

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron October 1986 (3)
Box: 18

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1986 (3/6)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 18

YARHI-MILO

1807

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8593	MEMO	MATLOCK/COBB/DEAN TO POINDEXTER RE KEY SOVIETS AT REYKJAVIK PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	1	10/7/1986	B1
8594	PAPER	MOSCOW'S USA TEAM D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5	4	10/3/1986	B1 B3 B6
8597	REPORT	D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5	2	ND	B1 B3
8598	REPORT	D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5	1	ND	B1 B3
8599	REPORT	D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5	1	ND	B1 B3
8600	REPORT	D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5	1	ND	B1 B3 B6
8601	REPORT	D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5	1	ND	B1 B3 B6
8602	REPORT	D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5	1	ND	B1 B3 B6
8603	REPORT	D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5	1	ND	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1986 (3/6)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 18

YARHI-MILO

1807

ID	Doc Type	Document Description			No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
8605	REPORT	<i>D</i>	<i>3/14/2011</i>	<i>F06-114/5</i>	1	ND	B1 B6	B3
8606	REPORT	<i>D</i>	<i>3/14/2011</i>	<i>F06-114/5</i>	1	ND	B1 B6	B3
8607	REPORT	<i>D</i>	<i>3/14/2011</i>	<i>F06-114/5</i>	1	ND	B1 B6	B3
8608	REPORT	<i>D</i>	<i>3/14/2011</i>	<i>F06-114/5</i>	1	ND	B1 B6	B3
8609	REPORT	<i>D</i>	<i>3/14/2011</i>	<i>F06-114/5</i>	1	ND	B1 B6	B3
8595	MEMCON		OCTOBER 11, 1986 PRESIDENT REAGAN MEETING WITH GORBACHEV		11	10/11/1986	B1	
		<i>R</i>	<i>11/29/2007</i>	<i>NLRRF06-114/5</i>				

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 07 OCT 86 12

TO RYAN, F

FROM SWAN, ROBERT

DOCDATE 11 SEP 86

KEYWORDS: USSR

MP

AP

SUBJECT: LTR TO RYAN FM SWAN SEEKING APPT W/ PRES - RYAN - CARD RE
US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: MEMO MCDANIEL TO RYAN

DUE: 17 OCT 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH

MANDEL

LAVIN

LENCZOWSKI

RODMAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
WJ/Amel	X 10/14	For Sig	10/15	
C	10/14	Pearson Sgd Memo		JFM - RSD, RB m
DISPATCH				

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL *Bob Bor*

SUBJECT: Request By Lawrence, Kansas "Meeting
for Peace" Committee for Appointment With You

Attached at Tab A is a draft response to the request by the Lawrence, Kansas "Meeting for Peace" Committee to meet with you. The Committee hopes to gain White House approval to host a summit between the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, if one should occur.

The response notes that planning has not begun for any such summit in the US. It regrets that the press of business will prevent you from meeting with them, but that once planning does begin, the White House will carefully consider Lawrence's offer.

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed Response

Tab B Letter from Robert Swan, Chairman Meeting for Peace Committee; "Meeting for Peace" Flyer with Story from "San Diego Union" of June 26, 1983; copy of July 25, 1986 letter from Sen. Dole to Amb. Dubinin; copy of June 16, 1986 letter from Kansas Gov. Carlin to Lawrence Mayor Longhurst; copy of May 29, 1986 letter from Kansas University Chancellor Budig to the President; Lawrence, Kansas Resolution no. 4935 of April 22, 1986; Article from "Lawrence Daily Journal-World" of April 29, 1986; Sept. 8, 1986 Memo re. Possible Itinerary; Prospectus for a Meeting for Peace in Lawrence, Kansas, USA

Dear Mr. Swan:

Thank you for your letter and materials about the availability of Lawrence, Kansas to host a summit between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev. The President is prepared to host a summit with Gorbachev in the US, as the USSR agreed at the meeting last year in Geneva. Unfortunately, the Soviets have resisted setting a date for a US summit, and planning has not yet begun on where such a summit would be held.

Regrettably, the press of business here will prevent me from meeting with you. However, I can assure you that when preparations do begin for a summit in the US, the White House will certainly consider Lawrence's offer carefully.

Sincerely,



POST OFFICE BOX 1776 • LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66044 • PHONE (913) 843-6435

September 11, 1986

Mr. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.
Director, Presidential Appointments
The White House
Washington, DC

RECEIVED
SEP 12 1986

Dear Mr. Ryan:

As you know the citizens of Lawrence, supported by their local, state and national representatives and other prominent Kansans, proposed a Meeting for Peace in this special community more than three years ago. We have appreciated your past interest and kind words regarding our efforts to contribute toward more stable and peaceful relations between our country and the Soviet Union.

Three months ago students at the University of Kansas initiated a postcard invitation campaign that has created even more interest and support in our community for a Meeting for Peace in Lawrence. Next Wednesday evening, after a rally and send-off at the University of Kansas, a delegation of prominent KU students and Lawrence citizens are coming to Washington, DC, to deliver personally more than 7,500 personally signed invitations from our people to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

Since our mission is supportive of President Reagan's hopes for improved relations and his stated desire that a summit take place this year in America, we ask, if at all possible, that we have the opportunity to meet briefly with President Reagan. If this is impossible, we ask that we have a meeting with you and Mr. Andrew Card of Intergovernmental Affairs who also has been kept informed of our initiative.

Mr. Ryan, we support our President's quest for peace and our delegation looks forward to meeting with those officials that you and Mr. Card recommend next Thursday. Our proposal and our commitment are serious and our city can make a great contribution to the peace process if it is included in your planning for the summit.

Respectfully,

Robert Swan, Chairman
Meeting for Peace Committee

RAS:cjs
Enclosures
cc. Mr. Andrew Card
Ms. Jane Plank



POST OFFICE BOX 1776 • LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66044 • PHONE (913) 843-6435

September 11, 1986

Mr. Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
for Intergovernmental Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Card:

As you know the citizens of Lawrence, supported by their local, state and national representatives and other prominent Kansans, proposed a Meeting for Peace in this special community more than three years ago. We have appreciated your past interest and kind words regarding our efforts to contribute toward more stable and peaceful relations between our country and the Soviet Union.

Three months ago students at the University of Kansas initiated a postcard invitation campaign that has created even more interest and support in our community for a Meeting for Peace in Lawrence. Next Wednesday evening, after a rally and send-off at the University of Kansas, a delegation of prominent KU students and Lawrence citizens are coming to Washington, DC, to deliver personally more than 7,500 personally signed invitations from our people to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

Since our mission is supportive of President Reagan's hopes for improved relations and his stated desire that a summit take place this year in America, we ask, if at all possible, that we have the opportunity to meet briefly with President Reagan. If this is impossible, we ask that we have a meeting with you and Mr. Frederick Ryan and any other officials you recommend who are involved in selection of locations for the summit and summit-related visits.

Mr. Card, we support our President's quest for peace and our delegation looks forward to meeting with those officials that you and Mr. Ryan recommend next Thursday. Our proposal and our commitment are serious and our city can make a great contribution to the peace process if it is included in your planning for the summit.

Respectfully,

Robert Swan, Chairman
Meeting for Peace Committee

RAS:cjs
Enclosures
cc. Mr. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.

6

STATE OF KANSAS



OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
State Capitol
Topeka 66612-1590

John Carlin Governor

June 16, 1986

The Honorable David Longhurst
Mayor, City of Lawrence
Post Office Box 1776
Lawrence, Kansas 66044

Dear Mayor Longhurst:

I commend you and the citizens of Lawrence for your efforts to secure a 1986 US-Soviet Summit to be held in Lawrence, Kansas. I share your enthusiasm for promoting Lawrence with its friendly, tranquil, and supportive atmosphere.

Should your efforts be successful, I am confident that Lawrence would provide all that is necessary for a successful meeting place.

Please feel free to contact my office should you need any assistance. Best wishes to you.

Sincerely,



JOHN CARLIN
Governor

JC:pd

Great Plains Epic: Searching For The Summit At Lawrence, Kan.

