

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron September 1986 (3)
Box: 17

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1986 (3/9)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1710

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8516	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR WIFE OF SHEVARDNADZE [1 - 1] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	9/8/1986	B1
8517	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO SIMPSON RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR WIFE OF SHEVARDNADZE [2 - 2] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	ND	B1
8518	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR WIFE OF SHEVARDNADZE [3 - 3] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	9/5/1986	B1
8519	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO SIMPSON RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR WIFE OF SHEVARDNADZE [4 - 4] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1986 (3/9)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1710

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8520	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8517 [17 - 17] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	9/10/1986	B1
8521	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8516 [18 - 18] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	9/8/1986	B1
8522	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8518 [19 - 19] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	9/5/1986	B1
8515	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO KELLEY RE RESPONSE TO LETTER AND BOOKS FROM MR. PROCTOR JONES [21 - 21]	1	ND	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JSW*

SUBJECT:

Secret Service Protection for Wife of Soviet Foreign Minister

The Soviets have requested, and State Department recommends, that Secret Service protection be accorded the wife of the Soviet Foreign Minister during her trip to the United States on September 16-30. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has received Secret Service protection during previous visits, and the NSC requested Secret Service protection for him for this trip on August 27.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memorandum at Tab I recommending Secret Service protection for Mrs. Shevardnadze.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Ty Cobb concurs.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo from McDaniel to Secret Service Director Simpson
Tab A	State Department Memo Requesting Secret Service Protection for Mrs. Shevardnadze
Tab B	McDaniel Memo to Simpson Requesting Secret Service Protection for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06714/5 #8516

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR JOHN R. SIMPSON
Director
U.S. Secret ServiceSUBJECT: Secret Service Protection for Wife of Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

State Department recommends and NSC concurs that the wife of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be accorded Secret Service protection during her trip to the United States September 16-30. The NSC requested on August 27 that Secret Service protection be accorded the Foreign Minister throughout this trip.

The travel schedule for the Foreign Minister and Mrs. Shevardnadze is now expected to be as follows:

Sept. 16 2:25 pm	Arrive JFK Airport, New York
Sept. 18 11:50 am	Arrive Andrews AFB, Washington D.C.
Sept. 21	Arrive New York
Sept. 30 5:00 pm	Depart US from New York

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, like his predecessor Mr. Gromyko, has received Secret Service protection during previous trips to the United States. Given the importance of this trip, the high profile of the visit, and the precedent of earlier Secret Service protection, we recommend that this protection be provided for both Foreign Minister and Mrs. Shevardnadze.

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive SecretaryCONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 114/5 #8517BY CU NARA DATE 11/21/07



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

6419

September 5, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Secret Service Protection for Wife of Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

In my memorandum to you of August 23, 1986, I requested Secret Service protection for Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during his September visit to the United States. The Soviets have since advised us that Mr. Shevardnadze will be accompanied by his wife and have requested that Secret Service protection be extended to cover Mrs. Shevardnadze.

We agree that Secret Service protection should be extended to include Mrs. Shevardnadze and ask that you convey our request to the appropriate officials.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt *for*
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/S #6518~~CONFIDENTIAL~~BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN R. SIMPSON
Director
U.S. Secret Service

SUBJECT: Secret Service Protection for
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

State Department recommends and NSC concurs that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be accorded Secret Service protection during his forthcoming trip to the United States on September 19 and 20. The Foreign Minister's schedule is not known at the moment, but it is anticipated that he may depart for New York on September 21 to attend the United Nations General Assembly.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, like his predecessor Mr. Gromyko, has received Secret Service protection during previous trips to the United States. Given the importance of this trip, the high profile of the visit, and the precedent of earlier Secret Service protection, we recommend that this protection be provided during the forthcoming trip.

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F010-114/5 #8519
BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

Cham 5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Telegram from Sister of Moscow
Correspondent Nick Daniloff

At Tab I is a letter from the President answering a telegram from Ellen Daniloff Krawiec, the sister of U.S. News and World Report's Moscow correspondent Nicholas Daniloff. As an alternative, at Tab II is a letter from you to Ms. Krawiec answering her telegram. In her telegram, Ms. Krawiec asks the President to do all in his power to secure the release of her brother from Soviet detention.

At Tab A is Ms. Krawiec's original telegram.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the President sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That, if the President does not sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab I, you sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

PH
Paul Hanley concurs.

Attachments

Tab I Letter from the President to Ms. Krawiec
Tab II Letter from you to Ms. Krawiec
Tab A Ms Krawiec's Telegram

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mrs. Krawiec:

The Soviet government's detention of your brother, Mr. Daniloff, on trumped-up charges is totally unwarranted. We reject the Soviet charges as contrived and have called for his immediate release.

I have directed that the U.S. Government do all it can to ensure Mr. Daniloff's release. I am deeply concerned by the Soviet government's action, and am watching your brother's case closely.

Sincerely,

Ellen Daniloff Krawiec
4490 Northwest 18 Ave.
Oakland Park, FL 33309

1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mrs. Krawiec:

The President has asked me to respond to your telegram about your brother. The Soviet government's detention of Mr. Danilooff on trumped-up charges is totally unwarranted. We reject the Soviet charges as contrived and have called for his immediate release.

The President is deeply concerned by the Soviet government's action and he has been personally involved in your brother's case. He has directed that the U.S. Government do all it can to ensure Mr. Danilooff's release and is continuing to watch his case closely.

Sincerely,

Ellen Danilooff Krawiec
4490 Northwest 18 Ave.
Oakland Park, FL 33309

MR PRESIDENT,

AS THE SISTER OF NICHOLAS DANILOFF I EMPLORE YOU TO DO ALL IN YOUR
POWER TO SECURE HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE UP TO AND INCLUDING PERSONAL
NEGOTIATIONS WITH PREMIER GORBACHOV. NICK HAS MUCH TO GIVE TO OUR
CONTRY AND MORE THAN I BELIEVE ANYONE COULD TAKE AWAY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

ELLEN DANILOFF KRAWIEC

4490 NORTHWEST 18 AVE

OAKLAND PARK FL 33309

1159 EST

1203 EST

1209 EST

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Telegram from Sister of Moscow
Correspondent Nick Daniloff

At Tab I is a letter from the President answering a telegram from Ellen Daniloff Krawiec, the sister of U.S. News and World Report's Moscow correspondent Nicholas Daniloff. As an alternative, at Tab II is a letter from you to Ms. Krawiec answering her telegram. In her telegram, Ms. Krawiec asks the President to do all in his power to secure the release of her brother from Soviet detention.

At Tab A is Ms. Krawiec's original telegram.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the President sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That, if the President does not sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab I, you sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

PH
Paul Hanley concurs.

Attachments

Tab I Letter from the President to Ms. Krawiec
Tab II Letter from you to Ms. Krawiec
Tab A Ms Krawiec's Telegram

10

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mrs. Krawiec:

The Soviet government's detention of your brother, Mr. Danilooff, on trumped-up charges is totally unwarranted. We reject the Soviet charges as contrived and have called for his immediate release.

I have directed that the U.S. Government do all it can to ensure Mr. Danilooff's release. I am deeply concerned by the Soviet government's action, and am watching your brother's case closely.

Sincerely,

Ellen Danilooff Krawiec
4490 Northwest 18 Ave.
Oakland Park, FL 33309

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mrs. Krawiec:

The President has asked me to respond to your telegram about your brother. The Soviet government's detention of Mr. Danilooff on trumped-up charges is totally unwarranted. We reject the Soviet charges as contrived and have called for his immediate release.

The President is deeply concerned by the Soviet government's action and he has been personally involved in your brother's case. He has directed that the U.S. Government do all it can to ensure Mr. Danilooff's release and is continuing to watch his case closely.

Sincerely,

Ellen Danilooff Krawiec
4490 Northwest 18 Ave.
Oakland Park, FL 33309

MR PRESIDENT,

AS THE SISTER OF NICHOLAS DANILOFF I EMPLORE YOU TO DO ALL IN YOUR
POWER TO SECURE HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE UP TO AND INCLUDING PERSONAL
NEGOTIATIONS WITH PREMIER GORBACHOV. NICK HAS MUCH TO GIVE TO OUR
CONTRY AND MORE THAN I BELIEVE ANYONE COULD TAKE AWAY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

ELLEN DANILOFF KRAWIEC

4490 NORTHWEST 18 AVE

OAKLAND PARK FL 33309

1159 EST

1203 EST

1209 EST

6346

13

MATLOCK

Cham

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


September 9, 1986

Dear Mrs. Krawiec:

The President has asked me to respond to your telegram about your brother. The Soviet government's detention of Mr. Danilooff on trumped-up charges is totally unwarranted. We reject the Soviet charges as contrived and have called for his immediate release.

The President is deeply concerned by the Soviet government's action and he has been personally involved in your brother's case. He has directed that the U.S. Government do all it can to ensure Mr. Danilooff's release and is continuing to watch his case closely.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

Ellen Danilooff Krawiec
4490 Northwest 18 Ave.
Oakland Park, FL 33309

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Response to Telegram from Sister of Moscow
Correspondent Nick Daniloff

At Tab I is a letter from the President answering a telegram from Ellen Daniloff Krawiec, the sister of U.S. News and World Report's Moscow correspondent Nicholas Daniloff. As an alternative, at Tab II is a letter from you to Ms. Krawiec answering her telegram. In her telegram, Ms. Krawiec asks the President to do all in his power to secure the release of her brother from Soviet detention.

At Tab A is Ms. Krawiec's original telegram.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the President sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove *Imp*

2. That, if the President does not sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab I, you sign the letter to Ms. Krawiec at Tab II.

Approve *Imp*

Disapprove _____

PH
Paul Hanley concurs.

Attachments

Tab I Letter from the President to Ms. Krawiec
Tab II Letter from you to Ms. Krawiec
Tab A Ms Krawiec's Telegram

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

86 SEP 3 8:05

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6346

ACTION OFFICER:

MATLOCK

DUE: 4 SEP 86

☐ Prepare Memo For President☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew☒ Prepare Memo For Poindexter

Fortier / Keel

☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan☐ Prepare Memo

to

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

☐ Brooks☐ Burghardt☐ Burns☐ Cannistraro☐ Childress☐ Cobb☐ Danzansky☐ deGraffenreid☐ Dobriansky☐ Donley☐ Douglass☐ Farrar☐ Grimes☒ Hanley☐ Kelly☐ Kissell☐ Kraemer

FYI

☐ Laux☐ Lavin☐ Lenczowski☐ Levine☐ Linhard☐ Mahley☐ Major☐ Mandel☐ Matlock☐ May☐ Mingle☐ North☐ Perry☐ Platt☐ Pugliaresi☐ Raymond☐ Reger

FYI

☐ Ringdahl☐ Ross☐ Sable☐ Sachs☐ Saunders☐ Sestanovich☐ Small☐ Sommer☐ Sods☐ Stark☐ Steiner☐ St Martin☐ Tahir-Kheli☐ Teicher☐ Thompson☐ Tillman☐

INFORMATION

☐ McDaniel☒ Rodman☒ Poindexter (advance)☒ Pearson☐ Cockell☐ Fortier (advance)☒ Secretariat☐☒ Keel (advance)

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

MR PRESIDENT,

AS THE SISTER OF NICHOLAS DANILOFF I EMPLORE YOU TO DO ALL IN YOUR
POWER TO SECURE HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE UP TO AND INCLUDING PERSONAL
NEGOTIATIONS WITH PREMIER GORBACHUV. NICK HAS MUCH TO GIVE TO OUR
CONTRY AND MORE THAN I BELIEVE ANYONE COULD TAKE AWAY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

