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WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files OA/Box: 20 File Folder: Andropov (8) Archivist: loj/loj FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	'QATE'	RESTRICTION
1. memo (8290897)	William Clark to the President, re Andropov, 1p D 6 2,06 DUSFOD -009/1 #82	11/17/82	B1,33
 2. memo 3. publication 4. memo (8290897) 5. memcon 6. report 7. cable 	To the President, Vice President, et al, re Andropov, 1p PAT #83 Copy of cover only, 1p D 9 484 Richard Pipes to William Clark, re Andropov, 1p PAT 4 485 Bush-Andropov meeting, 6p Re USSR, 1p PAT 5 Effection 11 487 160016Z Nov 82, 3p K 6/2, 106 DISF00 - 009/1 488	10/12/82 9/82 11/8/82 11/15/82 11/16/82	B1 ,63 B1 ,63 B1 B1 ,63 B1
D 1 Mating 1 and its	classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].		

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]. B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

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A CONTRACTOR AND A



Washington, D. C. 20505

12 October 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

The Vice President Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Counsellor to the President Chief of Staff to the President Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT


: Yuriy Andropov

1. Yuriy Andropov presently seems to be the front runner to succeed Brezhnev. While we have no idea how long Brezhnev may live or retain his present position, his demise could come at any time. Accordingly, we have prepared a comprehensive assessment of Andropov that examines his personality, policy views, political alliances and style.

2. I believe it is worth your time to read this study and gain some appreciation of what manner of man may succeed Brezhnev. I found two aspects of the study particularly interesting. First, I was struck by Andropov's decades-long preparation to assume the leadership position, and the unique strengths he would bring to the top spot. Second, I was impressed to learn the extent of his political alliances and how long they have been forming. For example, he is an old friend and ally of Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Minister Gromyko and, ironically, Kirilenko -- one of those he is perceived to have edged out in the succession race. He was also close to Suslov -- the long time conservative kingmaker -- before the latter's death last January, and he also has longstanding ties to Brezhnev.

3. In sum, I think you will find this a most interesting biography with a wealth of anecdotal information that offers insights into a man we may be dealing with in the not too distant future.

William J. Casey Director of Central Istelligence



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National Security Council The White House

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

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SITUATION UM

November 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz 49

Subject:

Report of Bush-Andropov Meeting

Enclosed is the memorandum of the Vice President's November 15 meeting with Andropov, which the Vice President has approved.

Attachment: As stated

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Report of Bush-Andropov Meeting

U.S. Participants

Vice President George Bush Secretary of State George P. Shultz Ambassador Arthur Hartman Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR Participants

General Secretary of the CPSU Yuriy V. Andropov Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko Mr. Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev Interpreter

TIME & PLACE: November 15, 1982 4:40 p.m. - 5:10 p.m. The Kremlin, Moscow

Addressing Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz, General Secretary Andropov first wanted to express his personal appreciation for the respect manifested by the United States toward the Soviet Union on this sad occasion of the death of President Leonid I. Brezhnev as indicated by the high rank of the delegation dispatched to Moscow by the United States.

Andropov said that the recent remarks by President Reagan to the effect that he wanted to conduct a policy of improving Soviet/American relations had not gone unnoticed on the Soviet side, and he wanted to add that the intentions of the Soviet leadership were certainly analogous. At the recent Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and at today's solemn ceremony, he had already had occasion to state that the principled policy of the Soviet leadership would remain unchanged and as consistent as it had been during the life of Leonid I. Brezhnev. In this connection he

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wanted to say that this consistent policy of the Soviet Union toward the U.S. had been and would continue to be based on equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Above all it would be a policy aimed at peaceful development of relations. He would not conceal the fact that the relations between our two countries today were guite complex. However, it was not the Soviet side which had dealt with the other as an adversary. Moreover, the Soviet Union invariably and consistently displayed restraint in the face of unfriendly and at times openly hostile remarks and steps on the U.S. side. Displaying such restraint, the Soviet Union was not doing it because it was unsure of its strength. The U.S. side or anyone else for that matter should have no illusions on this score. The Soviet leadership acted in this fashion because it believed that such a policy was sensible and that to act otherwise would hold no promise.