By EDWARD NICHOLS

Associate Editor, The San Diego Union

It isn't often, if ever, that the U.S. State Department gets upstaged by the folks of a medium-sized U.S. city, but it just might happen.

At Foggy Bottom, the State Department is pondering ways to arrange a meaningful summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Yuri Andropov.

But Andropov already has agreed "in principle" to come to a summit in Lawrence, Kan., if substantive results can be guaranteed before it begins.

The story of how Lawrence, Kan., landed the Soviet Union began earlier this year when the city invited Soviet athletes to participate in the Kansas Relays there. At first the Soviet Union politely rejected the invitation. Then, suddenly, at the end of April, the Soviet embassy notified Mayor David Longhurst that men and women from the U.S.S.R. would be delighted to compete in the track meet.

"They came with the appropriate number of interpreters and all that. There was a big to do about it. They were met at the Kansas City airport by the Kansas governor, school children and others — flowers, messages and pictures — all those kinds of things. They were here for the better part of a week and they went back with all kinds of messages. They did a lot of entertaining and they went back with good feelings. We understand there was quite a long article printed in one of the Soviet papers about their trip here and how well it worked.

"So the same people who were successful in inviting the Soviet athletes to Lawrence said: 'Well, we got one, why not go for two.' So they invited Andropov to hold a summit meeting here — and also had the school kids write both Andropov and the White House," said Dolph C. Simons, editor of the Lawrence Journal-World. "Stranger things have happened," he added.

Lawrence, the home of University of Kansas, is a city of about 60,000 population, 10 miles southwest of



Rod Stroup, The San Diego Union

Kansas City. It was founded in 1854 by the New England Immigration Aid Society, which was determined to have Kansas enter the Union as a non-slave state.

U.S.-Soviet summit meetings are not usually in places like Lawrence, but rather in major cities in the United States and the Soviet Union, or on neutral ground like Geneva, Helsinki or Vienna. Nevertheless, should a Soviet-U.S. summit materialize in Lawrence, that city wouldn't necessarily rate a mention in Guinness Book of Records as the smallest or most unlikely place hosting a meeting between inimical superpowers. That footnote probably goes to Glassboro, N.J., a community of about 10,000, where President Lyndon B. Johnson met Premier Alexei Kosygin in the home of the president of Glassboro State College. They talked about the Middle East crisis, Vietnam and nuclear weapons.

It was President Johnson's only venture into summitry, and he didn't ask in advance that success be guaranteed. No major issues were settled at Glassboro, but many historians believe the summit laid the groundwork for the SALT I treaty and interim agreement signed in 1972 by President Nixon.

The idea that some success has to be assured or that extensive preparations are necessary hasn't always been an article of faith among summitteers. When Winston Churchill proposed a "parley at the summit" in 1950 to thaw the Cold War, he met stiff opposition from diplomats, who told him that an unstructured meeting would bring few results, but raise many expectations.

Churchill reacted vigorously: "This conference should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agen-

da or led into mazes of technical details, zealously contested by hordes of experts and officials, drawn up in cumbrous array," he thundered.

Some believe that world leaders shouldn't hold summits at all because international problems usually are too complex to negotiate in a few days at high levels. And the danger of miscues always is present. As American statesman Dean Acheson noted: "When a chief of state or head of government makes a fumble, the goal line is open behind him." President Eisenhower was of the same opinion: "Every time an American leader goes to a summit, he loses his shirt," he said.

Whether Eisenhower was correct or not is in the eyes of the beholder. During and after World War II, the United States has been involved in 13 summit meetings with the Soviet Union. Among the major ones were the Teheran and Yalta conferences in 1943 and 1945 that brought together President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Churchill and Joseph Stalin. Many historians believe that these conferences "gave" Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. The Potsdam summit in 1945 concluded the postwar shaping of Europe's boundaries.

After a hiatus of 10 years, summitry resumed in 1955, when President Eisenhower met with Soviet, British and French leaders in Geneva. Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin rejected President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal to verify nuclear disarmament agreements and little was accomplished, but East-West contacts had been resumed after a hiatus of a decade. Good feelings developed between Eisenhower and Bulganin during the summit and both countries started talking about building on the "Spirit of Geneva." The spirit died a short time later, however, when the Soviet Union put tanks on the streets of Budapest, Hungary, to quell a rebellion.

In 1959 Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States, wading through corn fields, touring industries and addressing Americans on television. He and Pres-

(Continued on C-4, Col. 1)

(cont)

ident Eisenhower agreed to improve relations and to meet again in Paris the following year. The meeting in Paris in 1960 was a debacle. It had hardly opened when the Soviet Union shot down a United States spy plane over Russia. Khrushchev berated Eisenhower, demanding an apology. He refused and the summit broke up. The aborted agenda had included the East-West Berlin issue, German unity, atomic arms reductions and East-West relations in general.

President John F. Kennedy met Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961. History records that the Soviet leader mistook Kennedy's inexperience and friendliness for weakness and thus was encouraged to launch the Berlin crisis in 1961 and order Soviet missiles into Cuba in 1962.

"Atmospherics" between the Soviet Union and the United States were glowing after Glassboro in 1967. Although little of substance had been accomplished, President Johnson and Kosygin evaluated each other and reached some understandings, despite increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam and growing Soviet support for North Vietnam. The honeymoon ended in 1968 when the Soviet Union sent troops into Czechoslova-

kia to quell a rebellion. Soviet use of tanks to maintain rigid Marxism in Czechoslovakia delayed negotiation of the SALT I agreement by at least one year.

President Nixon went to Moscow in 1972 to meet Leonid Brezhnev and sign SALT I. Both pledged to work for "peaceful coexistence." Brezhnev came to the United States the following year and Nixon returned to Moscow in 1974. These were the productive years of the modern cycle of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

President Ford met Brezhnev in Vladivostok in 1974 to talk about SALT II, but five years elapsed before the treaty was signed in Vienna by President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev. Then the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 1979 and, realizing that SALT II would be defeated, Carter withdrew the treaty from U.S. Senate consideration. It still is unratified.

That was the last of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms summits. Now President Reagan obviously is looking for a way to meet Andropov without painting himself into a political corner.

Actually, Mr. Reagan began sounding out the Soviet

Union about the possibility of a summit meeting early in his term, despite his harsh rhetoric, when he invited Leonid Brezhnev to meet him informally at the United Nations last June. Brezhnev rejected the invitation and suggested that they could get together in a full-fledged summit in October — in either Finland or Switzerland. "A meeting between the President of the United States and myself obviously has to be well prepared and must be conducted thoroughly, not incidentally to some international forum," Brezhnev said. The Soviet leader insisted that he was amenable to a summit with Mr. Reagan and, indeed, he had stressed the value of summit meetings in a speech to the 26th Communist Party conference in February 1981.

Recently Godfrey Sperling of the Christian Science Monitor reported that White House insiders claim President Reagan is "favorably disposed" to a summit meeting with Andropov by early next year, before heavy presidential campaign traveling begins.

President Reagan himself is saying publicly: "I believe... that a summit is likely." The President is not "optimistic about this year... more possibility of next year." The reluctance of Andropov has delayed a summit. "We actually tried to make contact... very

early... There's no contact with him," Mr. Reagan says. Although he initially wanted an informal session with Brezhnev at the United Nations, the President now thinks a summit with the Soviet leader must have an agenda "in which you both agree that there are things you can probably resolve by meeting, and then you get together and meet."

Retired Air Force Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who heads a commission studying the MX missile and nuclear deterrence, has recommended to the President that the United States and the Soviet Union might have a better chance of holding private discussions out of the public eye. "One way to break out of the considerable depths of suspicion would be to initiate some kind of private talks, away from the spotlight, where neither side has to be perceived as caving in or making concessions, even as the one who requested such talks," Scowcroft said. Columbia University Kremlinologist Seweryn Bailer puts it more bluntly: "It's time President Reagan met a Russian," he says.

Lawrence, Kan., indeed would rate a Guinness entry if he met the Russian there.

Because PEACE begins⁸
at home . . .