ELLEN DANILOFF KRAWIEC

4490 NORTHWEST 18 AVE

OAKLAND PARK FL 33309

1159 EST

1203 EST

1209 EST

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 10, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN R. SIMPSON
Director
U.S. Secret ServiceSUBJECT: Secret Service Protection for Wife of Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (C)

State Department recommends and NSC concurs that the wife of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be accorded Secret Service protection during her trip to the United States September 16-30. The NSC requested on August 27 that Secret Service protection be accorded the Foreign Minister throughout this trip. (C)

The travel schedule for the Foreign Minister and Mrs. Shevardnadze is now expected to be as follows:

Sept. 16 2:25 pm Arrive JFK Airport, New York
Sept. 18 11:50 am Arrive Andrews AFB, Washington D.C.
Sept. 21 Arrive New York
Sept. 30 5:00 pm Depart US from New York (C)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, like his predecessor Mr. Gromyko, has received Secret Service protection during previous trips to the United States. Given the importance of this trip, the high profile of the visit, and the precedent of earlier Secret Service protection, we recommend that this protection be provided for both Foreign Minister and Mrs. Shevardnadze. (C)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-11415 #8520

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JSW*

SUBJECT:

Secret Service Protection for Wife of Soviet Foreign Minister

The Soviets have requested, and State Department recommends, that Secret Service protection be accorded the wife of the Soviet Foreign Minister during her trip to the United States on September 16-30. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has received Secret Service protection during previous visits, and the NSC requested Secret Service protection for him for this trip on August 27.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memorandum at Tab I recommending Secret Service protection for Mrs. Shevardnadze.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Ty Cobb concurs.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo from McDaniel to Secret Service Director Simpson
Tab A	State Department Memo Requesting Secret Service Protection for Mrs. Shevardnadze
Tab B	McDaniel Memo to Simpson Requesting Secret Service Protection for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-114/5 #8521

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



8627138

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

6419

September 5, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Secret Service Protection for Wife of Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

In my memorandum to you of August 23, 1986, I requested Secret Service protection for Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during his September visit to the United States. The Soviets have since advised us that Mr. Shevardnadze will be accompanied by his wife and have requested that Secret Service protection be extended to cover Mrs. Shevardnadze.

We agree that Secret Service protection should be extended to include Mrs. Shevardnadze and ask that you convey our request to the appropriate officials.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8522

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

20

6460

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 12, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK ^{RSD for JFM}

SUBJECT: Response to Letter and Books from Mr. Proctor Jones

At Tab I is a memo from Rod McDaniel to Sally Kelley forwarding a response to a letter from Mr. Proctor Jones. The letter itself is at Tab A.

Mr. Jones' letter is at Tab B. In his letter Mr. Jones forwards another copy of his book "Classic Russian Idylls" and a book "The Russian Threat" and suggests the President propose the goal of "interdependence between the United States and the Soviet Union." The President spoke with Mr. Jones before his November 1985 Geneva meeting, and Mrs. Reagan presented Mrs. Gorbachev with a copy of Mr. Jones' book of photographs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memo to Sally Kelley at Tab I forwarding the letter at Tab A to respond to Mr. Jones' letter.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

JEM
Judyt Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments:

Tab I	Memo from Rod McDaniel to Sally Kelley
Tab A	Letter from White House to Jones
Tab B	August 1986 Letter from Jones to the President

From Scott

For Amb Matlock

Subject: Letter to Rep Counter

22

Sable prefers we simply not answer Rep Counter's mass mailing of articles.

It's partly the blanket rule discouraging any NSC staff contact with the Hill, but more broadly Counter is trying to get the Administration to sign up to some things not in its interest. Sable prefers just to let this mailing die.

Therefore, with your permission, I do not intend to send Counter any response.
ok?

OK

21A

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

September 12, 1986

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Old Executive Office Bldg.
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Matlock:

Over the summer, I continued work on a variety of national security issues which may be of interest to you, and want to take a moment to send you a selection of articles.

A number of the enclosures concern two public issues which have much absorbed our attentions, strategic defense and aid to the freedom fighters of Nicaragua and Angola. These remain causes of strong interest to the American people which we have a clear duty to advance during the precious last years of the Reagan Presidency. Other articles concern another subject of much past work in this office: terrorism. The long-deserved respite won by the President's air raid on Libya on April 14 may have come to an end with the events in Pakistan and Turkey. Now there may be other crimes against innocent people, and America may again be required to take harsh action against the states and individuals which are responsible.

I hope the articles will prove to be of interest.

Sincerely,


JIM COURTER
Member of Congress

JAC/ch
Enclosures

Human Events

THE NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE WEEKLY



© 1986 by Human Events, Inc.

VOL. XLVI No. 29

JULY 19, 1986

\$

While Soviet 'SDI' Moves Ahead

U.S. Contemplates Surrendering 'Star Wars'

By REP. JIM COURTER (R.-N.J.)

Not too long ago, the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Gen. Nikolai Chervov, arrived in London to tout the latest Soviet arms control proposal.

At a press conference and an appearance before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Chervov announced that "on 'Star Wars,' the Soviet Union has actually made a very specific compromise." While the previous Soviet position had been that "everything was to be banned, including research," Chervov said, the new Soviet position says "let's limit it to research in laboratories."

It should be noted that the 1972 ABM treaty already permits SDI-type research and even some testing, so the "new" Soviet proposal is, in a very real sense, more than 14 years old. Even so, Chervov's announcement carries with it the implication that the Soviet Union is doing nothing more sinister than SDI research, and it is the U.S. that must rein in its ambitious strategic defense program if an arms control agreement is to be reached.

Unfortunately, the Soviet SDI proposal is evoking murmurs of interest and even approval from certain quarters within the Reagan Administration. Specifically, Secretary of State George Shultz and arms control adviser Paul Nitze have reportedly been urging a positive U.S. response to the Soviet scheme, either in a presidential letter to Mikhail Gorbachev or in Geneva when the arms control talks resume in September. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger is strenuously opposed.

Apparently the prospect of deep strategic offensive reductions, even at the alarming cost of a crippling

Rep. Courter, a ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, is one of Congress' leading experts on U.S. and Soviet defense systems.



While Secretary of State Shultz (left) appears willing to seriously consider surrendering any near-term deployment of an American "Star Wars" or the Strategic Defense Initiative in exchange for a Soviet pledge to cut back offensive nuclear arsenals, Defense Secretary Weinberger (right) is vigorously opposed to such a proposal.

pled SDI program, is so irresistible that some senior Administration officials are losing their appreciation of the real dangers involved.

In conjunction with their campaign against our SDI program, the Soviets have become noticeably more modest about their own strategic defense accomplishments. But as early as 1967, Soviet official publications were bragging about having already licked the most nettlesome strategic defense challenges.

"The USSR has far outstripped the United States not only in the creation of intercontinental and other rockets, but also in the area of anti-missile defense," said the authoritative military publication *Soviet Rocket Forces*. "In our country, we have successfully solved the problem of destruction of rockets in flight."



Almost 20 years later, it is enlightening to review the strategic defense advances the Soviets have made, and the ones that they are likely to make before the end of the century.

Soviet SDI efforts can be divided into three general categories: activities related to the Moscow ABM system; deployed systems for possible nationwide ABM defenses; and work on advanced systems, most notably directed energy weapons.

All of this work is driven by Soviet military doctrine, which holds that strategic defensive forces are to be used to destroy any incoming strategic offensive weapons which may have survived the Soviet first strike. The protection provided by strategic defensive systems is not expected to be total; only essential leadership, military and core industrial centers are to be defended on a priority basis. The proletariat would be left to fend for itself.

The flagship of the Soviet SDI system is the ABM interceptor system deployed around Moscow. A major system upgrade was initiated in 1978 and is due to be completed by 1987. The completed system will consist of 100 launchers of two varieties.

The GALOSH launchers will be capable of firing nuclear-tipped inter-

In this issue...

Page

• Court Shreds Reagan's Civil Rights Policies	3
• Will Kerry Filibuster Aid to Contras?	3
• Grace Reforms Being Blocked	3
• "Global Education" Pushed in High Schools	4
• Pornography Commission Issues Final Report	5
• Commissioner Dobson Blasts the ACLU	6
• Adult Bookstores Linked to AIDS	6
• Who Made Ted Turner Secretary of State?	8
By Howard Cosell	
• Also	
• "Racial Balance" Turns Law Inside-Out	7
By M. Stanton Evans	
• Glamorizing Drugs Played Part in Athletes' Deaths	9
By John Lofton	
• How One Man Fought Anti-Business Media Bias	10
By Allan C. Brownfeld	
• Who Will Succeed Stroessner in Paraguay?	11
By Smith Hempstone	
• Pro-Sandinista Professor at UCLA	12
By Les Corbora III	
• Will Yalie Fight Disciplinary Probation?	12
By Jeffrey Hart	
• Equal Time for Evolution and Creation?	16
By James J. Kilpatrick	
• Capital Briefs	2
• This Week's News From Inside Washington	3
• Politics '86	13
• Races of the Week:	
• Dunn vs. Carr	14
• Traywick vs. Olin	15
• Ballenger vs. Roark	15
• Conservative Forum	18
• Book Review: Goodbye To the Low Profile	10
By Herbert Schmertz	
• Rollcalls:	
• Senate: REA Loans	18
• House: SALT II Limits	19
• How's Your Political I.Q.?	9
• Classifieds	16



SCHMERTZ

How One Man Fought Anti-Business Media Bias
See page 10

U.S. TO SURRENDER 'STAR WARS'? / From page 1

ceptors at ballistic missile warheads outside the Earth's atmosphere. The GAZELLE launchers will deploy interceptors designed to stop warheads within the atmosphere.

Because only launchers and not the actual interceptors are limited by the ABM treaty, the possibility exists for the launchers to be reloaded and fired again. In fact, two advanced atmospheric ABM interceptors have been fired from the same test launcher in less than two hours.

The launchers are supported by a sophisticated engagement, guidance and battle management radar network, designed to maximize the potential for successful warhead intercepts. The new early warning radar at Pushkino will be the "bell-ringer" for the Moscow ABM system; the DOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE radars will track the incoming warheads; and the 24 TRY ADD radars will have actual battle management responsibilities.

The Soviet party elite are evidently quite pleased with the Moscow ABM system. They awarded one of only three senior military promotions in 1985 to Anatoly Konstantinov, the commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, whose primary responsibility includes maintenance and improvement of the Moscow ABM system.

Arrayed at more than a thousand locations around the Soviet Union are the more than 10,000 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and associated radars which constitute the Soviet "air defense" system. But true "air defenses" are intended to thwart attacks by "air breathing" systems, such as strategic bombers and cruise missiles. Gen. Chervov and his colleagues have never explained why, for example, between 1973 and 1975, SAM missiles were tested 50-60 times at altitudes as high as 100,000 feet, when it is well known U.S. bombers and cruise missiles fly at much lower altitudes. It has also never been explained why SAM radars were used in ABM-related testing activity, which is a probable violation of the ABM treaty.

Like the Moscow ABM system, the territorial defense SAM systems and radars are being expanded and modernized. The new SAM missile, the SA-12, is projected to have the capability to intercept shorter-range ballistic missiles, as well as some submarine-launched and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Of particular concern is the reported deployment of the SA-12 to defend SS-25 mobile ICBMs. Consistent with Soviet military doctrine, the SA-12 could greatly augment the survivability of a mobile ICBM "strategic reserve" force, thereby enabling the Soviets to execute a second strike after absorbing a U.S. retaliatory attack.

Incidentally, the deployment of mobile radars to operate the SA-12 in an ABM mode and the deployment of the SS-25 itself are violations of the ABM treaty and the SALT II treaty respectively.

A great deal of attention has focused upon the six new large phased-array Pechora-class radars, five of which are deployed around the periphery of the Soviet Union. These radars are intended to provide early warning of U.S. and Chinese ballistic missile launches, as well as missile tracking data. Because five of the radars provide little or no coverage for the Soviet interior, they are judged to have little or no ABM capability.

