28 and run as long as necessary.

2. Consider transmitting NST response after he arrives to deny Soviets opportunity to cancel trip. In that case, would have to make clear response would come upon his arrival.

Format

1. Asst. Sec. Ridgway interlocutor for formal discussions. Reinforced as necessary by experts. As Soviet side will be small, U.S. participants limited to State, NST.

2. Side discussions as appropriate. Nitze/Kampelman on NST. Ridgway on humanitarian issues.

3. Meeting with Secretary on last day to reinforce points. NO meeting with President necessary.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Chron - July 86*

*Jackie Hutchcock*  
~~*Eye Only*~~

NOT CLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
*CS 07/25/02*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1986

John -

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/S-#8454

BY AD NARA DATE 11/29/07

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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ask

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Mo8-125/2 # 8455

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

14 July 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Timescales in Strategic Defense

The purpose of this memorandum is to establish a realistic perspective on the possible deployment schedules of various elements of the SDI. The approach taken will be first to examine what might be deployed in the next eight to ten years. Second, we shall examine the technological status of accomplishing the mission of strategic defense in each of the three stages of ICBM trajectory -- boost, mid-course, and terminal. Third, we shall briefly discuss problems applicable to all phases, and their impact on timing. Finally, we shall offer observations concerning the necessity to abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty.

#### Near-Term Deployments

The only ABM technology with a well-evaluated military capability is nuclear-armed interceptor missiles, command guided by ground-based radars. The Soviet Union has a deployed system, which it is augmenting with a highly capable anti-tactical missile system. The US ceased development of a nuclear-interceptor ABM system in 1983. At that time, a year-long study performed for the Office of the Secretary of Defense concluded that the Soviets could proliferate their existing system nationwide in 2-3 years, since they have essentially open production lines, and that the US suffers a 4-6 year lead-time-to-deployment disparity. Thus, at the time we stopped development, the estimate was that US proliferation of this defensive technology would take between 6 and 9 years to reach some substantial level of deployment. Because some of the SDI research would be useful in redesigning and modernizing such a system, it is not unreasonable to assume that that estimate still applies.

Such a defense would be capable only of protecting hardened military targets, preferably extended targets (such as ICBM fields) where preferential defense could be employed.

As Harold Brown has recently pointed out, it takes at least eight years for the US to field any new military system once both the technology and basic design have been frozen. The nuclear interceptor estimate given above, arrived at independently and after intensive study, fits this model. But no other SDI technology is in such an advanced state that it could be considered frozen for design and deployment (see attached paper for descriptions of these technologies and their current levels of achievement). Therefore, no other SDI components could be reasonably judged available for deployment in the time frame 8-10 years from now. All of them will require engineering development and testing, followed by integration of system sub-elements. Some of them will require less development than others, but in no case do their schedules offer reasonable hope of achieving systems parameters in less than about five more years, which means that no deployments are credible in less than 13-15 years.

Of course, one may argue that, as Henry Ford said, "History is bunk," and that we may be able to achieve a magical shortcutting of the defense development system. There is, however, considerable evidence that such efforts are unlikely to succeed in producing a workable system. Numerous aircraft development programs have tried to meet operational requirements on truncated schedules, and ended by accepting delays. In one other instance, the M-16 rifle (not a particularly stressing technology), the testing cycle was successfully truncated, with catastrophic results for the combat troops using the weapon.

Certainly it would be foolishly fatalistic to say that strategic defense

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cannot be developed and tested faster than recent history suggests. We should make the strongest, most imaginative effort to change that record. But it would be self-delusional to plan on significant acceleration when both the evidence and the unique complexity of the task suggest otherwise.

#### Phases of the Mission

1. Terminal Phase. Non-nuclear interceptors for the terminal phase are the nearest SDI technology to meeting systems requirements. The sensors for these interceptors have also made real advances in the past two years. It is possible that some, perhaps even all of these technologies could reach systems levels in 5-10 years of further R&D, resulting in possible deployments as early as the turn of the century. Two points must be emphasized, however: first, such defenses still might not meet the responsive threat (maneuvering reentry vehicles) certain to be available to the Soviets in the same time frame; the question remains completely open. And second, such defenses could accomplish no more than the nuclear interceptors which could be deployed much sooner; their only advantages are the political benefits of avoiding nuclear weapons and the uncertain possibility of somewhat lower costs. Because of the small "footprint" of intercepts at endoatmospheric altitudes, such defenses are not, even in theory, capable of being more effective in defending large areas than are the nuclear interceptors.

2. Mid-course Phase. Several non-nuclear interceptor concepts for exoatmospheric intercept in the mid-course are currently under development. Some of these can also be expected to meet systems-level criteria in the 5-10 year time frame. The difficulty is that all these concepts are practically useless without a means of discriminating RVs from decoys in space. We currently have some interesting ideas for accomplishing this task, and one or more of them might be tested or ready for testing in five years, or even less.

On the other hand, mid-course discrimination has been recognized as a key problem of ballistic missile defense for thirty years, and the solution is not yet in hand. In short, we need a breakthrough here and no one can predict when a breakthrough will occur. A breakthrough on a problem which has received as much attention as this one has is not something to cast firm plans on.

3. Boost Phase. The boost phase has received most of the press and congressional attention in SDI, largely because the proposed solution, to the problem involve the most ambitious technological advances. None of the directed energy weapons being examined for this mission will be ready to meet systems-level criteria with less than ten years of further development. Advocates of various lasers or particle beams will usually claim that this is true of all but their technologies. The evidence on this point must in the end be argued for each technology separately, but the conclusion can be illustrated by the fact that all of them require improvements of roughly a factor of a million or more in operating parameters. Some of the ones touted as most promising (free electron lasers, for example) still have not only engineering scaling but also basic physics principles to demonstrate: it remains possible that they won't work at all.

Space-based rockets vehicles for boost-phase kill could reach systems criteria on the individual rockets in about five years' development; their complex sensors might also, with somewhat less confidence, be predicted to meet such a date. However, major problems would have to be overcome before one could contemplate only deployment aimed as early as the turn of the century. First, architecture studies thus far show that these vehicles are of dubious cost effectiveness, because of the large number that must be placed on station in space and because of the possible ease of shooting them down or exhausting

them in a defense-suppression attack. Some concrete answer to these problems will have to be established with high confidence to justify going beyond R&D. Second, vastly improved space-lift capability will be required (see below).

General Problems

1. Systems architecture. The SDI has yet to produce a standard architecture model for a multi-layer defense, even in generic form. This is frequently taken as a criticism of the management of SDIO, but such criticism is unjust. Thus far, each detailed architecture study has revealed as many new problems as new solutions; this is a function of the extreme difficulty and complexity of the problem, not of the competence of SDIO. In large measure, the problems arise from the necessity (as currently understood) of accomplishing boost-phase kill. The short timelines of this phase virtually mandate space-based weapons platforms, and the survivability of these platforms remains seriously problematic.

