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JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1986 (4/6)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 18

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1808

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8611	MEMCON	FIRST PRIVATE SESSION PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV OCTOBER 11, 1986 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	7	10/11/1986	B1
8612	TALKING POINTS	REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPATORY MEETING PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5; R M11-407 #8612 8/2/2016	5	ND	B1 B3
8617	CABLE	132045Z OCT 86 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/13/1986	B1
8619	CABLE	131635Z OCT 86 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/13/1986	B1
8620	CABLE	132119Z OCT 86 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/13/1986	B1
8613	MEMCON	REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 1986 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	8	ND	B1
8615	MEMO	SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH THATCHER OCTOBER 13, 1986 R 9/2/2011 M08-207 #32146 (DUPE)	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: First Private Session

PARTICIPANTS: The President
General Secretary Gorbachev

DATE, TIME: October 11, 1986
AND PLACE: 10:40 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.,
Hofdi House,
Reykjavik, Iceland

The President opened the meeting by saying that he was pleased that Gorbachev had proposed the meeting, since it was important to make sure that his visit to the United States is as productive as possible.

Gorbachev said that he and the Soviet leadership placed great value on the President's agreeing to the meeting.

The President said he was looking forward to the meeting and suggested that they alternate one-on-one meetings with meetings with their foreign ministers.

Gorbachev agreed.

The President asked which issues they should take up first.

Gorbachev suggested that they have a short exchange of views regarding the situation which produced the Soviet proposal for this meeting, and then he would explain the proposals he brought with him. He suggested that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be invited to join them when he presented the proposal. He then said that he wished to make clear at the beginning that he was prepared to discuss whatever the President considers necessary.

The President agreed to the general procedure suggested and noted that he felt topics such as intermediate-range missiles, the ABM Treaty and defensive space weapons, nuclear testing, and strategic arms reduction were all important. He added that we are particularly interested in strategic arms reduction and noted that both agreed at Geneva to reduce them by 50%. The world is watching in the hope that this will be achieved.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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NLRR F06-114/5 #8611

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

Gorbachev said that this coincides with his view of the issues. Perhaps they could devote this meeting to the problems the President listed, and then, after lunch, discuss regional, humanitarian and bilateral issues.

The President said that although issues such as humanitarian ones, those involving human rights, and regional conflicts may not always be appropriate subjects for formal agreements, progress on them has an important effect on how cooperative he can be in other issues. These are important issues with our public opinion.

Gorbachev reiterated that he would propose a short exchange regarding general principles, and then a presentation of new Soviet proposals when Shultz and Shevardnadze join them.

The President agreed and said that he would be discussing the other matters because of the effect they have on the whole range of issues.

Gorbachev then began his initial presentation, during which he made the following points:

-- Though public comment on their decision to meet here has been mixed, he is convinced that this meeting is a highly responsible step by the President and the Soviet leadership. It is testimony that the dialogue continues. It is not moving as fast as people on both sides would like, but it is moving.

-- Geneva summit set a mechanism of bilateral relations in motion. It is a very complex mechanism, and not everything moves smoothly. There have been some hiccups -- and even a black eye or two has been delivered since Geneva. But the main issue is how to avert the nuclear threat. Much work done at Geneva, but things are virtually at an impasse. 50 or 100 variant proposals have been considered -- and this complicates things. We need to concentrate on one or two options. The purpose of this meeting should be to outline agreements we can conclude when he visits the United States.

The President observed that they had agreed on a 50% reduction of strategic weapons in Geneva. It appears this is more than the Soviets are ready for now. We proposed a warhead limit of 4500, while they proposed a much higher level -- on the order of 6400-6800. This seems too high to us. It would leave the world threatened by these highly destructive weapons. But we might look at the possibility of an interim agreement, with the goal still the complete elimination of ballistic missiles. Perhaps with initial reductions to a level of 5500 warheads.

Gorbachev indicated that he would like to discuss specifics later, after he had presented the Soviet proposals, and continued with his general observations as follows:

-- The Soviet leadership wants to solve the problem of the nuclear arms race. Therefore, it has formulated proposals which take into account the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. This is the only way the problem can be solved, since if proposals are one-sided, it will suggest to the other side that there is an attempt to gain superiority -- and this would undermine the effort to get agreements.

-- In working out a solution to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons, there must be parity and equality at each stage along the way. Anything else is unacceptable.

The President observed that we feel the same way about the stages, but that one of the most difficult subjects is likely to be verification. He said that he was reminded of the Russian proverb "Doveriyai no proveryai" (Trust but verify). [Gorbachev smiled and acknowledged that he knew the proverb.] The President continued that he had discussed this with Gorbachev in their private meeting in Geneva, and he wanted to make clear that whether reductions start in the intermediate-range missile area or in the strategic missile area, they must agree on effective verification. It would be a great step and the world would applaud.

Gorbachev said he supported the President's position on the importance of effective verification. We have now reached the stage where we can commence the process of working out concrete agreements. In working out a treaty, one of the most important subjects is verification. Both sides must be confident of compliance.

As his final general point, Gorbachev said that he and the President were moving forward in their plans for a meeting in the United States; Reykjavik represents a stage half-way up the slope. He noted that some said the location was chosen because it is almost exactly mid-way between Moscow and Washington.

The President noted that he had selected it over London because it seemed more suited to private, serious conversations. He then asked if Gorbachev had a date in mind for his trip to the U.S.

Gorbachev said he was just getting to that. Both have an interest in making sure that there are concrete results from the next meeting. That is, agreements on major issues, affecting ending the arms race. The two of them really cannot risk failure, since it would be a scandal if they continued to meet and failed to reach agreements. Therefore, he felt that when they have exchanged views on the key issues, have compared their

positions, have agreed on instructions to negotiators and estimated the amount of time it will take to complete agreements for signature -- then it should be possible to determine when the meetings in the United States might be held.

The President pointed out that it would not be enough to agree just on missile numbers; throwweight is also important, and must be dealt with. Also it is important to keep in mind that what we are talking about are interim steps, moving toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev suggested that the foreign ministers should be invited to join the meeting.

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze then entered and joined the principals at the table.

Gorbachev then presented the following proposals:

Strategic Arms: Noted agreement to 50% reductions at Geneva. Number of proposals floating about since then. Soviet leadership wants 50% -- not less. Initially, Soviet proposal had been for a 50% reduction of the nuclear potential that can reach each other's territory. But now they are making proposals relating to strategic weapons alone, leaving out intermediate range and forward-based systems. In other words, they have taken the U.S. point of view into account and have been making concessions.

Equality and equal security are necessary, since strategic weapons form the basis of the military strength of both sides. He also noted that historic factors had resulted in different force structures in the two countries.

So, the Soviet Union will agree to 50% reduction, and it is prepared to meet U.S. concerns regarding Soviet heavy missiles by reducing them substantially -- not just to a trivial degree -- but substantially.

But -- they expect the U.S. to understand Soviet concerns regarding U.S. SLBMs. The U.S. has 6500 warheads on its submarines; 800 U.S. launchers are MIRVed. They are aware of the accuracy of U.S. warheads, both SLBMs and ICBMs.

We should meet each other half way and not push the other into a corner.

Medium-Range Missiles

Propose total elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, and will make the following major concession: Soviets will drop the question of British and French nuclear forces. This is a big step on their part since these forces are

sizeable and will be growing in numbers and improving in quality. Therefore, this is a substantial compromise.

Regarding medium-range missiles in Asia, the U.S. should, in a spirit of compromise, withdraw this question, or at least agree to continue negotiations regarding medium-range missiles in Asia while those in Europe are eliminated.

Regarding missiles with a range of less than 1000 km, they propose a freeze and the commencement of negotiations on their reduction.

This is our proposal -- it is a huge compromise on our part.

ABM Treaty

It is important to agree on a period during which both sides obligate themselves not to exercise their right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. We propose a compromise, in which we adopt the U.S. approach of a non-withdrawal commitment and a period of negotiations following it.

We propose that we agree on a period during which both sides would observe the ABM Treaty strictly and in full. What is important here is to get a mutual understanding which permitted research and testing in laboratories, but not outside of laboratories, covering space weapons which can strike objects in space and on earth. This would not, however, affect testing of those systems allowed by the ABM Treaty.

Both sides have made proposals on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. We propose a compromise as follows:

- Non-withdrawal for a period not less than ten years; and
- A period of negotiations of three to five years concerning how to proceed subsequently.

Also, logically, if we are to abide by the ABM Treaty, we should ban ASAT systems, since work on ASAT systems could be a channel for working on ballistic missile defense. Therefore, we propose a mutually acceptable agreement on this question.

Nuclear Testing

They understand that if there is no agreement on strategic arms reduction, there could be doubts on one side about the usefulness of banning nuclear testing. However, within the context of the proposals which he has made, it would be reasonable to agree on a comprehensive test ban.

There have been negotiations on this before, and the Soviets are proposing to renew either bilateral or trilateral negotiations (together with the British) in order to get agreement on a CTB.

While these negotiations proceed, each side can act as it wishes regarding testing, while negotiating on the following points:

- verification
- lowering the threshold
- reducing numbers of tests
- question of the 1974 and 1976 treaties

Beginning these negotiations would help work out an agreement on reducing strategic weapons.

* * * * *

Gorbachev concluded by saying that this is the package of proposals he has brought. He would suggest that they be discussed and that appropriate offices (State and MFA, for example -- or others if we wish) be directed to work out drafts of agreements to be signed during his visit to the United States.

He added that the Soviet Union is interested in effective verification and is prepared to implement verification by any means necessary, including on-site inspection. They expect the same approach on the part of the United States.

He then presented a memorandum to the President containing the Soviet proposals.

The President said that this was encouraging, although some points of difference remain. For example, zero INF in Europe is fine, but there must be reduction of these missiles in Asia. They are mobile and Europe could be targeted from the ones now in Asia. There also could be reductions in Europe to 100 warheads on each side.