The same cannot be said of the sixth radar, deployed near the town of Krasnoyarsk in the middle of the Soviet Union. This radar complex is located 3,700 kilometers east of Moscow and 750 kilometers north of the Mongolian border. But it is aimed toward the extreme northeastern tip of the Soviet Union, more than 4,000 kilometers away.

The Soviets claim that the Krasnoyarsk radar serves the same early warning function as the five other radars, but the ABM treaty requires that early warning radars be located on the Soviet border and pointed outward. Consequently, the Krasnoyarsk radar is widely acknowledged by most Western observers to be the Soviet Union's most blatant ABM treaty violation.

More importantly, the location and capabilities of the Krasnoyarsk radar present the threat of an evolving ABM battle management radar network. The Krasnoyarsk radar is located in the vicinity of at least four ICBM fields and at least one SAM deployment area. The radar's coverage "fan" may include potential U.S. ICBM attack corridors.

The laser weapons program appears to be the largest of the Soviet exotic SDI efforts. More than 10,000 top scientists and over \$1 billion per year are devoted to laser activity, which is conducted at six major centers. The largest center, at Sary Shagan, already boasts two ground-based lasers which could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites in low earth orbit. Work is also proceeding on three kinds of gas lasers, excimer lasers, nuclear weapon-driven X-ray lasers and argon ion lasers. These efforts could culminate in a space-based laser deployment by the year 2000.

The other exotic weapons efforts appear to be smaller and even more closely guarded than the laser program. Particle beam weapons, for instance, have been tested at laboratories in Sarov and Leningrad. Research on radio frequency weapons for damaging fragile missile and satellite electronic components may lead to tests in the 1990s. Guns for firing kinetic energy weapons, or

"smart rocks," were developed in the 1960s and could be deployed on space platforms in the mid-1990s.

The military significance of the total Soviet SDI program is considerable. Successful development and deployment of increasingly effective SDI systems, in conjunction with the continued deployment of sophisticated and mobile strategic offensive forces, would represent the fulfillment of the Soviet strategic military doctrine; that is, to inflict maximum damage on the imperialists' offensive forces and then provide maximum protection for important military and political assets in the face of the imperialists' retaliatory strike.

As Mikhail Gorbachev put it recently, "The interrelationship between offensive and defensive arms is so obvious as to require no proof."

Gen. Chervov is, no doubt, aware of this interrelationship, as well. No one expects the Soviet Union to abandon its vast and multifaceted SDI research, development and deployment program. Similarly, no one should expect the U.S. to abandon its embryonic SDI program.

The success or failure of U.S. efforts to build a defensive system will depend upon the Administration's ability to resist the siren's song of deep reductions in exchange for SDI limits.

Certainly, there are those who recall the inviting promise of the ABM treaty: strict limits on ABM activity, in exchange for deep reductions in strategic arsenals. Those same officials now know the cost of this treasured belief: The Soviets, through deceit and strategic arms violations, greatly expanded both their ABM system and their offensive arsenal, leaving this nation vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. The question left unanswered is: Will the mistakes of the past be repeated? It is a question only the President can answer.

The Philadelphia Inquirer

Op-ed Page

Monday, August 11, 1986

Page 13-A

Misguided allies

... and look who is aiding Managua

By Rep. Jim Courter

Not many Americans would be shocked to learn that Czechoslovakia boasts of giving the Sandinistas \$100 million in aid since 1979. After all, Czechoslovakia is a member of the Warsaw Pact and a colonial possession of the Soviet Union. Americans are well aware that Soviet bloc spending on Managua's Marxists is immense, indicative of an investment as important to the Kremlin as is Cuba.

What most Americans do not know is that Sweden, a gentle democracy that most frequently makes the news because of Soviet submarine espionage, has provided or pledged \$100 million to the Nicaraguan regime since 1979.


This disturbing parallel between Czech and Swedish assistance illustrates the degree to which many of our Western European friends are undoing our Nicaragua policy before our eyes.

For them, it would seem, Washington has not gone far enough by abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and permitting the construction of two communist states — Cuba and Nicaragua — a few hundred miles from U.S. borders. Instead, Americans are expected to endure the financial support of one of those governments by our democratic allies across the Atlantic.

Sweden is only one offender among many. Norway, which has its proper doubts about the growth of Soviet power, is nonetheless increasing assistance to Managua. This year \$11 million in government money will be spent to send fertilizer, paper, machines and direct technical assistance.

Finland, with a geopolitical position that condemns it to continual and wary study of the Soviet bloc, increased its contribution to Nicaragua to \$20 million this year. And Denmark granted Nicaragua \$9 million in soft loans last October for agricultural development. Most such aid goes to state collectives.

Spain gives more aid to Nicaragua



than to any other Central American nation and is increasing its assistance by \$26 million this year, according to the Sandinista daily *Nuevo Diario*. Agriculture, cooperative housing and health sectors are the scheduled beneficiaries. It is troubling indeed to see Spain, which has only recently put the fear of military juntas behind it, actively aiding the success of a junta in Central America.

The European aid is of "nonlethal" kinds, of course. That makes it less offensive to friends of freedom for Nicaraguans, but no less helpful to the Sandinista communists. Any aid permits them to reallocate indigenous resources to "lethal" realms. If butter comes free, there is more to spend on guns.

Second, the ultimate effect on the political opposition and besieged independent labor activists is no less discouraging than would be direct donations of weapons to the Sandinistas.

The Spanish foreign minister discovered this in January. After signing the new aid agreement in Managua, he ventured to balance Spanish policy by meeting with opposition parties. But the secretary general of

the Social Democratic Party, Luis Rivas Leiva, told him that Spain is something less than an ideal instrument to promote inter-Nicaraguan dialogue because, in his opinion, Spain supports the Sandinistas.

Other financial contributions have come from the governments of Austria, France and Holland and from private interests like the Federation of Social Workers of Denmark, a free labor union that delivered a small sum to a non-free Sandinista "trade union" on May Day this year.

In all, Western European nations are expected to send \$100 million to Nicaragua in 1986. That is the same amount President Reagan and members of the House fought long and hard to obtain for the enemies of Sandinista rule, the *contras*. (And they do not have it yet).

Under American pressure and relentless Sandinista thievery of the freedoms, properties and dignities of the Nicaraguans, France, Germany and Italy, at least, are decreasing their economic assistance. But even as these countries close down bilateral aid, they are yielding up gifts from another pocket; the European Economic Community has just promised the Sandinistas half of all EEC

food aid to be allocated to Latin governments this year.

Lamentably, the EEC has been nearly this generous to Nicaragua ever since the 1979 revolution. But it is still unfathomable that this year's EEC food consignment should not go to the hungry in Haiti, where democracy has its first opening in decades, instead of Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas have been closing cell doors on democrats for years.

Failing that, could not the aid go to the troubled democracies of Central and Latin America? And if it must go to Nicaragua, why not at least to the dwindling private sector, as against government entities which benefit only the Sandinistas? In short, why are our European friends not rewarding free enterprise and democracy instead of collectivist repression?

There is irony in these free nations' aid programs for revolutionary despots, but there is also a grave geopolitical problem. Ours is a time when the shift in the correlation of forces makes the United States unsure of its ability to defend Western Europe against Soviet attack.

Yesterday our weakness and lack of vision allowed Cuba to become a direct and immediate danger to American defenses and American plans for the resupply of Europe in the event of war. Today Europe is wittingly helping the Soviet Union build a second Cuba, another platform from which Soviet bloc air and sea power could interdict American air or seaborne assistance to European armed forces.

The answer is not in any renewal of discussion about decreasing the American commitment to Europe. We can permit that no more than can the Europeans. However, we can do that which our ambassador to the EEC is now attempting: ratchet up the diplomatic pressures against our allies for their contributions to our enemies.

(Rep. Jim Courter, who represents New Jersey's 12th Congressional District, is a member of the House Armed Services Committee.)

To the Editor

In the first paragraph of his open "Letter from the Ambassador of Nicaragua to the U.S." [June 1986], Carlos Tunnerman depicts the Sandinista revolution as aimed at independence and liberty, a revolt akin to the American one of two centuries ago. I wish that it were. Certainly other Central American republics such as Costa Rica and the renewed El Salvador have demonstrated that constitutional democracy needs no United States imprimatur to work well. Its principles are as universal as our founders declared them to be.

But the principles of Marxism-Leninism are also held to be universal, and it is they which guide certain modern revolutionaries, the Sandinista chiefs among them. Members of the junta bared their true allegiances at celebrations in Cuba a few days after the triumph over Somoza in 1979. The irony of the visit was that Cubans had overthrown Batista in the name of independence and democracy. Within a few years Cuba had neither, and Castro, who spoke in 1959 of an "olive-green revolution, as Cuban as the palm trees," admitted that his guide was the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

Look at Nicaragua. As early as 1981 *La Prensa's* Pedro Chamorro declared that the new rulers "practically idolize Cuba. They say that someone needs to teach us 'the Cuban way' . . . There are moral and ideological ties that cannot be broken with Cuba, Russia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia." Today the Nicaraguan revolutionaries are counterrevolutionaries whose powers are concentrated in the East German-advised secret police, the militias, Cuban-style block committees, Red Guard-style youth mobs, state socialism, and the quiet death of the last independent presses and radios. The Sandinista-run elections of 1984 of which Tunnerman makes so much did no more to protect and preserve democracy in Nicaragua than did the elections of 1948 in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Tunnerman extols the battle against Somoza because he imagines that Americans will remember their own rebellion and believe, adapting Gertrude Stein, that a revolution is a revolution is a revolution. But some revolutions make men free, and others make men the subjects of new dictators. The difference is in the revolutionaries' principles: either they base government on the principle of equality and limit the powers of their own governorship, or they base government on the principle that history anoints some to rule others, and to rule with irresistible means. Washington and Madison did the former. The Bolsheviks, the Castroites, and now the Sandinistas have done the latter.

Jim Courter
Member of Congress (R)
12th District, New Jersey

Regarding your July 1986 article on Morgan Fairchild by Bruce Brady: Please, give us a break. Your characterization of Morgan Fairchild as the actress-activist "at war" with the Hollywood stereotype, but nonetheless willing to buck the system in pursuit of her "ideals," is really too much.

In fact, the ideals that Ms. Fairchild espouses are exactly those which Hollywood holds nearest and dearest. First, Ms. Fairchild is "pro-choice". This is not surprising, in view of the fact that the entertainment industry as a whole endorses the idea that men and women should be able to do


what they want, when they want and how they want without regard to the consequences, particularly in matters of sex. Ms. Fairchild is obviously no exception.

Second, Ms. Fairchild is anti-censorship, and if it means allowing pornographers to distribute films, magazines, videos and what-have-you through the mass media, who is she to say it's wrong? Third, Ms. Fairchild is anti-school prayer. Yep, school is for reading Thoreau, Emerson, Jefferson and Franklin. Let's just make sure that we avoid those portions of their works which refer to God, the Almighty, the Creator, etc.—or would we be flirting with possible censorship? Obviously the reading of such highly moral and instructive works presents a knotty problem for Ms. Fairchild, who doesn't like fundamentalist Christian-type ideas.

That's all right, because kids in school are smart enough to make their own "choices" about what constitutes right and wrong, good and evil, moral and immoral. They don't need religion, they can listen to their inner voices. Or to shows such as *Falcon Crest*.

Bruce Brady's article would have put Ms. Fairchild in a kinder light had he stuck to the more basic things we are all just dying to know about Morgan—her weight, true age, dress size and make-up tips. I can believe she cares deeply about those.

