WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1986 (1/5)

FOIA F06-114/5 YARHI-MILO 1811

Box Number 18

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8641	MEMO	LINHARD TO POINDEXTER RE MEMO FOR SHULTZ ON HIS VIENNA MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	2	11/3/1986	B1
8642	MEMO	FOR SHULTZ RE MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	ND	B1
8643	MEMO	PROPOSED NEXT STEPS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	ND	B1
8644	MEMO	TREATMENT OF THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS IN U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	ND	B1
8645	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS FROM POINDEXTER RE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE VIENNA MEETINGS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	10/28/1986	B1
8652	TALKING POINTS	SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE TALKING POINTS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	6	10/29/1986	B1
8654	PAPER	DIRECTIVES ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	3	10/29/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1986 (1/5)

FOIA F06-114/5 YARHI-MILO

Box Number 18

1811

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8655	PAPER	DIRECTIVES ON INTERIM REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	3	10/29/1986	B1
8656	PAPER	DIRECTIVES ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	3	10/29/1986	B1
8657	PAPER	DIRECTIVES ON DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	3	10/29/1986	B1
8658	PAPER	DIRECTIVES ON KEY CONSIDERATIONS IN MOVING BEYOND INITIAL REDUCTIONS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	10/30/1986	B1
8659	PAPER	DIRECTIVES ON VERIFICATION R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/29/1986	B1
8660	PAPER	DIRECTIVES ON NUCLEAR TESTING R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	10/29/1986	B1
8661	PAPER	REPORT OF U.S.-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	10/29/1986	B1
8646	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE CLEARING ALL TDY TRAVEL TO US EMBASSY MOSCOW THROUGH STATE R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	1	11/3/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1986 (1/5)

FOIA F06-114/5 YARHI-MILO 1811

Box Number 18

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8647	MEMO	FROM MCDANIEL RE TDY TRAVEL TO THE USSR ***PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5***	4	11/3/1986	B1
8662	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE CLEARING TDY VISITORS TO EMBASSY MOSCOW ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	1	10/25/1986	B1
8663	LETTER	SUGGESTED DRAFT RE EMBASSY MOSCOW ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	2	ND	B1
8664	LETTER	SUGGESTED DRAFT RE EMBASSY MOSCOW ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	2	ND	B1
8665	LETTER	SUGGESTED DRAFT RE EMBASSY MOSCOW ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	2	ND	B1
8666	LETTER	SUGGESTED DRAFT RE EMBASSY MOSCOW ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	2	ND	B1
8648	MEMO	MATLOCK/DEAN TO POINDEXTER RE CLEARING ALL TDY TRAVEL TO US EMBASSY MOSCOW THROUGH STATE ***R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5***	1	10/28/1986	B1
8667	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8662 ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	1	10/25/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1986 (1/5)

FOIA F06-114/5 YARHI-MILO

Box Number 18

1811

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8668	LETTER	SUGGESTED DRAFT RE EMBASSY MOSCOW ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	1	ND	B1
8669	LETTER	SUGGESTED DRAFT RE EMBASSY MOSCOW ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	1	ND	B1
8649	MEMO	MATLOCK/DEAN TO POINDEXTER RE CLEARING ALL TDY TRAVEL TO US EMBASSY MOSCOW THROUGH STATE ***R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5***	1	10/28/1986	B1
8650	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS FROM DAVID MAJOR RE MOSCOW STAFFING ***R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5***	1	10/30/1986	B1
8651	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MAJOR RE MEMO TO AGENCIES ON IMMEDIATE TRAVEL TO EMBASSY MOSCOW ***R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5***	1	11/3/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7577

November 1, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY R. JAFFKE

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL Bth for

SUBJECT: Reply to Rep. Rudd on US Expulsion of 25 Soviets from Soviet Mission to the UN

On October 2 Congressman Rudd wrote the President to express concern over reports the Administration was reconsidering its order expelling 25 Soviets from the Soviet UN Mission.

The NSC recommends the draft at Tab A to respond to Congressman Rudd. It updates an earlier State draft to reflect our actions against Soviet intelligence agents at the Soviet Embassy, and our moves to bring the numbers at the Embassy into parity with our Embassy in Moscow. State drafted a response to Congressman Rudd as per your request at Tab C.

Attachments:

Tab A	Proposed Reply to Rep. Rudd
Tab B	Congressman Rudd's Letter
Tab C	Your memo to State requesting draft response

Dear Congressman Rudd:

Thank you for your letter of October 2 on reports the Administration might rescind its order to expel 25 Soviet diplomats from the Soviet Mission to the U.N.. The Soviets have complied with our reduction order. The last of those 25 Soviets left the United States on October 14.

In March we announced to the Soviets a program of reductions that will cut the size of their missions to the U.N. by about 100 personnel by April 1, 1988. The list of 25 we gave the Soviets on September 17 was part of this larger reduction plan.

As has been made clear by events since your letter, the Administration has not only held firm on expelling these 25 at the U.N., but we have also declared persona non grata 5 Soviets at their Embassy and have expelled 50 more and have brought the Soviet Embassy here into parity with our Embassy in Moscow.

Throughout all of these actions, the President has made it clear to the Soviet Union that we will not allow the Soviet presence here to be safehaven for espionage activities. We intend to stick to that policy.

We appreciate your support, and that of other members of Congress, for our efforts to reduce espionage activities in the United States.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Eldon Rudd
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington D.C. 20515

ELDON RUDD
4TH DISTRICT, ARIZONA

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

P860128-0268

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2465 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-3361

DISTRICT OFFICE
6900 E CAMELBACK ROAD
SCOTTSDALE, AZ 85251
(602) 241-2801

October 2, 1986

ACTION is assigned to EUR

IO

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United
States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am greatly disturbed by news reports, quoting "top administration officials," indicating the United States may rescind its order that 25 Soviets be expelled from the U.N. mission.

As you are aware, the order by your administration originally set yesterday as the deadline for the Soviet's departure. Congress too has passed legislation requiring a reduction in the number of Soviet personnel at the United Nations. We have also cut almost $20 million in U.S. contributions to the organization in FY '87 believing these monies help to subsidize the KGB's and GRU's subversive activities against the United States.

On a matter of national security, such as the expulsion of these identified Soviet espionage agents, I strongly believe there should be no reconsideration of their status. If they remain in this country, they have the potential to jeopardize the future security and freedoms of all Americans. Therefore, an "agreement" with the Soviet leadership on this question should not be a subject for negotiation during your upcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland.

News accounts have also suggested the United States may use the Soviet envoys to help win the release of imprisoned Soviet dissidents. While their release would be both morally right and politically appealing, I respectfully suggest it cannot be a prudent action, or an appropriate concession if we allow the Soviet personnel to remain on American soil.

I have applauded your decision to issue the expulsion order for the Soviet personnel, Mr. President. We cannot tolerate continued Soviet abuse of the international civil service system. Nor can we legitimize their actions by allowing identified espionage agents to remain in this country under any circumstances.

With every best wish,

Sincerely,

Eldon Rudd
Member of Congress

ER/ff

cc: Honorable George Shultz
Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter

OUT

1986 OCT -9 AM 9:56

FAIRFAX/AP/WI

1986 OCT -9 AM 9:10

SECRETARY OF STATE

8631444

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: CATHY THIBODEAU
Congressional Correspondence
Department of State

FROM: KATHY RATTÉ JAFFKE
Director, Congressional
Correspondence

SUBJECT: Soviets Expelled from the
U.N. Mission

In the attached letter, Congressman Eldon Rudd indicates concern over reports that the Administration may rescind its order that 25 Soviets be expelled from the U.N. mission.