Thus, although cost, realibility and lethality remain serious questions in evaluating various alternative architectures, survivability is the question which remains the dominant uncertainty, preventing any confident estimate of when multi-tiered defenses might credibly be deployed. For instance, the laser battle stations at about 300 km altitude that were envisioned in early architecture models have now been categorically shown not to be survivable against very simple defense-suppression attacks. The response of the designers has been to move the lasers to significantly higher altitudes -- thousands of kilometers. This makes the survivability problem easier (that is, it reopens the question, rather than clearly answers it), but it does so at the cost of requiring an extra factor of one hundred or more in required laser brightness. Thus, we may have to ask whether or not these higher brightnesses can be achieved cost effectively. But we certainly must presume that the development time for them, and hence their earliest

deployment time, must be pushed back several more years; such lasers cannot be expected to demonstrate systems-level criteria in this century.

2. Complexity and Computability. The systems complexity issues associated with mult-tiered defense are customarily represented by discussion and analysis of the computational requirements. Although other issues of organization and communications are significant, reliable computability is probably the most stressful aspect of the complexity problem.

Any multi-tiered system which requires birth-to-death tracking of RV, and decoys will generate information processing requirements that are on the order of millions of lines of code, and the difficulties of reliability in such a system are indeed formidable. SDIO's Eastport Study Group recently reported that such a requirement would probably be impossible to meet, but they also correctly observed that a properly designed system could operate with vastly reduced computational demands. Properly designed, in this case, means at least that each tier of defensive weapons must operate completely independently of the previous one. A critical key to such a felicitous design is a mid-course discrimination technique which does not require massive hand-off of data among sensors and weapon platforms. As suggested above, the existence and workability of such a discrimination technique remain completely unknown.

3. Space Lift Power. The difficulties of space access which have resulted from the shuttle disaster are well known and presumably transitory. However, the deployment of virtually any currently proposed SDI architecture will require the development of new, vastly less expensive space lift capabilities. The recent cost of putting mass into space with the shuttle was about \$3000 per pound. The estimates for SDI systems which include some components of space-based weaponry typically run from 50 million to 100 million

15

pounds in space. Thus, the current deployment costs for such system would be between \$150 billion and \$300 billion just to put the system on orbit.

A current program to improve the cost of space lift is jointly sponsored by SDIO, NASA, and USAF; it is aimed at roughly a factor of two reduction in lift cost by the mid-1990's. Although this is a credible goal, it is still not enough to make most candidate multi-tiered systems affordable. Thus there are two possible solutions: engineering of further substantial decreases in lift cost, which implies delays in deployment time of at least a decade past the mid-1990's (coincident with the delay seen above for directed-energy battle stations); or design of multi-tiered architectures which do not require massive space-based components. The latter is by no means impossible, but depends upon a highly effective mid-course tier (since boost phase will be weak or non-existent), which in turn depends upon (among other things) a highly effective discrimination technique.

4. Space Power. Space-based battle stations will require power supplies just for station-keeping that are at least ten times greater than currently available space power. The solar panels now in use will not scale up to these power requirements. Thus, some new source will be needed, and the logical candidate is a space-qualified nuclear reactor. SDIO is jointly sponsoring (with DOD & NASA) development of a reactor, called the SP100, which could meet the lowest end of the projected requirements for station-keeping power. This reactor is expected to have its first tests on the ground in the early-to-mid-1990's, and to be tested in space sometime thereafter. Methods by which the SDI could meet its power requirements actually to conduct an engagement remain notional; those requirements would be at least one hundred times the projected capability of the SP100 reactor. Thus, achievement of on-orbit power supplies for a multi-tiered system currently looks roughly twenty years in the future.

5. X-ray laser. A successfully-developed x-ray laser might be a key feature of a defensive architecture in any of the three tiers, depending upon its eventual capabilities. Although the prospects for development of such a weapon still look promising, there remain serious technical problems whose solution will, at the current rate of testing, certainly take several years, even in the optimistic view.

Summary and Treaty Considerations

In summary, the only strategic defense with which we could confidently deploy a real military capability within the next ten years would be nuclear interceptor defense of hardened military targets. It is possible that within five to ten years after that the same objective might be accomplished with non-nuclear interceptors. The wide deployment of any further defensive capabilities cannot be reckoned a credible possibility in less than twenty years. There are two possible exceptions to this strong statement: innovation in the near future of a particularly flexible and effective mid-course discrimination scheme; or breakthrough development of a workable, high-brightness x-ray laser. Both of these eventualities should prudently be regarded as improbable, but we should be investing resources heavily in those areas to raise the probabilities.

Examination of the states of technologies already discussed shows that in all the critical areas there is virtually no testing which will need to be done -- or, indeed, which it would be wise to do\* -- during the next decade that would violate the ABM Treaty. Space sensor development, beam pointing and tracking, space lift, space power and computer R&D can all be conducted

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\*Field test demos tend to freeze technology and to over-run in projected costs. Thus, conducting them too soon effectively commits to immature technology and uses up the funds that might have supported better ideas.

within the Treaty. Scaling up of directed energy weapons can proceed, as at present, within the Treaty; full systems-level lethality tests, which will eventually be required and which would violate the treaty, are more than fifteen years in the future. Kinetic kill vehicles, including even space-based ones, can be adequately tested within the treaty right up to the point of full systems evaluation. Thus, it will not be necessary to withdraw from the Treaty for at least ten years to support the best development of SDI. On the other hand, immediate revocation of the treaty will provide the Soviets with strong incentive to cash their lead-time advantage and proliferate their nuclear defenses. This would require us to enter into extensive development of new penetration aids, and probably to increase the size of our offensive forces.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5130

~~Matlock~~ 18  
Chron

~~SECRET~~

July 14, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JM*

SUBJECT: Hartman Conversation with Dobrynin *DR*

Art Hartman had a lengthy conversation with Dobrynin on July 8, at which time Dobrynin made the following points regarding Gorbachev's current position on U.S.-Soviet relations:

-- Time is moving quickly and there is a need to move rapidly to seize the opportunity of improving U.S.-Soviet relations.

-- Gorbachev wants a summit this year, but could not afford domestically or internationally to meet with you and settle nothing in the arms control area.

-- Gorbachev has laid out a specific "road map" on how to get there, with specialist meetings, followed by a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting to prepare the summit agenda.

-- Your remarks at Glassboro did much to meet their concern regarding atmosphere. However, Gorbachev wonders why all members of the Administration do not take the same line.

-- In this connection, the Soviets have "real doubts" whether you want to "discipline your ranks" to achieve agreement. They feel that there are those in the Administration who want no agreement.

Comment: This pretty well summarizes the line we are getting from all Soviet officials of late. It is consistent with our presumption that Gorbachev has in fact decided to come to Washington later this year, but is trying to keep the pressure on for at least one substantive agreement in the arms control area so that he will not risk returning home empty handed. His concern over "atmosphere" probably reflects his sensitivity to the prospect of appearing to come to Washington while under attack.