Mrs. Kerry Carter
Alexandria, VA



BEN SARGENT
©/1986 The Austin American-Statesman
Universal Press Syndicate

Copyright, 1986, Austin American-Statesman.
Reprinted with permission of Universal Press
Syndicate. All rights reserved.

A Look at the Yugoslavia-Libya Link

By JIM COURTER

WASHINGTON—A week after American warplanes struck at Libya, the foreign secretary of Yugoslavia arrived in Tripoli to denounce the United States' "unprovoked aggression." The characterization of the long overdue retaliatory act was part of a joint declaration issued by visiting foreign ministers of a small delegation from the Non-Aligned Movement countries, among them Cuba.

The United Nations Security Council debate in New York followed, and the Non-Aligned Movement sent a delegation as a show of support for Libya. Five foreign ministers were expected, but Ghana and the Congo withdrew, leaving three harder arrivals: Cuba, Senegal and Yugoslavia.

In the meantime, word escaped of Colonel Qadhafi's deep displeasure at the ineffectual performance of his military forces during the American raid. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were the two friendly countries to which he turned for analyses of his nation's military deficiencies.

Tripoli-Belgrade Axis

These details, so inconspicuous within the mass of press stories on the Libyan affair, are indicators of something almost unnoticed: the strategic alliance between Libya and Yugoslavia. Over the past decade, events in the Mediterranean and business in the Non-Aligned Movement, of which both Libya and Yugoslavia are members, have often taken a turn around the Tripoli-Belgrade axis.

The reasons for this are several. Both Libya and Yugoslavia are self-described revolutionary socialist powers. Both commonly adopt anti-American positions on foreign policy issues and routinely vote against the U.S. in the U.N. Libya is a hard-line and consistent Soviet ally; Yugoslavia—while more independent—holds observer status in Comecon, the Soviet economic bloc. Both countries are reliable political supporters of radical Soviet allies who hold fast to their certificates of nonaligned status: countries like Cuba, Nicaragua and Syria. Both have military relations with North Korea, which inclines increasingly toward the Soviets. Both openly support Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Namibian South West Africa People's Organization and the Salvadoran communist FMLN.

The origins of this strategic axis, this Mediterranean marriage of geopolitical interests, seem to lie in the Mideast Wars. Libya turned against Israel and the West after 1969 when Colonel Qadhafi unseated King Idris in a coup. By then Yugoslavia's Tito had long favored Egypt's interests. He assured President Nasser's ambassador to Belgrade during the 1967 war that "as far as Egypt is concerned, I am not non-aligned." Tito proved it by granting overflight and refueling rights to Soviet transports and fighter aircraft.

Yugoslavia's generosity with its airspace—a beneficence which has never been extended to American warplanes—was even more pronounced in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. By one report, 1,000 Soviet planes used Yugoslav corridors during a two-week period in October of that year. According to another, the Red Air Force airborne unit which had been the vanguard of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was readied for possible use in the Middle East.

Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin had spent a week in Belgrade immediately before the 1973 war began; Colonel Qadhafi went there in November, the month in which

the war ended. The Soviets and Libyans both wanted closer relations, and may have been rewarded for their efforts. The Soviets had set precedents for use—with minimal restrictions—of Yugoslav ports and airfields. Soviet military personnel have been reported at bases on more than a few occasions, and a standing agreement permits Soviet surface ships and submarines to come to Yugoslav ports for service and repairs.

Belgrade's relations with the Libyans remain strong despite the death of Tito in

Perhaps we should ask if Yugoslavia hasn't made too much of holding Moscow at a distance while indulging Moscow's closest anti-American allies.

1980. Staff Major Abd al-Salam Jalloud, who today appears to be the second most powerful man in Libyan politics, visited and made undisclosed agreements with both Moscow and Belgrade in July 1981. Libya and Yugoslavia announced an agreement on military cooperation that October. Within the space of the next year alone, there were visits to Tripoli by the Yugoslav president, the Yugoslav federal secretary for national defense and the vice president of the Yugoslav federal executive council.

Development of Libyan-Yugoslav relations has been paralleled by development of military relations with Warsaw Pact members. Libya's tight relations with East Germany and Czechoslovakia, whose personnel work in Libya and in the Libyan army and security services in enormous numbers, is well known. Many also noticed when Colonel Qadhafi signed new military and economic agreements with Soviet leader Gorbachev in Moscow last October. But there were other state visits in 1985.

One dimension of Yugoslavia's interest in Libya is military hardware sales. Libya already possesses Yugoslav Galeb aircraft, and once sent air force cadets to Yugoslavia for training. Now Libya has reportedly ordered four P400-class missile corvettes from the Yugoslav yard at Kraljevica. These are "splendid little ship killers, packing a frigate punch in 525-ton hulls," writes the privately published periodical U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

And then there are Yugoslavia's well-crafted midget submarines, the sort of weapon and reconnaissance vehicle that Soviet frogmen and commando teams have used repeatedly in Sweden's coastal waters. The submarines' capabilities include sabotage actions such as the laying of mines in harbors, torpedo launching, and infiltration of commandos. According to the publication Jane's Fighting Ships, two of the R-2 Mala class midgets have been transferred to Libya. There's also an unconfirmed report that Yugoslavia may have already trained Libyan nations and Palestine Liberation Organization personnel in midget sub operation.

Such cooperation, with all its implications for terrorism in Europe and the Mediterranean, would not be outside the realm of normal Yugoslav relations with either Libya or the PLO. In the wake of last fall's Achille Lauro incident, I detailed in these pages Belgrade's practice of arming, assisting and perhaps training the PLO ("Why Abbas Chose Yugoslavia," Oct. 22).

Subsequently, when the EgyptAir airliner was hijacked to Malta, Greek police were said to believe that the leader and sole survivor of the pro-Libyan Abu Nidal team bought his ticket in Belgrade. The other two members of the troika had come from Libya to meet him in Athens.

There have been three other recent incidents involving Arab or Palestinian terrorists operating from or passing through Yugoslavia. Given the repeated declarations by Tripoli and Belgrade of support for Arab and other Mediterranean liberation movements, news of a Feb. 20 agreement promising "closer cooperation on security matters" between the two countries is of no small concern.

Americans are no longer surprised by the machinations of Cuba and Libya and Syria and other rigorously aligned "non-aligned" countries. They are less aware of, and, when cognizant, more delicate about Yugoslavia. This is not without reason. Yugoslavia is more independent, and less directly cooperative with the Soviet Union, than is Cuba. Its leaders, unlike Fidel Castro, do not speak of the American president as a "legitimate heir of Hitler." The government has received American Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and American warships do call on Yugoslav ports a few times a year.

This small, bright corner in the big picture is partially the result of an immense and expensive American commitment to Yugoslav independence after the 1948 break between Tito and Stalin. Aid slowed drastically in the mid-1960s, but Belgrade still possesses most favored nation trading status. A decade ago, Laurence Silberman, the former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, dared to suggest "that Washington should reexamine its relations according to the United States' true interests" because "Yugoslavia had consistently sided with America's enemies in the world." The State Department disassociated itself from Mr. Silberman's views. But he had argued, and it is still true, that Belgrade's voting record in the U.N. bears out his judgment.

Ending Some Alignments

All the preceding is an attempt to adumbrate some much neglected realities of Yugoslav foreign policy. They do not accord easily with the opinions of those who have few second thoughts about Yugoslavia's conventional designation as non-aligned. Perhaps American policy makers should ask whether Yugoslavia has not publicly made too much of holding Moscow at a distance while simultaneously indulging Moscow's closest anti-American allies.

Once that question is answered, there is another, more difficult one: Given the Yugoslav penchant for courting the West's totalitarian enemies, and according them support they'd never dream of lending to the U.S. democracy, should America reduce its slender ties to Belgrade? Or, as with China, should it labor to make the best of an awkward relationship whose future will always be uncertain?

I believe the answer is that in a world where Soviet military power is the supreme fact, the latter is the better course. But America should make better use of what influence it has. A good beginning would be to let Belgrade know that what it gains from American relations—including most favored nation trade status, markets for its compact cars, and government assistance in rolling over Yugoslavia's \$20 billion debt—could become contingent upon abatement of certain of the more insufferable of Yugoslavia's foreign alignments.

Mr. Courter, a Republican congressman from New Jersey, is a fourth-term member of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee.

POINT OF VIEW

Ortega and Khadafy are comrades in arms

By JIM COURTER

Special to the Daily Record

A remarkable photograph arrived in the mail last week amidst all the debate on aid to the Nicaraguan contras. It showed two of the world's best-known dictators, Commandante Daniel Ortega and Colonel Muammar Khadafy, standing together in Libya. With clenched fists upraised, they saluted the Libyan military forces which maneuvered beneath their gaze.

If the photograph was remarkable, the meeting that made it possible was less so. Official Libyan connections to Nicaragua have been evident at least since 1980, the first year after the Sandinista assumption of power. President Ortega dispatched his Interior Minister Tomas Borge to Libya that year to discuss joint agricultural arrangements and to finalize a \$100 million loan from Tripoli to Managua. Much more aid was to follow: According to one estimate, Nicaragua has received \$400 million in economic aid from Libya during the last four years.

Nor has assistance been limited to the economic varieties. In September of 1981, 61 heavily armed Nicaraguan militiamen were discovered passing through Costa Rica en route to Tripoli for training. Some 40 Liby-

ans are believed to work in Nicaragua with the police. Libyan allies like Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany have also helped train the Sandinista internal security forces.

Covert arms shipments from Libya have been discovered on several occasions, the most impressive of which seized in 1983 by Brazilian authorities puzzled by irregularities on the cargo manifests of four Libyan transport aircraft loaded with "medical supplies." The planes turned out to hold 84 tons of arms destined for Nicaragua. Included were bazookas, multiple rocket launchers, wire-guided missiles, 600 light rockets, and two dismantled fighter aircraft.

Colonel Khadafy no longer hides this comradeship in arms with a country in Central America. In 1984 when Tomas Borge made another trip to the desert domain, Khadafy publicly lauded the Sandinistas with these words: "Libyan fighters, arms, and backing to the Nicaraguan people have reached them because they fight with us. They fight America on its own ground." Borge answered: "Our relationship with Libya is eternal."


Why? Why should a Central American nation lock hands with a radical Arab nation halfway around the globe? The reasons are ideological, military, and geopolitical, but they boil down to something which some Americans still wish to ignore: the profound differences between the

totalitarian internationalists and the practitioners of self-government. Like forms are drawn towards like forms. America's bond to a distant parliamentary nation like Israel or Costa Rica is politically natural. So too are the Sandinista bonds to other revolutionary, socialist, pro-Soviet powers like Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Iran.

That is the simplest and truest explanation for the trips Ortega and Borge make to Tripoli, and for the three conferences Commandante Ortega has held with the Prime Minister of Iran, Mir Hoseyn Musavi. It explains why someone with as many troubles in the Middle East as Yasir Arafat would take the time to meet Sandinista officials in Managua, Tunis, and elsewhere. And it explains why Borge went to North Korea in June of 1980 to proclaim that "Nicaraguan revolutionaries will not be content until the imperialists have been overthrown in all parts of the world ..."

It is therefore of no small interest to see Nicaraguan and Libyan armed forces on the attack in the same few days. The timing of the attacks may or may not be a coincidence. What matters is that, in Tripoli and Managua, both attacks will be seen as blows against the same enemy, the forces of "imperialist reaction."

Such is the name dictators give to democracy, and to its strongest proponent, America. And it is to America that the free, the self-governing,



and the anti-totalitarian should be able to look for inspiration and assistance in the struggle against the

enemies of freedom. Congressman Jim Courter, R-New Jersey, is fourth-term member of the

Daily Record/R. L. REBACH
House Armed Services Committee
and a congressional observer of the
Geneva arms talks.