Regarding strategic weapons, we would also like to go to zero, but we draw the line regarding the ABM provisions the Soviets have proposed. The point is that SDI should make the elimination of nuclear weapons possible. We are proposing to sign a treaty now which would supercede the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union is also researching defensive weaponry, and both sides would go forward within the limits of the ABM Treaty. If either reached the point that they decided it would be desirable to go beyond the ABM Treaty restrictions, they would conduct testing in the presence of representatives of the other country. For example, if the U.S. were first, Soviet representatives would be invited to witness the testing. Then, if testing should reveal that a system is practical, we would be obligated to share it, and we

would have two years to negotiate a agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles and to share.

The reason for this is that we can't guarantee in the future that someone -- a madman like Hitler, for example -- might not try to build nuclear weapons. Also, treaty now would bind our successors.

Gorbachev said that he hoped that these were preliminary remarks on the President's part. He had made new proposals that these had not been discussed previously. The President needs to give them appropriate attention.

Re INF, Soviets are proposing zero in Europe and negotiations regarding INF systems in Asia. U.S. seems to be moving back from its earlier proposal.

Re the ABM Treaty, Soviets are proposing to preserve and strengthen the treaty. U.S. is proposing to renounce it. We want to preserve it; you want to destroy it. We just don't understand this.

Re SDI, we have thought the matter through thoroughly. We are not worried by the prospect of the three-layered ABM system. We will respond to it, but not in the same way. But if we do so, we will just have the arms race transferred to a new environment. If this is what the U.S. wants, then we can understand why it has made the proposals it has. However, the resulting situation will simply be more dangerous to U.S. Allies -- and to the U.S. public.

So he hopes that the President will give careful thought to the new Soviet proposals. He and the Soviet leadership will appreciate the President's reaction point by point. It is important for us, and for the U.S., to know just what you can accept and what you cannot accept -- and why.

The President said that he would look at the proposal, but that Gorbachev was refusing to see one thing: If SDI research is successful, it would make possible the elimination of nuclear weapons. We are accused to wanting a first-strike capability, but we are proposing a treaty which would require the elimination of ballistic missiles before SDI is deployed, therefore a first strike would be impossible.

Gorbachev said that they had spoken of this in Geneva and that the Soviets had thought through it for a year now, and know their attitude very well. However, he is willing to continue the discussion of the subject later if the President wishes.

The meeting ended at 12:30 P.M.

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REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING

First Session

October 12, 1986, 10:30-12:30 A.M.

Setting and Goals

Since Gorbachev hosted your last meeting, you will be the "host" at this meeting. Following the photo op, you will probably wish to engage Gorbachev in a private conversation long enough to make your initial points and for him to make his -- perhaps an hour -- after which you might wish for Secretary Shultz and Shevardnadze to join you for a more detailed discussion of the initial points.

Your goals in this first meeting should be: (1) to indicate to Gorbachev that you are serious about planning a successful visit to the United States for him; (2) to make clear that a "successful meeting" will require more than an agreement or two on approaches to arms control; (3) to cover a couple of the more delicate of these issues; (4) to stress that, so far as arms control is concerned, strategic arms reduction remains our first priority -- and should be his; and (5) to get across the idea (indirectly) that you really do not need the meeting just for its own sake and will not pay a price just to get it.

Talking Points: Private Meeting

-- Glad you proposed meeting. Important to make sure your visit to the U.S. is as productive as possible.

-- Note he seems to feel U.S. has been dragging feet since Geneva. Not the case -- actually we have the same feeling re USSR. Important thing here, however, is to look ahead, and to find practical solutions to problems.

-- Suggest that you alternate private sessions and sessions with foreign ministers (or with other advisers if seems appropriate).

-- Ask what he thinks. (He presumably will agree.)

-- Ask which issues he feels you should concentrate on. (He will presumably name INF, Space Arms (ABM Treaty), and nuclear testing.)

-- These are very important issues, and we certainly need to discuss them in detail. However, there are others that are equally crucial to a successful meeting.

-- Some may not be suited to formal agreements -- actions on these are more important than words.

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NLRR M11-407 #8612

BY RW NARA DATE 8/2/16

-- For example, unless there is a substantial improvement on issues such as family reunification and emigration, your visit cannot be as successful as we both want it to be.

-- An example in another area is Afghanistan. Realistic movement toward Soviet withdrawal would make all the other issues much easier.

-- And, of course, if you don't scale back on your military involvement in Nicaragua and distance yourself from that crazy man Qadaffi, some incident to make our meeting very difficult.

-- Now, when it comes to arms control, it is no secret that our highest priority is reducing the level of strategic nuclear weapons. We both agreed at Geneva that we should aim for a 50% reduction, but you seem to be backing away -- and always finding other issues to distract us.

-- Is there anything you can tell me now about your approach to these issues in general?

-- Suggest we look at the issues outside the arms control area this morning, and move on to arms control this afternoon.

-- I must be frank and say that progress in these other areas is going to have some effect on how far we can go on the arms control issues.

[Continue exchange on the issues raised as long as Gorbachev wishes, then suggest that the Foreign Ministers join you.]

Talking Points: Meeting with Foreign Ministers

Human Rights

[Insert Here]

Regional Issues

[Insert Here]

HUMAN RIGHTS

- The last several months have shown that we can make progress in narrowing our differences and resolving some contentious problems. The record in the human rights area, however, has been deeply disappointing.
- Americans care about this issue at a very profound level. The strong American reaction to Danilooff should tell you something about the importance we attach to individual rights and the lengths we are prepared to go to when individual rights are violated.
- The Danilooff affair seriously damaged our relations. I am concerned that if there is not early and substantial improvement in human rights, particularly emigration, reunification of divided families, and better treatment of prominent human rights activists such as Sakharov, we could be moving toward the same result.
- In Geneva, you made a commitment to resolve humanitarian cases in a spirit of cooperation and consistent with Soviet law. Resolution of a large number of our divided family cases this year reflects that spirit, and we welcomed it, and other steps.
- But this represents a small fraction of the problem: it is important to resolve the remainder of these American divided family cases now, especially separated husbands and wives.
- Emigration is today at a 20 year low, and Soviet Jewish activists subjected to increased persecution. There is growing domestic political pressure to do something about it. American Jewish groups with whose leaders I met just before coming to Reykjavik, and many members of Congress have been asking us how we can sign agreements with the Soviets on cultural and scientific cooperation while this situation continues. Major demonstrations and other political actions are being discussed.
- On the positive side, if Jewish emigration rises to levels of 1978-79 -- and is sustained -- progress in overcoming Jackson-Vanik Amendment trade/credit limitations could be achieved. Prompt resolution of several hundred "long-term" refusenik cases would remove a major irritant.
- Improved treatment of prominent human rights activists such as Sakharov and others would also go a long way toward improving atmosphere.
- We noted and welcomed new willingness on part of Soviet Union to consider human rights legitimate topic of discussion.
- I have spent much time on this issue because you should realize how important it is to the political context of our relationship. I urge you to act now. The sooner we can resolve these issues, the easier it will be for us to move ahead in an improved atmosphere.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

REGIONAL ISSUES

-- Small prospect of specific agreements; Shultz and Shevardnadze can go over some narrow issues (Iran-Iraq, Korean Olympics, etc.)

-- For us, important to clarify, reiterate messages that may not have gotten across at Geneva or since. Focus on a few conflicts: Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Libya.

Afghanistan:

-- The most important case. You've called "bleeding wound" but long timetables, tiny (maybe phony) withdrawals won't end war.

-- Key is short timetable plus self-determination. I told this to resistance delegation that visited me.

-- We have no need or desire to exploit Soviet decision to get out (e.g., no bases). Neutral Afghanistan can protect both sides' interests.

-- Until then, freedom fighters will have all support they need.

Nicaragua:

-- Two crucial points: 1) we won't accept Soviet beachhead in Central America, 2) real democracy taking root in the region.

-- These mean our policy has support both of Central American governments and of American people and Congress.

-- Extending your involvement (and especially upgrading military presence or equipment) will bring you no gain.

Libya:

-- Clear that Qadhafi has launched a war against us. That's why we acted in April.

-- He continues to act. We'll keep responding.

-- Since you don't seem able to restrain, your support only exposes you to risk.

Middle East (If raised by MSG):

-- Some promising trends. Israel-Morocco, Israel-Egypt summits show moderates moving forward with peace process.

-- We don't rule out international conference, but very skeptical: might deepen paralysis, delay essential direct talks.

-- We watch your deeds for constructive signs: keys are relations with Israel, increased Jewish emigration, distance from "rejectionists" (Syria, Libya, other radicals).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SOVIET MISUSE OF UNITED NATIONS
(For Private Session)

-- There is one matter which has rarely been discussed between our governments, but which is very important. Since we are pledged to candor, I want you to know how I feel.

-- For decades the Soviet Union has assigned large numbers of intelligence officers to the United Nations.

-- Soviet practice has created problems in past, and has potential for major problems in future.

-- Soviet practice is not consistent with dealing as equals, or dealing on the basis of parity or reciprocity. (There are no international organizations in USSR and, anyway, U.S. does not use them for intelligence operations.)

-- Recent events have shown how Soviet intelligence operations under cover of UN can blow up into major confrontation.

-- In addition to using UN for cover, Soviet Union stations many more people in U.S. than U.S. does in USSR. A much larger proportion of Soviet officials are connected with intelligence operations than is the case with U.S. officials in USSR.

-- This situation and recent events have caused me to draw two conclusions:

a. The U.S. can no longer tolerate the Soviet practice of assigning intelligence officers to the UN or its missions attached to the UN.

b. Under no circumstances will the U.S. tolerate retaliation against its installations in the Soviet Union or against private American citizens when Soviet intelligence officials attached to international organizations break our laws.

c. If such retaliation occurs, I will have to take steps to see that there is real numerical parity in our respective bilateral representation.

