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DOC	TYPE	DATE	PAGES	CLASS.
1	Paper		3	
	Subject:	The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Paper I) (originally titled Role of the CPSU)		
	To:	R 6/21/06 NLSF00-009/1 #1		
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			
2	Paper		5	
	Subject:	The Soviet Military (originally titled The USSR: Civil-Military Relations) (Paper V)		
	To:	R " " #2		
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			
3	Paper		4	
	Subject:	No Title [re Soviet Military] (no page 1)		
	To:	R " " #3		
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			
4	Paper		4	
	Subject:	Nomenklatura: The USSR's Patronage System (paper IV)		
	To:	R " " #4		
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			

COLLECTION: Matlock, Jack F.

SERIES: USSR Subject Files

FOLDER TITLE: Action [Drafts of papers re USSR] (1)

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DOC	TYPE	DATE	PAGES	CLASS.
5	Paper		3	
	Subject: Nomenklatura: The USSR's Patronage System			
	To: R	6/21/06	NSFOU-009/1	#5
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			
6	Paper		5	
	Subject: The Soviet Political Police			
	To: R	"	"	#4
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			
7	Paper		5	
	Subject: The Soviet Military			
	To: R	"	"	#7
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			
8	Paper		5	
	Subject: The Soviet Political Police			
	To: R	"	"	#8
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			
9	Paper		4	
	Subject: Nomenklatura: The USSR's Patronage System			
	To: R	"	"	#9
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			
10	Paper		3	
	Subject: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union			
	To: R	"	"	#10
	From:			
	Restriction : FOIA(b)1			

COLLECTION: Matlock, Jack F.

SERIES: USSR Subject Files

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NAME OF PAPER ON DISKETTE

paper I

Paper II

Paper 3

paper IV

paper V

Paper VI

paper VII

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- put in consistent format
- title all copies & underlined
- description upper left



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Party members all belong to a ~~primary~~ party organization at their place of work. There are 426,000 of these primary party organizations in the Soviet Union, and they exist in every factory, office, farm, school, military unit — in short, in every organized unit in the society.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union

ROLE OF THE CPSU

The Communist Party is the core institution of the Soviet political system, focus of the levers of power and prestige in the USSR. Every branch of the bureaucracy--state, economic, military and police--is subordinated to its control. At the same time, the party is the guardian and interpreter of the Marxist ideology and responsible for indoctrinating the population with the ideas and values of Soviet-style communism.

The CPSU now numbers over 18 million members (including 700,000 candidates, i.e., probationers), encompassing about 6 percent of the adult population. The party does not solicit adherents; it chooses its members. Prospective candidates are carefully screened. Each must be recommended by three persons who have already been party members for at least five years. White-collar workers are prime targets for recruitment. They made up close to half of the membership in 1983, even though accounting for only a quarter of the general population.

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~~Of about 426,000 primary party organizations, 110,000 are in factories, transportation, and the like, while 48,000 are on farms. The remainder are in various institutions, administrative offices, and military formations. Each CPSU member is expected to stimulate production within his own primary organization; these units in turn provide the central authorities with a vehicle for constant pressure on lower echelon officials.~~

Every member has the duty to "master Marxist-Leninist theory, raise his ideological level, and contribute to the molding and rearing of the man of communist society." The political training of communists ranges from short-term evening and correspondence courses to the university-level Higher Party School in Moscow which has a regular four-year curriculum. Training at fulltime party schools is regarded as so important that middle-aged officials holding responsibilities as great as those of the governor of an American state are sent to the schools before being given new assignments.

Mass Organizations

Several mass organizations exist outside the party framework, but operate under its close and direct supervision. The Communist Youth League, Komsomol, is the most important of these. Its 41-million membership includes a majority of the country's adolescents (aged 14-18) and a substantial minority of the 19-26 age group. The Komsomol not only serves to indoctrinate the youth but it is also a testing and screening agency for prospective CPSU members. Furthermore, the Youth League exercises tutelage over the Pioneers, the organization to which all children of primary school age (10-15) belong.

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The Soviet trade unions, with some 130 million members, serve the party by stimulating production and prompting "socialist emulation," competitive campaigns aimed at raising productivity. They also administer social insurance funds, and to a limited extent defend worker rights. Other mass organizations effectively run by the party include the Knowledge Society (Znaniye), an adult-education body with over 1 million members, and DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy), which fosters military-type sports for civilians and school children.

Party Structure

Theoretically, the CPSU's sovereign organ is the Party Congress which, by statute, meets every five years. It is a gathering of some 5000 delegates which, among other functions, is responsible for policymaking in the interim between congresses. The Central Committee (470 members - 319 full and 151 alternates) in turn formally elects the members of smaller executive bodies to handle the day-to-day -- in particular the Politburo for policy decision, and the Secretariat to oversee and control party and government operations.

elects the Central Committee which is

In practice, however, these two latter bodies are in reality the decision making organs of the party, the peak of the CPSU's nearly perfect bureaucratic pyramid. The Politburo and Secretariat control the appointment of the regional secretaries throughout the country and, through them, the lesser secretaries down to the lowest echelons. The Secretariat sends binding "recommendations" for major personnel changes to the non-Russian republics or regional-level party offices, and often has its executives monitor the electoral plenums at those levels which implement its "recommendations."

The whole process of electing the party committee^s that choose the secretaries at each level is actually controlled by the very secretaries who are supposed to be elected by those same subordinates. Each non-Russian republic or regional party headquarters has an Organizational Party Work Department to manage the process. And the top leadership in Moscow controls the election of delegates to the sovereign party congress, which, through the Central Committee it elects, technically elects the General Secretary.

In the 5-year intervals between congresses, supreme authority in the CPSU is formally delegated to the Central Committee to which most of the important officials of the USSR belong. They are drawn from all segments of the bureaucracy, but most come from the party apparatus itself. (The party apparatus is the body of fulltime officials that arranges implementation of decisions, manipulates elections and controls discussions in party meetings.)

The Central Committee's brief and infrequent plenary meetings (two-three per year) rule out its management of day-to-day

decision-making. Consequently, the real focus of Soviet power is the Politburo. It is now composed of 13 voting members and 5 alternates, and meets weekly (usually on Thursday afternoons) to discuss and decide on major issues. The General Secretary (Gorbachev) is de facto chairman of the Politburo, which in recent years has seemed to reach most of its decisions by consensus.

The Party Secretariat -- a sort of NSC staff estimated to have as high as 10,000 employees -- sets the Politburo agenda, provides the requisite documentation and oversees implementation of Politburo decision. Of the 11 Secretaries, Gorbachev, Ligachev and Ryzhkov are full Politburo members; 2 of the 5 Politburo alternates are also central party Secretaries. (Six Party Secretaries hold no status in the Politburo).

With the exception of the General Secretary, each of the Secretaries exercises supervision over a specific sphere of operations. He does so via departments of the Secretariat which run parallel to all major state bodies and administer key areas of Soviet society and foreign affairs. A crucial function of the Secretariat's Organizational Party Work Department, for example, is controlling the assignments of the high -- and medium-level personnel to party and Komsomol organizations, as well as to State and trade union agencies.

Equally close to the heart of party operations are the Secretariat departments for ideology and indoctrination. These include the Propaganda, Culture, and Science and Educational Institutions Departments. Their function is to assure that every medium for conveying of ideas is actively and properly promoting the objectives of the regime.

