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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
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 File Folder: Andropov (6)

Archivist: loj/loj
 FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
 Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<u>ENTIRE FOLDER</u>			
1. memo (8208505)	William Clark to the President, 1p D 6/21/06 NLSF00-009/1 #59	12/28/82	B1 B3
2. memo (8208505)	Dobriansky to Clark, 1p Part u u #60	12/20/82	B1
3. memo (8208505)	Richard Pipes to Clark, 1p & Part u u #61	12/13/82	B1
4. memo (8208505)	Clark to the President, 1p D u u #62	ND	B1 B3
5. memo	To the President, Vice President, et al, 1p Part u u #63	11/29/82	B1 B3
6. memo	To the President, VP, et al, 1p Part u u #64	4/22/82	B1 B3
7. paper	Re Andropov, 7p Part u u #65	11/20/82	B1 B3
8. note/routing	Partial note copied over routing slip with handwritten note, 1p Part " u #66	11/20/82 and 12/13/82	B1 B3
9. report	Re USSR: Internal Activity, 1p Part " u #67	12/27/82	B1 B2, B6
10. report	Re Andropov Address..., 2p Part u u #68	12/21/82	B1 B3
11. report	Re Andropov publicizes..., 1p R u u #69	12/21/82	B1
12. report	Re Andropov Report at Kremlin Joint Meeting, 24p Part u u #70	12/21/82	B1 B3

RESTRICTIONS

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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~


December 20, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{R7}

SUBJECT: Andropov: His Power and Program



B1


RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A 

B1

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS EOO-00911 #60

By CW, NARA, Date 6/21/14

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 13, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *h*

SUBJECT: Andropov: His Power and Program



B1

RECOMMENDATION

That the memorandum at Tab I be forwarded to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A 

B1

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS FOO-009/1 *A61*
By CIS, NARA, Date 6/2/06

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

2 23:11


29 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓ The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Andropov: His Power and Program

1. Here is a memorandum on how we now see the thrust and scope of Andropov's program. It was prepared by Bob Gates, our Deputy Director for Intelligence, who has maintained a realistic view of Soviet purposes. He did two stints at the NSC, one with Kissinger and one with Brzezinski, and two stints at CIA as National Intelligence Officer for Soviet Affairs. You may recall that this experience was put to good use last year in analyzing Brezhnev's correspondence with you and recommending responses.

2. One added feature which has struck me is the emerging picture of Ustinov as giving Andropov crucial support. When you put together Ustinov's 30-odd years in command of defense industries and then defense and Andropov's 15 years at the KGB, you get an awesome concentration of institutional power. To brag a little, I attach a note in which we called this six months before the event.


William D. Casey

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS FOO-009/1 #163

By CH, NARA, Date 6/21/06

~~SECRET~~

B3

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

22 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Counsellor to the President
Chief of Staff to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Soviet Political Succession: Institutions,
People and Policies

1. With Suslov's death, Kirilenko fading away, and the inception of the Chernenko boom, I tasked our Soviet analysts to evaluate the prospects for the Soviet succession.

2. In recent weeks Chernenko appears to have peaked too soon, with Andropov emerging as the present favorite. Ustinov has the military clout and seems to be lining up with Andropov, but may be positioning himself for partnership or even competition. Under pressure, forced to stick our necks out on a dark horse, we pick Grishin, the 67 year old Moscow party boss and fourth youngest member of the Politburo, and Gorbachev, at 51 the youngest Politburo member, who is Party Secretary for Agriculture, a post which Khrushchev held on his way to the top. Brezhnev also was deeply involved in agricultural matters on his way up.

3. If I had to bet money, I'd take Andropov on the nose and Gorbachev across the board.

4. This paper analyzes the influence of various Soviet institutions, the policy issues which might be influential in the outcome, and the policy implications of possible resolutions.

W. J. Casey
William J. Casey

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS FOUO-009.11 #604
CN, NARA, Date 6/21/06

B3

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS FOUO-009/1, #65
By CN, NARA, Date 6/21/01

DDI #9593-82
20 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Andropov: His Power and Program

1. The emerging conventional wisdom seems to be that the USSR will now enter a period of collegial rule in which continuity will be stressed and the new leaders will hold back from significant policy changes for the near to medium term. In this view, Andropov will be preoccupied with internal matters such as improving the economy and any new initiatives that do appear will likely focus on domestic affairs rather than foreign policy. The immediate post-Khrushchev period is cited as precedent for what will happen.

2. I believe that analysis is based on a misreading of the events of recent days, Andropov's character, and history. In 1953, a number of new initiatives followed the death of Stalin (and preceded Khrushchev's consolidation of power) -- a purge of the KGB, an end to the intra-party terror, the Virgin Lands program, a decision to end the Korean War, and a mending of relations with the Yugoslavs. In 1964, the new leaders swept aside a number of major changes Khrushchev had made in the party organization, sharply raised investment in agriculture, began the heavy military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, and actively began to support North Vietnam's effort to take over the South.

3. Andropov comes to power at a time when there is a widely perceived need for renewal in the USSR -- to get the economy moving again, to get rid of corruption, to restore discipline, to reassert the idealism of the Revolution and relatedly to reaffirm Russia's missionary/evangelical role at home and abroad. Perversely, this often takes the shape of nostalgia for Stalin. It is his forcefulness, toughness, decisiveness and ability to move the country that the Party seeks in Andropov -- believing they can have all that without the old dictator's less welcome attributes (such as a tendency to shoot his colleagues).

4. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided last spring that Andropov was the man to lead the USSR out of its political and economic doldrums after Brezhnev's death. He was moved from the KGB back to the Central Committee Secretariat, a more appropriate and

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20 November 1982

acceptable launching point. I believe that since then he has steadily consolidated his power and begun, with his colleagues, to develop new initiatives and implement certain of them -- even before assuming power. As the Soviets say, "it is not by accident" that in the last several months we have seen both a new internal crackdown in the Soviet Union and also a major new initiative in foreign policy -- the effort to improve relations between the Soviet Union and China. There also are indications that the military has been asking for additional resources. In my judgment, Andropov has been behind the first two of these initiatives and supported the third.

5. In brief, I believe the precedent of an extended period for the new leader to consolidate power -- as with Brezhnev after the overthrow of Khrushchev -- does not apply this time around. This view is supported by Andropov's prompt appointment; his clear authoritativeness during events surrounding Brezhnev's funeral; his role and "presence" in meetings with the principal foreign visitors; the quick promotion of an old KGB colleague to the Politburo; and his speeches at the Central Committee Plenum and Supreme Soviet. This time we have a leader who has come to power with firm support in the Politburo at the outset, has a mandate to act in both domestic and foreign affairs, and will do so.

6. The nature of this succession and the character of Andropov himself argue strongly that he will move promptly and broadly to tackle many of Russia's problems. For the first time in Soviet history, there has been a smooth succession where the new leader has assumed power in an orderly way and probably with greater leeway to make decisions than enjoyed by his predecessor. Indeed, Andropov has been chosen because he is a man who can make decisions and hopefully can end the long period of drift, especially in internal affairs. He is on close terms with the powerful conservative elements in the Soviet hierarchy and is a man who can act with both intelligence and imagination on a long list of pressing foreign and domestic issues. What we are likely to see with Andropov is preservation of the forms of "collegiality" but the absence of its paralyzing effect on decisionmaking. All of the senior policymakers who might block Andropov are dead or out of power; those who remain, such as Ustinov and Gromyko, are closely allied with him; his presumed rival, Chernenko, appears (for now, at least) to have been co-opted.

7. Given Andropov's prompt and apparently unchallenged accession to power, his personality and past history, and the problems that face him, what might Andropov's agenda resemble for the coming period? On the basis of both 1953 and 1964, historical experience would suggest that a number of changes or initiatives can be expected:

Internal Affairs

-- A continuation of the "vigilance" campaign and internal crackdown to restore discipline, to give the impression

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20 November 1982

of a strong hand at the top again, to forestall any impression of internal relaxation as a result of the succession, to keep the country well under control so that other initiatives or reforms do not lead to unrealistic expectations or spontaneous popular action, and to secure the home front for perhaps severe measures to revive the economy.

- A major anti-corruption campaign by a man who is said to have a reputation for being relatively "clean" among Soviet leaders. The promotion of Aliyev to the Politburo further suggests action in this area. It is plain that many of the present political problems in Poland and Romania grow out of popular awareness and resentment of the corruption of senior party officials. While Andropov would have to proceed carefully with this, the KGB's role in exposing the corruption of Brezhnev's family early in the year is indicative of his willingness to use this issue both politically and for larger ends. With his KGB background, he would know against whom to strike. There might even be a return of an occasional show trial specifically for corruption, although Andropov would choose the targets with care to insulate his strongest supporters.
- It seems logical and likely that Andropov would press for additional resources for both the military and the KGB. These are important constituencies for him and for his principal supporters in the leadership. While there might be some reallocation of priorities within the military, overall greater resources to respond to the perceived increased threat from the US are in the cards, in my view.
- On the economy, while specific policies are difficult to forecast at this point, we should expect "reform" and perhaps some limited experimentation. The focus on internal discipline, anti-corruption and vigilance -- in essence, the maintenance of strict internal controls -- must go hand in hand with any effort to undertake economic reform or experiments, witness the Polish experience. While a more detailed analysis of economic options available to the new leadership will take more time, the essential message is that we should anticipate change in this area and it seems likely to involve (1) greater trade with the West, (2) more problems for us in the area of technology transfer, and (3) more difficulty with our Western and Japanese allies over the issue of trade with the East. The idea of Andropov's willingness to consider reform in the Soviet economy is suggested by stories that he has been the protector of Hungarian economic reform and is willing to consider such new approaches -- although Hungary is obviously a much smaller country and the costs of failure are not as high (always a disincentive to agricultural reform in Russia).