-- You must see to it that, over the coming months, remaining Soviet intelligence officials are withdrawn from the UN and from your missions accredited to it.

-- I have no desire to make this a public issue, but have nothing to lose if it should come to public attention. Would be best for all concerned if you quietly took the necessary steps.

-- In final analysis, I will be watching this situation for signs as to whether the Soviet Union is really prepared to deal with the U.S. as an equal, and on the basis of parity and reciprocity.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11A

NOTE: THIS TOPIC IS PROBABLY BEST LEFT
FOR A PRIVATE SESSION THE SECOND DAY.

JFM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NOTE:-

This topic is probably
best left for a private
session the second
day -

JFM

12

SOVIET MISUSE OF UNITED NATIONS
(For Private Session)

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-- Soviet practice is not consistent with dealing as equals, or dealing on the basis of parity or reciprocity. (There are no international organizations in USSR and, anyway, U.S. does not use them for intelligence operations.)

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[REDACTED]

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13
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 6, 1986

TO: Peter W. Rodman
William A. Cockell
Robert E. Linhard
Stephen R. Sestanovich

FROM: Jack A. Matlock

SUBJECT: Draft Talking Points:
Non-Arms Control

Appreciate your comments on this draft.

(I plan to send copy to Armacost if you
see no objection.)

NDDIS
SECTO 19021
SMUN Expulsions

WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESERVATION COPY

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PAGE 01 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0010 DTG: 132045Z OCT 86 PSN: 026651
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~~SECRET~~ SECTO 19021

NODIS

FOR ADM. POINDEXTER FROM SEC. SHULTZ

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: SMUN EXPULSIONS

1. ~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE - ENTIRE TEXT
2. JOSEPH VERNER REED TODAY INFORMED THE SOVIETS IN NEW YORK THAT THE REMAINING 11 MISSION EMPLOYEES ON OUR SEPTEMBER 17 LIST MUST LEAVE BY TOMORROW.
3. I UNDERSTAND THE SOVIETS HAVE SINCE INFORMED USUN THAT THEY WILL COMPLY. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, ASKED THAT THEY BE ALLOWED TO

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0010 DTG: 132045Z OCT 86 PSN: 026651

LEAVE ON THE REGULARLY SCHEDULED AEROFLOT FLIGHT OCTOBER 19.

4. THEY WILL NEED A PROMPT REPLY FROM US SO THAT IF IT IS NO, THEY CAN GET ON OTHER CARRIERS. I BELIEVE THIS IS A REASONABLE REQUEST. IF YOU AGREE, I WILL HAVE NICK PLATT CALL REED TO TELL HIM HE CAN AGREE TO THE SOVIET REQUEST. I WOULD PLAN TO BRIEF UP FRONT TOMORROW ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO LEAVE. THAT, AND THE EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE PROCEEDING TOGETHER TO CONSTRUCTIVELY ADDRESS EVEN THE TOUGHEST OF BILATERAL PROBLEM, CAN BE A POSITIVE STORY.

SHULTZ

BT

~~SECRET~~

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NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC, NATO
SUBJECT: NATO PRESS STATEMENT ON NAC MEETING WITH
SECRETARY SHULTZ

1. THE NATO PRESS SERVICE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING
OCTOBER 13:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE SECRETARY GENERAL COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS AT THE END OF
THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AT WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ
BRIEFED COLLEAGUES ON THE MEETING IN REYKJAVIK:

WE EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR
HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE OUTSTANDING RESULTS AT REYKJAVIK
AND TO SECRETARY SHULTZ FOR HIS DETAILED BRIEFING ON THE
MEETING IN REYKJAVIK. WE AGREED THAT POSSIBILITIES FOR
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAD EMERGED IN A NUMBER OF AREAS,
AND UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING THESE UP
ENERGETICALLY IN THE APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATING FORA.

WE ALSO FELT THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN
SOME AREAS SHOULD NOT BE MADE HOSTAGE TO DIFFICULTIES IN
OTHER, UNRELATED ONES. ALLIED COUNTRIES HAD TABLED
CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS IN ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT CURRENTLY IN TRAIN, AND WE
EMPHASIZED OUR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR
FAIR AND BALANCED AGREEMENTS RESPECTING THE LEGITIMATE
SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

WE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE US NEGOTIATORS WILL
RETURN TO GENEVA WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO BUILD UPON THE
PROGRESS MADE IN REYKJAVIK; WE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE
OF MAKING PROGRESS ALSO IN CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL
DISARMAMENT; AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP
MEETING IN VIENNA AS AN OPPORTUNITY BOTH TO MEASURE
TO HAVE PROGRESS OVER THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF EUROPEAN
RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE ALL IMPORTANT HUMAN DIMENSION.

3. END TEXT.

ABSHIRE

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SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0008 DTG: 131635Z OCT 86 PSN: 026438
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BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: MEETING WITH ALLIES

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ALLIES

3. I WANT TO GIVE YOU A QUICK REPORT ON MY MEETING TODAY IN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0008 DTG: 131635Z OCT 86 PSN: 026438

BRUSSELS WITH ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE ALLIED REACTION TO MY DETAILED ACCOUNT OF YOUR TALKS WITH GORBACHEV WAS CLEARCUT AND UNANIMOUS. THEY WERE IMPRESSED -- EVEN ASTONISHED -- BY THE TRULY SWEEPING NATURE OF THE PROPOSALS BROUGHT FORTH IN REYKJAVIK. ALTHOUGH SHARING OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO BRING THESE POTENTIAL AGREEMENTS TO CLOSURE, THE ALLIES WELCOMED THE REYKJAVIK MEETING AS A SUCCESS AND A MAJOR MILESTONE IN YOUR EFFORTS TO PUT U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS ON A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND STABLE LONG-TERM BASIS.

4. TO A MAN, THE ALLIES ALL SUPPORTED YOUR DECISION TO GO TO REYKJAVIK. IN FACT, THEY ASSERTED IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP NOT TO GO AND TRY TO MOVE THESE DECISIVE ISSUES FORWARD. THEY ALSO STRESSED IT WOULD BE A FAILURE NOT TO CONTINUE ON FROM HERE. IT WAS IMPORTANT, THEY STRESSED, FOR THE ALLIANCE TO BE UNIFIED AND PRESSING FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE FULL EAST - WEST AGENDA. THEY ESPECIALLY WELCOMED THE RETURN OF OUR NEGOTIATORS TO GENEVA TO BUILD ON THE FAR-REACHING PROGRESS ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK. THEY ALSO STRESSED THAT ANOTHER PRESSING CHALLENGE BEFORE US WAS TO DEVELOP A SOLID, ALLIANCE-WIDE FRAMEWORK FOR PURSUING THE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE.

SHULTZ##
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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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BY CLL NARA DATE 11/29/07

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~~SECRET~~ SECTO 19022

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: YOUR SPEECH TONIGHT

REF: STATE 321595

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SEC SHULTZ

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED HERE ON THE AIRCRAFT ON ROUTE ANDREWS
THE SPEECH TEXT WHICH THEY SAY WAS SENT TO YOU AT THREE P.M. TODAY.
I FEEL THAT THE TONE IS TOO DEFENSIVE AND APOLOGETIC AND GOES INTO
TOO MUCH DETAIL FOR THE AVERAGE LISTENER. I HOPE YOU WILL LOOK
AT THE MEMORANDUM I SENT YOU EARLIER THIS MORNING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0012 DTG: 132119Z OCT 86 PSN: 026675

IT CONVEYS SOME OF THE SENSE OF MY CONVICTION, ESPECIALLY AFTER MY SESSION WITH OUR ALLIES IN BRUSSELS TODAY, THAT IN FACT YOU HAVE AN ASTONISHING SUCCESS ON YOUR HANDS. WE NEED TO CONVEY THIS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS AND TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY TO CONSOLIDATE WHAT YOU ACHIEVED IN ICELAND. I HAVE ASKED TO SEE YOU TOMORROW TO GO OVER THESE NEXT STEPS WITH YOU.

SHULTZ

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 14, 1986

TO: Rod McDaniel

SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev Meetings
in Reykjavik

This is my initial draft, which was done very hurriedly. Before it goes in the archives, I will need to check against the interpreter's notes and also add some of the chit-chat.

Jack Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN REYKJAVIK
October, 1986

First Meeting

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 # 8613

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

DATE: October 11, 1986
TIME: 10:40 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.
PLACE: Hofdi House
Reykjavik, Iceland

PARTICIPANTS:

United States

President Ronald Reagan
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Notetaker

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Nikolay Uspensky, Interpreter
Notetaker

* * * * *

The President opened the meeting by saying that he was pleased that Gorbachev had proposed the meeting, since it was important to make sure that his visit to the United States is as productive as possible.

Gorbachev said that he and the Soviet leadership placed great value on the President's agreeing to the meeting.

The President said he was looking forward to the meeting and suggested that they alternate one-on-one meetings with meetings with their foreign ministers.

Gorbachev agreed.

The President asked which issues they should take up first.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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Gorbachev suggested that they have a short exchange of views regarding the situation which produced the Soviet proposal for this meeting, and then he would explain the proposals he brought with him. He suggested that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be invited to join them when he presented the proposal. He then said that he wished to make clear at the beginning that he was prepared to discuss whatever the President considers necessary.

The President agreed to the general procedure suggested and noted that he felt topics such as intermediate-range missiles, the ABM Treaty and defensive space weapons, nuclear testing, and strategic arms reduction were all important. He added that we are particularly interested in strategic arms reduction and noted that both agreed at Geneva to reduce them by 50%. The world is watching in the hope that this will be achieved.

Gorbachev said that this coincides with his view of the issues. Perhaps they could devote this meeting to the problems the President listed, and then, after lunch, discuss regional, humanitarian and bilateral issues.