*“Join the postcard
campaign”*

sponsored by

- KU Coalition for Peace and Justice
- Lawrence Coalition for Peace and Justice
- Meeting for Peace Committee

RESOLUTION NO. 4935

WHEREAS, the citizens of Lawrence and their elected officials have always had the deepest concern for matters of peace and war and have seen this concern magnified many times due to the threat of nuclear war to our children and to ourselves, and

WHEREAS, on April 23, 1983, Mayor David Longhurst invited American and Soviet leaders to come to Lawrence for a Meeting for Peace, and

WHEREAS, this invitation was acknowledged by both leaders and widely and favorably reported in the United States and several European nations, and

WHEREAS, Prominent Americans have endorsed a Meeting for Peace in our city, including Senator Robert Dole who asked, "Where better than Lawrence to hold a tranquil, uncluttered dialogue on world peace?"

WHEREAS, a committee of concerned and distinguished Lawrence citizens met in 1983, and drafted a detailed prospectus for the Meeting for Peace and sent it to both leaders, and

WHEREAS, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met at the summit last November in Geneva and called for a U. S. summit meeting in 1986 and a Soviet summit in 1987, and

WHEREAS, the White House last month asked Kansas Secretary of State Brier to provide full details on possible meeting places in Kansas for the 1986 U. S. summit, and

WHEREAS, Secretary of State Brier strongly recommended Lawrence for the site of the summit and a new letter of invitation and updated prospectus have been sent to President Reagan and the same prepared for General Secretary Gorbachev.


THEREFORE, be it resolved that the Lawrence City Commission reaffirms its belief that a productive summit with genuine progress in arms control is critically needed, and that our friendly, peaceful and supportive citizens and community would provide the ideal environment for such a Meeting for Peace.


FURTHER, the Lawrence City Commission states once again its support for holding the 1986 summit, a Meeting for Peace, in Lawrence, Kansas.

FURTHER, The Lawrence City Commission states its willingness to cooperate fully with all University, Douglas County, State of Kansas, and federal offices in making this 1986 summit in Lawrence a reality.


The Lawrence City Commission will inform immediately the proper University, City, State, and National officials of this resolution, including President Ronald Reagan, Senators Robert Dole and Nancy Kassebaum, Congressman James Slattery, State Senator Wint Winter, and State Representatives John Solbach, Jessie Branson, and Betty Jo Charlton, and request their full support of this important initiative.


Signed this 22nd day of April, 1986.


Sandra K. Praeger, Mayor



Howard Hill, Commissioner


Mike Amyx, Commissioner


Ernest Angino, Commissioner


David Longhurst, Commissioner

ATTEST:


Vera Mercer, City Clerk



(Staff photo by Mike Yoder)

Flanked by their countries' flags, Alexandre Olshansky, a Soviet veteran, left, and Buck Kotzebue, a U.S. veteran, lead a "walk for peace" down Massachusetts Street Monday. They were the first American and Soviet

soldiers to meet at the Elbe River 41 years ago as the allies made their final push into Nazi Germany.

Soviet visitor endorses Lawrence as summit site

By BOB MUELLER
J-W Staff Writer

Any Lawrence residents who envisioned Soviet citizens as Politburo robots had that view altered Monday in warm-hearted meetings with Soviet veterans on a "Journey for Peace."

Emphasizing a desire for peace, Ivan Katyshkin, a retired Soviet general, endorsed a proposal to have Lawrence serve as a site for a U.S.-Soviet summit later this year. His endorsement, the first public backing by a Soviet citizen, drew loud applause from 150 people attending a

farewell dinner Monday night at Plymouth Congregational Church, 925 Vt.

"LET US together persistently work toward ensuring a stable and just peace on Earth," Katyshkin said, speaking through an interpreter.

At a luncheon earlier in the day, Katyshkin vowed to deliver to Soviet officials a prospectus about a proposed summit prepared by local supporters.

Eight hours of previous talks between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was enough time to get to know each other, Katyshkin


said. "There's no need to get acquainted more. We wish for concrete, practical results. . . . The practical steps are the reversal of the arms race and putting a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing."

The local summit proposal grew from various activities, including a 1983 visit by Soviet athletes organized by Athletes United for Peace. When City Commissioner David Longhurst was mayor that year, he first invited U.S. and Soviet leaders to hold a summit in Lawrence. The invitation was reaffirmed this year in a resolution passed by the current city commission.


THE VISIT by four Soviet veterans and three representatives of the East German Democratic Republic (GDR) was sponsored by the Elbe Alliance, a Lawrence-based group working to foster the spirit of cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union when they met allies at the Elbe River in World War I defeat Nazi Germany, according to I. Swan, a local organizer.

Events during the past two days have been aimed at rekindling that spirit, stressing the need for peace.

See Americans, page 7



Students from McPherson College carried photos of Soviet-U.S. troops from World War II while listening to speakers in Lawrence's South Park Monday.



Ellen Anthony, a Lawrence resident who had a role in the "The Day After," a movie about a nuclear holocaust, joined Soviet veteran Alexandre Sylvashko, right, on the bandstand in South Park.

Americans, Soviets join in call for peace

(Continued from page 1)

remembers the meeting at the Elbe.

A "walk for peace" downtown drew one of the largest crowds for any of the day's events. The march was led by Alexander Olshansky and Buck Kotzebue, the first Soviet and U.S. soldiers to meet at the Elbe 41 years ago.

EARLIER in the day, the group held a solemn memorial service at the World War II memorial campanile on Kansas University's campus with several local veterans. A luncheon at KU was followed by a trip to Topeka to tour the heart of Kansas government.

A pot-luck dinner Monday evening that drew 150 people, with about half as many homemade dishes, drove home a point made all day: Peace is the only alternative for today's children.

That message was emphasized all day — by school children showering the visitors with handshakes and flowers and by the presentation of several paintings from East German children.

Presenting the paintings at dinner, Helga Scheibe, a member of the Peace Council of the GDR, said "children want to play in the U.S. just as in the GDR. . . . We need and support the freeze (on nuclear weapons)."

KATYSHKIN also made a plea for youth. "Help the young generation understand deeply the necessity to live in peace. Help to make them comprehend that if there is another world conflict, there will be no winning sides."

Local residents, both military veterans and non-veterans, participating in the events found the visit "enlightening," said Marlene Fisher, whose family housed Werner Handler, of the GDR, Monday night. Rob Fisher, Marlene's husband, was one of the organizers of the visit.

"He just seemed like one of us. He was very friendly," Mrs. Fisher said. "He was very sincere and really wants peace."

Handler, one of two visitors who spoke English, smiled and said he enjoyed the overnight stay, although he felt a little guilty about taking over a bedroom that belonged to Justin, the Fishers' 10-year-old son.

LeRoy Mzhickteno and Harold Volk, Lawrence residents who both served in the Army's 35th Division during World War II, said the visit was a good idea.

"Sure, anything to promote peace is a good idea," said Mzhickteno, who

HE EXCHANGED gifts with a Soviet visitor. In return for a button, Mzhickteno gave a visitor a golf ball. "He thought it was interesting and he didn't know what it was. I guess they don't play much golf over there."

Both American Legion members found it difficult to speak through an interpreter. "About all I could talk about was his bald head and my bald head. We kind of avoided politics," Volk said with a laugh. He said the visitors were "very congenial."

The visit is a good idea to help promote peaceful relations, Volk said, and "generally, we've done a pretty good job on both sides for the last 41 years."

Although he'd like to see peace, Volk is a little apprehensive about holding a summit in Lawrence because it might bring huge crowds and possibly demonstrators, he said.

JIM CLARK, the first U.S. soldier to enter Periers, France, after D-Day in June of 1944, said he was "a little apprehensive" when first asked to participate in the day's events. "I guess I envisioned people marching with placards saying 'ban the bomb.' But the sincerity of these people really struck me. If we don't get the problem solved in a peaceful manner, there is no solution," he said.

Clark said he plans to take Katyskhin up on a private invitation to visit his home in the Soviet Union next year.

After the luncheon, Glenn Kappelman, who served with the 106th Cavalry's reconnaissance group from Normandy to Salzburg, Austria, recalled when his outfit met Russian soldiers near Linz, Austria.

"There was a real feeling of camaraderie. All the GIs were thankful that the Soviet Army was on the east front. . . . There was a spirit of victory," he said.