Personal rivalries and frictions permeate the CPSU. Corruption is known to be rife from top to bottom. And there has been an increasing tendency among the youth to regard the Komsomol as a boring and restrictive institution. Nevertheless, the CPSU has succeeded in creating a strong amalgam of self-interest and pride in achievement which binds many to the Soviet system. Gorbachev is clearly eager to overhaul the party apparatus to make it more responsive to economic management, committed to reform and to rejuvenate its ranks. But neither he nor the apparatchiki have any intent of introducing changes that threaten to loosen their present grip on every facet of Soviet life.

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THE SOVIET MILITARY

The USSR: Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations in the Soviet Union are replete with paradox. The military as an institution is a dominant force in national security decision-making, yet it is also under party control. *fiam*

Civilian authority sets the broad outlines of defense policy but relies almost exclusively on military expertise to elaborate the military-technical side of strategy and doctrine. On military planning and technical assessments, there is no civilian counterweight to the General Staff.

Despite its internal bureaucratic politics, interservice rivalries, and long history of alliances and intrigues between individual military and civilian leaders, there is no evidence that the military has ever plotted to take power. The military as an institution has not aspired to rule. Nevertheless, it has sought to protect its own interests and professionalism.

In recent years, military figures have been much in the limelight. It has been primarily the arms control process and the civilian leadership's need for expert opinion which has put them there.

Anti-Bonapartist Tradition

There is a longstanding tradition of the importance of military power in Soviet life. Externally, Russian and now Soviet security and position in the world have rested primarily on military strength. Domestically, both Tsars and General Secretaries have played up military values and, when possible, their own military careers in order to buttress personal and regime authority.

Yet the military establishment itself is subject to more rigorous political controls than any other institution in the Soviet system. In both pre-and post-revolutionary societies, the military has been subservient to political authority.

This seeming inconsistency -- on the one hand, the Soviets emulate military values and, on the other, distrust the military as an institution -- reflects an anti-Bonapartist tradition in Soviet and Russian history. Indeed, the Bolsheviks who took power in 1917 frequently used analogies to the French revolution to discuss political developments in Russia, including the danger of a man on horseback taking over the revolution.

This wariness of the military stems in part from traditional revolutionary distrust of standing professional armies. Marx and Engels viewed standing armies as the tools of the 19th century monarchic-bourgeois states. Although their doctrine eventually evolved to strongly supporting the idea of a class-based revolutionary force, they left undefined the role of the armed forces in a post-revolutionary socialist society.

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Lenin did not reconcile himself to the need for a standing army until after the 1917 revolution, and even then the Bolsheviks' first order of business was to destroy the old army. The early Bolsheviks moved cautiously in building the new Red Army, emphasizing the principles of voluntary recruitment and elected commanders -- thus nullifying efforts to turn the new army into an effective fighting force. When War Commissar Trotsky, with Lenin's approval, finally undertook to transform the Red Army into a centralized, efficient professional force, he also incorporated the idea of political officers at every rank who could check the actions of their military counterparts.

Checks and Balances

Today, a set of extensive institutional arrangements is in place intended to ensure civilian control over the military.

--The Main Political Administration (MPA) is the party's political watchdog in the armed forces. As Trotsky envisaged, political officers are assigned to every level down to battalion and in general act as representatives of the party. Although the MPA reports to the Ministry of Defense, it also functions as a distinct department of the CPSU Central Committee and is ultimately accountable to the Politburo for the military's political reliability.

--In addition to the MPA network, party and Komsomol membership is encouraged and widespread -- over ninety percent of officers and enlisted men belong to one or the other of these bodies.

--On top of all this, the KGB maintains its own secret agents throughout the military establishment.

These arrangements underscore the continuing importance for Soviet leaders of political loyalty over military interests. The gravest charge made against Marshal Zhukov before his fall from grace in 1957 was that he had sought to eliminate party control. More recently, Marshal Ogarkov's demotion from Chief of Staff a year ago was accompanied by intimations that he harbored "unpartylike tendencies."

Civil-Military Interaction at the Top

Even though it is under Party Control, the military is one of the most highly organized and influential interest groups in the USSR. It has effectively used this influence to protect its own general interests (with regard to resource allocation, for instance) and professionalism.

Nevertheless, the military has only played an ancillary role in Soviet leadership consideration of broader policy questions. This is partly attributable to the fact that in upper levels of the party, the military carries relatively little weight. Only two professional military leaders have been full Politburo members: Zhukov (1956-57) and Grechko (1967-76). Ustinov, who succeeded Grechko as Defense Minister in 1976, was a civilian Politburo member who had spent his entire career dealing with defense production and was only given the military rank of Marshal when he became Defense Minister. The present Defense

Minister, Marshal Sokolov, is a long-time career military officer. He was promoted to candidate member of the Politburo in April 1985, but is widely regarded as a transitional figure with little political clout.

Likewise, the military's representation on the Central Committee is minimal. In 1981, only 30 professional military officers were candidate or full members, about six percent of total Central Committee membership.

The party's predominance over the military has allowed civilian leaders to meddle in military affairs at times. Stalin, ~~of course~~, decimated the high command in the purges of the late 1930s, and after WWII moved quickly to reduce Marshall Zhukov's stature.

Khrushchev Zhukov later regained his influence under Khrushchev. In 1957, Zhukov as Defense Minister was instrumental in helping the ~~First Secretary~~ put down a challenge from the ~~"anti-party group."~~ *Ris collapse the Politburo* Khrushchev, however, soon ousted his erstwhile ally and undertook to overturn measures instituted under Zhukov to bolster professional autonomy within the armed forces. Khrushchev even sought to intervene personally in the formulation of military strategy, though he did not attempt to create an institutional rival to the General Staff.

Gorbachev Continues the Tradition

Gorbachev presumably assumed the function of chairman of the Defense Council (where actual decision-making on national security issues -- including arms control -- appears to be centered) and, in effect, supreme commander-in-chief when he became General Secretary. Events over the past year do not suggest that the military has enjoyed greater ~~than~~ usual influence as a result of the civilian leadership transition.

Although Gorbachev has pushed for increased industrial investment as the number one priority in the next five-year plan (1986=90), he has also spoken out against cutting defense programs. At a June Central Committee meeting, he reaffirmed that "requisite funds" for the country's defense would be maintained. In his V-E Day address, Gorbachev stated that the importance of a "military-political" upbringing for Soviet citizens was growing.

Following the July 1 removal of Grigoriy Romanov as the CPSU Secretary responsible for military affairs, Gorbachev has moved vigorously to assert his leadership in this sphere. On July 10 he delivered an address to an unusual meeting of top military officers in Minsk and immediately afterward a number of key changes in military personnel began surfacing. Following the pattern of his personnel appointments in the civilian sphere, he replaced several older military leaders with younger -- in some cases relatively junior -- people.

--Army General Yepishev, 77, was replaced as head of the MPA by 57-year-old Colonel General Lizichev. Lizichev was promoted over several more senior officers in the MPA.

--Army General Maksimov, age 61, has apparently replaced 70-year-old Tolubko as head of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

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Together with Yepishev, Tolubko has been put out to pasture at the Main Inspectorate of the MOD.

--Army General Lushev, previously commander of the Moscow military district, replaced army general Zaytsev as head of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

--The replacement of 74-year-old Makeyev, the editor of the military paper Krasnaya Zvezda since 1955, removed another pillar of the military establishment.

There have also been reports that 74-year-old Defense Minister Sokolov is sick and perhaps on the way out. Whatever the case, the Soviet press reported that Sokolov was present at Gorbachev's meeting with the high command of the Belorussian military district on July 10.