The President said that although issues such as humanitarian ones, those involving human rights, and regional conflicts may not always be appropriate subjects for formal agreements, progress on them has an important effect on how cooperative he can be in other issues. These are important issues with our public opinion.

Gorbachev reiterated that he would propose a short exchange regarding general principles, and then a presentation of new Soviet proposals when Shultz and Shevardnadze join them.

The President agreed and said that he would be discussing the other matters because of the effect they have on the whole range of issues.

Gorbachev then began his initial presentation, during which he made the following points:

-- Though public comment on their decision to meet here has been mixed, he is convinced that this meeting is a highly responsible step by the President and the Soviet leadership. It is testimony that the dialogue continues. It is not moving as fast as people on both sides would like, but it is moving.

-- Geneva summit set a mechanism of bilateral relations in motion. It is a very complex mechanism, and not everything moves smoothly. There have been some hiccups -- and even a black eye or two has been delivered since Geneva. But the main issue is how to avert the nuclear threat. Much work done at Geneva, but things are virtually at an impasse. 50 or 100 variant proposals

have been considered -- and this complicates things. We need to concentrate on one or two options. The purpose of this meeting should be to outline agreements we can conclude when he visits the United States.

The President observed that they had agreed on a 50% reduction of strategic weapons in Geneva. It appears this is more than the Soviets are ready for now. We proposed a warhead limit of 4500, while they proposed a much higher level -- on the order of 6400-6800. This seems too high to us. It would leave the world threatened by these highly destructive weapons. But we might look at the possibility of an interim agreement, with the goal still the complete elimination of ballistic missiles. Perhaps with initial reductions to a level of 5500 warheads.

Gorbachev indicated that he would like to discuss specifics later, after he had presented the Soviet proposals, and continued with his general observations as follows:

-- The Soviet leadership wants to solve the problem of the nuclear arms race. Therefore, it has formulated proposals which take into account the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. This is the only way the problem can be solved, since if proposals are one-sided, it will suggest to the other side that there is an attempt to gain superiority -- and this would undermine the effort to get agreements.

-- In working out a solution to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons, there must be parity and equality at each stage along the way. Anything else is unacceptable.

The President observed that we feel the same way about the stages, but that one of the most difficult subjects is likely to be verification. He said that he was reminded of the Russian proverb "Doveryai no proveryai" (Trust but verify). [Gorbachev smiled and acknowledged that he knew the proverb.] The President continued that he had discussed this with Gorbachev in their private meeting in Geneva, and he wanted to make clear that whether reductions start in the intermediate-range missile area or in the strategic missile area, they must agree on effective verification. It would be a great step and the world would applaud.

Gorbachev said he supported the President's position on the importance of effective verification. We have now reached the stage where we can commence the process of working out concrete agreements. In working out a treaty, one of the most important subjects is verification. Both sides must be confident of compliance.

As his final general point, Gorbachev said that he and the President were moving forward in their plans for a meeting in the

United States; Reykjavik represents a stage half-way up the slope. He noted that some said the location was chosen because it is almost exactly mid-way between Moscow and Washington.

The President noted that he had selected it over London because it seemed more suited to private, serious conversations. He then asked if Gorbachev had a date in mind for his trip to the U.S.

Gorbachev said he was just getting to that. Both have an interest in making sure that there are concrete results from the next meeting. That is, agreements on major issues, affecting ending the arms race. The two of them really cannot risk failure, since it would be a scandal if they continued to meet and failed to reach agreements. Therefore, he felt that when they have exchanged views on the key issues, have compared their positions, have agreed on instructions to negotiators and estimated the amount of time it will take to complete agreements for signature -- then it should be possible to determine when the meetings in the United States might be held.

The President pointed out that it would not be enough to agree just on missile numbers; throwweight is also important, and must be dealt with. Also it is important to keep in mind that what we are talking about are interim steps, moving toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev suggested that the foreign ministers should be invited to join the meeting.

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze then entered and joined the principals at the table.

Gorbachev then presented the following proposals:

Strategic Arms: Noted agreement to 50% reductions at Geneva. Number of proposals floating about since then. Soviet leadership wants 50% -- not less. Initially, Soviet proposal had been for a 50% reduction of the nuclear potential that can reach each other's territory. But now they are making proposals relating to strategic weapons alone, leaving out intermediate range and forward-based systems. In other words, they have taken the U.S. point of view into account and have been making concessions.

Equality and equal security are necessary, since strategic weapons form the basis of the military strength of both sides. He also noted that historic factors had resulted in different force structures in the two countries.

So, the Soviet Union will agree to 50% reduction, and it is prepared to meet U.S. concerns regarding Soviet heavy missiles by reducing them substantially -- not just to a trivial degree -- but substantially.

But -- they expect the U.S. to understand Soviet concerns regarding U.S. SLBMs. The U.S. has 6500 warheads on its submarines; 800 U.S. launchers are MIRVed. They are aware of the accuracy of U.S. warheads, both SLBMs and ICBMs.

We should meet each other half way and not push the other into a corner.

Medium-Range Missiles

Propose total elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, and will make the following major concession: Soviets will drop the question of British and French nuclear forces. This is a big step on their part since these forces are sizeable and will be growing in numbers and improving in quality. Therefore, this is a substantial compromise.

Regarding medium-range missiles in Asia, the U.S. should, in a spirit of compromise, withdraw this question, or at least agree to continue negotiations regarding medium-range missiles in Asia while those in Europe are eliminated.

Regarding missiles with a range of less than 1000 km, they propose a freeze and the commencement of negotiations on their reduction.

This is our proposal -- it is a huge compromise on our part.

ABM Treaty

It is important to agree on a period during which both sides obligate themselves not to exercise their right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. We propose a compromise, in which we adopt the U.S. approach of a non-withdrawal commitment and a period of negotiations following it.

We propose that we agree on a period during which both sides would observe the ABM Treaty strictly and in full. What is important here is to get a mutual understanding which permitted research and testing in laboratories, but not outside of laboratories, covering space weapons which can strike objects in space and on earth. This would not, however, affect testing of those systems allowed by the ABM Treaty.

Both sides have made proposals on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. We propose a compromise as follows:

- Non-withdrawal for a period not less than ten years; and
- A period of negotiations of three to five years concerning how to proceed subsequently.

Also, logically, if we are to abide by the ABM Treaty, we should ban ASAT systems, since work on ASAT systems could be a channel for working on ballistic missile defense. Therefore, we propose a mutually acceptable agreement on this question.

Nuclear Testing

They understand that if there is no agreement on strategic arms reduction, there could be doubts on one side about the usefulness of banning nuclear testing. However, within the context of the proposals which he has made, it would be reasonable to agree on a comprehensive test ban.

There have been negotiations on this before, and the Soviets are proposing to renew either bilateral or trilateral negotiations (together with the British) in order to get agreement on a CTB.

While these negotiations proceed, each side can act as it wishes regarding testing, while negotiating on the following points:

- verification
- lowering the threshold
- reducing numbers of tests
- question of the 1974 and 1976 treaties

Beginning these negotiations would help work out an agreement on reducing strategic weapons.

* * * * *

Gorbachev concluded by saying that this is the package of proposals he has brought. He would suggest that they be discussed and that appropriate offices (State and MFA, for example -- or others if we wish) be directed to work out drafts of agreements to be signed during his visit to the United States.

He added that the Soviet Union is interested in effective verification and is prepared to implement verification by any means necessary, including on-site inspection. They expect the same approach on the part of the United States.

He then presented a memorandum to the President containing the Soviet proposals.

The President said that this was encouraging, although some points of difference remain. For example, zero INF in Europe is fine, but there must be reduction of these missiles in Asia. They are mobile and Europe could be targeted from the ones now in Asia. There also could be reductions in Europe to 100 warheads on each side.

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Regarding strategic weapons, we would also like to go to zero, but we draw the line regarding the ABM provisions the Soviets have proposed. The point is that SDI should make the elimination of nuclear weapons possible. We are proposing to sign a treaty now which would supercede the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union is also researching defensive weaponry, and both sides would go forward within the limits of the ABM Treaty. If either reached the point that they decided it would be desirable to go beyond the ABM Treaty restrictions, they would conduct testing in the presence of representatives of the other country. For example, if the U.S. were first, Soviet representatives would be invited to witness the testing. Then, if testing should reveal that a system is practical, we would be obligated to share it, and we would have two years to negotiate a agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles and to share.

The reason for this is that we can't guarantee in the future that someone -- a madman like Hitler, for example -- might not try to build nuclear weapons. Also, treaty now would bind our successors.

Gorbachev said that he hoped that these were preliminary remarks on the President's part. He had made new proposals that these had not been discussed previously. The President needs to give them appropriate attention.

Re INF, Soviets are proposing zero in Europe and negotiations regarding INF systems in Asia. U.S. seems to be moving back from its earlier proposal.

Re the ABM Treaty, Soviets are proposing to preserve and strengthen the treaty. U.S. is proposing to renounce it. We want to preserve it; you want to destroy it. We just don't understand this.

Re SDI, we have thought the matter through thoroughly. We are not worried by the prospect of the three-layered ABM system. We will respond to it, but not in the same way. But if we do so, we will just have the arms race transferred to a new environment. If this is what the U.S. wants, then we can understand why it has made the proposals it has. However, the resulting situation will simply be more dangerous to U.S. Allies -- and to the U.S. public.

So he hopes that the President will give careful thought to the new Soviet proposals. He and the Soviet leadership will appreciate the President's reaction point by point. It is important for us, and for the U.S., to know just what you can accept and what you cannot accept -- and why.

The President said that he would look at the proposal, but that Gorbachev was refusing to see one thing: If SDI research is

successful, it would make possible the elimination of nuclear weapons. We are accused to wanting a first-strike capability, but we are proposing a treaty which would require the elimination of ballistic missiles before SDI is deployed, therefore a first strike would be impossible.