Andropov wanted to draw the attention of the U.S. side to the fact that due to U.S. actions, at present almost the entire stock of stability between the two countries, which had been built up over the years, had been carelessly squandered. This was true of almost the entire reserve of stability which served to insure both sides against unpleasant surprises. He thought that both sides clearly understood that if such an erosion of the productive layer of Soviet/American relations were allowed to continue, there would be no guarantee that this would not bring the sides to catastrophe. He therefore believed that the urgent task today was to put an end to this process. He understood, of course, that matters could not be helped simply by verbal promises, but it was surely a fact, and he would like the Vice President to understand him correctly, that it would be desirable for our two countries to halt further spirals in the arms race and to reach agreement at the current negotiations on European and nuclear arms on a mutually agreeable basis that would not prejudice the interests of either side and would be based on strict adherence to the principle of equality and equal security. Of course, there really was no other way out of the present predicament, because if the arms build up continues, the U.S. side would build up, the Soviet side would build up too, and one might well ask where this would lead in the end and

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what would be the end result. After all, all present here today were certainly experienced and sophisticated people, and he was sure that his friend A.A. Gromyko shared his views in saying that it would be completely impossible for either side to believe that it could come to any negotiation with proposals that were unacceptable to the other side. This applied to both sides. Of course, the two sides could engage in debate and even sometimes scold each other in the press or in some other forum, but when it came to specific matters it was absolutely necessary to act as sober-minded and normal people. There was no way of evading this requirement. Andropov noted that at present there was insufficient trust between the two sides, i.e. trust on the part of the Soviet Union as well as on the part of the United States, but the Vice President should understand that this was so because universally accepted standards of conduct had been violated and attempts had been undertaken to interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. The Soviet leadership resolutely rejected such a policy of dictating one's own standards to the other side. No one had the right to do so or to dictate what the other side could or could not do.

He wanted to point out that the entire Soviet leadership had been and continued to be in favor of an active and businesslike dialogue between our two countries with respect to matters of mutual interest and questions that required businesslike discussion. There were certainly many such questions and the Soviet Union was in favor of broadening the range of problems discussed in negotiations and exchanging views in a direct dialogue in order to give such negotiations specific content and to insure that they would result in developing good and stable relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such relations would certainly be conducive to a far more healthy international atmosphere than existed today.

Andropov apologized to Mr. Bush for raising these questions on this, not the most auspicious occasion, realizing that, after all, he and Secretary Shultz had come to Moscow to express his condolences and sympathy to the Soviet Union at this moment of grief. However, the Soviet leadership wanted to have good relations in fact, and he would appreciate this being conveyed to

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President Reagan. Naturally, these relations had to be based on equality without prejudice to the interests of either country. He was well aware of the fact that Secretary Shultz and his friend Gromyko were used to this kind of dialogue because they were battle-hardened men, but he had felt that this first meeting betwen Mr. Bush and himself, even on this sad occasion, should be used as an opportunity to express these views.

Andropov thought that if this brief speech of his could contribute to improvement of relations between us, this meeting would have been well worthwhile. In conclusion he would ask the Vice President to convey the views expressed to President Reagan and to express to him best wishes on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership, wishes for continued success and good health. He also asked Bush to convey to the President the gratitude of the Soviet leadership for the condolences he had expressed on this sad occasion of the passing of L. I. Brezhnev, in particular when he had visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Vice President Bush first wanted to express officially the condolences we had come here to express and to tender to Andropov and his colleagues our thanks for the extraordinary courtesies extended to us not only here but also in Washington by Ambassador Dobrynin.

Andropov interrupted to repeat his thanks for these condolences, and also for the condolences in writing which President Reagan had conveyed in Washington.

Vice President Bush said he felt that he knew Andropov and that he was delighted to meet him at this table. He thought the two of them had a somewhat similar background. When Bill Clark had become the head of the National Security Council Bush had invited Ambassador Dobrynin to his home for the purpose of meeting Clark. He had asked Dobrynin to be as frank with us as Andropov had been today. In the same spirit of frankness we could, even on this sad occasion, as he had done with Dobrynin, detail some of the problems of deep concern to us, such as Afghanistan, Poland, and human rights from the standpoint of international norms, and one or two others. He could assure the General Secretary that we did not intend to interfere

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in the internal affairs of others but had to say that the American people felt strongly about these issues. We were committed, under this President, to maintaining the strength of our military forces, at a level adequate for our security, but we are not interested in an arms race. We shared the commitment which seemed to be expressed here regarding the need to have fruitful talks, but we believe that, in the arms control field, these must be based on verifiable agreements which provide for real reduction in arms. The Vice President said that the President is deadly serious on this issue.