I would appreciate State's guidance in a draft response for Will Ball's signature.

Thanks so much for your help.

cc: Records Management - FYI (ID# 428720)

ID# 428720

5

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

3631444

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 06, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ELDON RUDD

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER NEWS REPORTS INDICATING THAT THE U.S. MAY RESCIND ITS ORDER THAT 25 SOVIETS BE EXPELLED FROM THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	ACTION DATE YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION TYPE RESP	DISPOSITION C D	DISPOSITION COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
WILLIAM BALL	ORG	86/10/06		C	86/10/07
REFERRAL NOTE: 99 STAT	D	86/10/08			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /			/ /

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 ____ ____

__ MAIL USER CODES: (A)_____ (B)_____ (C)_____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS OF SIGNER
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* CODE = A
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	* OUTGOING
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY		
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE		
*X-INTERIM REPLY		

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT.

(Classification)

7 4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8631444

Date October 18, 1986

For: VADM John M. Poindexter
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Congressman Kuda

Date: October 2, 1986 Subject: 25 Soviets expelled from UN Mission

Referral Dated: October 7, 1986 ID# 428720 (if any)

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State

Action Taken:

__X__ A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

_____ A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

_____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.

_____ Other.

Remarks:

Sondia Sallis
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7577

October 31, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Reply to Rep. Rudd on US Expulsion of 25 Soviets from Soviet Mission to the UN

The draft reply at Tab A updates a State draft for Congressman Rudd on the Administration's expulsion of 25 Soviets from the Soviet Mission to the UN.

At Tab I is a memo to Kathy Jaffke for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Kathy Jaffke.

Approve WRP Disapprove _____

JEM RKB SRS

Judyt Mandel, Ron Sable and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Kathy Jaffke
Tab A Proposed Reply to Rep. Rudd
Tab B Congressman Rudd's Letter
Tab C Your memo to State requesting draft response

WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

System II
90754
11/3/86

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II 8641 9
90754

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Jack Matlock

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

November 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: BOB LINHARD

SUBJECT: Memorandum for SecState on His Vienna Meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Attached at Tab I for your signature, is the memorandum that you had asked via PROFs note (see Tab A) be prepared as a TOR for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meetings in Vienna.

You should note that the attachment to Tab I includes the two items of guidance (on conventional force arms control and on the treatment of third country missiles) that we have recently sent to you for review and approval. We have already gotten your approval on the conventional force item -- but not on the item on third country missiles. These pieces of guidance are referenced in the next to last paragraph of your memorandum to the SecState in a way that would permit you to remove the item on third country missiles if we are not yet in a position to issue this as Presidentially approved guidance. If this is the case, you do need to physically remove this item from the attachment before releasing it.

We have been working with the State staff on the plans for the meetings and the materials to be used in Vienna. Attached at Tab II is a copy of the talking points and "draft directives" that State has prepared, annotated to reflect the changes that the NSC staff have asked by made in these materials. The plan would be to table the "draft directives" as a mechanism to achieve the objectives identified in the TOR memorandum (Tab I).

As far as JCS participation, we have discussed this with the JCS and they will likely send General Moellering. This would be a good solution to that problem.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Shultz today so that it (Tab I with its attachment) can be formally transmitted to him before his departure at 3 pm tomorrow.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Concurrence: Matlock, Kraemer, Brooks, Manley

cc: Cockell, Rodman

Attachments:

Tab I	--	Memorandum for Secretary Shultz (S)
Atch	-	Other Items of Guidance (S)
Tab A	--	PROFs Note Tasking (S)
Tab II	--	State Department Materials (S)

SECRET

SYSTEM II
90754

11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Based upon our earlier discussions, the President has reviewed the plans for your upcoming meetings in Vienna with the Soviet Foreign Minister. The President agrees that the U.S. objectives for these meetings are as follows:

1. consolidate the accomplishments made at Reykjavik by confirming Soviet agreement on those issues which we feel were resolved to our satisfaction;

2. clarify the U.S. and Soviet positions in the Defense and Space area;

3. pocket the positive aspects of General Secretary Gorbachev's remarks on verification;

4. press for making progress in START, INF and in other areas where common ground exists and resist Soviet attempts to link such progress to the Defense and Space area; and

5. confirm Soviet intent to press forward with planned activities in the non-arms control areas as agreed in Reykjavik. (S)

The President also agrees with our objectives in each of the individual areas discussed at Reykjavik. (U)

-- With respect to the areas of human rights, regional and bilateral issues, we should confirm the work plan developed in Iceland. (U)

-- In START, we should confirm the language agreed at Reykjavik, as well as the supporting understanding reached during the U.S./Soviet experts discussions concerning the implementation of the agreed language. (S)

-- In the INF and nuclear testing areas, we should seek Soviet agreement on the language that we have previously proposed. (S)

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

-- In the area of Defense and Space, we should:

a. note for the record the last U.S. proposal made in Reykjavik;

b. note for the record the last Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik;

c. identify the key differences between these positions to include:

1. that the Soviet position is more restrictive than the existing ABM Treaty;

2. that we differ on what further reductions should occur during the second five years of the ten-year period; and

3. that we require a clear statement that either side would be free to deploy advanced defenses against ballistic missiles after the ten-year period, unless mutually agreed otherwise. (S)

The most recent instructions to the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (documented in NSDD 249) provide the authoritative guidance needed in the START, INF and Defense and Space areas. NSDD 247 provides corresponding guidance in the area of nuclear testing. Also attached are other items of guidance recently approved by the President which will also be helpful to you. With these documents to draw upon as needed, we should be in an excellent position to pursue the objectives outlined above. (S)

The President agrees that, if we are successful in achieving our objectives in Vienna, there could be a statement issued as a result of the meeting. He also agrees that if we are not successful, we should make a concerted effort to present and explain the positions we have recently tabled in Geneva to the public in the U.S. and overseas. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

PROPOSED NEXT STEPS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL (U)

- We would propose to complete the High Level Conventional Task Force (CTF) report for NAC Ministers on December 11-12, to incorporate the following concepts. (U)

- At the NAC Ministerial, Ministers would (1) review the CTF report; (2) endorse the concept of alliance-to-alliance negotiations on Atlantic-to-the-Urals force reductions and limitations, as an essential element of the response to the Halifax mandate; (3) mandate the CTF to remain in existence both to complete details of preparing for such negotiations, and to become the directing body for developing and issuing coordinated "guidance" to the delegations at the negotiations, clearly understood to foreclose individual national positions at the negotiations, and (4) call for the Warsaw Pact to agree to meet at a Preparatory Conference (PrepCon) at a time and place mutually agreed, to establish terms of reference for such a negotiation.

- Subsequent to the NAC statement, the Allies would undertake two separate areas of action at the CSCE RevCon in Vienna, respectively concerning future negotiations within the CSCE framework on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and human rights, and outside the CSCE framework on force reductions, as follows:

  1 - Within CSCE Framework
  Call on the RevCon to mandate:

  a. A new CSBM negotiation, within the CSCE framework, as a follow on to CDE -- a kind of CDE II.

  b. A human rights negotiation, within the CSCE framework, of equal status to the above negotiation on CSBM.