THAT SPIRIT of cooperation was rejuvenated during the last two days, Kappelman said.

"These meetings point out that there are more likenesses in the people of our countries than differences. I have no feeling that they're here for propaganda purposes. . . . As far as a summit, I don't know if we can make the grade or not. But if they leave the usual government center of Washington or Camp David, there's a good possibility it could be here. And away from those usual places, there might be some progress," he said.

In photo at right, Soviet visitors to Lawrence received flowers from children from the United Child Development Center. Below, Norman Porter, a U.S. veteran from Kansas City, Kan., carried both American and Soviet flags in a parade for peace in downtown Lawrence.



Photos by Mike Yoder, Richard Gwin and Ben Bigler

MEMORANDUM

TO: Kansas hosts of a Reagan/Gorbachev pre-Summit visit to the state

FROM: Mark Scott

RE: Possible itinerary

DATE: September 8, 1986

WHY SHOULD MR. GORBACHEV VISIT
VISIT KANSAS?

- *Immigrants from the Russian Empire first settled the Kansas prairies more than a century ago. They brought with them a strain of Ukrainian wheat--Turkey Red winter wheat-- which has become the staple of Kansas's agri-business economy.
- *Kansan George MacDowell was the first American awarded the Order of Lenin. MacDowell received the honor in the 1920s for his work in reorganizing Soviet agricultural production.
- *As Supreme Allied Commander, Kansan Dwight D. Eisenhower joined with the Soviet General Staff in defeating Nazi Germany. General Eisenhower hailed the meeting of US and Soviet troops in Germany on April 25, 1945, as "almost the peak of our establishment of world accord." President Eisenhower, his wife Mamie, and son Doud are buried in Abilene, Kansas.
- *Kansas universities have maintained long-standing academic ties with Soviet institutions of higher education. There are only two Schools of Milling and Baking in the world: Moscow State University and Kansas State University. Kansas State University has been involved in countless agricultural exchanges with Soviet farm specialists (Mr. Gorbachev himself is a farm specialist). The University of Kansas has sent thousands of American college students for Russian language instruction in the USSR. Some of the most prominent Soviet literary figures have been "writers-in-residence" at the University of Kansas. They include Viktor Rozov, Bella Akhmadulina, Evgeny Vinokurov, and Grigory Baklanov.
- *Lawrence, Kansas, hosted the visit of Soviet world-class track and field athletes who "competed for peace" in the 1983 Kansas Relays. Their participation in the Relays was the first time in US history that a Soviet track team had competed in a one-time, regional, outdoor meet.
- *Lawrence, Kansas, hosted the visit of Soviet Elbe veterans during their tour of the United States in the spring of 1986. Buck Kotzebue and Alexander Olshansky--the first American and Soviet soldiers to meet at the Elbe River on April 25, 1945--led a dramatic March for Peace down Lawrence's main street.

BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL RECEIVE A SPECTACULAR WELCOME FROM KANSANS ON THEIR VISIT TO THE WHEAT STATE. CITIZENS FROM THE "HEART OF AMERICA" WILL GREET BOTH LEADERS WITH OPEN HEARTS.

ITINERARY FOR A REAGAN/GORBACHEV PRE-SUMMIT VISIT TO KANSAS

(3 Days)

DAY 1 TOPEKA: Capital of the Wheat State

*Reagan/Gorbachev arrive at Topeka's Forbes Field in the morning. Both are met at the airport by Governor John Carlin, Mayor Doug Wright, and other Kansas dignitaries. Schoolchildren present guests with sunflower/wheat bouquets wrapped with red, white, blue, and yellow ribbons. Two children (boy/girl) offer Soviet guests bread and salt; the guests cut off a piece of bread, sprinkle it with salt, then eat it. The bread and salt ceremony is a Russian tradition.

Reagan/Gorbachev are taken to podium on airport landing strip. Red carpet. US/Soviet/Kansas flags behind podium. Band plays Soviet/US national anthems. Governor Carlin welcomes guests. Mayor Wright welcomes guests. Gorbachev speaks. Reagan speaks. (Check protocol.)

*Motorcade from airport to State Capitol. Appropriate black limousines have US/Soviet flags above respective headlights. Police escort in front and back of entourage-- sirens blaring. Proceed north on Kansas Avenue. At the intersection of Kansas Avenue and 17th Street, the motorcade is met by new Hesston tractors, which lead the procession on to the Capitol. Tractor drivers in overalls. Tractors have US/Soviet flags attached.

Crowd along Kansas Avenue waves US and Soviet flags. Posters along the way are photo enlargements of Reagan/Gorbachev, Eisenhower/Zhukov, and/or Robertson/Silvashko embracing at Torgau in 1945. Lettering at top of Robertson/Silvashko reads "Welcome to Kansas, Mr. President." Lettering at bottom of Robertson/Silvashko poster reads (in Russian) "Welcome to Kansas, Mikhail Sergeyevich!" (Dobro pozhalovat' v Kansas, Mikhail Sergeyevich!) Banners along motorcade route read (in Russian) "Dobro pozhalovat!"

Motorcade either turns west on 8th Street or turns on 6th Street and doubles back to Capitol. Gorbachev/Reagan address joint session of Kansas Legislature.

*Late lunch with Governor Carlin at the Executive Mansion at Cedar Crest

*Joint tree-planting ceremony in the mid-afternoon at Topeka's Gage Park. Ceremony takes place near the statue entitled "Madonna of the Prairies." Remarks by Mayor Wright, city officials. Gorbachev plants a birch tree, Reagan a cottonwood.

MEMORANDUM TO KANSAS HOSTS OF A REAGAN/GORBACHEV PRE-SUMMIT VISIT TO THE STATE
Page 3

- *Dinner, evening entertainment, and accommodations to be arranged by the Governor's Office and/or the Topeka Chamber of Commerce. If guests stay at hotel, pipe in US/ Soviet music over intercom system.

DAY 2 GARDEN CITY: Queen of the Prairies

- *Reagan/Gorbachev arrive in Garden City in the late morning. Greeted by cowboys on horses, local dignitaries. Itinerary to be arranged by Garden City officials. Could include covered wagon/stagecoach procession, visit to farm/feedlot, square dancing/ Country Western entertainment. Guests welcomed by attractive young women wearing bib overalls and straw hats. Children sing well-known Soviet song in Russian: "Pust' vseгда budet nebo"

Stress Wild West/farming/ranching motif in Garden City.

DAY 3 LAWRENCE: Far Above the Golden Valley

- *Reagan/Gorbachev arrive Lawrence in the late morning. Welcomed by large delegation of students from Haskell Indian Junior College. The Native Americans--in traditional dress--present Reagan/Gorbachev with eagle feathers (traditional sign of distinction). City officials then introduced to Reagan/Gorbachev. Reagan/Gorbachev introduced to Susan Eisenhower (DDE's granddaughter). Brief speeches.
- *Wreath-laying ceremony at Kansas University's World War II Memorial Campaign. Large wreath of blood-red roses. Bugler plays Taps. Carillonneur plays Robert Schumann's "Träumerei."
- *Late lunch at Boots Adams Alumni Center. Faculty welcome from Chancellor Gene Budig. Special welcoming remarks (in Russian) by Professor Gerald Mikkelson.
- *Reagan/Gorbachev visit KU's Allen Fieldhouse. Both leaders photographed in front of oil painting of Dr. James Naismith, inventor of basketball and first basketball coach at KU. Reagan/Gorbachev meet KU's basketball team. Basketball team leads both leaders out onto basketball court, where they are greeted by KU student body. Gorbachev/Reagan address students.
- *Pot-luck dinner at Plymouth Congregational Church. Country Western entertainment. Television sets show videotapes of 1) Soviet athletes competing in 1983 Kansas Relays, and 2) visit of US World War II veterans to USSR in 1985. No broadcast of Torgau ceremonies (US government boycotted).
- *Accommodations arranged through White House/Downtown Lawrence Association. Guests stay in Lawrence Holidome?

DAY 4 Reagan/Gorbachev leave Lawrence in the morning.