The Soviet Military: Coming of Age

The military has gradually assumed a more important role in national security decision-making over the past two decades and, in the process, has assumed a higher public profile. This has largely been due to the arms control process and increasingly sophisticated weaponry which have generated the civilian leadership's need for more military expertise and advice. The military has consequently also become more involved in decision-making on arms control itself. Because of the General Staff's technical expertise and its function, in effect, as executive secretariat to the Defense Council, the military is well positioned to argue its views and try to shape the internal debate in this area.

In the early days, the role of the military in the arms control process appeared to be limited to exercising a veto option over any given proposal, after which it stepped back. In the first SALT negotiations, sensitive information on the Soviet side appeared to be strictly compartmented and there was little interaction between military and civilian elements. When Ogarkov was a member of the Soviet delegation in the early 1970s, he once appealed to an American negotiator not to discuss classified information in front of Soviet civilian team members,

In recent years, however, the Soviets seem to have adopted more of an American style in the internal arms control process. Now the military is much more involved in interacting on an ongoing basis with other components of the Soviet national security structure both in Moscow and on the various negotiating teams in Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm. The MFA has its own stable of arms control experts, and the major Soviet negotiating teams are all led by diplomats with many years of negotiating experience. ~~teams are all led by diplomats with many years of negotiating experience.~~

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American deployment would upset this balance, with Defense Ministry officials taking the lead in its public formulation.

Both former Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov and now his successor Akhromeyev, as well as Col. Gen. N.F. Chervov, head of the Defense Ministry's arms control directorate, have been active public spokesmen for Soviet positions. Far from staying in the background, as would have been traditionally expected, they have been at the cutting edge of publicly developing and explicating Soviet positions.

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NOMENKLATURA: THE USSR'S PATRONAGE SYSTEM

Structure

The Soviet institution of nomenklatura amounts to an encyclopedia of "plum books." Its rules dictate that all key jobs throughout the USSR -- in the party bureaucracy, government, economy, cultural life, military or academic establishments, even agriculture -- be reserved for candidates picked and approved by the supervisory party organ. Stalin developed this system of personnel patronage as a vehicle for gaining control of both party and society. His successors have enlarged on it to such an extent that it has no real parallel in the noncommunist world. The Soviet party machine has greater power in co-opting, black-balling and ejecting personnel than does the most exclusive club in the west. Inside, one is entitled to a lifestyle befitting the position; outside, one is relegated to the "masses," to scramble as the average Soviet for an existence. Ousted from the system one is excluded from even marginal benefits available to the masses.

The so-called nomenklatura are the elite of the USSR, the most prominent and best rewarded people in each professional group, all the decision and policymakers. They fall into various categories:

- a) The political elite, consisting of the leaders of the party apparatchiki.
- b) The managerial elite, who actually operate the government, the economy, the armed forces, the police apparatus, and other parts of the Soviet system.
- c) The cultural and scientific elite, the artists, scientists, writers, performers, and scholars.

These groups differ in political influence, social status, prominence, and rewards. The political elite are those in the Communist hierarchy who enjoy decisive influence. The managerial elite, though not without political power, essentially occupies nonpolitical career tracks. Although the cultural and scientific elite wields relatively little political influence, it enjoys greater prominence: members of this group are often more visible and better paid than are the managers or political leaders.

The political and managerial elite are known in Soviet parlance as "leadership cadres". All in all they are estimated to number around 4 million. About 500,000 are top-level bureaucrats, half of them in the party apparatus itself. Another 500,000 hold government positions. Some 2 million are the economic managers who are regarded as the cream of the economic and technical intelligentsia. The rest occupy management or supervisory positions ranging from shop stewards to kolkhoz chairmen.

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NLS

FOUO-009/1 #4

a. CN NARA, DATE 6/21/06

Getting Ahead

Ability and expertise are only one element in getting to the top in Soviet society. Conformity with the current party line and mastery of the techniques of maneuvering within the system on the one hand, plus personal patronage from within the nomenklatura itself on the other, are the aids on which the ambitious rely.

The leaders of the USSR have long viewed economic efficiency and consumer satisfaction as matters of secondary importance. Their primary objective has always been a maximization of the national power of the USSR. And the consolidation, expansion and preservation of their own power is justified as a means to that end. That in turn justifies the higher income and perquisites of the ruling class. ✓

Life Style

The nomenklatura by and large enjoy a life style well above the drab level of reality faced by the average Soviet citizen. The upper crust has its cars and special access to goods and services. Its members move in a tight, private universe of suburban dachas, downtown co-operative apartments, exclusive clubs and vacation resorts. The sons and daughters have preferred access to the better schools and often intermarry. Those further down the pecking order have similar special stores, housing, resorts and benefits befitting their rank.

Money income is the least important advantage of making it in the USSR. The real boons derive from a compendium of tangible and intangible privileges: greater freedom, better medical care, the opportunity to travel abroad and ready access to domestic and imported goods unavailable to the average citizen at any time. ✓

Many in the ruling class experience such a sheltered existence they have not the faintest idea how the rest of the country really lives. Others -- the collective farm chairmen for example -- are ~~not~~ more directly exposed but still are far better off than their non-nomenklatura associates. ✓ Gorbachev has spearheaded a drive against the isolation of the apparatchiki from the masses, but the privileges of the Gorbachevs will unquestionably remain palatial by Soviet standards. Nor is there any real popular resentment of the advantages enjoyed by Raisa and the other "wives of" since their life style is not flaunted before the public. The gap between the elite and the masses is studiously ignored by the media.

Other Side of the Coin

The material advantages enjoyed by the power elite would be reduced if a larger share of the national product were to be

allocated to economic investment and mass consumption. As a result, the economic managers' advocacy of greater recognition of economic factors and for greater professional autonomy constantly runs into opposition from the political decision makers.

Even deeper is the tension between the ruling elite and the prestigious intellectuals who advocate greater individual freedom and more personal property. Although many cultural figures are conformists and as jealous of their perks as the power elite, some have advocated an easing of the internal control system under the rubric of "de-Stalinization." One of their targets is the party apparatus and its total domination of the elite structure. The party ideologists for their part are determined to keep a tight rein on the social sciences and the arts; they see their mission as the preservation of doctrinal purity which in turn justifies the rule of the party, and of course, their own privileged existence.

A generational conflict has also been developing within the nomenklatura itself, given the marked age difference between the CPSU leadership and its rank and file. While about 40 years of age (6.9 million), there is no one under 50 in the top leadership at all. And while men and women are represented about equally within the educated strata of Soviet society, only 9 women are full members of the Central Committee. (Women makeup 27 percent of the party membership.) Nor is any woman now included in the party's supreme leadership.

United We Stand

The interests of the nomenklatura are diverse: there are orthodox and pragmatic conservatives as well as moderate reformers within the policymaking bodies of the regime. They are frequently at odds among themselves, usually over questions which affect the status of different groupings within the nomenklatura itself. But there is no open opposition at any level or within any group to the system per se. After all, careers, lifestyle, future, and family well-being are all dependent on and a function of that system.