  2 - Outside of the CSCE Framework
  Call on the RevCon to:

  a. take note of the importance of reductions in the forces of the two Alliances;

  b. encourage the two Alliances to establish negotiations for significant conventional force reductions and limitations from the Atlantic to the Urals; and

  c. invite such a negotiation to inform CSCE participants not parties to the negotiation periodically on progress in the negotiation. (S)

If the Warsaw Pact has responded before the end of the RevCon to the Western invitation, the RevCon could note the encouraging activity on the part of the two Alliances. If the Warsaw Pact does not respond promptly to our invitation, we should seek to have the RevCon urge the Warsaw Pact to respond. (C)

SECRET

15

Treatment of Third Country Nuclear Ballistic Missile Systems in U.S. Arms Control Proposals

The guidance below reflects the President's decision on how third country nuclear ballistic missile systems are to be treated in the context of our arms control proposals to the Soviets. (U)

The US would describe its position, if asked, as

(1) The proposals we have put forward to the Soviets concerning the reduction and elimination of offensive ballistic missiles in the next ten years are bilateral proposals, applying explicitly only to US and USSR systems. As the US has long stated, we do not propose to negotiate, now or in subsequent phases, for third countries (e.g. UK and France). That is a matter of national decision by the country involved. (S)

(2) Inherent in our proposals for eliminating US and USSR ballistic missiles is the point that both the US and USSR would then be free to deploy advanced defensive systems that would, as well as deter against retention of missiles by either the US or the USSR, provide protection against third country systems, of countries that now have or could acquire such systems. (S)

As a separate point, the US would be willing to support a UK/French position that offered to discuss, in future negotiations following deep US and USSR reductions, prospects for negotiating the level of their national nuclear forces in the context of agreements redressing the conventional imbalance which now favors the Warsaw Pact. The US would also support similar discussions involving the PRC, once again following deep US and Soviet reductions in strategic offensive forces. (S)

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

From: NSJMP --CPUA Date and time 10/28/86 13:16:02
To: NSREL --CPUA BOB LINHARD

16

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Shultz-Shevardnadze Vienna Meeting

Bob and Jack should plan to go with George for the meeting. You are both invited. I would like a memo from me to George prepared that I can send him before he goes. In a nice tactful way I want it to be essentially a TOR for the meeting. The objective of the meeting would be to confirm and try to get agreement on the issues that were agreed in Reykjavik and to try to separate them from the ABM/SDI issue.

Regional, Human Rights, Bi-lateral: confirm plan from Roz's group
- START: confirm language agreed in Reykjavik
- INF: agree on language we prepared in Reykjavik
- Nuclear Testing: agree on langauge we prepared
- ABM/SDI: note for the record our last proposal
  note for the record their last proposal
  note there are three fundamental differences
  1. more restrictive than ABM treaty
  2. difference in weapons reduced in second five years
  3. freedom to deploy at end of 10 years.

The memo should reference the NSDD on Geneva instructions. Will the NSDD on Nu clear Testing that Herrington referenced yesterday record our current position? If so we should get it out before Vienna and reference it.

My plan would be that if George is successful then there could be a statement out of that meeting. If not, I think he should go public with the positions we have tabled in Geneva.

George agrees with this plan.

cc: NSJFM	--CPUA	JACK MATLOCK	NSAGK	--CPUA	AL KEEL
NSWAC	--CPUA	BILL COCKELL	NSPWR	--CPUA	PETER RODMAN
NSRBM	--CPUA	ROD MCDANIEL	NSWRP	--CPUA	BOB PEARSON

OBJECTIVES:
1. CONSOLIDATE WHAT ACCOMPLISHED
2. SET DOWN US/SOV POSITIONS ON Def/SPACE
3. CAPTURE VERIFICATION -- BENEFIT
4. NON-ARMS CONTROL

- 2 MEETINGS - afternoon 5th
  morning 6th

~~First Version~~
NSC Staff Comments

SECRET/SENSITIVE 10/29/86

SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE TALKING POINTS

-- Ambassador Dubinin has told me you want this to be ambitious meeting, to consolidate progress made at Reykjavik and move forward.

-- President has said exactly same thing. We're ready.

-- Suggest appropriate first step would be to commit to paper everything on which there was common ground at Reykjavik -- in arms control and other aspects of our relations -- as well as positions of our two sides on issues where we have yet to find common ground.

-- With this done, we can then focus on remaining issues to see if some convergence is possible.

-- Resulting joint texts can form basis for agreements our leaders could sign.

Arms Control

-- Have with me draft texts for each of the three areas of nuclear and space talks and for testing, as well as for two supplementary areas.

-- Believe these texts accurately represent positions of our two sides; where there is no common ground, we've included in brackets positions of both sides.

-- Suggest we go through each to ensure they are in fact accurate and can provide basis for joint work.

START

-- START text is drawn from paper negotiated by experts and agreed to by leaders at Reykjavik.

-- It includes our agreement to 1600 delivery systems, 6000 warheads, certain counting rules for warheads, significant reductions in heavy missiles, and handling of SLCMs.

-- Have also included three general verification measures agreed to in principle in discussion of INF limits at experts meeting at Reykjavik; believe these measures should be acceptable for START as well.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

-- This represents a good amount of progress, but we should not be satisfied to stop here.

-- Our efforts on this text should focus on fleshing it out further.

-- We need sublimits to constrain particularly threatening systems, along lines both sides have been discussing. It was agreed at Reykjavik that negotiations on sublimits would continue.

-- Have proposed such sublimits in Geneva, taking into account Soviet views.

-- For example, the number we propose for ballistic missile warheads -- 4800 -- is the result of applying an earlier Soviet proposal -- 80% -- to the agreed warhead total of 6000.

-- We have also adjusted the numbers for the other sublimits in your direction.

-- Ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs, pose special threats to stability. Swift, accurate, they threaten the other side's forces. They must be subject to special sublimits.

-- Completion and implementation of a 50% reductions agreement should move forward; we should not hold it hostage to progress in other areas.

(If he returns to their proposal to cut strategic forces by 50% in each category.)

-- As we told you in Reykjavik, we cannot agree to 50% cuts in each category, since this would result in unequal levels.

-- At Reykjavik both sides agreed upon an approach to implement the concept of 50% reductions -- 1600 SNDVs, 6000 warheads, etc. Let's focus on that approach.

INF

-- INF text records our leaders' agreement on 100 warheads on LRINF missiles -- in the central USSR and in the US.

-- It also includes agreement of the two sides on general verification measures.

-- The INF agreement would remain in force until replaced by a new agreement calling for further reductions. This was part of your May 15 draft Treaty.

-- Text also incorporates both sides' positions on SRINF.

-- With regard to these systems, we can agree to your proposal to a freeze at current Soviet level. We also agree on prompt follow-on negotiations on reductions of systems of a range less than 1000 KM.

-- But we cannot agree to unequal levels for our two sides; US must be permitted same level as USSR.

-- Suggest our efforts on this text focus on resolving this question.

-- We have long agreed that an INF agreement should not be held hostage to agreements in other areas. Let's follow through and complete a text and put it in force, as an interim agreement if necessary.

Defense and Space

-- Defense and space text is drawn from final written proposal made by each side at Reykjavik.

-- Three crucial questions here -- duration of period of time for which we are prepared to commit not to withdraw from ABM Treaty; situation after that time; constraints during that time.

-- As for the first, we are prepared to undertake for 10 years (through 1996) not to exercise right of withdrawal from the Treaty.

-- Of course, in agreeing not to exercise this right, neither side would be forfeiting right to withdraw for reasons of supreme national interest, or to respond to a material breach, and we will want to make sure this is part of any agreement.

-- Prepared to meet your concerns through a more limited commitment not to withdraw for purposes of deploying advanced defenses.

-- Our delegation in Geneva is prepared to discuss this in detail. If you have other concerns, prepared to discuss them.

-- Turning to second question, we believe that at end of 10-year period, either side should be free to deploy defenses unless parties agree otherwise.

-- As for third question, we believe that during this 10-year period each side should strictly observe the provisions of ABM Treaty. (Note: broad interpretation.)