Gorbachev said that they had spoken of this in Geneva and that the Soviets had thought through it for a year now, and know their attitude very well. However, he is willing to continue the discussion of the subject later if the President wishes.

The meeting ended at 12:30 P.M.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Matlock
Carson
File

UNCLASSIFIED W/
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

ACTION

October 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Pete*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
the President and Prime Minister Thatcher

Attached at Tab I is a summary of the President's October 13
telephone conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review of the Memorandum of Conversation, that we
put it in the NSC permanent files.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

cc: Jack Matlock
Bob Linhard

UNCLASSIFIED W/
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7413

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Telephone Conversation with
Prime Minister Thatcher (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Peter R. Sommer, Notetaker

Prime Minister Thatcher

DATE, TIME October 13, 1986
AND PLACE: 1:20 p.m. - 1:35 p.m.
The White House

In opening, Mrs. Thatcher told the President that he had done wonderfully at Reykjavik. Her main concern, said the Prime Minister, is for the President to make clear publicly that the fault for the stalemate lies with Gorbachev. Gorbachev's aim of stopping the President from going forward with SDI is simply unrealistic and harmful. (C)

The President replied that he was pleased with the opportunity to provide Mrs. Thatcher a personal readout of his meetings with Gorbachev in Reykjavik. We had intensive discussions in Iceland and reached agreements in a number of areas. But, in the end, these agreements floundered over Soviet insistence on killing SDI, even though they themselves are deeply engaged in similar research. We also discussed regional issues and human rights, but the main focus was on arms control. The President added that he did not plan on giving up; he would continue to pursue agreements. (C)

The President said he wanted to assure Mrs. Thatcher that British and French systems had not been the roadblock; indeed they had not been under discussion. The general tone of the talks was serious, but there was a great deal of haggling that went on all day long and into the night. Finally it became clear that the stumbling block was SDI. The Soviets wanted to restrict research to that which could be done in the laboratory. There were no takers on our side, said the President. Gorbachev was obsessed by the ABM treaty. The President quipped that Gorbachev worships ABM as if it were the Ten Commandments. (C)

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Continuing, the President said he told Gorbachev that he did not attach the same significance to the ABM treaty. To him, it represented two governments telling their peoples that they would not do everything possible to defend them. The President added that he also told Gorbachev that the Krasnoyarsk radar violated the ABM treaty. Gorbachev had not objected to his characterization, said the President. (C)

The President said he wanted Mrs. Thatcher to know that it looked like we had the framework for an INF agreement. The Soviets had agreed to eliminate INF missiles in Europe and to a global ceiling of 100 warheads. He underlined that there would be a global ceiling on INF missiles. (C)

Returning to the atmosphere in Reykjavik, the President said that after intensive discussions on Saturday, the two sides agreed to continue the negotiations into the evening via expert talks. There were two teams: one to address nuclear arms; the other to address regional, human rights, and bilateral issues. By Sunday morning, we had an agreement on a single sheet of paper on a wide range of issues. Of particular importance, said the President, was the agreement to abolish all nuclear missiles over a ten-year period. At the end of the first five-year period there would have been a fifty percent reduction in every kind of nuclear weapon, not just ballistic missiles. During the second five-year period, we would have eliminated the other fifty percent. (C)

The President continued that in return for this agreement on eliminating nuclear missiles, the U.S. would have committed itself to continue to confine its SDI research to that allowed by the ABM treaty. Recalling that there is a dispute over a strict versus a broad interpretation of the ABM treaty, the President reiterated that the US was willing to limit research over a ten-year period to that permitted by the ABM treaty. That is, said the President, we would not deploy SDI during this period, in return for the total elimination of all nuclear devices. (C)

The President observed that he had emphasized to Gorbachev throughout the discussions that the U.S. would be willing to share the results of our SDI research with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev had expressed doubts about our willingness. The President had insisted that he was willing to sign a binding treaty now to share SDI with the Soviets. But Gorbachev remained unconvinced. (C)

The President said that at the end of the talks we were hung up on one word: "laboratory." The Soviets wanted to renegotiate the ABM treaty to limit SDI research to that which takes place in a laboratory. Of course, he could not agree to this restriction.

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He had tried to use all his persuasive powers to convince Gorbachev to drop his insistence on this one word. Gorbachev would not budge, commented the President. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher thanked the President for his detailed comments on the talks. She said Gorbachev clearly was trying to divide Europe from America. She opined that if Gorbachev had said before Reykjavik that progress in other areas was linked to abandonment of SDI, the President would not have gone to Iceland. In hindsight, Reykjavik looks like a Soviet setup. Gorbachev had tried to set strict pre-conditions about SDI before Geneva. And the positions he pushed in Reykjavik appear to be a step backward, even from what he proposed in Geneva. Gorbachev had left Geneva with nothing to take home. In Reykjavik, he was trying to recoup lost ground. But in doing so, Gorbachev was actually proposing less than he had agreed to in Geneva. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher emphasized that the Soviet offer to eliminate all nuclear missiles in return for a 10-year agreement to restrict SDI research to the laboratory is extremely dangerous. The West has relied on nuclear deterrence for many years. The elimination of all nuclear weapons would strike at the heart of our deterrence strategy. The Soviets clearly have conventional superiority. Doing away with nuclear weapons would leave the Soviets with the upper hand. The President replied that we do not believe the conventional situation is so imbalanced. Furthermore, what the Soviets do not want is a war, he opined. We would, however, have to increase our conventional efforts. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher repeated that Reykjavik looked like a Soviet setup. She was sure the President would not have gone if Gorbachev had indicated beforehand that all progress was linked to an agreement to kill SDI. Be sure, she underscored, to put the blame for the stalemate on Gorbachev. He had reverted to pre-Geneva positions. The President observed that he would be addressing the American people on TV early this evening. He had previously pledged to them that he would not give up SDI, and he had no intention of doing so. (C)

Reiterating that our policy of deterrence rests on nuclear weapons, Mrs. Thatcher said we had to be careful in advocating the elimination of all such weapons. Giving up nuclear weapons is the sort of thing that Neil Kinnock advocates. This would be tantamount to surrender, so we must be very, very careful. The United Kingdom, said Mrs. Thatcher, has no intention of giving up its independent nuclear deterrent. Winston Churchill had long ago declared that an independent nuclear deterrent was the only way for smaller countries, like Great Britain, to equalize the strength and power of bigger countries. Some British missiles would always get through. Thus, the Soviets did not have a free hand regarding the UK. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

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Mrs. Thatcher reemphasized that Reykjavik looked like a setup. The Soviets were looking for propaganda gains to separate Europe from the U.S. Please be sure, repeated the Prime Minister, to assign fault for the breakdown to Gorbachev. You should also make clear that, if the Soviets walk away from further discussions, they have no one to blame but themselves. (C)

The Prime Minister continued that she was confident the President had looked out for Western interests. You did a magnificent job, said Mrs. Thatcher. We remain concerned, however, that if we give up all our nuclear weapons the Soviets -- with their conventional superiority -- could just sweep across Europe. The President commented that he was sure we could develop a strategy to defeat the Soviets. Afghanistan has blunted their image of invincibility. (C)

Saying if it was convenient, she hoped to come over and meet with the President on November 15. The President replied that he was aware of her suggestion to meet and wanted to do it. He continued that he had his people working on setting up a mutually convenient time. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher again expressed her gratitude for what she called a job well-done in Reykjavik. You lived up to the confidence we have in you. She understood that Secretary Shultz had received a warm reception when he briefed the NATO allies in Brussels today. The President responded that this was welcome news. (C)

In closing, Mrs. Thatcher sent her blessings to the President and love to Nancy. The President said "send our love to that fine husband of yours." (U)

The phone conversation concluded at 1:35 p.m. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 14, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Request by Lawrence, Kansas "Meeting for Peace"
Committee to Meet with Fred Ryan to Offer to Host
US-Soviet Summit

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Fred Ryan responding to his request for the NSC to draft a letter giving his regrets to a request by the Lawrence, Kansas "Meeting for Peace" Committee. The Committee is trying to build support for Lawrence, Kansas to be chosen as the site for any US-Soviet summit in the US. The draft response is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Ryan at Tab I, forwarding the draft response at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Your memo to Ryan
Tab A	Draft Response for Ryan
Tab B	Letter from Robert Swan, Chairman Meeting for Peace Committee; "Meeting for Peace" Flyer with Story from "San Diego Union" of June 26, 1983; copy of July 25, 1986 letter from Sen. Dole to Amb. Dubinin; copy of June 16, 1986 letter from Kansas Gov. Carlin to Lawrence Mayor Longhurst; copy of May 29, 1986 letter from Kansas University Chancellor Budig to the President; Lawrence, Kansas Resolution no. 4935 of April 22, 1986; Article from "Lawrence Daily Journal-World" of April 29, 1986; Sept. 8, 1986 Memo re. Possible Itinerary; Prospectus for a Meeting for Peace in Lawrence, Kansas, USA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Request By Lawrence, Kansas "Meeting
for Peace" Committee for Appointment With You

Attached at Tab A is a draft response to the request by the Lawrence, Kansas "Meeting for Peace" Committee to meet with you. The Committee hopes to gain White House approval to host a summit between the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, if one should occur.

The response notes that planning has not begun for any such summit in the US. It regrets that the press of business will prevent you from meeting with them, but that once planning does begin, the White House will carefully consider Lawrence's offer.