JERSEY ON THE POTOMAC

Courter and Chevron debate politics of oil in war-torn Angola

By J. SCOTT ORR

Star-Ledger Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Rep. Jim Courter (R-12th Dist.) is taking on one of the nation's major oil companies in a dispute over oil fields in war-torn Angola.

The dispute centers on an amendment sponsored by Courter that would prohibit the Department of Defense from buying oil from any company that pumps oil in or sells oil from Angola.

Courter's amendment is intended as a slap at the Communist government of Angola and its use of Cuban troops and Soviet officers to protect itself against resistance fighters.

"While at this very moment the democratic resistance is battling a major offensive by the Cuban, Soviet, East German and Angolan Communist forces, private American companies are indirectly underwriting that offensive," Courter said in June when the House Armed Services Committee approved the amendment as part of the Department of Defense authorization bill.

The bill, with the amendment, later passed the House and was sent to the Senate.

The action set off an exchange of letters between Courter and George M. Keller, chairman of the board of Chevron Corp.—the correspondence was not exactly friendly.

"You should be aware," Keller wrote, "that driving Chevron and other U.S. companies out of Angola will not appreciably harm the Angolan oil industry nor affect government revenues there."

"Furthermore, this amendment could pose a potential threat to our nation's security by restricting the De-

fense Department's ability to readily obtain essential petroleum supplies around the world," Keller added.

Keller's letter went on to point out that the company has operated in Angola for 30 years and that the company "has always maintained a position of strict neutrality with regard to political matters in Angola and has acted in accordance with the expressed foreign policy of the U.S. towards Angola."

Courter responded earlier this month that he would be "surprised" if Chevron has maintained neutrality and pointed to an editorial distributed at the company's annual stockholder meeting.

"The article was a veritable diatribe against the Angolan resistance and what it called the 'radical right in the U.S.' which has the temerity to find virtue in (the) struggle for Angolan independence," Courter wrote.

He went on to point out that the American general manager of Chevron's Cabinda Gulf Oil corporation, Will Lewis, has been quoted as criticizing the Reagan Administration's support for Jonas Savimbi, leader of the resistance group UNITA, the national union for the total independence of Angola.

"Permit me to inquire whether your office has remembered to give Mr. Will Lewis the same guideline you have described to me concerning Chevron's strict neutrality on political matters," the letter said.

Courter said in the letter that he is concerned about what would happen to Angolan oil sales if U.S. companies leave, "but I am more concerned that I, as a representative of the U.S., do not begin making decisions based on what is good for our corporations rather than

what is necessary for our security.

"This is much more than a business question. It is a moral and geopolitical question. Your concern is profitability, while mine must be the American taxpayers' subsidization of our enemies."

"Your corporate officers' eyes are fixed—not improperly—on the bottom line; mine are fixed upon the struggle against the Cuban, Angolan and Soviet forces which are the enemies of Angolan freedom and American security," Courter wrote.

Beside Chevron, Texaco Inc. also has a significant investment in Angola. Shell Oil Co. has a smaller investment, and Conoco has a plant there but would not be affected by the amendment because it doesn't pump Angolan oil, according to Courter staffers.

Mobil Corp. divested itself of its holding in Angola about three months ago and got out, the staffer said, adding that the company has said it is making a conscious effort not to buy Angolan oil.

Though Courter has heard little from Chevron in recent weeks, staffers said they don't believe they have heard the last of the company's objections to the amendment.

WASHINGTON TALK

NEW YORK TIMES Friday August 22, 1986

Briefing

A Letter to Reagan


Eleven conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives have urged President Reagan to promote talks on power-sharing between the Government of South Africa and "nonviolent South African groups representing blacks."

In a letter to the President this week, the lawmakers suggested specifically that the South African Parliament be expanded from three to five chambers, with one of the two new bodies elected by blacks. The existing three chambers are elected by whites, people of mixed race and Indians. The second new house would be a Senate, with equal representation for each province and homeland in the country, to be elected by their residents. Legislation could be passed by three of the five houses.

"We are not recommending that the United States dictate a constitution to South Africa," the letter said. "Rather we urge you to propose some constitutional plan in order to begin the process of negotiations, making it unmistakably clear that what we seek is any reasonable form of democratic black power-sharing."

"There is no reason to insist on the principle of one-person, one-vote instantly, which few on any side of the debate think is realistic in the current context and should be allowed to evolve once black power-sharing has come about."

The appeal was initiated by Representative Jim Courter of New Jersey and signed by Representatives Dick Armey of Texas, William F. Clinger Jr. of Pennsylvania, Bob Dornan of California, Newt Gingrich of Georgia, John Hiler of Indiana, Robert J. Lagomarsino of California, Tom Lewis of Florida, John G. Rowland of Connecticut, Barbara F. Vucanovich of Nevada and Robert S. Walker of Pennsylvania. No response has been received from the White House.



Drawings by Redinger

The Calico Question

Reports from the California White House that one of the three newest members of the Reagan pet family is a male calico cat named Morris appear to be imprecise. Morris, yes; male calico,

probably not. According to experts in this arcane area, it is genetically all but impossible for a male offspring of any feline union, however checkered, to carry a three-color calico coat.

Reached in Santa Barbara, Elaine Crispin, Mrs. Reagan's press secretary, reported that the two other new cats, Cleo and Sara, had been established as female calico kittens. But since the cat story broke earlier this week, no one has ventured up to the Reagan ranch to make a closer inspection of Morris's markings, nor has he or she been photographed. Ms. Crispin said that Cleo, Sara and Morris, of whatever color or configuration, were co-existing peacefully with the considerable Reagan dog-pack at the ranch: Lucky, Victory, Millie, Freebo and Taka.

Money, Money, Money

From the Democratic point of view, the bad news is that Republican political committees raised 5.3 times as much money as their Democratic equivalents (\$186.1 million to \$35.1 million) from January of 1985 through last June. The good news is that the disparity was better than it was in 1981-82, when, according to the Federal Election Commission, the Republicans raised 6.5 times as much as the Democrats (\$161.2 million to \$24.8 million).

Public Opinion for Sale

The American Enterprise Institute, a Washington-based conservative research group that has recently been experiencing financial problems, is offering its bimonthly magazine, Public Opinion, for sale. The principal prospective buyer so far is Dow Jones & Company, which publishes The Wall Street Journal and has been seeking the acquisition for some time.

Sources close to the negotiations report that the staff of the magazine would probably continue to work out of offices at the institute but that Dow Jones would assume management of the magazine. Wall Street Journal editors are said to be interested in obtaining direct access to the polling information that makes up the "Opinion Roundup" section that has been a feature of Public Opinion.

Established in the late 1970's, Public Opinion now has a press run of about 7,800 copies, of which a little more than half is paid circulation and the rest is complimentary copies given to Government officials, journalists and the like.

Wayne King
Warren Weaver Jr.

COMMENTARY

JIM COURTER

Ex-Im's pipeline to Angola

When a government looks Communist, acts Communist, declares itself to be Communist, and depends for its survival upon "internationalist" troops from Communist countries, is it Communist?

That deceptively simple question is likely to be raised in the House of Representatives this afternoon when Republican Rep. Bill McCollum of Florida moves his amendment to the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act. Scores of millions of dollars in loans and loan guarantees by our Ex-Im Bank are still in the pipeline to Angola, and Mr. McCollum would have the flow sharply reduced, at least until the 35,000-man Cuban occupation army goes home.

It hardly seems too much to ask. The Ex-Im Bank's charter specifi-

cally forbids expenditure of aid dollars in Communist countries. But it is the Department of State which has the authority to decide what "Communist" means, and that word is resisted in the case of Angola, since it "does not share the characteristics common to the countries such as the Warsaw Pact members . . ."

That is not the point. It is the 1962 Foreign Assistance Act to which the bank's charter points for a proper definition of "Communist," and that act does not say anything about the Warsaw pact: "The phrase 'Communist country' shall include specifically, but not be limited to the following . . ." All the pact countries can be found on the list, but so can China, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and their like.

Mr. McCollum, and Republican Rep. Duncan Hunter of California, who introduced a bill on this matter in February, must be forgiven for thinking that Angola is at least as Communist as Yugoslavia or Cuba. And if Angola is not in the Warsaw Pact, does it matter that the Warsaw Pact and its Cuban arm are in Angola?

I have found sufficient evidence of Angola's Communism in a rather obvious place: the first paragraph of the State Department's own *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. Angola permits the existence of but one political party. It is the "Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the

Liberation of Angola." All major decisions are made by the party's Central Committee. And President Jose Eduardo dos Santos heads both the party and the government.

To that one might add any number of indicators of Angola's politics. Streets in that remote African country are named for Karl Marx. Cuban experts in the workings of that tool of totalitarian organization, "the block committee," just finished a working visit in which they shared their "battle and ideological experience" with reliable Angolan counterparts. The party has marked its 10th year of rule by changing the day of national celebration from Nov. 11, when Portugal granted the Angolans

We could quit subsidizing the regime with Ex-Im loans that expand the production of oil which, when sold, generates the pay of the Cuban soldiers.

their independence in 1975, to Dec. 10, the day in that year on which the

MPLA was formed. New agreements, signed April 4 and April 6 this year, "strengthen ties" — including military ties — between Luanda and Havana.

The Cubans are in Angola because "solidarity" is more than a word, and because the MPLA needs them to protect the regime against its own people and Dr. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. What is more, if Mr. dos Santos decided one day that the Cuban troops, the Soviet generals, and the East German security specialists should leave, there are good reasons to believe that the praetorian guard might find itself a new emperor.

If the Angolans are all but unable to make their friends leave, surely the U.S. State Department's negotiators can not expect to do so. But we could quit subsidizing the regime with Ex-Im loans that expand the production of oil which, when sold, generates the pay of the Cuban soldiers. The McCollum amendment would do that.

Republican Rep. Jim Courter of New Jersey is a fourth-term member of the House Armed Services Committee.

28

POINT OF VIEW

A tour of Camelot on the Moskva River

By JIM COURTER

Special to the Daily Record

Accclaim for the new open Soviet leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and his stylish wife Raisa, has filled the last two years. Comparisons with the secretive Josef Stalin are gone. The glamorous Gorbachevs have the star quality of a John and Jacqueline Kennedy. Is Moscow a new Camelot? On my trip there three weeks ago, I did not find it so.

We flew from the harried bustling of JFK to the empty, grey colossus of Moscow Airport. My party, including Congressman Dean Gallo and several New Jerseyans, went on a private mission to meet with a group of refuseniks, divided spouses and relatives of prisoners of conscience. One observation we made speaks volumes about the type of society we were visiting: the ordinary, cheerful smile which is so much a part of American life was almost nowhere to be seen on the faces of Soviet subjects.

Nearly every waiter, hotel official, storekeeper or other worker we met tended to be unpleasant, slow, sullen, surly and apparently unhappy. This behavior is utterly unlike the generous hospitality the Russian people were always famed for. It's as though human friendliness were illegal in Gorbachev's Camelot.

There is a dull, foglike oppressiveness about Moscow which is unnerving because it is so diffuse, so subtle. Unlike other dictatorships, public places in Moscow are not awash with military uniforms. Police are visible but usually keep their distance. Two presences, though, help to sustain the somber atmosphere: the omnipresent bureaucracy and the KGB.

Alexis de Tocqueville described 150 years ago how a society enmeshed in a cobweb of petty rules and meaningless regulations can smother the humanity of personal relationships. The Soviet authorities have brought bureaucratic pettiness to state-of-the-art levels. In my hotel, supposedly one of the finest in the Soviet capital,

one was not permitted to move between hotel room and lobby, or lobby and the outside without standing on some line to exchange a passport for a form, a form for a card, a card for a key, a key for a pass. Every floor is guarded by a bureaucrat who keeps track of your comings and goings. You can't use the hotel restaurant without exhibiting your guest pass.