-- When ABM Treaty was negotiated, there was considerable discussion leading to agreement on what provisions of the Treaty permit and prohibit.

-- We are prepared to set forth our view in detail. We are also prepared to listen to your view of what the Treaty permits and prohibits.

-- We both have programs. Ours is entirely compliant with the provisions of the Treaty, and will continue to be.

-- We cannot agree to make the Treaty more restrictive than the agreement signed in 1972.

-- One additional issue reflected in this text -- nature of arms reductions in second five-year period.

-- We propose elimination of remaining ballistic missiles; not only would this remove all weapons capable or potentially capable of a surprise first strike, it would also resolve your concern that ballistic missile defenses could be used to degrade your deterrent.

Moving Beyond Initial Reductions

-- In order to move toward very low levels of nuclear weapons, we must, of course, recognize need to address concerns that require maintenance of a nuclear deterrent today. We should be able to record this recognition in agreed language.

-- Dealing successfully with these other concerns will be necessary if we are to move beyond initial phase of 50% cuts in START and an interim INF agreement. We must begin to deal with them now.

-- These steps should come as no surprise. We discussed them last year when I visited Moscow, and President cited them when he answered General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal of January 15.

-- They include such necessary steps as establishment of a balance in conventional forces, an effective worldwide ban on chemical and biological weapons, and a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime. Eventually, we must also consider the involvement of other nuclear powers.

-- And, of course, further efforts to reduce arms will be greatly influenced by a relaxation of tensions in various regions of the world where conflicts now exist.

-- THEREFORE As for eliminating all strategic nuclear weapons, or indeed all nuclear weapons, as is President's vision, these remain steps beyond what we are considering here today.

Verification

-- General Secretary Gorbachev made a number of points in Reykjavik on verification and its importance with which we can agree.

-- This too should be recorded.

-- Our agreement on need for effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed must be implemented with concrete measures in each agreement.

-- Language in directives on START, INF, and Defense and Space is completely consistent with this text.

-- Would like to emphasize importance of inspections; am pleased that your side now recognizes that importance.

-- Use of inspections can solve problems as they arise and give both sides confidence that agreements are being honored.

-- It makes no sense to arbitrarily limit number of inspections, since we cannot now predict frequency of problems.

-- Purpose of such inspections is to give each side confidence in integrity of agreements.

-- Suggest we add language to effect that agreements will provide for use of inspections to resolve problems that may arise and give confidence in compliance with obligations assumed.

Nuclear Testing

-- Text on nuclear testing reflects our agreement on negotiations on testing, except for how those negotiations should be characterized.

-- Negotiations would begin promptly. The first item on the agenda would be to resolve the verification problems with the 1974 and 1976 agreements.

[Once these problems are resolved* ~~and the treaties ratified~~]

22

-- We would then immediately proceed to address further step-by-step limitations on nuclear testing in parallel with the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, leading ultimately to cessation of testing. [We are prepared to say that publicly.]

-- Let's see if we can bridge the semantics gap, and move forward on this issue as we progress in other areas.

Next Step

-- Have a team of arms control experts with me; know you have brought some as well.

-- Suggest we turn these texts over to them to see what progress they can make, for our review tomorrow.

-- With sufficient progress, we might consider releasing at least some of the texts as a consolidation of US-Soviet understandings; I have some possible language for an appropriate chapeau.

(0516a)

-- As we have stated before, a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective to be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend upon nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved deep, broad, and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and a greater balance in conventional forces.

*(FYI: BY "RESOLVED" WE WOULD PREFER THAT THE VERIFICATION ISSUE ASSOCIATED WITH TTBT/PNET HAS BEEN ELIMINATED AND THE TREATIES ARE RATIFIED. AS A MINIMUM, BY "RESOLVED" WE WOULD EXPECT PROTOCOLS NEEDED TO BE FINALIZED AND AGREED BY BOTH SIDES PENDING RATIFICATION.)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

10/29/86

DIRECTIVES ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Having considered during their working meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986, the state of affairs with respect to strategic offensive arms and having drawn the positions of the two countries substantially closer together, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have agreed to direct their countries' Foreign Ministers to prepare the text of a document based on the key provisions set out hereunder, for signature in Washington during the official visit to the United States of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on (date).

1. The sides shall reduce their strategic offensive arms by fifty percent, taking into account historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the sides' strategic forces, as follows:

a. The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 1600.

b. The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 6000. For the purpose of counting warheads pursuant to this limit, each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs or short-range attack missiles shall count as one warhead and each long-range air-launched cruise missile carried by a heavy bomber shall count as one warhead.

c. Within this framework, reductions shall apply to all types of strategic offensive arms, including a significant number of heavy missiles. Both sides retain the right to propose additional sublimits within the limits specified in paragraphs a. and b. above.

d. The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting deployment of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles.

2. The sides in the course of negotiating a treaty to codify the above reductions and limitations shall agree to measures which permit effective verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific verification measures shall include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

3. Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the sides shall negotiate other appropriate constraints.

4. On all matters relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms the sides will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

(0512a)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

10/29/86

DIRECTIVES ON INTERIM REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Having considered during their working meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986, the state of affairs with respect to strategic offensive arms and having drawn the positions of the two countries substantially closer together, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have agreed to direct their countries' Foreign Ministers to prepare the text of a document based on the key provisions set out hereunder, for signature in Washington during the official visit to the United States of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on (date).

1. The sides shall, as an interim step, reduce their strategic offensive arms by fifty percent, taking into account historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the sides' strategic forces, as follows:

DECL: OADR

a. The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 1600.

b. The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 6000. For the purpose of counting warheads pursuant to this limit, each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs or short-range attack missiles shall count as one warhead and each long-range air-launched cruise missile carried by a heavy bomber shall count as one warhead.

c. Within this framework, reductions shall apply to all types of strategic offensive arms, including a significant number of heavy missiles. Both sides retain the right to propose additional sublimits within the limits specified in paragraphs a. and b. above.

d. The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to limiting deployment of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles.

2. The sides in the course of negotiating a treaty to codify the above reductions and limitations shall agree to measures which permit effective verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific verification measures shall include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

3. Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the sides shall negotiate other appropriate constraints.

4. The agreement resulting from these negotiations shall remain in force until superseded by a later agreement calling for further reductions in strategic offensive arms.

5. On all matters relating to the problem of strategic offensive arms the sides will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

10/29/86

DIRECTIVES ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS

Having considered during their working meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986, the state of affairs with respect to intermediate-range nuclear arms and having drawn the positions of the two countries substantially closer together, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have agreed to direct their countries' Foreign Ministers to prepare the text of a document based on the key provisions set out hereunder, for signature in Washington during the official visit to the United States of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on (date).

1. The sides shall reduce their intermediate-range nuclear missiles of longer range to an equal global limit of 100 warheads on these missiles. The 100 warheads on the Soviet side shall be deployed in the central USSR; the 100 on the US side shall be deployed in the United States.

DECL: OADR

2. The sides shall agree to concurrently [constrain][1] [freeze][2] deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles of shorter range [to the current Soviet level of ___. Constraints on these missiles shall take into account their capabilities and reflect equality between the US and the Soviet Union.][1] [at current levels.][2] Negotiations on reductions in missiles with a range less than 1000 kilometers shall begin within six months of completion of a treaty incorporating the elements described herein.

3. The sides in the course of negotiating a treaty to codify the above reductions and limitations shall agree to measures which permit effective verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific verification measures shall include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

1 US proposal
2 Soviet proposal

4. The sides shall agree to a reductions schedule such that the above limits will be reached within five years. The limits will remain in effect until superseded by an agreement providing for further reductions.

5. Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the sides shall negotiate other appropriate constraints.