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- In the Party itself, I expect to see Andropov move to improve the competence of senior officials generally while ensuring that the new men are sympathetic to his objectives and politically supportive. He already is placing his own people in openings on the Politburo, Secretariat, and elsewhere in the hierarchy.
- More generally, Andropov's advocacy at the Supreme Soviet of greater realism in planning and recognition of problems, and the call of an important Soviet newspaper editorial last week for a major revamping of the Soviet bureaucracy, both suggest that significant changes are in store internally.

Foreign Policy

- US: Andropov seems likely to pursue a policy directed at achieving simultaneously some visible reduction in tensions with the United States, curbing new US arms programs, preventing the deployment of INF, and dividing the US from its European allies. A conciliatory approach to the United States and effective use of peace-oriented propaganda and "active measures" are to be expected. The Soviets will try to reinforce notions already current in the West of the need for forthcoming gestures to the new Soviet leader and the need to take advantage of this "new beginning." While the European decision on INF remains uncertain it would seem most unlikely for the Soviets to abandon the Geneva talks. Rather, we should be prepared for imaginative Soviet initiatives both in negotiations and in public in the next few months to throw the US on the defensive and increase divisions between the Europeans and ourselves. Should INF deployment actually begin, the Soviets could then walk out in Geneva and blame failure on the US. They would subsequently strive to prevent full deployment by playing on European fears and purported US intransigence.

The Soviets have seen a steady deterioration in US-Soviet relations for seven years under three US administrations. I believe they have concluded that the moment for establishing a more benign relationship on their terms has passed. Arms control negotiations and other forms of cooperation with the US government are likely considered to hold out little prospect of success for years to come. Thus, Andropov probably will focus Soviet policy on isolating the US and trying, through all instruments available to him, to build opposition to US military modernization and to US policies toward the USSR generally, both in the US and abroad.

- East-West Trade: Andropov likely will continue efforts to tie East and West Europe to the USSR through economic

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20 November 1982

"cooperation" and trade. The Soviets already are aware of the leverage they hold because of the value of East-West trade to the West and the jobs said to depend upon it. Trade thus has both economic and political benefits for them. Andropov presumably will strive to maximize these benefits and seek a corollary benefit in the strains such increased dealings will bring between the US and its allies. After removal by the US of sanctions imposed after Afghanistan and after Poland, this instrument of US policy will have little credibility in the future in Soviet eyes. Indeed, Andropov will see the US as little more than an annoyance in the area of trade and technology transfer, unable to impose discipline inside the US, much less in Europe and Japan.

- Eastern Europe: Andropov reportedly has evinced considerable hostility to the Yugoslavs, Romanians and Czechs in the past -- implying little tolerance for deviation from loyalty to Moscow and political orthodoxy. Almost as proof, his meeting with the Yugoslavs after the Brezhnev funeral was "harsh" and he pointedly snubbed Ceausescu. On the other hand, he is said to be close to Kadar of Hungary and a protector of Hungarian economic reforms. This and other information suggests some flexibility toward East European efforts to cope with economic problems but only within the context of close ties to the USSR and firm party control. As in the USSR, Andropov could well urge his East European colleagues to impose stricter discipline at home -- accompanied by a campaign to root out obvious and damaging corruption in high places, perhaps by making examples of some officials.
- Afghanistan: Afghanistan seems to be a candidate for a new Soviet initiative to try to diminish in some measure both the insurgency there and their military role. It continues to be an embarrassment for them in Islamic countries as well as in the West, it does impose a certain military cost in both materiel and casualties, and it is an obstacle to any significant reconciliation with the Chinese. Some new initiative combining a new government with some greater legitimacy in Afghanistan (although still under Soviet control) coupled with strong pressure on Pakistan to abandon its supporting role for the insurgents could conceivably meet with some success if orchestrated well by the Soviets. It could involve a government in Kabul with a figleaf image of neutrality and a diminution of support for the insurgents that would allow the Soviets to withdraw at least some of their forces.
- Middle East: The short term options are not bright, but the Soviets are prepared to be patient. Egypt and Iran are the big prizes and Andropov will pursue overt and covert policies designed to take advantage of any instability in either country.

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20 November 1982

- Kampuchea: Kampuchea is another area where the Soviets could make some concessions to the Chinese for larger ends. Never before have the Soviets shown any particular sensitivity to Hanoi's concerns. While Vietnam might not abandon its campaign in Kampuchea under Soviet pressure, the Soviets still could claim to the Chinese that they were no longer supporting Vietnam's effort and were amenable to new political arrangements that could be worked out. This might involve some sort of face saving settlements that would not represent a defeat for Vietnam but would get most of their troops out of the country.
- Third World: In the Third World, I believe we can expect not only a continuation of the direct and indirect destabilization activities the Soviets have had underway in recent years but perhaps an increase in that activity. In many ways Soviet policy in the Third World is likely to be indicative of a more assertive Soviet role abroad generally, although as our papers on Andropov have made clear, he prefers to win by strategem and maneuver rather than resort to force -- although he will use force if maneuvering fails and the risks are deemed acceptable.
- China: As I have suggested in several places above, I believe Andropov is playing a key role in the new initiative to try and patch things up with China. At some point, this will involve tough decisions for the Soviets because any real reconciliation with China will require acceding to Chinese preconditions relating to Afghanistan, Kampuchea or Soviet deployments along the Chinese border. The latter is probably the easiest area for the Soviets to be responsive. Andropov's pointed conversation with Foreign Minister Huang Hua after Brezhnev's funeral, the meeting between Huang Hua and Gromyko the next day and Chinese willingness to send Huang Hua is indicative of both powers intent to pursue an improved relationship at minimum and to improve their mutual positions with respect to the US.

8. In sum, the US faces a new and, in many ways, far more intelligent and skillful adversary than we confronted in Khrushchev or Brezhnev -- and a man who is a "doer". He is familiar with the world and a realist. My money says we will face a much greater challenge from the USSR under his leadership. While the specifics of his program are difficult to construct, we should be prepared for significant new Soviet initiatives in both internal and foreign policy. A leadership has come to power during the last two weeks in the Soviet Union with greater power and more unity at the highest level than after either the succession in 1953 or 1964. It has come to power with considerable work to do and Andropov is not a man who will delay in setting

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20 November 1982

in motion initiatives to address a number of issues and problems. The effort to repair relations with China -- long thought out of the question by most analysts in the West -- is indicative of the kind of flexibility, pragmatism and boldness we can expect from this new leader. His talks with the Yugoslavs and Finns are indicative of his willingness to play hard ball.


Robert M. Gates

[All Portions of this Memo
are Classified 

National Security Council The White House

Package # 8505

EO 13526 P 6: 03

B3

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	☒	☒
Bud McFarlane	2	☒	
Jacque Hill	3	☒	
Judge Clark			☒
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
Information	3		☒
A-Action			
B-Retain			
D-Dispatch			
N-No further Action			

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

*Pick,
Please expand your cover
memo. Presid to probably want
have him to read State memo.
JL*

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NLS FOUO 09/11/96
By CL, NARA, Date 2/21/06

USSR: Internal Activity. ~~(U)~~

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ There are growing signs that Soviet leader Andropov is laying the groundwork for a major anticorruption campaign as part of his overall internal policy.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In a 17 December reorganization of key security personnel, KGB chief Fedorchuk was named Minister of Internal Affairs, and KGB First Deputy Chairman Chebrikov replaced him as head of the KGB. Both men have long been associated with the KGB and appear to enjoy Andropov's support. The Internal Affairs Ministry, which controls the uniformed police among its other responsibilities, has been plagued with rumors of corruption among top officials, and the shakeup puts an Andropov associate with ties to the KGB in position to oversee additional changes that may be forthcoming.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ As if to emphasize that an anticorruption campaign is imminent, on 18 December stiff new penalties, including fines, prison terms, and forced labor, were announced for a number of crimes. Included in the decree was a provision dealing with the misappropriation of state and public property, which appears aimed at corrupt officials.

COMMENT: ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In addition to reports of extensive underground economic activity, there have been numerous reports of bribery involving Soviet officials. Accounts of widespread corruption indicate a potentially serious challenge to effective control and policy implementation. While the need for reform is clear, the personnel changes also enable Andropov to place his own supporters in key positions and to remind recalcitrant officials of their possible fate if they do not toe the line.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The personnel changes and stiffer penalties follow other recent innovations by Andropov. For example, there has been an unprecedented degree of reporting on Politburo meetings, including some agenda items. This appears to be part of an effort by the new Soviet leadership to present an image of openness. It may also be an attempt to convince the Soviet people that the new leadership is paying attention to their interests by removing corrupt officials, providing tougher penalties for offenders, and addressing their problems at the highest levels. Since the personnel shuffles also strengthen Andropov's position, additional changes can be expected as he continues to consolidate his power.
(DECL OADR)



BZ, Bp

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By CJ, NARA, Date 6/21/06

~~SECRET~~

B3

3/5 ANDROPOV

16

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

#1/21 December 1982

SPOT COMMENTARY: Andropov Addresses Soviet 60th Anniversary Meeting

In his speech this morning, Andropov made public Moscow's offer in the INF talks to reduce Soviet "medium-range" missiles in Europe to a number equivalent to the UK and French missile forces. He appeared to tie this offer to an additional agreement on INF aircraft. He reiterated Moscow's threat to deploy an ICBM analogous to the MX and stated that the USSR was already testing a long-range cruise missile which would be deployed if the U.S. proceeded to deploy long-range cruise missiles of its own.

At the same time, he reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to strategic arms limitations and reiterated the Soviet Union's willingness to reduce the level of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by 25 percent below the SALT II aggregates.

