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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>ENTIRE FOLDER</i>			
1. memo	John Lenczowski to Robert McFarlane, re military aid to communist Mozambique, 4p <i>R 6/2/06 NLSFOO-009/1 #18</i>	2/7/85	B1
2. memo	Page 4 of item #1 (with recommendation noted), 1p <i>R " " #19</i>	Nd	B1
3. memo	Lenczowski to Raymond and Wettering, re Nigeria, 1p <i>R " " #20</i>	1/11/84	B1

RESTRICTIONS

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Africa

1023

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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February 7, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Military Aid to Communist Mozambique

I understand the logic behind the recommendation that we should give \$1 million in military aid to Samora Machel -- particularly the fact that this move is designed to wean Mozambique away from the Soviet orbit. I have heard Phil Ringdahl make a very persuasive case that unless we try to take advantage of this opportunity, we may indeed let Mozambique fall back into exclusive dependence on the Soviets. Perhaps Phil is right and his argument is the best one. However, I would like to raise some questions which I think the President should seriously consider.

1. First, what is the goal of our policy? Is it simply to wean Mozambique away from Moscow or, in addition, to change its system so that it will no longer be a communist state? This does make a difference. In spite of the fact that we prefer a Titoist and not a Soviet Yugoslavia, I believe there must be limits as to how many Titoist communist countries we can safely tolerate in the world. The Tito-Moscow split and the Sino-Soviet split are basically squabbles within the family. They may get acrimonious, but the possibility of reconciliation always exists. The reason for this is that neither China nor Yugoslavia represents a mortal threat to Soviet communism -- i.e., a threat to the very legitimacy of the regime. For this reason, a Titoist Mozambique should not be our objective if we have some possible alternatives.
2. Although our intelligence reveals that moderate elements in the regime are indicating a willingness to move Mozambique in a moderate direction, can we be so sure of their bona fides that we can bank on the possibility that we are not being deceived? FRELIMO has a sterling record of orthodox Leninist accomplishments. These include all the elements of a classic communist takeover: the formation of a revolutionary party; establishment of a popular front; the use of ruthless methods to eliminate both intra- and extra-front opposition; the use of camouflage of the party's true program; the use of a gradualist, step-by-step process of seizing power; the adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology; the establishment of a secret police system; the use of officially-sponsored terrorism, the curtailment of freedoms

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CS NARA, DATE 6/2/86

enjoyed even in authoritarian states; the destruction of the churches; the use of internal passports; the nationalization of the economy and collectivization of farms; the establishment of a propaganda apparatus and monopoly of information; the reliance on Soviet proxy support; the murder, exile or imprisonment of tribal chiefs; encouragement of children to turn in their parents if they are critical of the regime, etc.

People capable of doing such things are also capable of the classic Leninist maneuver: tactical retreat when the correlation of forces is against them. When the Bolsheviks were "up against the wall," they signed the peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany ceding to the imperialists thousands of square miles of territory. When War Communism rendered the Soviet economy a shambles, Lenin retreated again with his New Economic Policy (NEP) -- a program of market-oriented reforms replete with invitations to Western capitalists to help rebuild the economy with financing, management expertise, technology and turnkey plants.

The Nkomati accord was reached with South Africa for one reason alone -- RENAMO was pushing Maputo up against the wall. Now we see the beginnings of a NEP. Will we be rewarding "Lenin" for Brest-Litovsk and NEP, only to see him consolidate his position and use the instruments of totalitarian control to keep Mozambique permanently a communist country -- only now a stronger and more reliable ally of Moscow?

3. Perhaps Machel is no Lenin, and perhaps Mozambicans are not inclined to build a Teutonically-efficient totalitarianism. Perhaps Machel is an opportunist who will sway to Western breezes. But what about the vast consequences of abandoning the single force that is pushing him in our direction -- RENAMO? This resistance movement may not be truly democratic and may have its internal problems such as white political leaders in Portugal and black military leaders in Mozambique. Nevertheless, it is anticommunist, and it is fighting a regime that represents everything that is the antithesis of democracy. It is also widely perceived as one of the six anticommunist insurgencies underway around the globe.

These insurgencies derive much of their strength to push on from the faith that they have in the moral and political support of the Free World. If we abandon one or another of these insurgencies, cannot this have a demoralizing effect on the others -- not to mention on the hundreds of millions who live under communist slavery and whose hopes for freedom rest partly on the success of these resistance movements?

Secretary Shultz and other like to point to these insurgencies to show how the correlation of forces is changing in our favor and how the Soviets are having troubles around the globe. Thus, whether possessed of pure democratic intentions or not, RENAMO is perceived as a force generally on our side.

To say that we would not be abandoning a pro-Western resistance since we never supported it in the first place is splitting hairs. We have explicitly and implicitly offered moral support to this resistance which is more important in many respects than material support.

Just two days ago, the President said: "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives -- on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua -- to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth." Why did he say it this way -- that we should not "break faith?" It is because he recognizes that standing for something, standing for democracy, exhibiting a strong moral-political posture, is the heart, soul and backbone of our national defense. This means expressing our willingness to declare that democracy is good, that it has a future and that we are willing to fight for it. But given the perceptions of the principal enemy (not "potential adversary") of democracy, namely that this is a struggle between two social systems, our willingness to stand for the freedom and sovereignty of peoples and nations around the world is equally important in demonstrating our commitment to the universality of the principles we espouse. To abandon forces that are part of our "social system" is to exhibit a lack of that "faith," a lack of seriousness of purpose.

4. Although we may try such a political manipulation and bribe Machel away from communism, it would not have nearly the effect that a victory by the resistance would. A RENAMO victory, which may indeed be possible, would have as great global reverberations as the Grenada liberation -- only this time it would be the first time that indigenous forces could be credited with reversing the "forces of history." If this resistance could force Machel to sign a Brest-Litovsk, it probably has enough force to overthrow the regime. Are we underestimating it?
5. In light of all this, the principal question we must ask is: Will the world's perception that we have scored a pro-freedom victory by weaning Mozambique from the Soviet-communist orbit be greater than the perception that we have abandoned and betrayed a pro-Western resistance movement at the very moment that it has accumulated enough strength to operate in every province of the country?
6. If we are resolved to go ahead with aid to the communists, then to mitigate the perception that we are conducting another betrayal of a pro-Western force, we may want to consider doing so by covert rather than overt means. This way we could remove the demoralizing political effects of abandoning an anticommunist resistance movement while still accomplishing our objective. This would first require

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publicly retracting our announced intention of aiding Machel. Under these circumstances, we may even be able to have our cake and eat it too: so long as RENAMO continues, it can help keep Machel honest.

RECOMMENDATION

If you agree that the President should consider these views, that you authorize the NSC staff to rework the decision memorandum to the President so that it reflects the other options suggested here.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cy Ringdahl
Stark

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-4-

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Disapprove _____ ✓

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NLS F00-009/L #19

CN NARA DATE 6/21/06

Nigeria 6

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

January 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT RAYMOND
FRED WETTERING

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Nigeria

Why were we so blasé about the demise of a democratic government in Nigeria? Why weren't we more critical of the coup d'etat?

State Department's statement was crafted only with an eye toward bilateral relations and with no regard to public diplomacy. Shouldn't State's public diplomacy office have been plugged into this?

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