6. On all matters relating to the problem of intermediate-range nuclear arms the sides will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

(0495a)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

10/29/86

DIRECTIVES ON DEFENSE AND SPACE ARMS

Having considered during their working meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986, the state of affairs with respect to defense and space arms and their relationship to reductions in offensive arms, and having drawn the positions of the two countries substantially closer together, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have agreed to direct their countries' Foreign Ministers to prepare the text of a document based on the key provisions set out hereunder, for signature in Washington during the official visit to the United States of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee on (date).

1. The sides shall undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration. During that period, the sides shall strictly observe all the provisions of the ABM Treaty, while continuing research, development and testing, which are

DECL: OADR

permitted by the Treaty, and shall reduce offensive arms as outlined below. [The testing in space of all space components of anti-ballistic missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories.][2]

2. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by fifty percent.

3. During the following five years of that period, the remaining [offensive ballistic missiles][1] [fifty percent of the strategic offensive arms][2] of the two sides shall be eliminated [~~[as an interim step leading toward the elimination of all nuclear arms]~~[1].]

4. Thus, by the end of 1996, all [offensive ballistic missiles][1] [strategic offensive arms][2] of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated.

5. At the end of this ten-year period, [either side shall be allowed to deploy advanced strategic defenses if it so chooses, unless the sides agree otherwise.][1] [the two sides shall, in the succeeding several years, find in the course of negotiations further mutually acceptable solutions in this field.][2]

1 US proposal
2 Soviet proposal

6. The sides in the course of negotiating a treaty to codify the above reductions and limitations shall agree to measures which permit effective verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific verification measures shall include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

7. Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the sides shall negotiate other appropriate constraints.

8. On all matters relating to the problem of defense and space arms and their relationship to reductions in offensive arms, the sides will negotiate having regard for their mutual interests and concerns, and displaying a political will to reach agreement.

(0513a)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

* HOLD ON TABLING THIS PENDING DISCUSSION - CHANGES NEEDED.

10/30/86

35

DIRECTIVES ON KEY CONSIDERATIONS

IN MOVING BEYOND INITIAL REDUCTIONS

The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union hold as an ultimate goal the elimination of nuclear weapons. Toward this goal, arms reductions agreements must ensure stability and confidence at every step along the way. This requires an appreciation of the relationship between the nuclear balance and a complex of other critical security and arms control questions, including the need for a stable balance of conventional forces, for an effective worldwide ban on chemical and biological weapons, for a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime, and for a corresponding effort to relieve tensions in various regions where conflicts currently exist. The United States and Soviet Union agree that they will, in conjunction with their respective allies, work urgently on these issues in the recognition that their resolution will be critical to reductions of nuclear arms beyond those CURRENTLY envisioned THROUGH 1996. [~~for the first phase~~]

(0526a)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

SECRET/SENSITIVE

10/29/86

DIRECTIVES ON VERIFICATION

Having considered during their working meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986, the importance of verification to the arms control process and having drawn the positions of the two countries substantially closer together, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have agreed to the following directives on verification:

1. The sides agree that they are now engaged in a concrete process aimed at arriving at agreements and they recognize that verification has an important part to play in this process.

2. The sides recall their commitment at Geneva that during the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon.

DECL: OADR

3. They stress that effective verification is necessary to achieve far-reaching and enduring agreements leading to greater peace and an improvement of the international situation.

4. The sides agree that verification provisions will be strict, well defined and will ensure that both sides will have confidence in the observance of agreements reached.

5. Consequently, both sides are prepared to implement effective verification by any means necessary. Specific verification measures shall include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

(0521a)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

10/29/86

DIRECTIVES ON NUCLEAR TESTING

Having considered during their working meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986, the state of affairs with respect to nuclear testing, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have agreed to begin negotiations on [nuclear testing][1] [the cessation of nuclear testing][2]. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the US and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.

1 US proposal
2 Soviet proposal

(0496a)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

SECRET/SENSITIVE 10/29/86

REPORT OF US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDINGS

In their discussions at Reykjavik, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had as their aim the development of instructions to Foreign Ministers to be transmitted to their respective negotiators. The understandings that emerged in Reykjavik, and which have been developed and reconfirmed here in Vienna, are as follows.

(0518a)

chron
40

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Tass Article on Gorbachev Meeting With Tofflers and Other Writers/Cultural Figures

Attached at Tab A is a Tass report as translated by FBIS on Gorbachev's meeting on October 21 with several Western cultural figures. FBIS translated the report as it appeared in the October 22 Literaturnaya Gazeta, but the same report appeared in that day's Pravda.

The meeting included: "Albin Toffler and Haide Toffler," Arthur and Inga Miller, "writer James Baldwin and actor David Baldwin," Peter Ustinoff and Claude Simon.

Tass reports that Gorbachev said that "There is the need...to awaken the conscience and responsibility of each person for the destinies of peace." Reykjavik "showed that it is possible to reach agreements which would set the beginning to the elimination of nuclear weapons." Soviet proposals open rather than close the door for mutually acceptable solutions.

Speaking on "the restructuring processes and changes under way" in the USSR, "Gorbachev dwelt on the spread of questions concerning the country's socioeconomic development, democracy, and broad publicity. Soviet intelligentsia -- and this is very important -- has vigorously joined the restructuring process, and not simply joined, but became its fervent advocate."

Prepared by:
R. Scott Dean

GORBACHEV MEETS CULTURAL WORKERS IN KIRGHIZIA

PM211529 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Oct 86 p 1

[Text] Moscow October 20 TASS -- Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 20 October received a group of prominent cultural workers who had attended an international meeting in Kirghizia at the invitation of Soviet author Chinghiz Aitmatov.

Taking part in the conversation were writer James Baldwin and actor David Baldwin, both of the United States, writer Yasar Kemal of Turkey, president of the Club of Rome Alexander King of Britain; composer Omer Livanelli of Turkey, public figure Federico Mayor of Spain, composer Naroyan Menon of India, writer Arthur Miller and artist Inga Miller, both of the United States, writer Lisandro Otero of Cuba, writer Claude Simon of France, artist Afework Tekle of Ethiopia, philosophers Albin Toffler and Haide Toffler of the United States, writer and actor Peter Ustinoff of Britain, member of the UNESCO secretariat Augusto Forti of Italy and writer Chinghiz Aitmatov of the Soviet Union, president of the Issyk-Kul Forum.

At the meeting, which passed in a frank and friendly atmosphere, there was an exchange of views on a wide range of problems of our time dealing with the destinies of peace, civilization and culture.

The participants in the conversation noted that at the Issyk-Kul forum they discussed many outstanding problems faced by mankind today and which it can encounter tomorrow. They said that creative intelligentsia could make a substantial contribution to the molding of a new thinking meeting the goals of the progress of mankind on the threshold of the third millenium.

In his speech Mikhail Gorbachev noted that he readily decided to respond to the wish to meet him expressed by the cultural personalities. He congratulated the participants in the Issyk-Kul forum with success and wished that this forum, which he described as a good beginning, be kept going.

"The advantage of your meeting," Mikhail Gorbachev said further, "is that it has been attended by most different people. But they have been able to rise above everything that divides them and reach consensus on the principal issue -- the issue of everyone's responsibility for the future of mankind. This is a lesson for all others."

"Way back at the beginning of this century Vladimir Lenin voiced an idea of a tremendous depth when he said that general human values took priority over the tasks of this or that class. The significance of this thought is felt especially keenly today. It is very desired that in the other part of the world too they understand and accept the thesis about the priority of the general human values over all others to which some or other people are committed."