- Andropov's INF missile proposal has previously been made by Soviet negotiators in Geneva. It implies a Soviet willingness to reduce approximately one-third of its SS-20 force opposite Europe in addition to the dismantlement of approximately 250 older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The Soviet offer remains contingent, however, on nondeployment of new NATO missiles.
- His announcement of the Soviet cruise missile program is new. He indicated that these programs were already being tested and that they will be deployed as counters to U.S. long-range cruise missile programs. This line is intended to heighten pressure on West Europeans to break with NATO's INF plans and may be related to previous Soviet threats to place the U.S. in an analogous strategic position if NATO proceeds with INF modernization.
- Andropov's claim that Moscow is willing to reduce strategic delivery vehicles by 25 percent is consistent with Moscow's START offer to reduce to 1,800 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers from the agreed SALT II level of 2,400.
- Andropov also touched upon the subject of confidence building measures (CBMs). He indicated that the Soviets were serious about CBMs but offered little in the way of substance.
- The new General Secretary did say, however, in the context of the USSR's policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, that they were ready to negotiate an extension of this pledge to include a prohibition on the first use of conventional weapons.

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NLS F00-00911 #408

~~SECRET~~

By CU, NARA Date 6/21/06

B3

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Domestic Aspects

The domestic portion of Andropov's speech provided few clues about the direction of policy in coming months, and suggested he has yet to formulate a comprehensive plan for attacking economic problems. He refrained from praising Brezhnev, however, perhaps out of a desire to dissociate himself from the policy failures of recent years.

Andropov's remarks on domestic policy focused on the nationality question, as had Brezhnev's speech 10 years ago and as was appropriate for the anniversary of the Soviet Union's formation. Overall, his remarks emphasized the themes of Russian nationalism and political and economic centralization. He emphasized, for example, the need for greater regional specialization. And his statement that the final aim of nationality policy was the "merger" of national cultures and peoples, for example, was a centralizing formulation that has not been used in recent years. However, he seemed to call for increased representation of indigenous nationalities in the party and state institutions of non-Russian republics. He attributed the persistence of parochial tendencies among Soviet nationalities partly to "mistakes we make in our work."

Andropov also made a brief reference to the food program, suggesting that this part of Brezhnev's domestic policy will continue. He stressed the need to improve transportation, reinforcing other indications that improving the performance of this distressed sector will be a top priority.

Chernenko made a brief introductory speech. The prominent role accorded him indicates that he remains a key figure in the leadership, and further indicates that he is exercising responsibility within the Secretariat for ideology.

(The above preliminary assessments are based on the partial text available from TASS and Moscow Radio at time of writing and are not exhaustive.)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] B3

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 21, 1982

1. USSR: ANDROPOV PUBLICIZES POLITBURO ACTIVITIES

Andropov's Politburo has broken sharply with traditional Kremlin secrecy and has begun to publish reports of weekly Politburo meetings. From these and from announcements of personnel shifts, the Soviet public is now getting a sense of direction and energy lacking under Brezhnev. Andropov's own image-building is being matched by the efforts of lower-ranking leaders to get on the bandwagon.

Andropov apparently intends to limit his public appearances to major occasions. Unlike Brezhnev, he avoids numerous appearances at purely ceremonial functions. Instead, publicity for the Thursday afternoon Politburo sessions serves to create an image of direction, energy and leadership attention to major issues. Several reports testify to an improvement in official morale. The publicizing of activity rather than ceremony is well calculated to appeal to a Soviet officialdom irked by Brezhnev's immobilism.

The two reports of the Politburo's proceedings which have appeared to date give some idea of the main lines of Andropov's efforts. It is also clear that some of the most important matters--especially key personnel moves--are not reflected in the reports. No speakers are identified, and little is said about the actual disposition of important matters.

Media coverage of the December 9 Politburo meeting carried a strong message of leadership concern about corruption and widespread public displeasure over the arbitrariness and privileges of insensitive officials. The report of the December 16 meeting mentioned three items. Discussion of START and INF evidently reflected customary recess reports of the Soviet arms control delegations. Premier Tikhonov's report on his Finnish visit presumably was routine. The directive to improve servicing and repair of private cars probably was clearly intended to appeal to the interests of Soviet elites.

Recent personnel moves support the image of Andropov as a leader intent on curbing official corruption and inefficiency. He quickly shook up the railroad management following his criticism at the November 12 plenum. He replaced the head of the party's Propaganda Department and now has put his own man in as head of the civilian police, where corruption flourishes. His continuing grip on the KGB is reflected in the changes in its top leadership since he left the secret police in May.

In addition to Andropov's efforts to garner publicity, he is increasingly being cited as an authority figure by Soviet officials and publicists in a variety of fields. A bandwagon effect appears to be developing, and it promises to help Andropov consolidate his authority.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-00911 #69CNNARA, DATE 6/1/06

CONFIDENTIAL

XEROX
FOR TITLES
put
on my desk
(60th Anniversary)

ANDROPOV
SPEECH

33

Page 1 of 25

THIS 09 (SEE 03)''''

ANDROPOV REPORT AT KREMLIN JOINT MEETING

TAKE 1 -- ANDROPOV SPEECH

MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 0820 GMT 21 DEC 82

('SIXTY YEARS OF THE USSR 'YURIY ANDROPOV'S REPORT AT THE KREMLIN MEETING'. -- TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW DECEMBER 21 TASS -- YURIY ANDROPOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, TODAY DELIVERED A REPORT AT THE JOINT CELEBRATION MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR AND THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEVOTED TO THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE USSR.

HE SAID:

DEAR CONRADES:

ESTEEMED GUESTS,

SIXTY YEARS AGO, THE PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRY, WHO HAD BEEN EMANCIPATED BY THE VICTORIOUS OCTOBER REVOLUTION, UNITED VOLUNTARILY TO FORM THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART /RE/ASED
NLS F00-00911 #70
By CKJ, NARA, Date 6/21/06

IN CLOSING THE FIRST, UNIFICATION CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS, WHICH PROCLAIMED THE USSR, MIKHAIL KALININ SAID: "FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS HUMANKIND'S FINEST MINDS HAVE BEEN STRUGGLING WITH THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM OF FINDING THE FORMS THAT WOULD GIVE THE PEOPLES THE POSSIBILITY, WITHOUT THE GREATEST OF TORMENT, WITHOUT MUTUAL STRIFE, OF LIVING IN FRIENDSHIP AND BROTHERHOOD. PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, THE FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION IS BEING TAKEN ONLY NOW, THIS VERY DAY."

2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM DID NOT LEAD TO THE ABOLITION OF NATIONAL OPPRESSION. ON THE CONTRARY, NATIONAL OPPRESSION WAS COMPOUNDED AND AGGRAVATED BY COLONIAL OPPRESSION. HAVING ENSLAVED HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE, A HANDFUL OF CAPITALIST POWERS SENTENCED THEM TO STAGNATION, CUTTING OFF THEIR ROAD TO PROGRESS.

MARXISM WAS THE FIRST TO SHOW THAT THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION IS LINKED ORGANICALLY TO SOCIETY'S SOCIAL, CLASS STRUCTURE, TO THE PREDOMINANT TYPE OF PROPERTY. IN OTHER WORDS, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONALITIES HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN SOCIAL SOIL. THIS IS WHAT BROUGHT MARX AND ENGELS ROUND TO THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSION THAT THE ABOLITION OF SOCIAL OPPRESSION WAS THE CONDITION AND PREREQUISITE OF THE ABOLITION OF NATIONAL OPPRESSION. MARX SAID: "...THE VICTORY OF THE PROLETARIAT OVER THE BOUREGEOISIE IS AT THE SAME TIME THE SIGNAL OF LIBERATION FOR ALL OPPRESSED NATIONS." PROCLAIMED BY THE FOUNDERS OF MARXISM, THE IMMORTAL SLOGAN OF "WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!" BECAME THE CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE OF WORKING PEOPLE AGAINST ALL FORMS OF ENSLAVEMENT -- BOTH SOCIAL AND NATIONAL.

(MORE)

21 DEC 0910Z [REDACTED]

B3

3

FBIS 10

TAKE 2 -- 09 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///SOCIAL AND NATIONAL.

B3

(TEXT) IN NEW HISTORICAL CONDITIONS THE WORK OF KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS WAS CONTINUED BY LENIN. HE HEADED THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AT A TIME WHEN THE DAWN OF REVOLUTION WAS RISING OVER RUSSIA. NATURALLY, IN A COUNTRY JUSTIFIABLY CALLED THE 'PRISON OF PEOPLES,' THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION WAS GIVEN A PROMINENT PLACE WHEN THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY WAS ELABORATING ITS STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

LENIN FOCUSED HIS ATTENTION ON THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION AS THE SINGLE DEPENDABLE MEANS OF ENSURING THEIR ACTUAL AND STEADY COMING TOGETHER. IT WAS ONLY THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION THAT COULD BE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE VOLUNTARY UNITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THE STRUGGLE TO OVERTHROW TSARISM AND BUILD A NEW SOCIETY. THIS WAS HOW THE QUESTION WAS PUT BY LENIN. SUCH WAS THE CORE OF THE POLICY OF THE PARTY OF LENIN IN THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION TRANSLATED POLITICAL SLOGANS AND DEMANDS INTO THE LANGUAGE OF DAY-TO-DAY ORGANISATIONAL WORK, LIFE ITSELF, FORMIDABLE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, FOREIGN-POLICY, DEFENCE PROBLEMS COMPELLED THE NEED TO RALLY THE PEOPLES, TO UNITE THE REPUBLICS THAT SPANG UP ON THE RUINS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

WHAT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED TODAY WAS FAR FROM BEING THE CASE IN THAT TURBULENT TIME OF TRANSITION. THE QUEST FOR SPECIFIC STATE FORMS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT HAD TO EMBODY THE GENERAL IDEAS AND PROPOSITIONS IN THE NATIONALITIES PROGRAMME PROCEEDED IN SHARP DEBATES. DIFFERING OPINIONS CAME INTO CONFLICT -- FROM A PROGRAMME FOR A LOOSE, AMORPHOUS ASSOCIATION OF REPUBLICS WITHIN A CONFEDERATION TO THE DEMANDS TO SIMPLY INCORPORATE THEM IN THE RSFSR ON THE BASIS OF AUTONOMY. IT TOOK THE GENIUS AND PRESTIGE OF LENIN TO FIND AND UPHOLD THE ONLY SURE WAY -- THE WAY OF SOCIALIST FEDERALISM.