Attachments:

Tab A	Proposed Response
Tab B	Letter from Robert Swan, Chairman Meeting for Peace Committee; "Meeting for Peace" Flyer with Story from "San Diego Union" of June 26, 1983; copy of July 25, 1986 letter from Sen. Dole to Amb. Dubinin; copy of June 16, 1986 letter from Kansas Gov. Carlin to Lawrence Mayor Longhurst; copy of May 29, 1986 letter from Kansas University Chancellor Budig to the President; Lawrence, Kansas Resolution no. 4935 of April 22, 1986; Article from "Lawrence Daily Journal-World" of April 29, 1986; Sept. 8, 1986 Memo re. Possible Itinerary; Prospectus for a Meeting for Peace in Lawrence, Kansas, USA

Dear Mr. Swan:

Thank you for your letter and materials about the availability of Lawrence, Kansas to host a summit between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev. The President is prepared to host a summit with Gorbachev in the US, as the USSR agreed at the meeting last year in Geneva. Unfortunately, the Soviets have resisted setting a date for a US summit, and planning has not yet begun on where such a summit would be held.

Regrettably, the press of business here will prevent me from meeting with you. However, I can assure you that when preparations do begin for a summit in the US, the White House will certainly consider Lawrence's offer carefully.

Sincerely,



POST OFFICE BOX 1776 • LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66044 • PHONE (913) 843-6435

September 11, 1986

Mr. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.
Director, Presidential Appointments
The White House
Washington, DC

RECEIVED

SEP 12 1986

SCHEDULING
OFFICE

Dear Mr. Ryan:

As you know the citizens of Lawrence, supported by their local, state and national representatives and other prominent Kansans, proposed a Meeting for Peace in this special community more than three years ago. We have appreciated your past interest and kind words regarding our efforts to contribute toward more stable and peaceful relations between our country and the Soviet Union.

Three months ago students at the University of Kansas initiated a postcard invitation campaign that has created even more interest and support in our community for a Meeting for Peace in Lawrence. Next Wednesday evening, after a rally and send-off at the University of Kansas, a delegation of prominent KU students and Lawrence citizens are coming to Washington, DC, to deliver personally more than 7,500 personally signed invitations from our people to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

Since our mission is supportive of President Reagan's hopes for improved relations and his stated desire that a summit take place this year in America, we ask, if at all possible, that we have the opportunity to meet briefly with President Reagan. If this is impossible, we ask that we have a meeting with you and Mr. Andrew Card of Intergovernmental Affairs who also has been kept informed of our initiative.

Mr. Ryan, we support our President's quest for peace and our delegation looks forward to meeting with those officials that you and Mr. Card recommend next Thursday. Our proposal and our commitment are serious and our city can make a great contribution to the peace process if it is included in your planning for the summit.

Respectfully,

Robert Swan, Chairman
Meeting for Peace Committee

RAS:cjs
Enclosures
cc. Mr. Andrew Card
Ms. Jane Plank



41
POST OFFICE BOX 1776 • LAWRENCE, KANSAS 66044 • PHONE (913) 843-6435

September 11, 1986

Mr. Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
for Intergovernmental Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Card:

As you know the citizens of Lawrence, supported by their local, state and national representatives and other prominent Kansans, proposed a Meeting for Peace in this special community more than three years ago. We have appreciated your past interest and kind words regarding our efforts to contribute toward more stable and peaceful relations between our country and the Soviet Union.

Three months ago students at the University of Kansas initiated a postcard invitation campaign that has created even more interest and support in our community for a Meeting for Peace in Lawrence. Next Wednesday evening, after a rally and send-off at the University of Kansas, a delegation of prominent KU students and Lawrence citizens are coming to Washington, DC, to deliver personally more than 7,500 personally signed invitations from our people to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

Since our mission is supportive of President Reagan's hopes for improved relations and his stated desire that a summit take place this year in America, we ask, if at all possible, that we have the opportunity to meet briefly with President Reagan. If this is impossible, we ask that we have a meeting with you and Mr. Frederick Ryan and any other officials you recommend who are involved in selection of locations for the summit and summit-related visits.

Mr. Card, we support our President's quest for peace and our delegation looks forward to meeting with those officials that you and Mr. Ryan recommend next Thursday. Our proposal and our commitment are serious and our city can make a great contribution to the peace process if it is included in your planning for the summit.

Respectfully,

Robert Swan, Chairman
Meeting for Peace Committee

RAS:cjs
Enclosures
cc. Mr. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.

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STATE OF KANSAS



OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

State Capitol
Topeka 66612-1590

John Carlin Governor

June 16, 1986

The Honorable David Longhurst
Mayor, City of Lawrence
Post Office Box 1776
Lawrence, Kansas 66044

Dear Mayor Longhurst:

I commend you and the citizens of Lawrence for your efforts to secure a 1986 US-Soviet Summit to be held in Lawrence, Kansas. I share your enthusiasm for promoting Lawrence with its friendly, tranquil, and supportive atmosphere.

Should your efforts be successful, I am confident that Lawrence would provide all that is necessary for a successful meeting place.

Please feel free to contact my office should you need any assistance. Best wishes to you.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature of John Carlin in black ink.

JOHN CARLIN
Governor

JC:pd

Great Plains Epic: Searching For The Summit

By EDWARD NICHOLS

Associate Editor, The San Diego Union

It isn't often, if ever, that the U.S. State Department gets upstaged by the folks of a medium-sized U.S. city, but it just might happen.

At Foggy Bottom, the State Department is pondering ways to arrange a meaningful summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Yuri Andropov.

But Andropov already has agreed "in principle" to come to a summit in Lawrence, Kan., if substantive results can be guaranteed before it begins.

The story of how Lawrence, Kan., landed the Soviet Union began earlier this year when the city invited Soviet athletes to participate in the Kansas Relays there. At first the Soviet Union politely rejected the invitation. Then, suddenly, at the end of April, the Soviet embassy notified Mayor David Longhurst that men and women from the U.S.S.R. would be delighted to compete in the track meet.

"They came with the appropriate number of interpreters and all that. There was a big to do about it. They were met at the Kansas City airport by the Kansas governor, school children and others — flowers, messages and pictures — all those kinds of things. They were here for the better part of a week and they went back with all kinds of messages. They did a lot of entertaining and they went back with good feelings. We understand there was quite a long article printed in one of the Soviet papers about their trip here and how well it worked.

"So the same people who were successful in inviting the Soviet athletes to Lawrence said: 'Well, we got one, why not go for two.' So they invited Andropov to hold a summit meeting here — and also had the school kids write both Andropov and the White House," said Dolph C. Simons, editor of the Lawrence Journal-World. "Stranger things have happened," he added.

Lawrence, the home of University of Kansas, is a city of about 60,000 population, 10 miles southwest of



Rad Stroup, The San Diego Union

Kansas City. It was founded in 1854 by the New England Immigration Aid Society, which was determined to have Kansas enter the Union as a non-slave state.

U.S.-Soviet summit meetings are not usually in places like Lawrence, but rather in major cities in the United States and the Soviet Union, or on neutral ground like Geneva, Helsinki or Vienna. Nevertheless, should a Soviet-U.S. summit materialize in Lawrence, that city wouldn't necessarily rate a mention in Guinness Book of Records as the smallest or most unlikely place hosting a meeting between inimical superpowers. That footnote probably goes to Glassboro, N.J., a community of about 10,000, where President Lyndon B. Johnson met Premier Alexei Kosygin in the home of the president of Glassboro State College. They talked about the Middle East crisis, Vietnam and nuclear weapons.

It was President Johnson's only venture into summitry, and he didn't ask in advance that success be guaranteed. No major issues were settled at Glassboro, but many historians believe the summit laid the groundwork for the SALT I treaty and interim agreement signed in 1972 by President Nixon.

The idea that some success has to be assured or that extensive preparations are necessary hasn't always been an article of faith among summitteers. When Winston Churchill proposed a "parley at the summit" in 1950 to thaw the Cold War, he met stiff opposition from diplomats, who told him that an unstructured meeting would bring few results, but raise many expectations.

Churchill reacted vigorously: "This conference should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agen-

da or led into mazes of technical details, zealously contested by hordes of experts and officials, drawn up in cumbrous array," he thundered.

Some believe that world leaders shouldn't hold summits at all because international problems usually are too complex to negotiate in a few days at high levels. And the danger of miscues always is present. As American statesman Dean Acheson noted: "When a chief of state or head of government makes a fumble, the goal line is open behind him." President Eisenhower was of the same opinion: "Every time an American leader goes to a summit, he loses his shirt," Ike said.

Whether Eisenhower was correct or not is in the eyes of the beholder. During and after World War II, the United States has been involved in 13 summit meetings with the Soviet Union. Among the major ones were the Teheran and Yalta conferences in 1943 and 1945 that brought together President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Churchill and Joseph Stalin. Many historians believe that these conferences "gave" Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. The Potsdam summit in 1945 concluded the postwar shaping of Europe's boundaries.

After a hiatus of 10 years, summitry resumed in 1955, when President Eisenhower met with Soviet, British and French leaders in Geneva. Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin rejected President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal to verify nuclear disarmament agreements and little was accomplished, but East-West contacts had been resumed after a hiatus of a decade. Good feelings developed between Eisenhower and Bulganin during the summit and both countries started talking about building on the "Spirit of Geneva." The spirit died a short time later, however, when the Soviet Union put tanks on the streets of Budapest, Hungary, to quell a rebellion.

In 1959 Nikita Khrushchev visited the United States, wading through corn fields, touring industries and addressing Americans on television. He and Pres-

(Continued on C-4, Col. 1)

(cont)

ident Eisenhower agreed to improve relations and to meet again in Paris the following year. The meeting in Paris in was a debacle. It had hardly opened when the Soviet Union shot down a United States spy plane over Russia. Khrushchev berated Eisenhower, demanding an apology. Ike refused and the summit broke up. The aborted agenda had included the East-West Berlin issue, German unity, atomic arms reductions and East-West relations in general.

President John F. Kennedy met Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961. History records that the Soviet leader misfired Kennedy's inexperience and friendliness for weakness and thus was encouraged to launch the Berlin crisis in 1961 and order Soviet missiles into Cuba in 1962.