Attachment:

Tab A Hartman cable

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

NLRR 106-114/S #8450  
BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

S/S-  
INCO

# Department of State



NODS-0015

PAGE 02 OF 10 MOSCOW 11617 00 OF 04 090907Z 004/05 004818 NOD  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 /000 W

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O 090848Z JUL 86 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7160

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 11617

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 106-11415 #8466  
BY: CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

FOR SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: I SPENT AN HOUR AND THREE QUARTERS WITH DOBRYNIN THE EVENING OF JULY 8. HIS VIEW, WHICH HE LAID OUT AS GORBACHEV'S AS WELL, WAS THAT TIME WAS MOVING BY QUICKLY AND A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SOMETHING POSITIVE MIGHT BE ESCAPING US. GORBACHEV HAD PUT OUT A COMPLETE DIAGRAM OF HIS APPROACH TO WORLD PROBLEMS AND SPECIFICALLY U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS. HE WANTED TO GO AHEAD WITH A SUMMIT MEETING THIS YEAR BUT HE COULD NOT AFFORD DOMESTICALLY OR INTERNATIONALLY TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SETTLE NOTHING IN THE VITAL AREA OF SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL. FOR THAT REASON, HE HAD PROPOSED A SPECIFIC ROAD MAP ON HOW TO GET THERE AND HE HOPED WE WERE EXAMINING IT SERIOUSLY. THEY HAVE NOTED GLASSBORO AND BELIEVE

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

# Department of State

S/S-0  
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THAT THAT KIND OF PUBLIC APPROACH DOES MUCH TO MEET THEIR CONCERN ON ATMOSPHERE, ALTHOUGH THEY CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT INSIST ON ALL MEMBERS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION USING THE SAME TONE. IN GENERAL, DOBRYNIN WAS HIS BOUNCY SELF. HE RADIATED ASSURANCE AND SPOKE CONFIDENTLY OF MODERNIZING HIS VERY COMMUNIST PARTY-LOOKING OFFICE WITH ITS 1930'S DECOR. HE WAS CAREFUL NOT TO STEP ON SHEVARDNADZE'S TOES BUT, THAT DID NOT PREVENT A TONE OF TOTAL AUTHORITY AND WORLD VIEW TO GOVERN HIS CONVERSATION. END SUMMARY.

### 3. PROCESS

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ON PROCESS DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THEY FAVORED A STEP-BY-STEP BUILDING BLOCK PROCESS. THEY HAD DESCRIBED IT IN DETAIL AND DUBININ HAD MADE IT EXPLICIT. PREPARATIONS FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING WOULD BE BY EXPERTS, THROUGH THE EMBASSIES OR BY A SPECIAL TRIP BY BESSMERTNYKH AS THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IN CHARGE FOR THEM. IN RESPONSE TO SOME PROBING HE INDICATED THAT NO ONE WOULD SIDLE UP TO US AND SUGGEST A CHANNEL. HE DESCRIBED, AS HE HAS MANY TIMES IN THE PAST, HOW THE MAN WHO DID THAT BY TALKING TO SCALI IN THE CUBAN MISSILE DAYS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY FIRED FOR UNAUTHORIZED BEHAVIOR. HE SAID, INDICATING THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME RIVALRY, THAT OFTEN LOWLY ASSISTANTS TRIED TO BRING PRIZES TO THEIR BOSSES AND PUT THE CHATAUQUA PROBE IN THIS CATEGORY. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT YET DECIDED WHO WOULD GO TO THAT MEETING FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. IN ANY CASE THE BUSINESS WOULD ONLY BE DONE BY THOSE OFFICIALLY DESIGNATED TO TALK FOR THEM AND THAT I WOULD HEAR

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 OR WASHINGTON WOULD BE TOLD DIRECTLY. HE WENT ON  
 TO SAY THAT THEY AGREED TO THE DATES IN SEPTEMBER  
 BUT DID NOT WANT A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. DUBININ,  
 HE THOUGHT, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EMPHASIZE ONCE  
 AGAIN THE PROCEDURE AND THE NECESSITY OF REAL  
 SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATION. IF THEY HAD REAL CONFIDENCE  
 IN THE ONE OR TWO AREAS WHERE PROGRESS ON ARMS  
 CONTROL WAS POSSIBLE, THE SOLUTION OF MANY OTHER  
 PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WOULD FALL INTO PLACE.

4. SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL  
 -----

DOBRYNIN SPENT SOME TIME DESCRIBING HOW GORBACHEV  
 GOES ABOUT DEALING WITH PROBLEMS. HE STARTS FROM  
 HIS OWN PHILOSOPHY AND BELIEFS WHICH LEAD HIM TO  
 BE PRAGMATIC AND LOGICAL. ALTHOUGH PREOCCUPIED  
 WITH DOMESTIC ORGANIZATION AND POLICY, HE HAS SPENT  
 HOURS AND DAYS WORKING OUT A GLOBAL VIEW OF WHERE  
 THEY SHOULD BE HEADED. HE (DOBRYNIN) DID NOT WISH  
 TO BE CURRYING FAVOR WITH HIS PRESENT BOSS BUT HE  
 COULD SAY OF ALL THE GENERAL SECRETARIES HE HAD  
 WORKED WITH GORBACHEV WAS THE FIRST TO MASTER THE  
 DETAILS OF POLICY AS WELL AS THE GENERAL TREND.  
 GORBACHEV RESENTS PARTICULARLY OUR DISMISSAL OF  
 HIS JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS AS PROPAGANDA. INSTEAD HE  
 SAW THESE AS A FRAMEWORK TO BE TAKEN UP AND ELABORATED  
 ON AND WITHIN WHICH TO FORMULATE SPECIFIC STEPS.  
 WHEN I SAID THAT IT WAS A PITY WE HAD NOT HAD THEIR  
 JUNE PROPOSALS IN JANUARY AS A COUNTER TO OUR NOVEMBER  
 GENEVA PROPOSITION DOBRYNIN DID NOT SEE THAT THE  
 LATEST PROPOSALS WERE ANYTHING MORE THAN A DEVELOPMENT  
 OF THEIR EARLIER THINKING.

5. SIMILARLY, THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS, CW, TESTING  
 AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS HAD BEEN PUT OUT TO GIVE

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PUBLIC EXPRESSION, TO A LARGER FRAMEWORK THAT GORBACHEV  
LIKES TO WORK WITH. WITHOUT SUCH A STRUCTURE HE DOES  
NOT FEEL THAT HE CAN PULL TOGETHER THE FORCES THAT  
HE MUST LEAD AND COMMAND. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT WE  
MADE A MISTAKE TO THINK THAT A PROPOSAL IS PUT  
FORWARD FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. EACH TIME AS  
GORBACHEV SITS WITH SOKOLOV, AKHROMEYEV  
AND HIS PARTY AND FOREIGN POLICY COLLEAGUES AND  
ADVISORS, HE ASKS THE QUESTION: IF THIS PROPOSAL  
IS ACCEPTED, CAN WE LIVE WITH THE CONSEQUENCES?