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WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF THE WAY INDICATED BY LENIN?
ONE MAY PUT IT BRIEFLY AS FOLLOWS. THE UNEQUIVOCALLY VOLUNTARY
UNION OF FREE PEOPLES AS THE GUARANTEE OF MAXIMUM STABILITY OF THE
FEDERATION OF SOCIALIST REPUBLICS; COMPLETE EQUALITY OF ALL
NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES AND A CONSISTENT COURSE TOWARDS THE
ABOLITION NOT ONLY OF THEIR JURIDICAL BUT ALSO OF THEIR ACTUAL
[INEQUALITY]; THE UNHAMPERED DEVELOPMENT OF EACH REPUBLIC, OF
EACH NATIONALITY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF FRATERNAL UNION AND THE
PERSEVERING INCULCATION OF INTERNATIONALIST CONSCIOUSNESS AND A
STEADFAST COURSE TOWARDS THE DRAWING TOGETHER OF ALL THE NATIONS AND
NATIONALITIES INHABITING THE COUNTRY.

4

PRECISELY IN THE YEAR THE SOVIET UNION WAS FORMED LENIN WROTE
THE WORDS THAT VIVIDLY SHOWED HIS LINE OF THOUGHT ON THE NATIONALITIES
QUESTION. HERE ARE THESE WORDS: "OUR FIVE YEARS' EXPERIENCE IN
SETTLING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN A COUNTRY THAT CONTAINS A
TREMENDOUS NUMBER OF NATIONALITIES SUCH AS COULD HARDLY BE FOUND
IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, GIVES US THE FULL CONVICTION THAT UNDER SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES THE ONLY CORRECT ATTITUDE TO THE INTERESTS OF NATIONS
IS TO MEET THOSE INTERESTS IN FULL AND PROVIDE CONDITIONS THAT
EXCLUDE ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICTS ON THAT SCORE.

"OUR EXPERIENCE," LENIN CONTINUES, "HAS LEFT US WITH THE FIRM
CONVICTION THAT ONLY EXCLUSIVE ATTENTION TO THE INTERESTS OF
VARIOUS NATIONS CAN REMOVE GROUNDS FOR CONFLICTS, CAN REMOVE
MUTUAL MISTRUST, CAN REMOVE THE FEAR OF ANY INTRIGUES AND CREATE
THAT CONFIDENCE, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF WORKERS AND PEASANTS
SPEAKING DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, WITHOUT WHICH THEY ABSOLUTELY
CANNOT BE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLES OR ANYTHING LIKE
A SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF EVERYTHING THAT IS OF VALUE IN
PRESENT-DAY CIVILISATION."

LENIN'S BEHESTS AND HIS PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE POLICY IN
THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION ARE SACRED TO US. RELYING ON AND
STEADFASTLY ASSERTING THEM IN PRACTICE WE HAVE CREATED A POWERFUL
STATE, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, WHOSE FORMATION
WAS NOT ONLY A MAJOR STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALISM BUT
ALSO A CRUCIAL TURNING POINT IN WORLD HISTORY.

(MORE)

21 DEC 0943Z [REDACTED]

B3

47
FRIS 11

TAKE 3 -- 09 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///IN WORLD HISTORY.

5
B3

(TEXT) 1. RESULTS OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AND AIMS OF
THE NATIONALITIES POLICY (SUBHEAD)

THE PATH TRAVERSED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN 60 YEARS IS AN
EPOCH IN ITSELF. I WOULD SAY THAT HISTORY HAS NEVER BEEN SUCH
RAPID PROGRESS FROM BACKWARDNESS, MISERY, AND RUIN TO A MIGHTY,
MODERN GREAT POWER WITH AN EXTREMELY HIGH LEVEL OF CULTURE AND A
CONSTANTLY CLIMBING LIVING STANDARD.

WHAT ARE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF OUR DEVELOPMENT?

--HISTORY HAS FULLY BORNE OUT THE THEORY OF MARX AND LENIN
THAT THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION CAN ONLY BE SETTLED ON A CLASS
BASIS. NATIONAL DISCORD AND ALL FORMS OF RACIAL AND NATIONAL
INEQUALITY AND OPPRESSION RECEDED INTO THE PAST TOGETHER WITH
SOCIAL ANTAGONISMS.

--IT HAS BEEN COMPELLINGLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE COMMUNIST
PARTY AND ITS SCIENTIFIC POLICY ARE THE GUIDING FORCE IN THE
SOCIALIST SETTLEMENT OF THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION AND THE
GUARANTOR THAT THIS SETTLEMENT IS CORRECT.

--BACKWARD OUTLYING REGIONS POPULATED BY ETHNIC MINORITIES,
IN MANY OF WHICH FEUDAL-PATRIARCHAL AND EVEN CLAN RELATIONS WERE
STILL DOMINANT, HAVE DISAPPEARED.

--AN INTEGRAL UNION-WIDE ECONOMIC COMPLEX HAS FORMED ON THE
BASIS OF THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC GROWTH OF ALL THE REPUBLICS, A
GROWTH GUIDED BY THE GENERAL STATE PLAN.

--THERE HAS BEEN A QUALITATIVE CHANGE OF THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC: A MODERN WORKING CLASS HAS EMERGED
IN EACH OF THEM; THE PEASANTS ARE MOVING ALONG THE NEW ROAD OF
COLLECTIVE FARMING; AN INTELLIGENTSIA OF ITS OWN HAS BEEN
CREATED AND SKILLED CADRES HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN ALL AREAS OF THE
LIFE OF STATE AND SOCIETY.

476
6
--A SOCIALIST MULTINATIONAL CULTURE HAS BURGEONED ON THE BASIS OF PROGRESSIVE TRADITIONS AND AN INTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF CULTURAL VALUES.

--SOCIALIST NATIONS HAVE FORMED, AND THESE NOW COMPRISE A NEW HISTORICAL COMMUNITY -- THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

THE INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLICS ARE INTERTWINING EVER MORE CLOSELY, AND THE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND THE MUTUAL LINKS THAT DIRECT THE CREATIVE EFFORTS OF THE NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES OF THE USSR INTO A SINGLE CHANNEL ARE GROWING MORE PRODUCTIVE. THE ALL-SIDED DEVELOPMENT OF EACH OF THE SOCIALIST NATIONS IN OUR COUNTRY LOGICALLY BRINGS THEM EVER CLOSER TOGETHER.

EACH OF THE UNION REPUBLICS -- THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UKRAINE AND BELORUSSIA, UZBEKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN, GEORGIA AND AZERBAIJAN, LITHUANIA AND MOLDAVIA, LATVIA AND KIRGHIZIA, TAJIKISTAN AND ARMENIA, TURKMENIA AND ESTONIA -- EACH, I REPEAT, OF THE UNION REPUBLICS IS MAKING AN INVALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVERALL GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY AND CULTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION. THIS IS NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY AN ADDING TOGETHER, BUT A MULTIPLICATION OF OUR CREATIVE CAPABILITY.

ALL THE NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES LIVING IN THE TWENTY AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS AND EIGHTEEN AUTONOMOUS REGIONS AND AREAS ARE SUCCESSFULLY UNFOLDING THEIR POTENTIALITIES IN A FRATERNAL FAMILY. THE MILLIONS OF GERMANS, POLES, KOREANS, KURDS, AND PEOPLE OF OTHER NATIONALITIES, FOR WHOM THE SOVIET UNION HAS LONG AGO BECOME THE HOMELAND, ARE FULL-PLEDGED SOVIET CITIZENS.

THE PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRY ADDRESS SPECIAL WORDS OF GRATITUDE TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. IN NONE OF THE REPUBLICS WOULD THE PRESENT ACHIEVEMENTS HAVE BEEN CONCEIVABLE WITHOUT THEIR DISINTERESTED FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE. THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE, WHICH HAS NATURALLY ENTERED THE LIFE OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE OF EVERY NATIONALITY, IS A FACTOR OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE IN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL LIFE, IN THE DRAWING TOGETHER OF ALL ITS NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES, IN MAKING THE RICHES OF WORLD CIVILISATION ACCESSIBLE TO THEM.

(MORE)


21 DEC 1009Z [REDACTED]

B3

7
FBI 12

TAKE 4 -- 09 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///ACCESSIBLE TO THEM.

 B3
(TEXT) THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE USSR IS A MAJOR LANDMARK IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET SOCIETY'S NATIONAL-STATE FOUNDATIONS. THIS OUTSTANDING DOCUMENT NOT ONLY SUMS UP THE RESULTS OF PRECEDING DEVELOPMENT BUT ENSHRINES SOLID AND LASTING POLITICO-LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE FURTHER BURGEONING AND DRAWING TOGETHER OF ALL THE COUNTRY'S NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES.

THE TANGIBLE QUALITATIVE CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE COURSE OF 60 YEARS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONALITIES ARE EVIDENCE THAT THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION, AS IT WAS LEFT TO US BY THE EXPLOITING SYSTEM, HAS BEEN SETTLED SUCCESSFULLY, FINALLY AND IRREVERSIBLY. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY THE MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER OF A COUNTRY HAS TURNED FROM A SOURCE OF WEAKNESS INTO A SOURCE OF STRENGTH AND PROSPERITY.