Bush said that he had noted some contentious areas of deep concern to us, areas where we hoped change would be possible on the Soviet side. He could assure Andropov that we would respond positively to any positive changes. He could not agree more that the objective of our negotiations had to be preservation of peace and stability. Andropov had said that the Soviet Union had acted with restraint in the face of what it considered to be hostile actions. Time did not allow Bush to develop this theme, to rebut Andropov's contentions, or to detail our list of Soviet actions which we considered hostile. Still, if both sides felt it was possible to make progress, it was an important The Vice President said he had noted the young fact. men who had marched in the parade at today's ceremony. He himself had four sons and of course could not help but hope that the negotiations in Geneva would bear fruit. The Vice President appreciated Andropov's taking time to meet with us and wanted to wish him well on his accession to great new responsibilities. We were ready to do our part.

Andropov thanked the Vice President and the Secretary for this meeting and once again for the goodwill manifested in coming here to share the grief of the Soviet people. He did not believe it necessary to go into the details of the questions each of them had raised today, but of course these problems did exist and they should be understood from a correct perspective. At present the US side had its own understanding of these matters, as did the Soviet side. It was therefore necessary to sit down and talk and resolve the differences between us, but this was not the occasion to do so. He would therefore once again thank the Vice President for the views he had

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expressed, and would ask him once again to convey his best regards to President Reagan and assure the President that the most sincere wish of the Soviet leadership was to improve and strengthen the relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S., since this would be in the interests of not only our two countries, but in fact of all mankind.

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USSR: Andropov's Role in Foreign Policy

General Secretary Andropov's meetings with Vice President Bush and other foreign leaders yesterday indicate that he is already moving to establish himself as the chief spokesman in foreign policy.

Comment: It took Brezhnev several years to assert his authority in foreign affairs. In 1971, for example, it was Premier Kosygin rather than Brezhnev who signed the SALT communique with President Nixon. The fact that Premier Tikhonov did not participate in Andropov's meeting with the Vice President suggests that the General Secretary may play the dominant role from the outset.

This demonstration of Andropov's political strength also raises the possibility of his taking over Brezhnev's job as president. The constitution of 1977 gave the president considerable formal power in foreign policy.

At this stage, however, Andropov probably will be denied the presidency. In past successions, Soviet leaders have acted to prevent the new party head from assuming the full measure of his predecessor's power.

Moreover, the formulation of policy under Brezhnev was based more on consensus. The public statements of Politburo members since Brezhnev's death have stressed collectivity.

The informal institutionalization of decisionmaking processes also will almost certainly put significant constraints for now on Andropov's power. As General Secretary, however, Andropov may already exercise greater actual influence in foreign policy than any other leader.

In his eulogy at the funeral, Andropov sounded a somewhat more positive note about the prospects for a relaxation of international tensions than he had in his speech to the plenum. He presumably wanted to reassure his domestic audience of his commitment to the cardinal principle of Soviet military power. Having made his policy priorities clear, Andropov then advised Western statesmen of the regime's continuing interest in improving relations in ways consistent with Soviet national goals.

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16 November 1982

Top Secret

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE GIVING HIS IMPRESSION OF OUR MEETING TODAY. I WOULD ALSO URGE YOU TO READ THE SHORT TRANSCRIPT WHICH I HAVE SENT THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR HIM TO REVIEW. THE MEETING LASTED ONLY HALF AN HOUR. BUT IT MARKS . THE BEGINNING OF A RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE REST OF YOUR PRESIDENCY. UNLESS ANDROPOV IS MUCH LESS SECURELY IN CHARGE THAN IT NOW APPEARS. MY OWN IMPRESSIONS OF THE MEETING. SUBJECT OF COURSE TO FURTHER ANALYSIS. ARE AS FOLLOWS.

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3. FIRST, THE MAN HIMSELF. FACE-TO-FACE HE WAS INCISIVE, STRONG, AND SECURE WITH HIMSELF AND WITH THE POWER HE

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PAGE Ø2 OF Ø3 USDEL SECRETARY AIR ØØ19 DTG: 160016Z NOV 82 PSN: 008426

NOW WIELDS. ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE FROM A PAPER AND SOUNDED LIKE GROMYKO AT SOME POINTS, HE WAS AT EASE WITH HIS MATERIAL AND WILL CLEARLY BE CAPABLE OF ENGAGING IN GIVE-AND-TAKE WHEN THE TIME COMES.