THE ITINERARY IN TOPEKA, GARDEN CITY, AND LAWRENCE CAN BE EASILY EXPANDED SHOULD THE WHITE HOUSE OR KREMLIN REQUEST MORE TIME IN A PARTICULAR HOST CITY.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 14, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*
R. SCOTT DEANSUBJECT: Request by Lawrence, Kansas "Meeting for Peace"
Committee to Meet with Fred Ryan to Offer to Host
US-Soviet Summit

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Fred Ryan responding to his request for the NSC to draft a letter giving his regrets to a request by the Lawrence, Kansas "Meeting for Peace" Committee. The Committee is trying to build support for Lawrence, Kansas to be chosen as the site for any US-Soviet summit in the US. The draft response is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Ryan at Tab I, forwarding the draft response at Tab A.

Approve *WRP*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Your memo to Ryan
Tab A	Draft Response for Ryan
Tab B	Letter from Robert Swan, Chairman Meeting for Peace Committee; "Meeting for Peace" Flyer with Story from "San Diego Union" of June 26, 1983; copy of July 25, 1986 letter from Sen. Dole to Amb. Dubinin; copy of June 16, 1986 letter from Kansas Gov. Carlin to Lawrence Mayor Longhurst; copy of May 29, 1986 letter from Kansas University Chancellor Budig to the President; Lawrence, Kansas Resolution no. 4935 of April 22, 1986; Article from "Lawrence Daily Journal-World" of April 29, 1986; Sept. 8, 1986 Memo re. Possible Itinerary; Prospectus for a Meeting for Peace in Lawrence, Kansas, USA

8593
7280

clean
Reyk 16

matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 7, 1986

SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK
TYRUS W. COBB
SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Biographies of Key Soviets for Reykjavik

Attached are CIA biographies of some of the key Soviets that may come to Reykjavik with General Secretary Gorbachev.

The official Soviet "delegation" accompanying Gorbachev consists of:

- Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister;
- Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Chief Internat'l Dept. CPSU Central Committee;
- Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, Secretary CPSU Central Committee;
- Anatoliy S. Chernyayev, Foreign Policy Aide to Gorbachev.

It is interesting that, other than Shevardnadze, no Foreign Ministry (MFA) officials are included in the official delegation. Dobrynin and Yakovlev are both Party Secretaries in charge of Central Committee Departments, while Chernyayev is Gorbachev's personal assistant for foreign affairs.

The memo at Tab A, [REDACTED]

As you can see, the struggle over the locus of control of policy is not unique to the capitalist system!

RECOMMENDATION

That you peruse the attached biographic material.

Approve [Signature]

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab A [REDACTED]
- Tab B Biographies

SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/5# 8593
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

Sec. 3.3 (b) (1)
E.O. 13526
13526

RECEIVED 08 OCT 86 10

TO

POINDEXTER

FROM EVANS, MICHAEL A W

DOCDATE 03 OCT 86

KEYWORDS: USSR

SPACE PROGRAMS

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO JMP FM EVANS RE LARRY NEWMANS ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMNAVIGATE EARTH
HELIUM BALLOON REQUIRING OVERFLIGHT PERMISSION FM SOVIET UNION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 18 OCT 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

MAY

LINHARD

GANTT

RODMAN

COBB

COCKELL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Hate 10/16 Prof + Reply 10/23 Dean

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

REFERRAL

DATE: 16 OCT 86

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: POINDEXTER

SOURCE: EVANS, MICHAEL A W

DATE: 03 OCT 86

KEYWORDS: USSR

SPACE PROGRAMS

MP

SUBJ: LTR TO JMP FM EVANS RE LARRY NEWMANS ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMNAVIGATE EARTH

REQUIRED ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE DATE: 23 OCT 86

COMMENTS:

FOR *Rodney B. McDaniel*
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

5520 33rd Street NW
Washington DC 20015
202 362 4901

■ MICHAEL EVANS

October 3, 1986

36
7
PHY
u seg

Dear Admiral Poindexter:

I know you must be horribly busy with the upcoming meeting in Iceland (among other things), but frankly, I could use a little help.

I am acting as the Washington representative for a project involving Mr. Larry Newman's attempt to circumnavigate the earth in a helium balloon. This flight would be the first non-stop manned flight around the world by balloon.

You may recall that Newman, along with Ben Abruzzo and Maxie Anderson, was one of the crew that first crossed the Atlantic Ocean by balloon in 1978. Along with Abruzzo, Ron Clark, and Rocky Aoki, he was also the first to cross the Pacific Ocean by balloon in 1981 in a flight from Japan to the United States.

Newman was the technical genius behind both of those flights and is at present a commercial airline pilot. He holds several ballooning and aviation world records.

Our proposed flight is scheduled to launch from the northwestern coast of the United States some time between November 1987 and February 1988. (The Polar Jetstream is at its most consistent during winter months.) The balloon would fly aloft in the prevailing winds at an average estimated speed of 75 MPH, approximately following the 45th. parallel of latitude, and land back in the central United States after about 12 days.

Hour-to-hour variations in wind patterns make it impossible for us to file an exact flight plan for the balloon. However, the planned route would require that we obtain overflight permission from the government of the U.S.S.R..

In addition to seeking overflight permission from the Soviet Union for this project, Mr. Newman would also like to explore the possibility of including a Russian pilot to internationalize the flight.

Dr. Rhinesmith's staff has submitted the formal proposal for this project to the Soviet government via the United States Embassy in Moscow, and I have received a great deal of advice and assistance from the State Department. However, we have yet to receive any substantive feedback from the Russians, either formally or informally.


I would like to ask you if it would be possible for someone from the White House to informally pass the proposal on to the Russians, indicating, if possible, at least mild interest and support.

While I am a great photographer and a thoroughly fine fellow to boot, I make no claims to being a great diplomat! I also realize that my request to you does bypass normal channels. However, I have spent a great deal of time, effort and expense on this project and if the Russians are going to turn us down (their most likely response, given their sensitivities and the up and down nature of present-day Soviet-American relations), I would like to find out soon and move on to other things.

At the risk of stating the obvious, this flight poses no real security threat to the Soviets because of our inability to guarantee the precise route of the flight and because of the advanced state of current satellite technology. The positive public relations for both sides is what I like the most about the flight.

I enclose our draft proposal to the Soviet government and other background material.

Regards,



Michael A. W. Evans

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

38

PROPOSAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.

Mr. Larry Newman, an accomplished balloonist and aviator, and the holder of four world ballooning records as certified by the Federation Aeronautique Internationale, is leading an attempt to make the first non-stop flight around the world in a helium-filled balloon. His current plans call for an international flight crew of three, comprised of Newman as captain and aircraft commander, and, he hopes, a Russian pilot and a Chinese pilot.

The approximate cost of the flight will be US\$1,000,000. This venture is a private, non-governmental project to be underwritten by corporate sponsors and with income from the sale of worldwide television, magazine, newspaper and book rights.

Tentative plans call for the flight to be launched during the winter of 1987-88 from the northwest coast of the U.S.A. The balloon will follow the 45th parallel around the globe, cruising at an altitude of 35,000 to 50,000 feet above sea level. A winter launch has been chosen because weather conditions are the best and most consistent for long-distance ballooning. However, because the balloon's route is determined by the prevailing winds, an exact flight path is impossible to predict. Average ground speed at an altitude 50,000 feet will be about 75 miles per hour, or 1800 miles per day, for an anticipated elapsed time of approximately 12 days. Chuck Yeager, personal friend of Mr. Newman's, a noted test-pilot and the first man to break the sound barrier, has agreed to pilot the chase plane.

The balloon and attached gondola will stand some 200 feet in height. The balloon envelope itself will contain some 2.5 million cubic feet of helium at launch. This configuration will lift a payload of some 20,000 pounds (15,000 pounds of which will be ballasted out during flight to maintain altitude as necessary) and will allow a potential flight duration sufficient for a global circumnavigation plus a healthy margin of safety. The gondola, built of Kevlar, a space-age material, will be 20 feet long with a diameter of 8 feet. The gondola will be pressurized and will be powered by storage batteries connected to photo-voltaic cells.