SPEAKING IN THIS HALL EXACTLY TEN YEARS AGO, LEONID BREZHNEV PUT IT VERY APTLY WHEN HE SAID THAT IN THIS COUNTRY THERE HAVE EMERGED RELATIONS THAT "HAVE NO EQUAL IN HISTORY AND WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO CALL THESE RELATIONS THE LENINIST FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES. THIS FRIENDSHIP, COMRADES, IS ONE OF OUR INVALUABLE GAINS, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT GAINS OF SOCIALISM WHICH IS MOST DEAR TO THE HEART OF EVERY SOVIET CITIZEN. WE SOVIET PEOPLE WILL ALWAYS SAFEGUARD THIS FRIENDSHIP AS OUR MOST CHERISHED POSSESSION!"

TODAY, ON THIS ANNIVERSARY, WE PAY TRIBUTE TO THE MANY GENERATIONS OF SOVIET PEOPLE OF ALL NATIONALITIES, MEN AND WOMEN, WORKERS, PEASANTS AND INTELLECTUALS, PARTY AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES, MEN OF THE ARMED FORCES, COMMUNISTS AND NON-PARTY PEOPLE, TO ALL WHO BUILT SOCIALISM, UPHELD IT IN A BITTER WAR, AND MADE A REALITY OF THE MILLENNIA-LONG DREAM OF EQUALITY, FRIENDSHIP AND BROTHERHOOD AMONG PEOPLES.

COMRADES, IN SUMMING UP WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, WE, 8
NATURALLY, GIVE MOST OF OUR ATTENTION TO WHAT STILL REMAINS TO BE
DONE. OUR END GOAL IS CLEAR. IT, TO QUOTE LENIN, "IS NOT ONLY
TO BRING THE NATIONS CLOSER TOGETHER BUT TO REFUSE THEM." THE
PARTY IS WELL AWARE THAT THE ROAD TO THIS GOAL IS A LONG ONE. ON
NO ACCOUNT MUST THERE BE EITHER ANY FORESTALLING OF EVENTS OR
ANY HOLDING BACK OF PROCESSES THAT HAVE ALREADY MATURED.

THE SUCCESSES IN SETTLING THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION BY NO
MEANS SIGNIFY THAT ALL THE PROBLEMS GENERATED BY THE VERY FACT
OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF NUMEROUS NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES IN A
SINGLE STATE HAVE VANISHED. THIS IS HARDLY POSSIBLE AS LONG AS
NATIONS EXIST, AS LONG AS THERE ARE NATIONAL DISTINCTIONS. AND
THESE WILL EXIST FOR A LONG TIME TO COME, MUCH LONGER THAN CLASS
DISTINCTIONS.

THAT IS WHY THE PERFECTION OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM -- AND THIS
IS PRECISELY HOW WE CAN DEFINE THE BASIC CONTENT OF THE WORK OF
THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE AT THE PRESENT STAGE -- MUST INCLUDE A
CAREFULLY CONSIDERED, SCIENTIFIC POLICY IN THE NATIONALITIES
QUESTION. I SHOULD LIKE TO SPEAK OF SOME OF ITS AIMS.

I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED WHAT ENORMOUS BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGES
A SINGLE UNION HAS GIVEN THE PEOPLES AND REPUBLICS OF OUR COUNTRY.
HOWEVER, THE POTENTIALITIES BEING OPENED BY SUCH A UNION ARE
FAR FROM HAVING BEEN EXHAUSTED.

TAKE THE ECONOMY. MODERN PRODUCTIVE FORCES DEMAND INTEGRATION
EVEN IN THE CASE OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. MUCH MORE SO DO THEY
REQUIRE THE CLOSE AND SKILLFUL COORDINATION OF THE EFFORTS OF THE
VARIOUS REGIONS AND REPUBLICS OF ONE AND THE SAME COUNTRY. THE
MOST JUDICIOUS UTILISATION OF THE NATURAL AND LABOUR RESOURCES
AND CLIMATIC SPECIFICS OF EACH REPUBLIC AND THE MOST RATIONAL
INCLUSION OF THIS POTENTIAL INTO THAT OF THE UNION AS A WHOLE IS
WHAT WILL YIELD THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO EACH REGION, TO EACH
NATION AND NATIONALITY, AND TO THE STATE AS A WHOLE.

(MORE)

21 DEC 1029Z [REDACTED]

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51
FDIS 15

TAKE 5--09--09 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///AS A WHOLE.

9

BB

(TEXT) SUCH IS THE GENERAL FUNDAMENTAL GUIDELINE. TO PUT IT INTO EFFECT MUCH WILL HAVE TO BE DONE BY OUR CENTRAL AND LOCAL PLANNING AND ECONOMIC AGENCIES. THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES, OF REGIONAL SPECIALISATION AND COOPERATION, AND OF THE PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC LINKS AND TRANSPORTATION. THIS IS NOT AN EASY TASK, OF COURSE, BUT IT IS ON THE AGENDA AND ITS FULFILMENT HOLDS OUT THE PROMISE OF CONSIDERABLE BENEFIT.

THE WHOLE COUNTRY IS NOW WORKING ON THE FOOD PROGRAMME. IT CLEARLY DEFINES CONCRETE AIMS FOR ALL THE UNION REPUBLICS, AND EACH OF THEM WILL HAVE TO WORK HARD IN ORDER TO MAKE A TANGIBLE CONTRIBUTION -- IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE -- TO THE KEY MATTER OF ENSURING AN UNINTERRUPTED SUPPLY OF FOOD FOR SOVIET PEOPLE.

WE KNOW THAT THE ADOPTED PROGRAMME DEALS WITH IMMEDIATE, URGENT TASKS. BUT IF WE TAKE A LONG-TERM VIEW, IT BECOMES OBVIOUS THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX -- AND, FOR THAT MATTER, THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY AS A WHOLE -- WILL REQUIRE A MORE IN-DEPTH AND CONSISTENT SPECIALISATION OF AGRICULTURE ON A NATIONWIDE SCALE.

ONE MORE POINT. IN A VAST COUNTRY LIKE OURS TRANSPORT PLAYS A PARTICULARLY DISTINCTIVE ROLE -- ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND, IF YOU

THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
PROGRESS OF ALL NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES IS ACCOMPANIED WITH
THE GROWTH OF THEIR NATIONAL SELF-AWARENESS. THIS IS A LOGICAL,
OBJECTIVE PROCESS. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT THE NATURAL
PRIDE ONE TAKES IN THE GAINS ATTAINED SHOULD NOT DEGENERATE INTO
NATIONAL ARROGANCE OR CONCEIT, THAT IT SHOULD NOT GRAVITATE TOWARDS
EXCLUSIVENESS, AND DISTRESPECT FOR OTHER NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES.
YET, SUCH NEGATIVE PHENOMENA STILL OCCUR., AND IT WOULD BE WRONG
TO ATTRIBUTE THEM SOLELY TO SURVIVALS OF THE PAST. AMONG OTHER
THINGS, THEY ARE SOMETIMES FOSTERED BY MISTAKES WE MAKE IN OUR
WORK. HERE, COMRADES, NOTHING CAN BE DISMISSED AS INSIGNIFICANT.
EVERYTHING COUNTS -- THE ATTITUDE TO THE LANGUAGE, TO MONUMENTS OF
THE PAST, THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORICAL EVENTS, AND THE WAY WE
TRANSFORM RURAL AND URBAN AREAS AND INFLUENCE LIVING AND WORKING
CONDITIONS.

NATURAL MIGRATION OF THE POPULATION IS MAKING OF EACH OF OUR
REPUBLICS -- AND, TO VARYING DEGREES, EACH REGION AND EACH CITY --
INCREASINGLY MULTINATIONAL. THIS MEANS THAT PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
BODIES, AND ALL OUR LOCAL CADRES, ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY
INSTRUMENTAL IN IMPLEMENTING THE PARTY'S NATIONALITIES POLICY.
AND THEY HAVE TO CARRY FORWARD THE LOFTY PRINCIPLES OF THAT POLICY
DAY AFTER DAY, ENSURING HARMONIOUS, FRATERNAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL, BOTH BIG AND SMALL, NATIONS AND
NATIONALITIES IN WORK AND DAILY LIFE.

THE PARTY HAS ALWAYS ATTACHED GREAT ATTENTION TO THE GROWTH
OF THE NATIONAL DETACHMENTS OF THE SOVIET WORKING CLASS, THE
LEADING FORCE OF OUR SOCIETY. THE RESULTS ARE THERE FOR ALL TO
SEE. THESE DAYS, WORKERS MAKE UP THE LARGEST SOCIAL GROUP IN ALL
THE UNION REPUBLICS.

(MORE)

21 DEC 1103Z [REDACTED]

BB

53
FBIS 16

TAKE 6 -- 09 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///THE UNION REPUBLICS.

12
BB
[REDACTED]
(TEXT) IN SOME OF THEM, HOWEVER, THE INDIGENOUS NATIONALITY SHOULD BE REPRESENTED IN THE WORKING CLASS MORE FULLY. HENCE THE TASK SET BY THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU -- TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE THE TRAINING OF SKILLED WORKERS FROM AMONG ALL THE NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES RESIDING IN THE REPUBLICS. THE NEED FOR THIS IS BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL. MULTINATIONAL WORK COLLECTIVES, ABOVE ALL THOSE IN INDUSTRY, ARE THAT VERY MILIEU IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONALIST SPIRIT IS FOSTERED BEST, AND THE FRATERNAL RELATIONS AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR GROW STRONGER.