Standing on lines for every conceivable service is part of Moscovites' daily life. There are lines in the food shops for the little available food — huge lines in the alcoholic beverage stores — lines for restaurant service. Soviet housewives are estimated to spend an average two hours daily on shopping lines, and often return home disappointed.

Moreover, I was surprised to learn that ordinary Russians simply expect the elite to move to the front of lines to be recognized first. One evening I had the embarrassing experience of joining a restaurant line and being escorted to the front, where those who were ahead of me not only did not protest, but even helped clear up some confusion over a name in my party so that we could be seated instantly. I could just imagine what would have happened on a similar line in the United States. Capitalist America is, by Marxist definition, class ridden, but the "classless society of the workers' paradise" has privileges all its own.

Bureaucracy permeates every possible niche of Soviet society. Seeing the smothering effect of this meaningless regulation at close range as I did, I believe the Communist leaders designed the bureaucratic system with one purpose in mind: to convince the Russian people that the socialist state is literally everything, their family and companions are nothing. There is no one else to be thankful to for your daily bread — when bread is available — but the new socialist order. Once gratitude is monopolized by the Soviet state, human relationships are deprived of significance. The undermining of personal loyalty, love and friendship is of the essence of the totalitarian order.

For the same reason the Soviet rulers encourage an insidious fear of the KGB. The secret police, of course, wear no uniforms, but they are, or are thought to be, everywhere; mingled in every street crowd, in the subway, in stores, in your apartment lobby, at the theater. Our Jewish refusenik contacts told us of their weekly social gatherings in front of Moscow's only synagogue, where they exchange news about friends and relatives. KGB agents have also infiltrated here. Even at synagogue you

Once gratitude is monopolized by the Soviet state, human relationships are deprived of significance.

can never be too cautious.

Because of the secret police, Moscovites in public places shun Westerners. It was difficult to secure help even on the strange Moscow subway where the clerks are reluctant to speak to Americans for fear of suspicious KGB eyes.

Nothing was more pathetic than the realization that of all the Russians, the refuseniks, many of whom have been fired, interrogated, tortured and jailed, appear to be the only optimists. These people have decided they can no longer live the Soviet lie; they apply to emigrate to Israel, the United States, or elsewhere; they are refused (hence their name); they are punished; they apply again. Some have tried a dozen times. Yet they, almost alone, still smile. They are sustained by the hope of leaving and by their faith in the God of their fathers. Most of their fellow subjects have neither.

From Lenin to Gorbachev, the Soviet leaders' deepest wish is to extend this "Camelot" across the world. Naturally, their emigration problem would disappear. It is hard to understand why a few men can only be happy when the rest of mankind has lost every reason to smile.

Jim Courter, a Republican, represents New Jersey's 12th District in the U.S. House of Representatives.

OPINION

Pentagon-watching gone awry: over 45 committees

By Jim Courter

BURIED deep within the recently passed Senate bill reorganizing and streamlining the military bureaucracy were the first seeds of real, fundamental military reform.

While most of the public attention was focused upon the landmark changes mandated in the military command structure, the Senate also took the unprecedented step of lopping almost 18,000 employees off the Pentagon's defense agencies and headquarters staffs. In addition, a critical eye fell upon the heretofore sacrosanct domain of congressional defense oversight: More than 250 congressional reporting requirements were allowed to expire, and the wheels were set in motion to reduce further the burden of congressional micro-management of the Defense Department.

These small stirrings were driven by a growing realization that the multi-layered, green-eyeshaded "Military-Congressional Complex" (a term coined by a former Wall Street Journal editorial writer), intended to keep a sharp eye on every imaginable aspect of defense procurement, has begun to betray its original purpose.

The sheer size and complexity of the "complex" are its most striking features, as well as its most basic flaws. By the Pentagon's own count, more than 200,000 people are involved in some aspect of defense procurement. They use as their bible 32 volumes of defense procurement regulations that consume six feet of shelf space. They have at their disposal an army of 8,500 auditors to enforce 44,000 procurement specifications.

These bureaucrats are layered in a dizzying hierarchy that towers more than 40 levels above the typical military procurement program manager.

Indeed, Congress has repeatedly weighed in to ensure that every conceivable avenue for procurement disasters has been sealed off, but the result has only been more auditors auditing the auditors and, paradoxically, fewer weapons, of lower quality, reaching the troops in the field. But the paradox should not be surprising.

There are now more than 45 congressional commit-

tees and subcommittees overseeing the Pentagon. They employ more than 300 aides and, in a typical year, receive testimony from 1,500 Pentagon officials, request more than 450 studies, change 700 budget line items, generate 150-page defense bills, tie up the House and Senate floor for almost three weeks, and still deliver defense appropriations bills to the President an average of 45 days late, or, as is often the case, not at all.

The whole situation would be comic, were it not so tragic. The "complex" was erected and is inhabited by well-meaning patriotic Americans who want nothing more than for our military forces to have at their disposal sufficient numbers of advanced weapons systems

Invitation to Bid • (TAKE YOUR TIME)



DEVICE. Driving, Screw, One each, Omni-directional, bi-circumotational, non-explosive, beehopaluluble, ramalamadingdong, shaboom...

JEFF DANZIGER — STAFF

to defend our country and our allies.

But while the procurement "horror stories" featuring the \$700 toilet seat and the \$7,000 coffeemaker may make good copy, they do not explain how the "complex" has undermined its own promise. Constructed for the purpose of eliminating fraud and inefficiency, the "complex" has only aggravated inefficiency by raising procurement costs and lengthening acquisition time.

The real story is found in the weapons depots, airfields, and ship magazines of America's military forces. We do not have available the numbers of sophisticated weapons to fulfill our present obligations. The weapons that are in the inventory may not work. System costs are rising, production rates are falling, and our adversaries are beginning to erode our technological edge.

No major category of weapons system is immune from this process. For example, in the 1950s and '60s, the Air

Force had 3,400 fighters and was building 1,000 more a year. We now have only 600 fighters and barely 300 a year being built. Congressionally reduced production rates increased the costs of the F-15 fighter by \$10 million per plane. In general, wildly fluctuating and uneconomical weapons production rates increase weapons costs by more than \$300 million a year.

The "complex" also imposes unnecessary production and delivery delays. With 2,000 congressionally mandated "competition advocates" in place, the Air Force Logistics Command now takes 260 days to process even small spare-parts orders and two more years to deliver the parts. In one defense plant, with 300 Air Force oversight personnel in residence, it now takes 17 days to deliver a standard military aircraft engine; a similar commercial engine can be delivered in 26 hours.

It is this procurement "gridlock" which, in part, prompted the Senate to vote 95-0 to simply chop away 18,000 Pentagon bureaucrats.

I applaud the Senate's boldness and have proposed the elimination of the 50,000-member Pentagon buying agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the centralized audit bureaucracy, the Defense Contract Audit Agency. The military services can and should handle their own procurement and audits, and they can do with fewer bureaucrats.

The Senate's cancellation of 265 congressional reporting requirements is another landmark step, but I propose going directly to the source of the problem. Under my legislation, the number of congressional defense oversight bodies would be cut dramatically, from 45 to 17. The defense budget would undergo only two instead of three reviews in the Congress each year, thereby streamlining the Pentagon funding and procurement process.

The Senate has planted the seeds of future fundamental defense procurement reforms. It now falls to the House to demonstrate a similar boldness.

In a very real sense, America's future security hangs in the balance.

Rep. Jim Courter (R) of New Jersey is a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

Should Navy Build New Nuclear Attack Subs?

By JIM COURTER
Special to Navy Times


THE NAVY'S RECENT request for almost \$800 million in additional start-up funds for a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarines is reviving an old question in the Congress: Should we continue to buy large, expensive nuclear attack submarines, when smaller, cheaper diesel-electric submarines could handle the attack missions just as well?

The question has been based on a common misconception: that the United States does not have any diesel-electric submarines at her disposal. In fact, the U.S. and her allies have just as many (approximately 150) diesel-electric submarines as the Soviet Union and her allies. What's more, several U.S. allies (most notably, West Germany and The Netherlands) have active diesel-electric submarine construction programs; by contrast, none of the Soviet allies builds diesel-electric submarines, preferring instead to obtain them from their Soviet benefactors.

Nevertheless, in an era of unfortunate "gold-plating" of weapons systems, U.S. lawmakers and taxpayers are well justified in closely examining the rationale for funding a new class of submarine that will cost more than \$1 billion per vessel, when advanced diesel-electric designs can be obtained in the \$200 million range. The key question in this examination should be: Can diesel-electric submarines perform the same missions as their nuclear-powered counterparts at lower cost?

The primary mission of the U.S. attack submarine is the detection and destruction of Soviet submarines, both ballistic missile and attack varieties. The Soviet fleet deploys approximately 375 submarines, including more than 65 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The U.S. attack submarine fleet numbers approximately 100 vessels. Accordingly, superior technology and tactics are required to overcome this vast numerical disadvantage.

Detection and destruction of the Soviet SSBN fleet will be an extremely challenging and time-sensitive task. Already respectful of U.S. attack submarine capabilities, the Soviet SSBN fleet could be expected to launch its missiles from protected sanctuaries, either close to home ports or from under the Arctic ice pack. Increased missile ranges and accuracies permit the Soviets this luxury.



Navy Photo

Diesel-electric submarine Blueback (SS 581) underway. It is a misconception that the United States does not have any diesel-electric submarines at her disposal.

Attack submarines attempting to penetrate home port sanctuaries require great speed, quietness, endurance and large numbers of advanced weapons to do maximum damage in the shortest amount of time. In stalking Soviet SSBNs under the ice, one of the most critical requirements is the ability to "hold one's breath" for days or weeks at a time, while searching for the telltale contact from a Soviet vessel.

In both of these mission scenarios, diesel-electric submarines are at a disadvantage. Slower speeds, fewer and less advanced weapons, and the need to "snorkel" to recharge batteries detract from the diesel-electric submarine's utility for the anti-SSBN mission. In fact, even the diesel-electric submarine's most ardent proponents do not envision using this kind of vessel for strategic anti-submarine warfare. It is, nevertheless, important to note that nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are especially suited to this mission.

Destruction of the Soviet attack subma-

rine fleet will likely be a more free-wheeling, wide-ranging affair than attacks on SSBNs. Ideally, in a crisis, most Soviet SSNs would be caught at key "choke points" as they attempt to reach the open ocean. One such "choke point" is the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. Diesel-electric submarines currently deployed with allied navies could serve a useful role in such a scenario, by making the relatively short transit from their northern European homeports and acting as "floating mines" or "fixed barriers" against Soviet submarines. Allied diesel-electrics now participate in this fashion in NATO naval exercises.

Once again, however, nuclear-powered attack submarines are superior to diesel-electrics in the various attack roles. In addition to being able to perform the "fixed barrier" missions, SSNs can search for Soviet SSNs during high-speed transits, and after reaching their deployment area, can search large ocean areas while remaining continuously submerged. Once a target is

acquired, SSNs can bring to bear a far greater number and variety of advanced ASW weapons than can their diesel-electric counterparts.

A key attack submarine mission, which has gained even greater prominence under Navy Secretary John Lehman, is that of actual land attack against the Soviet Union and her allies, using long-range conventional and nuclear-armed Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Submarine-deployed SLCMs are a tremendous offensive force multiplier, requiring the Soviet Union to treat each SSN as a potential strategic reserve weapon which may come into play during a crisis. Diesel-electric submarines, due to their small size and other limitations, are not able to perform this mission.

Thus, in answering the question of diesel-electric submarine utility, it must be said that these vessels are demonstrably incapable of performing the vast majority of missions assigned to SSNs. This is not to say that diesel-electrics do not have a place in U.S. and NATO maritime strategy; their extreme quietness while operating on batteries and their relatively low cost are powerful arguments for continuing to depend upon them to do the jobs that they do best.