PERSONNEL

Captain & Aircraft Commander: Mr. Larry Newman

Russian pilot: To be determined

Chinese pilot: To be determined

Chase Plane pilot: General Chuck Yeager, USAF retired

Official Videographer: Mr. John Wilcox

Governmental Liaison and

Official Still Photographer: Mr. Michael Evans

(See attached Biographical Notes)

REQUESTED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.

- 1) Permission for the balloon to overfly the U.S.S.R.
- 2) Provision of co-pilot for the flight, a commercial pilot who is fluent in the English language.
- 3) Communications assistance.
- 4) Local meteorological information.
- 5) Emergency evacuation and medical assistance in the unlikely event of a forced landing.
- 6) Chase plane overflight permission, with Russian navigator, and necessary flight support services.

Messrs. Newman, Evans and Wilcox are prepared to travel to the U.S.S.R. to further discuss the flight.

The designated contact for this project is:

Michael Evans
5520 33rd. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20015
(202) 362-4901

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

LARRY NEWMAN: An airline pilot with America West Airlines, Mr. Newman, 38, holds seven current aviation and ballooning world records as certified by the Federation Aeronautique Internationale. He is an accomplished designer of Ultra-Light aeroplanes and is the only man alive to have crossed both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by balloon. He crossed the Atlantic Ocean by balloon in 1978 with Ben Abruzzo and Maxie Anderson (see attached copy of National Geographic, December, 1978: "Double Eagle II Leaps the Atlantic") and in 1981, with Abruzzo and two passengers, was the first to cross the Pacific Ocean by balloon (see attached copy of National Geographic, April, 1982: "Across the Pacific by Balloon"). Mr. Newman designed and supervised the construction of the gondolas and related equipment for both flights. He has been awarded the Congressional Gold Medal for Aviation Achievement, a civilian award previously granted only to Charles Lindbergh and the Wright Brothers. A resident of Tempe, Arizona, Newman is single.

JOHN WILCOX: An independent producer of sports documentaries for television and theatrical release, Mr. Wilcox, 41, was with ABC Television for 18 years, serving as Executive Assistant to Mr. Boone Arledge, then President of ABC Sports, and also as producer and director. Wilcox has won 15 Emmys, a Peabody award and a Freedom Foundation TV award for programs he has produced and/or directed, which include "The End of the Game", a safari through Kenya with Photographer/Historian Peter Beard and his wife Cheryl Tiegs; "Spirit of 1978: Flight of the Double Eagle II", the first crossing of the Atlantic Ocean by balloon; "Alaska - The American Child", an expedition through Alaska with John Denver; "China Panda", the first film documenting the Panda in the wild; and "Triumph on Mount Everest", a documentary which chronicled the first successful climb of Mount Everest by one man without the assistance of oxygen. At both the summer and winter 1984 Olympic Games, Wilcox served as Producer/Director for Special Coverage for ABC Sports. Wilcox is a single resident of Aspen, Colorado.

41

CHUCK YEAGER: Arguably the best pilot the U.S.A. has ever produced, General Yeager (USAF retired), 65, is known for his brilliant career as a fighter pilot in the European Theatre during World War II and as the first man to break the sound barrier (in 1947), flying as a test pilot for the U.S. Air Force. Yeager returned to regular flight duties in 1954, and, when he retired in 1975, had logged ten thousand hours flying in 180 different military aircraft, including foreign or experimental rocket aircraft. Yeager has been awarded a Special Congressional Medal of Honor and the Collier Trophy, among other awards. He lives in California, serves as a consultant to the aerospace industry and still flies frequently.

MICHAEL EVANS: A freelance photographer also under contract to TIME Magazine, Mr. Evans has worked as a staff photographer for the Cleveland (Ohio) Plain Dealer and The New York Times newspapers. In January 1981, he was appointed to the position of Personal Photographer to the President, following his long-term photographic coverage of Ronald Reagan's presidential bids. While at the White House, Mr. Evans produced a documentary collection of portraits of Washingtonians which led to his first one man show at the Corcoran Gallery of Art, "People and Power: Portraits from the Federal Village," and a successful book of the same name. Evans returned to his career in freelance photography in April 1985. He is married with four children and resides in Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER



10/17/86

MEMCON



POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA. 501

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, \$300

ZARECHNAK'S
Memcon

~~SECRET~~

AMB. MATLOCK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

Gas 6/25/02

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: October 11, 1986

TIME: 10:40 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

US SIDE

President Reagan
Secretary Shultz (came in at 11:30)
Ambassador Matlock
D. Zarechnak (interpreter)

USSR SIDE

General Secretary Gorbachev
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (came in at 11:30)
Notetaker
N. Upsenskiy (interpreter)

The President invited the General Secretary to have a seat at the table.

Gorbachev thanked the President and noted that both sides had a lot of paper with them. What did this mean?

The President replied that it was to recall the things that the two of them had discussed in Geneva. He continued that he was glad that the General Secretary had proposed this meeting, since it was important to make sure that their next meeting would be a productive one.

Gorbachev replied, in turn, that he and the Soviet leadership very much appreciated the President's agreement to have this meeting.

The President said that he had been looking forward to the meeting. He proposed that the two of them could meet alone, and perhaps also alternate their meetings with meetings that would include the respective Foreign Ministers. Would the General Secretary agree to such an approach?

Gorbachev indicated that he would.

The President asked Gorbachev which questions he felt they should discuss.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/S #8595

BY ai NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~SECRET~~

Gorbachev replied that he wished to begin with a brief exchange of views about the present situation, which had given rise to Gorbachev's proposal to meet with the President before his visit to the US. After that he would tell the President about the proposals which he had brought with him. At that point they might ask Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz to join them.

The President indicated that this was acceptable.

Gorbachev said that he was prepared to talk about everything that the President thought needed to be discussed here.

The President replied that there were a number of things that had been discussed and left open in Geneva, such as INF, the ABM Treaty, space arms and nuclear testing. The US side was especially interested in strategic arms proposals for the US negotiators in Geneva. Both the US and USSR would like to see a world without nuclear missiles. This was a very important issue, and the world was interested in the possibility of achieving this.

Gorbachev replied that since this was the main issue for the meeting, perhaps they could devote this first session to that issue, including the subsequent participation of the Foreign Ministers. Then in the afternoon questions of regional issues, humanitarian issues, bilateral relations, and everything else that was the subject of mutual interest could be discussed.

The President replied that the question of humanitarian issues and human rights needed to be discussed. This was a question different from the other ones in that no formal agreement would be signed on this, but this was a very important issue for the US side. The degree to which the President could work together with the Soviet side depended on US public opinion. This concerned such issues as emigration. This would never be put forward as a demand by the US side. The President was simply trying to say how important this issue was and how it would open up greater possibilities for achieving other aims if steps were taken along these lines. But the US would never take credit for this.

Gorbachev suggested that after a brief exchange about how to structure their meeting they could have a basic exchange of views on what had happened since Geneva and in the world in general and what US and Soviet concerns were at present. Then Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze could be invited to join them, at which time he could present specific arms control proposals involving strategic offensive weapons, medium-range forces, the ABM Treaty, nuclear testing, and all issues of nuclear arms and the arms race.

The President agreed and indicated that the reason for bringing up the other issues was their effect on the issue of arms

~~SECRET~~

45

control. As he had indicated in Geneva, this was not an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. But public opinion was very important in the US. One-eighth of US citizens have relatives and families with ties to the Soviet Union. Just the other day, and the President would return to this later, he had received a message from a US Senator whose mother had emigrated from Russia. Now her son had become an American Senator. Another example of such ties were the President's own ties to Ireland. In general, Americans have a very strong bond to the lands of their heritage. So it is easier for the US to reach agreements with the USSR if public opinion is not aroused by things that happen in the countries where people came from. But the President agreed that the issue of nuclear arms was the most important issue in the world today.

Gorbachev indicated that he wished to give his evaluation and the evaluation of the Soviet leadership concerning the importance of their present meeting in light of the current world situation as the Soviet side sees it.

The President agreed to listen to what Gorbachev had to say.