For the sake of efficiency, Gorbachev apparently is prepared to make certain concessions to dissatisfied elements of the elite. He has urged more operational autonomy for lower managerial personnel, and encouraged creative artists to be more

realistic in their portrayals of life. The younger generation and women have been promised a larger role in the conduct of political affairs. In the field of domestic policy, the pressure is on for less cronyism and nepotism and more specialized knowledge and expertise as the major criterion for advancement. ✓
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~~of the~~ nomenklatura, and any basic reform of the system would threaten its power and its perks. Whatever changes Gorbachev might introduce -- and even the smallest will run into opposition from some quarter -- the nomenklatura as a whole will insist on retaining control of the social processes in the USSR. It cannot do otherwise and still preserve communist rule in the USSR.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NOMENKLATURA: THE USSR'S PATRONAGE SYSTEM

Structure

The Soviet institution of nomenklatura² amounts to an encyclopedia of "plum books." Its rules dictate that all key jobs throughout the USSR -- in the party bureaucracy, government, economy, cultural life, military or academic establishments, even agriculture -- be reserved for candidates picked and approved by the supervisory party organ. Stalin developed this system of personnel patronage as a vehicle for gaining control of both party and society. His successors have enlarged on it to such an extent that it has no real parallel in the noncommunist world. The Soviet party machine has greater power in co-opting, black-balling and ejecting personnel than does the most exclusive club in the west. Inside, one is entitled to a lifestyle befitting the position; outside, one is relegated to the "masses," to scramble as the average Soviet for an existence. Ousted from the system one is excluded from even marginal benefits available to the masses.

The so-called nomenklatura² are the elite of the USSR, the most prominent and best rewarded people in each professional group, all the decision and policymakers. They fall into various categories:

- a) The political elite, consisting of the leaders of the party apparatchiki.
- b) The managerial elite, who actually operate the government, the economy, the armed forces, the police apparatus, and other parts of the Soviet system.
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CIS NARA, DATE 6/21/06

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THE SOVIET POLITICAL POLICE

Lenin created the "Sword and Shield of the Revolution"--the Cheka--to crush domestic opposition and to protect the Bolshevik party from its enemies, using any and all means, including terror. By any standard, the Cheka succeeded brilliantly and bloodily. Its present-day incarnation, the KGB, has become one of the three pillars of the Soviet regime, the other two being the party and the military.

There is no American analog for the KGB: apart from a political role which would be unthinkable in a democracy, it has the functions of the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, the NSA, the EPS, and it has two divisions of heavily armed troops. The KGB also controls resources and uses tactics which in the US could only be likened to those of organized crime. Because of strict Soviet secrecy, no accurate figure on personnel strength is available for the secret police or even for the regular police.

Historical Background

The Cheka has strong roots in Russian history. Stalin in his he gave favorable publicity to Tsar Ivan the Terrible's equivalent institution, the Oprichnina which ruthlessly and bloodily suppressed the Tsar's enemies. Although much subdued compared to its 16th century predecessor, the Tsarist Okhrana was the main persecutor of the Bolsheviks prior to the 1917 Revolution.

Soviet propaganda on the glamor and romance of the Cheka goes back to its early period under Felix Dzerzhinskiy when it launched "Red Terror" against the Bolsheviks' domestic and foreign enemies. This was the time when Operation Trust snared the feared British agent Sidney Reilly and when "Iron Felix" and his underlings were hailed as the "knights of the Revolution."

Its image worsened in the 1930s when the secret police participated in Stalin's assaults against the peasantry and destroyed the Old Bolsheviks and the Red Army's officer corps. Led by such men as Yagoda and Yezhov, it doomed millions to forced labor in the GULAG forced labor camps under inhuman conditions and with appalling casualty rates. During World War II it conducted a successful espionage effort against the Nazis and created a special wartime disciplinary unit known as SMERSH (Death to Spies). The GULAG population was at a peak--an estimated 15 million--in the postwar reconstruction period, swollen by captured Axis prisoners and Soviet victims of Stalin's harsh policies.

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CN NARA, DATE 6/21/06

The KGB's Political Role after Stalin

Following the execution of Lavrentiy Beriya after Stalin's death in 1953, the KGB gradually became intertwined with leadership politics and has at key moments played a role in leadership successions.

As the agency which provides the leadership with bodyguards and secure communications, the KGB could also isolate the top leader at a critical moment. When the Politburo members in October 1964 chose to oust Khrushchev, the conspirators took care to prevent Khrushchev from mobilizing his allies (as he had done in June 1957). The party secretary for security, Alexander Shelepin, called upon his protege, the KGB chief at that time, to cut off Khrushchev's communications from his vacation dacha to Moscow. After the coup Khrushchev was flown back to Moscow and expelled from the Politburo.

The KGB's resources were used in 1982 by Yuriy Andropov (who gained the political police job after Brezhnev's successful power play against Shelepin in 1967) to mount a campaign aimed at capturing the succession from Brezhnev's putative heir Chernenko. Andropov undertook in March 1982 a widely leaked investigation of corruption on the part of Brezhnev's political supporters and even Brezhnev's daughter Galina. Andropov's goal was to taint Brezhnev's associates and to demonstrate that Brezhnev could no longer protect his followers. The most publicized target was Galina Brezhneva's association with the colorful Boris the Gypsy, a shady figure involved in underworld jewel dealings. The campaign was successful; Andropov left the KGB when he acquired the party secretaryship in May. Memories of the 1930s are still strong enough that he could not move directly from the KGB into Brezhnev's shoes.

The Gorbachev-KGB Link

As his health declined, Andropov pushed Gorbachev as his successor but could not determine the succession. During Chernenko's reign, the KGB's disappointment and vexation over having lost its moment of glory with the death of Andropov was widely bruited. It was equally clear that the KGB as an institution sided with Gorbachev, viewing him as Andropov's heir. Its loyalties were repaid upon Gorbachev's accession in March of this year. Chebrikov, brought into the KGB with Andropov in 1967 and named by him as KGB chief in 1982, was promoted to full member of the Politburo this April, obviously as a member of Gorbachev's ruling coterie.

Two members of the Politburo--Chebrikov and Aliyev, who was the Azerbaydzhan KGB chief until he became the republic party chief--have had professional experience in the KGB. Obviously, KGB prestige and influence are now high and its relations with Gorbachev are demonstrably supportive.

The Public's View of the KGB

Not surprisingly, the Soviet public's attitude toward the KGB is quite unlike that of Western public opinion, which is uniformly hostile to it as a repressive agency with an extraordinarily bloody past. With the exception of hardened Soviet dissidents who have dealt with low-level KGB operatives, the Soviet public tends to accept the high status and glamor accorded the KGB in the media. There is an entire school of literature, films, and TV glorifying the espionage and counter-intelligence role of the KGB. But the public's respect for the KGB rests largely on fear.

The KGB's Domestic Security Role

Like the party, the KGB is virtually everywhere in Soviet society. There are KGB units on every level of government. Every major factory and institution has its "first department" which handles security matters, including employee clearances and access to classified information. The KGB official who sits on every party committee probably has the last word on security issues, and even a republic first secretary is bound to respect the KGB representative on the republic party bureau.

As a true political police, KGB local units have a widespread net of informers who report on their fellow workers and neighbors. Citizens are encouraged to report deviant speech and behavior to the authorities. Unauthorized assemblies and publications are searched out and terminated, sometimes with significant criminal penalties for the participants.

The KGB has organized special units to monitor religious organizations and nationalist activities. A voluminous literature exists abroad on these activities in addition to the documentation of the KGB suppression of political dissent and control over emigration.

The political police function extends to the armed forces in which a net of secret informants reports on moods and attitudes among the troops. Any security incident draws the attention of KGB investigators.

In addition to their security responsibilities, the KGB has special police jurisdiction over cases involving large amounts of foreign currency, gold, and jewels. This conveniently permitted Andropov in 1982 to investigate the scandals involving Brezhnev's daughter Galina. Otherwise, the regular police, headed by Brezhnev's crony Shchelokov, could have whitewashed the affair.