"Mankind has always had enough reason, courage and conscience to sort out the reasons behind these or other upheavals. This often happened, alas, only after the misfortunes had happened. Just imagine the kind of world we would enjoy today if people had been able to ward off a misfortune in time whenever it was on their threshold."

"We have all drawn lessons from the past and, overcoming hardships and privations, have all risen to our feet again and marched forward, choosing our own roads. But only imagine what will happen if we fail to fend off the nuclear threat looming large over our common human home. If this happens, there would no longer be a possibility to rectify mistakes. Now we have really reached the critical moment in history when it is obvious that the fatal danger can only be removed by joint effort."

There is the need to speak at the top of one's voice about the concerns of our time, jointly to conduct the search for necessary solutions in consolidating the peaceful present and future, to awaken the conscience and responsibility of each person for the destinies of peace.

Man is, ultimately, what is all-important. If progress in some or other area is accompanied by human losses -- not only spiritual or political but also physical ones -- the system which allows for such losses should be called in question. Civilization with all its difficulties and contradictions should be preserved for life, for man. And if mankind lives, it will sort out contradictions this way or another.

Mikhail Gorbachev shared his impressions of the meeting with the U.S. President in Reykjavik. This meeting, he stressed, showed that it is possible to reach agreements which would set the beginning to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The program of new proposals put forward by the USSR opens rather than closes the door to the quest for mutually acceptable solutions. It provides the real opportunity to unlock the deadlock. But the meeting showed at the same time that no small difficulties should be overcome on the road towards agreements.

One of the principal lessons of Reykjavik is that a new political thinking, corresponding to the realities of the nuclear age, is the indispensable condition for breaking out of the critical situation in which mankind has found itself at the turn of the 20th century. Deep modifications in the political thinking of the entire human community are needed.

The spiritual energy of scientists and cultural personalities, their intellectual and moral authority can be instrumental in shaping this new thinking. The Issyk-Kul forum fully confirms this.

Speaking about the restructuring processes and changes under way in our country, Mikhail Gorbachev dwelt on the spread of questions concerning the country's socioeconomic development, democracy, and broad publicity.

Soviet intelligentsia -- and this is very important -- has vigorously joined the restructuring process, and not simply joined, but became its fervent advocate. All of our society was set in motion and this movement is gaining momentum.

In conclusion, the cultural personalities cordially thanked Mikhail Gorbachev for the conversation.

Chron
8646 43

7767

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Clearing All TDY Travel to US Embassy Moscow Through State

At Tab I is a memo from Rod McDaniel to US agencies to require them to clear all temporary travel to our Embassy in Moscow through the Soviet desk at State. State has asked that we do this in light of the Soviets' withdrawal of all Soviet workers from the Embassy and the Soviet threat to reduce severely the number of USG TDY travelers to the Embassy. It would not prevent those on exchange programs from traveling to the Soviet Union, nor affect non-government travel. (C)

State's request seems very reasonable to me in light of the situation. It seems particularly important that if the Soviets will limit the number of TDY workers at the Embassy/Consulate, we coordinate to send our most important TDYers first. I recommend that you authorize Rod McDaniel to issue the directive. (U)

Dave Major had some concerns with the original memo. He was out today but the new draft should take care of his concerns. (LOU)

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memo at Tab I instructing agencies to clear all TDY travel to the US Embassy in Moscow with State. (LOU)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

RSO for TC RSO for JM SRS

Ty Cobb, John Lenczowski, Judyt Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo from McDaniel to US agencies
Tab A Platt-Poindexter Memo
Tab B State Draft for McDaniel Memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

8647 44

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7767

November 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Mr. Floyd Gaibler
Confidential Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Mr. Richard Meyer
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

Mr. Beryl Sprinkel
Chairman
President's Council of Economic Advisers

Mr. John H. Rixse
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Mrs. Helen Robbins
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Commerce

Mr. William von Raab
Commissioner
U.S. Customs Service

Colonel David R. Brown
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Mr. William Vitale
Department of Energy

Mr. Fitzhugh Green
Associate Administrator of International
Activities
Environmental Protection Agency

Mr. William H. Draper, III
President and Chairman
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.

Mr. James Geer
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Ms. Janice Obuchowski
Assistant to the Chairman for
International Communications
Federal Communications Commission

Mr. Charles Siegman
Senior Associate Director Division of
International Finance
Federal Reserve Board

Mr. Terence C. Golden
Administrator
General Services Administration

Mr. James J. Delaney
Executive Secretary
Department of Health and Human Services

Mr. Stephen Gleason
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of the Interior

Captain Joseph C. Strasser, USN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Stephen Galebach
Senior Special Assistant to the
Attorney General
Department of Justice

Mr. Dennis Whitfield
Under Secretary-
Department of Labor

Mr. Richard Barnes
Director of International Affairs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Mr. Samuel Chilk
Secretary of the Commission
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

[redacted]
National Security Agency

MR. JAMES GEER
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

MR. BODA BARTOCHA
Division Director
Division of International Programs
National Science Foundation

MR. WILLIAM H. DRAPER, III
President and Chairman
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.

MS. JANICE OBUCHOWSKI
Assistant to the Chairman for
International Communications
Federal Communications Commission

MR. CHARLES SIEGMAN
Senior Associate Director Division of
International Finance
Federal Reserve Board

[redacted]
National Security Agency

MR. WILLIAM VON RAAB
Commissioner
U.S. Customs Service

SUBJECT: TDY Travel to the USSR

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose a ceiling on U.S. TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we reduce non-essential TDY travel to Moscow and reduce the number of official delegations and visitors requiring Embassy services.

All U.S. agencies planning official travel to the Soviet Union should clear travel plans with the Office of Soviet Union Affairs of the Department of State, which will coordinate the plans with Embassy Moscow. Travel plans should be submitted in writing to EUR/SOV, Room 4225, The Department of State, (647-8956, 647-8670). The Office of Soviet Union Affairs will work with concerned agencies to establish a regular mechanism to facilitate the coordination of TDY travel over the longer term.

This memorandum complements the President's Directive of February 22, 1982, on foreign travel, which requires that travel by government officials at the level of Assistant Secretary or above be approved by the National Security Adviser.

The Embassy will make every effort to provide as much support as possible. However, it will be unable to give its customary level of visitor support for the present. While the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations, ticketing, check cashing, and snack bar/commissary support will not be available from the Embassy, they normally can be obtained through Intourist. Exchange visitors should arrange to rely on their Soviet host organizations or Intourist for these services.

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

8633312

48

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 7767

October 25, 1986 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Clearing TDY Visitors to Embassy Moscow

In light of the Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The withdrawal of local employees and consequent need to restructure staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for an indefinite time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on US TDY travel will require us to examine all such travel carefully. We recognize that this will pose operational difficulties for US agencies in Moscow but only close coordination of TDY travel will enable us to meet basic USG objectives and equally distribute the burdens involved.

We request that the NSC issue the attached directive requiring that all US agencies clear prospective TDY travel with the Department of State, which will coordinate these plans with Embassy Moscow. The Department of State will work with concerned agencies to establish mechanisms for clearing and coordinating TDY travel to the USSR.

In addition, all agencies with programs and exchanges in the USSR should be aware that the Embassy will normally not be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticketing arrangements, check cashing facilities and snack bar or commissary support. Exchange visitors whose support will be provided by Soviet host organizations may proceed to the USSR but they should not expect any of these services from Embassy Moscow.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NLRR F06-114/5 #8662 Decl:Oadr
BY CH NARA DATE 11/29/07

CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTED DRAFT

TO: Executive Secretaries

All Executive Branch Agencies

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of official delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The withdrawal of Soviet locals and consequent need to restructure Embassy Moscow staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for an indefinite ~~period of~~ time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on TDY travel to Moscow requires that all such travel be carefully coordinated.