Gorbachev stressed that much had been said in the world about the decision to meet in Reykjavik. Many contradictory views were being presented. But he was certain that this was an important step which the President and the Soviet leadership had taken. Cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union was continuing and the present meeting bore witness to that. The process was a difficult one and was not going as smoothly as the two countries and their peoples might wish, but it was continuing. This was the main thing which justified this meeting.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev continued that many people in the world viewed the meeting between them as a chance for each of them to promote their personal ambitions, but he totally rejected this notion and considered that they were accountable vis-a-vis their governments and their countries, since too much depended on the two countries, the relationship between them, and contacts between their two leaders.

The President replied that, as he had indicated in Geneva, they had a unique opportunity to possibly decide whether or not there should be war or peace in the world, and he assumed that both sides wanted peace. The question was how to bring this about with confidence and with a decrease in mistrust between the two peoples.

Gorbachev said that this was his second thought as well. Since Geneva the development of the bilateral relationship had not been smooth, and there were occasional flair-ups. The relationship was not an easy one, but it had been improving. But with regard

~~SECRET~~

to the main issue, which was of greatest concern, i.e., the nuclear threat, the Geneva Summit had been intended to give a push to the negotiations on this issue. A great deal has been said about the matter, but that things had come to an impasse. For when there are 50 or 100 different proposals, there is no commonality of approach and no indication of progress. For this reason Gorbachev felt that a meeting was necessary in order to push the two sides along the main directions aimed at achieving agreements which could be signed during Gorbachev's visit to the US.

The President replied that these were the thoughts of the US Delegation as well. After Geneva, the experts of both sides had presented various proposals. The US side had presented a proposal for 50 percent reduction, which was apparently too much for the Soviet side. The US had proposed a limit of 4500 on ballistic missile warheads, and the Soviet side had proposed 6400 to 6800. The US side felt that this number was too high and that with such a high level the world would still be threatened by destruction. The US, however, was ready to conclude an interim agreement, and bearing in mind the goal of total elimination of such weapons, the US would be prepared to agree to a number between those two figures, i.e., 5500.

Gorbachev replied that he wished to make it very clear to the President and the US Government that the Soviet side wished to find such solutions which would take equal account of Soviet and US interests. Any other approach would not be realistic. If the Soviet side only wished to look out for its interests or to strive for superiority in some other way, it felt that this would not stimulate US interest. An agreement could not be built on such a basis. He wanted to clearly say that the Soviet side was in favor of proposals which were aimed at total elimination of nuclear arms, and on the way to this goal there should be equality and equal security for the Soviet Union and the United States. Any other approach would not be acceptable. The Soviet side would count on the President and the US Government to approach the situation in the same way.

The President indicated his agreement and added that one of the most difficult issues of the negotiations was the issue of verification, to make sure that both sides did what they had promised to do. He quoted a Russian proverb: "Doveray no proveryay (trust but verify)." In previous statements, the two sides had spoken optimistically about INF and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The negotiators in Geneva had discussed a cut-back in the number of weapons. And whether the two sides would start there or would start with proposals to decrease strategic weapons, if agreement could be reached on verification which would give confidence about the fact that neither side was doing what it had agreed not to, this could be a very big step, and the world would cheer.

~~SECRET~~

Gorbachev replied that he would like to support what the President had said about the importance of verification. The two sides were now at the stage where they could begin a concrete process aimed at arriving at agreements, and verification had an important part to play in this. The Soviet side was interested in this issue. Without such verification he did not think it would be possible to have agreements leading to greater peace and an improvement of the international situation. The Soviet side was prepared, and he knew that the US was also prepared, to go as far as necessary to have complete confidence in the fact that agreements were being fulfilled.

Gorbachev said that he wished to say one more thing and then Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze could be invited in and he could present the Soviet side's specific proposals. He wished to touch upon their next meeting in the US. Reykjavik was sort of half-way point on the way to that meeting.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev said that someone had stated that Iceland was picked because it was the same distance from Moscow and Washington and that this was done in order to show that the US and USSR were working on the basis of equality in every respect.

The President replied that he had chosen Iceland out of the proposals made by the General Secretary not because he had measured the distances, but because he felt that London was too big and too busy a city and would not lend itself to the type of free discussions which they wished to have. He then asked Gorbachev if he had a date in mind for the U.S. meeting or whether he, the President, ought to propose a date.

Gorbachev replied that, as he had written to the President and as he had stated publicly, the Soviet side felt that the meeting in the US should be marked by concrete results on important issues, primarily those concerning halting the arms race, which were of concern to the US people, the Soviet people and other nations as well. That meeting could not be permitted to fail. This would have very serious consequences. The world would say that these politicians are meeting and talking, which was good, but a great deal of time had been spent and there had been one meeting, two meetings, and three meetings without any forward movement. This would be very bad for the two countries and for the world. So the present meeting should lay a basis for the meeting in the US during which specific agreements could be signed. After there is an exchange of views and the two sides see where they are and how they should work in order to arrive at agreements to be finalized in the US, what instructions are to be given and how much work needs to be done, then the two sides could agree on the date of the meeting.

The President agreed and said that they could go forward and try

~~SECRET~~

to achieve such understandings. He indicated, however, that in talking about the number of missiles, he had failed to mention one important factor, i.e., an agreement on throw-weight. It would not be good if there were agreement only on the number of missiles where one side had considerably more destructive power. As he had indicated before, this would be an element of an interim step on the way to complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev noted that exactly one hour had passed during which they had exchanged views on the basic relationship, and if the President did not object, they might now call in their Foreign Ministers, and he would like to give the US side the Soviet side's proposals on nuclear weapons.

The President agreed.

After a short interval, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze joined the President and the General Secretary.

The President explained to Secretary Shultz that the General Secretary had started by speaking of strategic missiles and had indicated that various figures had been given in Geneva. The proposals which the Soviet side has come with would be aimed at producing results which could then be finalized and signed during the next meeting between the President and the General Secretary in the United States.

Gorbachev said that if the President did not object, he wanted to present the Soviet side's proposals, which would then give a push to the negotiators in Geneva.

The President agreed to listen to Gorbachev's proposals.

Gorbachev indicated that in the basic exchange of opinions on bilateral relations, he had recognized an admission of the mutual ultimate aim of total elimination of nuclear weapons. This stemmed from what had been agreed in Geneva, i.e., that a nuclear war must never be fought. On January 15 the Soviet side had proposed a plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The US side had also made various proposals. Gorbachev wished to confirm that the US side should understand that during the movement towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it was expected that there would be equality and equal security for both sides at all stages of this process. Neither side should attempt to strive to achieve superiority.

Gorbachev said that he wanted to begin with the area of strategic offensive weapons. In Geneva the Soviet side had proposed a reduction of these weapons by 50 percent. Since then, and at present, many different options have been floated in Geneva, but now he wished to say that the Soviet side is interested in

~~SECRET~~

49

radical reductions of strategic offensive arms by 50 percent and no less. In the year's time that had gone by since Geneva the Soviet side had become convinced that it would be possible to expect large reductions in these systems.

Gorbachev continued that, unlike previous Soviet proposals, wherein the 50 percent covered all weapons reaching the territory of the other side, the present one concerns only strategic weapons, without including medium-range missiles or forward-based systems. This takes into account the US viewpoint and is a concession.