KGB Influence over the Civilian Police

The KGB under Andropov began an extensive purge of the regular police following the ouster of MVD minister Shchelokov in December 1982. (Shchelokov was disgraced and reportedly committed suicide in December 1984 to avoid a trial for corruption.) The regular police or MVD is now headed by a former KGB official and several other KGB officials were transferred to the MVD's top leadership. In addition, a new political administration was created in the MVD and a large number of party members were detailed to police work in an effort to purge and upgrade the police, which is now playing a larger role in Gorbachev's anti-corruption and anti-alcohol campaigns. There is no question about the superior status of the KGB compared to the MVD and its ability to intervene in the jurisdiction and processes of the MVD and the courts, but there is also a strong history of bad relations between the two police agencies which occasionally erupts in ugly incidents.

Foreign Intelligence and Counter Intelligence

Abroad, the KGB is especially active in intelligence collection--political, military, technical--under diplomatic, journalistic, and business cover. It is without doubt the world's largest and most active intelligence service, and it also draws upon the resources of its Warsaw Pact allies to complement its intelligence effort abroad.

KGB foreign reporting goes independently of foreign ministry reporting to Moscow where it is coordinated and submitted to the Politburo. KGB activities and reporting partly parallel and duplicate those of the Defense Ministry's Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) and inevitably there is rivalry between the two.

The KGB also engages in covert action "active measures," agent-of-influence operations, clandestine support of foreign political parties, and forgeries and bribery to get press placement of Soviet materials.

KGB counterintelligence work most often shows up in public accounts of agent arrests and the declaration of foreign diplomats persona non grata, but some of the counter-intelligence materials published in the Soviet press must be put into the prophylactic propaganda category, aimed primarily at Soviet citizens. However, Western diplomats in Moscow and Leningrad are primary, but not sole, targets of KGB counter-intelligence efforts. Heavy surveillance, active attempts to penetrate the staff and buildings, and the creation of effective obstacles between Soviet citizens and foreigners are permanent elements in the KGB's operations.

Soviet Views of the KGB

^{which} Soviet dissidents who have faced KGB harassment see it as the regime's arm of repression, ~~often arbitrary in its actions.~~

^{seem to} Most Soviet citizens regard the KGB as a necessary part of a well-ordered state. While Soviet citizens ~~regard the media, with some of the skepticism that Americans have for advertising,~~ ^{are skeptical regarding their} the flood of books, films and TV glorifying the KGB's exploits in counter-intelligence and intelligence leaves its impression. But the public's respect for the KGB still rests mostly on fear.

Careerists look upon the secret police as an avenue for upward mobility. The KGB successfully recruits the cream of university graduates for careers in overseas intelligence work, careers often under diplomatic and journalistic guise which are regarded as more rewarding and interesting than most.

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THE SOVIET MILITARY

Civil-military relations in the Soviet Union are replete with paradox. The military as an institution is a dominant force in national security decision-making, yet it is also under firm party control.

Civilian authority sets the broad outlines of defense policy but relies almost exclusively on military expertise to elaborate the military-technical side of strategy and doctrine. On military planning and technical assessments, there is no civilian counterweight to the General Staff.

Despite its internal bureaucratic politics, interservice rivalries, and long history of alliances and intrigues between individual military and civilian leaders, there is no evidence that the military has ever plotted to take power. The military as an institution has not aspired to rule. Nevertheless, it has sought to protect its own interests and professionalism.

In recent years, military figures have been much in the limelight. It has been primarily the arms control process and the civilian leadership's need for expert opinion which has put them there.

Anti-Bonapartist Tradition

There is a longstanding tradition of the importance of military power in Soviet life. Externally, Russian and now Soviet security and position in the world have rested primarily on military strength. Domestically, both Tsars and General Secretaries have played up military values and, when possible, their own military careers in order to buttress personal and regime authority.

Yet the military establishment itself is subject to more rigorous political controls than any other institution in the Soviet system. In both pre-and post-revolutionary societies, the military has been subservient to political authority.

This seeming inconsistency -- on the one hand, the Soviets emulate military values and, on the other, distrust the military as an institution -- reflects an anti-Bonapartist tradition in Soviet and Russian history. Indeed, the Bolsheviks who took power in 1917 frequently used analogies to the French revolution to discuss political developments in Russia, including the danger of a man on horseback taking over the revolution.

This wariness of the military stems in part from traditional revolutionary distrust of standing professional armies. Marx and

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Engels viewed standing armies as the tools of the 19th century monarchic-bourgeois states. Although their doctrine eventually evolved to strongly supporting the idea of a class-based revolutionary force, they left undefined the role of the armed forces in a post-revolutionary socialist society.

Lenin did not reconcile himself to the need for a standing army until after the 1917 revolution, and even then the Bolsheviks' first order of business was to destroy the old army. The early Bolsheviks moved cautiously in building the new Red Army, emphasizing the principles of voluntary recruitment and elected commanders -- thus nullifying efforts to turn the new army into an effective fighting force. When War Commissar Trotsky, with Lenin's approval, finally undertook to transform the Red Army into a centralized, efficient professional force, he also incorporated the idea of political officers at every rank who could check the actions of their military counterparts.

Checks and Balances

Today, a set of extensive institutional arrangements is in place intended to ensure civilian control over the military.

--The Main Political Administration (MPA) is the party's political watchdog in the armed forces. As Trotsky envisaged, political officers are assigned to every level down to battalion and in general act as representatives of the party. Although the MPA reports to the Ministry of Defense, it also functions as a distinct department of the CPSU Central Committee and is ultimately accountable to the Politburo for the military's political reliability.

--In addition to the MPA network, party and Komsomol membership is encouraged and widespread -- over ninety percent of officers and enlisted men belong to one or the other of these bodies.

--On top of all this, the KGB maintains its own secret agents throughout the military establishment.

These arrangements underscore the continuing importance for Soviet leaders of political loyalty over military interests. The gravest charge made against Marshal Zhukov before his fall from grace in 1957 was that he had sought to eliminate party control. More recently, Marshal Ogarkov's demotion from Chief of Staff a year ago was accompanied by intimations that he harbored "unparty-like tendencies."

Civil-Military Interaction at the Top

Even though it is under Party Control, the military is one of the most highly organized and influential interest groups in the

USSR. It has effectively used this influence to protect its own general interests (with regard to resource allocation, for instance) and professionalism.

Nevertheless, the military has only played an ancillary role in Soviet leadership consideration of broader policy questions. This is partly attributable to the fact that in upper levels of the party, the military carries relatively little weight. Only two professional military leaders have been full Politburo members: Zhukov (1956-57) and Grechko (1967-76). Ustinov, who succeeded Grechko as Defense Minister in 1976, was a civilian Politburo member who had spent his entire career dealing with defense production and was only given the military rank of Marshal when he became Defense Minister. The present Defense Minister, Marshal Sokolov, is a long-time career military officer. He was promoted to candidate member of the Politburo in April 1985, but is widely regarded as a transitional figure with little political clout.

Likewise, the military's representation on the Central Committee is minimal. In 1981, only 30 professional military officers were candidate or full members, about six percent of total Central Committee membership.

The party's predominance over the military has allowed civilian leaders to meddle in military affairs at times. Stalin of course, decimated the high command in the purges of the late 1930s, and after WWII moved quickly to reduce Marshall Zhukov's stature.

Zhukov later regained his influence under Khrushchev. In 1957, Zhukov as Defense Minister was instrumental in helping Khrushchev put down a challenge from his colleagues in the Politburo. Khrushchev, however, soon ousted his erstwhile ally and undertook to overturn measures instituted under Zhukov to bolster professional autonomy within the armed forces. Khrushchev even sought to intervene personally in the formulation of military strategy, though he did not attempt to create an institutional rival to the General Staff.