But, with only two active submarine-building yards (the Soviets have at least five), the U.S. attack submarine fleet will have to depend upon newer, larger, more advanced nuclear attack submarines, like the SSN-21 *Seawolf*. The Soviets certainly recognize the value of such submarines: they have three new, large (6,400-8,000 metric ton) SSN classes undergoing sea trials. By contrast, their diesel-electric submarine fleet is at its lowest numerical level (83 boats) since 1933.

The laws of physics require larger vessels to insulate noisy equipment from the acoustically sensitive sea water; the laws of war dictate that each platform deploy the maximum possible number of sophisticated weapons systems. To comply with both sets of laws, the U.S. attack submarine program must proceed along its present path. U.S. diesel submarine construction would represent a critical point in our drive for a modernized attack submarine fleet.

Representative Courter, a former Chairman of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus, serves on the Research and Development and Procurement Subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee. The Republican from New Jersey is also an Official House Observer to the Geneva arms reduction negotiations.

Please check to
make sure this got
into the cream

32

6602

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 15, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *True for*SUBJECT: USIA Memo On European Press Reaction on the
Daniloff Case

Attached at Tab A is a memo from Charlie Wick on European press treatment of the Daniloff case.

The European media recognize Daniloff's innocence and have given the US high marks for its treatment of the case. The British media are focusing on the human rights aspects. The continental media (French, West German, Italian, Dutch, and Swedish) stress that the case should not be allowed to derail a summit.

Paul Hanley, Walt Raymond and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachment

Tab A Wick Memo

Prepared by:
R. Scott Dean

September 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral
John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *MLS for CZW*

SUBJECT: West European Attitudes Toward the Daniloff
Case: Support but Concern that the East-West
Relationship not be Held Hostage to it

A survey of senior USIS officers in major West European capitals shows that Europeans agree that Daniloff is innocent. However, the continental Europeans (French, West Germans, Italians, Dutch and Swedes) stress that arms control negotiations and a U.S.-Soviet Summit meeting should not be held hostage to the Daniloff case. They view East-West relations as more important than the fate of one man.

In the UK, where Daniloff has many personal and professional contacts throughout the British establishment, there is emotional outrage over his arrest. British journalists are treating the Daniloff affair mainly as a major human rights case. They have focused to a much lesser extent on its potential implications for East-West relations.

In continental West Europe, the Administration has received high marks for its restraint in responding to the Soviet provocation. In the UK, the Administration has received high marks for its principled stand on the human rights aspects of the case.

There is a general hope that the Daniloff case is nearing resolution, but also continuing fear, especially in Germany, that it could slip out of control. European TV newscasts this evening gave wide play to U.S. news stories that Daniloff and Zakharov may be remanded to the custodies of their respective Ambassadors as an interim move.

35
02

DATE 11 SEP 86

Scott -
Do INFO Memo for
The Admiral -
Jack

NILOFF, NICHOLAS

KEYWORDS: U
E

SUBJECT: WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES RE DANILOFF CASE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 16 SEP 86 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

MATLOCK

FOR CONCURRENCE

HANLEY

RAYMOND

DANZANSKY

FOR INFO

RODMAN

PEARSON

COCKELL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8606368

8606447

NSCIFID

(IB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
--------------------	----------	-----------------	-----	-----------

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Peter Rodman

TO: Admiral Poindexter

FROM: Jack Matlock

SUB: "Chautauqua" Speech

J
Good
speech.

Here is the text of the
speech minus the parts I will
add re Daniloff.

I will also make other
course corrections (eg. - less on
Summitry - maybe nothing under
the circumstances.)

If you have any thoughts
or instructions, our consulate
in Leningrad can relay the
message if it is sent out
by Saturday night.

(We leave Leningrad
at 3:00 PM local (7:00 AM here)
on Sunday.

Jack

CHAUTAUQUA IN RIGA
September 15, 1986
U.S.-Soviet Relations
by Jack F. Matlock
Draft

37
Portions regarding
Daniloff to be
added

[In Latvian]

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to visit Latvia again. It has been 25 years since I first visited Riga, admired its beauty and witnessed a splendid performance in your National Theater. I hope to have a chance to meet many of you who are participating in this meeting. We Americans have a special interest in Latvia, since many of your relatives and descendants are now Americans and have made a distinctive contribution to our society. Just last week, a major exhibit of Latvian art opened in the Washington area. It presents a century of the Latvian artistic heritage through the works of three generations of the Skulme family. The exhibit is attracting wide attention and will enrich the lives of us Washingtonians. Thank you for sending such an impressive artistic collection to our shores.

Thank you also for providing such beautiful surroundings for our discussions this week. All of us visiting from outside Latvia, whether Americans, Russians, or others are in your debt for your wonderful hospitality. And now, I am sure you will understand if I speak in Russian, rather than continuing to torture your beautiful language with my barbaric accent.

(In Russian)

The state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union is much on the minds of people not only in our countries, but throughout the world. This is natural, for only the U.S. and the Soviet Union possess immense nuclear arsenals. All know that if they are ever used, it could be a disaster for mankind. It is not an exaggeration to say that the fate of the world depends on peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, we can be grateful to the Chautauqua Institution and the Soviet Friendship Society for organizing this meeting. I know that I speak for all the Americans present when I say that we look forward to a week of frank discussion of the vital issues before us. Let us hope that it will be followed by many more such opportunities.

Although I am a government official, I would like to talk to you today as an individual American, one who has lived several years in the Soviet Union and several more elsewhere in Europe, and also in Africa. This has given me the opportunity to learn first-hand about the lives and cultures of people in countries outside my own. I have also learned another thing: that international relations is not some abstract discipline dealing with impersonal geopolitical forces and ideologies, but a process that affects the lives of people throughout the world. Therefore, I will not be speaking of generalized "forces of history," but of attitudes held by people and actions that affect the lives of people.

We will be able to solve problems only if we understand them, understand our respective points of view, and make a special effort to find solutions. Therefore, I will speak candidly about the American view of the relationship. Discussion is worthless if it is not frank, and we all need to make the most of the splendid opportunity this meeting provides.

How is it that two countries which have never fought each other, which do not covet any of the other's territory, and the people of which want nothing so much as peace find themselves so frequently at odds?

It has not always been so. We Americans treasure the memories of our wartime alliance, and know very well the immense sacrifices made by all the peoples of the Soviet Union in that fateful struggle. We also know that, historically, American relations with Russia were close and friendly in the 19th century.

I am reminded of a conversation which took place not long ago in the White House. An important Soviet official was visiting Washington, and the President arranged a luncheon for him. As the group was sitting in the State Dining Room, one of the guests called attention to a portrait of Abraham Lincoln on the wall. The Soviet visitor remarked that "During Lincoln's time, relations between our countries were very friendly."

The President agreed, then said that this reminded him of an anecdote. A couple, married for ten years or so were riding in their car, the husband driving and the wife sitting beside him, but near the door. The wife observed wistfully,

"Remember how it was when we were first married? We sat very close together, and I often put my head on your shoulder as you drove. Now we are sitting so far apart!"

The husband's answer was, "But, honey, I haven't moved!"

And so it often seems to us Americans. As your proverb goes, "There's no inheritance for us to fight over." We do not seek conflict and confrontation. So why have we had recurrent tensions and at times come close to conflict during the years since World War II?

Some might say it is because we have different values, social structures and political systems. These differences are real. Yet we have always had such differences and they did not lead to conflict. Tensions arose only when you adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and declared yourselves the enemy of those of a different persuasion. Thus it is ideology that has spawned apprehension and distrust. And given this ideology, we must expect that we will be rivals in many areas for the foreseeable future. But do the problems caused by ideology doom us to conflict?

I cannot believe that they do. Let us take a look at the recent past for some clues as to what sort of events and practices have brought us into confrontation.

When the Second World War ended in 1945, Americans, in their joy, thought of nothing more than bringing their fighting men home from the battlefields of Europe and Asia, demobilizing them, and settling down to building a better life

at home. We hoped that the new United Nations Organization would preserve peace and freedom of choice for all nations. We hoped that we would never again be drawn into conflicts outside our borders, as we had been during both world wars. President Truman announced a policy of bring our boys home before Christmas. Most were home for Christmas, but our hopes turned out to be unrealistic.

For what did we witness? In country after country of Eastern and Central Europe occupied by the Soviet Army, governments were imposed which were not the result of the free elections which our leaders had pledged at the Yalta Conference. The United States added not one square millimeter of territory as a result of the war. Indeed, shortly after the war's end, it granted independence to the 19 million residents of the Philippines. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, appropriated to itself vast territories, without seeking or obtaining the consent of the residents. The use of force and the absence of freely given consent are the reasons the United States has never recognized the legality of the forcible incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the Soviet Union.

The United States emerged from the war with a monopoly of a new, immensely destructive technology -- the atomic bomb. Had it chosen to flex its muscles and make demands upon others, few -- if any -- could have resisted. But this was far from our minds; instead we proposed that all nuclear weapons and the technology to make them be turned over to an international authority, which would destroy existing weapons and maintain an

inspection and control of all countries to ensure that they could not be created again. It is a tragic fact of history that Stalin rejected this plan and the inspection and control which would make it feasible.

By 1947 it was clear that the devastated countries of Europe and Asia could not promptly rebuild their societies and economies without outside assistance. The United States, which had not suffered wartime destruction of its industry and agriculture, offered the most farsighted and generous plan of economic cooperation the world has known. The Marshall Plan was offered both to wartime allies and to erstwhile enemies, for we knew that if we were to have peace and security, all nations must have the opportunity to rebuild their economies as they chose. The nations of Western Europe accepted and within a very few years were accomplishing economic miracles. Once again Stalin refused, and not just for the Soviet Union, but also for countries of Eastern and Central Europe under Soviet influence.

What conclusions did Americans draw from these and other associated events? Basically, that the Soviet Union was determined to use military force whenever it could to extend its dominance, was contemptuous of democratic values, and had no interest in cooperation.

Much has changed since those early postwar years, but every time Americans have rekindled their hope that the Soviet Union is prepared to enter a new era -- one of cooperation and peaceful, constructive competition -- events have shattered the hope and have reconfirmed those conclusions drawn from Soviet

actions just after the war. From the invasion of Hungary in 1956 to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, we have witnessed the Soviet resort to force when no reasonable person would judge that Soviet security, or that of its allies, was threatened. The issue seemed to be one of Soviet insistence on dominating neighbors, pure and simple.

Many will doubtless say that the United States also has used force since World War II, and this is true. We led an allied effort to resist aggression against South Korea in the 1950's. We tried unsuccessfully to help South Vietnam defend itself against North Vietnam. And we provide assistance to people trying to defend their country's independence from armed attack. But the important thing to understand is that all of these actions were reactive -- a response to armed aggression by others. The object was never to extend American dominance, but only to avoid a world in which military strength is the ultimate arbiter of national independence.

I cite these snippets of history not primarily to debate -- though we can do so if you wish -- and not to reopen old sores, but to explain why the United States reacts as it does to today's events. We must understand each other's frame of mind, and understand how we perceive events if we are to find a way to avoid repeating the shocks and disillusionments of the past.

Key Factors

Once when I was discussing such matters after dinner with a Soviet friend, he asked me, in a tone of desperation,

"Just what do you want of us, you Americans? Do you insist that we give up our system, change our values, just surrender if we are to have peace?" Of course, I told him that was not the point. But I'm not sure I gave a coherent answer as to what we do want. It was late at night -- and since the dinner was before May, 1985, we both had consumed more vodka and cognac than we should have. I have often thought about his question since, and would like to try an answer.

What is important to Americans in the U.S.-Soviet relationship? The differences in our values and political systems are important, but they need not lead to conflict or even international tension. Of course we will defend our values and speak out in favor of them. We expect the same from others. We believe firmly, however, that every nation must decide its own destiny, and we respect such choices when they are made by democratic means.