Gorbachev continued that since strategic arms formed the basis of the nuclear might of the two sides, it would be especially important to have a good understanding of each other's interests and to have equality. As had been indicated before, historically the composition of the nuclear forces of the two sides has been different. Nevertheless, in reducing these forces by 50 percent, the Soviet side would be prepared to have a considerable reduction of heavy missiles in answer to US concerns. He wished to stress that this would be considerable, and not just cosmetic. However, he would expect the US side to have the same regard for the Soviet side's concerns. One example of this would be the fact that there are now 6500 nuclear warheads on American submarines which are all over the world and which are difficult to monitor. More than 800 of these missiles are MIRVed. The Soviet side knows the great precision of US missiles, both submarine-based and land-based. Therefore, each side would need to meet the concerns of the other one, and not to try to back it into a corner.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to medium-range missiles, a great deal has been said lately between the two countries and in the world. Various predictions are being made even as the two of them sat here together. The Soviet side had analyzed this issue again, taking into consideration the situation in Western Europe, the views of governments there, as well as public opinion, and had decided to take a broad approach on this issue. Solutions ought to be found which would take account of the interests of the two sides, as well as their allies. Therefore, the Soviet side was proposing to have a complete elimination of US and Soviet medium-range nuclear forces in Europe. In doing so, the Soviet side has made the concession not to count English and French nuclear forces. This was a big step, since both quantitatively and qualitatively the possibilities of developing those forces were very great. But a compromise needed to be found, and therefore risks needed to be taken.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to medium-range nuclear forces in Asia, in the spirit of cooperation and in light of the concessions made by the Soviet side, the US should take back its demands about these missiles or give instructions to both sides to negotiate this issue, i.e., nuclear forces in Asia - both

~~SECRET~~

50

Soviet and US.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to missiles of less than 1000 kilometer range, the Soviet side proposed a freeze, coupled with negotiations about this type of weapons.

The President asked if the General Secretary was talking about shorter-range missiles, and the General Secretary confirmed this.

Gorbachev indicated that he thought that the President and the US Administration should appreciate these significant steps which the Soviet side had taken on this very important issue.

Gorbachev continued that the third item was the question of the ABM Treaty and nuclear testing. He thought that in order for both sides to have greater confidence in the ABM Treaty, which was of unlimited duration, it would be important to set a specific period for non-withdrawal from the Treaty in order to strengthen its basis, which would then help to resolve questions of nuclear arms. The Soviet side was proposing a compromise, taking into consideration the US approach, which sets a basic period of non-withdrawal and an additional period for negotiations. The Soviet side was proposing to have a mutually determined period during which there would be complete adherence to the ABM Treaty by both sides. It would be important to get a mutual understanding which permitted research and testing in laboratories, but not outside of laboratories, covering space weapons which could strike objects in space and on earth. He noted that the Soviet side was proposing not to prohibit current systems, permitted today, i.e., stationary land-based systems and their components.

Gorbachev continued that there should be a specific period of non-withdrawal. The US side had made a proposal, and the Soviet side had made a proposal. Now the Soviet side was proposing a compromise, i.e., a sufficiently long period of time, but not less than ten years, followed by a 3-5 year period for negotiations on how to proceed subsequently.

Gorbachev continued that there was another issue connected with the latter, i.e., adherence by both sides to the ABM Treaty would require the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons. It was clear that if both sides did not abide by this prohibition, it would open a channel for development of ABM weapons. The Soviet side was proposing to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement on this score.

Gorbachev continued that he wished to proceed now to the question of nuclear testing. As long as no large steps had been taken to reduce nuclear weapons, including strategic weapons, there might have been doubts on the part of one of the sides about the desirability of a ban on nuclear tests. But in the context of these proposals, there would be a sufficient basis to agree on a

~~SECRET~~

complete cessation of such tests. There have been negotiations on this before. The Soviet side was proposing to the US to renew either bilateral or trilateral negotiations (together with the British) in order to get agreement on a comprehensive test ban. During these negotiations, each side could do what it wished about testing, but the Soviet side felt that during the negotiations, the sides could look at questions of verification, lowering of thresholds, decreasing the number of nuclear explosions, and the 1974 and 1976 treaties. Renewing the CTB negotiations would be a good beginning and would be helpful for quickly arriving at an agreement on strategic missile forces.

Gorbachev concluded that this was the package of Soviet proposals. He wanted to suggest that the two of them give instructions to the appropriate agencies, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of State, to produce a draft agreement for signature in the US. In the context of these proposals, the Soviet side was interested in effective verification and was prepared to implement such verification by any means necessary, including on-site inspection, and would expect the same of the US side. Since these were very serious issues, in order to exclude the possibility of any misinterpretation, he said he now wished to pass these proposals in writing, in English, to the President.

The President replied that the General Secretary's proposals were very encouraging, although there were some differences vis-a-vis the US position. The first one concerned INF. The zero proposal in Europe was acceptable, but the missiles in Asia should also be reduced, because these missiles could be targeted on Europe, and the allies would be left without a deterrent. After consultation with Secretary Shultz, the President said that instead of the zero option, there could be a maximum of 100 warheads on each side. In this case, there would still be a NATO deterrent left. But the main issue was strategic arms. The US side also wants to reduce them to zero. But there is a problem with the question of the ABM provisions. SDI was born as an idea which would give a chance to all of us to completely eliminate strategic weapons. The US side proposed to go forward in reducing the number of strategic weapons and to sign a treaty which would supersede the ABM Treaty.

~~SECRET~~

52

The President continued that the US side believed that the Soviet side was also doing research on defensive systems. The US side was proposing in this new treaty to go forward with development, staying within the ABM limits, and when the point was reached when testing was required beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty, the US would go forward with such testing in the presence of representatives of the other country. So if the US side were first in developing such a system, the Soviet side would observe the test. If testing showed that such a defense system could be practical, then the treaty would call for the US to share this defense system. In return for this, there would be a total elimination of strategic missiles. A two year period could be set for negotiating this elimination of strategic missiles and the sharing of the defense system.

The President continued that the reason for wanting such a system was that the two of them would not be there forever. Perhaps in the future there might be those who would want to cheat or there might be a madman such as Hitler who would want to have such weapons. But if both countries had such a defense system, we would not need to be concerned about what others might do and we could rid the world of strategic nuclear arms. Such a treaty would be signed by both sides and would be binding on both sides for the future as well.

Gorbachev indicated that he wished to briefly reply to what the President had said. First of all, he thought that the President's reply was a preliminary one, since these were new proposals by the Soviet side which had not been put forward before. He asked the President to study them, and they could meet again to have an exchange on this. The things that the President had said now had already been mentioned on the level of the negotiators in Geneva. The Soviet side valued the work which the specialists were doing in Geneva, but at the present talks a push needed to be given to those negotiators, and it was for this reason that the Soviet side had made its proposals.

Gorbachev continued that the Soviet side had proposed to agree to the US zero option with regard to medium-range missiles and was ready to discuss the question of the missiles in Asia. But the President had gone back on his previous proposals, and the Soviet side did not understand this.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side's proposal concerned a very important instrument which needed to be preserved. The US side, on the other hand, wanted to renounce the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to SDI, the Soviet side had sorted this out and was not concerned about the creation of a three-tier ABM system by the US. It would have a reply to such a system. The Soviet side was concerned about something else, i.e., moving the arms race into a new stage and into a new medium, and

~~SECRET~~

creating new weapons which would destabilize the strategic situation in the world. If this was what the US Administration wanted, that was one thing. But if the US Administration wanted greater security for the American people and its allies, then SDI was dangerous.

Gorbachev wished to end his quick reply to what the President had said, but asked the President to carefully examine the new Soviet proposals and to answer them point by point, with indication of where US agreed and where it had problems. This was important for the Soviet side and he thought it was important for the US side as well. He noticed that it seemed to be time to end the meeting.

The President said that he wished to say one thing. The two sides would discuss these things after lunch, and the US side would review the Soviet proposals. But he thought that the Soviet side was refusing to see the point of SDI. If US research showed that there could be such a system, and if the US went forward with such a system in the presence of offensive systems, then it could be accused of striving for a first-strike capability, since it had both protection and offensive arms. But the US would forego this. The treaty he had proposed would prevent the deployment of such a system until there was complete elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time this system would be available to both sides, and would not be deployed until there was a complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The President continued that the General Secretary might ask why, in that case, was there a need for defensive arms at all. And the answer was that the world knows how to make offensive arms, and just as we kept our gas masks after World War I in case there would ever be a temptation to use gas warfare in the future, such a system would be in place in case there was the temptation to secretly build nuclear missiles after the world had gotten rid of them. But this could be discussed further after lunch.

Gorbachev replied that a year had passed since their meeting in Geneva, and the Soviet side had studied the question of SDI very carefully and had sorted it out. He had indicated the Soviet side's view to the President.

Gorbachev asked the President if they should continue to discuss these issues in the afternoon, or go on to other ones.

The President replied that they should go on to other ones.

Draft:DZarechnak:jms

~~SECRET~~