"Atmospherics" between the Soviet Union and the United States were glowing after Glassboro in 1967. Although little of substance had been accomplished, President Johnson and Kosygin evaluated each other and reached some understandings, despite increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam and growing Soviet support for North Vietnam. The honeymoon ended in 1968 when the Soviet Union sent troops into Czechoslova-

kia to quell a rebellion. Soviet use of tanks to maintain rigid Marxism in Czechoslovakia delayed negotiation of the SALT I agreement by at least one year.

President Nixon went to Moscow in 1972 to meet Leonid Brezhnev and sign SALT I. Both pledged to work for "peaceful coexistence." Brezhnev came to the United States the following year and Nixon returned to Moscow in 1974. These were the productive years of the modern cycle of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

President Ford met Brezhnev in Vladivostok in 1974 to talk about SALT II, but five years elapsed before the treaty was signed in Vienna by President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev. Then the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 1979 and, realizing that SALT II would be defeated, Carter withdrew the treaty from U.S. Senate consideration. It still is unratified.

That was the last of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms summits. Now President Reagan obviously is looking for a way to meet Andropov without painting himself into a political corner.

Actually, Mr. Reagan began sounding out the Soviet

Union about the possibility of a summit meeting early in his term, despite his harsh rhetoric, when he invited Leonid Brezhnev to meet him informally at the United Nations last June. Brezhnev rejected the invitation and suggested that they could get together in a full-fledged summit in October — in either Finland or Switzerland. "A meeting between the President of the United States and myself obviously has to be well prepared and must be conducted thoroughly, not incidentally to some international forum," Brezhnev said. The Soviet leader insisted that he was amenable to a summit with Mr. Reagan and, indeed, he had stressed the value of summit meetings in a speech to the 26th Communist Party conference in February 1981.

Recently Godfrey Sperling of the Christian Science Monitor reported that White House insiders claim President Reagan is "favorably disposed" to a summit meeting with Andropov by early next year, before heavy presidential campaign traveling begins.

President Reagan himself is saying publicly: "I believe... that a summit is likely." The President is not "optimistic about this year... more possibility of next year." The reluctance of Andropov has delayed a summit. "We actually tried to make contact... very

early.... There's no contact with him," Mr. Reagan says. Although he initially wanted an informal session with Brezhnev at the United Nations, the President now thinks a summit with the Soviet leader must have an agenda "in which you both agree that there are things you can probably resolve by meeting, and then you get together and meet."

Retired Air Force Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who heads a commission studying the MX missile and nuclear deterrence, has recommended to the President that the United States and the Soviet Union might have a better chance of holding private discussions out of the public eye. "One way to break out of the considerable depths of suspicion would be to initiate some kind of private talks, away from the spotlight, where neither side has to be perceived as caving in or making concessions, even as the one who requested such talks," Scowcroft said. Columbia University Kremlinologist Seweryn Bailer puts it more bluntly: "It's time President Reagan met a Russian," he says.

Lawrence, Kan., indeed would rate a Guinness entry if he met the Russian there.

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Because PEACE begins
at home . . .



*“Join the postcard
campaign”*

sponsored by

- KU Coalition for Peace and Justice
- Lawrence Coalition for Peace and Justice
- Meeting for Peace Committee

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RESOLUTION NO. 4935

WHEREAS, the citizens of Lawrence and their elected officials have always had the deepest concern for matters of peace and war and have seen this concern magnified many times due to the threat of nuclear war to our children and to ourselves, and

WHEREAS, on April 23, 1983, Mayor David Longhurst invited American and Soviet leaders to come to Lawrence for a Meeting for Peace, and

WHEREAS, this invitation was acknowledged by both leaders and widely and favorably reported in the United States and several European nations, and

WHEREAS, Prominent Americans have endorsed a Meeting for Peace in our city, including Senator Robert Dole who asked, "Where better than Lawrence to hold a tranquil, uncluttered dialogue on world peace?"

WHEREAS, a committee of concerned and distinguished Lawrence citizens met in 1983, and drafted a detailed prospectus for the Meeting for Peace and sent it to both leaders, and

WHEREAS, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met at the summit last November in Geneva and called for a U. S. summit meeting in 1986 and a Soviet summit in 1987, and

WHEREAS, the White House last month asked Kansas Secretary of State Brier to provide full details on possible meeting places in Kansas for the 1986 U. S. summit, and

WHEREAS, Secretary of State Brier strongly recommended Lawrence for the site of the summit and a new letter of invitation and updated prospectus have been sent to President Reagan and the same prepared for General Secretary Gorbachev.

THEREFORE, be it resolved that the Lawrence City Commission reaffirms its belief that a productive summit with genuine progress in arms control is critically needed, and that our friendly, peaceful and supportive citizens and community would provide the ideal environment for such a Meeting for Peace.


FURTHER, the Lawrence City Commission states once again its support for holding the 1986 summit, a Meeting for Peace, in Lawrence, Kansas.

FURTHER, The Lawrence City Commission states its willingness to cooperate fully with all University, Douglas County, State of Kansas, and federal offices in making this 1986 summit in Lawrence a reality.

The Lawrence City Commission will inform immediately the proper University, City, State, and National officials of this resolution, including President Ronald Reagan, Senators Robert Dole and Nancy Kassebaum, Congressman James Slattery, State Senator Wint Winter, and State Representatives John Solbach, Jessie Branson, and Betty Jo Charlton, and request their full support of this important initiative.


Signed this 22nd day of April, 1986.


Sandra K. Praeger, Mayor



Howard Hill, Commissioner


Mike Amyx, Commissioner


Ernest Angino, Commissioner


David Longhurst, Commissioner

ATTEST:


Vera Mercer, City Clerk



(Staff photo by Mike Yoder)

Flanked by their countries' flags, Alexandre Olshansky, a Soviet veteran, left, and Buck Kotzebue, a U.S. veteran, lead a "walk for peace" down Massachusetts Street Monday. They were the first American and Soviet

soldiers to meet at the Elbe River 41 years ago as the allies made their final push into Nazi Germany.

Soviet visitor endorses Lawrence as summit site

By BOB MUELLER
J-W Staff Writer

Any Lawrence residents who envisioned Soviet citizens as Politburo robots had that view altered Monday in warm-hearted meetings with Soviet veterans on a "Journey for Peace."

Emphasizing a desire for peace, Ivan Katyshkin, a retired Soviet general, endorsed a proposal to have Lawrence serve as a site for a U.S.-Soviet summit later this year. His endorsement, the first public backing by a Soviet citizen, drew loud applause from 150 people attending a

farewell dinner Monday night at Plymouth Congregational Church, 925 Vt.

"LET US together persistently work toward ensuring a stable and just peace on Earth," Katyshkin said, speaking through an interpreter.

At a luncheon earlier in the day, Katyshkin vowed to deliver to Soviet officials a prospectus about a proposed summit prepared by local supporters.

Eight hours of previous talks between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was enough time to get to know each other, Katyshkin


said. "There's no need to get acquainted more. We wish for concrete, practical results. . . . The practical steps are the reversal of the arms race and putting a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing."

The local summit proposal grew from various activities, including a 1983 visit by Soviet athletes organized by Athletes United for Peace. When City Commissioner David Longhurst was mayor that year, he first invited U.S. and Soviet leaders to hold a summit in Lawrence. The invitation was reaffirmed this year in a resolution passed by the current city commission.

THE VISIT by four Soviet veterans and three representatives of the East German Democratic Republic (GDR) was sponsored by the Elbe Alliance, a Lawrence-based group working to foster the same spirit of cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union when they met as allies at the Elbe River in World War II to defeat Nazi Germany, according to Bob Swan, a local organizer.

Events during the past two days have been aimed at rekindling that spirit and stressing the need for peace.

See Americans, page 7



Students from McPherson College carried photos of Soviet-U.S. troops from World War II while listening to speakers in Lawrence's South Park Monday.



Ellen Anthony, a Lawrence resident who had a role in the "The Day After," a movie about a nuclear holocaust, joined Soviet veteran Alexandre Sylvashko, right, on the bandstand in South Park.

Americans, Soviets join in call for peace

(Continued from page 1)

remembers the meeting at the Elbe.

A "walk for peace" downtown drew one of the largest crowds for any of the day's events. The march was led by Alexander Olshansky and Buck Kotzebue, the first Soviet and U.S. soldiers to meet at the Elbe 41 years ago.

EARLIER in the day, the group held a solemn memorial service at the World War II memorial campanile on Kansas University's campus with several local veterans. A luncheon at KU was followed by a trip to Topeka to tour the heart of Kansas government.

A pot-luck dinner Monday evening that drew 150 people, with about half as many homemade dishes, drove home a point made all day: Peace is the only alternative for today's children.

That message was emphasized all day — by school children showering the visitors with handshakes and flowers and by the presentation of several paintings from East German children.

Presenting the paintings at dinner, Helga Scheibe, a member of the Peace Council of the GDR, said "children want to play in the U.S. just as in the GDR. . . . We need and support the freeze (on nuclear weapons)."

KATYSHKIN also made a plea for youth. "Help the young generation understand deeply the necessity to live in peace. Help to make them comprehend that if there is another world conflict, there will be no winning sides."

Local residents, both military veterans and non-veterans, participating in the events found the visit "enlightening," said Marlene Fisher, whose family housed Werner Handler, of the GDR, Monday night. Rob Fisher, Marlene's husband, was one of the organizers of the visit.

"He just seemed like one of us. He was very friendly," Mrs. Fisher said. "He was very sincere and really wants peace."

Handler, one of two visitors who spoke English, smiled and said he enjoyed the overnight stay, although he felt a little guilty about taking over a bedroom that belonged to Justin, the Fishers' 10-year-old son.