DECL: OADR

All US agencies planning official travel to the Soviet Union should clear travel plans with the Office of Soviet Union Affairs of the Department of State, which will coordinate these plans with Embassy Moscow. Travel plans should be submitted in writing to EUR/SOV, Room 4225, The Department of State (647-8956; 647-8670). The Office of Soviet Union Affairs will work with concerned agencies to establish a regular mechanism to facilitate the coordination of TDY travel over the long term.

In addition, all agencies with programs and exchanges in the USSR should be aware that the Embassy will normally not be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticketing arrangements, check cashing facilities and snack bar or commissary support. Exchange visitors whose support will be provided by Soviet host organizations may proceed to the USSR but they should not expect any of these services from Embassy Moscow.

51

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

OCT 26 P2:23

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 7767

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 27 October

- ☐ Prepare Memo For President
- ☒ Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Keel
- ☐ Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- ☐ Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* *PHONE** to action officer at ext. 5112

	FYI		FYI		FYI
☐	☐ Brooks	☐	☐ Lavin	☐	☐ Ross
☐	☐ Burghardt	☐	☒ Lenczowski	☐	☐ Sable
☐	☐ Burns	☐	☐ Levine	☐	☐ Sachs
☐	☐ Cannistraro	☐	☐ Linhard	☐	☐ Saunders
☐	☐ Childress	☐	☐ Mahley	☐	☒ Sestanovich
☐	☒ Cobb	☐	☒ Major	☐	☐ Small
☐	☐ Danzansky	☐	☐ Mandel	☐	☐ Sommer
☐	☐ deGraffenreid	☐	☐ Matlock	☐	☐ Soos
☐	☐ Dobriansky	☐	☐ May	☐	☐ Stark
☐	☐ Donley	☐	☐ Mingle	☐	☐ Steiner
☐	☐ Douglass	☐	☐ Morton	☐	☐ St Martin
☐	☐ Farrar	☐	☐ Murdock	☐	☐ Tahir-Kheli
☐	☐ Grimes	☐	☐ North	☐	☐ Teicher
☐	☐ Hanley	☐	☐ Perry	☐	☐ Thompson
☐	☐ Kelly	☐	☐ Platt	☐	☐ Tillman
☐	☐ Kissell	☐	☐ Pugliaresi	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Kraemer	☐	☐ Raymond	☐	☐ _____
☐	☐ Laux	☐	☐ Reger	☐	☐ _____

INFORMATION

- ☒ McDaniel
- ☒ Rodman
- ☐ Poindexter (advance)
- ☒ Pearson
- ☒ Cockell
- ☐ Keel (advance)
- ☒ Secretariat
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

Not to copy but to attach to our Xerox copy of 7767

This is State's draft as approved by everyone except Majors.

524

TO: Executive Secretaries

All Executive Branch Agencies

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail all non-essential TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of official delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The new situation means that the withdrawal of Soviet locals and ~~consequent~~ need to restructure Embassy Moscow staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for the present and ~~an indefinite period of time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on TDY travel to Moscow requires that all such~~ TDY travel will have to be carefully coordinated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

Therefore

All US agencies planning official travel to the Soviet Union should clear travel plans with the Dept of State's Office of Soviet Union Affairs ~~of the Department of State~~, which will coordinate these plans with Embassy Moscow. Travel plans should be submitted in writing to EUR/SOV, Room 4225, The Department of State (647-8956; 647-8670). The Office of Soviet Union Affairs will work with concerned agencies to establish a regular mechanism to facilitate the coordination of TDY travel over the long term.

In addition, all agencies with programs and exchanges in the USSR should be aware that the Embassy will ~~normally~~ not now be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticketing arrangements, check cashing facilities and snack bar or commissary support. Such services can normally be obtained through Intourist. Exchange visitors whose support will be provided by Soviet host organizations may proceed to the USSR but they should ~~not expect~~ be aware that the Embassy cannot provide any of these services ~~from Embassy Moscow.~~ and they will have to rely on their Soviet host organization or Intourist.

For Judyt Mandel
for ~~From~~ Scott Dean X6959
For clearance ASAP
Amb. Matlock asked if you could review this before we send it out for formal clearance.

54

CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTED DRAFT

TO: Executive Secretaries

All Executive Branch Agencies

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail all non-essential TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of official delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The withdrawal of Soviet locals and consequent need to restructure Embassy Moscow staffing patterns means that the new set means Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for the present and ~~an indefinite period of time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on TDY travel to Moscow requires that all such~~ TDY travel will have to be carefully coordinated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

55

CONFIDENTIAL

Therefore, All US agencies planning official travel to the Soviet Union should clear travel plans with the Dept of State's Office of Soviet Union Affairs ~~of the Department of State~~, which will coordinate these plans with Embassy Moscow. Travel plans should be submitted in writing to EUR/SOV, Room 4225, The Department of State (647-8956; 647-8670). The Office of Soviet Union Affairs will work with concerned agencies to establish a regular mechanism to facilitate the coordination of TDY travel over the long term.

In addition, all agencies with programs and exchanges in the USSR should be aware that the Embassy will ~~normally~~ not now be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticketing arrangements, check cashing facilities and snack bar or commissary support. Such services can normally be obtained through Intourist. Exchange visitors whose support will be provided by Soviet host organizations may proceed to the USSR but they should ~~not expect~~ be aware that the Embassy can not provide any of these services ~~from Embassy Moscow.~~ and they will have to rely on their Soviet host organization or Intourist.

For ~~Ty~~, John, Dave Major, Steve Sestanovich SE
For your clearance by COB today (Wed 29th)
From Scott Dean X6959
CONFIDENTIAL (Amb Matlock has not yet seen.)

SUGGESTED DRAFT

Peter! This is more up your alley.

TO: Executive Secretaries

All Executive Branch Agencies

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail all non-essential TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of official delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The new situation means that the withdrawal of Soviet locals and ~~consequent~~ need to restructure Embassy Moscow staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for the present and ~~an indefinite period of time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on TDY travel to~~ Moscow requires ~~that~~ all TDY ~~such~~ travel will have to be carefully coordinated.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECL: OADR

Therefore,

All US agencies planning official travel to the Soviet Union should clear travel plans with the Department of State's Office of Soviet Union Affairs ~~of the Department of State~~, which will coordinate these plans with Embassy Moscow. Travel plans should be submitted in writing to EUR/SOV, Room 4225, The Department of State (647-8956; 647-8670). The Office of Soviet Union Affairs will work with concerned agencies to establish a regular mechanism to facilitate the coordination of TDY travel over the long term.

In addition, all agencies with programs and exchanges in the USSR should be aware that the Embassy will ~~normally~~ not now be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticketing arrangements, check cashing facilities and snack bar or commissary support. Such services can normally be obtained through Intourist. Exchange visitors whose support will be provided by Soviet host organizations may proceed to the USSR but they should ~~not expect~~ be aware that the Embassy cannot provide any of these services ~~from Embassy Moscow.~~ and they will have to rely on their Soviet host organization or Intourist.