REPRESENTATION IN PARTY AND STATE BODIES OF THE REPUBLICS AND THE UNION AS A WHOLE IS ALSO A HIGHLY IMPORTANT QUESTION. THE REFERENCE HERE, OF COURSE, IS NOT TO ANY FORMAL QUOTAS. ARITHMETIC IS NO WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION. THERE SHOULD BE A CONSISTENT EFFORT TO ENSURE PROPER REPRESENTATION OF ALL NATIONALITIES IN ANY REPUBLIC IN THE VARIOUS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BODIES AT ALL LEVELS. DUE REGARD TO COMPETENCE, TO MORAL AND POLITICAL QUALITIES, CARE AND ATTENTION, AND GREAT TACT IN SELECTING AND POSTING CADRES ARE ESPECIALLY NECESSARY IN VIEW OF THE MULTINATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS.

A CONSTANT AND EVER-IMPORTANT TASK IS TO CONTINUE INSTILLING IN SOVIET PEOPLE A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND FRIENDSHIP FOR ALL THE NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES OF THE COUNTRY, OF LOVE FOR THEIR GREAT SOVIET COUNTRY, OF INTERNATIONALISM AND SOLIDARITY WITH THE WORKING PEOPLE OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

IT IS UP TO ALL PARTY AND YCL ORGANISATIONS, THE SOVIETS, TRADE UNIONS AND OUR ARMED FORCES, WHICH HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A GOOD SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONALISM, TO WORK TOWARDS THIS END. IT SHOULD

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IN THE SPHERE OF INTERNATIONALIST EDUCATION, AS IN ALL OUR IDEOLOGICAL AND MASS POLITICAL WORK, WE ARE FACING BIG TASKS. CONCRETE AND CONVINCING DEMONSTRATION OF OUR ACHIEVEMENTS, EARNEST ANALYSIS OF NEW PROBLEMS CONSTANTLY GENERATED BY LIFE, AND FRESHNESS OF THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE -- THESE ARE THE ELEMENTS WE NEED TO IMPROVE OUR PROPAGANDA, WHICH MUST ALWAYS BE TRUTHFUL AND REALISTIC, AS WELL AS INTERESTING AND EASY TO UNDERSTAND, AND THEREFORE MORE EFFECTIVE.

FURTHER ADVANCEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR DEPENDS TO A GREAT EXTENT ON THE DEEPENING OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY. INCREASINGLY BROAD INVOLVEMENT OF THE WORKING PEOPLE OF ALL NATIONALITIES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL AND STATE AFFAIRS IS, TO PUT IT IN CONCISE TERMS, THE LEADING TREND IN OUR COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LIFE. AND OUR PARTY WILL DO EVERYTHING TO PROMOTE AND ADVANCE IT.

CONRADES, ALL THIS MEANS THAT PROBLEMS OF RELATIONS AMONG NATIONS ARE STILL ON THE AGENDA IN THE SOCIETY OF NATURE SOCIALISM. THEY CALL FOR PARTICULAR CARE AND CONSTANT ATTENTION ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE PARTY SHOULD DELVE INTO THEM DEEPLY AND CHART THE WAY OF SOLVING THEM, ENRICHING THE LENINIST PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONALITIES POLICY WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM.

WE SPEAK BOLDLY BOTH ABOUT THE EXISTING PROBLEMS AND THE OUTSTANDING TASKS BECAUSE WE KNOW FOR SURE THAT WE ARE EQUAL TO THEM, THAT WE CAN AND MUST SOLVE THEM. A DISPOSITION TO ACTION RATHER THAN RHETORIC IS WHAT WE NEED TODAY TO MAKE THE GREAT AND POWERFUL UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS EVEN STRONGER. I AM SURE THAT THIS VIEW IS SHARED BY ALL THOSE PRESENT IN THIS HALL, BY ALL OUR PARTY, BY ALL SOVIET PEOPLE.

2. THE USSR -- BUTTRESS OF THE GREAT CAUSE OF PEACE AND
FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLES (SUBHEAD)

14

COMRADES, ON DECEMBER 30, 1922, THE VERY DAY OF THE DECLARATION
AND TREATY ON THE FORMATION OF THE USSR WERE ADOPTED IN MOSCOW,
IT WAS STATED AT THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE ON LENIN'S INSTRUCTIONS
THAT, GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF UNIVERSAL PEACE, THE SOVIET
REPUBLICS 'CONSIDER IT THEIR URGENT DUTY TO DO EVERYTHING IN
THEIR POWER TO FACILITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL EQUALITY
AMONG RACES, RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
AND TO COMPLETE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE OF ALL STATES.'

THIS WAS HOW THE ESSENCE OF THE FUNDAMENTALLY NEW FOREIGN
POLICY WHICH THE WORLD'S FIRST COUNTRY OF VICTORIOUS SOCIALISM
HAD BEGUN TO CARRY FORWARD CONSISTENTLY, WAS SET FORTH IN PLAIN
AND COMPREHENSIBLE TERMS.

(MORE)

21 DEC 1116Z



B3

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE
SITUATION IN THE USSR AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1922. THE
COUNTRY IS NOW A UNIFIED
STATE AND IS IN A POSITION
TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS
AND TO PROMOTE THE
WELFARE OF ITS PEOPLE.

15

FBIS 17

TAKE 7 -- 09 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///AND COMPREHENSIBLE TERMS.

B3

(TEXT) AND AS NEW SOCIALIST COUNTRIES EMERGED, A COMPLETELY NEW TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BEGAN TO TAKE SHAPE. THESE RELATIONS ARE BASED ON IDEOLOGICAL UNITY, COMMON GOALS AND COMRADELY COOPERATION WITH FULL RESPECT FOR THE INTERESTS, DISTINCTIVE FEATURES AND TRADITIONS OF EACH COUNTRY. AT THEIR CENTRE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM.

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD TO BLAZE NEW TRAILS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE RELATIONS. MANKIND'S PAST EXPERIENCE COULD NOT SUGGEST ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEMS THAT LIFE SET BEFORE THEM. NATURALLY, NOT EVERYTHING WORKED OUT RIGHT AWAY. ALL THE MORE SO BECAUSE THE COUNTRIES WHICH MADE UP THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM STARTED IN MANY WAYS FROM DIFFERENT LEVELS -- BOTH IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT AND SPECIFIC EXTERNAL CONDITIONS. NOR DID THEY ALWAYS SUCCEED IN DRAWING TIMELY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CHANGES WITHIN THE SOCIALIST WORLD ITSELF.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, TOO, DID NOT ALLOW TIME FOR REFLECTION: THE NEW FORMS OF RELATIONS HAD TO BE TESTED ON THE GO, AS PEOPLE SAY. THERE WERE ILLUSIONS WE HAD HAD TO ABANDON, AND MISTAKES FOR WHICH WE HAD HAD TO PAY A PRICE.

BUT AS WE ASSESS THE PRESENT DAY OF OUR COUNTRIES, WE CAN SAY WITH SATISFACTION THAT WE HAVE LEARNED A LOT, AND THAT THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY IS A POWERFUL AND HEALTHY ORGANISM WHICH IS PLAYING AN ENORMOUS AND BENEFICIAL ROLE IN THE WORLD OF TODAY. THE MECHANISM OF FRATERNAL COOPERATION ENCOMPASSES A VARIETY OF SPHERES OF LIFE IN OUR COUNTRIES AND DIFFERENT AREAS OF OUR JOINT SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION. BY POLLING OUR RESOURCES WE ARE FINDING INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE WAYS OF HARMONISING THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY WITH

THOSE OF EACH MEMBER COUNTRY

TRUE, EVEN NOW WE CANNOT SAY THAT ALL THE DIFFICULTIES
ARE BEHIND US. THAT WE HAVE ATTAINED OUR IDEAL. WHAT WAS GOOD
ENOUGH YESTERDAY NEEDS IMPROVING TODAY. THE COUNTRIES OF OUR
COMMUNITY FACE MANY SERIOUS TASKS -- THOSE OF DEFENDING OUR SOCIALIST
GAINS AND VALUES AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST ONSLAUGHT, OF FIGHTING
TOGETHER FOR DURABLE PEACE AND DETENTE, FURTHER IMPROVING OUR
POLITICAL COOPERATION AND, FINALLY, PROVIDING NEW IMPULSE TO
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION.

IN SHORT, MUCH HAS STILL TO BE DONE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE
YOU THAT FOR ITS PART THE SOVIET UNION WILL DO ITS UTMOST TO MAKE
THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM STRONGER AND MORE PROSPEROUS.

COMRADES, THE SOCIALIST EXPERIENCE OF SOLVING THE NATIONALITIES
QUESTION IS BEING CLOSELY STUDIED IN SCORES OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE
FREED THEMSELVES FROM THE COLONIAL YOKE. OUR ACHIEVEMENTS IN
BUILDING SOCIALISM, OUR HISTORY-MAKING VICTORY OVER FASCISM,
AND THE FLOWERING OF ALL THE SOVIET NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES
HAVE BEEN A POWERFUL STIMULANT FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION
STRUGGLE.

THE SOVIET UNION'S VIGOROUS AND RESOLUTE STRUGGLE FOR THE
ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM, ITS UNFAILING SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERATION
AND EQUALITY OF NATIONS FACILITATE THEIR ADVANCE TO FREEDOM
AND PROGRESS. THIS IS WELL KNOWN BY THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA,
THE ARAB EAST AND LATIN AMERICA.

THE YOUNG STATES THAT HAVE FLUNG OFF THE COLONIAL YOKE ARE AT
PRESENT GOING THROUGH A DIFFICULT PERIOD OF NATIONAL SELF-ASSERTION
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. THEY ARE HAMPERED BY THEIR COLONIAL
HERITAGE OF BACKWARDNESS, INTERNAL STRIFE AND CONFLICT.