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N D D I S 4. THE FOLLOWING POINTS STOOD OUT FROM HIS PRESENTATION: --THE NEW LEADERSHIP HAS GOTTEN THE MESSAGE YOU HAVE BEEN SENDING AND WANTS US TO KNOW IT. ANDROPOV REFERRED EXPLICITLY AND WITH GRATITUDE NOT ONLY TO THE DELEGATION'S VISIT BUT TO YOUR MESSAGE AND YOUR VISIT TO THE EMBASSY TO SIGN THE CONDOLENCE BOOK. HE ASKED US TO CONVEY TO YOU THAT THEY WANT "THE BEST POSSIBLE" RELATIONS WITH US.

--AT THIS POINT CONTINUITY IS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP'S APPROACH. FOR STARTERS, ANDROPOV HAD BOTH GROMYKO AND BREZHNEV'S KEY FOREIGN POLICY SUBSTANTIVELY, HE ECHOED THE LINE I HEARD FROM GROMYKO IN NEW YORK: THAT THE U.S. IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLINE IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN RECENT YEARS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE DISPLAYED SOME SOPHISTICATION IN RECOGNIZING THAT THE U.S. HAS ITS "OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THESE MATTERS."

--FOR ANDROPOV. THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK FACING THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IS HALTING "FURTHER SPIRALS IN THE ARMS RACE" AND REACHING "AGREEMENT AT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS." HE ADDED THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD COME TO THE TABLE WITH UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS.

--THE MOST FORCEFUL PART OF HIS PRESENTATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNED INTERFERENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. "THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP RESOLUTELY REJECTS A POLICY OF DICTATING ONE'S OWN STANDARDS TO THE OTHER SIDE," HE SAID.

5. IN RESPONSE TO THESE THEMES, THE VICE PRESIDENT TOLD ANDROPOV THAT WE TOO WERE LOOKING FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP AND THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION. BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY WE ALSO FELT DEEPLY ABOUT CERTAIN ISSUES, SUCH AS

SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø3 OF Ø3 USDEL SECRETARY AIR ØØ19 DTG: 160Ø16Z NOV 82 PSN: ØØ8426

AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND HUMAN RIGHTS. HE EXPRESSED YOUR COMMITMENT TO VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND, SPEAKING MORE GENERALLY, HE ECHOED YOUR CONCLUDING STATEMENT IN LAST SATURDAY'S RADIO TALK BY SAYING WE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO POSITIVE CHANGES WE SAW.

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6. THE POSITIVE SPIN ANDORPOV WAS TRYING TO GIVE OUR TALK WAS ONLY THE MOST IMPRESSIVE OF A NUMBER OF GESTURES MEANT TO SHOW THEY KNEW THEY WERE DEALING WITH VISITORS FROM AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY. AT THE END OF THE FUNERAL CEREMONY, FOR INSTANCE, THE VICE PRESIENT AND I WERE PULLED OUT FROM FAR BACK IN THE LONG LINE, INCLUDING PREMIERS AND HEADS OF STATE, WAITING TO GREET THE LEADERSHIP AFTER THE RECEPTION, AND BROUGHT DIRECTLY TO ANDROPOV AND GROMYKO DESPITE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S INITIAL RESISTANCE. AS FOR LOGISTICS, THE EMBASSY SAYS THEY CANNOT RECALL SO MUCH COOPERATIONS FROM THE SOVIETS ON ANY VISIT.

7. IN SUM, THE MEETING SHOWED NO NARROWING OF THE WIDE DIFFERENCES ON ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT THIS WAS NOT THE TIME OR PLACE FOR NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, ANDROPOV WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT HE WANTS A DIALOGUE. ALTHOUGH HE MADE NO MENTION OF A SUMMIT, HE REPEATEDLY ASKED US TO CONVEY HIS POINTS TO YOU. HE HAS GOTTEN YOUR MESSAGE, AND ONE REASON IS SURELY BECAUSE HE RESPECTS YOUR STRENGTH AND STEADINESS. BUT WHETHER OR NOT DIALOGUE WITH HIM CAN PRODUCE THE KINDS OF MOVEMENT

FROM THE SOVIETS THAT WILL LEAD TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS IS OF COURSE STILL AN OPEN OUESTION. SHULTZ. BT 1 +

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Special Memorandum

Andropov on Major International Issues: The Public Record



FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service

This report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

FOREWORD

Yuriy Andropov has made relatively few public statements during the 25 years he has served in the central leadership in Moscow. For the most part, his remarks have reflected prevailing leadership positions on major issues. Between his promotion to the CPSU Secretariat at the May 1982 Central Committee plenum and his elevation to General Secretary on 12 November, he met with several foreign delegations but did not speak on policy issues. His last major address was in connection with the Lenin Day ceremonies last April.