What disturbs Americans is the use (or threat) of force to resolve disputes, to impose a political system on others, or simply to gain influence and dominance in the world. We find it abhorrent when a faction within a country imposes its will by force of arms, and are likely to speak our minds. But we don't involve ourselves unless the force is introduced from the outside.

History has taught us that when one country begins to throw its weight around by military force, the seeds are sown for a wider conflict in the future. In a nuclear age, the world cannot risk wider conflicts.

Armed force, of course, can be a source of tension even when it is not used directly. If one country attempts to force another country to do its bidding under the threat of superior military force, this too is destabilizing, and only encourages others to try to counter the threat which is invoked.

This means that one of the most basic things Americans are looking for is a movement away from the use of military force to settle disputes. Unless we can learn to deal with our differences by non-military means, we will always have a rocky road ahead in the relationship.

A second thing which is very important to Americans -- and I believe to all people -- is the sanctity of agreements. Nothing is more destructive of trust than the feeling that a partner to an agreement ignores it and fails to meet its terms if they seem inconvenient. Unfortunately, we feel that some past agreements with the Soviet Union have not been fully and faithfully implemented.

A third matter of great importance to Americans stems in part from their own history and values but also from their assessment of what will promote a peaceful world. Americans are, frankly, deeply influenced in their attitudes by the way a government treats its own citizens. Are citizens free to come and go, to have contact with whomever they choose, to practice their religion without constraint or disability, to speak their minds as they wish, without reprisals or repression? Or, conversely, does a government act as if its citizens are its own property, to be herded in, forbidden the right to travel, prosecuted for

studying the language of their religion, and "shielded" from information or views the government considers unpalatable or inaccurate?

Now, some would say that this is none of our business; these are internal matters. Others would say that the United States has its own problems. We do not deny that we have problems -- we recognize that our society is not perfect. But we constantly strive to correct injustices and are attentive to the suggestions of others. And, any American who prefers to live elsewhere has an absolute right to do so, and to come and go as he or she pleases.

But we do not accept the proposition that questions regarding human rights are purely a matter of internal jurisdiction. We believe firmly that human rights are a legitimate international concern, for at least three reasons: legal, practical, and ethical.

From the standpoint of legality, most nations of the world adhered to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and all the nations of Europe save only Albania, along with the United States and Canada, subscribed to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. These establish certain rights as internationally accepted standards.

From the standpoint of practicality, it seems to Americans that nations with governments which respect the basic rights of their citizens are much less likely to resort to the aggressive use of military force than those who cut their citizens off from contact with the outside world and suppress the

free expression of opinion. All ordinary people, throughout the world, want peace, and if they are allowed to influence the political processes in their own country, this would provide a bulwark against the practice of military adventurism.

From an ethical standpoint, nobody has expressed the matter more clearly than the great Russian thinker Alexander Herzen, who wrote in 1852: "The time has come when Russian serfdom should be made, if not a European, at least an English question." He compared the intense attention the British public gave to slavery in the United States, to the scant attention given to serfdom in the Russian Empire. Fortunately, both American slavery and Russian serfdom were abolished a few years after Herzen's article, but his basic point is as valid today as it was then: it does matter to the international community how citizens of a country are treated by their governments.

And so, to return to my Soviet friend's question, what do Americans want in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, I would reply as follows: They want to deal peacefully and relegate the use and threat of force to the ashbin of history; they want to reduce military arsenals radically and move toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; they want honest, fair agreements, faithfully observed; and -- if they are to develop a cooperative relationship free of fears that breed the accumulation of weaponry -- they want to deal with a society which is open to the world and an integral part of international intellectual and social intercourse.

We will spend most of the week discussing the specific issues now affecting the U.S.-Soviet relationship, but let me say a few words about these issues in general. It seems to many of us Americans that we can group them into four broad areas.

Armed Conflicts

As I have said, one of the most disturbing factors in U.S.-Soviet relations has been the resort to armed force in an attempt to extend influence or to be the arbiter of local conflicts. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is still conducting a full-scale war. Elsewhere, it has supplied arms or supported foreign troops, in ways which exacerbate local conflicts. Cambodia, Angola and Nicaragua come to mind in this context. In some instances, the United States has responded belatedly by providing support -- though not its own military forces -- to those struggling for national independence and democracy.

Military involvement of the superpowers in these conflicts increases the risk of military confrontation between us. If we are serious about dealing with each other in peaceful ways, we should find a way out of this cycle of action and reaction, and work toward a world in which disputes are settled peacefully.

Last year, President Reagan made a far-reaching proposal in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. It was that the United States and the USSR should encourage the parties to these various conflicts to initiate negotiations aimed

at finding political solutions. Then, when this is done, the US and USSR should enter into bilateral talks in an effort to terminate their own military involvement, direct or indirect. This would encourage the warring parties to compose their differences -- and if they could not find a solution, at least the means for destructive combat would be reduced. Finally, if a peace settlement could be achieved locally, among the parties, the U.S. would join in an international effort to promote reconstruction of the countries despoiled by fighting.

The overall goal of this proposal is to remove regional military conflicts from the agenda of U.S.-Soviet problems. We believe it is important to continue to explore its potential.

One thing is certain: Few developments would have a more salutary effect on U.S.-Soviet relations than the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of Cuban and Vietnamese forces, armed with Soviet weapons, from battlefields outside their borders. Another thing is certain: If the Soviet Union were not involved in these disputes militarily, the United States would not be either.

Arms Reduction

The level of arms, particularly nuclear weapons, is much too high in the world. Chairman Gromyko, when he was Foreign Minister, spoke of our countries sitting on respective mountains of nuclear weapons. We have both agreed that it is imperative to start reducing these bloated arsenals.

We are encouraged that our leaders were able to agree in Geneva to a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, and to the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It is time we got on with negotiating the concrete arrangements to permit a radical reduction of nuclear weapons.

There are many other important issues in the arms control area, but none are so urgent as the need to begin, at long last, a substantial reduction of these weapons. Let us not forget that when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, it was signed on the presumption that an agreement would follow to reduce the levels of offensive weapons. However, we have not been able to achieve such reductions up to now.

So far as the United States is concerned, we are eager for deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. Furthermore, we believe that such reductions should be structured so neither side need fear a disarming first strike from the other -- whether or not there are defenses in place.

We have noted that the Soviet Union has made a series of arms control proposals this year. We have welcomed many elements in these proposals, but overall I would be less than candid if I did not say that some strike us as designed more to create a public image than to solve the concrete problems involved. If we are to solve the problems, we must speed up work at the negotiating table.

Human Rights

I have already spoken of the importance of human rights to the American people and their government. I regret that the situation still remains an important source of tension in our relationship. Spouses continue to be divided and families split apart. Persons are in prison for no apparent reason other than expressing views distasteful to their authorities. Emigration is at the lowest level in over 15 years. Suffice it to say that until this situation changes, the possibilities for a true improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations will be severely limited.

Confidence and Dialogue

The fourth group of issues are those remaining ones which affect the confidence both sides have in dealing with each other. Abiding by past agreements, of which I have spoken, is one of these, but there is much more. We are seeking a radical expansion of ties and increased dialogue. This would help both sides to understand the other better and would bring both government officials and private citizens in both countries in broader and more regular contact.

President Reagan proposed last fall that both governments consider the possibility of a vast expansion of contacts between private citizens. We have lived too long in isolation from each other, and this has created an atmosphere which makes accommodation difficult. The point is not that all problems can be solved by better understanding -- many problems are too deep and too real for that to be true -- but that lack of

contact and lack of understanding exacerbate the real problems and make it more difficult to solve them.

In this area, I am encouraged by recent developments. This meeting in itself could be a good example of what we would like to see. And American and Soviet organizations are beginning to discuss a number of innovative new projects with the same aim -- to make it easier for American and Soviet citizens of all ages to meet, get to know each other, and learn from each other. But what we have done so far is only a small first step, given the vast distance we must travel if we are to create the conditions necessary for the widescale and fruitful interaction that our peoples need, and desire.

Last November President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev conducted two days of intensive, fruitful meetings in Geneva. Their meeting was important. And not just because it was the first meeting of American and Soviet leaders for six years, and because it gave them an opportunity to get to know each other. These factors alone would have justified the meeting, but the other achievements of the Geneva Summit were even more important: the establishment of a structure of dialogue between our governments, the agreement to intensify negotiations on nuclear arms reduction and to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50%, to name only a few.

Most importantly, however, the Geneva meeting demonstrated that it is possible to meet and to make progress in the relationship without either side triumphing over the other. It was truly a meeting in which both sides gained.

While at Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to meet again -- in the United States this year and in the Soviet Union next year.

Since then, much attention has been devoted to the question of when the meeting will take place, whether there are preconditions to it, and what it might achieve. As one who participated in most of the summit meetings of the 1970's, and in the meeting at Geneva, I would like to make some general observations.

The first is that I believe these meetings are important as a channel of communication at the highest levels of our governments. Our leaders of course can correspond, and they have diplomatic representatives to speak for them, but there is no substitute for direct personal contact. Both countries suffer when years go by and no meetings are possible.

Now some maintain that there is no point in meeting unless agreements can be signed. I believe this is incorrect. Naturally, any political leader wants a meeting to produce as much as it can, but if the public comes to require political leaders to reach agreements every time they meet, we will find that meetings will occur rarely -- and that in the absence of direct contact at the top, it will be much more difficult to come to agreement on difficult issues.

None of this means that summit meetings should not be well prepared. Of course they should, and the more thoroughly the better. But it does mean that neither side should consider the meetings as a "gift" to the other, or a matter to be bartered

for concessions in substantive areas. I can think of no better way to make sure that summit meetings rarely occur. To be useful, they must be viewed as events in the mutual and joint interest of both countries.

For these reasons, I hope that the pattern of meetings agreed on at Geneva can be followed. If it is, I am confident that the publics of both countries -- and people throughout the world -- will approve the results.

* * * * *

So where does this leave us? Should we begin our discussion this week in an optimistic or pessimistic mood? Of course, whether one is an optimist or pessimist depends upon what question is asked and what goals are assumed. Perhaps it is better to ask what joint goals we should set and then discuss what will be required to achieve them.

The most basic of the joint goals which have already been set is to make sure that the United States and the Soviet Union never wage a war with each other. As our leaders agreed at Geneva last November, "...a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." And therefore they "emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional."

I am confident that this solemn commitment by our highest political leaders is a genuine one, and therefore am very optimistic that the United States and Soviet Union will continue

5

to avoid direct military conflict, as they have throughout their history.

The real question in my mind, therefore, is not whether there will be war or peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, but whether the U.S.-Soviet relationship will continue to be full of tension, shaken by recurrent crises, and largely confrontational, or whether we can find ways to compete peacefully and even cooperate on a widening range of issues.

We must expect competition, since the vast difference in our values and political ideals requires us to defend what we hold dear. In the 1970's, when many Americans exaggerated the degree of understanding which had been achieved, it was Soviet leaders who reminded us that there could be no slackening of what they called the "ideological struggle." We took note of this reality and accept its implications.

Nevertheless, these differences and this competition need not prevent increasing cooperation in many areas where we -- and other countries of the world -- face common problems. Surely the most urgent of these problems are diminishing the use of force to resolve political and social conflicts, reducing the level of arms in the world, and establishing patterns of broad and open contact and communication between our countries and throughout the world community.

I look forward to hearing the views of our Soviet spokesmen on these important questions, as well as those of my own compatriots. Let us use this meeting to clarify and debate our various points of view, in the hope that we will all emerge

56

with a clearer understanding of how we each, in our individual capacities, can contribute to building a better and safer world for our children and grandchildren.