NOT YET STRONG ENOUGH, THEY ARE IN DANGER OF FALLING INTO THE
NUMEROUS NEOCOLONIALIST TRAPS. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT
RESOLUTE RESISTANCE TO IMPERIALISM, A WELL-DEFINED STRATEGY OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, MUTUAL RESPECT FOR EACH
OTHER'S INTERESTS AND RIGHTS WILL ENABLE THEIR PEOPLES TO OVERCOME
THESE DIFFICULTIES, WHICH WE MIGHT DESCRIBE AS GROWING PAINS. SOVIET
PEOPLE WISH THEM GREAT SUCCESS IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR INDEPENDENCE,
AND IN THEIR FIGHT FOR PROSPERITY AND PROGRESS.

50

17

WE RESPECT THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT WHOSE POLICY OF PEACE IS MAKING A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. WE ARE SQUARELY AND UNSHAKINGLY ON THE SIDE OF THOSE WHO STILL HAVE TO FIGHT FOR FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE AND THE VERY SURVIVAL OF THEIR PEOPLES, THOSE WHO ARE FORCED TO REBUFF OR ARE THREATENED WITH AGGRESSION. OUR POSITION HERE IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE SOVIET UNION'S CONSISTENT AND TIRELESS DRIVE FOR DURABLE PEACE ON EARTH.

OVER THESE SIX DECADES THE POSITION OF OUR SOVIET STATE HAS CHANGED RADICALLY; ITS PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE HAVE GROWN ENORMOUSLY. CLOSE PEACEFUL COOPERATION LINKS THE SOVIET UNION WITH COUNTRIES ON ALL CONTINENTS. ITS VOICE COMMANDS RESPECT AT INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE -- THE BASIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY -- HAVE WON BROAD INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO SCORES OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING THE FINAL ACT OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE IN HELSINKI. SOVIET PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN THE BASIS OF MAJOR U.N. DECISIONS ON STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY.

BUT EACH STEP ALONG THE ROAD TO MORE DURABLE PEACE HAS TAKEN AND DOES TAKE A LOT OF EFFORT; IT CALLS FOR INTENSE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALIST WARPAWKS. THIS STRUGGLE HAS BECOME ESPECIALLY ACUTE NOW THAT THE MORE WARLIKE FACTIONS IN THE WEST HAVE BECOME VERY ACTIVE; THEIR CLASS-BASED HATRED OF SOCIALISM PREVAILING OVER CONSIDERATIONS OF REALISM AND SOMETIMES OVER PLAIN COMMON SENSE.

(MORE)

21 DEC 1144Z [REDACTED]

B3

18

FBI 20

TAKE 8--9 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

////PLAIN COMMON SENSE.

B3

(TEXT) THE IMPERIALISTS HAVE NOT GIVEN UP THE SCHEME OF ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, OF INTERFERING IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN THE HOPE OF ERODING THEIR SOCIAL SYSTEM, AND ARE TRYING TO WIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE USSR, OVER ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY.

OF COURSE, THESE PLANS ARE SURE TO FAIL. IT IS NOT GIVEN TO ANYONE TO TURN BACK THE COURSE OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. ATTEMPTS TO "STRANGLE" SOCIALISM FAILED EVEN WHEN THE SOVIET STATE WAS STILL GETTING ON ITS FEET AND WAS THE ONLY SOCIALIST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. SO, SURELY, NOTHING WILL COME OF IT NOW.

BUT ONE CANNOT HELP SEEING THAT WASHINGTON'S PRESENT POLICY HAS SHARPENED THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION TO DANGEROUS EXTREMES.

THE WAR PREPARATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATO BLOC WHICH ITS LEADS HAVE GROWN TO UNHEARD-OF, RECORD SCALE. OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN IN WASHINGTON ARE HEARD TO DISCOURSE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF "LIMITED", "SUSTAINED" AND OTHER VARIETIES OF NUCLEAR WAR. THIS INTENDED TO REASSURE PEOPLE, TO ACCUSTOM THEM TO THE THOUGHT THAT SUCH WAR IS ACCEPTABLE.

VERITABLY, ONE HAS TO BE BLIND TO THE REALITIES OF OUR TIME NOT TO SEE THAT WHEREVER AND HOWEVER A NUCLEAR WHIRLWIND ARISES, IT WILL INEVITABLY GO OUT OF CONTROL AND CAUSE A WORLDWIDE CATASTROPHE.

OUR POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IS CLEAR: A NUCLEAR WAR -- WHETHER BIG OR SMALL, WHETHER LIMITED OR TOTAL -- MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO BREAK OUT. NO TASK IS MORE IMPORTANT TODAY THAN TO STOP THE INSTIGATORS OF ANOTHER WAR. THIS IS REQUIRED BY THE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS. THAT IS WHY THE UNILATERAL COMMITMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST WAS RECEIVED WITH APPROVAL AND HOPE ALL OVER THE WORLD. IF OUR EXAMPLE IS FOLLOWED BY OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS, THIS WILL BE A TRULY MOMENTOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFORTS OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR.

IT IS SAID THAT THE WEST CANNOT TAKE SUCH A COMMITMENT BECAUSE, ALLEGEDLY, THE WARSAW TREATY HAS AN ADVANTAGE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. TO BEGIN WITH, THIS IS UNTRUE, AND THE FACTS AND FIGURES BEAR WITNESS TO IT.

19

FURTHERMORE, AS EVERYBODY KNOWS, WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF LIMITING SUCH ARMAMENTS AS WELL, AND OF SEARCHING FOR SENSIBLE, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THIS END. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO AGREE THAT THE SIDES SHOULD RENOUNCE FIRST USE OF CONVENTIONAL, AS WELL AS NUCLEAR ARMS.

OF COURSE, ONE OF THE MAIN AVENUES LEADING TO A REAL SCALING DOWN OF THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR IS THAT OF REACHING A SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. WE APPROACH NEGOTIATIONS OF THE MATTER WITH THE UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, AND SEEK AN HONEST AGREEMENT THAT WILL DO NO DAMAGE TO EITHER SIDE AND WILL, AT THE SAME TIME, LEAD TO A REDUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

SO FAR, UNFORTUNATELY, WE SEE A DIFFERENT APPROACH BY THE AMERICAN SIDE. WHILE CALLING FOR 'RADICAL REDUCTIONS' IN WORD, WHAT IT REALLY HAS IN MIND IS ESSENTIALLY A REDUCTION OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC POTENTIAL. FOR ITSELF, THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE A FREE HAND IN BUILDING UP STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS. IT IS ABSURD EVEN TO THINK THAT WE CAN AGREE TO THIS. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, SUIT THE PENTAGON, BUT CAN ON NO ACCOUNT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND, FOR THAT MATTER, TO ALL THOSE WHO HAVE A STAKE IN PRESERVING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE.

COMPARE TO THIS THE PROPOSALS OF THE USSR. THEY ARE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PRESERVING PARITY. WE ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE OUR STRATEGIC ARMS BY MORE THAN 25 PER CENT. U.S. ARMS, TOO, MUST BE REDUCED ACCORDINGLY, SO THAT THE TWO STATES HAVE THE SAME NUMBER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES. WE ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWERED AND THAT IMPROVEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE MAXIMALLY RESTRICTED.

OUR PROPOSALS REFER TO ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS WITHOUT EXCEPTION, AND ENVISAGE REDUCTION OF THEIR STOCKPILES BY MANY HUNDREDS OF UNITS. THEY CLOSE ALL POSSIBLE CHANNELS FOR ANY FURTHER ARMS RACE IN THIS FIELD. AND THAT IS ONLY A START: THE PERTINENT AGREEMENT WOULD BE THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR A STILL LARGER MUTUAL REDUCTION OF SUCH WEAPONS, WHICH THE SIDES COULD WORK OUT WITH REFERENCE TO THE GENERAL STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE WORLD.

20

AND WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY, WE OFFER WHAT IS SUGGESTED BY COMMON SENSE: TO FREEZE THE STRATEGIC ARSENALS OF THE TWO SIDES. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT THIS, AND NOW EVERYONE CAN UNDERSTAND WHY: IT HAS EMBARKED ON A NEW, CONSIDERABLE BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

WASHINGTON'S ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THIS BUILD-UP ARE OBVIOUSLY IRRELEVANT. THE ALLEGATION OF A "LAG" BEHIND THE USSR WHICH THE AMERICANS MUST CLOSE, IS A DELIBERATE UNTRUTH. THIS HAS BEEN SAID MORE THAN ONCE. AND THE TALK THAT NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SUCH AS THE MX MISSILE, ARE MEANT "TO FACILITATE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS" IS ALTOGETHER ABSURD.

(MORE)

21 DEC 1157Z

B3

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS OFFERED TO THE SOVIET UNION A PROPOSAL FOR A TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THE PROPOSAL IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

1. A FURTHER REDUCTION OF THE STOCKPILES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS BY BOTH SIDES.
2. A PROHIBITION ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS.
3. A PROHIBITION ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

64

21

FBI 21

TAKE 9 -- 09 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///IS ALTOGETHER ABSURD.

[REDACTED]

B3

(TEXT) NO PROGRAMMES OF A FURTHER ARMS BUILDUP WILL EVER FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS. WE WILL BE COMPELLED TO COUNTER THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN SIDE BY DEPLOYING CORRESPONDING WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF OUR OWN -- AN ANALOGOUS MISSILE TO COUNTER THE MX MISSILE, AND OUR OWN LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILE, WHICH WE ARE ALREADY TESTING, TO COUNTER THE U.S. LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILE.