This report, which draws on FBIS files dating back to Andropov's first tour of service in the Secretariat in the 1960's, highlights some of his significant public remarks on selected foreign policy issues.

- 1 -

ANDROPOV ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES:

THE PUBLIC RECORD

DETENTE, ARMS CONTROL, AND MILITARY POWER

Andropov has emphasized the need for a strong Soviet defense capability, but he has also said that military strength alone will not maintain peace. He has warned that a nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences and has spoken out in favor of the reduction of international tensions, East-West detente, and arms control.

15 November 1982: Eulogy of Brezhnev (TASS, 15 Nov)

In the complicated international situation when the forces of imperialism are trying to push the peoples onto the road of hostility and military confrontation, the party and state will firmly uphold the vital interests of our homeland and maintain great vigilance and readiness to give a crushing rebuff to any attempt at aggression. They will redouble their efforts in the struggle for the security of the peoples and strengthen cooperation with all the peace forces of the world. We are always ready for honest, equal, and mutually beneficial cooperation with any state that is willing to cooperate.

12 November 1982: Central Committee plenum speech (PRAVDA, 13 Nov)

Leonid Ilich Brezhnev will live forever in the memory of thankful mankind as a consistent, ardent, and tireless fighter for peace and the security of the peoples and for removing the threat of world nuclear war looming over mankind.

We know well that one cannot obtain peace from the imperialists by begging for it [chto mir u imperialistov ne vyprosish]. It can be defended only by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces. As the leader of the party and state and chairman of the Defense Council, Leonid Ilich constantly paid attention to ensuring that the country's defense capability meets present-day requirements.

22 April 1982: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

All of our post-October experience shows that one cannot obtain peace from the imperialists by begging for it--we remember Lenin's behest, that the revolution must be able to defend itself. Following this

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behest, our party and the Soviet people have created the glorious armed forces and the invincible defense might of our country.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has never taken as its premise that firm peace can be ensured only by military strength and a policy founded on it. Such a policy would lead not to peace, but to an arms race, to confrontation, and, in the final analysis, to war. It is for this reason that our party and the Soviet state stand up so purposefully for the principles of peaceful coexistence and so steadfastly follow the course of peace and international cooperation.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

Under the prevailing conditions, we are obliged to pay paramount attention to consolidating the might and defense capability of the Soviet state. As long as the forces prepared to jeopardize the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and our allies are actively operating, firm and reliable defense is vitally necessary. . . . At the same time, our party proceeds from the premise that peace and international security cannot be strengthened through military rivalry.

The arms race undermines trust among states, poisons the international atmosphere and increases the likelihood that crisis situations will develop into military conflicts. It is for precisely this reason that our party and state attach paramount significance to the limitation and then to the reduction of armaments, to the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, to the consolidation of the relaxation of international tension, and to the development of mutually advantageous international cooperation. We are firmly convinced that there is no sensible alternative to this policy.

22 April 1976: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

The question of the basis on which relations between the socialist and capitalist world should be built has not lost its meaning and gravity--for it is a question of war and peace. . . This remains the chief question of contemporary times . . , due to the emergence of weapons of enormous destructive force that make the consequences of war truly catastrophic. This creates practical preconditions, on the one hand, and the inevitable necessity, on the other; to reduce and eventually eliminate altogether the

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danger of a new world war and, if I may say so, to expand the limits of peaceful coexistence. The goal that the party now sets for itself is not to gain a peaceful respite but to establish a just and durable peace on earth. . . In the nuclear era there is no sane alternative to peaceful coexistence.

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PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST DETENTE

Like other Soviet leaders, Andropov has blamed Washington for the deterioration of East-West relations since the late 1970's while professing optimism about the long-range prospects for detente. His remarks have been distinguished by a sensitivity to the diversity of opinion among Western leaders. He has cited the contribution of "realistic" elements to the establishment of detente and warned of persistent efforts by "hawks" to complicate East-West relations.

22 April 1982: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

Our people are convinced that a new world war can be averted. . . . The party of the communists has always proceeded from the fact that the road to stable peace is a difficult and thorny one. We must not expect easy victories, and every step is taken with great effort. And it is precisely because we know all this that our heads have never been turned by success and we have never been idle when we come up against difficulties.

Leonid Ilich Brezhnev has likened the present international situation to a fork in the road, thereby emphasizing the great responsibility of the choice now facing mankind. It can either take a long step along the road leading away from war toward peace or it can move along the road toward a continued arms race and confrontation.