6. THIS LED DOBRYNIN TO A PROBING ON WHERE THE  
PRESIDENT GETS HIS INFORMATION. WAS HE, FOR EXAMPLE,  
CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT ENGAGE IN AN  
ARMS RACE? WAS THAT WHAT I WAS REPORTING FROM MOSCOW?  
THIS GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIM TO OPEN UP  
THE CHANNELS SO THAT I COULD GET A MORE ACCURATE  
PICTURE, BUT I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN THEIR  
AVARICIOUS READING OF THE AMERICAN PRESS THEY SHOULD  
TAKE WITH A GRAIN OF SALT READINGS OF THE PRESIDENT'S  
THINKING. SOMETIMES PEOPLE WHO WRITE STUDIES AND  
SEND THEM TO HIM THEN LEAK THE RESULTS AS THE  
"PRESIDENT'S THINKING." IN ANY CASE, I SAID THAT  
WAS NOT WHAT I WAS REPORTING. I HAD SAID DIRECTLY  
TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON THAT  
RESOURCES WOULD ALWAYS BE FOUND HERE FOR AN ADEQUATE  
DEFENSE BUT THAT LIKE ALL RATIONAL LEADERS IN TODAY'S  
WORLD THEY MUST WANT TO SEE THAT THEIR RESOURCES ARE  
USED IN THE SECTOR WHERE THE NEED IS GREATEST AND  
FOR THIS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST AT LEAST HOPE  
TO BUY SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF EFFORT, PARTICULARLY

WHEN IT COMES TO HIGHLY TRAINED PEOPLE AND TECHNOLOGY.  
BUT ABOVE ALL SOVIET LEADERS WOULD GIVE HIGHEST  
PRIORITY TO DEFENSE. I SAID THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE  
THAT THE PRESIDENT HELD A DIFFERENT VIEW OR HE  
WOULD NOT HAVE SPOKEN THE WAY HE DID TO THE GENERAL

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SECRETARY IN THEIR PRIVATE CONVERSATION.

7. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THE KEY POINT FOR SOVIET LEADERS WAS WHAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. THEY HAD REAL DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO DISCIPLINE HIS RANKS TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT. THEY KNOW, HE SAID, THAT THERE ARE THOSE WHO WANT NO AGREEMENT. GORBACHEV CANNOT AFFORD ANOTHER SUMMIT WHERE HE JUST DISCUSSES RELATIONS AND WORLD PROBLEMS. THE LEADERSHIP HAS NO PARTICULAR STEPS IN MIND BUT IT HAS TO BE SOMETHING CONCRETE. I HAD THE FEELING LISTENING TO HIM TALK, AND DISCOUNTING ALL THE SELF-SERVING ARGUMENTS THAT GORBACHEV HAD LAID OUT HIS CONCEPT AND GOTTEN SUPPORT FOR THEM FROM HIS COLLEAGUES BUT WHILE HIS POWER WAS NOT CHALLENGED, THERE WERE KIBITZERS ON THE SIDELINES ONLY TOO READY TO CRITICIZE HIS LACK OF RESULTS. HE MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES "THOSE WHO HAVE A VIEW BUT NO KNOWLEDGE OR RESPONSIBILITY...."

8. ON SPECIFICS, DOBRYNIN WELCOMED THE APPARENT AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS TESTING AND SAID AT LEAST THIS SHOWED THAT WE COULD TALK ABOUT PROBLEMS WHERE WE HAVE OPPOSING VIEWS. BUT HE WAS PESSIMISTIC THAT THIS COULD BE CHOSEN AS AN AREA FOR EARLY PROGRESS. HE JOKED ABOUT OUR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND WHAT THEY MIGHT CONTRIBUTE. HE DID NOT RESPOND WHEN I SAID THAT I ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT GOING TO LET THEM MONITOR A TEST BUT ONLY TAKE SEISMIC READINGS. THIS LED TO AN EXCHANGE ON VERIFICATION WHICH COVERED A VARIETY OF ARMS

CONTROL AREAS. HE SAID THAT WE SEEM TO WANT TO LOAD UP ALL OF OUR PROPOSALS WITH THE MOST INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS. HE CITED MBFR, CDE, AND TESTING WHERE ON RATHER MINOR AGREEMENTS WE WERE INSISTING ON ELABORATE MECHANISMS. THIS, HE SAID,

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HAD LED GORBACHEV, TO CONCLUDE THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD BE LOOKED AT SERIOUSLY AND WHEN AN AGREEMENT CALLED FOR A MAJOR REDUCTION OR IN THE CASE OF TESTING A COMPLETE BAN, THEN VERIFICATION COULD BE JUSTIFIED AS INTRUSIVE. I POOH-POOHED THIS RATIONALIZATION AND SAID THAT THEIR CHARACTER AND HISTORY HAD MORE TO DO WITH THE ATTITUDE TOWARD VERIFICATION AND IN ANY CASE CONFIDENCE BUILDING IS NECESSARY. EVEN IN THOSE CASES WHERE A BAN HAD BEEN AGREED, E. G., ABM, WE SEE A RADAR BEING BUILT WITH NO OTHER PURPOSE. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WE AND OUR ALLIES WOULD INSIST ON MORE OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN MBFR AND THE CDE. IN THE LATTER CASE THIS ISSUE WOULD DETERMINE THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE STOCKHOLM MEETINGS.

9. ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATION ISSUES, DOBRYNIN EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT OUR REPLY WOULD BE POSITIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE. HE SAID THAT THE NEWS REPORTS, WHICH HE ADMITTED THAT BOTH HE AND GORBACHEV READ AVIDLY, APPEAR TO INDICATE A POSITIVE TONE. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS AMONG THESE ISSUES THAT SOME AREA FOR PROGRESS COULD BE FOUND. THEY HAD TRIED TO PUT OUT A VARIETY OF NEW APPROACHES DESIGNED TO MEET CONCERNS AND CRITICISMS WE HAD MADE OF EARLIER PROPOSALS. IN THE STRATEGIC AREA, THEY HAD COME UP WITH MORE MODEST REDUCTIONS BUT DESIGNED TO MAKE A FIRST STEP POSSIBLE. BUT WE HAD TO RECOGNIZE

THAT BALANCE IN ANY AGREEMENT WAS NECESSARY. ON SPACE, HE HOPED THAT WE WERE SERIOUSLY LOOKING AT THE POSSIBILITY OF STRENGTHENING THE ABM REGIME THROUGH AGREEMENT ON A TIME PERIOD FOR NOT EXERCISING THE WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE AND SOME DEFINITIONAL DEVELOPMENT ON PERMISSABLE ACTIVITIES. WHAT COULD WE SAY ABOUT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN SPACE? ABOUT ASAT? AFTER ALL WE NEEDED SATELLITES EVEN MORE THAN THE



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SOVIETS DID. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT RESPOND BUT  
THAT I WAS CERTAIN WASHINGTON UNDERSTOOD THE  
IMPORTANCE OF A RESPONSE THAT TOOK FULL ACCOUNT OF  
THE EFFORT MADE BY THE SOVIET SIDE. I ASKED HOW  
HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD PROCEED AFTER THEY RECEIVE OUR  
REPLY. DOBRYNIN SAID MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE REPLY.  
IF IT HAD REAL POSITIVE ELEMENTS AND CONVINCED  
GORBACHEV THAT WE WANTED EVEN PARTIAL, BALANCED  
AGREEMENTS FOR THE SUMMIT, THEN HE WOULD ORDER FULL  
STEAM AHEAD ON PREPARATIONS AND WE SHOULD GET  
THE APPROPRIATE EXPERTS TOGETHER TO PREPARE THE  
WAY FOR THE NEGOTIATORS TO PICK UP IN THE FALL.  
I TOOK THIS TO MEAN - POSSIBLY, IT WAS NOT CLEAR -  
PART OF AN AUGUST BESSMERTNYKH TRIP TO WASHINGTON.