THOSE ARE NOT THREATS AT ALL. WE ARE WHOLLY AVERSE TO ANY SUCH COURSE OF EVENTS, AND ARE DOING EVERYTHING TO AVOID IT. BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THOSE WHO SHAPE U.S. POLICY, AS WELL AS THE PUBLIC AT LARGE, SHOULD BE PERFECTLY CLEAR ON THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS. HENCE, IF THE PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON REALLY BELIEVE THAT NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS WILL BE A "TRUMP" FOR THE AMERICANS AT NEGOTIATIONS, WE WANT THEM TO KNOW THAT THESE "TRUMP" ARE FALSE. ANY POLICY DIRECTED TO SECURING MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO FUTURE AND CAN ONLY HEIGHTEN THE THREAT OF WAR.

NOW A FEW WORDS ABOUT WHAT ARE KNOWN AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THEM.

GIVEN THE SWIFT ACTION AND POWER OF MODERN WEAPONS, THE ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL SUSPICION IS ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS. EVEN A TRIVIAL ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION, OR TECHNICAL FAILURE CAN HAVE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCE. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO TAKE THE FINGER OFF THE TRIGGER, AND PUT A RELIABLE SAFETY CATCH ON ALL WEAPONS. A FEW THINGS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO THIS EFFECT PARTICULARLY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. AS EVERYBODY KNOWS, THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO OFFERING MEASURES OF A MORE FAR-REACHING NATURE AND OF A BROADER SCOPE. OUR PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE HAVE ALSO BEEN TABLED AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

22

WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO CONSIDER PERTINENT PROPOSALS MADE BY OTHERS, INCLUDING THE RECENT ONES BY THE U.S. PRESIDENT. BUT THE MEASURES HE REFERRED TO ARE NOT ENOUGH TO DISPEL THE ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL SUSPICION, AND TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE. SOMETHING MORE IS NEEDED: TO NORMALISE THE SITUATION, AND TO RENOUNCE INCITEMENT OF HOSTILITY AND HATRED, AND PROPAGANDA OF NUCLEAR WAR. AND, SURELY, THE ROAD TO CONFIDENCE, TO PREVENTING ANY AND ALL WARS, INCLUDING AN ACCIDENTAL ONE, IS THAT OF STOPPING THE ARMS RACE AND GOING BACK TO CALM, RESPECTFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, BACK TO DETENTE.

WE CONSIDER THIS IMPORTANT FOR ALL REGIONS OF THE WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY FOR EUROPE, WHERE A FLARE-UP OF ANY KIND MAY TRIGGER A WORLDWIDE EXPLOSION.

AT PRESENT, THAT CONTINENT IS BESET BY A NEW DANGER -- THE PROSPECT OF SEVERAL HUNDRED U.S. MISSILES BEING DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE. I HAVE GOT TO SAY BLUNTLY: THIS WOULD MAKE PEACE STILL MORE FRAGILE.

AS WE SEE IT, THE PERIL THREATENING THE EUROPEAN NATIONS, AND, FOR THAT MATTER, THE NATIONS OF THE WHOLE WORLD, CAN BE AVERTED. IT IS DEFINITELY POSSIBLE TO SAVE AND STRENGTHEN PEACE IN EUROPE -- AND THIS WITHOUT DAMAGE TO ANYONE'S SECURITY. IT IS, INDEED, FOR THIS PURPOSE THAT WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE UNITED STATES IN GENEVA FOR ALREADY MORE THAN A YEAR ON HOW TO LIMIT AND REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE.

THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO GO VERY FAR. AS EVERYBODY KNOWS, WE HAVE SUGGESTED AN AGREEMENT RENOUNCING ALL TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- BOTH OF MEDIUM RANGE AND TACTICAL -- DESIGNED TO STRIKE TARGETS IN EUROPE. BUT THIS PROPOSAL HAS COME UP AGAINST A SOLID WALL OF SILENCE. EVIDENTLY, THEY DO NOT WANT TO ACCEPT IT, BUT ARE AFRAID TO REJECT IT OPENLY. I WANT TO REAFFIRM AGAIN THAT WE HAVE NOT WITHDRAWN THIS PROPOSAL.

WE HAVE NOT

23

WE HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED ANOTHER VARIANT: THAT THE USSR AND THE NATO COUNTRIES REDUCE THEIR MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONRY BY MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS. SO FAR, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT HAVE IT. FOR ITS PART, IT HAS SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL WHICH, AS IF IN MOCKERY, IS CALLED A 'ZERO OPTION.' IT ENVISAGES ELIMINATION OF ALL SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES NOT ONLY IN THE EUROPEAN, BUT ALSO IN THE ASIATIC PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE NATO'S NUCLEAR-MISSILE ARSENAL IN EUROPE IS TO REMAIN INTACT AND MAY EVEN BE INCREASED. DOES ANYONE REALLY THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN AGREE TO THIS? IT APPEARS THAT WASHINGTON IS OUT TO BLOCK AN AGREEMENT AND, REFERRING TO COLLAPSE OF THE TALKS, TO STATION ITS MISSILES ON EUROPEAN SOIL IN ANY CASE.

THE FUTURE WILL SHOW IS THIS IS SO. WE, FOR OUR PART, WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR AN AGREEMENT ON A BASIS THAT IS FAIR TO BOTH SIDES. WE ARE PREPARED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO AGREE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD RETAIN IN EUROPE ONLY AS MANY MISSILES AS ARE KEPT THERE BY BRITAIN AND FRANCE -- AND NOT A SINGLE ONE MORE. THIS MEANS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE HUNDREDS OF MISSILES, INCLUDING DOZENS OF THE LATEST MISSILES KNOWN IN THE WEST AS SS-20. IN THE CASE OF THE USSR AND THE USA THIS WOULD BE A REALLY HONEST 'ZERO' OPTION AS REGARDS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. AND IF, LATER, THE NUMBER OF BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES WERE SCALED DOWN, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ONES WOULD BE ADDITIONALLY REDUCED BY AS MANY.

(MORE)

21 DEC 1224Z [REDACTED]

33

165
24
FBIS 23

TAKE 10 OF 10 -- 09 (ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///BY AS MUCH.
[REDACTED] B3

(TEXT) ALONG WITH THIS THERE MUST ALSO BE AN ACCORD ON REDUCING TO EQUAL LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR-DELIVERY AIRCRAFT STATIONED IN THIS REGION BY THE USSR AND THE NATO COUNTRIES.

WE CALL ON THE OTHER SIDE TO ACCEPT THESE CLEAR AND FAIR TERMS, TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY WHILE IT STILL EXISTS. BUT LET NO ONE DELUDE HIMSELF: WE WILL NEVER LET OUR SECURITY OR THE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES BE JEOPARDISED. IT WOULD ALSO BE A GOOD THING IF THOUGHT WERE GIVEN TO THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES THAT THE STATIONING OF NEW U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE WOULD ENTAIL FOR ALL FURTHER EFFORTS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL. IN SHORT, THE BALL IS NOW IN THE COURT OF THE USA.

IN CONCLUSION, LET ME SAY THE FOLLOWING. WE ARE FOR BROAD, FRUITFUL COOPERATION AMONG ALL NATIONS OF THE WORLD TO THEIR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE AND THE GOOD OF ALL MANKIND, FREE FROM DICTAT AND INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET UNION WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO SECURE A TRANQUIL, PEACEFUL FUTURE FOR THE PRESENT AND COMING GENERATIONS. THAT IS THE AIM OF OUR POLICY, AND WE SHALL NOT DEPART FROM IT.

COMRADES, LOOKING BACK AT THE PATH TRAVELLED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN SIXTY YEARS, WE SEE CLEARLY THAT ALL OUR ACHIEVEMENTS AND VICTORIES ARE INDISSOLUBLY LINKED WITH THE ACTIVITY OF THE LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY. THE PARTY HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THE POWERFUL CREATIVE AND MOBILISING FORCE WHICH ENSURES STEADY SOCIAL PROGRESS IN ALL FIELDS.

IN IDEOLOGY, COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE, OUR PARTY IS A LIVING EXPRESSION OF THE UNITY AND COHESION OF ALL THE NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION, SHAPING ITS POLICY TO ENSURE HARMONY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS. THE PARTY IS CREATING SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE FLOWERING AND ALL-ROUND DEVELOPMENT OF EACH NATION IS THE CONDITION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT

~~AND FLOWERING OF OUR FUTURE PROSPEROUS UNION~~

WHEN WE SAY THAT THE PEOPLE AND THE PARTY ARE UNITED, THIS IS
A STATEMENT OF THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT THE AIMS AND TASKS SET
ITSELF BY THE PARTY ARE AN ACCURATE EXPRESSION OF THE
ASPIRATIONS AND NEEDS OF ALL SOVIET PEOPLE. THE MULTI-MILLION
PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE, BY THEIR DEEDS, CARRYING INTO
EFFECT THE POLICY OF THE PARTY. ONE OF THE MOST APPARENT
PROOFS OF THIS ARE THE SUCCESSES ALL THE REPUBLICS HAVE ACHIEVED
BY THE PRESENT JUBILEE.

25
and final

COMRADES, LET ME EXPRESS GRATIFICATION AND DEEP GRATITUDE TO
THE MILLIONS OF FRONT-RANKERS WHO HAVE FULFILLED AND OVERFULFILLED
THEIR SOCIALIST PLEDGES MADE IN TRIBUTE TO THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

PERMIT ME, ON BEHALF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET AND
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR, TO WARMLY CONGRATULATE ALL
SOVIET PEOPLE ON THIS MOMENTOUS DAY, THE BIRTHDAY OF OUR GREAT
UNION.

LONG LIVE THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE PEOPLES WHO ARE BUILDING
COMMUNISM!

LONG LIVE PROLETARIAN, SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM!

LONG LIVE WORLD PEACE!

MANY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC FLOURISH!

(ENDALL)

21 DEC 1247Z [REDACTED]

B3