We made our choice a long time ago. For us this is a question of the vital interests of the people and the country, a question of principle. It would appear that not only we but also the major countries of the capitalist world, including the United States, made this choice too. They took this fork as early as the beginning of the 1970's, guiding themselves by the experiences of the preceding decades, experiences that clearly showed that there is no acceptable alternative to peaceful coexistence, that the cold war and the arms race have no prospects, and that a hot war would bring victory to no one.

However, certain governments as well as individuals are inclined, as is apparent, to forget the experiences and lessons of history. It would seem that this is now happening to the Washington administration, which is trying to steer the entire development of international relations onto a dangerous path. Of course, the United States will not be successful in this. But we must not ignore the fact that such policies on the whole worsen the situation and increase the danger of war.

11 February 1980: Election speech in Gorkiy (PRAVDA, 12 Feb)

We frequently hear voices in the West speaking of the "crisis" and virtually the "collapse" of the relaxation of international tension. People ask how the world situation will further develop and whether the positive elements achieved in the 1970's in relations between states with different social systems will be discarded and lost to mankind. It must be said frankly that anxiety about the future and the destiny of detente and peace has real foundations. The reason for the complication of the international situation is well known: it is Washington's irresponsible and dangerous policy. To all appearances it is the most reactionary forces, aligned with the military-industrial complex, that are now setting the tone-the forces that would like to bring back the old times when the imperialist powers imposed systems upon other countries and peoples to suit themselves. The sources of this "political nostalgia" lie in the fact that certain circles in the United States have been unable to interpret sensibly the social and political changes taking place in the world and have been unable to understand their objective essence. . . .

Events in Afghanistan . . . are made out to be the basic reason for the deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations and of the entire international situation. There is nothing more absurd than such assertions. It is not in the events in Afghanistan or in the Soviet Union's actions that the true reasons for the present turn in Washington's course should be sought. They lie in the U.S. ruling circles' fear in the face of the wave of social changes and in their desire to return the world by force to the "blessed times" of imperialist domination. . .

We will not yield to provocations from across the ocean. As before, we advocate detente. For us detente means above all overcoming the mistrust and hostility of the cold war period and resolving differences and disputes, not by force or by the threat of weapons, but by peaceful means around the negotiating table. Detente, which reflects the objective, underlying changes in the world arena, is too deeply rooted, it means too much for the destiny of mankind to allow any forces to toy with it.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

Detente has many opponents who have been noticeably active recently. It is they who are inciting the arms race, intimidating people with the alleged "Soviet threat." It is they who, interfering in the internal

affairs of other states, are worsening the general international climate. It is they who are trying to depict detente as some sort of agreement to freeze and preserve obsolete social relations and reactionary political regimes. And if the peoples break these relations and overthrow these regimes, heartrending cries are heard about the notorious "hand of Moscow," and there is a ballyhoo about KGB agents allegedly organizing social upheavals throughout the world. . . .

The complex and sometimes contradictory nature of events in the world do not change our approach to foreign policy. On the contrary, with every passing year the Soviet people are increasingly convinced of the correctness of the course chosen by our party and of the importance of continuing to wage a consistent and resolute struggle for the relaxation of international tension, for arms limitation and disarmament, and for the development of international cooperation.

5 August 1978: Speech in Petrozavodsk (PRAVDA, 6 Aug)

The fact is, comrades, that U.S. imperialism, by all appearances, is having difficulty restructuring its policy in relation to the new realities of international life. . . .

Of course, different strata and different groups of the bourgeoisie react in different ways to these objective demands of the time. Some, occupying realistic positions, proceed from the premise that with the present correlation of forces in the world arena, there is no acceptable alternative to detente and that therefore capitalism must adapt to the new situation. They recognize the need for peaceful coexistence with socialist countries and even for cooperation with them, revise the nature of relations with developing countries, and show greater flexibility on the fronts of the social struggle. Others--the so-called hawks, who represent the interests of the military-industrial complex--oppose this with all their might. They propose gripping the cudgel a little more firmly and brandishing it until the world finds itself in the grip of a dangerous East-West confrontation and returns to the trenches of the "cold war."

Finally, there is a third type. They are aware in general of the catastrophic consequences of a global thermonuclear conflict. They are even ready to achieve limited agreements reducing the level of international tension. But they are afraid of the changes that detente brings in international and domestic affairs. Hence the instability and hesitation in policy, the increasing gulf between

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words and deeds, the desire to appease the right flank and to make concessions to overtly militarist, highly reactionary forces. . . .