10. REGIONAL  
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DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THEIR ASSESSMENT AGREED WITH OURS  
ON UTILITY OF MURPHY-POLYAKOV TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST.  
HE HOPED WE MIGHT FIND SOME POINTS OF AGREEMENT  
THERE TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO A HIGHER-LEVEL MEETING.  
HE SUGGESTED DECLARATION ON IRAN/IRAQ MIGHT BE A  
POSSIBILITY DEPENDING ON SITUATION AT THE TIME. HE  
SAID THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO ANOTHER TALK ON  
TERRORISM AT SIMONS LEVEL AS LONG AS IT WAS CLEAR  
THAT WE WERE NOT USING THAT MEANS TO CONDEMN  
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. I SAID I THOUGHT THERE WAS

SOME ROOM THERE FOR DISCUSSION. HE WELCOMED  
AGREEMENT TO TALK ON AFGHANISTAN. I SAID THAT I  
THOUGHT THAT MIGHT OCCUR AFTER THE NEXT SESSION  
IN GENEVA AND AFTER WE HAD VISIT FROM PAKISTANI  
PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH THAT.  
I REITERATED OUR GREAT CONCERN IF THREATS WERE  
USED AGAINST PAKISTAN AND A CONNECTION MADE TO  
AFGHANISTAN IN SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S RECENT DEMARCHE.



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HE HAD HEARD OF MY EARLIER TALK AND APPEARED TO  
THINK I WAS EXAGGERATING THE SITUATION. SIMILARLY  
ON MICRONESIA HE TOOK OUR POSITION ABOARD AND  
SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO SOVIET POSITION IN SECURITY  
COUNCIL. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE DID NOT EXPECT  
SUPPORT: JUST NO VETO.

11. BILATERAL  
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ALL THROUGH OUR CONVERSATION I STRESSED IMPORTANCE  
OF CONTACT AT ALL LEVELS. I REMINDED HIM THAT  
YOU HAD BEEN TO SOVIET EMBASSY TWICE IN LAST  
SEVERAL MONTHS. OFFICIAL SOVIET NO-SHOW AT MY  
JULY 4 RECEPTION AND LACK OF RESPONSE TO MY  
APPOINTMENT REQUESTS WERE NO WAY TO SET NEW TONE.  
DOBRYNIN THEN PULLED HIS FAMILIAR OLD TRICK OF  
MAKING UP FACTS TO SUIT SITUATION. HE HAD BEEN  
UNABLE TO SEE PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON. DEPUTY FOREIGN  
MINISTER WAS AT MY RECEPTION AND THAT WAS "NORMAL."  
I EXPLAINED THAT IN "COLDER" DAYS OF LAST FOUR  
YEARS, MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HIGH-LEVEL  
SCIENTISTS, AND EVEN MINISTERS HAD ATTENDED. I  
CONCLUDED THAT GORBACHEV'S OPENNESS POLICY WAS  
NOT MEANT FOR TREATMENT OF AMBASSADORS AND THIS  
  
WAS BOUND TO AFFECT THEIR VIEWS. IN THIS CONTEXT  
HE MADE ONE OF SEVERAL DISPARAGING REMARKS ABOUT  
SCIENTISTS (READ VELIKHOV) WHO TRY TO MAKE  
THEIR OWN POLICY, ETC.

12. COMMENT/CONCLUSION  
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I FOUND DOBRYNIN RELAXED AND SURE OF HIMSELF. MOST  
OF WHAT HE SAID WAS PROBABLY AN ACCURATE VIEW OF  
GORBACHEV'S STATE OF MIND. IN COMMENTING ON THE

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 ATMOSPHERE IN MOSCOW HE SAID THAT BUREAUCRATS,  
 "AS I WOULD KNOW," ARE GREAT FENCE SITTERS AND  
 THE WHOLE APPARATUS IS IN THAT MOOD ON U.S./SOVIET  
 RELATIONS. NO ONE WANTS TO BACK A LOSER. THUS  
 IF YOU TOOK A VOTE PARTICULARLY AMONG NON-FOREIGN  
 AFFAIRS PARTY WORKERS THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY  
 WOULD BE NEGATIVE ON A SUMMIT. TO THIS I WOULD ADD  
 THE NON-BUREAUCRATIC EXPLANATION THAT SOVIETS ARE  
 RUSSIANS AND BASICALLY WHEN IT COMES TO BARGAINING  
 THEY HAVE A PEASANT MENTALITY. THEY WISH TO SEE THE  
 PRODUCT THAT THEY ARE BUYING BEFORE THEY SHELL OUT  
 THE CASH, OR IN THIS CASE THE PRESTIGE OF  
 BEING COMMITTED TO A SUMMIT, WITHOUT KNOWING FOR  
 SURE THAT SOMETHING CONCRETE WILL HAPPEN THERE.  
 I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ONLY A BARGAINING  
 TACTIC. I THINK THAT GORBACHEV WOULD CONSIDER  
 HIMSELF GENUINELY EXPOSED IF HE DIDN'T HAVE A  
 PRETTY GOOD IDEA THAT SOMETHING NOTEWORTHY WOULD  
 HAPPEN ON HIS FIRST TRIP TO "ENEMY" TERRITORY.  
 HARTMAN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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July 10, 1986

ACTION

**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Hartman-Dobrynin Conversation, July 8, 1986

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President with a summary of the principal points in Art Hartman's report on his meeting with Dobrynin.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve   *J*  

Disapprove     

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Hartman cable

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR F06-114/S #8457

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

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Declassify: OADR

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Matlock 29

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR:

July 14, 1986

MR. DONALD GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

MS. RUTH KNOUSE  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of Transportation

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. WILLIAM VITALE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Energy

MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

MS. CYNTHIA CANEVARO  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Education

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. PHILIP DuSAULT  
Acting Associate Director for  
National Security and  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON  
Senior Special Assistant to the  
Assistant to the Attorney General  
and Chief of Staff  
Department of Justice

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. STEPHEN GLEASON  
Executive Assistant to the Secretary  
Department of the Interior

MR. JAMES FRIERSON  
Chief of Staff  
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. FLOYD GAIBLER  
Confidential Assistant  
to the Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

MR. JOHN A. SVAHN  
Assistant to the President  
for Policy Development

MRS. HELEN ROBBINS  
Executive Assistant  
to the Secretary  
Department of Commerce

MR. BERYL SPRINKEL  
Chairman  
President's Council of  
Economic Advisers

MR. DENNIS WHITFIELD  
Under Secretary  
Department of Labor

MR. ALAN HILL  
Chairman  
Council on Environmental Quality

MR. JAMES J. DELANEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Health  
and Human Services

MR. CHARLES SIEGMAN  
Senior Associate Director  
Division of International  
Finance  
Federal Reserve Board

MR. DAVID TURNER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Housing  
and Urban Development

MR. JAMES H. DRAPER, III  
President and Chairman  
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.