Gorbachev Continues the Tradition

Gorbachev presumably assumed the function of chairman of the Defense Council (where actual decision-making on national security issues -- including arms control -- appears to be centered) and, in effect, supreme commander-in-chief when he became General Secretary. Events over the past year do not suggest that the military has enjoyed greater than usual influence as a result of the civilian leadership transition.

Although Gorbachev has pushed for increased industrial investment as the number one priority in the next five-year plan (1986-90), he has also spoken out against cutting defense programs. At a

June Central Committee meeting, he reaffirmed that "requisite funds" for the country's defense would be maintained. In his V-E Day address, Gorbachev stated that the importance of a "military-political" upbringing for Soviet citizens was growing.

Following the July 1 removal of Grigoriy Romanov as the CPSU Secretary responsible for military affairs, Gorbachev has moved vigorously to assert his leadership in this sphere. On July 10 he delivered an address to an unusual meeting of top military officers in Minsk and immediately afterward a number of key changes in military personnel began surfacing. Following the pattern of his personnel appointments in the civilian sphere, he replaced several older military leaders with younger -- in some cases relatively junior -- people.

The Soviet Military: Coming of Age

The military has gradually assumed a more important role in national security decision-making over the past two decades and, in the process, has assumed a higher public profile. This has largely been due to the arms control process and increasingly sophisticated weaponry which have generated the civilian leadership's need for more military expertise and advice. The military has consequently also become more involved in decision-making on arms control itself. Because of the General Staff's technical expertise and its function, in effect, as executive secretariat to the Defense Council, the military is well positioned to argue its views and try to shape the internal debate in this area.

In the early days, the role of the military in the arms control process appeared to be limited to exercising a veto option over any given proposal, after which it stepped back. In the first SALT negotiations, sensitive information on the Soviet side appeared to be strictly compartmented and there was little interaction between military and civilian elements. When Ogarkov was a member of the Soviet delegation in the early 1970s, he once appealed to an American negotiator not to discuss classified information in front of Soviet civilian team members,

In recent years, however, the Soviets seem to have adopted more of an American style in the internal arms control process. Now the military is much more involved in interacting on an ongoing basis with other components of the Soviet national security structure both in Moscow and on the various negotiating teams in Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own stable of arms control experts, and the major Soviet negotiating teams are all led by diplomats with many years of negotiating experience. Nevertheless, the Soviets have no counterpart either to ACDA or the oversight of Congressional committees. Few, if any, civilians would dare challenge the professional military analysis of their requirements.

The military has also assumed a more prominent role in explaining and advancing Soviet positions on military matters, particularly with regard to the arms control process. By the beginning of the INF period, it was Defense Minister Ustinov who in October 1979 in Pravda began to lay out the public argument that an INF balance already existed. Much of the Soviet INF argument since then has been framed around the assertion that the American deployment would upset this balance, with Defense Ministry officials taking the lead in its public formulation.

Both former Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov and now his successor Akhromeyev, as well as Col. Gen. N.F. Chervov, head of the Defense Ministry's arms control directorate, have been active public spokesmen for Soviet positions. Far from staying in the background, as would have been traditionally expected, they have been at the cutting edge of publicly developing and explicating Soviet positions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~THE SOVIET POLITICAL POLICE

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Historical Background

The Cheka has strong roots in Russian history. Stalin in his heyday gave favorable publicity to Tsar Ivan the Terrible's equivalent institution, the Oprichnina, which ruthlessly and bloodily suppressed the Tsar's enemies. Although much subdued compared to its 16th century predecessor, the Tsarist Okhrana was the main persecutor of the Bolsheviks prior to the 1917 Revolution.

Soviet propaganda on the glamor and romance of the Cheka goes back to its early period under Felix Dzerzhinskiy when it launched "Red Terror" against the Bolsheviks' domestic and foreign enemies. This was the time when Operation Trust snared the feared British agent Sidney Reilly and when "Iron Felix" and his underlings were hailed as the "knights of the Revolution."

Its image worsened in the 1930s when the secret police participated in Stalin's assaults against the peasantry and destroyed the Old Bolsheviks and the Red Army's officer corps. Led by such men as Yagoda and Yezhov, it doomed millions to forced labor in the GULAG forced labor camps under inhuman conditions and with appalling casualty rates. During World War II it conducted a successful espionage effort against the Nazis and created a special wartime disciplinary unit known as SMERSH (Death to Spies). The GULAG population was at a peak--an estimated 15 million--in the postwar reconstruction period, swollen by captured Axis prisoners and Soviet victims of Stalin's harsh policies.

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The KGB's Political Role after Stalin

Following the execution of Lavrentiy Beriia after Stalin's death in 1953, the KGB gradually became intertwined with leadership politics and has at key moments played a role in leadership successions.

As the agency which provides the leadership with bodyguards and secure communications, the KGB could also isolate the top leader at a critical moment. When the Politburo members in October 1964 chose to oust Khrushchev, the conspirators took care to prevent Khrushchev from mobilizing his allies (as he had done in June 1957). The party secretary for security, Alexander Shelepin, called upon his protege, the KGB chief at that time, to cut off Khrushchev's communications from his vacation dacha to Moscow. After the coup Khrushchev was flown back to Moscow and expelled from the Politburo.

The KGB's resources were used in 1982 by Yuriy Andropov (who gained the political police job after Brezhnev's successful power play against Shelepin in 1967) to mount a campaign aimed at capturing the succession from Brezhnev's putative heir Chernenko. Andropov undertook in March 1982 a widely leaked investigation of corruption on the part of Brezhnev's political supporters and even Brezhnev's daughter Galina. Andropov's goal was to taint Brezhnev's associates and to demonstrate that Brezhnev could no longer protect his followers. The most publicized target was Galina Brezhneva's association with the colorful Boris the Gypsy, a shady figure involved in underworld jewel dealings. The campaign was successful; Andropov left the KGB when he acquired the party secretaryship in May. Memories of the 1930s are still strong enough that he could not move directly from the KGB into Brezhnev's shoes.

The Gorbachev-KGB Link

As his health declined, Andropov pushed Gorbachev as his successor but could not determine the succession. During Chernenko's reign, the KGB's disappointment and vexation over having lost its moment of glory with the death of Andropov was widely bruited. It was equally clear that the KGB as an institution sided with Gorbachev, viewing him as Andropov's heir. Its loyalties were repaid upon Gorbachev's accession in March of this year. Chebrikov, brought into the KGB with Andropov in 1967 and named by him as KGB chief in 1982, was promoted to full member of the Politburo this April, obviously as a member of Gorbachev's ruling coterie.

Two members of the Politburo--Chebrikov and Aliyev, who was the Azerbaydzhan KGB chief until he became the republic party chief--have had professional experience in the KGB. Obviously, KGB prestige and influence are now high and its relations with Gorbachev are demonstrably supportive.

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The KGB's Domestic Security Role

Like the party, the KGB is virtually everywhere in Soviet society. There are KGB units on every level of government. Every major factory and institution has its "first department" which handles security matters, including employee clearances and access to classified information. The KGB official who sits on every party committee probably has the last word on security issues, and even a republic first secretary is bound to respect the KGB representative on the republic party bureau.

As a true political police, KGB local units have a widespread net of informers who report on their fellow workers and neighbors. Citizens are encouraged to report deviant speech and behavior to the authorities. Unauthorized assemblies and publications are searched out and terminated, sometimes with significant criminal penalties for the participants.