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are following the development of the situation and the maneuvers of the opponents of detente attentively. We take into account the hesitations in Washington's policy. At the same time, our strategic line remains unchanged. Our country, the Soviet Union, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev has said, sees its most important goal in international affairs as "preventing mankind from sliding toward war and defending and consolidating peace--a universal, just, long-lasting peace.

5 June 1974: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 6 Jun)

In working out the peace program, our party is guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching. It clearly realized that the fierce counteraction of forces interested in preserving a cold war atmosphere has to be overcome on the path toward accomplishing this program. The process of relaxation is going in an indirect manner. Various turns and zigzags are encountered along the way. The champions of militarism and adherents of ideological subversion against socialism raise their heads first here, then there.

In our time it is not as simple in the west to act openly against a policy of peace. Public opinion forces the ruling circles to heed the desire to eliminate the threat of war and to adjust to normal relations among states. Everyone who wants to engage in politics in our time has to deal with these sentiments. It must also be said that many political figures of capitalism display a certain realism in their approach to foreign policy problems. Those among them who think most soberly realize that peaceful coexistence is the only possible and necessary basis for relations among states of opposite systems. . .

It stands to reason that there are also many in our enemies' camp who, in spite of common sense, do not wish to view the world realistically. Using various pretexts, they attempt to disrupt the process of relaxation, in particular the improvement in Soviet-American relations. Some seemingly do not oppose a relaxation; they suggest "going slowly." Others simply are driven into a rage just at the thought of relaxation. There are also those in the capitalist world who attempt to depict matters in such a way that only the Soviet Union and the socialist countries stand to win from relaxation and cooperation, whereas the West will just bear losses. The reactionary, aggressive circles of imperialism even

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attempt in places to take the counteroffensive to undermine the basis of relaxation. But the future is not for those who attempt to draw the world again into a dangerous confrontation. It is not they who now determine the main line of world development.

POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

Andropov has consistently maintained that Moscow has a duty to assist "national liberation" struggles in the Third World, particularly when they are opposed by Western nations. He argued in the 1970's that East-West detente did not restrain either side from supporting clients in the Third World conflicts. He has defended the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as fraternal assistance to the Afghan revolution and as a legitimate measure to protect the USSR's southern borders.

11 February 1980: Election speech in Gorkiy (PRAVDA, 12 Feb)

As for the events in Afghanistan, it is not hard for any unbiased person to understand them. Under conditions in which the Afghan Revolution has encountered flagrant outside interference, which one can only call intervention, when a dangerous hotbed of tension has been created on the USSR's southern borders to which long arms were extended from across the Atlantic, our country responded to the Afghan Government's repeated requests and introduced a limited contingent of troops into Afghanistan to help the people's power to suppress the aggression. This step--not a simple one for us--was taken in full accord with the Soviet-Afghan treaty and with the spirit and letter of the UN Charter. It was a lofty act of loyalty to the principle of proletarian internationalism, essential to the defense of our motherland's interests.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

It is not the "hand of Moscow" but the bony hand of hunger, not the "intrigues of communists" but deprivation, oppression, and suffering that force people to take up arms and take them to the streets, that make radical changes inevitable. This is how it was in Vietnam and Angola. This is how it was in Afghanistan and Cambodia. And that is what is now taking place in Iran. And nothing, I repeat, nothing can stop the invincible forces of history that in the final analysis pave the way for themselves in spite of the Pinochets, Pol Pots, Smiths, and the like, despite the attempts of reactionary forces to stifle social progress.

It would be extremely unwise and dangerous for disagreeable Western politicians and ideologists to endanger detente or the strengthening of peace each time this or that internal political change occurs in some country.

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22 April 1976: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

In conditions of relaxation of tension, we do not expect the monopoly bourgeoisie and the governments carrying out its will to side with the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat or the national-liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples. The Soviet Union does not present such demands to the West. But then, let them not present demands to the Soviet Union to renounce solidarity with those fighting against exploitation and colonial oppression. The Soviet Union is not going to interfere in the affairs of other countries, is not going to "export" revolution. Revolution is a result of internal development of society, Lenin says. It "cannot be made to order or by agreement." Each people determines its own destiny, but if it chooses a road of struggle, if it is forced to fight the colonialists, repel attacks from foreign invaders and hired killers, our sympathies have been and will be with it.