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Declassify: OADR

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NLRR M08-125/2 #8458

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

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REAR ADMIRAL JOHN BITOFF  
Executive Assistant  
to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. RONALD J. POST  
Acting Chief of the Executive  
Secretariat  
U.S. Information Agency

MR. RICHARD MEYER  
Executive Secretary  
Agency for International  
Development

MR. HENRY E. CLEMENTS  
Executive Officer  
National Aeronautics and Space  
Administration

MR. WILLIAM STAPLES  
Executive Secretary  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. FITZHUGH GREEN  
Associate Administrator of  
International Activities  
Environmental Protection Agency

DR. RICHARD G. JOHNSON  
Acting Director  
Office of Science and Technology  
Policy

DR. BODO BARTOCHA  
Division Director  
Division of International  
Programs  
National Science Foundation


MS. JANE A. KENNY  
Executive Secretary  
General Services Administration

SUBJECT: Procedures for Handling Administration  
Contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin (S)

The President has concluded that the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador presents an opportunity to coordinate more closely high-level USG contacts with the Soviet Embassy. This coordination is essential to promote the national interest, to increase the reciprocity in our relationship, and to ensure that the Soviets do not use our open system to play US agencies and policy makers against each other. In general, our position will be that Ambassador Dubinin should not be permitted more extensive contacts in the Executive Branch than those the Soviet authorities allow the American Ambassador in Moscow. (S)

To this end, Departments and other Agencies should observe the following procedures for contacts with the new Soviet Ambassador:

- Secretary Shultz is the primary point of contact with Ambassador Dubinin. (S)
- Ambassador Dubinin's requests for meetings with senior officials in other agencies should be coordinated in advance of a response and responses sent through the State Department. (S)
- Ambassador Dubinin's invitations to senior officials for business and social events at the Soviet Embassy should likewise be coordinated. (S)
- The point of contact in the State Department is the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, telephone: 647-3738. (U)

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

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Declassify: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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July 7, 1986

ACTION

**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Administration Contacts with  
Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

State has recommended that we take advantage of the change in Soviet ambassadors to establish more reciprocity in the access our respective ambassadors enjoy here and in Moscow. This will require designating a central point for clearance of senior-level appointments. State recommends that this be done by the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in State.

In my opinion, this is a constructive suggestion, since EUR/SOV will be in a position to monitor Hartman's access in Moscow and, in view of this, monitor and advise our high-level contacts here.

A memorandum for Rod McDaniel to send to the executive secretaries of U.S. departments and agencies is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the attached memorandum for the executive secretaries of U.S. departments and agencies outlining the procedures for handling Administration contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin.

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I McDaniel Memorandum
- Tab II Platt-Poindexter Memorandum

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Declassify: OADR

**DECLASSIFIED**  
NLRR F06-114/5 #8459  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11





SECRET

July 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ

At your luncheon meeting July 1 with Secretary Shultz and other cabinet-level officials, it was agreed that Administration contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin would be handled in a coordinated way. We have attached draft "rules of engagement" based on the understanding reached, and recommend that you circulate them to the heads of relevant agencies.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated

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DECL: OADR

NLRR Feb 11/4/5 #8467  
BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

Procedures for Handling Administration Contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

The President has concluded that the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador presents an opportunity to coordinate more closely high-level USG contacts with the Soviet Embassy. This coordination is essential to promote the national interest, to increase the reciprocity in our relationship, and to ensure that the Soviets do not use our open system to play U.S. agencies and policy makers against each other.

To this end, Departments and other agencies should observe the following procedures for contacts with the new Soviet Ambassador:

-- Secretary Shultz is the primary point of contact with Ambassador Dubinin.

-- Ambassador Dubinin's requests for meetings with senior officials in other agencies should be coordinated in advance of a response and responses sent through the State Department.

-- Ambassador Dubinin's invitations to senior officials for business and social events at the Soviet Embassy should likewise be coordinated. ~~and responses sent through the State Department.~~

-- The point of contact in the State Department is the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Tel. 647-3738.

*In general, our position will be that Ambassador Dubinin should not be permitted to make extensive contacts in the Executive Branch. Above the Soviet authority of the American Embassy.*

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NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8605175

RECEIVED 14 JUL 86 10

TO BROCK, W

FROM WALLOP, MALCOLM

DOCDATE 27 JUN 86

JAFFKE, K

11 JUL 86

KEYWORDS HUMAN RIGHTS

USSR

BONNER, YELINA

MP

CO

SUBJECT LTR TO BALL FM SEN WALLOP RE PRES NOT MEETING W/ BONNER

ACTION: MEMO MDCANIEL TO KATHY JAFFKE DUE 25 JUL 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MANDEL

RAYMOND

MATLOCK

PEARSON

SABLE

RODMAN

THOMPSON

COMMENTS

*7/14/86*  
 I think this should be dropped for Ball to  
 reply, making following pts: (1) Pres made decision  
 on his own - was not a case of staff misbehavior  
 and (2) Soviets are fully aware of President's  
 view since he expresses this to the directly and  
 privately. Pres. is convinced that this  
 is the best method to get results -

REF# 408523

LOG

NSC/FID

( LB )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

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W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENDA S. REGER

Don Mahley  
Jack Matlock

FROM: NANCY V. MENAN *Ann*

SUBJECT: Appeal of Declassification Review Request of Kai Bird and Max Holland

The requester has appealed our denial in this case, and we must now review that decision. The "appeal committee" consists of the Executive Secretary, the Director of Information Policy and Security Review, and the substantive staff officer(s).

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

In the initial case, Department of State denied on behalf of the NSC the attached documents in accordance with EO 12356, (a)(3) foreign government information, and, (a)(5) foreign relations or foreign affairs of the U.S. In its review of the appealed documents, State recommends release of the cover letter on #14, deny in full #10,12, and the attachment to #14 on the basis of (a)(3) & (5). I recommend that you uphold the initial denial of all three documents. (a)(3)& (5) Author of #10 is Dean Acheson.

FYI: Also Coordinated with P. Dobriansky.

Please review the previously denied information and check the appropriate block(s) below with your recommendations. If you recommend denial in part, be sure to bracket those portions you feel must remain classified on the attached copy(ies) and provided justifications.

REGER <i>BSR 7/16/86</i>	MAHLEY <i>Don 7/17/86</i>	MATLOCK <i>JSW 7/17/86</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declass/release	<input type="checkbox"/> Declass/release	<input type="checkbox"/> Declass/release
<input type="checkbox"/> Release in part Reason _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Release in part Reason _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Release in part Reason _____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Uphold denial Reason <u>a3 + 5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Uphold denial Reason <u>a3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Uphold denial Reason <u>a3, a5</u>

Attachments: DOC #12 *only*

DUE DATE: July 22, 1986

*Chome*  
*36*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

July 17, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: SDI Timescales

Tom Johnson has done an interesting summary of his view of what optimistic but realistic timescales look like in the SDI program. I believe you will find it of interest. (He asked that I not let the paper be circulated with his name on it, since he feels he is in a rather delicate position.)