The KGB has organized special units to monitor religious organizations and nationalist activities. A voluminous literature exists abroad on these activities in addition to the documentation of the KGB suppression of political dissent and control over emigration.

The political police function extends to the armed forces in which a net of secret informants reports on moods and attitudes among the troops. Any security incident draws the attention of KGB investigators.

In addition to their security responsibilities, the KGB has special police jurisdiction over cases involving large amounts of foreign currency, gold, and jewels. This conveniently permitted Andropov in 1982 to investigate the scandals involving Brezhnev's daughter Galina. Otherwise, the regular police, headed by Brezhnev's crony Shchelokov, could have whitewashed the affair.

KGB Influence over the Civilian Police

The KGB under Andropov began an extensive purge of the regular police following the ouster of MVD minister Shchelokov in December 1982. (Shchelokov was disgraced and reportedly committed suicide in December 1984 to avoid a trial for corruption.) The regular police or MVD is now headed by a former KGB official and several other KGB officials were transferred to the MVD's top leadership. In addition, a new political administration was created in the MVD and a large number of party members were detailed to police work in an effort to purge and upgrade the police, which is now playing a larger role in Gorbachev's anti-corruption and anti-alcohol

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campaigns. There is no question about the superior status of the KGB compared to the MVD and its ability to intervene in the jurisdiction and processes of the MVD and the courts, but there is also a strong history of bad relations between the two police agencies which occasionally erupts in ugly incidents.

Foreign Intelligence and Counter Intelligence

Abroad, the KGB is especially active in intelligence collection--political, military, technical--under diplomatic, journalistic, and business cover. It is without doubt the world's largest and most active intelligence service, and it also draws upon the resources of its Warsaw Pact allies to complement its intelligence effort abroad.

KGB foreign reporting goes independently of foreign ministry reporting to Moscow where it is coordinated and submitted to the Politburo. KGB activities and reporting partly parallel and duplicate those of the Defense Ministry's Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) and inevitably there is rivalry between the two.

The KGB also engages in covert action "active measures," agent-of-influence operations, clandestine support of foreign political parties, and forgeries and bribery to get press placement of Soviet materials.

KGB counterintelligence work most often shows up in public accounts of agent arrests and the declaration of foreign diplomats persona non grata, but some of the counter-intelligence materials published in the Soviet press must be put into the prophylactic propaganda category, aimed primarily at Soviet citizens. However, Western diplomats in Moscow and Leningrad are primary, but not sole, targets of KGB counter-intelligence efforts. Heavy surveillance, active attempts to penetrate the staff and buildings, and the creation of effective obstacles between Soviet citizens and foreigners are permanent elements in the KGB's operations.

Soviet Views of the KGB

While Soviet dissidents who have faced KGB harassment see it as the regime's arm of repression, most Soviet citizens seem to regard the KGB as a necessary part of a well-ordered state. While Soviet citizens -- are skeptical regarding their media, the flood of books, films and TV glorifying the KGB's exploits in counter-intelligence and intelligence leaves its impression. But the public's respect for the KGB still rests mostly on fear.

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Careerists look upon the secret police as an avenue for upward mobility. The KGB successfully recruits the cream of university graduates for careers in overseas intelligence work, careers often under diplomatic and journalistic guise which are regarded as more rewarding and interesting than most.

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NOMENKLATURA: THE USSR'S PATRONAGE SYSTEM

Structure

The Soviet institution of nomenklatura amounts to an encyclopedia of "plum books." Its rules dictate that all key jobs throughout the USSR -- in the party bureaucracy, government, economy, cultural life, military or academic establishments, even agriculture -- be reserved for candidates picked and approved by the supervisory party organ. Stalin developed this system of personnel patronage as a vehicle for gaining control of both party and society. His successors have enlarged on it to such an extent that it has no real parallel in the noncommunist world. the Soviet party machine has greater power in co-opting, black-balling and ejecting personnel than does the most exclusive club in the west. Inside, one is entitled to a lifestyle befitting the position; outside, one is relegated to the "masses," to scramble as the average Soviet for an existence. Ousted from the system one is excluded from even marginal benefits available to the masses.

The so-called nomenklatura are the elite of the USSR, the most prominent and best rewarded people in each professional group, all the decision and policymakers. They fall into various categories:

- a) The political elite, consisting of the leaders of the party apparatchiki.
- b) The managerial elite, who actually operate the government, the economy, the armed forces, the police apparatus, and other parts of the Soviet system.
- c) The cultural and scientific elite, the artists, scientists, writers, performers, and scholars.

These groups differ in political influence, social status, prominence, and rewards. The political elite are those in the Communist hierarchy who enjoy decisive influence. The managerial elite, though not without political power, essentially occupy nonpolitical career tracks. Although the cultural and scientific elite wield relatively little political influence; they enjoy greater prominence: members of this group are often more visible and better paid than are the managers or political leaders.

The political and managerial elite are known in Soviet parlance as "leadership cadres". All in all they are estimated to number around 4 million. About 500,000 are top-level bureaucrats, half of them in the party apparatus itself. Another 500,000 hold government positions. Some 2 million are the economic managers who are regarded as the cream of the economic and technical intelligentsia. The rest occupy management or supervisory positions ranging from shop stewards to kolkhoz chairmen.

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Getting Ahead

Ability and expertise are only one element in getting to the top in Soviet society. Conformity with the current party line and mastery of the techniques of maneuvering within the system on the one hand, plus personal patronage from within the nomenklatura itself on the other, are the aids on which the ambitious rely.

The leaders of the USSR have long viewed economic efficiency and consumer satisfaction as matters of secondary importance. Their primary objective has always been a maximization of the national power of the USSR. And the consolidation, expansion and preservation of their own power is justified as a means to that end. That in turn justifies the higher income and perquisites of the ruling class.

Life Style

The nomenklatura by and large enjoy a life style well above the drab level of reality faced by the average Soviet citizen. The upper crust has its cars and special access to goods and services. Its members move in a tight, private universe of suburban dachas, downtown co-operative apartments, exclusive clubs and vacation resorts. The sons and daughters have preferred access to the better schools and often intermarry. Those further down the pecking order have similar special stores, housing, resorts and benefits befitting their rank.

Money income is the least important advantage of making it in the USSR. The real boons derive from a compendium of tangible and intangible privileges: greater freedom, better medical care, the opportunity to travel abroad and ready access to domestic and imported goods unavailable to the average citizen at any time.

Many in the ruling class experience such a sheltered existence they have not the faintest idea how the rest of the country really lives. Others -- the collective farm chairmen for example -- are more directly exposed but still are far better off than their non-nomenklatura associates. Gorbachev has spearheaded a drive against the isolation of the apparatchiki from the masses, but the privileges of the Gorbachevs will unquestionably remain palatial by Soviet standards. Nor is there any real popular resentment of the advantages enjoyed by Raisa and the other "wives of" since their life style is not flaunted before the public. The gap between the elite and the masses is studiously ignored by the media.

Other Side of the Coin

The material advantages enjoyed by the power elite would be reduced if a larger share of the national product were to be allocated to economic investment and mass consumption. As a result, the economic managers' advocacy of greater recognition of economic factors and for greater professional autonomy constantly runs into opposition from the political decision makers.

Even deeper is the tension between the ruling elite and the prestigious intellectuals who advocate greater individual freedom and more personal property. Although many cultural figures are conformists and as jealous of their perks as the power elite, some have advocated an easing of the internal control system under the rubric of "de-Stalinization." One of their targets is the party apparatus and its total domination of the elite structure. The party ideologists for their part are determined to keep a tight rein on the social sciences and the arts; they see their mission as the preservation of doctrinal purity which in turn justifies the rule of the party, and of course, their own privileged existence.