4 March 1967: Election speech in Novomoskovsk (Moscow domestic radio, 4 Mar)

Any people who rise up to fight for their national liberation are confronted with direct or indirect aggression by U.S. imperialism. That is what happened in Korea, Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo, and the Dominican Republic, and finally, as everyone knows, that is what is happening in Vietnam. The party Central Committee, the Soviet Government, and all Soviet people see their international duty in rendering aid and support to the Vietnamese people in their liberation struggle.

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CHINA

Andropov's comments on China over the years have followed the dominant leadership line. His most extensive statements came in the 1960's while he was serving as CPSU secretary with responsibility for party relations with other communist countries. Then, as during his more recent tenure as KGB chairman, he criticized Beijing's policies but expressed Moscow's interest in normalizing relations. He has not spoken on China since returning to the Secretariat--a period that has coincided with conciliatory Soviet, gestures toward Beijing.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

Speaking of factors deteriorating the international situation, it is impossible not to mention Beijing's foreign policy. Today there is no other large state in the world that has so demonstratively sabotaged all efforts on limiting the arms race, put forth such extensive territorial pretensions toward neighboring countries, and attempted to undermine relaxation of international tension. The manifestation of the great-power, hegemonic nature of the foreign policy course of Beijing's present leaders is betting on a "policy of force," on the threat of force in relations to its neighbors.

Recently, the world witnessed the treacherous armed attack on Vietnam, organized by the Beijing leaders. The invasion of Chinese troops is real evidence of Beijing's hegemonic aspirations, evidence of how false and hypocritical are the discussions of the Chinese leaders on the struggle against some kind of mythical "hegemonism" concerning which they have talked so much recently. The aggression against Vietnam is the logical extension of the entire foreign policy of Beijing's leaders, who against the interests of their people are most candidly placing reliance on war.

5 August 1978: Speech in Petrozavodsk (PRAVDA, 6 Aug)

Peking is now shouting for NATO to be strengthened, trying to push Japan into anti-Soviet positions, and encouraging the Washington "hawks." The treacherous stab in the back against socialist Vietnam is a shameful but completely logical manifestation of the utterly cynical hegemonist policy of the Chinese leaders, who are not averse to supporting the most reactionary forces, such as the Pinochet regime.

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5 June 1974: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 6 Jun)

With regard to our position on China, it is clear and consistent. While resolutely defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the interests of our socialist motherland and rebuffing the hostile intrigues of the Maoist leadership, the CPSU and the Soviet state at the same time are for a normalization of relations between the USSR and China and for a restoration of friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. Here we invariably follow the line of the 24th congress.

4 March 1967: Election speech in Novomoskovsk (Moscow domestic radio, 4 Mar)

Rebuffing the anti-Soviet policy of the present Chinese leadership, our party has fully taken into consideration that it is not struggling against the communists of China. It is struggling for the Chinese communists, for the CPC, for the return of the CPC to correct Marxist-Leninist positions. The Soviet people have always regarded the Chinese working people as their friends and allies in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of society.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOVIET DISSIDENTS

As KGB chairman, Andropov spoke at greater length than most leaders about external and internal threats to the Soviet system. He maintained that human rights pledges signed by Moscow in the 1975 Helsinki CSCE accords did not restrict Soviet actions against dissidents. He has stressed the need for constant vigilance against the threat of Western-inspired subversion.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

The agents of Western intelligence services and the emissaries of foreign anti-Soviet organizations try to penetrate our secrets, take part in organizing acts of ideological subversion, and condition and corrupt certain unstable, weak-willed people. Therefore, as the party Central Committee points out, constant vigilance on the part of all Soviet people remains an important and topical requirement of the day. Within the country we have no social basis for anti-Soviet activity. At the same time, it would be wrong to close our eyes to the fact that cases do occur of antistate crimes, anti-Soviet actions and deeds committed under hostile influence from abroad. There are still various renegades who embark on the path of malicious slander of Soviet reality and sometimes in direct complicity with imperialist special services. Some people in the West call this "activity" the "defense of human rights."

But Soviet people have never given and never will give anyone the "right" to harm socialism, for the triumph of which they have given so many lives and contributed so much labor. To protect society against such criminal actions is just and democratic. This fully accords with Soviet citizens' rights and freedoms and with the interests of society and the state. Of course, this does not accord with the interests of socialism's enemies. In the West we sometimes hear hypocritical lamentations about alleged infringements of democracy in our country, and allegations are heard that the KGB makes life impossible for certain "champions of rights." In fact, they are worried not only and not so much by the fact that the Soviet state security organs, acting in strict accordance with our laws, intercept the criminal activity of renegades. They are worried by the fact that these renegades met with resolute condemnation from the entire Soviet people.

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