LeRoy Mzhickteno and Harold Volk, Lawrence residents who both served in the Army's 35th Division during World War II, said the visit was a good idea.

"Sure, anything to promote peace is a good idea," said Mzhickteno, who

HE EXCHANGED gifts with a Soviet visitor. In return for a button, Mzhickteno gave a visitor a golf ball. "He thought it was interesting and he didn't know what it was. I guess they don't play much golf over there."

Both American Legion members found it difficult to speak through an interpreter. "About all I could talk about was his bald head and my bald head. We kind of avoided politics," Volk said with a laugh. He said the visitors were "very congenial."

The visit is a good idea to help promote peaceful relations, Volk said, and "generally, we've done a pretty good job on both sides for the last 41 years."

Although he'd like to see peace, Volk is a little apprehensive about holding a summit in Lawrence because it might bring huge crowds and possibly demonstrators, he said.

JIM CLARK, the first U.S. soldier to enter Periers, France, after D-Day in June of 1944, said he was "a little apprehensive" when first asked to participate in the day's events. "I guess I envisioned people marching with placards saying 'ban the bomb.' But the sincerity of these people really struck me. If we don't get the problem solved in a peaceful manner, there is no solution," he said.

Clark said he plans to take Katyskhin up on a private invitation to visit his home in the Soviet Union next year.

After the luncheon, Glenn Kappelman, who served with the 106th Cavalry's reconnaissance group from Normandy to Salzburg, Austria, recalled when his outfit met Russian soldiers near Linz, Austria.

"There was a real feeling of camaraderie. All the GIs were thankful that the Soviet Army was on the east front. . . . There was a spirit of victory," he said.

THAT SPIRIT of cooperation was rejuvenated during the last two days, Kappelman said.

"These meetings point out that there are more likenesses in the people of our countries than differences. I have no feeling that they're here for propaganda purposes. . . . As far as a summit, I don't know if we can make the grade or not. But if they leave the usual government centers of Washington or Camp David, there's a good possibility it could be here. And away from those usual places, there might be some progress," he said.



In photo at right, Soviet visitors to Lawrence received flowers from children from the United Child Development Center. Below, Norman Porter a U.S. veteran from Kansas City, Kan., carried both American and Soviet flags in a parade for peace in downtown Lawrence.



Photos by Mike Yoder, Richard Gwin and Ben Bigler

MEMORANDUM

TO: Kansas hosts of a Reagan/Gorbachev pre-Summit visit to the state

FROM: Mark Scott

RE: Possible itinerary

DATE: September 8, 1986

WHY SHOULD MR. GORBACHEV VISIT VISIT KANSAS?

- *Immigrants from the Russian Empire first settled the Kansas prairies more than a century ago. They brought with them a strain of Ukrainian wheat--Turkey Red winter wheat--which has become the staple of Kansas's agri-business economy.
- *Kansan George MacDowell was the first American awarded the Order of Lenin. MacDowell received the honor in the 1920s for his work in reorganizing Soviet agricultural production.
- *As Supreme Allied Commander, Kansan Dwight D. Eisenhower joined with the Soviet General Staff in defeating Nazi Germany. General Eisenhower hailed the meeting of US and Soviet troops in Germany on April 25, 1945, as "almost the peak of our establishment of world accord." President Eisenhower, his wife Mamie, and son Doud are buried in Abilene, Kansas.
- *Kansas universities have maintained long-standing academic ties with Soviet institutions of higher education. There are only two Schools of Milling and Baking in the world: Moscow State University and Kansas State University. Kansas State University has been involved in countless agricultural exchanges with Soviet farm specialists (Mr. Gorbachev himself is a farm specialist). The University of Kansas has sent thousands of American college students for Russian language instruction in the USSR. Some of the most prominent Soviet literary figures have been "writers-in-residence" at the University of Kansas. They include Viktor Rozov, Bella Akhmadulina, Evgeny Vinokurov, and Grigory Baklanov.
- *Lawrence, Kansas, hosted the visit of Soviet world-class track and field athletes who "competed for peace" in the 1983 Kansas Relays. Their participation in the Relays was the first time in US history that a Soviet track team had competed in a one-time, regional, outdoor meet.
- *Lawrence, Kansas, hosted the visit of Soviet Elbe veterans during their tour of the United States in the spring of 1986. Buck Kotzebue and Alexander Olshansky--the first American and Soviet soldiers to meet at the Elbe River on April 25, 1945--led a dramatic March for Peace down Lawrence's main street.

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BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL RECEIVE A SPECTACULAR WELCOME FROM KANSANS ON THEIR VISIT TO THE WHEAT STATE. CITIZENS FROM THE "HEART OF AMERICA" WILL GREET BOTH LEADERS WITH OPEN HEARTS.

ITINERARY FOR A REAGAN/GORBACHEV PRE-SUMMIT VISIT TO KANSAS

(3 Days)

DAY 1 TOPEKA: Capital of the Wheat State

*Reagan/Gorbachev arrive at Topeka's Forbes Field in the morning. Both are met at the airport by Governor John Carlin, Mayor Doug Wright, and other Kansas dignitaries. Schoolchildren present guests with sunflower/wheat bouquets wrapped with red, white, blue, and yellow ribbons. Two children (boy/girl) offer Soviet guests bread and salt; the guests cut off a piece of bread, sprinkle it with salt, then eat it. The bread and salt ceremony is a Russian tradition.

Reagan/Gorbachev are taken to podium on airport landing strip. Red carpet. US/Soviet/Kansas flags behind podium. Band plays Soviet/US national anthems. Governor Carlin welcomes guests. Mayor Wright welcomes guests. Gorbachev speaks. Reagan speaks. (Check protocol.)

*Motorcade from airport to State Capitol. Appropriate black limousines have US/Soviet flags above respective headlights. Police escort in front and back of entourage-- sirens blaring. Proceed north on Kansas Avenue. At the intersection of Kansas Avenue and 17th Street, the motorcade is met by new Hesston tractors, which lead the procession on to the Capitol. Tractor drivers in overalls. Tractors have US/Soviet flags attached.

Crowd along Kansas Avenue waves US and Soviet flags. Posters along the way are photo enlargements of Reagan/Gorbachev, Eisenhower/Zhukov, and/or Robertson/Silvashko embracing at Torgau in 1945. Lettering at top of Robertson/Silvashko reads "Welcome to Kansas, Mr. President." Lettering at bottom of Robertson/Silvashko poster reads (in Russian) "Welcome to Kansas, Mikhail Sergeyevich!" (Dobro pozhalovat' v Kansas, Mikhail Sergeyevich!) Banners along motorcade route read (in Russian) "Dobro pozhalovat!"

Motorcade either turns west on 8th Street or turns on 6th Street and doubles back to Capitol. Gorbachev/Reagan address joint session of Kansas Legislature.

*Late lunch with Governor Carlin at the Executive Mansion at Cedar Crest

*Joint tree-planting ceremony in the mid-afternoon at Topeka's Gage Park. Ceremony takes place near the statue entitled "Madonna of the Prairies." Remarks by Mayor Wright, city officials. Gorbachev plants a birch tree, Reagan a cottonwood.

MEMORANDUM TO KANSAS HOSTS OF A REAGAN/GORBACHEV PRE-SUMMIT VISIT TO THE STATE
Page 3

- *Dinner, evening entertainment, and accommodations to be arranged by the Governor's Office and/or the Topeka Chamber of Commerce. If guests stay at hotel, pipe in US/Soviet music over intercom system.

DAY 2 GARDEN CITY: Queen of the Prairies

- *Reagan/Gorbachev arrive in Garden City in the late morning. Greeted by cowboys on horses, local dignitaries. Itinerary to be arranged by Garden City officials. Could include covered wagon/stagecoach procession, visit to farm/feedlot, square dancing/ Country Western entertainment. Guests welcomed by attractive young women wearing bib overalls and straw hats. Children sing well-known Soviet song in Russian: "Pust' vseгда budet nebo"

Stress Wild West/farming/ranching motif in Garden City.

DAY 3 LAWRENCE: Far Above the Golden Valley

- *Reagan/Gorbachev arrive Lawrence in the late morning. Welcomed by large delegation of students from Haskell Indian Junior College. The Native Americans--in traditional dress--present Reagan/Gorbachev with eagle feathers (traditional sign of distinction). City officials then introduced to Reagan/Gorbachev. Reagan/Gorbachev introduced to Susan Eisenhower (DDE's granddaughter). Brief speeches.
- *Wreath-laying ceremony at Kansas University's World War II Memorial Campanile. Large wreath of blood-red roses. Bugler plays Taps. Carillonneur plays Robert Schumann's "Träumerei."
- *Late lunch at Boots Adams Alumni Center. Faculty welcome from Chancellor Gene Budig. Special welcoming remarks (in Russian) by Professor Gerald Mikkelsen.
- *Reagan/Gorbachev visit KU's Allen Fieldhouse. Both leaders photographed in front of oil painting of Dr. James Naismith, inventor of basketball and first basketball coach at KU. Reagan/Gorbachev meet KU's basketball team. Basketball team leads both leaders out onto basketball court, where they are greeted by KU student body. Gorbachev/Reagan address students.
- *Pot-luck dinner at Plymouth Congregational Church. Country Western entertainment. Television sets show videotapes of 1) Soviet athletes competing in 1983 Kansas Relays, and 2) visit of US World War II veterans to USSR in 1985. No broadcast of Torgau ceremonies (US government boycotted).
- *Accommodations arranged through White House/Downtown Lawrence Association. Guests stay in Lawrence Holidome?

DAY 4 Reagan/Gorbachev leave Lawrence in the morning.

THE ITINERARY IN TOPEKA, GARDEN CITY, AND LAWRENCE CAN BE EASILY EXPANDED SHOULD THE WHITE HOUSE OR KREMLIN REQUEST MORE TIME IN A PARTICULAR HOST CITY.

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