A generational conflict has also been developing within the nomenklatura itself, given the marked age difference between the CPSU leadership and its rank and file. While about 40 percent of the party's 18 million members are under 40 years of age (6.9 million), there is no one under 50 in the top leadership at all. And while men and women are represented about equally within the educated strata of Soviet society, only 9 women are full members of the Central Committee. (Women makeup 27 percent of the party membership.) Nor is any woman now included in the party's supreme leadership.

United We Stand

The interests of the nomenklatura are diverse: there are orthodox and pragmatic conservatives as well as moderate reformers within the policymaking bodies of the regime. They are frequently at odds among themselves, usually over questions which affect the status of different groupings within the nomenklatura itself. But there is no open opposition at any level or within any group to the system per se. After all, careers, lifestyle, future, and family well-being are all dependent on and a function of that system.

For the sake of efficiency, Gorbachev apparently is prepared to make certain concessions to dissatisfied elements of the elite. He has urged more operational autonomy for lower managerial personnel, and encouraged creative artists to be more

realistic in their portrayals of life. The younger generation and women have been promised a larger role in the conduct of political affairs. In the field of domestic policy, the pressure is on for less cronyism and nepotism and more specialized knowledge and expertise as the major criteria for advancement. But the Gorbachev-led political elite is still part of the nomenklatura, and any basic reform of the system would threaten its power and its perks. Whatever changes Gorbachev might introduce -- and even the smallest will run into opposition from some quarter -- the nomenklatura as a whole will insist on retaining control of the social processes in the USSR. It cannot do otherwise and still preserve communist rule in the USSR.

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Communist party is the core institution of the Soviet political system, focus of the levers of power and prestige in the USSR. Every branch of the bureaucracy--state, economic, military and police--is subordinated to its control. At the same time, the party is the guardian and interpreter of Marxist ideology and responsible for indoctrinating the population with the ideas and values of Soviet-style communism.

The CPSU now numbers over 18 million members (including 700,000 candidates, i.e., probationers), encompassing about 6 percent of the adult population. The party does not solicit adherents; it chooses its members. Prospective candidates are carefully screened. Each must be recommended by three persons who have already been party members for at least five years. White-collar workers are prime targets for recruitment. They made up close to half of the membership in 1983, even though accounting for only a quarter of the general population.

Party members all belong to a party organization at their place of work. There are 426,000 of these primary party organizations in the Soviet Union, and they exist in every factory, office, farm, school, military unit -- in short, in every organized unit in the society. Each party member is expected to stimulate production within his own primary organization; these units in turn provide the central authorities with a vehicle for constant pressure on lower echelon officials.

Every member has the duty to "master Marxist-Leninist theory, raise his ideological level, and contribute to the molding and rearing of the man of communist society." The political training of communists ranges from short-term evening and correspondence courses to the university-level Higher Party School in Moscow which has a regular four-year curriculum. Training at fulltime party schools is regarded as so important that middle-aged officials holding responsibilities as great as those of the governor of an American state are sent to the schools before being given new assignments.

Mass Organizations

Several mass organizations exist outside the party framework, but operate under its close and direct supervision. The Communist Youth League, Komsomol, is the most important of these. Its 41-million membership includes a majority of the country's adolescents (aged 14-18) and a substantial minority of the 19-26 age group. The Komsomol not only serves to indoctrinate the youth but it is also a testing and screening agency for prospective CPSU members. Furthermore, the Youth League exercises tutelage over the Pioneers, the organization to which all children of primary school age (10-15) belong.

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The Soviet trade unions, with some 130 million members, serve the party by stimulating production and prompting "socialist emulation," competitive campaigns aimed at raising productivity. They also administer social insurance funds, and to a limited extent defend worker rights. Other mass organizations effectively run by the party include the Knowledge Society (Znaniye), an adult-education body with over 1 million members, and DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy), which fosters military-type sports for civilians and school children.

Party Structure

Theoretically, the CPSU's sovereign organ is the Party Congress which, by statute, meets every five years. It is a gathering of some 5000 delegates which, among other functions, elects the Central Committee, which is responsible for policymaking in the interim between congresses. The Central Committee (470 members - 319 full and 151 alternate) in turn formally elects the members of smaller executive bodies to handle the day-to-day matters -- in particular the Politburo for policy decision, and the Secretariat to oversee and control party and government operations.

In practice, however, these two latter bodies are the decision making organs of the party, the peak of the CPSU's nearly perfect bureaucratic pyramid. The Politburo and Secretariat control the appointment of the regional secretaries throughout the country and, through them, the lesser secretaries down to the lowest echelons. The Secretariat sends binding "recommendations" for major personnel changes to the non-Russian republics or regional-level party offices, and often has its executives monitor the electoral plenums at those levels which implement its "recommendations."

The whole process of electing the party committees that choose the secretaries at each level is actually controlled by the very secretaries who are supposed to be elected by those same subordinates. Each non-Russian republic or regional party headquarters has an Organizational Party Work Department to manage the process. And the top leadership in Moscow controls the election of delegates to the sovereign party congress, which, through the Central Committee it elects, technically elects the General Secretary.

In the 5-year intervals between congresses, supreme authority in the CPSU is formally delegated to the Central Committee to which most of the important officials of the USSR belong. They are drawn from all segments of the bureaucracy, but most come from the party apparatus itself. (The party apparatus is the body of fulltime officials that arranges implementation of decisions, manipulates elections and controls discussions in party meetings.)

The Central Committee's brief and infrequent plenary meetings (two-three per year) rule out its management of day-to-day decision-making. Consequently, the real focus of Soviet power is the Politburo. It is now composed of 13 voting members and 5 alternates, and meets weekly (usually on Thursday afternoons) to discuss and decide on major issues. The General Secretary (Gorbachev) is de facto chairman of the Politburo, which in recent years has seemed to reach most of its decisions by consensus.

The Party Secretariat -- a sort of NSC staff estimated to have as high as 10,000 employees -- sets the Politburo agenda, provides the requisite documentation and oversees implementation of Politburo decisions. Of the 11 Secretaries, Gorbachev, Ligachev and Ryzhkov are full Politburo members; 2 of the 5 Politburo alternates are also central party Secretaries. (Six Party Secretaries hold no status in the Politburo).

With the exception of the General Secretary, each of the Secretaries exercises supervision over a specific sphere of operations. He does so via departments of the Secretariat which run parallel to all major state bodies and administer key areas of Soviet society and foreign affairs. A crucial function of the Secretariat's Organizational Party Work Department, for example, is controlling the assignments of the high and medium-level personnel to party and Komsomol organizations, as well as to State and trade union agencies.

Equally close to the heart of party operations are the Secretariat departments for ideology and indoctrination. These include the Propaganda, Culture, and Science and Educational Institutions Departments. Their function is to assure that every medium for conveyin ideas is actively and properly promoting the objectives of the regime.

Personal rivalries and frictions permeate the CPSU. Corruption is known to be rife from top to bottom. And there has been an increasing tendency among the youth to regard the Komsomol as a boring and restrictive institution. Nevertheless, the CPSU has succeeded in creating a strong amalgam of self-interest and pride in achievement which binds many to the Soviet system. Gorbachev is clearly eager to overhaul the party apparatus to make it more responsive to economic management, committed to reform and to rejuvenate its ranks. But neither he nor the apparatchiki have any intent of introducing changes that threaten to loosen their present grip on every facet of Soviet life.