Tom told me that all his estimates were as optimistic as he felt the technical facts could possibly allow. In fact, he is not as sanguine regarding boost phase interceptors as the paper suggests. He feels that we will probably never solve all the problems related to boost phase interception, but will probably find that two or three layers during midcourse is more feasible. These could be handled with "pop-up" systems and thus avoid the great problems associated with the survivability of space-based systems and the enormous lift capacity required.

Tom also points to one real problem which would face us if we contemplate withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in the near term: it would give the Soviets the opportunity to proliferate nuclear-armed terminal defense systems several years before we could get any sort of terminal defenses deployed.

Another concern Tom conveyed to me orally is that raising public and Congressional expectations too high regarding the time factors which are likely could ultimately be used to turn people off on the program. If we are to "institutionalize" it so that it will go forward under future administrations (which should be our overall goal), we must not cultivate unrealistic expectations. If we do, we are handing critics powerful arguments three or four years from now to restrict or kill the program.

If you would like to discuss any of these matters with Tom, he will be glad to come by.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/S 128460

BY CJ NARA DATE 11/29/07

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

37

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

July 17, 1986

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8461

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

→ Chron 38

Jul 17, 1987

NOTE FROM: Jack Matlock

SUBJECT: Paul Nitze

I had lunch with Paul today, and found that he is most concerned over his inability to see you -- either in a SACG or privately -- before he takes on the mission to the Allies. As you probably are aware, he has some problems with the letter and feels that the President has possibly not had the benefit of a full discussion. But -- what seems more important to him, since he is a good soldier-- is that he just doesn't feel that he understands enough of what lies behind some of the decisions to deal with Thatcher in particular. (He feels that Thatcher will go up the wall over the language about signing a treaty now (sub para b) to share if both parties agree to eliminate offensive missiles. He thinks she will see this as undercutting the British and French deterrents.)

In sum, though he did not threaten to refuse to go to Europe, I believe some stroking is going to be required for him to be effective. Could you find time to talk to him between now and Saturday?

cc: NSHS --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASED)  
NLRR FOL-114/S 178462  
BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

WR - 7/18  
The resolution Navah  
brought in is full of  
contradictions - doubt  
less representing doubts  
& divisions in the  
uncertainties in the  
Polish American  
community - Paula's  
recommendations  
makes sense -  
Jack

July 18, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK  
PAULA DOBRIANSKY

FROM: WALT RAYMOND

SUBJECT: Poland

Please call Francine at 6900 with your concurrence on the  
attached memo.

Thanx.

Attachment

**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D. C. 20547

7/22 Copies to:  
Office of the Director  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Raymond  
Mandel  
Steiner



July 18, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM: Marvin L. Stone *MLS*  
Deputy Director

SUBJECT: USIA Support for The Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of July 2, 1986

The Director is out of town, so please consider this an interim reply to your memorandum. Director Wick will probably want to make a fuller response after he returns.

Thank you for the kind words on our March suggestions. We are ready to move on these or any other ideas you might have as soon as we get the go-ahead.

We look forward to participating fully in the working group on the summit when it is formed. In the meantime, our policy office will be in contact with Jack Matlock.

7/21/86

Ken Kries  
-6921

~~SECRET~~

# ACHIEVE A PRODUCTIVE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN THE U.S.

## *Enhance Bilateral Relations with the Soviet While Protecting Vital Global Interests*

**SETTING** Opportunity exists to build on the improved tone set by the Glassboro Speech and the June 8 Soviet arms control proposal. However, regional <sup>conflicts</sup> tensions and arms control disagreements could be obstacles. <sub>human rights</sub>

**ARMS CONTROL** Press the Soviets for commitments to deep, equitable, verifiable strategic arms reductions; and for positive movement on INF, testing verification, and MBFR.

**REGIONAL SECURITY** Protect security assistance programs, develop a full range of active capabilities, and encourage Allied support thus strengthening our ability to limit Soviet action and influence in the Third World.

**HUMAN RIGHTS** Continue to remind the Soviets that serious progress in bilateral relations is contingent upon improvements in Soviet human rights. Encourage benefits of private diplomacy in important Refusnik and dissident cases.

**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY** Emphasize Geneva commitments to discussion and progress on all aspects of the relationship especially where there is common ground. Highlight Soviet intransigence, disinformation, lack of forthrightness, and abuse, while showing U.S. desire to improve relations.

**RISK** Soviets may continue to issue broad and general arms proposals that appeal to Europe and the American public in an effort to saddle the Administration with the responsibility for impasse in arms talks.

**MILESTONES**  
Cultural exchanges and contacts  
Regional and Functional discussions  
Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting  
Gorbachev visit to the U.S.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8463

BY CV NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~SECRET~~

42

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 22, 1986

NOTE FOR: PETER RODMAN  
ROD McDANIEL  
BOB LINHARD  
STEVE SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT: Bessmertnykh

Attached "Notional Schedule" received informally from State/EUR. Although State wants to keep the group at the table as small as possible, NSC participation is -- I understand -- welcome. In particular, Simons asked that either Rodman or Sestanovich participate in the session on regional issues.

(This is all I have up to now.)

JACK F. MATLOCK

Attachment: Notional Schedule

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 100-114/5 #8464

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

Notional Schedule  
Visit to Washington of  
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh  
July 25 - 30(?), 1986

FRIDAY, JULY 25

Morning	Bessmertnykh arrives Washington National Airport.
2:30 PM	<u>Organizational Meeting</u> . Chaired by DAS Thomas Simons. Room 6226
3:30 PM	<u>Regional Issues</u> . Chaired by DAS Thomas Simons. Room 6226.
Evening	Free

SATURDAY, JULY 26

10:00 AM	<u>Bilateral Issues</u> . Chaired by Asst. Sec. Ridgway. Room 6226.
Lunch/Evening	Free (Possibility of informal supper or drinks)

SUNDAY, JULY 27

Free

**DECLASSIFIED / RE / CASOJ**  
 NLRR F06-114/5 #8468  
 BY CJ NARA DATE 11/29/07

MONDAY, JULY 28

09:30 AM Call on Secretary Shultz

10:30 AM NST Issues. Chaired by Asst. Sec Ridgway. Amb.'s Nitze, Kampelman to attend. Room 6226.

Lunch Henry Clay Room. Asst. Sec. Ridgway host.

4:00 PM Humanitarian Issues. Small meeting in Asst. Sec. Ridgway's office.

Evening Free

TUESDAY, July 29

10:00 AM Non-NST Issues. Chaired by Asst. Sec. Ridgway. Room 6226.