I'm hoping my printer will actually work when we reprint this for final - please ignore the crooked letter. 8648 58

7767

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October ? 8, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK
SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Clearing All TDY Travel to US Embassy Moscow Through State

At Tab I is a memo from Rod McDaniel to US agencies ~~to~~ requiring them to clear all temporary travel to our Embassy in Moscow through the Soviet desk at State. State has asked that we do this in light of the Soviets' withdrawal of all Soviet workers from the Embassy and the Soviet threat to reduce severely the number of USG TDY travelers to the Embassy. It would not prevent those on exchange programs from traveling to the Soviet Union, nor affect non-government travel. (C)

~~State's request seems very reasonable to me in light of the situation and I recommend that you authorize Rod McDaniel to issue the directive. (U)~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memo at Tab I instructing agencies to clear all TDY travel to the US Embassy in Moscow with State. (LOU)

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Ty Cobb, John Lenczowski, Dave Major, Judyt Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo from McDaniel to US agencies
Tab A Platt-Poindexter Memo
Tab B State Draft for McDaniel Memo with handwritten NSC changes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

8633312

59

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 7767

October 25, 1986 CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Clearing TDY Visitors to Embassy Moscow

In light of the Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The withdrawal of local employees and consequent need to restructure staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for an indefinite time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on US TDY travel will require us to examine all such travel carefully. We recognize that this will pose operational difficulties for US agencies in Moscow but only close coordination of TDY travel will enable us to meet basic USG objectives and equally distribute the burdens involved.

We request that the NSC issue the attached directive requiring that all US agencies clear prospective TDY travel with the Department of State, which will coordinate these plans with Embassy Moscow. The Department of State will work with concerned agencies to establish mechanisms for clearing and coordinating TDY travel to the USSR.

In addition, all agencies with programs and exchanges in the USSR should be aware that the Embassy will normally not be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticketing arrangements, check cashing facilities and snack bar or commissary support. Exchange visitors whose support will be provided by Soviet host organizations may proceed to the USSR but they should not expect any of these services from Embassy Moscow.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Decl:Oadr

For Ty, John, Dave Major, ~~Steve Sestanovich~~ ✓
For your clearance by COB today (Wed 29th)
From: Scott Dean X6959
CONFIDENTIAL (Amb Matlock has not yet seen.)

SUGGESTED DRAFT

Fine. SRS

TO: Executive Secretaries

All Executive Branch Agencies

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail all non-essential TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of official delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The withdrawal of Soviet locals and consequent need to restructure Embassy Moscow staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for the present and ~~an indefinite period of time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on TDY travel to Moscow requires that all such~~ TDY travel will have to be carefully coordinated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

For Ty, John, Dave Major, Steve Sestanovich et al
For your clearance by COB today (Wed 29th)
From Scott Dean X6959
CONFIDENTIAL (Amb Matlock has not yet seen.)

SUGGESTED DRAFT

Scott -
This looks good to me.
Thanks,
- John L

TO: Executive Secretaries

All Executive Branch Agencies

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail all non-essential TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of official delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The withdrawal of Soviet locals and consequent need to restructure Embassy Moscow staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for ~~an indefinite period of time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on TDY travel to Moscow requires that all such~~ the present and TDY will have to travel be carefully coordinated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

8649 62

7767

Need to reprint

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 8, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK
SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Clearing All TDY Travel to US Embassy Moscow Through State

At Tab I is a memo from Rod McDaniel to US agencies to require them to clear all temporary travel to our Embassy in Moscow through the Soviet desk at State. State has asked that we do this in light of the Soviets' withdrawal of all Soviet workers from the Embassy and the Soviet threat to reduce severely the number of USG TDY travelers to the Embassy. It would not prevent those on exchange programs from traveling to the Soviet Union, nor affect non-government travel. (U)

State's request seems very reasonable to me in light of the situation and I recommend that you authorize Rod McDaniel to issue the directive. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memo at Tab I instructing agencies to clear all TDY travel to the US Embassy in Moscow with State. (LOU)

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Ty Cobb, John Lenczowski, Dave Major, Judyt Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo from McDaniel to US agencies
Tab A Platt-Poindexter Memo
Tab B State Draft for McDaniel Memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

8650 #3

MSG FROM: NSRSD --CPUA TO: NSPMC --CPUA 10/30/86 09:

To: NSPMC --CPUA

*** Resending note of 10/30/86 09:44
To: NSPWR --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 10/29/86 18:53
NOTE FROM: David Major
Subject: Moscow Staffing
STATE'S MEMO"CLEARING TDY VISITORS TO EMBASSY MOSCOW"
I AGREE WITH JUDTY, THE SOVIET'S HAVE BEEN AGGRESSIVELY SURVEILLING OUR PEOPLE IN MOSCOW, HERE THE FBI IS BEING AS SENSITIVE AS POSSIBLE AND IN FACT A FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP EXISTS ON THE STREET. STATE SOV APPEARS TO BE PREPARED TO MAKE THE SITUATION OUT SO BAD WE WILL TURN ON OURSELVES JUST TO FULLFILL THEIR PREDICTIONS. EXAMPLE IS THE DRAFT MEMO ON TDY WITH LANGUAGE LIKE "curtail tdy travel to Moscow", "sharply reduce delega and visitors whose programs could have a negative impact on the Embassy facilities" THEY ARE IN BUSINESS TO PROVIDE FACILITIES, THESE COMMENTS SE A VERY NEGATIVE ATMOSPHERE AND CERTAINLY NOT AN UP BEAT CAN DO ATTITUDE. COMMENTS LIKE"ALL AGENCIES WITH PROGRAMS AND EXCAHNGES IN THE USSR should be aware the embassy will not normally be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticket arrangements check cashing facilities snack bar or commissary support"
THIS MEMO IS NOT NECESSARY. IT LOOK LIKE STATE IS SAYING "SEE I TOLD YOU SO" THE WORLD IS GOING TO HELLIN A HAND CART
THE SOVIETS ARE NOT SENDING OUT GLOOM AND DOOM INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR AGENCIES.
I OPPOSE SENDING THIS MEMO, UNLESS IT IS DRAMATICALLY CHANGES TO BE UPBEAT IN TONE.

cc: NSTC --CPUA
SESTANOV--VAXB
NSRSD --CPUA
NSWAC --CPUA
NSJFM --CPUA
NSJL --CPUA
NSKED --CPUA
NSDGM --CPUA

For Amb. Motlock — 64A

For your approval to send out ASAP so you can send up a final text to Poindexter before you leave [redacted] with the Secretary (unless you prefer to wait so that you are around while the Admiral considers it.) Scott

64B

Lets try to move it today. (Keel can sign for JMP — or they can "day com" it to him —

Jack

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Nov. 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVE MAJOR

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Memo to Agencies on Immediate Travel to Embassy Moscow

Thanks for your prof note. Please take a look at the new draft below. I believe it addresses the concerns you mentioned earlier. I'd prefer not having to send up a split recommendation, but do intend to send up something today or Tuesday.

Everyone else has cleared State's draft with the modifications you saw earlier. I believe that given the Soviet actions, it is necessary to coordinate US travel to Moscow and Leningrad. If the Soviets intend to limit the number of TDYers traveling to work at the Embassy, we should make sure we are sending our most important TDYers first.

Please get back to me today on this. Thanks.

Draft for memo to Exec Secs

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose a ceiling on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we reduce non-essential TDY travel to Moscow and reduce the number of official delegations and visitors requiring Embassy services.

All US agencies planning official travel to the Soviet Union should clear travel plans with the Office of Soviet Union Affairs of the Department of State, which will coordinate the plans with Embassy Moscow. Travel plans should be submitted in writing to EUR/SOV, Room 4225, The Department of State, (647-8956, 647-8670). The Office of Soviet Union Affairs will work with concerned agencies to establish a regular mechanism to facilitate the coordination of TDY travel over the longer term.

The Embassy will make every effort to provide as much support as possible. However, it will be unable to give its customary level of visitor support for the present. While the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations, ticketing, check cashing and snack bar/commissary support will not be available from the Embassy, they normally can be obtained through Intourist. Exchange visitors should arrange to rely on their Soviet host organizations or Intourist for these services.