Lunch Soviet Embassy (Probable)

Afternoon Available for wrap-up session or second call on Secretary.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30

Morning Bessmertnykh departs Washington

45

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 22, 1986

NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK  
BOB LINHARD  
STEVE STEINER  
DON MAHLEY



7/22 90 ~~FROM:~~ → KARNA SMALL

Attached are talking points for the President's use in his upcoming news conference. Obviously, points on the SCC and testing meetings will have to be updated, but we need to do the best we can TODAY.

You'll see some words are needed on the first page (the points were supplied by State, but they're not very catchy or clever - so need your urgent comments, edits ASAP) May I hear from you by 3:00 today. We need to get everything retyped and in to the Admiral before he leaves on the trip with the President tomorrow.

Many thanks for your help.

Summit

o At our Summit last year, <sup>RR</sup> I invited General Secretary Gorbachev to visit the U.S. in 1986 and he accepted. That invitation stands without preconditions.

-- We want to accelerate work for a productive, substantive Summit in 1986 to cover all the issues. For months, we've been trying to intensify our dialogue with the Soviets.

Shultz-Shevardnadze

o We're now making intensive preparations for a Foreign Ministers' meeting. We don't yet have dates, but <sup>RR</sup> I hope that we can hold the first one early in the fall.

-- We wanted to hold a Foreign Ministers' meeting early this year but the Soviets weren't ready. Now they may be and we're looking forward to substantive discussions across the board.

President's Letter to Gorbachev

o These days, you can't even send a letter without everybody talking about it.

o <sup>RR is</sup> I'm not going to comment on the contents of a confidential exchange. Our suggestions are part of what <sup>RR</sup> I hope will be an ongoing, serious dialogue leading to the Summit.

-- While <sup>RR</sup> I didn't agree with everything he said, General Secretary Gorbachev's last letter <sup>to me</sup> was serious and constructive. My response will likewise be constructive and <sup>RR</sup> I think Mr. Gorbachev will read it in that spirit.

Without discussing letter, in general, are you prepared to extend the ABM treaty (and thus delay deployment of SDI) in exchange for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals? Why, why not?

*need  
points  
here*

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON SALT II/SCC

Why is there so much confusion about the status of SALT?

- There should be no confusion about the status of SALT <sup>II</sup> SALT <sup>II</sup> is no longer relevant. On the other hand, restraint is still very much the basis for U.S. policy. What is needed is for the Soviets to exercise comparable restraint.

Why Is the U.S. accepting the Soviet request for a Special Session if SALT is no longer relevant?

- The Soviets rejected our request in 1983 to convene a special session of the SCC to discuss their development of the SS-25 in violation of SALT II.
- <sup>RR</sup> didn't understand their refusal to talk then and felt we should not shrink in any way from a full explanation of <sup>my RR's</sup> May 27 decision on SALT.
- Whether SALT is relevant or irrelevant, dead or alive, is not the issue. What is important from <sup>our</sup> my perspective is that restraint is very much alive.
- The special session of the Standing Consultative Commission offers us the opportunity to see just how serious the Soviet Union is in joining in a framework of truly mutual restraint.

Does the U.S. have any concrete objectives in attending the session or is for appearances only?

- We continue to seek constructive Soviet action.
  - o It is essential that they correct their noncompliance, reverse their strategic arms buildup, and work seriously with us to make real progress in Geneva.
  - o If they do so, we will certainly take that into account.

What does the US hope to get out of the upcoming meeting on nuclear testing?

- o The talks on nuclear testing are without preconditions. We'll give the Soviets our views; they'll give us theirs.
- o For our part we intend to discuss U.S. views on verification of nuclear testing limitations. Resolution of our verification concerns would permit us to move forward on ratification of existing treaties limiting nuclear testing.

Is this meeting a resumption of the test ban talks?

- o No, it is not. This meeting is about making progress on nuclear testing. We suggested meeting without preconditions so we can try to develop some common ground about practical steps on nuclear testing.

What about those American scientists who have set up a seismic monitoring station in the Soviet Union? Does this mean our verification concerns are resolved?

- o No, <sup>RR</sup> ~~I~~ <sup>do not</sup> believe our verification concerns can be resolved by this private exchange.
- o Issues like nuclear testing have very clear national security implications. Such issues can only be resolved in a government-to-government context.
- o Nevertheless, <sup>RR</sup> ~~I~~ <sup>hopes</sup> that the agreement between this private group and the Soviets reflects a change in Soviet attitudes toward the need for enhanced verification of nuclear testing limitations.

Is the US proposing a linkage between reductions in strategic arms and reductions in nuclear testing?

- o For negotiations to have the best chance of success, it is important that both sides respect the confidentiality of the process. Therefore, I can't comment on your question.

Why is the U.S. opposed to a comprehensive test ban?

- o A CTB remains a long-term objective for the United States.  
  
However, for the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will remain a key element of our deterrent. In such a situation, where we and our allies must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression, a moderate level of nuclear testing will be required to ensure the continued effectiveness, reliability and safety of our weapons.

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Letter to Gorbachev

- Have replied to his proposals in forthcoming way.
- Hope to give momentum to negotiations to lower levels of nuclear arms.
- Contents of letter confidential.
- Eager to move rapidly to agreement if Soviets willing.

Summit

- Gen. Sec. Gorbachev accepted invitation to visit U.S. this year; assume he was serious.
- We are working with Soviets actively on range of issues on our agenda.
- Believe we could have productive meeting before the end of the year, but Soviets have not yet responded to our suggestion for a date.

Shultz-Shevardnadze

- Believe they will meet in September, but precise date not yet set.
- Have much to discuss. We think the meeting would be a useful one.

SDI/Strategic Arms

- Our top priority is reducing offensive nuclear weapons.
- SDI research is important and will be continued; Soviet program is a substantial one, and we are sure they will continue theirs.
- We are interested in discussing the interrelationship between defensive and offensive weapons.
- Believe it important that no nation have a first-strike capability.
- Our proposals take these factors and aims into account.
- Cannot comment in detail on the issues since they are under negotiation.

SALT-II

- No longer a factor in our decisions.
- We wish to move rapidly to a concrete agreement to reduce nuclear weapons substantially, not build them up, as SALT-II permitted.
- We will continue our own restraint in deploying weapons systems. Important for both sides to exercise utmost restraint.

SCC

- Purpose of meeting is to discuss compliance issues.
- These are important and we will leave no stone unturned in our effort to encourage better compliance.
- Meeting on compliance issues does not mean that SALT-II can be revived.
- We hope it will be useful, however, in developing a pattern of mutual restraint, and in encouraging better compliance with treaties across the board.

Nuclear Testing

- Our specialists will be meeting without preconditions.
- U.S. aim is to secure more reliable means of verification, so that we deal with the testing issue on the basis of mutual confidence.
- Hope we can make progress on this issue: better verification and a more solid basis for limits on testing.

U.S.-Soviet Relations in General

- Soviets have shown more interest recently in negotiating in practical terms regarding outstanding issues.
- This makes me optimistic that we will be able to move toward agreements in some key areas.
- We still have a long way to go, however, so the important thing is to keep the negotiations moving.
- U.S. will be negotiating seriously; to give the negotiations a real chance, we must deal with the issues on a confidential basis.